PREFACE
1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1968), p.274.
CHAPTER 1: SNOW
1. Snow’s physical characteristics are known from KV 2/444.
2. As we will see, there is often something apposite in the codenames assigned to individuals by the security services. Owens was codenamed Snow because it was a part anagram of his name.
3. Ladislas Farago, The Game of the Foxes (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1971), p. 153.
4. Ibid, p.40.
5. Charles Wighton and Gunter Peis, They Spied on England: Based on the German Secret Service War Diary of General Lahousen (London: Odhams, 1958), p.104.
6. J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p.37.
7. Wighton and Peis, They Spied on England, p. 105.
8. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1979–90),vol.4, p.41.
9. Nikolaus Ritter, Deckname Dr. Rantzau: Die Aufzeichnungen des Nikolaus Ritter, Offizier im Geheimen Nachrichtendienst (Hamburg: Hoffmann and Campe, 1972), p.150.
10. Nigel West., MI5: British Security Service Operations 1909–1945 (London: Bodley Head, 1981), pp.137–4–0.
11. For a full study of 18(b) see A. W. B. Simpson’s In the Highest Degree Odious (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
12. Ben Macintyre, Agent Zigzag (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), p.68.
13. Tom Bower, The Perfect English Spy (London: Heinemann, 1995), p.33. Bower reports the pub as being in Jermyn St, but Robertson’s brother-in-law through his second marriage gives the location as the Brompton Road. There are in fact a number of pubs by that name in London.
14. The triple agent theme is put forward in Ladislas Farago’s The Game of the Foxes. He asserts that by giving himself up to the British authorities, Owens in effect gambled possession of his transmitter in order to win his freedom and allow him to carry on working for the Germans. Although his subsequent actions do lend themselves to the hypothesis that Owens was a loyal German spy, there is still a lingering possibility that Owens worked only for himself in order to realize financial rewards – which were considerable. J. C. Masterman described Owens as having ‘an enormous salary – a salary that would make a cabinet minister’s salary look stupid’ (N/A file: KV 2/450).
15. In his book The Double-Cross System, Masterman describes the first message sent by Snow as the true beginning of the double cross system. He calls the Welshman the fons et origo (source and origin) of all MI5’s double agent activities for the war (p.36).
16. Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol.1, p.311. Both Farago and Masterman describe this man as a Voluntary Interceptor (VI) – a radio ham monitoring the airwaves for enemy transmissions.
17. Farago, The Game of the Foxes, p. 180.
18. Nigel West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.1 (London: Routledge, 2005), p.39. In terms of purchasing power, £470 in 1939 would be worth slightly under £20,000 today.
19. West, MI5, p. 142; Lily’s detention order is found in KV 2/446.
20. West, The Liddell Diaries, vol. 1, p.39.
21. Ibid, p.58.
22. See KV 2/706.
23. See KV 2/454.
24. West, The Liddell Diaries, vol. 1, p.40.
25. Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol.4, p.44 and pp.311–12; Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret U (London: P. Davies, 1977), p.34.
26. KV 4/444–53.
27. Masterman, The Double-Cross System, pp.46–47. The name Bernie Kiener is given by Guy Liddell (West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.1, p.75). Previously Rainbow was identified by Nigel West as a Portuguese named Pierce.
28. West, The Liddell Diaries, vol. 1, p.80.
29. Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol.4, p.88.
30. West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.1, pp.80–81.
31. Joan Miller, One Girl’s War (Brandon: Dingle, 1986), p.82.
32. West, MI5, pp.224–25, and West, The Liddell Diaries, vol. 1, p.77.
33. The NewYorker Book of War Pieces – London 1939 to Hiroshima 1945 (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1947), p.36.
34. Kim Philby, My Silent War (London: Macgibbon and Kee Ltd, 1968), p.51; Joan Miller, One Girl’s War, p. 107.
CHAPTER 2: THE INVASION SPIES
1. William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (London: Secker and Warburg, 1960), p.755.
2. Denis Sefton Delmer, Black Boomerang (London: Secker and Warburg, 1962), pp.10–11.
3. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol.2 (London: Cassell and Co Ltd, 1949), p.230.
4. For the rest of this and other of Churchill’s speeches visit www.churchill-society-london.org.uk.
5. Ladislas Farago, The Game of the Foxes (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1971), p.235.
6. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1979–90),vol.4, p. 321.
7. Farago, The Game of the Foxes, p.240.
8. Robin Stephens (edited by Oliver Hoare), Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies: the Official History of MI5’s Wartime Interrogation Centre (Richmond: Public Record Office, 2000), p.134. Stephens’ case history says the man was an air raid warden; Nigel West’s MI5 British Security Service Operations 1909–1945 (London: Bodley Head, 1981) says the man was an RAF officer living nearby.
9. Coded messages from Winston G. Ramsey (ed.), German Spies in Britain (After the Battle, number 11, 1976), p.15.
10. Stephens, Camp 020, p. 15.
11. ‘Alarming’ description by Joan Miller, One Girl’s War (Brandon: Dingle, 1986), p.82. Second quote from Kim Philby, My Silent War (London: Macgibbon and Kee Ltd, 1968), p.35.
12. Stephens, Camp 020, p. 109.
13. Ibid, p. 118.
14. In David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1978), and other accounts of the Abwehr, Schmidt was known to the Abwehr as Hans Hansen. To avoid confusion we have used the name familiar to the British security services. Equally, Caroli is sometimes given to be a Finn – he was known to be a Swede by MI5. Caroli is also sometimes known as Jorgen Bjoernson or Axel Hilberg in other works.
15. J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p.49.
16. Nigel West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.1 (London: Routledge, 2005), pp.92–93.
17. Ibid, p. 98.
18. See entry of 13 September, KV 4/186 Liddell Diary March–October 1940.
19. Stephens, Camp 020, p. 140 and West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.1, p.122. It is often believed that Schmidt took a long time to break down and only agreed to work as a double cross agent after almost two weeks’ interrogation. However, the Liddell diaries and Stephen’s 020 report clearly indicate the chronology suggested here.
20. Stephens, Camp 020, p. 140 and West, The Liddell Diaries, vol. 1, p. 98.
21. Ian Cobain, ‘The Secrets of the London Cage’, (The Guardian, 12 November 2005). Scotland had served in the German Army in Africa before World War I, and had then been an interrogator during that conflict. He caused mayhem when he submitted his memoirs to be censored by the War Office in June 1950. Officials told Scotland to lock the manuscript away and threatened him with prosecution under the Official Secrets Act if he did not. A censored version of the book was released in 1957.
22. 24 September KV 4/186 Liddell Diary March–October 1940.
23. Stephens, Camp 020, pp.149–50.
CHAPTER 3: BURNING LIES
1. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1979–90), vol.4, p. 67.
2. 23 September, KV 4/186 Liddell Diary March–October 1940.
3. Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret U (London: P. Davies, 1977), p.40.
4. Dennis Wheatley, The Deception Planners (London: Hutchinson, 1980), p. 18.
5. 1 October 1940, KV 4/186 Liddell Diary March–October 1940.
6. The speed of eight knots was suggested by an SIS report. 23 September 1940, KV 4/186 Liddell Diary March–October 1940. In fact it was probably half that at best.
7. Charles G. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p.15.
8. David Garnett, The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive 1939-1945 (London: St Ermin’s, 2002), pp.214–15.
9. John Baker White, The Big Lie (London: Evans, 1955), p.15.
10. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol.2 (London: Cassell and Co Ltd, 1949), p.275.
11. Ibid, p.275.
12. Denis Sefton Delmer, Black Boomerang (London: Secker and Warburg, 1962), pp.15–16.
13. Unless marked otherwise, for this section see Colin Dobinson, Fields of Deception (London: Methuen, 2000).
14. Seymour Reit, Masquerade: The Amazing Camouflage Deceptions of World War II (London: Hale, 1979), p.56.
15. Ibid, p.54.
CHAPTER 4: THE SYSTEM
1. Joan Miller, One Girl’s War (Brandon: Dingle, 1986), pp.86–88.
2. Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.5, Strategic Deception (London: HMSO, 1990), p. 17.
3. KV/4/187 Liddell Diary.
4. J.C. Masterman, On the Chariot Wheel (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.209 and the Liddell Diary (2 December 1940) KV/4/187.
5. Tom Bower, The Perfect English Spy (London: Heinemann, 1995), p.20.
6. Ibid, p.27.
7. Masterman, On the Chariot Wheel, p.221.
8. Kim Philby was less kind, describing White as ‘a nice and modest man’ but who had ‘a tendency to agree with the last person he spoke to’. To MI5’s Joan Miller, Dick White came across as a weak individual, although she wondered if that was not a deliberate ruse to look ineffectual on his part. (Philby, My Silent War (London: MacGibbon and Kee Ltd, 1968), p.51; Joan Miller, One Girl’s War, p. 107).
9. Bower, The Perfect English Spy, p.37.
10. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p.36.
11. Mure had a problem with what he called ‘private armies’ and with Masterman in particular for publishing his book The Double-Cross System although it was against the government’s wishes. David Mure, Master of Deception (London: Kimber, 1980), pp.181–82.
12. Bower, The Perfect English Spy, p.44.
13. Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret U (London: P. Davies, 1977), p.48.
14. Masterman, On the Chariot Wheel, p.223.
15. Montagu, Beyond Top Secret U, pp.48–49.
16. The filmmaker Ivor Montagu had set up the International Table Tennis Federation in 1926 and served as its first president until 1967. He also became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1938 and maintained a close link with the Soviet embassy. During the war he was a journalist on the Daily Worker newspaper.
17. See Howard, Strategic Deception, p.9.
18. KV/47/187. Liddell was sorry to see Beaumont-Nesbitt go as he had always been very helpful to MI5.
19. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1979–90), vol.4, p. 100.
20. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.4, p. 100.
21. Ibid, pp.96–97.
22. Stephens, Camp 020, p.46.
23. Howard, Strategic Deception, p.16; Liddell Diary 3 February 1941 (KV/4/187); also see Philby, My Silent War, for a good account of the inter-departmental wrangling over decrypts.
CHAPTER 5: SNOW FALLS
1. J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p.3.
2. Ladislas Farago, The Game of the Foxes (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1971), p.266. His identity was not recorded.
3. Meems’ file at the National Archives is KV 2/2428.
4. Liddell quotes Paulton’s report in his diary entry for 13 January 1941 (KV/4/187).
5. Masterman, The Double-Cross System, p.52 and Joan Miller, One Girl’s War (Brandon: Dingle, 1986), p.91.
6. Celery KV 2/674.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Sir Ronald Wingate, Not in the Limelight (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1959).
10. Remarkably this photo and note survived and are still in Celery’s case file at the National Archives, KV 2/674.
11. Liddell Diary, April 10 (KV/4/187).
12. KV 2/451.
13. Charles Wighton and Gunter Peis, They Spied on England: Based on the German Secret Service War Diary of General Lahousen (London: Odhams, 1958), pp.101–02.
14. Ibid, pp.108–09.
15. Nikolaus Ritter, Deckname Dr. Rantzau: Die Aufzeichnungen des Nikolaus Ritter, Offizier im Geheimen Nachrichtendienst (Hamburg: Hoffmann and Campe, 1972), p.254.
16. Ibid, p.212.
17. Ibid, p.259.
18. Ibid, p.290.
19. Ibid, p.320.
CHAPTER 6: THE ‘DICKY’ PERIOD
1. 1 Jan Moen, John Moe: Double Agent (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1986), p. 163–66.
2. Ibid, p. 186.
3. Ibid, p. 188.
4. Robin Stephens (edited by Oliver Hoare), Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies: the Official History of MI5’s Wartime Interrogation Centre (Richmond: Public Record Office, 2000), p. 162.
5. Liddell Diary, 10 April (KV/4/187).
6. Ladislas Farago, The Game of the Foxes (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1971), p.260.
7. Ibid, p.265.
8. KV 4/64.
9. Farago, The Game of the Foxes, p.265.
10. Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret U (London: P. Davies, 1977), pp.58–59.
11. Russell Miller, Codename Tricycle: The True Story of the Second World War’s Most Extraordinary Double Agent (London: Secker and Warburg, 2004), p.75.
12. Joan Miller, One Girl’sWar (Brandon: Dingle, 1986), p.89.
13. Miller, Codename Tricycle, p.88.
14. If the Twenty Committee was privy to the information that Japan was planning to attack Pearl Harbor one might expect to find mention of this in the committee’s minutes after the attack. The minutes for that period make no mention of this; however, some of the original pages had been substituted for re-typed ones prior to their public release.
15. See KV 4/190.
16. Miller, Codename Tricycle, p. 138.
CHAPTER 7: SPANISH INTRIGUES
1. Robin Stephens (edited by Oliver Hoare), Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies: the Official History of MI5’s Wartime Interrogation Centre (Richmond: Public Record Office, 2000), pp.178–79; Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.5, Strategic Deception (London: HMSO, 1990), p. 104.
2. Nigel West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.1 (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 189.
3. Kim Philby, My Silent War (London: Macgibbon and Kee Ltd, 1968), pp.37–38.
4. Ibid, p.35.
5. West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.1, p.223.
6. Stephens, Camp 020, pp.179–80.
7. J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 113.
8. KV 4/64.
9. Juan Pujol (with Nigel West), Garbo (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), p.39.
10. In Pujol’s account he says he went to the embassy himself. This account opts for the version written at the end of the war by Tomás Harris, Pujol’s case officer.
11. Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret U (London: P. Davies, 1977), p.114.
12. Tomás Harris (intro. by Mark Seaman), Garbo – the Spy Who Saved D-Day (Richmond: Public Record Office, 2000), pp.58–59.
13. West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.1, p.228.
14. Ibid, p.229.
15. KV 4/64.
16. Cyril Mills was the son of Bertram Mills, the premier circus owner in Britain.
17. Harris had a Spanish mother and a British father. He was a gifted artist and art dealer and was introduced into secret service by his friendship with the notorious ‘Cambridge spies’ Kim Philby, Guy Burgess and Anthony Blunt.
CHAPTER 8: ‘A’ FORCE
1. John Roy Carlson (pen name of the Armenian-American Arthur A. Derounian), Cairo to Damascus (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 114.
2. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1979–90), vol.1, pp.191–95.
3. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.4, p. 150.
4. Ibid, p. 162.
5. Ronald Lewin, The Chief: Field Marshal Lord Wavell: Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy 1939–1947 (London: Hutchinson, 1980), p.53.
6. Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.5, Strategic Deception (London: HMSO, 1990), p.33.
7. Dudley Clarke, Seven Assignments (London: Jonathan Cape, 1948), p.7.
8. Ibid, p.219.
9. David Mure, Practise to Deceive (London: Kimber, 1977), pp.21–22.
10. Howard, Strategic Deception, p.35.
11. David Mure says one of A Force’s first operations was to support an attack by the Long Range Desert Group on elite Italian Blackshirts at the Siwa Oasis. He says that dummy parachutists were dropped by aircraft with fire crackers round their waists to simulate Tommy-gun fire. Mure says this operation took place before the Sidi Barrani operation, which makes it before A Force’s formation. However, it is possible this operation was undertaken by individuals that went on to serve A Force (Mure, Practise to Deceive, pp.21–22).
12. Howard, Strategic Deception, p.35.
13. Mure gives Cheese the Abwehr codename Orlando in Practise to Deceive and then refers to him as Moses in Master of Deception.
14. CAB 154/100 Wingate report, vol.1, p.30.
15. Mure initially stated that Levi used a secret Jewish network to facilitate his passage to Egypt. In Master of Deception he corrected himself, and attributed that link to another agent.
16. Howard, Strategic Deception, p.36.
17. Mure, Master of Deception (London: Kimber, 1980), p.67.
18. Ibid, p.70.
19. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.4, p. 166.
20. CAB 154/100 Wingate report, vol.1, p.45.
21. Nigel West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.1 (London: Routledge, 2005), pp.180–81.
22. Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret U (London: P. Davies, 1977), pp.110–11.
23. West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.1, p. 181.
24. Liddell Diary, 11 November 1941 (KV 4/88).
25. CHAR 20/25 CIGS to Prime Minister 31.10.41 (Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge).
26. See the Churchill Papers: CHAR 20/25 (Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge).
27. West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.1, p. 185.
28. Nigel West, The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives (London: HarperCollins, 1998), p.307–09.
CHAPTER 9: THE CONTROLLING OFFICER
1. These papers were published after the war in Dennis Wheatley’s book Stranger than Fiction (London: Hutchinson, 1959).
2. Dennis Wheatley, The Deception Planners (London: Hutchinson, 1980), p.12.
3. Duff Hart-Davis, Peter Fleming (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1974), pp.241–42.
4. Ronald Lewin, The Chief: Field Marshall Lord Wavell: Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy 1939–1947 (London: Hutchinson, 1980), pp.196–97.
5. J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939-1945 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 107.
6. Quoted by Wheatley, The Deception Planners, p. 80.
7. Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.5, Strategic Deception (London: HMSO, 1990), p.243.
8. ‘Unreal’ was the description used by Masterman, The Double-Cross System, p. 106.
9. Howard, Strategic Deception, pp.28–29.
10. Nigel West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.1 (London: Routledge, 2005), pp.307–08.
11. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1979–90), vol.4, p. 129.
12. Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret U (London: P. Davies, 1977), p.138.
13. Martin Young and Robbie Stamp, Trojan Horses: Deception Operations in the Second World War (London: Bodley Head, 1989), p. 177.
14. Tomás Harris (intro. by Mark Seaman), Garbo – The Spy Who Saved D-Day (Richmond: Public Record Office, 2000), p.90.
15. Howard, Strategic Deception, p.54–58.
16. Harris, Garbo, p. 103.
17. Ibid, p. 102.
18. Ronald Wingate, Not in the Limelight (London: Hutchinson, 1959), pp.198–99.
CHAPTER 10: EL ALAMEIN
1. Roy R. Behrens, ‘Art, culture and camouflage’, from Tate etc: Visiting and Revisiting Art, etcetera (Issue 4, Summer 2005).
2. See www.maskelynemagic.com for a fuller examination of the magician’s role.
3. Julian Trevelyan, Indigo Days (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1957), p. 152.
4. Geoffrey Barkas, The Camouflage Story (London: Cassell, 1952) pp.181–82.
5. CAB 154/100, Wingate narrative, vol.1, p.63.
6. Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (London: W. H. Allen, 1975), p.101.
7. See Hans-Otto Behrendt, Rommel’s Intelligence in the Desert Campaign: 1941–1943 (London: Kimber, 1985).
8. John Roy Carlson, Cairo to Damascus (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 113.
9. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1979–90), vol.4, p.166.
10. David Mure, Master of Deception (London: Kimber, 1980), p. 107.
11. Earl Alexander of Tunis, The Alexander Memoirs 1940–1945 (London: Cassell, 1962), p.10.
12. Martin Young and Robbie Stamp, Trojan Horses: Deception Operations in the Second World War (London: Bodley Head, 1989), p.61.
13. Alexander’s despatch ‘The African Campaign from El Alamein To Tunis’ was printed as a supplement to The London Gazette on 5 February 1948 (London: Stationery Office, 1948).
14. For doubts see also Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.2, p.4-16.
15. Mure, Master of Deception, p.91.
16. Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.5, Strategic Deception (London: HMSO, 1990), pp.65–66.
17. Montgomery of Alamein, Memoirs (London: Collins, 1958), p. 121.
18. Young and Stamp, Trojan Horses, p. 71.
19. Barkas, The Camouflage Story, p. 191.
20. Letter to Sykes of 7 November 1942, in Steven Sykes, Deceivers Ever (Speldhurst: Spellmount, 1990), p.95.
21. Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 122.
CHAPTER 11: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGENT CASES
1. David Mure, Practise to Deceive (London: Kimber, 1977), p.31 and Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.5, Strategic Deception (London: HMSO, 1990), p.68.
2. Mure, Practise to Deceive, p.70. Mure’s version of this phrase was coarser.
3. Ibid, p. 101.
4. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1979–90), vol. 4, pp.229–30.
5. Nigel West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.2 (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 103 (19 August 1943).
6. Duff Hart-Davis, Peter Fleming (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1974), p.280.
7. Paul Paillole, Fighting the Nazis (New York: Enigma Books, 2003), p.113.
8. Ibid, p.391.
9. Anon, ‘Les Services Spéciaux de la Défense Nationale pendant la guerre 1939– 1945: Le T.R. africain participe à la victoire de Tunisie’ (see the Amicale des Anciens des Services Spéciaux de la Défense Nationale (France), www.aassdn.org).
10. KV 2/458.
11. KV 2/458.
12. See Ben Macintyre, Agent Zigzag (London: Bloomsbury, 2007).
13. KV 4/191.
CHAPTER 12: MINCEMEAT
1. Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret U (London: P. Davies, 1977), p.143.
2. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1979–90), vol.3, p.77.
3. Paul Paillole, Fighting the Nazis (New York: Enigma Books, 2003), p.393.
4. CAB 154/100, Wingate report, vol.1, p.32, and Gilbert dossier WO 169/24898.
5. Ewen Montagu, The Man Who Never Was (London, Evans Bros., 1953), p.22.
6. Montagu, Beyond Top Secret U, p. 146.
7. J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 137.
8. Some believe the corpse was exchanged with a ‘fresher’ one at the last minute. John Melville, aged 37, had been a coder on the aircraft carrier HMS Dasher and had been killed when it blew up in the Clyde Estuary on 27 March 1943. See Ben Fenton, ‘Tracking down a most unlikely hero’ (Daily Telegraph, 28 October 1996).
9. Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.5, Strategic Deception (London: HMSO, 1990), p.91.
10. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.3, p.78.
11. Louis Lochner (ed. & trans.), The Goebbels Diaries (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948), p.312.
CHAPTER 13: LONDON CALLING
1. See Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.5, Strategic Deception (London: HMSO, 1990) and CAB 154/100, Wingate report, pp.37–38.
2. Nigel West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.2 (London: Routledge, 2005), p.269.
3. Paul Paillole, Fighting the Nazis (New York: Enigma Books, 2003), pp.396–97.
4. David Garnett, The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive 1939–1945 (London: St Ermin’s, 2002), pp.196–97.
5. Unless specified otherwise, this account relies on Denis Sefton Delmer’s excellent autobiography Black Boomerang (London: Secker and Warburg, 1962).
6. Garnett, The Secret History of PWE, p.41.
7. Report quoted by Garnett, The Secret History of PWE, p.45.
8. Ibid, pp.44–45.
9. Lee Richards, ‘Sir Stafford Cripps and the German Admiral’s Orgy – The Gustav Siegfried Eins Controversy’ (article for Psywar.org). Much more information on PWE propaganda and subversion campaigns can be found on this excellent website.
10. R.V. Jones, Most Secret War (London: Hamilton, 1978), p.387.
11. Jones knew ‘George’ was heavily involved with Mincemeat and rules out Ewen Montagu by naming the latter in the same piece. Also, coincidentally or not, in Montagu’s The Man Who Never Was (London: Evan Bros, 1953), Cholmondeley’s character was named ‘George’.
12. Jones, Most Secret War, pp.215–22.
CHAPTER 14: THE FORTITUDE PLAN
1. Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (London: St Ermin’s, 1999), p.24.
2. Sir Frederick Morgan, Overture to Overlord (Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1950), p.91.
3. Ibid, p. 104.
4. Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.5, Strategic Deception (London: HMSO, 1990), p.80.
5. For these factors see Morgan, Overture to Overlord, pp.139–40.
6. Ronald Wingate, Not in the Limelight (London: Hutchinson, 1959), p.209.
7. Hesketh, Fortitude, p. 11n.
8. David Mure, Master of Deception (London: Kimber, 1980), pp.9–10 and p.242.
9. Dennis Wheatley, The Deception Planners (London: Hutchinson, 1980), p.220.
10. Ibid, p. 177.
11. Charles G. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 112.
12. When Montgomery came back from Italy the deception planners advised him to keep a low profile, not to be seen in uniform and to take a house at the edge of town. Instead he booked a suite at Claridges and on his first night back turned up at the Palladium theatre in full uniform, whereupon he received a five-minute ovation from his admiring public (Dennis Wheatley, Stranger than Fiction London: Hutchinson, 1959), p.174).
CHAPTER 15: BY SPECIAL MEANS
1. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1979–90), vol.4, p.237.
2. J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 128.
3. Nigel West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.2 (London: Routledge, 2005), p.206.
4. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.4, p.278; Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (London: St Ermin’s, 1999), p.206; Robin Stephens (edited by Oliver Hoare), Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies: the Official History of MI5’s Wartime Interrogation Centre (Richmond: Public Record Office, 2000), p.354.
5. West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.2, p. 161.
6. Lily Sergueiev, Secret Service Rendered (London: Kimber, 1968), p. 141. In the English translation of the book, Frisson is called ‘Babs’.
7. Masterman, The Double-Cross System, pp.159–60.
8. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.4, p.239.
9. Hesketh, Fortitude, pp.95–96.
10. Ibid, pp.126–30.
CHAPTER 16: VINDICATION
1. F. H. Hinsley et al, British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1979–90), vol.3, p.80.
2. Nigel West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.2 (London: Routledge, 2005), pp.204–05.
3. As Hesketh was in charge of the sub-section for Special Means in Ops.B that points to himself. However, he elsewhere writes that he only once met Garbo during the war and that was by accidentally bumping into him with Tommy Harris in Jermyn Street.
4. Martin Young and Robbie Stamp, Trojan Horses: Deception Operations in the Second World War (London: Bodley Head, 1989), pp.78–81.
5. David Garnett, The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive 1939–1945 (London: St Ermin’s, 2002), p.410.
6. Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (London: St Ermin’s, 1999), p.102.
7. Tomás Harris (intro. by Mark Seaman), Garbo – The Spy Who Saved D-Day (Richmond: Public Record Office, 2000), p. 183.
8. Denis Sefton Delmer, The Counterfeit Spy (London: Hutchinson, 1971), p. 164.
9. Harris, Garbo, p.204.
10. Delmer, The Counterfeit Spy, p. 182.
11. Hesketh, Fortitude, p.207.
12. Ibid, p.210.
13. Sir Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top (London: Cassell, 1968), pp.141–42.
14. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1948), p.316.
15. Dennis Wheatley, The Deception Planners (London: Hutchinson, 1980), p.212.
16. J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p.179.
17. Harris, Garbo, pp.250–51.
18. Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.5, Strategic Deception (London: HMSO, 1990), pp.169–72.
19. Howard, Strategic Deception, p. 178.
20. R.V. Jones, Most Secret War (London: Hamilton, 1978), p.422.
21. Ibid, p.423.
CHAPTER 17: MEDITERRANEAN SWANSONG
1. Charles G. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 147.
2. David Mure, Practise to Deceive (London: Kimber, 1977), p.236.
3. Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.5, Strategic Deception (London: HMSO, 1990), pp.137–38.
4. J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p.161.
5. Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (London: St Ermin’s, 1999), p. 105.
6. Masterman, The Double-Cross System, p. 162.
7. Nigel West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.2 (London: Routledge, 2005), p.208.
8. Dennis Wheatley, The Deception Planners (London: Hutchinson, 1980), p. 190.
9. West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.2, p.202.
10. David Mure, Master of Deception (London: Kimber, 1980), p.252.
11. West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.2, p.202.
12. Hesketh, Fortitude, p. 189.
13. Wheatley, The Deception Planners, p. 168.
14. Denis Sefton Delmer, The Counterfeit Spy (London: Hutchinson, 1971), p. 126.
15. Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, p. 112.
16. Paul Paillole, Fighting the Nazis (New York: Enigma Books, 2003), p.396.
17. West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.2, p.225.
18. It has long been believed that Churchill was behind this change of name. His opposition to the landing in the south of France is well documented, as was Eisenhower’s insistence that it went ahead. When Churchill backed down, it is said he changed the name of the operation to Dragoon, implying he had been ‘dragooned’ into agreeing to it.
CHAPTER 18: THE FINAL DECEITS
1. Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.5, Strategic Deception (London: HMSO, 1990), p. 192.
2. Howard, Strategic Deception, p. 192.
3. Nigel West, The Liddell Diaries, vol.2 (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 166.
4. Ibid, p.222.
5. Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret U (London: P. Davies, 1977), p.160.
6. J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p.161.
7. Ibid, p. 181.
8. Howard, Strategic Deception, p. 183.
9. Montagu, Beyond Top Secret U, p. 176.
EPILOGUE
1. J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), pp.162–63.
2. Tomás Harris (intro. by Mark Seaman), Garbo –The Spy Who Saved D-Day (Richmond: Public Record Office, 2000), p.288.