Notes and Sources

Introduction

1. Confirmed in a personal communication of 31 August 2007 by Professor Viktor Kuvaldin, who in March 1989 entered the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a member of a group of consultants on foreign policy.

1 The Idea of Communism

1. Andrzej Walicki, Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom: The Rise and Fall of the Communist Utopia (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 71). See also Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. II, The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel and Marx (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 3rd ed., 1957); and Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 2nd ed., 1960). • 2. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. II, p. 122. • 3. Max Beer, A History of British Socialism (Allen & Unwin, London, 1953), Vol. 1, p. 6. See also Alexander Gray, The Socialist Tradition: Moses to Lenin (Longmans, London, 1947), p. 38. • 4. Acts, Chapter 4, Verse 32, The Bible (King James Authorised Version). • 5. Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages (Pimlico, London, 2004), p. 193. (Cohn’s pioneering study was first published in 1957.) • 6. Beer, A History of British Socialism, p. 23. • 7. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, p. 200. • 8. Ibid. • 9 Ibid., p. 198. • 10. Beer, A History of British Socialism, p. 27. • 11. Ibid., p. 28. • 12. This is the usual rendering of the verse, although there are a number of variants. The version I have quoted is that used by the nineteenth-century socialist William Morris, in his account of an imaginary conversation with the fourteenth-century priest. See Morris, A Dream of John Ball (Seven Seas Publishers, Berlin, 1958), p. 24. It involves already a modernization of Ball’s language. In an earlier rendering it is: ‘When Adam dalf and Eve span, Who was then a gentilman?’ (Beer, A History of British Socialism, Vol. 1, p. 27). At one time the earliest use of it was attributed (wrongly, it now appears) to Richard Rolle of Hampole, who was born in the late thirteenth century and died in 1349. The origins of the verse remain unknown. According to Norman Cohn, at the time John Ball preached a sermon, taking that verse as his text, it was already ‘a traditional proverb’ (The Pursuit of the Millennium, p. 199). • 13. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, p. 207. • 14. Ibid., p. 216. • 15. Ibid., p. 217. • 16. Ibid., pp. 119–226. • 17. Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 2nd ed., 1959), p. 217. This is a translation of the 3rd German edition of that work by Engels, published in 1894. • 18. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, pp. 247–8. • 19. It was written in Latin. For an excellent edition, with a modern translation by Paul Turner, see Thomas More, Utopia (Penguin, London, revised edition, 2003). • 20. Ibid., Introduction by Turner, p. xx. • 21. Ibid. • 22. More, Utopia, p. 45. • 23. Ibid., p. 111. • 24. Ibid., p. 113. • 25. Gray, The Socialist Tradition, pp. 70–2. • 26. See, for example, Norman Hampson, The Enlightenment (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968); and Roy Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World (Penguin, London, 2000). • 27. See, in particular, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, translated by Thomas Nugent with an Introduction by Franz Neumann (Hafner, New York, 1949; first published in Paris in 1748 as Des l’esprit des loix); Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, edited by R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael and P.G. Stein (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978) (Smith’s lectures were delivered at Glasgow University in the 1750s and early 1760s; this edition is mainly of student notes of his lectures in the 1762–63 academic year); and John Millar, Observations Concerning the Distinction of Ranks in Society (John Murray, London, 1771). See also Anand Chitnis, The Scottish Enlightenment: A Social History (Croom Helm, London, 1976); Ronald L. Meek, ‘Smith, Turgot, and the “Four Stages” Theory’, in Meek, Smith, Marx, and After: Ten Essays in the Development of Economic Thought (Chapman and Hall, London, 1979), pp. 18–32; and A.H. (Archie) Brown, ‘Adam Smith’s First Russian Followers’, in Andrew S. Skinner and Thomas Wilson (eds.), Essays on Adam Smith (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975), pp. 247–73, esp. pp. 270–2. • 28. Biancamaria Fontana, ‘Democracy and the French Revolution’, in John Dunn (ed.), Democracy: The Unfinished Journey 508 BC to AD 1993 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992), p. 107. • 29. Leszek Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism. Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution, translated from the Polish by P.S. Falla (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978), Vol. 1, The Founders, p. 186. For a much fuller discussion of Babouvism, see J.L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (Secker and Warburg, London, 1952), Part III, ‘The Babouvist Crystallization’. • 30. Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Vol. 1, p. 187. • 31. Ibid., pp. 187–92; and Robert Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress (Heinemann, London, 1980), pp. 246–51. • 32. See Gareth Stedman Jones, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Penguin, London, 2002), p. 173; and David McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought (Macmillan, London, 1973; Paladin paperback ed., 1976), pp. 186–7. • 33. Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Vol. 1, pp. 198–203. • 34. Ibid., pp. 203–11, esp. p. 209. • 35. Ibid., pp. 213–14. • 36. G.D.H. Cole, Introduction to Robert Owen, A New View of Society and other Writings (Dent, London, 1927), pp. x – xi. See also Margaret Cole, Robert Owen of New Lanark (Batchworth Press, London, 1953); and Beer, A History of British Socialism, Vol. 1, pp. 160–81. • 37. Margaret Cole, Robert Owen of New Lanark, p. 151. • 38. Ibid., p. 152. • 39. Ibid., p. 156. • 40. Ibid., p. 159. Although New Harmony did not live up to Owen’s expectations as a shining example of a new form of community, it left some useful legacies. Owen’s son, David Dale Owen, remained in New Harmony, and the

laboratory he established there was the headquarters of what became the United States Geological Survey. William Maclure – a Scots immigrant to the United States who became a successful businessman and philanthropist and had helped Owen finance New Harmony – also stayed on to preserve the enlightened Education Society and School of Industry he had set up. (All four of Robert Owen’s sons and one of his daughters eventually settled in the United States. Apart from the successful David Dale Owen, another son, Robert Dale Owen, became a US Congressman.) • 41. The literature on Marx and Marxism is voluminous. For particularly good biographical studies of Marx, which naturally discuss also his ideas, see Isaiah Berlin, Karl Marx (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1948); McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought; and Francis Wheen, Karl Marx (Fourth Estate, London, 1999). On Engels, see David McLellan, Engels (Fontana, Glasgow, 1977); and Terrell Carver, Friedrich Engels: His Life and Thought (Macmillan, London, 1989). On Marxism as a doctrine, apart from the books by Popper, Walicki and Kołakowski already cited, important studies include John Plamenatz, German Marxism and Russian Communism (Longman, London, 1954); George Lichtheim, Marxism (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961); Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968); David McLellan, Marx before Marxism (Macmillan, London, 1970; rev. ed., Pelican, London, 1972); Angus Walker, Marx: His Theory and its Context. Politics as Economics (Longman, London, 1978); and David McLellan, Marxism after Marx (Macmillan, London, 1979). • 42. Wheen, Karl Marx, p. 18. • 43. Berlin, Karl Marx, p. 215. • 44. Wheen notes that Jenny’s mother’s wedding present ‘was a collection of jewellery and silver plate embellished with the Argyll family crest, a legacy from the von Westphalens’ Scottish ancestors’ and that during the next few years ‘the Argyll family silver spent more time in the hands of pawnbrokers than in the kitchen cupboard’ (Wheen, Karl Marx, p. 52). The help provided by Engels was much more substantial. Although Marx was close to destitution during his first fifteen years in London, from the late 1860s ‘Engels was able to settle a generous annual income on him’ which in the monetary values of a century later meant that ‘Engels subsidized Marx and his family to the extent of over £100,000’ (McLellan, Engels, p. 67). • 45. McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought, p. 46. • 46. McLellan, Engels, p. 15. • 47. Ibid., pp. 15–16. • 48. Wheen, Karl Marx, pp. 261–5; and McLellan, Engels, pp. 20–1. • 49. McLellan, Engels, pp. 21–2. • 50. Volume 1 of Capital was published first in German (Das Kapital) in 1867. The first English edition was published only twenty years later – after Marx’s death, edited by Engels. • 51. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, first published 1848, cited here in the scholarly edition of Gareth Stedman Jones (Penguin, London, 2002), p. 219. • 52. Cited in Berlin, Karl Marx, p. 193. • 53. For a discussion of the Gotha Programme and Marx’s criticism of it, see McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought, pp. 431–5. • 54. Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1959), p. 22. (Marx’s critique of the ‘Gotha Unity Congress’ programme of the German Social Democrats was written in London in 1875. It was first published by Engels in 1891.) • 55. Ibid. • 56. Robert C. Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (Allen & Unwin, London, 1970), p. 15. • 57. Marx, ‘Preface to A Critique of Political Economy’, in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2nd

ed., 2000), p. 426. • 58. Ibid., p. 202. • 59. Engels, ‘Preface to the English Edition of 1888’ of Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto (ed. Gareth Stedman Jones), op.cit., pp. 202–3. • 60. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965), pp. 794–6. • 61. Ibid., p. 9. • 62. See, for example, G.Kh. Shakhnazarov and F.M. Burlatsky, ‘O razvitii marksistsko-leninskoy politicheskoy nauki’, in Voprosy filosofii, Vol. 12, 1980, pp. 10–22, at p. 12. • 63. Plamenatz, German Marxism and Russian Communism, p. 9. • 64. Ibid. • 65. David McLellan, in McLellan, Karl Marx: Selected Writings, p. 377. • 66. Ibid. • 67. ‘Letter to Vera Sassoulitch’ in McLellan, Karl Marx: Selected Writings, pp. 623–7. • 68. Ibid., p. 623. • 69. Marx and Engels, ‘Preface to the Russian Edition of 1882’ of the Communist Manifesto (ed. Gareth Stedman Jones), p. 196. • 70. Stedman Jones points to evidence indicating that Marx was willing to go further than Engels and to allow that ‘a transition from village commune to advanced communism might be possible without a proletarian revolution in the West’ (Stedman Jones, in Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 261). Engels may have been a restraining and more cautious voice in the composition of the Preface of 1882. • 71. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Progress, Moscow, 1967), p. 10. This work of Marx was first published – in New York – in 1852.

2 Communism and Socialism – the Early Years

1. Edmund Wilson, To the Finland Station: A Study in the Writing and Acting of History (Fontana, London, 1960), pp. 271–3. • 2. Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers (Hogarth Press, London, 1978), pp. 110 and 192. • 3. Leszek Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Vol. 1, The Founders (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978), pp. 248–9. • 4. Ibid., pp. 250–1. • 5. Ibid., pp. 255–6. • 6. Mikhail Bakunin, Statehood and Anarchy, quoted by Kołakowski, ibid., p. 252. • 7. Kenneth O. Morgan, Keir Hardie: Radical and Socialist (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1975), p. 40. • 8. Ibid. • 9. Ibid., p. 289. • 10. Ibid., p. 216. • 11. James Farr, ‘Understanding conceptual change politically’, in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson, Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989), pp. 24–49, at p. 30. • 12. Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century (Fontana, London, 1997), p. 7. • 13. Dmitri Volkogonov, Lenin: A New Biography, translated by Harold Shukman (The Free Press, New York, 1994), p. 8. • 14. Ibid., pp. 8–9. • 15. Ibid., p. 8. • 16. Robert Service, Lenin: A Biography (Macmillan, London, 2000), p. 42. • 17. Cited by Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., enlarged ed., 1997), pp. 257–8. • 18. The prestige of the Lenin anniversary speech was such that, strangely enough, even as important a reformer in the last years of the Soviet Union as Alexander Yakovlev continued late in life to resent the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev had never invited him to be the Lenin orator. This was rather an odd grievance, for before the Soviet Union ceased to exist, Yakovlev had turned against Lenin, and in the post-Soviet years he came to the conclusion that Lenin was ‘the initiator and organizer of mass terror in Russia’ and ‘eternally indictable for crimes against humanity’. See Yakovlev, Sumerki (Materik, Moscow, 2003), pp. 26 and 495–6. • 19. Neil Harding, Leninism (Macmillan, London, 1996), p.

18. As Harding observes: ‘The trauma of Alexander’s execution may well have had a profound psychological effect on Lenin’s whole career but we shall never be able to assess it, not only because the impact of such personal tragedies is inherently difficult to gauge, but also because Lenin himself was extraordinarily reticent about the matter’ (ibid.). • 20. Ibid., pp. 20–1; and Nikolay Valentinov, Encounters with Lenin (Oxford University Press, London, 1968), p. 176. • 21. Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891–1924 (Jonathan Cape, London, 1996), pp. 146–7. • 22. Neil Harding (ed.), with translations by Richard Taylor, Marxism in Russia: Key Documents 1879–1906 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983), pp. 29–30. • 23. Andrzej Walicki, A History of Russian Thought From the Enlightenment to Marxism (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980), p. 251. • 24. Valentinov, Encounters with Lenin, p. 203. • 25. G.V. Plekhanov, ‘Propaganda Among the Workers’, in Harding (ed.), Marxism in Russia: Key Documents 1879–1906, pp. 59–67, at p. 65. • 26. Louis Fischer, The Life of Lenin (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1964), pp. 20–1. • 27. Ibid. • 28. Berlin, Russian Thinkers, p. 228. • 29. Ibid., pp. 229–30. • 30. Ibid., p. 230. • 31. Valentinov, Encounters with Lenin, p. 63. • 32. Ibid. • 33. Valentinov, Encounters with Lenin, p. 64. • 34. V.I. Lenin’s What is to be Done?, edited with an introduction by S.V. Utechin (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963), p. 117. • 35. Service, Lenin: A Biography, p. 152, • 36. Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Methuen, London, 2nd ed., 1970), pp. 49–50. • 37. Leon Trotsky, My Life: An Attempt at Autobiography (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975). Trotsky wrote this book in 1929. • 38. Ibid., pp. 50–1; and Figes, A People’s Tragedy, pp. 195–6 and 198. • 39. Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution: A Biographical History (Beacon Press, Boston, 1948), pp. 243–4. • 40. Ibid., p. 244. • 41. Marc D. Steinberg, ‘Russia’s fin de siècle, 1900–1914’, in Ronald G. Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia. Volume III: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), pp. 67–93, at p. 75. • 42. V.I. Lenin, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back (Progress, Moscow, 1969), p. 211. • 43. Ibid., p. 210. • 44. See the Preface to the English edition (first published in 1909) of Eduard Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation (Schocken Books, New York, 1961), p. xxii. • 45. David McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought (Macmillan, London, 1973; Paladin paperback ed., 1976), p. 424. • 46. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, p. 203. • 47. Ibid. • 48. Ibid., pp. 203–4. • 49. Ibid., p. 219. • 50. Ibid., pp. xxviii – xxix. • 51. Ibid., p. 146. • 52. Cited by Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 19.

3 The Russian Revolutions and Civil War

1. Baruch Knei-Paz, The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978), p. 15. • 2. Trotsky, Nashi politicheskie zadachi (1904), cited by Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed. Trotsky: 1879–1921 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1970), p. 90. • 3. Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982), p. 25. • 4. For an account of Russian history which takes such an interpretation to an extreme, see Tibor Szamuely, The Russian Tradition (Secker & Warburg, London, 1974). • 5. Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, p. 25. • 6. Volsky (Valentinov) contrasted the respectful and reasoned way in which the Menshevik leader, Martov, listened to those same views of his, with which Martov also disagreed, with Lenin’s stream of abuse. See Nikolay Valentinov, Encounters with Lenin (Oxford University Press, London, 1968), esp. pp. 205–43. • 7. Moshe Lewin, Lenin’s Last Struggle (Pluto Press, London, 1975). • 8. See Terence Emmons, The Russian Landed Gentry and the Peasant Emancipation of 1861 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968); and Daniel Field, The End of Serfdom: Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia, 1855–1861 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1976). • 9. Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801–1917 (Oxford University Press, London, 1967), pp. 563–4. • 10. Dominic Lieven, Nicholas II: Emperor of All the Russias (John Murray, London, 1993), pp. 144–5. • 11. Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891–1924 (Jonathan Cape, London, 1996), p. 175. • 12. Ibid., p. 178. • 13. Leon Trotsky, My Life: An Attempt at Autobiography (Penguin, Hardmondsworth, 1975), p. 184. See also Leon Trotsky, 1905 (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973). • 14. Trotsky, My Life, p. 184. • 15. Ibid., pp. 185–6. • 16. For a vivid account of one such bank raid, see Simon Sebag Montefiore, The Young Stalin (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2007), pp. 1–11. • 17. Dmitri Volkogonov, Lenin: A New Biography, translated by Harold Shukman (The Free Press, New York, 1994), pp. 54–5. For a fuller account of the financing of the Bolsheviks prior to the 1917 revolution, see ibid., pp. 49–63. • 18. Figes, A People’s Tragedy, p. 223. • 19. Geoffrey Hosking, The Russian Constitutional Experiment: Government and Duma, 1907–1914 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973), p. 148. See also Figes, A People’s Tragedy, pp. 221–32. • 20. Figes, A People’s Tragedy, p. 196. • 21. Ibid., pp. 196–7. • 22. Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, p. 32. • 23. Ibid., pp. 332–3. • 24. See Figes, A People’s Tragedy, pp. 289–91. • 25. Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801–1917, pp. 721–2. • 26. Figes, A People’s Tragedy, p. 291. • 27. Volkogonov, Lenin, p. 104. • 28. Donald Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia (Rand McNally, Chicago, 2nd ed., 1964), p. 119. • 29. Lieven, Nicholas II, p. 231. • 30. Volkogonov, Lenin, pp.208–12; Lieven, Nicholas II, pp. 241–5. • 31. Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, p. 34. • 32. Robert Service, Lenin: A Biography (Pan Macmillan, London, 2002), pp. 255–9; Volkogonov, Lenin, pp. 110–11 and 120–1. • 33. Service, Lenin, pp. 261–3. • 34. See Robert Service, The Bolshevik Party in Revolution: A Study in Organisational Change 1917–1923 (Macmillan, London, 1979); and Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, pp. 36–7. • 35. Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, pp. 36–7. • 36. Volkogonov, Lenin, p. 173. • 37. Ibid., p. 176. • 38. Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1964–first published 1919), p. 140. • 39. Ibid., pp. 19–20. • 40. Ibid., p. 74. • 41. Figes, A People’s Tragedy, p. 574. • 42. George Leggett, The Cheka: Lenin’s Political Police (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981), p. 359.

4 ‘Building Socialism’: Russia and the Soviet Union, 1917–40

1. V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1962; first published 1917), p. 192. • 2. Ibid., p. 145. • 3. Ibid. • 4. Ibid., p. 157. • 5. Ibid., p. 152. • 6. A.J. Polan, Lenin and the End of Politics (Methuen, London, 1984), p. 11. • 7. Neil Harding, Lenin’s Political Thought: Volume 2. Theory and Practice in the Socialist Revolution (Macmillan, London, 1981), p. 140. • 8. John Plamenatz, German Marxism and Russian Communism (Longman, London, 1954), p. 248. • 9. Polan, Lenin and the End of Politics, p. 129. • 10. See Leonard Schapiro, ‘“Putting the Lid on Leninism”: Opposition and dissent in the communist one-party states’, in Schapiro (ed.), Political Opposition in One-Party States (Macmillan, London, 1972), pp. 33–57, esp. 35–41. • 11. Leonard Schapiro, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy. Political Opposition in the Soviet State: First Phase 1917–1922 (Bell, London, 1955), p. 301. • 12. Ibid., p. 303. • 13. Ibid., pp. 318–19. • 14. Schapiro, ‘“Putting the lid on Leninism”’, p. 43. • 15. Alec Nove, An Economic History of the U.S.S.R. (Pelican, Harmondsworth, 1972), pp. 85–6. • 16. T.H. Rigby, Lenin’s Government: Sovnarkom 1917–1922 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979), p. 178. • 17. Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982), p. 101. • 18. See James Harris, ‘Stalin as General Secretary: the appointments process and the nature of Stalin’s power’, in Sarah Davies and James Harris (eds.), Stalin: A New History (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), pp. 63–82, esp. 74–80. • 19. See Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939 (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001). • 20. Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine (Macmillan, London, 1985), p. 86. • 21. Ibid., p. 89. • 22. Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, pp. 12–13. • 23. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (André Deutsch, London, 1974), p. 278. • 24. David R. Shearer, ‘Stalinism, 1928–1940’, in Ronald G. Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume III, The Twentieth Century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006); and Michael Lessnoff, ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy’, Political Studies, Vol. XXVII, No. 4, 1979, pp. 584–602, at pp. 599–600. • 25. Robert Service, Stalin: A Biography (Macmillan, London, 2004), p. 245. • 26. Lewis Siegelbaum, ‘Workers and Industrialization’, in Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia: The Twentieth Century, pp. 440–67, at p. 446. • 27. Ronald G. Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States (Oxford University Press, New York, 1998), p. 224. • 28. Ibid., pp. 223–4. • 29. Ibid., p. 226. • 30. Ibid., p. 228; Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism. Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999), p. 169; and Michael Ellman, ‘Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932–33 Revisited’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 4, June 2007, pp. 663–93. • 31. Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed: What is the Soviet Union and Where is it Going? (Pathfinder Press, New York, 5th ed., 1972; first published 1937), and Trotsky, The Stalin School of Falsification (Pathfinder Press, New York, 3rd ed., 1972; first published 1937). • 32. Sheila Fitzpatrick (ed.), Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931 (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1978). • 33. See Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography 1888–1938 (Wildwood House, London, 1974). A Russian translation of this book (banned in the Soviet Union prior to the Gorbachev era) was read by Mikhail Gorbachev in the summer of 1987. Bukharin was fully rehabilitated in 1988, the centenary of his birth and the fiftieth anniversary of his execution. • 34. Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, pp. 118–19. • 35. Sheila Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union 1921–1934 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979), p. 169. • 36. Ibid., p. 176. • 37. Martin, The

Affirmative Action Empire, pp. 126–7. • 38. Some would include Georgy Malenkov in the list of Soviet leaders, for immediately after Stalin’s death, in the period 1953–54, he was no less important than Khrushchev. This was, however, essentially a period of oligarchic rule, and when one man emerged on top, that man was the Communist Party’s General (or First) Secretary, Khrushchev. • 39. Interview with Alexander Zinoviev, ‘Why the Soviet system is here to stay’, in G.R. Urban (ed.), Can the Soviet System Survive Reform? (Pinter, London, 1989), pp. 44–107, at p. 74. This interview was first published in the journal Encounter in April and May 1984. It caused an outcry and Zinoviev did not at that time take responsibility for the authenticity of the text because he was not given the opportunity to check it. See Charles Janson, ‘Alexander Zinoviev: Experiences of a Soviet Methodologist’, in Philip Hanson and Michael Kirkwood (eds.), Alexander Zinoviev as Writer and Thinker (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988), pp. 22–3. However, when the interview was republished in Urban’s book, it appeared with a postscript by Zinoviev written in 1988. He does not retract what he said in the interview, but observes that his critics failed to distinguish sociological analysis from moral judgement. He emphasizes that he did not consider ‘that collectivization was a blessing; it was an appalling tragedy’. But, he adds, ‘those who survived the tragedy had no desire to go back’ (in Urban, Can the Soviet System Survive Reform?, p. 106). • 40. George Leggett, The Cheka: Lenin’s Political Police (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981), pp. 15–27. • 41. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, No. 4, 1990, pp 190–3, at p. 193. • 42. Shearer, ‘Stalinism, 1928–1940’, in Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia: The Twentieth Century, p. 214. • 43. Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, revised and expanded edition (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989), pp. 258–60, esp. p. 258; and David Holloway, ‘Science, Technology, and Modernity’, in Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia: The Twentieth Century, pp. 549–78, at p. 560. • 44. Rose L. Glickman, ‘The Russian Factory Woman, 1880–1914’, in Dorothy Atkinson, Alexander Dallin and Gail Warshofsky Lapidus (eds.), Women in Russia (Harvester Press, Hassocks, 1978), pp. 63–83, at p. 63. • 45. Ibid., pp. 62–3. • 46. Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, Women in Soviet Society: Equality, Development, and Social Change (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978), pp. 60–1; and Peter H. Juviler, ‘Family Reforms on the Road to Communsm’, in Juviler and Henry W. Morton, Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in Transition (Pall Mall Press, London, 1967), pp. 29–55, at pp. 31–2. • 47. Lapidus, Women in Soviet Society, pp. 5–6. • 48. David L. Hoffmann, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917–1941 (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2003), pp. 100–2. • 49. Ibid., p. 106. • 50. Ibid., p. 112. • 51. Ibid., pp. 111–12. • 52. Richard Stites, Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992), pp. 72–8. • 53. Ibid., p. 72. • 54. Richard Taylor, The Politics of the Soviet Cinema 1917–1929 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979), p. 98. • 55. John Gooding, Socialism in Russia: Lenin and his Legacy, 1890–1991 (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002), p. 136. • 56. Ibid. • 57. Ibid. • 58. Oleg V. Khlevniuk, ‘Stalin as dictator: the personalization of power’, in Davies and Harris (eds.), Stalin: A New History, pp. 108–20, at p. 110. See also the same author’s more detailed recent study: Khlevniuk, Master of the House: Stalin and his Inner Circle (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2009). • 59. Service, Stalin, p. 317. • 60. I. Stalin, ‘Rech’ na pervom vsesoyuznom soveshchanii stakhanovtsev’, in Voprosy

Leninizma (11th ed., Politizdat, Moscow, 1952), pp. 531–44, at p. 531. • 61. Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism, p. 185. • 62. I. Stalin, ‘O proekte Konstitutsii Soyuza SSR’, in Voprosy Leninizma, pp. 545–73, at p. 556. • 63. Ibid., p. 553. • 64. Cited in Suny, The Soviet Experiment, p. 263. • 65. N.S. Khrushchev, The Secret Speech delivered to the closed session of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with an introduction by Zhores and Roy Medvedev (Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1976), p. 33. • 66. Ibid., pp. 33–4. • 67. Ibid., p. 34. • 68. Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia: The Twentieth Century, p. 40. • 69. Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A History (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 2004), pp. 515–22. • 70. Associated Press report from Moscow of 26 September 2007, in Johnson’s Russia List, 2007, No. 2003, 27 September 2007, p. 43.

5 International Communism between the Two World Wars

1. Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century (Fontana, London, 1997), p. 32. • 2. E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1923, Vol. 3 (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1966), pp. 507–9, 512–16 and 522–4; and Milan Hauner, What is Asia to Us? Russia’s Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today (Unwin Hyman, London, 1990), p. 7. • 3. Mary Fulbrook, History of Germany 1918–2000: The Divided Nation (Blackwell, Oxford, 2nd ed., 2002), p. 20; and Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 31. • 4. Eric D. Weitz, Creating German Communism, 1890–1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997), p. 92. • 5. Ibid., p. 89; and Fulbrook, History of Germany 1918–2000, pp. 20–4. • 6. Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919–1933 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005), p. 10. • 7. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1974), pp. 139–45. • 8. Ibid., p. 143. • 9. Ibid., p. 148. • 10. Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918–1941 (Harper & Row, New York, 3rd ed., 1967), pp. 186–7; and George Schöpflin, Politics in Eastern Europe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1993), pp. 43–5. • 11. Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, p. 148. • 12. Ibid., p. 150. • 13. Ibid., p. 151. • 14. Norman Davies, A History of Poland. Volume II: 1795 to the Present (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981), p. 396. • 15. Ibid., p. 399. • 16. Jonathan Haslam, ‘Comintern and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1919–1941’, in Ronald G. Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia, Vol. III: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), pp. 636–61, at p. 639. • 17. Adam Westoby, The Evolution of Communism (Polity, Oxford and Cambridge, 1989), p. 38. • 18. See Haslam, ‘Comintern and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1919–1941’, pp. 636–7. • 19. Ibid., p. 640. • 20. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, pp. 32–3. • 21. Westoby, The Evolution of Communism, p. 47; and Haslam, ‘Comintern and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1919–1941’, p. 644. • 22. Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography 1888–1938 (Wildwood House, London, 1974), p. 294; Bertram Wolfe, A Life in Two Centuries (Stein and Day, New York, 1981), p. 496; and Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 76. • 23. Carole Fink, ‘The NEP in Foreign Policy: The Genoa Conference and the Treaty of Rapallo’, in Gabriel Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy 1917–1991: A Retrospective (Frank Cass, London, 1994), pp.

11–20, esp. p. 15; and Robert Service, Lenin: A Biography (Macmillan, London, 2000), pp. 440–1. • 24. Fink, ‘The NEP in Foreign Policy’, p. 19. • 25. Steiner, The Lights that Failed, pp. 174–5. • 26. Introduction by Ivo Banac to Banac (ed.), The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov 1933–1949 (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2003), pp. xxv – xxvi. • 27. Raphael Samuel, The Lost World of British Communism (Verso, London, 2006), pp. 41–2. • 28. See John McIlroy, ‘The Establishment of Intellectual Orthodoxy and the Stalinization of British Communism 1928–1933’, Past and Present, No. 192, August 2006, pp. 187–226, esp. p. 189. • 29. ‘“Politsekretariat IKKI trebuet”: Dokumenty Kominterna i Kompartii Germanii, 1930–1934’, Istoricheskiy arkhiv, No. 1, 1994, pp. 148–74. • 30. F.W. Deakin, H. Shukman and H.T. Willetts, A History of World Communism (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1975), p. 77. • 31. Ibid., p. 76; and Branco Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, revised and expanded edition (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1986), pp. 465–7. • 32. ‘“Sobytiya zastali partiyu vrasplokh”: Pis’mo aktivista Kompartii Germanii K. Fridberga I.V. Stalinu, 1933 g.’, Istoricheskiy arkhiv, No. 3, 1996, pp. 211–15. • 33. The Russian archive-based journal (cited above), which provides the full text of Friedberg’s letter, states, incorrectly, that ‘Friedberg’ was arrested in 1937 by the NKVD and ‘shared the bloody fate of hundreds of thousands of political emigrants from Germany and many other countries at that time in the USSR’ (ibid., p. 213). However, Karl Gröhl – who was better known under one of his other pseudonyms, Karl Retzlaw, than as either Gröhl or Friedberg – lived on until 1979, dying in Frankfurt on 20 June at the age of eighty-three. He published memoirs eight years earlier in which he mentioned, briefly, his letter to Stalin. See Karl Retzlaw (Karl Gröhl), Spartakus – Aufstieg und Niedergang. Erinnerungen eines Parteiarbeiters (Neue Kritik, Frankfurt am Main, 1971), p. 361. Gröhl wrote at the same time as his letter to Stalin, and along similar lines, to Comintern Secretariat member Iosif Pyatnitsky whose own fate was to be less fortunate than Gröhl’s. He was arrested by the NKVD in 1937 and executed in 1939. • 34. Banac (ed.), The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov 1933–1949, p. xvi. • 35. Ibid., pp. xvi – xvii and xxv. • 36. Ibid., pp. xxvi – xxvii. • 37. Weitz, Creating German Communism, p. 280. • 38. Ibid. • 39. Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2004), p. 122. • 40. Ibid., pp. 186–7. • 41. Ibid., pp. 157–8. • 42. Ibid., pp. 164–6. • 43. Ibid., p. 166. • 44. Ibid., pp. 167–70. • 45. Ibid., p. 261. • 46. Ibid., pp. 207–8. • 47. Ibid., p. 153. • 48. Ibid., p. 316. • 49. Haslam, ‘Comintern and Soviet Foreign Policy’, p. 656. • 50. Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (Macmillan, London, 1946), p. 378. • 51. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 84. • 52. Banac (ed.), The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov 1933–1949. Dimitrov is citing Klement Voroshilov’s report to a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on 27 March 1940. • 53. Nikita Khrushchev, in his memoirs, has much to say about the war with Finland that ‘cost us so dearly’ and adds: ‘I’d say we lost as many as a million lives.’ See Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (Little, Brown, Boston, 1970), p. 155. For an account of Finnish losses based on the official documentation in Finland, see Osmo Jussila, Seppa Hentila, Jukka Nevakiki, A Political History of Finland since 1809: from Grand Duchy to Modern State (Hurst, London, 1995), p. 191. These authors cite Soviet sources claiming that 49,000 were killed on the Soviet side, but add that the Finns have estimated the Red Army’s losses to be at least four times the figure

they admitted to. Widely different figures for the Soviet death toll in this short but ferocious war continue to be given by different authors. Citing a post-Communist Russian source on Soviet losses in armed conflicts, Catherine Merridale gives a figure of over 126,000 for Soviet dead in the Winter War with Finland and puts the number of Finns killed at just over 48,000. See Merridale, Ivan’s War: The Red Army 1939–45 (Faber & Faber, London, 2005), p. 44. Other Western accounts have put the figure for Soviet losses either dramatically higher or markedly lower. Ronald Suny suggests that around a quarter of a million Soviet troops lost their lives, compared with 25,000 Finns, a ratio of ten to one. See Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1998), p. 304. That is close to what is suggested by Finnish scholars. A more recent book accepts a figure adjacent to the official Soviet one, giving the number of Soviet troops killed in the Winter War as ‘at least 49,000’. See Bernard Wasserstein, Barbarism and Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), p. 293. • 54. Suny, The Soviet Experiment, pp. 303–4. • 55. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 85. • 56. Geoffrey Nowell Smith and Quintin Hoare, Introduction to Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Hoare and Nowell Smith (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971), p. xciv. • 57. Ibid. • 58. David McLellan, ‘Western Marxism’, in Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (eds.), The Cambridge History of Twentieth Century Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), p. 286. • 59. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, pp. 332–3. • 60. McLellan, ‘Western Marxism’, p. 288. • 61. Annie Kriegel, The French Communists: Profile of a People (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1972), p. 108. • 62. Ibid., p. 369. • 63. Ibid. • 64. Stéphane Courtois and Marc Lazar, Histoire du Parti Communiste Français (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2nd ed., 2000), p. 143. • 65. Kriegel, The French Communists, pp. 214–23. • 66. Lazitch and Drachkovitch (eds.), Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p. 125; and Kriegel, The French Communists, pp. 217–18 and 277–8. • 67. Edward Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948–1960 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1961), pp. 6–7. • 68. Ibid. • 69. Guenter Lewy, The Cause that Failed: Communism in American Political Life (Oxford University Press, New York, 1990), p. 7. • 70. Bertram D. Wolfe, A Life in Two Centuries: An Autobiography, with an Introduction by Leonard Schapiro (Stein and Day, New York, 1981), esp. pp. 442–551. • 71. Ibid., p. 441. • 72. Witold S. Sworakowski (ed.), World Communism – A Handbook 1918–1965 (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1973), pp. 462–72. • 73. Lerry Keplair and Stephen Englund, The Inquisition in Hollywood: Politics in the Film Community 1930–60 (University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 2003). • 74. Kevin Morgan, Gidon Cohen and Andrew Flinn, Communists and British Society 1920–1991 (Rivers Oram Press, London, 2007), p. 169. • 75. Henry Pelling, The British Communist Party: A Historical Profile (Adam and Charles Black, London, 1958), p. 192. • 76. Morgan, Cohen and Flinn, Communists and British Society 1920–1991, p. 26. • 77. Ibid., pp. 188–96 and 240. • 78. Westoby, The Evolution of Communism, p. 72. • 79. Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), pp. 36–7. • 80. Ibid., p. 37. • 81. Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (Norton, New York, 2nd ed., 1999), pp. 310–11. • 82. Ibid., p. 312. • 83. Ibid., p. 319. • 84. Ibid., p. 320. • 85. Ibid., p. 321. • 86. Ibid., pp. 319–20. • 87. Mitter, A Bitter Revolution, p. 159. • 88. Ibid., pp. 159–61. • 89. The most unremittingly hostile account

of Mao’s activities, which casts doubt on his authority among party members in the inter-war years, is by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (Jonathan Cape, London, 2005). This influential book has, however, been more critically received by specialists on China – including many who are far from being admirers of Mao – than by non-specialist reviewers. The book has been challenged not only in reviews but in review articles in the specialist journals on China. See, for example, Gregor Benton and Steve Tsang, ‘The Portrayal of Opportunism, Betrayal, and Manipulation in Mao’s Rise to Power’, The China Journal, No. 55, January 2006, pp. 95–109; Timothy Cheek, ‘The New Number One Counter-Revolutionary Inside the Party: Academic Biography as Mass Criticism’, ibid., pp. 109–18; Lowell Dittmer, ‘Pitfalls of Charisma’, ibid., pp. 119–28; and Geremie R. Barmé, ‘I’m So Ronree’, ibid., pp. 128–39.

6 What Do We Mean by a Communist System?

1. See, for example, the posthumously published book by the former Soviet Communist Party Central Committee official and Gorbachev aide Georgiy Shakhnazarov, Sovremennaya tsivilizatsiya i Rossiya (Voskresen’e, Moscow, 2003), pp. 179–80; and former Polish Communist prime minister Mieczysaw Rakowski, in Andrei Grachev, Chiara Blengino and Rossella Stievano (eds.), 1985–2005: Twenty Years that Changed the World (World Political Forum and Editoria Laterza, Turin, 2005), p. 35. • 2. See Andrew Roberts, ‘The State of Socialism: A Note on Terminology’, Slavic Review, Vol. 63, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 349–66. • 3. The Swedish social democrats were the first major, and successful, political party to go beyond the ‘revisionism’ of Eduard Bernstein. See Sheri Berman, The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006). • 4. See Evan Luard, Socialism without the State (Macmillan, London, 1979), David Miller, Market, State and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990), Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994), Julian Le Grand and Saul Estrin (eds.), Market Socialism (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989), Thomas Meyer with Lewis Hinchman, The Theory of Social Democracy (Polity, Cambridge, 2007), Alec Nove, The Economics of Feasible Socialism (Allen & Unwin, London, 1983), Stephen Padgett and William E. Paterson, A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe (Longman, London, 1991) and Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism (Fontana, London, 1997). • 5. Michael Lessnoff, ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy’, Political Studies, Vol. XXVII, No. 4, December 1979, pp. 594–602, esp. p. 601. • 6. Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985), pp. 105–6. • 7. Ibid., p. 848. • 8. See Archie Brown, ‘The Study of Totalitarianism and Authoritarianism’, in Jack Hayward, Brian Barry and Archie Brown (eds.), The British Study of Politics in the Twentieth Century (Oxford University Press, for the British Academy, Oxford, 1999), pp. 345–94, at pp. 345–7; and Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1954), pp. 74 and 133. • 9. Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (Oxford University Press, New York, 1993), p. 133. • 10. John H. Kautsky,

Communism and the Politics of Development: Persistent Myths and Changing Behavior (Wiley, New York, 1968), p. 216. • 11. See Alan Angell, ‘The Left in Latin America Since c. 1920’, in Leslie Bethell (ed.), The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. VI, Part 2, Politics and Society (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994), pp. 163–232. • 12. Jasper Becker, Rogue State: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (Oxford University Press, New York, 2005), p. 77. • 13. Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (Longman, London, 2003), p. 9. • 14. Alec Nove, The Soviet System in Retrospect: An Obituary Notice, The Fourth Annual Averell Harriman Lecture, 17 February, 1993, Columbia University, New York, p. 22. • 15. Alec Nove, Glasnost’ in Action: Cultural Renaissance in Russia (Unwin Hyman, London, 1989), p. 236. • 16. Michael Oakeshott, ‘Political Education’, in Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Methuen, London, 1962), p. 127. • 17. T.H. Rigby, The Changing Soviet System: Mono-organisational Socialism from its Origins to Gorbachev’s Restructuring (Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1990), p. 166. The quotation is from a chapter entitled ‘Political Legitimacy under Mono-organisational Socialism’ which Rigby first published in 1983. • 18. Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdenk Mlyná, Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism (Columbia University, New York, 2002), p. 37. • 19. Rudolf L. Tkés, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution: Economic reform, social change, and political succession, 1957–1990 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), p. 428. • 20. Republished in Eric Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries (Abacus, London, 1999), pp. 5–6. • 21. See Michael Kenny, The First New Left: British Intellectuals after Stalin (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1995). • 22. Raphael Samuel, The Lost World of British Communism (Verso, London, 2006), pp. 47–8. • 23. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries, p. 6.

7 The Appeals of Communism

1. Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century (Fontana, London, 1997), p. 95. • 2. Ibid., pp. 95–6. • 3. Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1954), pp. 104–5. • 4. Stéphane Courtois and Marc Lazar, Histoire du Parti Communiste Français (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2nd ed., 2000), pp. 145–6 and 296. • 5. Ibid., p. 32. • 6. Almond, The Appeals of Communism, p. 104. • 7. Bernard Shaw, The Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism and Capitalism (Constable, London, 1928). • 8. Howard Fast, The Naked God: The Writer and the Communist Party (Bodley Head, London, 1958), pp. 14–15. • 9. Shaw, The Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism and Capitalism, p. 441. • 10. Ibid., p. 443. • 11. Hugh McDiarmid, First Hymn to Lenin and Other Poems (Unicorn Press, London, 1931), pp. 11–13. • 12. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Soviet Communism: A New Civilization (Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1937); quoted from 3rd edition, Longmans, 1944, p. 971. • 13. Ibid., p. xi. • 14. Ibid., p. 970. • 15. Ibid. • 16. Ibid., p. 973. • 17. André Gide in Richard Crossman (ed.), The God that Failed, new edition with an introduction by David C. Engerman (Columbia University Press, New York, 2001), p. 173. • 18. Ibid., pp. 173 and 184. • 19. Ibid., p. 181. • 20. Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon (Jonathan

Cape, London, 1940); cited from Penguin Classics edition, Harmondsworth, 1964, p. 190. • 21. Eric Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries (Abacus, London, 1979), p. 13. • 22. Fast, The Naked God, p. 30. • 23. Ibid., pp. 30–1 • 24. Guenter Lewy, The Cause that Failed: Communism in American Political Life (Oxford University Press, New York, 1990), p. 61. • 25. Kevin Morgan, Gidon Cohen and Andrew Flinn, Communists and British Society 1920–1991 (Rivers Oram, London, 2007), p. 83. • 26. Douglas Hyde, I Believed. The Autobiography of a former British Communist (Heinemann, London, 1951), p. 290. • 27. Raphael Samuel, The Lost World of British Communism (Verso, London, 2006), p. 53. • 28. Robert D. Putnam, ‘The Italian Communist Politician’, in Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow (eds.), Communism in Italy and France (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975), p. 177. • 29. Ibid., pp. 177–8. • 30. Samuel, The Lost World of British Communism, pp. 53–6. • 31. Ibid., p. 58. • 32. Almond, The Appeals of Communism, pp. 162–3. • 33. Sudhir Hazareesingh, Intellectuals and the French Communist Party: Disillusion and Decline (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991), p. 15. • 34. Ibid., p. 101. See also Courtois and Lazar, Histoire du Parti Communiste Français, pp. 279 and 285–7. • 35. Sidney Tarrow, ‘Party Activists in Public Office: Comparisons at the Local Level in Italy and France’, in Blackmer and Tarrow (eds.), Communism in Italy and France, pp. 150–1. • 36. Almond, The Appeals of Communism, p. 173. • 37. As noted also by Almond, ibid., p. 105. • 38. Dan Diner and Jonathan Frankel, ‘Introduction. Jews and Communism: The Utopian Temptation’, in Frankel (ed.), Dark Times, Dire Decisions: Jews and Communism, p. 3. • 39. George Schöpflin, Politics in Eastern Europe 1945–1992 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1993), pp. 42–3. • 40. Alec Nove, The Soviet System in Retrospect: An Obituary Notice (The Fourth Averell Harriman Lecture, Columbia University, New York, 1993), pp. 14–15. • 41. Jaff Schatz, ‘Jews and the Communist Movement in Interwar Poland’, in Frankel (ed.), Dark Times, Dire Decisions, p. 20. • 42. Ibid., p. 32. • 43. Ibid., p. 30. • 44. Ibid., p. 32. • 45. Theodore Draper, The Roots of American Communism (Elephant paperback ed., Chicago, 1989), p. 79. • 46. Ezra Mendelsohn, ‘Jews, Communism, and Art in Inter-war America’, in Frankel (ed.), Dark Times, Dire Decisions, p. 101. • 47. Lewy, The Cause that Failed, pp. 6–7. • 48. Ibid., p. 295. • 49. Ibid. • 50. Samuel, The Lost World of British Communism, p., 67. • 51. Jason L. Heppell, ‘Party Recruitment: Jews and Communism in Britain’, in Frankel (ed.), Dark Times, Dire Decisions, p. 163. • 52. Ibid. • 53. Ibid. • 54. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries, p. 300. • 55. Ibid. • 56. Heppell, ‘Party Recruitment’, p. 165. • 57. For a good brief discussion of what the nomenklatura does, and does not, mean, see John H. Miller, ‘The Communist Party: Trends and Problems’, in Archie Brown and Michael Kaser (eds.), Soviet Policy for the 1980s (Macmillan, London, 1982), pp. 20–3.

8 Communism and the Second World War

1. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, The Hinge of Fate (Cassell, London, 1951), p. 443. • 2. On the plethora of warnings Stalin received, see John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1975), pp. 87–98; and Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin,

The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West (Allen Lane Penguin Press, London, 1999), pp. 122–5. • 3. Robin Edmonds, ‘Churchill and Stalin’, in Robert Blake and Wm Roger Louis (eds.), Churchill (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993), p. 311. • 4. Ibid., p. 313. • 5. Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, p. 123. • 6. Ibid. • 7. Ibid., pp. 123–4. • 8. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1990), pp. 195–6, 202–4 and 212. • 9. William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and his Era (The Free Press, New York, 2003), pp. 256–7. • 10. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 351. • 11. Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, pp. 4–5. For detailed figures on the proportion of the senior officer corps arrested during Stalin’s purge of the army, see A.A. Kokoshin, Armiya i politika: Sovetskaya voenno-politicheskaya i voenno-strategicheskaya mysl’, 1918–1991 gody (Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, Moscow, 1995), pp. 40–51. On Tukhachevsky, see ibid., pp. 49 and 104–5. • 12. Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, p. 15. • 13. Catherine Merridale, Ivan’s War: The Red Army 1939–45 (Faber & Faber, London, 2005), pp. 76–7. • 14. Rodric Braithwaite, Moscow 1941: A City and its People at War (Profile Books, London, 2006), pp. 216–17, 223 and 225. • 15. Ibid., p. 152. • 16. Antony Beevor, Stalingrad (Penguin, London, 2007), p. 428. • 17. Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941–1945, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare (Macmillan, London, 1985), p. 120. • 18. Norman Davies, Europe at War 1939–1945: No Simple Victory (Macmillan, London, 2006), p. 312. • 19. Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941–1945, pp. 107–8. • 20. Ibid., p. 156. • 21. For long the accepted figure was twenty million. A recent study by two British historians of the Soviet Union and the Second World War puts the total at ‘roughly 25 million’. See John Barber and Mark Harrison, ‘Patriotic War, 1941–1945’, in Ronald G. Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia, Vol. III: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), pp. 217–42, at p. 225. • 22. Ibid. • 23. Braithwaite, Moscow 1941, pp. 303–5. • 24. Ibid., p. 7. • 25. Barber and Harrison, ‘Patriotic War, 1941–1945’, pp. 224–5. • 26. Beevor, Stalingrad, p. 48. • 27. Ibid., p. xiv. • 28. Ibid., p. 419. • 29. Davies, Europe at War 1939–1945, p. 312. • 30. Hoover Institution Archives, Fond 89, Reel 1.1993, opis 14. Beria’s three-and-a-half-page letter to Stalin is in Fond 89 of the Russian state archive, RGANI, in Moscow. It is now available in microfilm in a number of major Western libraries, including that of the Hoover Institution, which catalogued the contents of Fond 89. Until 1989, when the head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Valentin Falin (Volkogonov Papers, National Security Archive, R 6522, memorandum of 6 March 1989), informed the party leadership that the Polish officers had been killed by the NKVD on the orders of Stalin and Beria, the Soviet authorities had pretended even among themselves, as well as to the outside world, that this had been another German atrocity. A Politburo meeting of 15 April 1971 approved Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko’s protest to the British Foreign Office about a BBC film ‘hostile to the Soviet Union…about the so-called “Katyn affair”’ (Volkogonov Collection, National Security Archive). At a Politburo meeting on 5 April 1976 there was discussion of how to combat Western propaganda alleging Soviet responsibility for the killings in Katyn forest (Volkogonov Collection, NSA, R8966). It was as late as 13 April 1990 that it was decided that the Polish President Jaruzelski should be informed that there was now sufficiently convincing proof that the Polish

officers had been killed at Katyn on the instructions of the leadership of the NKVD at that time (HIA, Fond 89, Reel 1.1991, opis 9, file 115, p. 2). • 31. See Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers (Sphere Books, London, 1972). • 32. Bernard Wasserstein, Barbarism and Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), p. 401. • 33. Braithwaite, Moscow 1941, p. 305. • 34. See Timothy Snyder, ‘“To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All”: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 86–120, esp. 91–4; and Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine (Macmillan, London, 1985), esp. pp. 154–64. • 35. Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine, pp. 153 and 166. • 36. Ibid., p. 166. • 37. Ibid. • 38. See, for example, Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Volume V: Closing the Ring (Cassell, London, 1952), pp. 272–84. • 39. Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century (Fontana, London, 1997), p. 92. • 40. D. George Kasoulous, ‘The Greek Communists Tried Three Times – and Failed’, in Thomas T. Hammond (ed.), The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1975), pp. 293–309. • 41. Ibid., p. 305. • 42. Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (Columbia University Press, New York, 1968), p. 59. • 43. Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974 (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977), p. 5. • 44. Milovan Djilas, Wartime (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1977), p. 253. For Deakin’s assessment of Djilas, see F.W.D. Deakin, The Embattled Mountain (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971), esp. pp. 84–5. • 45. Ibid., p. 369. • 46. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume V, p. 423. • 47. Ibid. • 48. Stephen Peters, ‘Ingredients of the Communist Takeover in Albania’, in Hammond (ed.), The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, pp. 273–93. • 49. Ibid., pp. 291–2. • 50. Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), pp. 121 and 138. • 51. Jürgen Domes, ‘The Model for Revolutionary People’s War: The Communist Takeover of China’, in Hammond (ed.), The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, p. 520. • 52. Mitter, A Bitter Revolution, pp. 170 and 175. • 53. Domes, ‘The Model for Revolutionary People’s War’, p. 520. • 54. Mitter, A Bitter Revolution, pp. 183–4.

9 The Communist Takeovers in Europe – Indigenous Paths

1. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (Vintage Books, London, 2006), p. 52. • 2. Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century (Fontana, London, 1997), p. 93. • 3. Stephen Peters, ‘Ingredients of the Communist Takeover in Albania’, in Thomas T. Hammond (ed.), The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1975), p. 276. • 4. See Jon Halliday in The Artful Albanian: The Memoirs of Enver Hoxha, edited and introduced by Jon Halliday (Chatto & Windus, London, 1986), p. 2. • 5. Ibid., pp. 2–3. • 6. Ibid., pp. 273–92, at 280. • 7. Ibid., pp. 32–3. • 8. Peters, ‘Ingredients of the Communist Takeover in Albania’, pp. 290–2. • 9. Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974 (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978),

pp. 2–3. • 10. Ibid., p. 12. • 11. Phyllis Auty, Tito: A Biography (Longman, London, 1970), p. 265. • 12. Ibid., p. 266. • 13. Ibid., pp. 268–9. • 14. David Dyker, ‘Yugoslavia: Unity out of Diversity?’, in Archie Brown and Jack Gray (eds.), Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (Macmillan, London, 1977), pp. 66–100, at p. 76. • 15. Those who had been called ‘Ethnic Muslims’ became known as Bosniaks. They are also, of course, Bosnians, but that is a broader term, embracing all the citizens of contemporary Bosnia, whatever their ethnic origin or religious affiliation. • 16. Gordon Wightman and Archie Brown, ‘Changes in the Levels of Membership and Social Composition of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 1945–73’, Soviet Studies, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, July 1975, pp. 396–417, at pp. 396–7. • 17. Archie Brown and Gordon Wightman, ‘Czechoslovakia: Revival and Retreat’, in Brown and Gray (eds.), Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, pp. 159–96, at p. 163. • 18. Jacques Rupnik, Histoire du Parti Communiste Tchéchoslovaque: Des origines à la prise du pouvoir (Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1981), pp. 188–9. • 19. Edward Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948–1960 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1961), pp. 19–21 and 100–2. • 20. Ibid., p. 20. • 21. Wightman and Brown, ‘Changes in the Levels of Membership and Social Composition of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia’, pp. 397 and 401. • 22. Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia, p. 21. • 23. Melvin P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (Hill and Wang, New York, 2007), p. 62. • 24. Pavel Tigrid, ‘The Prague Coup of 1948: The Elegant Takeover’, in Hammond (ed.), The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, pp. 399–432, at pp. 406–7. • 25. Ibid., p. 409. • 26. Ibid., p. 417. • 27. Ibid., pp. 419–20. • 28. Ibid., p. 427. • 29. His former aide – a committed democrat – Lubomír Soukup was convinced this was suicide, but his explanation of it, when he had access for the first time to the mass media in Czechoslovakia in 1968, brought no comfort to those who wished to present a rosy account of the events of February 1948. It was, said Soukup (and I heard this directly from him on more than one occasion when we were colleagues teaching in Glasgow University during the 1960s), Masaryk’s last protest against the destruction of democracy in Czechoslovakia by the Communists. • 30. Vladimir V. Kusin, The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring: The Development of Reformist Ideas in Czechoslovakia 1956–1967 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971), p. 7.

10 The Communist Takeovers in Europe – Soviet Impositions

1. Robin Edmonds, ‘Churchill and Stalin’, in Robert Blake and Wm Roger Louis (eds.), Churchill (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993), pp. 320–1; Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Volume VI: Triumph and Tragedy (Cassell, London, 1954), pp. 198–9; Geoffrey Best, Churchill: A Study in Greatness (Penguin, London, 2002), p. 258; and Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2007), pp. 20–1. • 2. Churchill, The Second World War, Volume VI, pp. 201–2. • 3. Best, Churchill, pp. 259–60. • 4. Churchill, The Second World War, Volume VI, p. 200. • 5. Geoffrey Roberts,

‘Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4, Fall 2007, p. 30. • 6. Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. II: 1795 to the Present (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981), pp. 399–403. • 7. Timothy Snyder, ‘“To Resolve the Ukrainian Question Once and for All”’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 86–120, at p. 101. • 8. Ibid. • 9. Roberts, ‘Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences’, p. 34. This statement is from the official Soviet record of the conference in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. It is among those excluded from the documents which were published in the Soviet Union. • 10. Roy Jenkins, Churchill (Pan Books, London, 2002), p. 762. • 11. Ibid. • 12. Bernard Wasserstein, Barbarism and Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), pp. 414–15. • 13. Edmonds, ‘Churchill and Stalin’, p. 326. • 14. Ibid. • 15. Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, edited by Robert H. Ferrell (Harper & Row, New York, 1980), pp. 21–2. • 16. Truman’s diary entry for 15 July 1945 at Potsdam, ibid., p. 53. • 17. George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925–1950 (Pantheon, New York, 1967), p. 279. • 18. Truman, Off the Record, pp. 58–9. • 19. Ibid., p.. 349. • 20. Jan M. Ciechanowski, The Warsaw Rising of 1944 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1974); and Norman Davies, God’s Playground, Vol. II, pp. 472–80. • 21. Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since World War Two (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1989), p. 79. • 22. Hugh Seton-Watson, The Imperialist Revolutionaries: World Communism in the 1960s and 1970s (Hutchinson, London, 1980), p. 14. • 23. R.J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – and After (Routledge, Abingdon, 2nd ed., 1997), p. 221. • 24. Susanne S. Lotarski, ‘The Communist Takeover in Poland’, in Thomas T. Hammond (ed.), The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1975), pp. 339–67, at p. 353. • 25. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 221. • 26. Ibid., pp. 220–1. • 27. Bennett Kovrig, Communism in Hungary: From Kun to Kádár (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1979), p. 128. • 28. Ibid., pp. 138–40. • 29. Ibid., pp. 224–8. • 30. Ibid., pp. 227–8. • 31. Peter A. Toma and Ivan Volgyes, Politics in Hungary (Freedman, San Francisco, 1977), pp. 6–9. • 32. Rudolf L. Tkés, ‘Hungary’, in Witold S. Sworakowski (ed.), World Communism: A Handbook (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1973), pp. 184–91. • 33. Ibid., p.. 188. • 34. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 225. • 35. Ghia Ionescu, Communism in Rumania 1944–1962 (Oxford University Press and Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1964), pp. 61–2. • 36. Ibid., pp. 83–6. • 37. Ibid., pp. 90–2. • 38. As is clear from his diary entries. See Ivo Banac (ed.), The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov 1933–1949 (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2003), pp. 351–83. • 39. R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd ed., 2005), p. 183. • 40. Ibid., p. 228. • 41. Ibid., pp. 183–8. • 42. Hans W. Schoenberg, ‘The Partition of Germany and the Neutralization of Austria’, in Hammond, The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, p. 374. • 43. Wolfgang Leonhard, Child of the Revolution (Ink Links paperback ed., London, 1979), pp. 329–30. This important book was first published in German in 1955 as Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder. • 44. Zubok, A Failed Empire, pp. 62–3. • 45. Leonhard, Child of the Revolution. Leonhard

escaped from East Germany in 1949 to Yugoslavia, where he spent two years. He has lived subsequently in the United States and in the united Germany. • 46. Ibid., pp. 359–65. • 47. Mary Fulbrook, History of Germany 1918–2000: The Divided Nation (Blackwell, Oxford, 2nd ed., 2002), p. 129. • 48. Ibid., pp. 133–4. • 49. Eric D. Weitz, Creating German Communism, 1890–1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997), p. 352. • 50. Gary Bruce, ‘The Prelude to Nationwide Surveillance in East Germany: Stasi Operations and Threat Perceptions, 1945–1953’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 2003, pp. 3–31. • 51. Kennan, Memoirs 1925–1950, pp. 547–59. • 52. Ibid., pp. 294–5. • 53. Ibid., p. 294. • 54. Ibid., p. 295. • 55. Ibid. • 56. Roy Jenkins, Churchill (Pan Macmillan, London, 2002), p. 812. • 57. Patrick Wright, Iron Curtain: From Stage to Cold War (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), pp. 82–4. • 58. Ibid., p. 152.

11 The Communists Take Power in China

1. Jürgen Domes, ‘The Model for Revolutionary People’s War: The Communist Takeover of China’, in Thomas T. Hammond (ed.), The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1975), pp. 516–33, at pp. 520–1. • 2. V.S. Myasnikov, ‘SSSR i Kitay vo vtoroy mirovoy voine’, Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya, No. 4, 2005, pp. 3–29, at p. 21. • 3. The Russian historian Academician Myasnikov cites Mao as saying that it was the entry of Soviet troops into Manchuria which played a greater part in ending the Japanese occupation of China than the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japanese cities by the United States – ibid., p. 24. • 4. Jonathan Spence, ‘China’, in Michael Howard and William Roger Louis (eds.), The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998), pp. 216–26, at pp. 221–2. • 5. Craig Dietrich, People’s China: A Brief History (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 3rd ed., 1998), p. 48. • 6. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2nd enlarged edition, 2006), p. 311. • 7. Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd ed., 1997), p. 1. • 8. Fairbank and Goldman, China: (A New History, p. 302. • 9. Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), p. 183. • 10. Domes, ‘The Model for Revolutionary People’s War’, p. 521. • 11. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (Vintage Books, London, 2006), pp. 296–7; and Domes, ‘The Model for Revolutionary People’s War’, pp. 522–3. • 12. Jacques Guillermaz, ‘The Soldier’, in Dick Wilson (ed.), Mao Tse-Tung in the Scales of History (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977), pp. 117–43, at pp. 117 and 124–5. • 13. Domes, ‘The Model for Revolutionary People’s War’, p. 526. • 14. Dietrich, People’s China, p. 31. • 15. Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (Rupert Hart-Davis, London, 1962), pp. 164–5. • 16. Domes, ‘The Model for Revolutionary People’s War’, pp. 525–6. See also Dietrich, People’s China, p. 31. • 17.A.V. Pantsov, ‘Kak Stalin pomog Mao Tszedunu stat’ vozhdem’, Voprosy istorii, No. 2, 2006, pp. 75–87, at p. 78. • 18. Chang and Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story, pp. 264 and 279. • 19. Ivo Banac (ed.), The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov 1933–1949 (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2003), pp. xxxvii – xxxviii. • 20. A Russian historian who has studied

the Comintern documents suggests that Stalin may have been deliberately misinformed. Dimitrov knew nothing of this telegram proposal, no evidence of it has emerged, and it is likely, in the view of A.V. Pantsov, that it never existed. See Pantsov, ‘Kak Stalin pomog Mao Tszedunu stat’ vozhdem’, p. 81. • 21. Banac (ed.), The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, p. 42 (italics in original). • 22. According to Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Wang Ming’s life was endangered not by Stalin but by Mao Zedong. They suggest that Mao orchestrated more than one attempt to poison Wang when he was back in China, and the attempts succeeded to the extent of permanently undermining Wang’s health. See Chang and Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story, pp. 262–6, 271 and 649. • 23. Pantsov, ‘Kak Stalin pomog Mao Tszedunu stat’ vozhdem’. • 24. Ibid., p. 79. • 25. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), p. 65. • 26. Dietrich, People’s China, p. 32. • 27. Pantsov, ‘Kak Stalin pomog Mao Tszedunu stat’ vozhdem’, p. 85. • 28. Chang and Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story, pp. 225–6. • 29. Frederick C. Teiwes, ‘The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, 1949–57’, in MacFarquhar (ed.), The Politics of China, pp. 5–86, at p. 13. • 30. Lowell Dittmer, ‘Pitfalls of Charisma’, The China Journal, No. 55, January 2006, pp. 119–28, at p. 126. • 31. Teiwes. ‘The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, 1949–57’, p. 17. • 32. Ibid., p. 18. • 33. Ibid., p. 70. • 34. Ibid., p. 18. • 35. Ibid., p. 29. • 36. Ibid., p. 22. • 37. Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, p. 348. • 38. Fairbank, in ibid., pp. 348–9. • 39. Chang and Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story, p. 394. For the number of 400,000, the authors cite Deng Xiaoping, speaking to Japanese Communists. For the figure of a million they refer to a Russian-language source – Sergo Beria’s 1994 biography of his father, the NKVD chief Lavrenti Beria (ibid., pp. 394 and 719). An American figure which conflates those killed or missing with those wounded lists 900,000 Chinese casualties. See Dietrich, People’s China, p. 67. • 40. Chang and Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story, p. 394. • 41. Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), p. 97. • 42. Introduction by James G. Hershberg to a collection of correspondence between Stalin and Mao Zedong and between Stalin and the Soviet ambassadors in China and North Korea, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 14/15, Winter 2003–Spring 2004, pp. 369–72. • 43. Chang and Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story, p. 377. There are, however, still some unanswered questions about the Sino-Soviet relationship on the eve of Chinese participation in the Korean War, including discrepancies between the Chinese and Russian versions of Mao’s letter to Stalin of 2 October 1950. A Chinese scholar, Shen Zhihua, has recently argued that ‘the main reason for Mao’s decision to send troops to Korea was to avert Soviet entry into north-east China in the wake of North Korea’s defeat and the extension of the war to Manchuria’. See Yafeng Xia, ‘The Study of Cold War International History in China: A Review of the Last Twenty Years’, in Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, Winter 2008, pp. 81–115, at p. 108. • 44. Letter of Stalin to Mao, dated 4 October 1950, sent via Soviet Ambassador to Beijing, 5 October 1950, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 14/15, pp. 375–6. • 45. ‘Russian Documents on the Korean War 1950–1953’, ibid., pp. 370 and 376. • 46. Dietrich, People’s China, p. 671; and Julia C. Strauss, ‘Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and

Regime Consolidation in the People’s Republic of China, 1950–1953’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 44, No. 1, January 2002, pp. 80–105, at pp. 87–9. • 47. Ibid., p. 69. • 48. Strauss, ‘Paternalist Terror’, pp. 80–1. • 49. Ibid., pp. 94–6. • 50. Ibid., p. 72; and Fairbank, in Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, pp. 360–4. • 51. Arguably, such a view of the world was also to be found in Confucianism. • 52. Dietrich, People’s China, pp. 72–6. • 53. Ibid., pp. 77–8. • 54. Teiwes, ‘The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, 1949–1957’, pp. 38–9. • 55. Ibid., p. 42.

12 Post-War Stalinism and the Break with Yugoslavia

1. Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society (Harvard University Press, 1961), esp. pp. 233–80. • 2. Cited in D.G. Nadzhafov and Z.S. Belousova (eds.), Stalin i kosmopolitizm: Dokumenty Agitpropa TsK KPSS 1945–1953 (Materik, Moscow, 2005), p. 18. • 3. Catherine Merridale, Ivan’s War: The Red Army 1939–1945 (Faber & Faber, London, 2005), p. 293. • 4. Ibid., p. 198. • 5. David Brandenberger, ‘Stalin as symbol: a case study of the personality cult and its construction’, in Sarah Davies and James Harris (eds.), Stalin: A New History (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), pp. 249–70, at p. 270. • 6. ‘Sekretaryu TsK. Tovarishchu N.S. Khrushchevu, 14.2.1956’, Vokogonov Papers, National Security Archive, R1217. This is one of the numerous papers from the Russian archives, photocopies of which were supplied to the Library of Congress by General Dmitriy Volkogonov. Copies of them are also in other libraries. I used them in the National Security Archive in Washington. Chagin, who welcomed Khrushchev’s speech to the 1956 Party Congress, was at the time of his meeting with Stalin in 1926 the editor of a newspaper, Krasnaya gazeta. • 7. Brandenberger, ‘Stalin as Symbol’, p. 250. • 8. Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind: Studies in Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change (Praeger, New York, 1963), pp. 16–19. • 9. Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), pp. 60–1. • 10. Ibid. • 11. This was less important than his control of the unified organs of repression, for the title notwithstanding, he was not the only first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. Molotov and Bulganin were also given that title. See Robert Service, Stalin: A Biography (Macmillan, London, 2004), p. 587. • 12. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, pp. 52–3. • 13. Much of the documentary evidence for this is to be found in Nadzhafov and Belousova (eds.), Stalin i kosmopolitizm. • 14. Sergo Mikoyan, ‘Stalinism as I saw it’, in Alec Nove (ed.), The Stalin Phenomenon (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1993), pp. 152–96, at p. 157. • 15. T.H. Rigby, ‘Was Stalin a Disloyal Patron?’, in Rigby, Political Elites in the USSR: Central Leaders and Local Cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev (Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1990), pp. 127–46. • 16. Oleg V. Khlevniuk, ‘Stalin as Dictator: The personalization of power’, in Davies and Harris (eds.), Stalin: A New History, pp. 108–20, at p. 115. • 17. Rigby, ‘Was Stalin a Disloyal Patron?’, p. 143. • 18. Ibid. • 19. Nadzhafov and Belousova (eds.), Stalin i kosmopolitizm, pp. 31–2; and Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, pp. 20–1 and 75–7. • 20. Nadzhafov and Belousova (eds.), Stalin i kosmopolitizm, p. 31. • 21. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, pp. 75–6. • 22. Joshua Rubenstein, Tangled Loyalties: The Life and Times of Ilya Ehrenburg (Tauris, London, 1996), p. 262. • 23. Ibid. • 24. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, p. 75. • 25. Ibid., p. 25. • 26. In the words of two scholars whose work is based on close scrutiny of the relevant Soviet documents: ‘Rather than initiating these campaigns [against the slightest unorthodoxy on the part of the intelligentsia], as some earlier scholars have surmised, the archives show that Zhdanov was Stalin’s compliant, hard-pressed, and ultimately rather bewildered agent.’ See ibid., p. 31. • 27. Vera Dunham, In Stalin’s Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976), p. 13. • 28. Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974 (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, and Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1977), pp. 19–21. • 29. Ibid., p. 25. • 30. Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (Rupert Hart-Davis, London, 1962), pp. 155–7. • 31. Ibid., p. 162. • 32. Ibid., p. 164. A Russian scholar who has studied the relevant Soviet archives argues that it was the Yugoslav attitude to the Greek civil war, much more than any infringement of Albanian sovereignty, which enraged Stalin. He began to suspect Tito of ‘pursuing hegemonic aims in the Balkans’. See N.D. Smirnova, ‘Stalin i Balkany v 1948 g.: Problemy natsional’noy bezopasnosti SSSR’, in A.O. Chubaryan, I.V. Gayduk and N.I. Egorova (eds.), Stalinskoe desyatiletie kholodnoy voyny: fakty i gipotezy (Nauka, Moscow, 1999), pp. 36–44, at p. 42. • 33. T.V. Volokitina, ‘Stalin i smena strategicheskogo kursa Kremlya v kontse 40-kh godov: ot kompromissov k konfrontatsii’, in Chubaryan, Gayduk and Egorova (eds.), Stalinskoe desya-tiletie kholodnoy voyny, pp. 10–22, esp. p. 19. • 34. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, p. 161. • 35. Ibid., p. 159. Djilas wrote a report for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on the Moscow meeting, to which he did not have access (since by that time he had become a political dissident in Yugoslavia), while writing his Conversations with Stalin. It was retained in Tito’s personal archive and has now been translated, published in a journal of archival materials, and compared with information from other national archives, including the Soviet and Bulgarian. In essence, the passages I have cited from Djilas’s book correspond with his more official report at the time, but they are expressed more colourfully in the book. One point which is somewhat at odds with his book account of the Stalin – Dimitrov encounter is that in his 1948 report for the Central Committee he says that ‘the criticism of Dimitrov by Stalin, although rough in form, was expressed in friendly tones’. Perhaps this was an example of wishful thinking at a time when Djilas, like other Yugoslav leaders, did not yet want to think ill of Stalin and the Soviet Union. See ‘Report of Milovan Djilas about a secret Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav meeting 10 February 1948’, translated by Vladislav Zubok, Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC), No. 10, March 1998, pp. 128–34, esp. p. 132. • 36. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, p. 28. • 37. Milovan Djilas, Tito: The Story from Inside (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1981), p. 32. • 38. Milorad M. Drachkovitch, ‘Yugoslavia’, in Witold S. Sworakowski (ed.), World Communism: A Handbook 1918–1965 (Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1973), pp. 503–13, at p. 509. • 39. Zhores A. Medvedev and Roy A. Medvedev, The Unknown Stalin, translated by Ellen Dahrendorf (Tauris, London, 2003), pp. 61–2. The Medvedevs say their information came directly from Aleksei Snegov, a former Khrushchev aide, who said that this was one of five notes or letters found under a pile of newspapers in one of the drawers of

Stalin’s desk when it was being moved from the dead leader’s former study. • 40. ‘Stalin’s Plan to Assassinate Tito’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No.10, March 1998, p. 137. • 41. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, p. 29. • 42. N.S. Khrushchev, The ‘Secret’ Speech, with an Introduction by Zhores and Roy Medvedev (Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1976), pp. 61–2. • 43. R.J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – and After (Routledge, London, 2nd ed., 1997), p. 260. • 44. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, p. 30. • 45. Ibid. • 46. Ibid., p. 36. • 47. Ibid., p. 39. • 48. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, revised and expanded edition (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2005), p. 66. • 49. Cited in Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, pp. 44–5. • 50. Ibid., p. 61. • 51. Fred Singleton, Twentieth Century Yugoslavia (Macmillan, London, 1976), pp. 134–42. • 52. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, pp. 62–80; and Sharon Zukin, Beyond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975), pp. 21–5. • 53. Smirnova, ‘Stalin i Balkany v 1948 g.’, p. 43. • 54. Volokitina, ‘Stalin i smena strategi-cheskogo kursa Kremlya v kontse 40-kh godov’, p. 21. • 55. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 261–2. • 56. G.P. Murashko and A.F. Noskova, ‘Sovetskoe rukovodstvo i politicheskie protsessy T. Kostova i L. Rayka (po materialam rossiyskikh arkhivov)’, in Chubaryan, Gayduk and Egorova (eds.), Stalinskoe desya-tiletie kholodnoy voyny, pp. 23–35, esp. pp. 24–7. • 57. Roger Gough, A Good Comrade: János Kádár, Communism and Hungary (Tauris, London, 2006), p. 45. • 58. Ibid., p. 53. • 59. Ibid., p. 60. • 60. Murashko and Noskova, ‘Sovetskoe rukovodstvo i politicheskie protsessy T. Kostova i L. Rayka’, p. 31. • 61. Ibid. • 62. For a discussion of Gomuka’s arrest and imprisonment and for the range of possible reasons why he was neither tortured nor killed, see Nicholas Bethell, Gomuka: His Poland and His Communism (Pelican, Harmondsworth, rev. ed., 1972), pp. 171–93. • 63. Ibid., pp. 184–5. • 64. Eric D. Weitz, Creating German Communism, 1890–1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997), pp. 360–1. • 65. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 263. • 66. There is much evidence for this in Chubaryan, Gayduk and Egorova (eds.), Stalinskoe desyatiletie kholodnoy voyny. See, for example, the chapter by Murashko and Noskova, p. 33. • 67. Edward Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948–1960 (Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 102–3. • 68. Jií Pelikán (ed.), The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 1950–1954: The Suppressed Report of the Dubek Government’s Commission of Inquiry, 1968 (Macdonald, London, 1971), p. 104. • 69. Ibid., p. 106. • 70. Ibid., p. 110. • 71. See Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 262–4; Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia, pp. 75–6; and Karel Bartošek, ‘Central and Southeastern Europe’, in Stéphane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panné, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartošek and Jean-Louis Margolin, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1999), pp. 394–456, at pp. 433–6. • 72. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 265. • 73. Christopher Cviic, ‘The Church’, in Abraham Brumberg (ed.), Poland: Genesis of a Revolution (Vintage Books, New York, 1983), pp. 92–108, at p. 96. • 74. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 267; and Bartošek, ‘Central and Southeastern Europe’, pp. 407–37.

• 75. Khrushchev, The ‘Secret’ Speech, p. 59. • 76. Ibid. • 77. Dmitrii Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar: A Memoir of Soviet Politics under Stalin and Khrushchev, ed. Stephen V. Bittner and trans. Anthony Austin (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2007), pp. 132–54, at p. 135. • 78. Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, revised and expanded edition (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989), pp. 783–5. • 79. Khrushchev Remembers, ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott (Little, Brown, Boston, 1970), pp. 248–9. • 80. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, p. 91. • 81. Ibid., pp. 91–2. • 82. Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 250–8. Characteristically for the Brezhnev era, the last edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia – Bol’ shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, Vol. 5, 1971, p. 268; and Vol. 13, 1973, p. 560–published entries on Kuznetsov and Voznesensky without a word about how their lives ended. • 83. Khrushchev Remembers, p. 257. A post-Soviet biography of Kosygin, based on family and archival sources, comes no closer to explaining how he survived, though it makes plain that for many months he believed that he was liable to be arrested at any moment: V.I. Andriyanov, Kosygin (Molodaya gvardiya, Moscow, 2003), pp. 118–25. • 84. Geoffrey Hosking, Rulers and Victims: The Russians in the Soviet Union (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2006), p. 264. The fullest documentary account of the planning and execution of the campaign from within the Central Committee of the party is to be found in Nadzhafov and Belousova (eds.), Stalin i kosmopolitizm, op. cit. • 85. Nadzhafov and Belousova (eds.), Stalin i kosmopolitizm, p. 15; and Josephine Woll, ‘The Politics of Culture, 1945–2000’, in Ronald G. Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia. Volume III: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), pp. 605–35, at pp. 608–9. • 86. Nadzhafov and Belousova (eds.), Stalin i kosmopolitizm, pp. 221 and 667. • 87. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, pp. 156 and 217. • 88. Ibid. • 89. Nadzhafov and Belousova (eds.), Stalin i kosmopolitizm, pp. 651–2. • 90. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, pp. 158–9. • 91. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939–1956 (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994), pp. 213–16. • 92. Ibid., pp. 203 and 216. • 93. Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar, p. 118. • 94. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 207–8. See also Loren R. Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993); Zhores Medvedev, ‘Stalin and Lysenko’, in Medvedev and Medvedev, The Unknown Stalin, pp. 181–99; and Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar, pp. 115–28. • 95. Max Hayward, Writers in Russia: 1917–1978, edited with an introduction by Patricia Blake (Harvill, London, 1983), p. 158. • 96. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, pp. 162 and 222; and Service, Stalin, pp. 581–90. • 97. In Khrushchev’s words: ‘When Stalin died, 109 people were killed. 109 people died because everyone moved like a mob and smothered them.’ See ‘Khrushchev’s Second Secret Speech’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 10, March 1998, pp. 44–9, at p. 47. • 98. See the account of one of those who was in that crowd: Zdenk Mlynár?, Nightfrost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism (Hurst, London, 1980), pp. 24–6; and also Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar, p. 31. • 99. John Gooding, Socialism in Russia: Lenin and his Legacy, 1890–1991 (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 140–1. • 100 Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar, pp. 1, 5 and 19–21.

13 Khrushchev and the Twentieth Party Congress

1. William J. Tompson, Khrushchev: A Political Life (Macmillan, London, 1995), pp. 114–15; and William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (Free Press, New York, 2003), p. 240. • 2. Tompson, Khrushchev, p. 118. • 3. See V. Naumov and Yu. Sigachev (eds.), Lavrentiy Beriya 1953. Stenogramma iyul’ skogo plenuma TsK KPSS i drugie dokumenty (Mezhdunarodnyy fond ‘Demokratiya’, Moscow, 1999), esp. p. 111. • 4. Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 244–9. Nikita Khrushchev has provided his own colourful account of the post-Stalin power struggles in Khrushchev Remembers (Little, Brown, Boston, 1970), pp. 306–41. An account which partly confirms and partly contradicts Khrushchev is that of Dmitrii Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar: A Memoir of Soviet Politics under Stalin and Khrushchev (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2007), pp. 244–76. Some of the struggle emerges in a large collection of Soviet archival documents, in which Presidium of the Central Committee sessions are reported, sometimes in note form, at other times with verbatim speech: A.A. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964: Chernovye protokol’nye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy (Rosspen, Moscow, 2004). • 5. Khrushchev’s son provides both a memoir of his father and a discussion of the progress and fate of his father’s memoirs in Sergei Khrushchev, Khrushchev on Khrushchev: An Inside Account of the Man and His Era, edited and translated by William Taubman (Little, Brown, Boston, 1990). Digitized versions of the tapes and complete printed transcripts are kept in the John Hay Library of Brown University in the United States. Sergei Khrushchev, who is now an American citizen, is associated with that university. • 6. Khrushchev Remembers, p. 301. • 7. Ibid., p. 303. • 8. Ibid., p. 276. • 9. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, p. 5. • 10. Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle 1945–1953 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), p. 222. • 11. Ibid., p. 166. • 12. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, p. 883. • 13. Khrushchev’s conversation on the arrest of Beria (one of his favourite topics) with Shepilov: Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar, p. 264. • 14. Ibid., pp. 266–7. • 15. Ibid., p. 267. • 16. Taubman, Khrushchev, p. 253. • 17. Ibid., pp. 254–5. See also Timothy K. Blauvelt, ‘Patronage and Betrayal in the post-Stalin succession: The case of Kruglov and Serov’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1, March 2008, pp. 105–20. • 18. Ibid., p. 256. • 19. Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar, pp. 269–70; and Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era, p. 256. • 20. Fursenko, Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, p. 1195. • 21. Naumov and Sigachev (eds.), Lavrentiy Beriya 1953, p. 88. • 22. Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 256–7. • 23. Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar, p. 275. • 24. Khrushchev’s major biographer, William Taubman, notes: ‘Khrushchev and Malenkov each claimed he led the coup against Beria. Molotov, who hated them both, and Mikoyan, who got along with both, confirmed Khrushchev’s account’ (Khrushchev, p. 250). • 25. T.H. Rigby, Political Elites in the USSR: Central leaders and local cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev (Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1990), pp. 150–1. • 26. Ibid., pp. 154–5. • 27. Key documents from the Soviet archives on this are translated and published in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 10, March 1998, pp. 72–98. • 28. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, p. 42. • 29. Ibid., p. 45. • 30. Ibid., p. 893. • 31. Joshua Rubenstein, Tangled Loyalties: The Life and

Times of Ilya Ehrenburg (Tauris, London, 1996), pp. 278–82. • 32. Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era (Little, Brown, Boston, 1990), p. 74. • 33. Ibid., p. 71. • 34. A. Artizov, Yu. Sigachev, I. Shevchuk and V. Khlopov (eds.), Reabilitatsiya: kak eto bylo. Fevral’ 1956–nachalo 80-kh godov (Materik, Moscow, 2003), p. 71. • 35. N.S. Khrushchev, The Secret Speech (Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1976), p. 45. • 36. Artizov et al., Reabilitatsiya: kak eto bylo, pp. 192–3. I am grateful to Yoram Gorlizki for drawing my attention to this work and to the great disparity in the numbers of people who were released from the Gulag as compared with the minority who were formally rehabilitated. Cf. Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A History (Penguin, London, 2003), pp. 456–7. • 37. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (André Deutsch, London, 1974), pp. 78–9. • 38. Ibid., p. 81. • 39. Fursenko, Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, pp. 879–80. • 40. Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar, pp. 276 and 304–5. • 41. Fursenko, Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, pp. 19–24. • 42. Ibid., pp. 35–40 and 886–7. • 43. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (Norton, New York, 2006), p. 21. • 44. Fursenko, Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, pp. 35–6. • 45. The evidence is to be found in the reports of the meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee, published for the first time in Russia comparatively recently. See Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, pp. 88–106. • 46. Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, Tak bylo: Razmyshleniya o minuvshem (Vagrius, Moscow, 1999), pp. 597–8. • 47. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, p. 96. • 48. Mikoyan, Tak bylo, p. 594. • 49. Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar, p. 392; and Mikoyan, Tak bylo, p. 592. • 50. Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar, pp. 391–2; and Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 274–83. • 51. Mikoyan, Tak bylo, p. 594. In the first volume of his memoirs, Khrushchev says that he raised the issue of a speech criticizing Stalin with the party Presidium only after the Twentieth Congress was under way. The documentary evidence (note 52) shows that it was agreed in the Presidium on 13 February 1956, the day before the congress opened, that such a speech would be made and that the speaker would be Khrushchev. However, Khrushchev had no access to documents when he was dictating his memoirs and his memory (which, in general, was remarkably good) let him down at times. He would appear to be unreliable also when he states there that he had wanted Pospelov to deliver the speech but was prevailed upon by his colleagues to make it himself. Mikoyan’s account is more convincing. Where Khrushchev’s memory coincides perfectly with that of Mikoyan (ibid.) is in his observation that Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov were opposed to such a speech being made at all. See Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 347–53. • 52. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, p. 106. • 53. Taubman, Khrushchev, p. 271. • 54. Ibid. • 55. Tompson, Khrushchev, p. 156. Tompson says that if Mikoyan spoke after the Presidium had taken a decision in favour of Khrushchev delivering his speech to the final closed session, ‘then he may have been testing the waters for Khrushchev himself’. He may, indeed, for we now know that the Presidium gave its approval to Khrushchev delivering his Secret Speech three days before Mikoyan’s intervention. • 56. Mikoyan, Tak bylo, pp. 594–5. • 57. Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 283–4. • 58. The report was published in a journal of the Central Committee of the CPSU which existed in the last three years of the Soviet Union’s existence: ‘O kul’te lichnosti i ego posledstviyakh. Doklad Pervogo sekretarya TsK KPSS N.S. Khrushcheva XX s”ezdu KPSS 25 fevralya 1956 g.’, Izvestiya TsK KPSS, No. 3, 1989, pp. 128–70. Among several English-language editions of the speech is that edited by Roy and Zhores Medvedev and published on the twentieth anniversary of the speech – already cited in note 37. • 59. Khrushchev, The Secret Speech, pp. 40–1. • 60. Ibid., pp. 41–2. • 61. Ibid., p. 67.

14 Zig-zags on the Road to ‘communism’

1. Apart from his political journalism, Orwell, of course, provided profound insight into, and scathing condemnation of, the Soviet system as it had developed under Stalin in his most famous novels, Animal Farm, first published in 1945, and Nineteen Eighty-Four, completed in 1948 (and the title chosen by reversing the last two numbers) and first published in 1949. • 2. Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953); and Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (Macmillan, London, 1958). • 3. William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (Norton, New York, 2003), pp. 285–7. • 4. Ibid., pp. 316–17. • 5. See Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, Tak bylo: razmyshleniya o minuvshem (Vagrius, Moscow, 1999), p. 597. • 6. Dmitrii Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar: A Memoir of Soviet Politics under Stalin and Khrushchev (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2007), p. 397. • 7. Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 310 and 319. • 8. Mikoyan, Tak bylo, p. 600. • 9. Ibid., p. 599. • 10. Taubman, Khrushchev, p. 314. • 11. The plenum lasted from 22 to 29 June. A transcript of the proceedings was published in post-Soviet Russia. See N. Kovaleva, A. Korotkov, S. Mel’chin, Yu. Sigachev and A. Stepanov (eds.), Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich 1957. Stenogramma iyun’skogo plenuma TsK KPSS i drugie dokumenty (Mezhdunarodnyy fond ‘Demokratiya’, Moscow, 1998). • 12. William J. Tompson, Khrushchev: A Political Life (Macmillan, London, 1995), p. 181. • 13. Ibid., p. 182. • 14. Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar, esp. pp. 277–314 and 387–400. • 15. Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 310–11. • 16. See Robert V. Daniels, ‘Stalin’s Rise to Dictatorship, 1922–29’, in Alexander Dallin and Alan F. Westin (eds.), Politics in the Soviet Union: 7 Cases (Harcourt, Brace & World, New York, 1966), pp. 4–5; and Daniels, Is Russia Reformable? Change and Resistance from Stalin to Gorbachev (Westview, Boulder, 1988), pp. 88–93. • 17. A.A. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964: Tom 1. Chernovye protolkol’nye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy (Rosspen, Moscow, 2004), pp. 269–73 and 1015–17. • 18. Ibid., pp. 271 and 278. • 19. Ibid., p. 277. • 20. ‘Vystuplenie Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuza G.Kh. Zhukova na sobranii partiynogo aktiva Ministerstva oborony i Moskovskogo garnizona 2 iyulya 1957 g.’, Volkogonov Papers, R 9191, National Security Archive, Washington DC., esp. p. 21. • 21. Ibid., p. 20. • 22. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, p. 279. • 23. Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 362–3. • 24. Ibid., p. 363. • 25. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (André Deutsch, London, 1974), pp. 17–18. • 26. Mikoyan, Tak bylo, p. 608–11. • 27. Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 285 and 301. • 28. Veljko Miunovi, Moscow Diary (Chatto and Windus, London, 1980), p. 187. • 29. Ibid., p. 188. • 30. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, p.

67. • 31. Ibid., pp. 530–1 (italics in original). • 32. Robert C. Tucker has an illuminating discussion of this in his ‘The Image of Dual Russia’, in Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (Praeger, New York, 1963), pp. 69–90, esp. pp. 87–9. • 33. As Khrushchev put it: ‘In connection with Doctor Zhivago, some might say it’s too late for me to express regret that the book wasn’t published. Yes, maybe it is too late. But better late than never’ (Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, p. 77). Khrushchev gives a fuller account of the Pasternak affair in the third volume of his memoirs: Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Little, Brown, Boston, 1990), pp. 195–201. • 34. Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 384–8. • 35. See Priscilla Johnson and Leopold Labedz (eds.), Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962–1964 (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965), esp. pp. 120–2 and 186–210. • 36. Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961), p. 128. • 37. Ibid., p. 62 (italics in original). • 38. Ibid., p. 123 (italics in original). • 39. Ibid., p. 127. • 40. Ibid., pp. 62 and 85. • 41. Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 514–15. • 42. On the Moscow housing boom of the Khrushchev era, see Timothy J. Colton, Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1995), pp. 367–76. • 43. William Taubman, ‘The Khrushchev period, 1953–1964’, in Ronald G. Suny, The Cambridge History of Russia. Volume III: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), pp. 268–91, at p. 280. • 44. See T.H. Rigby, The Changing Soviet System: Mono-Organisational Socialism from its Origins to Gorbachev’s Restructuring (Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1990), p. 215. • 45. For a good account, see Robert J. Osborn, Soviet Social Policies: Welfare, Equality, and Community (Dorsey Press, Homewood, Ill. 1970), pp. 95–135 (‘Equality of Educational Choice’). • 46. Michael Bourdeaux, ‘Religion’, in Archie Brown and Michael Kaser (eds.), The Soviet Union since the Fall of Khrushchev (Macmillan, London, 2nd ed., 1978), pp. 156–80, at p. 156. • 47. Ibid. • 48. Alec Nove, An Economic History of the U.S.S.R (Pelican, Harmondsworth, 1972), p. 331. • 49. Ibid., pp. 331–2. • 50. David Holloway, ‘Science, Technology, and Modernity’, in Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume III: The Twentieth Century, pp. 549–78, at pp. 562–3. • 51. Loren R. Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993), pp. 257–9. • 52. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, p. 448. • 53. Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2007), p. 138. • 54. Ibid., pp. 149–51; and Mikoyan, Tak bylo, p. 606. • 55. Zubok, A Failed Empire, pp. 151–2. See also Vojtech Mastny, ‘The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: A Missed Opportunity for Détente?’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, Winter 2008, pp. 3–25. • 56. Solzhenitsyn published a fascinating account of Soviet literary politics, including the campaign to get this, his first published work in the Soviet Union, into print. See Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and the Calf: Sketches of Literary Life in the Soviet Union, translated by Harry Willetts (Collins and Harvill Press, London, 1980). He provides in this book an affectionate, but not uncritical, account of Tvardovsky, but is much less generous to Khrushchev’s aide Lebedev, who on a number of occasions pushed wider the limits on what could be published in the Soviet Union. • 57. Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 588–602. • 58. Johnson and Labedz (eds.), Khrushchev and the Arts,

pp. 120–2. • 59. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, p. 80. • 60. Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 519–23; and Mikoyan, Tak bylo, pp. 610–11. Mikoyan accompanied Kozlov to Novocherkassk and urged restraint, but Kozlov had no compunction about authorizing the use of armed force in which between twenty and thirty people died. • 61. Report from Novocherkassk of 7 June 1962 from Deputy Chairman of the KGB, P. Ivashutin, Volkogonov Papers R 3305, National Security Archive. • 62. Taubman, Khrushchev, p. 617. • 63. Mikoyan, Tak bylo, p. 615. • 64. Taubman, Khrushchev, p. 5. • 65. Ibid., pp. 3–17; and Sergei Khrushchev, Khrushchev on Khrushchev: An Inside Account of the Man and His Era (Little, Brown, Boston, 1990), pp. 83–162. • 66. Tompson, Khrushchev, p. 276. Tompson adds (p. 277): ‘Khrushchev must also have known that in an earlier time he would undoubtedly have been shot after his removal from office.’

15 Revisionism and Revolution in Eastern Europe

1. V. Naumov and Yu. Sigachev (eds.), Lavrentiy Beriya 1953. Stenogramma iyul’skogo plenuma TsK KPSS i drugie dokumenty (Mezhdunarodnyy fond ‘Demokratiya’, Moscow, 1999), p. 111. • 2. Alexey Filitov, ‘“Germany Will Be a Bourgeois-Democratic Republic”: The New Evidence from the Personal File of Georgiy Malenkov’, Cold War History, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2006, pp. 549–57, at pp. 550 and 553. • 3. Ibid., pp. 350–1. • 4. Ibid., p. 353. • 5. Ibid., pp. 549–51. See also the discussion of the confused policy-making process in the party Presidium in Moscow at this time, based on archival evidence, in Christian F. Ostermann, ‘“This is not a Politburo, But a Madhouse”: The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle. Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin (CWIHPB), No. 10, 1998, pp. 61–72. • 6. Filitov, ‘“Germany Will Be a Bourgeois-Democratic Republic”’, p. 554. • 7. ‘Memorandum of V. Chuikov, P. Iudin and L. Il’ichev to G.M. Malenkov, 18 May 1953’, in CWIHPB, No. 10, 1998, pp. 74–8. • 8. Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953–1961 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003), pp. 25–48; Peter Pulzer, German Politics 1945–1995 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995), pp. 95–7; and Eric D. Weitz, Creating German Communism 1890–1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997), p. 360. • 9. Weitz, Creating German Communism, p. 362. • 10. Otto Ul, ‘Pilsen: The Unknown Revolt’, Problems of Communism, Vol. XIV, No. 3, May – June 1965, pp. 46–9, at p. 49. Ul was an assistant judge in Pilsen in the immediate aftermath of the disturbances and attended the trials of those who took part in the revolt. He also had access to the secret documentation, and his account of the event, from which my summary of it is drawn, is well informed. Later Ul became a professor of political science in the United States and the author of Politics in Czechoslovakia (W.H. Freeman, San Francisco, 1974). • 11. Leszek Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Vol. III: The Breakdown (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978), pp. 173–4. • 12. Ibid., p. 174. • 13. Victor Sebestyen, Twelve Days: Revolution in 1956. How the Hungarians tried to topple their Soviet masters (Phoenix, London, 2007), p. 102. • 14. Ibid., pp. 102–3. • 15. Peter Raina, Political Opposition in

Poland 1954–1977 (Poets and Painters Press, London, 1978), pp. 30–1. • 16. János Kornai, By Force of Thought: Irregular Memoirs of an Intellectual Journey (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2006), p. 63. • 17. Ibid. • 18. I remember seeing on my first study visit to Prague in March 1965 a window display of Brus’s books, translated into Czech. He was one of the influences on the Czech economic reformers of the second half of the 1960s – not least on their leading spokesman, Ota Šik. • 19. Sebestyen, Twelve Days, pp. 77–8. • 20. Kornai, By Force of Thought, p. 57. • 21. Sebestyen, Twelve Days, p. 27. • 22. Ibid., p. 17. • 23. Phyllis Auty, Tito: A Biography (Longman, London, 1970), pp. 258–9. • 24. Tony Kemp-Welch, ‘Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” and Polish Politics: The Spring of 1956’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1996, pp. 181–206, at pp. 186–7; and Norman Davies, God’s Playground. A History of Poland: Volume II: 1979 to the Present (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981), p. 583. • 25. Raina, Political Opposition in Poland 1954–1977, pp. 42–3. • 26. Kemp-Welch, ‘Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” and Polish Politics’, p. 199. • 27. I am indebted to Mark Kramer (personal communication of 6 May 2008) for the figure of ‘at least 74’ dead. Archival material from Pozna has made clear that the long-accepted figure of fifty-three who lost their lives was significantly understated. See also Mark Kramer, ‘New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises’, CWIHPB, Nos. 8–9, 1996–97, pp. 358–84; and Kramer, ‘The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1998, pp. 163–214. • 28. Kramer, ‘New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making…’. • 29. Ibid., p. 361. • 30. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (André Deutsch, London, 1974), p. 205. • 31. Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism: Vol. III, p. 454. • 32. Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2006), pp. 36–7. • 33. Ibid., pp. 37 and 224–6. • 34. Roger Gough, A Good Comrade: János Kádár, Communism and Hungary (Tauris, London, 2006), p. 98. • 35.Gati, Failed Illusions, p. 138. • 36. Ibid. • 37. Ibid., pp. 131–2. • 38. Sebestyen, Twelve Days, pp. 96–7. • 39. Ibid., p. 99. • 40. Ibid., pp. 303–4. • 41. Ibid., pp. 115–17. • 42. Ibid., pp. 124–5. • 43. Ferenc A. Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961), pp. 284–305. • 44. Mikoyan and Suslov’s Letter to the CC CPSU on Situation in Budapest, 25 October 1956, Volkogonov Papers, R 2476, National Security Archive, Washington DC. • 45. A.S. Stykalin, ‘Soviet – Yugoslav Relations and the Case of Imre Nagy’, Cold War History, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2005, pp. 3–22; and Péter Vámos, ‘Evolution and Revolution: Sino-Hungarian Relations and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution’, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 54, November 2006 (Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC). • 46. Csaba Békés, ‘The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality’, Cold War History, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2006, pp. 477–500, at p. 482. • 47. A. Stykalin, ‘The Hungarian Crisis of 1956: The Soviet Role in the Light of New Archival Documents’, Cold War History, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2002, pp. 113–44, at pp. 132–3. • 48. Gati, Failed Illusions, p. 177; and Stykalin, ‘The Hungarian Crisis of 1956’, pp. 134–5. • 49. Kramer, ‘The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland’, pp. 192–3. • 50. See, for example, the testimony of the Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow, Velko Miunovi, a former Partisan who enjoyed relations of trust with Tito, in Miunovi, Moscow Diary (Chatto &

Windus, London, 1980), pp. 134–46. See also Gati, Failed Illusions, p. 192. • 51. Békés, ‘The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality’, p. 483. • 52. Miunovi, Moscow Diary, p. 134. • 53. Sir Brian Barder, cited by Keith Kyle, ‘To Suez with Tears’, in Wm Roger Louis (ed.), More Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain (Tauris, London, 2003), pp. 265–81, at p. 272. • 54. Stykalin, ‘The Hungarian Crisis of 1956’, pp. 136–7; Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez (Constable, London, 1967); and Kyle, ‘To Suez with Tears’. • 55. Békés, ‘The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality’, p. 491. • 56. Gati, Failed Illusions, pp. 192–3. • 57. From the protocol of the meeting of Kádár and Ferenc Münnich with the Soviet leadership in Moscow, 3 November 1956, in A.A. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, Tom 1 (Rosspen, Moscow, 2004), p. 200. • 58. Kramer, ‘New Evidence’, p. 363. • 59. Gough, A Good Comrade, pp. 93–4. • 60. Ibid., p, 372; Anastas Mikoyan, Tak bylo: Razmyshleniya o minuvshem (Vagrius, Moscow, 1999), p. 598; and William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (Free Press, New York, 2003), p. 298. • 61. Kramer, ‘New Evidence’, pp. 371–2 and 376. • 62. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, pp. 193–201; and Kramer, ‘New Evidence’, pp. 372–3. • 63. Gough, A Good Comrade, p. 98. • 64. Ibid. • 65. Rudolf L. Tokés, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), p. 15. • 66. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, pp. 201–2. • 67. Khrushchev Remembers (Little, Brown, Boston, 1970), p. 425. • 68. Ibid., p. 424. • 69. Kramer, ‘New Evidence’, p. 376; and Tokés, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution, pp. 13–14. • 70. Tokés, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution, p. 13. • 71. Stykalin, ‘Soviet – Yugoslav Relations and the Case of Imre Nagy’, p. 14. • 72. Sebestyen, Twelve Days, p. 292. • 73. Ibid. • 74. Gati, Failed Illusions, p. 3. • 75. Ibid., pp. 2 and 90. Gati observes (p. 2): ‘the more evident goal was to satisfy the far-right wing of the Republican Party led by Senator Joseph McCarthy and roll back the Democrats from Capitol Hill – rather than liberate Central and Eastern Europe from Soviet domination’. • 76. Ibid., p. 101. For a carefully nuanced discussion of Hungarian RFE broadcasts at the time of the Hungarian revolution, which partly disagrees with Gati’s assessment, see A. Ross Johnson, ‘Setting the Record Straight: Role of Radio Free Europe in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956’, Occasional Paper No. 3, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, October 2006. • 77. Gati, Failed Illusions, p. 109. For the social composition of the active Hungarian insurgents, see the survey-based data in Bennett Korvig, Communism in Hungary: From Kun to Kádár (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1979), p. 310. • 78. Sebestyen, Twelve Days, pp. 34–7 and 258–9. • 79. Ibid., p. 266. • 80. Kramer, ‘New Evidence’, p. 377. • 81. Ibid. • 82. J.F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule (Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1988), pp. 160–1. • 83. Gough, A Good Comrade, p. 120. • 84. Ibid., p. 256. • 85. Ibid., p. xi.

16 Cuba: A Caribbean Communist State

1. Along with other revolutionary parties and student groups, Communists were, however, active in urban resistance and played a rather greater part in undermining the pre-Castro regime than post-revolutionary Cuban historiography acknowledges. • 2. Volker Skierka, Fidel Castro: A Biography, translated by Patrick Camiller (Polity, Cambridge, 2004), pp. 15–17; and Fidel Castro, My Life, ed. Ignacio Ramonet and trans. Andrew Hurley (revised edition, Allen Lane, London, 2007), pp. 2, 6 and 21–2. • 3. Alan Angell, ‘The Left in Latin America since c. 1920’, in Leslie Bethell (ed.), The Cambridge History of Latin America. Vol. IV, Part 2: Politics and Society (Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 163–232, at p. 176. • 4. Skierka, Fidel Castro, pp. 6–7. • 5. Ibid., pp. 10–20. • 6. Ibid., p. 5. In the letter to the American president, Castro understated his age, saying that he was a twelve-year-old. • 7. Castro, My Life, pp. 80–1. • 8. Skierka, Fidel Castro, p. 24. • 9. Ibid., pp. 30 and 32. • 10. There is a slight discrepancy between the numbers of men with whom Castro mounted the attack as related in Castro’s memoirs and in the account of his recent major biographer. The discrepancy is greater in their accounts of the number of soldiers in the barracks. Volker Skierka puts the number of government troops billeted there at 700, whereas Castro says there were 1,500. Cf. Skierka, Fidel Castro, p. 34; and Castro, My Life, pp. 121–2. • 11. Skierka, Fidel Castro, pp. 34–7; Fidel Castro, History Will Absolve Me (Jonathan Cape, London, 1968); and Castro, My Life, pp. 104–34. • 12. Castro, History Will Absolve Me, p. 104. Some accounts of the speech describe it as lasting four hours, others say five hours. Castro spoke extemporaneously and the speech was not recorded. He wrote it up in prison and it was smuggled out in matchboxes for publication (Skierka, Fidel Castro, p. 36). • 13. Castro, History Will Absolve Me, p. 103. • 14. Skierka, Fidel Castro, pp. 38–9. • 15. Ibid., pp. 40–1. • 16. Castro, My Life, p. 182; and Skierka, Fidel Castro, pp. 46–7. • 17. Luis E. Aguilar, ‘Currents in Latin America: Fragmentation of the Marxist Left’, Problems of Communism, Vol. XIX, No. 4, July – August 1970, pp. 1–12, at p. 7. • 18. Skierka, Fidel Castro, pp. 56–7. • 19. Robert F. Lamberg, ‘Che in Bolivia: The “Revolution” That Failed’, Problems of Communism, Vol. XIX, No. 4, July – August 1970, pp. 25–37, at p. 36. There was also revolutionary activity in the towns, including general strikes, which were unconnected with Castro’s revolutionary group. This, too, helped to undermine the old regime. • 20. Skierka, Fidel Castro, pp. 60–1. • 21. Ibid., p. 61. • 22. Ibid., pp. 68–9. • 23. Castro, My Life, p. 203. • 24. Skierka, Fidel Castro, p. 69. • 25. Castro, My Life, pp. 146–57. • 26. Ibid., p. 157. • 27. Karl E. Meyer, ‘Cuba’s Charismatic Communism’, Problems of Communism, Vol. XI, No. 6, November – December 1962, pp. 44–5. • 28. Theodore Draper, quoted in ibid., p. 45. • 29. Skierka, Fidel Castro, p. 72. • 30. Ibid., pp. 72–3. • 31. Ibid., p. 76. • 32. Ibid., p. 82. • 33. Ibid., pp. 84–5. • 34. Ibid., pp. 87–9. • 35. Ibid., p. 89. • 36. Kevin Devlin, ‘The Permanent Revolutionism of Fidel Castro’, Problems of Communism, Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1968, pp. 1–11, at p. 2; and Skierka, Fidel Castro, p. 196. • 37. Castro, My Life, p. 272; and Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (Norton, New York, 2006), p. 436. • 38. Aleksandr Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, Tom 1: Chernovye protokol’nye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy (Rosspen, Moscow, 2004), p. 556; Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, pp. 426–507; and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, Tak bylo: Razmyshleniya o minuvshem (Vagrius, Moscow, 1999), p. 606. • 39. Castro, My Life, p. 258. • 40. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, p. 490. • 41. Mikoyan, Tak bylo, p. 606. The notes taken of the long discussions

on the Cuban crisis in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU were far from full. They are reproduced in Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, pp. 617–25. • 42. Castro, My Life, p. 283–4. • 43. Melvin P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (Hill and Wang, New York, 2007), p. 166. • 44. Ibid., pp. 166–7; and Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2007), pp. 149–53. • 45. Castro, My Life, pp. 285–6. • 46. Ibid., p. 288. Castro added that this had to be borne in mind when comparisons were made with Eastern Europe, where at one time there were ‘attempts to construct Socialism’ but where they ‘are now attempting to construct capitalism’. • 47. Ibid., p. 248. • 48. Ibid. • 49. Skierka, Fidel Castro, pp. 163–5. • 50. Ibid., p. 165. • 51. From Granma, 19 March 1967, cited in Devlin, ‘The Permanent Revolutionism of Fidel Castro’, p. 4. • 52. Daniela Spenser, ‘The Caribbean Crisis: Catalyst for Soviet Projection in Latin America’, in Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, In From the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War (Duke University Press, Durham NC, 2008), pp. 102–4. • 53. Castro, My Life, p. 580. • 54. Ibid., pp. 174–6. • 55. Carlos Acosta, Carlos Acosta: A Cuban Dancer’s Tale (HarperCollins, London, 2007), p. 32. • 56. Edward Gonzalez, ‘Castro and Cuba’s New Orthodoxy’, Problems of Communism, Vol. XXV, No. 1, January – February 1976, pp. 1–19, at p. 5. • 57. Ibid., pp. 7–9. • 58. Skierka, Fidel Castro, p. 220. • 59. Jorge I. Domínguez, ‘Cuba in the 1980’s’, Problems of Communism, Vol. XXX, No. 2, March – April 1981, pp. 48–59, at p. 52. • 60. Angell, ‘The Left in Latin America’, p. 210. • 61. Piero Gleijeses, ‘The View from Havana: Lessons from Cuba’s African Journey, 1959–1976’, in Joseph and Spenser (eds.), In From the Cold, pp. 112–33, at p. 119. • 62. Ibid., pp. 120–2. • 63. Ibid., pp. 123–4. • 64. Ibid., p. 129. • 65. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986) (Random House, New York, 1995), p. 362. • 66. Ibid., pp. 362–3. • 67. Domínguez, ‘Cuba in the 1980’s’, p. 57. • 68. ‘The Cuban Paradox’, Harvard Public Health Review, Summer 2002: http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/review/review_summer_02/677cuba.html. • 69. See Gloria Giraldo, ‘Cuba Rising in Major UN Indices’, MEDICC Review, 9 April 2007; Marc Schenker, ‘Cuban Public Health: A Model for the US?’, from CIA World Factbook, 2001 and schenker.ucdavis.edu/CubaPublicHealth.ppt; Castro, My Life, pp. 585 and 709 (n. 14); and Skierka, Fidel Castro, p. 302. • 70. William Leogrande, ‘Republic of Cuba’, in Bogdan Szajkowski (ed.), Marxist Governments: A World Survey, Vol. 2 (Macmillan, London, 1981), pp. 237–60, at p. 251. • 71. Domínguez, ‘Cuba in the 1980’s’, p. 57. • 72. Pascal Fontaine, ‘Communism in Latin America’, in Stéphane Courtois et al., The Black Book of Communism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1999), pp. 647–82, at pp. 661–2; and Skierka, Fidel Castro, pp. 87 and 227. • 73. Skierka, Fidel Castro, p. 87. • 74. Ibid., p. 245.

17 China: From the ‘Hundred Flowers’ to ‘Cultural Revolution’

1. Craig Dietrich, People’s China: A Brief History (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 3rd ed., 1998), p. 84. • 2. Ibid., pp. 86–9. • 3. Frederick C. Teiwes, ‘The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, 1949–1957’, in Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd ed., 1997), p. 67. • 4. Dietrich, People’s China, p. 89. • 5. Ibid., p. 90. • 6. Ibid., p. 91. • 7. Teiwes, ‘The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime’, pp. 73–4. • 8. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Deutsch, London, 1974), p. 253. • 9. Ibid., pp. 76–7. • 10. Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), pp. 189–90; John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2nd enlarged ed., 2006), p. 364; and Lowell Dittmer, ‘Pitfalls of Charisma’, in The China Journal, No. 55, January 2006, p. 124. • 11. Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008), p. 71; and Dietrich, People’s China, p. 113. • 12. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, pp. 271–2. • 13. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, p. 72. • 14. Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, pp. 80–1. • 15. Dietrich, People’s China, p. 118. • 16. Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan’an Leadership 1958–1965’, in MacFarquhar (ed.), The Politics of China, pp. 87–147, at p. 88; and Dietrich, People’s China, p. 123. • 17. Mitter, A Bitter Revolution, pp. 196–7; Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2006), p. 2008; Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, pp. 116–18; and Jonathan Fenby, The Penguin History of Modern China: The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850–2008 (Allen Lane, London, 2008), pp. 415–16. Fenby cites a secret CCP report which puts the death toll from the famine at over forty million. • 18. Lieberthal, ‘The Great Leap Forward’, pp. 103–4. • 19. Ibid., p. 112. • 20. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, pp. 114–18; and Dietrich, People’s China, pp. 136–8. • 21. Lieberthal, ‘The Great Leap Forward’, pp. 116–22. • 22. Mao’s ambition to take over the leadership of the Communist world doubtless began earlier – shortly after the death of Stalin. See Mercy A. Kuo, Contending with Contradictions: China’s Policy toward Soviet Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1953–1960 (Lexington Books, Lanham and Oxford, 2001). • 23. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, pp. 73–4. • 24. Ibid., p. 77. • 25. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, p. 255. • 26. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, pp. 81–2. • 27. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, p. 259. See also William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (Simon & Schuster, London, 2003), pp. 388–92. • 28. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, pp. 136–8. • 29. ‘Memorandum of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Beijing’, 3 October 1959 (Cold War International History Project Virtual Archive, National Security Archive, Washington DC, R 9204), pp. 1–13, at p. 5. • 30. Ibid., pp. 6 and 9. • 31. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, pp. 172–3. • 32. Ibid., pp. 174–5. • 33. Ibid., p. 177. • 34. Ibid., p. 244. • 35. Ibid., p. 264. • 36. Ibid., p. 285. • 37. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, p. 9. • 38. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, pp. 289–90. • 39. At times of crisis in his relations with the United States – as in 1954–55 and 1958–Mao was careful not to risk provoking an American attack. See Steve Tsang, The Cold War’s Odd Couple: The Unintended Partnership between the Republic of China and the UK, 1950–1958 (Tauris, London, 2006), pp. 115–51. • 40. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, p. 8. • 41. Dietrich, People’s China, p. 179. • 42. Ibid., pp.

179–80. • 43. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, p. 17. On the campaign against Wu Han more generally, ibid., pp. 15–19. • 44. Ibid., pp. 333–6. • 45. Harry Harding, ‘The Chinese State in Crisis, 1966–1969’, in MacFarquhar (ed.), The Politics of China, pp. 148–247, at p. 240. • 46. Ibid., p. 244. Some authors put the figure much higher. Jamie Morgan, in his article, ‘China’s Growing Pains: Towards the (Global) Political Economy of Domestic Social Instability’, International Politics, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2008, pp. 413–38, cites (p. 416) a figure of four million. • 47. Harding, ‘The Chinese State in Crisis, 1966–1969’, pp. 242–3. • 48. MacFarquhar and Schoenfals, Mao’s Last Revolution, pp. 358–9. • 49. Ibid., p. 409. • 50. Ibid., p. 411. • 51. Ibid., p. 20. • 52. Harding, ‘The Chinese State in Crisis’, pp. 241–2. • 53. Dietrich, People’s China, p. 187. • 54. See ‘Forum on Mao and the Cultural Revolution in China’, in Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 2008, pp. 97–130, esp. Yafeng Xia at pp. 111–12. • 55. Dietrich, People’s China, p. 256. • 56. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, p. 3. • 57. Ibid. • 58. See, for example, Fedor Burlatskiy, Mao Tsedun i ego nasledniki (Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, Moscow, 1979). For discussions of literature which used ostensible discussion of China as a way of raising issues in the Soviet context forbidden by censorship, see Gilbert Rozman, A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticisms of China (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1985); and Alexander Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia’s Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian – Chinese Relations Since the Eighteenth Century (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2003), esp. pp. 75–250. • 59. For a very readable account of Nixon’s visit to China and its implications, see Margaret MacMillan, Seize the Hour: When Nixon Met Mao (John Murray, London, 2006).

18 Communism in Asia and Africa

1. Christopher Bluth, Korea (Polity, Cambridge, 2008), p. 11. • 2. Dae-Sook Suh, ‘A Preconceived Formula for Sovietization: The Communist Takeover of North Korea’, in Thomas T. Hammond (ed.), The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971), pp. 475–89, at pp. 476–7. • 3. Ibid., pp. 483–4. • 4. Ibid., pp. 482–3. • 5. Introduction by James G. Hershberg to ‘Russian Documents on the Korean War, 1950–53’, in Cold War International History Project, No. 14/15, Winter 2003–Spring 2004, pp. 369–73; and Bluth, Korea, pp. 15–17. • 6. Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (Oxford University Press, New York, 2005), pp. 131–3. • 7. Bluth, Korea, pp. 22–32. • 8. Ibid., pp. 36–7. • 9. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (Dent, London, 1958), p. 102. Machiavelli wrote The Prince in 1513. • 10. David Hume, ‘On the First Principles of Government’, in Essays Moral, Political and Literary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963), pp. 29–34, at p. 31. These essays were first published in 1741 and 1742. • 11. William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh (Hyperion, New York, 2000), p. 64. • 12. Ibid. • 13. Ibid., p. 75. • 14. Ibid., p. 306. • 15. Ibid., pp. 321–32. • 16. Dennis J. Duncanson, ‘Vietnam: From Bolshevism to People’s War’, in Hammond (ed.), The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, pp. 490–515, at p. 506. • 17. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, pp. 397 and 443. • 18. Ibid., pp. 445–6. • 19. Ibid., pp. 455–61. • 20. Ibid., pp. 473, 477–9, 491–2, and 500–1. • 21. Duncanson, ‘Vietnam: From

Bolshevism to People’s War’, p. 51. • 22. Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972), pp. 181 and 197. • 23. Seth Jacobs, ‘“No Place to Fight a War”: Laos and the Evolution of U.S. Policy toward Vietnam, 1954–1963’, in Mark Philip Bradley and Marilyn B. Young (eds.), Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008), pp. 45–66, at p. 45. • 24. Ibid., p. 51. • 25. Ibid., pp. 46–51. • 26. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Little, Brown, Boston, 1982), p. 21. • 27. Jacobs, ‘“No Place to Fight a War”’, p. 59. • 28. Ibid., p. 49. • 29. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 18–23. • 30. Jean-Louis Margolin, ‘Vietnam and Laos: The Impasse of War Communism’, in Stéphane Courtois et al., The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1999), pp. 565–76, at pp. 575–6. • 31. Jacobs, ‘“No Place to Fight a War”’, pp. 45–6 and 59. • 32. Ibid., p. 62. • 33. Fredrik Legevall, ‘“There Ain’t No Daylight”: Lyndon Johnson and the Politics of Escalation’, in Bradley and Young (eds.), Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars, pp. 91–108, at p. 93. • 34. Gareth Porter, ‘Explaining the Vietnam War: Dominant and Contending Paradigms’, in Bradley and Young (eds.), Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars, pp. 67–90, at pp. 76–80. • 35. Cited by Legevall, ‘“There Ain’t No Daylight”’, pp. 100–1. • 36. Porter, ‘Explaining the Vietnam War’, pp. 72 and 82. • 37. Sophie Quinn-Judge, ‘Through a Glass Darkly: Reading the History of the Vietnamese Communist Party, 1945–1975’, in Bradley and Young (eds.), Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars, pp. 111–34, at p. 117. • 38. Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, ‘Cold War Contradictions: Toward an International History of the Second Indochina War, 1969–1973’, in Bradley and Young (eds.), Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars, pp. 219–49, at pp. 229–30. • 39. Quinn-Judge, ‘Through a Glass Darkly’, pp. 127 and 130. • 40. Nguyen, ‘Cold War Contradictions’, p. 235. • 41. Ibid., pp. 234–9. • 42. David W.P. Elliott, ‘Official History, Revisionist History, and Wild History’, in Bradley and Young (eds.), Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars, pp. 277–304, at p. 281. • 43. Ibid., p. 288. • 44. Ibid., p. 297. • 45. Ibid., p. 295. • 46. Jean-Louis Margolin, ‘Cambodia: The Country of Disconcerting Crimes’, in Courtois et al., The Black Book of Communism, pp. 577–635, at p. 609. • 47. Ibid., p. 581. • 48. Ibid. • 49. On the doubtful appropriateness of the term ‘genocide’ for the slaughter which ensued, see the observations of former UN Under-Secretary-General Marrack Goulding, in his book Peacemonger (John Murray, London, 2002), pp. 247–8. See also the discussion of ‘genocide’ in Margolin, ‘Cambodia’, pp. 633–5. • 50. Patrick Raszelenberg, ‘The Khmers Rouges and the Final Solution’, History and Memory, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1999, pp. 62–93, at pp. 81–2. • 51. Margolin, ‘Cambodia’, p. 582. • 52. Ibid., p. 620. • 53. Ibid., pp. 589–90 and 635. • 54. Ibid., pp. 582–3. • 55. Ibid., pp. 631–2. • 56. Goulding, Peacemonger, pp. 247–8. • 57. Ibid., p. 588. • 58. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Bantam, New York, 1982), p. 254. • 59. Ibid., p. 256. • 60. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1983), pp. 408–14. • 61. Ibid., p. 409. • 62. In his memoirs, Marrack Goulding cites this as an example of how the ‘worldwide struggle against Soviet-led Communism had distorted the values which the West itself claimed to be defending’ (Goulding, Peacemonger, p. 248). • 63. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), p. 300; Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Mohammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia

(HarperCollins, London, paperback ed., 1995), p. 234; and Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2007), p. 259. • 64. Hiro, Between Marx and Mohammad, p. 234. • 65. Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 302. • 66. Ibid., pp. 301–2. • 67. Ibid., p. 303. • 68. ‘Zapis’ besedy A.N. Kosygina, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinova, B.N. Ponomareva s N.M. Taraki 20 marta 1979 goda’, Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter HIA), Fond 89, 1.1003, opis 42, file 3, pp. 2 and 15. • 69. Ibid., p. 3. • 70. Ibid., p. 8. • 71. Ibid., p. 12. • 72. Ibid., p. 13. • 73. Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 316. • 74. Ibid., p. 313. • 75. Ibid., p. 321. • 76. Ibid. • 77. HIA, Fond 89, 1.1003, opis 42, file 10, pp. 1–2. • 78. Ibid., p. 4. • 79. Ibid., p. 5. • 80. Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 322. • 81. Ibid., p. 357. • 82. Ibid., p. 356. • 83. Hiro, Between Marx and Mohammad, pp. 237–8. • 84. Peter Berton, ‘Japanese Eurocommunists: Running in Place’, Problems of Communism, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, 1986, pp. 1–30, esp. pp. 1–3. • 85. J.A.A. Stockwin, Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Resurgent Economy (Blackwell, Oxford, 4th ed., 2008), pp. 198–9. For a useful short history of the JCP, see also Stockwin, ‘Japan Communist Party’ in Haruhiro Fukui (ed.), Political Parties of Asia and the Pacific (Greenwood Press, Westport, 1985), pp. 500–14; and Berton, ‘Japanese Eurocommunists’. • 86. Guy Pauker and Ewa Pauker, ‘Indonesia’, in Witold S. Sworakowski (ed.), World Communism: A Handbook 1918–1965 (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1973), pp. 200–5, at p. 203. • 87. Ibid., p. 204. • 88. Adam Westoby, Communism since World War II (Harvester Press, Brighton, 1981), pp. 182–5. • 89. Pauker and Pauker, ‘Indonesia’, p. 204. • 90. Westoby, Communism since World War II, p. 191. • 91. Dan Diner and Jonathan Frankel, in their essay on ‘Jews and Communism: The Utopian Temptation’, mention South Africa as one of the many places where Jews ‘were disproportionately represented in the Communist movement (be it in the total membership, the apparatus, or the leadership)’. See Frankel (ed.), Dark Times, Dire Decisions: Jews and Communism (Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), p. 3. • 92. Martin Meredith, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (Simon & Schuster, London, 2006), pp. 122–3. • 93. Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 215–16. • 94. Ibid., p. 216. • 95. Nelson Mandela, The Long Walk to Freedom (Abacus, London, 1995), p. 321. • 96. William Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2nd ed., 2001), pp. 167–8. • 97. Mandela, The Long Walk to Freedom, p. 134. • 98. Ibid., pp. 428–37. • 99. Ibid., p. 436. • 100. See Adrian Guelke, ‘The Impact of the End of the Cold War on the South African Transition’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1996, p. 97. See also Meredith, The State of Africa, pp. 434–5. • 101 Meredith, The State of Africa, pp. 385–6. • 102. A.N. Yakovlev, Gor’kaya chasha: Bol’shevizm i Reformatsiya Rossii (Verkhne-Volzhskoe izdatel’stvo, Yaroslavl’, 1994), p. 190. • 103. For discussion of these issues, see, for example, Jerry F. Hough, The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options (Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1986), esp. pp. 226–57. The argument about societies prematurely striving for socialism applied also in Asia, and such a neo-Marxist critique of Soviet orthodoxy in the Brezhnev era was developed, particularly notably, by Nodari Simonia, first at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and later at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations

(IMEMO), of which Simonia became director in the post-Soviet era. See, for example, L.I. Reysner and N.A. Simonia (eds.), Evolyutsiya vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo (Nauka, Moscow, 1984). • 104. Frederick Cooper remarks that even before Frelimo ‘dropped its Marxist-Leninist label’, the substance of the ideology ‘had long been a mixed bag’. See Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002), p. 144. • 105. Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 216–18. • 106. Ibid., pp. 244–5. • 107. Meredith, The State of Africa, pp. 311–19. • 108. Fidel Castro, My Life (Allen Lane, London, 2007), pp. 329 and 333. • 109. Ibid., p. 322. • 110. Meredith, The State of Africa, pp. 243–8. • 111. Ibid., pp. 331–42. • 112. Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 286–7 and 383–4.

19 The ‘Prague Spring’

1. I raised the theoretical possibility of a ‘Moscow Spring’, making the point that ‘a movement for democratising change can come from within a ruling Communist Party as well as through societal pressure’, in a paper I wrote for a seminar convened by the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, at Chequers on 8 September 1983. Under the UK Freedom of Information Act (2000), which became operational in 2005, the Cabinet Office and Foreign Office documents relating to that seminar have been declassified. Extensive use of them is made in Archie Brown, ‘The Change to Engagement in Britain’s Cold War Policy: The Origins of the Thatcher – Gorbachev Relationship’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2008, pp. 3–47. See also Adam Roberts, ‘International Relations after the Cold War’, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2, 2008, pp. 335–50. • 2. Jan Gross, ‘War as Revolution’, in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (eds.), The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949 (Westview, Boulder, 1997), pp. 17–40, at p. 38. • 3. Igor Lukes, ‘The Czech Road to Communism’, in Naimark and Gibianskii, pp. 243–65. • 4. Rita Klímová (née Budínová) was the person who said this to me. She was, in fact, only sixteen in February 1948, but already an enthusiastic young Communist. In 1968 her father, Stanislav Budín, was editor of one of the most reformist journals in Czechoslovakia, Reportér. Budínová (as she then was, before a second marriage in 1978) was an economist, teaching at Charles University. She was expelled from her university post and from the Communist Party in 1970. She subsequently became an active dissident. • 5. I quoted this in my tribute to Rita Klímová on her death in 1994. For that, and for Richard Davy’s accompanying obituary of Klímová, see The Independent, 7 January 1994, p. 14. • 6. In a conversation I had with him in Prague in March 1965. • 7. XIII. Sjezd Komunistiké Strany eskoslovenska, Praha 31. V.–4. VI. 1966 (Svoboda, Prague, 1966), pp. 302–9, esp. p. 309. • 8. Zdenk , Nightfrost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism, trans. Paul Wilson (Hurst, London, 1980), p. 65. • 9. Ibid., p. 66. Mlyná saw the official documents relating to the sale of the effects of those executed when he briefly worked in the procurator-general’s office in the mid-1950s. He learned directly about the earlier admiration of the tea service from Clementis’s widow in 1956. • 10. Ibid. • 11. Outstanding and politically unorthodox films were made at various times throughout Eastern Europe, not least in Poland and Hungary.

On film in the whole area, including the Soviet Union, see the perceptive survey by Mira Liehm and Antonin J. Liehm, The Most Important Art: East European Film After 1945 (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977). • 12. Mlyná, Nightfrost in Prague, p. 60. • 13. Ibid., p. 59. • 14. Ibid., p. 58. • 15. Dušan Hamšík, Writers Against Rulers (Hutchinson, London, 1971), p. 174. • 16. Ibid., p. 182. • 17. Jaromír Navrátil (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (Central European University Press, Budapest, 1998), pp. 9–10. • 18. Ibid., p. 11. • 19. Vojtch Mencl and František Ouedník, ‘Jak to bylo v lednu’ (part of a series of articles on the lead-up to the Prague Spring), in Život strany, No. 19, September 1968, p. 12. • 20. Mencl and Ourednik, Život strany, No. 17, August 1968, p. 37. • 21. Ibid., p. 38. Extracts from Dubek’s and Novotný’s speeches, based on the original transcripts, appeared in English translation in 1998. They confirm the accuracy of the 1968 report cited above. See Navrátil (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968, pp. 13–17. • 22. Hamšík, Writers Against Rulers, p. 181. Novomeský’s speech, which, in his absence, was read out to the Writers’ Congress in 1967, is published in full in ibid., pp. 177–181. • 23. H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976), p. 185. • 24. Mlyná, Nightfrost in Prague, p. 71; and Navrátil (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968, p. 7. • 25. Mlyná, Nightfrost in Prague, p. 71; and ‘Document No. 4: János Kádár’s Report to the HSWP Politburo of a Telephone Conversation with Leonid Brezhnev, December 13, 1967’, reproduced in Navrátil (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968, pp. 20–2. • 26. Khrushchev Remembers (Little, Brown, Boston, 1970), pp. 365–6; and Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, pp. 206 and 398. • 27. See Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968–1970 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), pp. 67–9. Williams observes (p. 67): ‘To maintain control of the reform course and prevent Soviet displeasure, censorship after the January plenum was absolutely essential. It was also unrealistic given the hunger for information and the appetite for debate.’ • 28. Ibid., p. 69. • 29. Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, pp. 382–7. • 30. Cited in Archie Brown and Gordon Wightman, ‘Czechoslovakia: Revival and Retreat’, in Archie Brown and Jack Gray (eds.), Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (Macmillan, London, 1977), pp. 159–96, at p. 177. • 31. The information in this paragraph comes from my interviews of reformist party officials and party intellectuals in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 1969. • 32. These points are drawn from a longer summary of the contents of the Action Programme in my article, ‘Political Change in Czechoslovakia’, Government and Opposition, Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 1969, pp. 169–94, at pp. 173–7. • 33. Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, p. 275. • 34. Ludvík Vaculík, ‘Two thousand words to workers, farmers, scientists, artists and everyone’ (Literární listy, 27 June 1968), in Andrew Oxley, Alex Pravda and Andrew Ritchie, Czechoslovakia: The Party and the People (Allen Lane Penguin Press, London, 1973), pp. 261–74, at p. 263. • 35. Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, p. 90. • 36. Vaculík, ‘Two thousand words…’, pp. 266–7. • 37. On the emergence of intellectual and political groupings in Czechoslovakia both before and during 1968, see Vladimir V. Kusin, The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring: The Development of Reformist Ideas in Czechoslovakia (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971); and Kusin, Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak

Reform Movement (Macmillan, London, 1972). • 38. Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, p. 202. • 39. Mlyná was born on 22 June 1930, and hence was as young as 37 in early 1968. Already having been co-opted into the Central Committee apparatus, he was formally elected a secretary of the Central Committee on 1 June 1968. He subsequently became a member of the Presidium, but he resigned from all his political offices in November 1968 in protest at the excessive concessions being made to the Soviet leadership. He was among the many expelled from the Communist Party in 1970. • 40. Jií Pelikán (ed.), The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 1950–1954 (Macdonald, London, 1971), p. 12. This book contains a full translation of the Piller Report. • 41. Kusin, Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement, p. 74. • 42. On rehabilitation in Czechoslovakia more broadly, see Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, pp. 373–411. Even before the fall of Communism, and the opening of the Czech archives, Karel Kaplan was able to use some of the products of his research on the political trials in work he published abroad in the 1970s. See, for example, Kaplan, Dans les Archives du Comité Central: Trente ans de secrets du Bloc soviétique (Albin Michel, Paris, 1978). • 43. Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, pp. 48–9. • 44. ‘Document No. 14: Stenographic Account of the Dresden Meeting, March 23, 1968 (Excerpts)’, in Navrátil (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968, pp. 64–72, at p. 67. • 45. Ibid., pp. 68–9. • 46. Ibid., p. 69. • 47. Ibid., p. 70. • 48. Ibid., p. 65. • 49. Ibid., pp. 71–2. • 50. Mlyná, Nightfrost in Prague, p. 164. • 51. ‘Document No. 28: Stenographic Account of the Soviet – Czechoslovak Summit Meeting in Moscow, May 4–5, 1968 (Excerpts)’, in Navrátil (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968, pp. 114–25, at p. 117. • 52. Ibid., p. 116. • 53. Mlyná, Nightfrost in Prague, p. 122. • 54. Ibid., pp. 121–2. • 55. Ibid., pp. 122–3. • 56. Navrátil (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968, p. 125. • 57. ‘Document No. 31: Minutes of the Secret Meeting of the “Five” in Moscow, May 8, 1968 (Excerpts)’, in Navrátil (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968, pp. 132–43, at p. 139. • 58. Soviet reporting of events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was highly selective and mendacious. Their attempt to control the flow of information meant that even Western European Communist Party newspapers disappeared from Moscow kiosks. During the 1967–68 academic year – including all of the first half of 1968–I was an exchange scholar at Moscow State University (under the terms of the Cultural Agreement between Great Britain and the USSR). For days on end the Italian Communist Party newspaper L’Unità (especially), the PCF paper L’Humanité, and even the British CP’s Morning Star disappeared from the university’s newspaper stalls. The concern of the Soviet authorities about the spread and possible influence of ideas emanating from Czechoslovakia reached neurotic proportions. Once, when I was working in Reading Room Number One (Pervyy zal) of the Lenin Library, where normally Western – and, naturally, Communist – journals would be delivered on order, I was refused permission to see a copy of the inoffensive British academic quarterly the Slavonic and East European Review. It turned out that the person at the library desk believed that it was a Czech journal. It was only when I finally persuaded her that it was a British publication that the librarian relented. • 59. Navrátil, The Prague Spring 1968, p. 141. • 60. ‘Document No. 32: Cable from the Czechoslovak Ambassador to Yugoslavia, May 9, 1968, on Leonid Brezhnev’s Recent Discussions with Josip Broz Tito’, in ibid., p. 144. • 61. ‘Document No. 51: Message

from Alexander Dubek and Oldich erník to Leonid Brezhnev, July 14, 1968’, in ibid., p. 210. • 62. ‘Document No. 52: Transcript of the Warsaw Meeting, July 14–15 1968 (Excerpts)’, in ibid., pp. 212–33, at p. 213. This is a translation of the Polish transcript of the proceedings. The 91-page Soviet transcript has not been declassified in Moscow. • 63. Ibid., p. 214. • 64. Ibid., pp. 215–18. • 65. Ibid., p. 218. • 66. R.G. Pikhoya, ‘Chekhoslovakiya, 1968 god. Vzglyad iz Moskvy. Po dokumentam TsK KPSS’, Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya, Vol. 6, 1994, pp. 3–20, at p. 20. • 67. Navrátil (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968, p. 220. • 68. R.G. Pikhoya, ‘Chekhoslovakiya, 1968 god. Vzglyad iz Moskvy po dokumentam TsK KPSS’, Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya, Vol. 1, 1995, pp. 34–48, at pp. 35–6. • 69. Shelest, worried about the impact of Czechoslovak developments in Ukraine, was one of the harshest critics of Dubek and the Prague reformers. See, for example, his speech at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU on 17 July 1968. It is reproduced in full in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 14/15, Winter 2003–Spring 2004, pp. 318–20. • 70. ‘Document No. 65: Speeches by Leonid Brezhnev, Alexander Dubek, and Aleksei Kosygin at the Cierna nad Tisou Negotiations, July 29, 1968 (Excerpts)’, in Navrátil (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968, pp. 284–97, at pp. 292–3. • 71. Ibid., pp. 294–5. • 72. Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, pp. 305–6. • 73. ‘Document No. 73: The Bratislava Declaration, August 3, 1968’, in Navrátil (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968, pp. 326–9, at p. 327. • 74. ‘Document No. 72: The “Letter of Invitation” from the Anti-Reformist Faction of the CPCz Leadership, August 1968’, in ibid., pp. 324–5. • 75. Ibid., p. 324. • 76. That this was an important consideration for the Soviet leadership was confirmed by Brezhnev when he – together with Kosygin and Politburo member and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Nikolay Podgorny – met with Czechoslovak president Ludvík Svoboda in the Kremlin on 23 August 1968. See HIA, Fond 89, 1.1002, opis 38, file 57, p. 3. • 77. ‘Document No. 98: Invasion Warning from Czechoslovak Ambassador to Hungary Jozef Púik, August 20, 1968’, in Navrátil (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968, p. 410. • 78. Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, pp. 126–7. • 79. ‘Document No. 92: Leonid Brezhnev’s Speech at a Meeting of the “Warsaw Five” in Moscow, August 18, 1968 (Excerpts)’, in Navrátil (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968, pp. 395–9, at p. 398. • 80. Pravda, 22 August 1968. • 81. Mlyná, Nightfrost in Prague, p. 146. • 82. Ibid., pp. 147 and 150; Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, p. 127; and ‘Document No. 100: Statement by the CPCz CC Presidium Condemning the Warsaw Pact Invasion, August 21, 1968’, in Navrátil (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968, p. 414. Two other reformist members of the leadership, Presidium member estmír Císa and secretary of the Central Committee Václav Slavík, were also asked by Dubek to participate in the drafting of the resolution, but the document (in which the reference to contravention of international law enraged the Soviet leadership) was essentially that written by Mlyná, an academic lawyer by profession. • 83. On the resistance, see the near-contemporary account of Adam Roberts in Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968: Reform, Repression and Resistance (Chatto and Windus, London, for the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1969). See also Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, pp. 759–810; and Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, pp. 127–37. • 84. Jií Pelikán (ed.), The Secret Vysoany Congress: Proceedings and Documents of the Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 22 August 1968 (Allen Lane Penguin Press, London, 1971). • 85. HIA, Fond 89, 1.1002, opis 38, file 57, pp. 1 and 40–1. • 86. The full text was published in Windsor and Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968, pp. 178–81. • 87. Podgorny and Shelest also espoused that hard line. See Pikhoya, ‘Chekhoslovakiya, 1968 god’, Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya, No. 1, 1995, p. 47. • 88. Ibid., p. 46–7. • 89. HIA, Fond 89, 1.1002, opis 38, file 57, p. 7. • 90. ‘O deyatel’nosti kontrrevolyutsionnogo podpol’ya v Chekhoslovakii’, HIA, Fond 89, 1.1009, opis 61, file 5. • 91. Ibid., p. 8. • 92. Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, p. 143.

20 ‘The Era of Stagnation’: The Soviet Union under Brezhnev

1. See, for example, Georgi Arbatov, The System: An Insider’s Life in Soviet Politics (Random House, New York, 1992), pp. 124–5. • 2. Brezhnev’s observation to Bohumil imon has been related more than once by Zdenk Mlyná. The quotation is taken in this case from an interview in G.R. Urban (ed.), Communist Reformation: Nationalism, internationalism and change in the world Communist movement (Temple Smith, London, 1979), p. 136. • 3. Arbatov also cites Brezhnev saying (in conversation with the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Stepan Chervonenko, in July 1968) that the search for a political solution should continue, but that he would be forced to resign as general secretary if he ‘lost Czechoslovakia’. See Arbatov, The System, p. 141. • 4. Brandt describes the political process in his memoirs. See Willy Brandt, My Life in Politics (Penguin, London, 1993), pp. 138–209. • 5. Arbatov, The System, p. 126. • 6. Ibid., p. 130. • 7. Ibid., pp. 130–2. Although Brezhnev did not ultimately endorse publicly the rehabilitation of Stalin, his inclinations lay in that direction. Willy Brandt notes that in the first major conversation he had with the Soviet leader in 1970, Brezhnev made clear that ‘he did not want to be identified with Khrushchev’s anti-Stalinist ideas’. On the contrary: ‘Stalin, he said, had achieved much, and after all the country had finally won the war under his leadership; he would return to favour’ (Brandt, My Life in Politics, p. 183). • 8. Archie Brown and Michael Kaser (eds.), The Soviet Union since the Fall of Khrushchev (Macmillan, London, 2nd ed., 1978), pp. 226–8. • 9. Ibid., p. 226. • 10. Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy (Novosti, Moscow, 1995), Vol. 1, pp. 229–30. • 11. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Little, Brown, Boston, 1979), p. 527. • 12. Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (Longman, London, 2003), pp. 100–12. • 13. See Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and the Calf: Sketches of Literary Life in the Soviet Union, trans. Harry Willetts (Collins and Harvill, London, 1980). • 14. Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs (Knopf, New York, 1990), p. 23. • 15. Sakharov’s own account of where he differed from Solzhenitsyn is to be found in ibid, pp. 406–9. • 16. Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (Knopf, New York, 1971; and Macmillan, London, 1972). A revised and expanded edition was published in 1989 by Columbia University Press, New York, and Oxford University Press, Oxford. • 17. In the Introduction to the 1989 English-language edition of his book (ibid., p. 19), Medvedev was able to mention for the first time four people who were working within the Central Committee apparatus in the 1960s who helped him

greatly during that decade: Georgiy Shakhnazarov, Yuriy Krasin, Lev Delyusin and Fedor Burlatsky. During the late perestroika period, Medvedev’s book was finally published in the Soviet Union with the title Pered sudom istorii (Before the Court of History). • 18. Medvedev’s letter to Suslov is in HIA, Fond 89, 1.1994, opis 17, file 49, p. 14. The same file (p. 5) contains a letter by KGB chairman Andropov about Roy Medvedev and his book manuscript on Stalinism and the hostile judgement on Medvedev’s work, in a joint statement, dated 11 February 1969, signed by V. Stepakov, head of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee, S. Trapeznikov, head of the Department of Science and Education, and V. Shauro, head of the Department of Culture (ibid., pp. 1–3). The excommunication of Medvedev from the CPSU which followed did not stop a steady stream of samizdat works (almost invariably published abroad) from his pen and from that of his twin brother, Zhores Medvedev. The latter, a biochemist by profession, was incarcerated in a Soviet mental hospital in 1970 entirely for political reasons, and later, when on a research visit to London in 1973, deprived of his Soviet citizenship. He continued thereafter to live and write in London. Although the works of the Medvedevs were among the best-known of unofficial Soviet writings abroad, they were untypical within the Soviet dissident movement. For scholarly studies of that movement, see Peter Reddaway, Uncensored Russia: The Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union (Jonathan Cape, London, 1972); Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway, Russia’s Political Hospitals: The Abuse of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union (Gollancz, London, 1977); and Peter Reddaway, ‘Policy Towards Dissent since Khrushchev’, in T.H. Rigby, Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway (eds.), Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR (Macmillan, London, 1980). • 19. Peter Reddaway, ‘Dissent in the Soviet Union’, Problems of Communism, Vol. XXXII, No. 6, November – December 1983, pp. 1–15, at p. 14. • 20. V. Stanley Vardys, ‘Lithuanians’, in Graham Smith (ed.), The Nationality Question in the Soviet Union (Longman, London, 1990), pp. 72–91, at pp. 78–9; and Vardys, The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania (Columbia University Press, New York, 1978). • 21. Laurie J. Salitan, Politics and Nationality in Contemporary Soviet-Jewish Emigration, 1968–1989 (Macmillan, London, 1992), pp. 96–7. • 22. John B. Dunlop. The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983), pp. 87–92; and for a much fuller account of Russian environmentalism and its struggles, Douglas R. Weiner, A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1999). • 23. Dunlop, The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism, p. 57. • 24. Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006), pp. 158–237, esp. p. 196. • 25. See Gerald Stanton Smith, Songs to Seven Strings: Russian Guitar Poetry and Soviet ‘Mass Song’ (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1984). • 26. Shakhnazarov told me, in one of the interviews I had with him (in the Kremlin, shortly before he, along with Gorbachev, was turned out of it by Yeltsin in December 1991), that he had felt himself to be a social democrat ever since the early 1960s. See Archie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), p. 173. • 27. A.S. Chernyaev, Moya zhizn’ i moe vremya (Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, Moscow, 1995), pp. 237–80. • 28. At the very end of the Brezhnev era,

although not on the ailing Brezhnev’s initiative, a fierce attack on IMEMO was launched by hard-liners in the leadership whose outlook was strongly influenced by Russian nationalism. IMEMO was accused of being in a state of ‘ideological collapse’, partly due to the influence of ‘zionist elements’. On this, see Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (Columbia University Press, New York, 2000), pp. 169–72. For a more detailed study of the episode, see the important institutional history of IMEMO by Petr Cherkasov, IMEMO: portret na fone epokhi (Ves’ mir, Moscow, 2004), esp. pp. 451–530. • 29. On the significance of critical thinking within these and other Soviet institutes in the years before perestroika, see, for much fuller discussions, English, Russia and the Idea of the West; Neil Malcolm, Soviet Political Scientists and American Politics (Macmillan, London, 1984); Ronald J. Hill, Soviet Politics, Political Science, and Reform (Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1980); Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1997); Julie M. Newton, Russia, France, and the Idea of Europe (Macmillan, London, 2003); and Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World, esp. Ch. 6, ‘Institutional Amphibiousness or Civil Society: The Origins and Development of Perestroika’, pp. 157–89. • 30. Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World, pp. 174–5. • 31. X.L. Ding, ‘Institutional Amphibiousness and the Transition from Communism: The Case of China’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 24, No. 3, July 1994, pp. 293–318. • 32. Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg,, The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era (Little, Brown, Boston, 1990). On INION and Delyusin, see p. 236. Once when I tried to re-contact in the 1970s an erudite person of distinctly anti-Communist views whom I had met on a previous visit, I called INION, where I knew he worked, and told the telephonist I didn’t know his extension number: ‘Department of Scientific Communism,’ she replied. • 33. Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, p. 162. • 34. The growing economic crisis of the 1980s is well described, with much important documentation and illustration, by Yegor Gaidar in Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia (Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2007), although his account of political change in the Soviet Union leans much too strongly towards economic determinism. • 35. See for the results of one such professional survey Boris Dubin, ‘Litso epokhi: Brezhnevskiy period v stolknovenii razlichnykh otsenok’, Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya (VTsIOM, Moscow), No. 3 (65), 2003, pp. 26–40. See also Archie Brown, ‘Cultural Change and Continuity in the Transition from Communism: The Russian Case’, in Lawrence E. Harrison and Peter L. Berger (eds.), Developing Cultures: Case Studies (Routledge, New York, 2006), pp. 387–405.

21 The Challenge from Poland: John Paul II, Lech Wa;esa, and the Rise of Solidarity

1. Peter Raina, Political Opposition in Poland 1954–1977 (Poets and Painters Press, London, 1978), p. 146. • 2. Ibid., pp. 148–9; Leszek Kołakowski, ‘The Intelligentsia’, in Abraham Brumberg (ed.), Poland: Genesis of a Revolution (Vintage Books, New York, 1983), pp. 54–67, at pp. 61–2; and Tadeusz Szafar, ‘Anti-Semitism: A Trusty Weapon’, in ibid., pp. 109–22, at pp. 112–13. • 3. Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), From Solidarity to Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980–81. A Documentary History (Central European Press, Budapest, 2007), p. xxix. Paczkowski, in his chapter, ‘Poland, the “Enemy Nation”’, in Stéphane Courtois et al., The Black Book of Communism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1999), pp. 363–93, at p. 387, gives a figure of 45 killed throughout Poland in the December 1970 strikes and protests. • 4. Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity 1980–81 (Jonathan Cape, London, 1983), pp. 11–13; and Jack Bielasiak, ‘The Party: Permanent Crisis’, in Brumberg (ed.), Poland: Genesis of a Revolution, pp. 10–25, at p. 15. • 5. Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution, p. 13. • 6. Alex Pravda, ‘Poland 1980: From “Premature Consumerism” to Labour Solidarity’, Soviet Studies, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2, April 1982, pp. 167–99, at p. 170. • 7. The phrase ‘premature consumerism’ was coined by Pravda in the article noted above. • 8. Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution, p. 16. • 9. Ibid. • 10. Ibid., pp. 16–17; Jan B. de Weydenthal, ‘Workers and Party in Poland’, Problems of Communism, Vol. XXIX, No. 6, November – December 1980, pp. 1–22, at pp. 3–4; and Kołakowski, ‘The Intelligentsia’, p. 63. • 11. Kołakowski, ‘The Intelligentsia’, pp. 63–5. • 12. On KOR, in particular, and more generally on the development of civil society in Poland, see Michael H. Bernhard, The Origins of Democratization in Poland (Columbia University Press, New York, 1993). Bernhard (p. 3) defines civil society as ‘a public space located between official public and private life, which is populated by a range of different autonomous organizations’. • 13. Jan Jozef Lipski, ‘The Founding of KOR’, Survey, Vol. 26, No. 3, Summer 1982, pp. 61–79. • 14. Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution, p. 19. • 15. Maria Hirszowicz, Coercion and Control in Communist Society: The Visible Hand of Bureaucracy (Harvester, Brighton, 1986), pp. 181–3. • 16. Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution, p. 20. • 17. Carl Bernstein and Marco Politi, His Holiness: John Paul II and the Hidden History of Our Time (Doubleday, New York, 1996), p. 175. • 18. Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution, p. 29. • 19. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 8–9. • 20. Kołakowski, ‘The Intelligentsia’, pp. 64–6; and Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution, p. 32. • 21. Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution, p. 23. • 22. Aleksander Smolar, ‘The Rich and the Powerful’, in Brumberg (ed.), Poland: Genesis of a Revolution, pp. 42–53. • 23. Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution, pp. 40–1. • 24. Ibid., pp. 42–4. • 25. On further personnel changes, see de Weydenthal, ‘Workers and Party in Poland’, pp. 13–15. • 26. ‘Document No. 3: Cardinal Wyszyski’s Sermon at Jasna Góra Following the Outbreak of Strikes, with Reactions’, in Paczkowski and Byrne (eds.), From Solidarity to Martial Law, pp. 51–6. • 27. Paczkowski and Byrne (eds.), From Solidarity to Martial Law, pp. 10–11. • 28. Ibid., pp. 11–12. It is estimated that a million party members out of a total membership of approximately three million joined Solidarity. • 29. ‘Document No. 2: Extract from Protocol No. 210 of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, August 25, 1980’, in ibid., p. 50. • 30. These contingency plans were outlined in a top-secret document in which the name of the country the Politburo members were talking about and the number of troops and tanks that would be involved were written in ink in gaps left in the typed document. As happened with a number of exceptionally sensitive issues, not even a Central Committee typist was to be trusted with the information on what was afoot. The

document, which is headed simply ‘TsK KPSS’, and dated 18 August 1980, was signed by Suslov, Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and Chernenko. A photocopy is to be found in the Volkogonov Collection, R 9659, National Security Archive, Washington DC. • 31. Paczkowski and Byrne (eds.), From Solidarity to Martial Law, p. xxxiii. • 32. As reported by Hungarian sociologists during a study visit I made to Budapest in June 1981. Kádár relayed the kind of criticism to be heard in Hungary to the Soviet and East European leaders in Moscow in December 1980, saying: ‘When we first got news about the strikes on the coast, there were certain reactions [in Hungary]. I am speaking now not about party members and the party leadership but about the man on the street, thus de facto about the ideologically and politically less qualified masses. The first reaction was as follows: what do the Polish comrades think they are doing? To work less and earn more? Then it was said:…they want to strike and we are supposed to do the work?’ See ‘Document No. 22: Minutes of Warsaw Pact Leadership Meeting in Moscow, December 5 1980’, ibid., p. 147. Kádár also stated (ibid.) that ‘as far as we are concerned, the Polish events are of little concern to us in terms of domestic politics’. While there was, indeed, no sign of Hungarian workers wishing to copy their Polish counterparts, for some reformist party members in Hungary the crisis of the Polish party was a stimulus to thought about political as well as economic reform. • 33. Ibid., p. xxxiii. • 34. ‘Document No. 18: Letter from Erich Honecker to Leonid Brezhnev, November 26, 1980’ in ibid., pp. 134–5. • 35. ‘Document No. 22: Minutes of Warsaw Pact Leadership Meeting in Moscow, December 5, 1980’, in ibid., p. 151. • 36. Ibid., pp. 154–6. • 37. Ibid., pp. 160–1. • 38. Georgi Arbatov observed that the fact that the Soviet Union was ‘bogged down in Afghanistan may have helped us avoid an even more dangerous adventure: intervention in Poland during the political crisis in 1980’. See Arbatov, The System: An Insider’s Life in Soviet Politics (Random House, New York, 1992), p. 200. • 39. Paczkowski and Byrne (eds.), From Solidarity to Martial Law, p. 19. • 40. At a meeting of the Soviet Politburo on 12 March 1981, Brezhnev described Jaruzelski as ‘a good, intelligent comrade who has great authority’. See ‘Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 12 marta 1981 goda’ (READD Collection, National Security Archive), p. 6. • 41. On the duality in the personality of Jaruzelski, see Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution, pp. 143–5. • 42. ‘Document No. 39: Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, April 2, 1981’, in Paczkowski and Byrne (eds.), From Solidarity to Martial Law, pp. 239–44, at p. 239. • 43. On the self-limiting aspect of Solidarity in 1980–81, see the work of the Polish sociologist (one of the intellectual advisers at the birth of Solidarity) Jadwiga Staniszkis, Poland’s Self-Limiting Revolution, edited by Jan T. Gross (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984); and Alaine Touraine et al., Solidarity. The Analysis of a Social Movement: Poland 1980–1981 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983), esp. pp. 64–79. • 44. Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution, p. 207. • 45. Ibid., p. 212. • 46. ‘Document No. 61: Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, September 10, 1981’, in Paczkowski and Byrne (eds.), From Solidarity to Martial Law, p. 348. • 47. ‘Document No. 72: Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting on Rusakov’s Trip to Eastern Europe’, in ibid., pp. 395–9, at pp. 396–7. • 48. ‘Document No. 81: Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, 10 December 1981’, in ibid., pp. 446–53, at pp. 449–53. • 49. Paczkowski and Byrne (eds.), From Solidarity to Martial Law, p. 35. • 50. John O’Sullivan, The Pope, the President, and the Prime Minister: Three Who Changed the World (Regnery, Washington DC, 2006), p. 187; and Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (Oxford University Press, New York, 1983), p. 117. • 51. Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, pp. 112–21. • 52. Ibid., p. 122.

22 Reform in China: Deng Xiaoping and After

1. See Chapter 17, note 8. • 2. Quoted in Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2006), p. 457. • 3. John Gittings, The Changing Face of China: From Mao to Market (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), pp. 170–1. • 4. Craig Dietrich, People’s China: A Brief History (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 3rd ed., 1998), pp. 238–9. • 5. Gittings, The Changing Face of China, p. 167. • 6. Ibid. • 7. Ibid., p. 168. • 8. Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), p. 222. • 9. Ibid., p. 223. • 10. Author’s interview with Professor Su Shaozhi, Oxford, June 1988. At a party symposium later in 1988, Su (who had headed the Institute of Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought, but was dismissed from that post in 1987 for calling for more democracy) spoke out boldly against ‘ideological prejudices, bureaucratism, sectarianism, Zhdanovism…and cultural autocracy’ and complained that in spite of sweeping promises ‘a lot of forbidden zones still remain in our academic and theoretical studies’ (Gittings, The Changing Face of China, p. 227). In January 1989 he got into further trouble by speaking his mind at a symposium addressed by the party leader, Zhao Ziyang. He said that in the natural sciences alone there had been since 1949 34 mass campaigns against defenceless victims. He criticized not only the Cultural Revolution as an extreme example but also the ‘anti-Rightist movement of 1987’, following the dismissal of Hu Yaobang as party leader. Thus, he was criticizing policies decreed not only by Mao but also by Deng. Su added, for good measure, that ‘it is wrong to force scholars to accept Marxism’. His speech was sufficiently unorthodox that the Shanghai newspaper which published it faced reprisals. See Jonathan Mirsky, ‘Chinese glasnost savaged by guru’, The Observer, 29 January 1989, p. 23. • 11. Author’s interview with Su Shaozhi, June 1988. • 12. Gittings, The Changing Face of China, pp. 154–9. • 13. See David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2008). • 14. Dietrich, People’s China, pp. 242–3. • 15. Ibid. • 16. Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1988), p. 148. See also Will Hutton, The Writing on the Wall: China and the West in the 21st Century (Little, Brown, London, 2007), p. 103. • 17. Dietrich, People’s China, p. 244. • 18. Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 143. • 19. Dietrich, People’s China, pp. 245–6. • 20. Ibid., p. 249. • 21. Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2nd ed., 2004), pp. 100–3. • 22. Dietrich, People’s China, p. 270–2. • 23. Ibid., pp. 273–6. • 24. Saich, Governance and Politics of China, p. 70. • 25. When I was in China in September 1988, as one of a small group of Oxford scholars who were guests of the Chinese

Academy of Social Sciences, I was asked to speak about the Soviet perestroika in virtually every institute we visited in Beijing and Shanghai. • 26. Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy (Novosti, Moscow, 1995), Vol. 2, pp. 435–6. • 27. Ibid., p. 444. • 28. Ibid., p. 446. • 29. Cited in Joseph Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen: From Deng Xiaoping to Ho Jintao (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd ed., 2008), p. 30. • 30. Dietrich, People’s China, pp. 287–8. • 31. As Susan Shirk observes: ‘When Zhao Ziyang died in 2005, the current leaders revealed their persistent insecurity by suppressing news of the event and restricting the funeral to a small private gathering’. See Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford University Press, New York, 2007), p. 38. Shirk was the senior Department of State official responsible for US relations with China in the Clinton administration. • 32. Dietrich, People’s China, p. 289. • 33. Richard Baum, ‘The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s’, in Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), pp. 340–471, at pp. 450–1. • 34. Dietrich, People’s China, p. 292. • 35. Ibid. • 36. Baum, ‘The Road to Tiananmen’, p. 456. • 37. Ibid. • 38. Ibid. Baum gives a figure of between 600 and 1,200 for those killed. • 39. Dietrich, People’s China, pp. 298–300. • 40. Ibid., p. 301. • 41. Fewsmith, China since Tainanmen, pp. 26–7. • 42. Dietrich, People’s China, p. 303. • 43. Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen, pp. 30–1. • 44. Ibid., p. 39. • 45. Dietrich, People’s China, pp. 305–6. • 46. On the relationship between global attention and human rights in China more generally, see Rosemary Foot, Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in China (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000). • 47. For some of the reasons why civil society is weakly developed in China, see X.L. Ding, ‘Institutional Amphibiousness and the Transition from Communism: The Case of China’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 24, No. 3, July 1994, pp. 293–318; Shu-Yun Ma, ‘The Chinese Discourse on Civil Society’, The China Quarterly, No. 137 (March 1994), pp. 180–93; and Alena Ledeneva, ‘Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China’, Contemporary Studies in Society and History, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2008, pp. 1–27. • 48. See the important article by Ding, ‘Institutional Amphibiousness and the Transition from Communism’. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing and the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences have also been home to many thinkers who have broken through the barriers of ideological orthodoxy. This is often done indirectly, as in an article on the fate of democratic thought in China published in 1988. Although the author was writing about the pre-Communist period, it is not difficult to see that he also had the Communist era in mind when he wrote: ‘But freedom and equality was [sic] in fact forgotten, for they seemed to have nothing to do with the salvation of the nation. There was no systematic effort to deal with the Chinese traditional suppression of freedom, human rights and other features of autocracy. As a result, form was paid more attention than content.’ Advocacy of democracy is still clearer in his conclusion: ‘Chinese modern history shows that, though it was politically a great achievement and not easy to overthrow autocracy, to establish the Republic of China, to draft the constitution and to set up the legislative assembly, it was even more difficult and important to get rid of the feudal influence ideologically and to establish democratic consciousness. As to the latter, we not only should have a sense of urgency, but also

should be mentally prepared to have a protracted struggle.’ See Xiong Yuezhi, ‘A Summary of the Historical Development of the Chinese Democratic Thought’, in SASS Papers (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Shanghai, 1988), pp. 268–89, at pp. 285 and 289. • 49. Kellee S. Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2007), p. 53. • 50. Ibid., p. 53. • 51. Ibid., pp. 53–4. • 52. Ibid., p. 54. • 53. Andrew J. Nathan, ‘China’s Path from Communism’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 2, April 1993, pp. 30–42, at pp. 35–6. • 54. Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy, pp. 54–7. • 55. X.L. Ding, ‘Who Gets What, How? When Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Become Shareholding Companies’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 46, No. 3, May – June 1999, pp. 32–41; Ding, ‘Informal Privatization Through Internalization: The Rise of Nomenklatura Capitalism in China’s Offshore Businesses’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2000, pp. 121–46; Jonathan Story, China: The Race to Market (Prentice-Hall, London, 2003), pp. 230–2; and BBC News, 16 March 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6456959.stm. • 56. Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy, pp. 81–2. • 57. Ding, ‘Informal Privatization Through Internationalization’, p. 138. • 58. Ibid., pp. 139 and 142. • 59. Jamie Morgan, ‘China’s Growing Pains: Towards the (Global) Political Economy of Domestic Social Instability’, International Politics, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2008, pp. 413–38, at p. 414. • 60. Albert Kiedel, ‘China’s Economic Rise – Fact and Fiction’ (Policy Brief 61, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, July 2008), p. 5. Against Kiedel’s confident prediction, it is worth noting that, with an ageing population (because of the one-child policy), and fewer economically active young people, the rate of growth may slow considerably. Putting the remarkable post-Mao growth in the size of the Chinese economy in a much longer historical perspective, Chris Patten – the last British governor of Hong Kong – has observed that, so far as it is possible to ascertain, for eighteen of the last twenty centuries China’s economy was the biggest in the world. See Chris Patten, Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths about World Affairs (Allen Lane, London, 2005), p. 264. • 61. Ibid., p. 9. • 62. Ibid., pp. 11–12. • 63. Jianyong Yue, ‘Peaceful Rise of China: Myth or Reality?’, International Politics, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2008, pp. 439–56, at p. 443. • 64. Longer-established industrialized economies have had a somewhat analogous experience. There was much gnashing of teeth in Britain over the demise of a domestically owned car industry. However, in the twenty-first century it does not seem to trouble either British car workers or the population as a whole that the factories – in which both labour relations and productivity have been much improved – are owned by companies whose headquarters are in Japan, the United States, Germany and France. • 65. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, p. 46. • 66. Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, pp. 156–7. • 67. Shirk, Fragile Superpower, p. 68. • 68. Financial Times, 2 July 2008, p. 1. • 69. Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, p. 123. See also Arthur Kroeber, ‘China needs proof of democracy’s advantage’, Financial Times, 4 August 2008, p. 13. • 70. Cited in Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, p. 134. • 71. The point is made by a leading specialist on the Chinese Communist Party, David Shambaugh. The equivalent institution to Beijing’s Central Party School has produced important reformers in several other Communist states. See ibid., pp. 137, 139 and 144; and Chapter 19 of the present volume. • 72. Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, pp. 111–14; Saich, Governance and Politics of China, pp. 84–5; and Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen, pp. 5 and 243. • 73. Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, p. 114. • 74. Ibid., pp. 114–15. • 75. Ibid., pp. 111 and 121. • 76. Ibid., pp. 138–9. • 77. X.L. Ding, ‘Who Gets What, How?’; Ding, ‘Internal Privatization Through Internationalization’ and Ledeneva, ‘Blat and Guanxi’. • 78. Lindsey Hilsum, ‘The great bore of the people’, New Statesman, 22 October 2007, p. 26. • 79. Yue, ‘Peaceful Rise of China’, p. 449. • 80. ‘Chinese Communist Party membership exceeds 74 million in 2007’, http://www.yndehong.cn/1103/2008/07/03/54 mall@23723.htm. • 81. Morgan, ‘China’s Growing Pains’, p. 427. • 82. Tianjian Shi, ‘Cultural Values and Democracy in the People’s Republic of China’, China Quarterly, No. 162 (2000) pp. 540–59, at p. 557. • 83. ‘Chinese Communist Party…’, http://www.yndehong.cn/1103/2008/07/03/54@23723.htm. • 84. In August 2008, shortly before the opening of the Olympic Games, sixteen Chinese policemen were killed in an attack in Xinjiang, and there were several explosions in the province during the Games themselves. Uighur separatists have waged an unsuccessful campaign for decades against Chinese rule. See the BBC news report of 10 August 2008, ‘Blasts in China’s Xinjiang region’, http.://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7551954.stm. • 85. Cited in Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen, p. 282.

23 The Challenge of the West

1. The Harvard Project, based on in-depth interviews with 3,000 former Soviet citizens who had either taken the opportunity of the Second World War to stay abroad or had been ‘displaced persons’ who chose not to return to the USSR, found that the great majority were very attached to the educational and medical provision of the Soviet Union. Those who were at the time of the interviews living in West Germany preferred the German medical system to the Soviet because it, too, was one of ‘socialized medicine’ but on a higher level. However, they preferred the medical service they had left behind in the Soviet Union to that of the United States because of the high cost of the latter and the extent to which quality of service depended on ability to pay. See Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961), pp. 236–43. • 2. Cited by Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy (Longman, London, 2003), p. 124. • 3. It was published in all 35 countries which were signatories to it. I have used the British document, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act (Cmnd. 6198, HMSO, London, 1975). • 4. G. Bennett et al. (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas: Series III, Volume II: The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1972–1975 (HMSO, London, 1997), pp. 56–7 and 323–5. • 5. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act – from Part 1, Principle I, p. 3. See also Richard Davy (ed.), European Détente: A Reappraisal (Royal Institute of International Affairs and Sage, London, 1992), p. 16. • 6. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, p. 3. This wording is to be found in Part 1, Principle II. • 7. This is the first sentence of the lengthy ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ Principle VII

of Basket One. Many authors who would appear not to have read the Final Act have placed human rights exclusively in the Third Basket. This is just one of a number of common errors on the Helsinki agreement exposed by Richard Davy in a forthcoming article, ‘Helsinki myths: setting the record straight on the Final Act of the CSCE, 1975’, to be published in Cold War History. • 8. See ibid.; and also Davy (ed.), European Détente, pp. 16–19. • 9. Svetlana Savranskaya, ‘Unintended Consequences: Soviet Interests, Expectations, and Reactions to the Helsinki Final Act’, in Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart (eds.), Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe (Berghahn, Oxford, 2008), pp. 175–90, at p. 181. • 10. Ibid. For a Russian study by one of the Helsinki process participants which focuses especially on the post-1975 follow-up to the Final Act, see Yu. V. Kashlev, Khel’sinskiy protsess 1975–2005: svet i teni glazami uchastnika (Izvestiya, Moscow, 2005). • 11. In private it was another matter. During a visit to the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow in 1976, I was told that its former director, Viktor Chkhikvadze, a Stalinist by disposition as well as background, who was not generally given to criticizing higher Soviet authority, had muttered: ‘Our leaders made a big mistake when they signed the Helsinki accord.’ • 12. Quoted in Davy (ed.), European Détente, p. 251. • 13. ‘Sir T. Garvey (Moscow) to Mr Callaghan’ [ENZ 3/303/1]’, Document No. 141 in Bennett et al. (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas: Series III, Volume II, pp. 474–9, at pp. 478–9. • 14. Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era (Little, Brown, Boston, 1990), pp. 280–1. • 15. Thus, for example, even twelve years after the Helsinki accord was signed, the British prime minister’s private secretary, Charles Powell, discussing a seminar held as part of the preparation for Margaret Thatcher’s forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union, noted, as one of the conclusions, that ‘the Helsinki agreements gave us legitimate grounds to comment on some aspects of what was going on’ and that the ‘Prime Minister would want to raise human rights’ (C.D. Powell, ‘Seminar on the Soviet Union’, 1 March 1987, Cabinet Office Papers, A 2162, pp. 9 and 10. Emphasis in the original. Document obtained under the UK Freedom of Information Act.) • 16. On that point, see Rudolf L. Tőkés (ed.), Eurocommunism and Détente (Council on Foreign Relations and New York University Press, New York, 1978). Tkés discusses, inter alia, the different views taken of the Helsinki accord, arguing that ‘on balance, the Helsinki agreement has been more beneficial to adherents of liberal democracy and to the peoples of Eastern Europe than to the U.S.S.R. and to Moscow’s East European clients’ (ibid., p. 453). • 17. Arrigo Levi, ‘Eurocommunism: Myth or Reality?’, in Paulo Filo della Torre, Edward Mortimer and Jonathan Story (eds.), Eurocommunism: Myth or Reality? (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1979), pp. 9–23, at pp. 9 and 13. • 18. ‘Appendix One: Joint Declaration of the Italian and Spanish Communist Parties, 12 July 1975’, in della Torre, Mortimer and Story (eds.), Eurocommunism, pp. 330–3. • 19. Santiago Carrillo, ‘Eurocommunism’ and the State (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1977), pp. 115–18. • 20. Ibid., pp. 131–2. • 21. Eusebio M. Mujal-León, ‘The Domestic and International Evolution of the Spanish Communist Party’, in Tkés (ed.), Eurocommunism and Détente, pp. 204–70, at pp. 255–6. • 22. Robert Legvold, ‘The Soviet Union and West European Communism’, in Tkés, Eurocommunism and

Détente, pp. 314–84, at p. 377. • 23. Paradoxically, one of the most convinced ‘Eurocommunist’ parties was the Japanese. It came to share many of the critical positions of its West European counterparts and condemned the invasions of both Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. See Peter Berton, ‘Japanese Eurocommunists: Running in Place’, in Problems of Communism, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, July – August 1986, pp. 1–30. • 24. ‘Appendix Two: Joint Declaration of the French and Italian Communist Parties, 15 November 1975’, in della Torre, Mortimer and Story (eds.), Eurocommunism, pp. 334–8. • 25. ‘Contrary to the Interests of Peace and Socialism in Europe: Concerning the book “Eurocommunism” and the State by Santiago Carrillo, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Spain’, New Times, No. 26, June 1977, pp. 9–13, at p. 10 (italics added). • 26. Archie Brown and George Schöpflin, ‘The Challenge to Soviet Leadership: Effects in Eastern Europe’, in della Torre, Mortimer and Story (eds.), Eurocommunism, pp. 249–76, at p. 263. • 27. Ibid., pp. 266–8. • 28. In addition to the works already cited on Eurocommunism, see Richard Kindersley (ed.), In Search of Eurocommunism (Macmillan, London, 1981); Howard Machin (ed.), National Communism in Western Europe: A Third Way for Socialism? (Methuen, London, 1983); Roy Godson and Stephen Haseler, ‘Eurocommunism’: Implications for East and West (Methuen, London, 1978); and Vadim Zagladin et al., Europe and the Communists (Progress, Moscow, 1977). • 29. The story was told to the Soviet scientist Roald Sagdeev by the Director of the Institute of Nuclear Physics at Akademgorodok (a city created in Siberia specifically for the advancement of science), Andrey Budker, who was himself of Jewish origin. See Sagdeev, The Making of a Soviet Scientist: My Adventures in Nuclear Fusion and Space from Stalin to Star Wars (Wiley, New York, 1994), pp. 134–5. • 30. Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy (Novosti, Moscow, 1995), Vol. 1, pp. 155–70, esp. pp. 168–70. • 31. Ibid., p. 169. • 32. Interview with G.A. Arbatov, 8 February 2000, The Hoover Institution and the Gorbachev Foundation (Moscow) Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Acc. No. 980676. 305, Box 1. • 33. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (HarperCollins, London, 1993), p. 321, where Thatcher reports what Trudeau told her about Gorbachev later in 1983. • 34. Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, Vol. 1, p. 255. • 35. Memorandum from John Coles to Brian Fall, 13 September 1983, Foreign Office Papers, RS013/2 (obtained under the UK Freedom of Information Act). • 36. The meeting on 8–9 September, in which I took part, is one of the themes of my article, ‘The Change to Engagement in Britain’s Cold War Policy: The Origins of the Thatcher – Gorbachev Relationship’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3, Summer 2008, pp. 3–47. • 37. Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (John Murray, London, 1997), p. 18. • 38. Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (Macmillan, London, 1994), pp. 428–35. • 39. Writing to Brian Fall, who was private secretary to Sir Geoffrey Howe, the prime minister’s private secretary noted the aim of building up contacts with the Soviet Union ‘at higher levels’ over the next few years, adding: ‘There will be no public announcement of this change of policy.’ See ‘Policy on East/West Relations’, Memorandum from John Coles to Brian Fall, 12 September 1983, Foreign Office Papers, RS013/2. • 40. The Foreign Office needed no convincing of this. If they had been the prime movers on East – West relations

during Margaret Thatcher’s prime ministership, this change of policy would have occurred earlier. Geoffrey Howe’s predecessor as foreign secretary, Francis Pym, had tried unsuccessfully to change the tone of the rhetoric and to pursue East – West contacts, but got no response from 10 Downing Street – other than his unceremonious dismissal from office on 10 June 1983. See Pym, The Politics of Consent (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1984), p. 56; and Brown, ‘The Change to Engagement in Britain’s Cold War Policy’, esp. pp. 11–12 and 27–31. • 41. ‘Vystuplenie pered chlenami parlamenta Velikobritanii, 18 dekabrya 1984 goda’, in M.S. Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat’i, Vol. 2 (Politizdat, Moscow, 1987), pp. 109–16. • 42. Financial Times, 22 December 1984, p. 26. • 43. The transcript of this meeting at Camp David of 22 December 1984 is in the Reagan Library Archive and available online on the website of the Thatcher Foundation: http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive. Commenting on Margaret Thatcher’s contribution to this Camp David meeting, George Shultz later wrote: ‘She was enthusiastic about Gorbachev, as had been clear from her public statements.’ See Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (Scribner’s, New York, 1993), p. 509. • 44. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 430. • 45. Ibid. • 46. David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), p. 31. • 47. Alexander Zinoviev, The Yawning Heights, trans. Gordon Clough (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1981), p. 649. • 48. Ibid. • 49. The US-based British author John O’Sullivan adds the name of Margaret Thatcher to that of Reagan and the Pope. His book is somewhat more nuanced than its title suggests. See O’Sullivan, The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister: Three Who Changed the World (Regnery, Washington DC, 2006). • 50. Ronald Reagan, An American Life (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1990), pp. 570 and 683. • 51. The former director of the Space Research Institute in the Soviet Union, Roald Sagdeev, who was brought into Gorbachev’s consultative circle on SDI, advised strongly against any escalation of Soviet expenditure on an SDI-equivalent. He remarked to an American journalist that ‘if Americans oversold SDI, we Russians overbought it’. Sagdeev personally thought the idea that SDI could provide a foolproof defence against incoming nuclear missiles was laughable. He argues that the Soviet side paid more attention to SDI than it was worth, but by becoming all the more conscious of its infeasibility, at least they ‘saved the country a few billion rubles’. See Sagdeev, The Making of a Soviet Scientist, p. 273. • 52. Ibid. • 53. Jack F. Matlock, Jr, Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (Random House, New York, 2004), pp. 75–6. • 54. Ibid., pp. 53–4. • 55. Ibid., p. 75. • 56. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 350. The former CIA director, Robert M. Gates, observes that the CIA ‘did not really grasp how alarmed the Soviet leaders might have been until some time after the exercise had been concluded’. He cites the British view, which owed much to the information passed to them by Oleg Gordievsky, that ‘the threat of a preemptive strike was taken very seriously in Moscow in mid-1983 and early 1984’. See Gates, From the Shadows (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996), p. 272. • 57. See Melvin P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (Hill and Wang, New York, 2008), esp. pp. 448–50; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph; and Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev.

24 Gorbachev, Perestroika and the Attempt to Reform Communism, 1985–87

1. Gorbachev had, in a sense, been pre-selected as general secretary already on the evening of 10 March when he was designated as chairman of the funeral commission for Chernenko. Viktor Grishin reminded members of the Politburo of this at their meeting formally to choose the general secretary the next day. He had been the person to propose Gorbachev for the funeral commission chairmanship, hoping thus to improve his chances of political survival. At the 11 March meeting Gromyko was the first member to propose Gorbachev and everyone present added words of praise and said that he was the obvious choice. The transcript of that Politburo meeting, ‘Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 11 marta 1985 goda’, is available in Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter HIA), Fond 89, 1.1001, opis 36, file 16, pp. 1–14. • 2. I observed this myself in the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow. • 3. Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy (Novosti, Moscow, 1995), Vol. 1, pp. 234–5. • 4. David Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire (Random House, New York, 1993), p. 192. • 5. Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin (Pantheon, New York, 1993), pp. 39–43. • 6. Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), pp. 68–9. • 7. M.S. Gorbachev, ‘Zhivoe tvorchestvo naroda’, 10 December 1984, republished in Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat’i (Politizdat, Moscow, 1987), Vol. 2, pp. 75–198. I discussed this significant speech at some length in ‘Gorbachev: New Man in the Kremlin’, Problems of Communism, Vol. 34, No. 3, May – June 1985, pp. 1–23. • 8. ‘Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 12 iyulya 1984 goda’, HIA, Fond 89, 1.001, opis 36, file 15, p. 5. • 9. Ibid. • 10. Aleksandr Yakovlev, Sumerki (Materik, Moscow, 2003), pp. 475–6. • 11. His close friend Zdenk Mlyná described Gorbachev to me in June 1979 (six years before he became Soviet leader) as ‘open-minded, intelligent, and anti-Stalinist’. At the time Gorbachev became general secretary, Mlyná wrote an important article for the Italian Communist newspaper L’Unità (9 April 1985, p. 9), in which he said that Gorbachev had ‘never been a cynic and he is in character a reformer’. Nevertheless, in the early stages of his general secretaryship, as in the years before he became party leader, Gorbachev could repeat the current party orthodoxy even on the concept of Stalinism. Thus, in an interview with the French Communist Party newspaper L’Humanité on 4 February 1986, he responded to a question in which the interviewer cited Western circles which spoke about ‘remnants of Stalinism in the Soviet Union’ by saying: ‘“Stalinism” is a concept thought up by the enemies of communism, and is being widely used in order to blacken the Soviet Union and socialism as a whole’ (Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat’i, Vol. 3, pp. 154–70, at pp. 162–3). He went on to speak about the respects in which the Soviet Union was changing – a widening of glasnost, the further development of intra-party democracy and ‘socialist democracy in general’ – but his response on the concept of Stalinism was that which any previous Soviet leader would have made and, as he was to go on to demonstrate, did not reflect his inner convictions. • 12. Raisa Gorbachev, I Hope: Reminiscences and Reflections (HarperCollins, London, 1991), pp. 16–17. • 13. M.S. Gorbachev, ‘Oktyabr’ i perestroyka: revolyutsiya prodolzhaetsya’ (speech of 2 November 1987 to joint session of the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet, in celebration of the Seventieth Anniversary of ‘Great October’), in Izbrannye rechi i stat’i, Vol. 5, pp. 386–436, at p. 402. • 14. Richard Pipes was wrong in thinking that the Politburo chose a ‘soft-liner’ in Gorbachev, ‘a man committed to perestroika and disarmament’, in response to the hard-line policies of President Reagan. Neither the transcript of the Politburo meeting at which Gorbachev was proposed by all as general secretary nor the subsequent interviews and memoirs of Politburo members suggest that they were at all aware that they were electing a radical reformer who would also transform the essence of Soviet foreign policy. See Pipes, ‘Misinterpreting the Cold War: The Hard-liners Had it Right’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 1, January – February 1995, pp. 154–60, at p. 158. My own argument is set out at substantially greater length than here in a chapter called ‘Ending the Cold War’, in Archie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), pp. 239–76. • 15. Yegor Gaidar (who was to become acting prime minister in the first post-Soviet Russian government and was an influential economic reformer for much of the 1990s) lays great stress on the heavy blow to the Soviet economy of the fall of oil prices. He notes: ‘In 1986, prices fell to an unprecedented low for the previous decade – less than $10 a barrel in prices at that time.’ See Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia (Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2007), p. 61. • 16. ‘O perestroyke i kadrovoy politike partii’, speech of 27 January 1987, in Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat’i, Vol. 4 (1987), pp. 299–354, at p. 319. • 17. Ibid., p. 354 • 18. Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat’i, Vol. 3, pp. 235–43, at p. 241 (italics in the original). • 19. Georgiy Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody: Reformatsiya Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika (Rossika Zevs, Moscow, 1993), p. 53. • 20. It appeared in the journal Oktyabr’ (previously a very conservative Soviet journal, but, under new editorship, transformed in the Gorbachev era), No. 3, 1987, pp. 130–5. In a letter of 12 May, Berlin replied: ‘If, indeed, it was released for general circulation, I am to some degree shaken, as I promised you I would be; evidently something is happening.’ However, he remained, as he put it in the same letter, ‘obstinately sceptical about fundamental change or the real belief in peaceful co-existence on the part of the Soviet authorities’. • 21. Pravda, 15 July 1987, p. 2; and Pravda, 30 September 1987, p. 1. • 22. ‘Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 15 oktyabrya 1987 goda’, Volkogonov Papers, R 10012, National Security Archive (hereafter NSA), Washington DC, p. 155. • 23. Ibid., p. 178. • 24. Ibid., pp. 149–50. • 25. Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat’i, Vol. 5 (1988), p. 402. • 26. In September 1988, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ryzhkov drew the Politburo’s attention to many of ‘the negative phenomena in the struggle with drunkenness and alcoholism’. These included thousands of deaths arising from the consumption of dangerous alternative intoxicants, shortages in the shops of a variety of products which were being adapted for these purposes, and the immense loss of revenue to the state. See ‘O nekotorykh negativniykh yavleniyakh v bor’be s p’yanstvom i alkogolizmom’, in Isvestiya TsK KPSS, No. 1, 1989, pp. 48–51. See also Stephen White, Russia Goes Dry: Alcohol, State and Society (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996). • 27. A.S. Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym (Kul’tura, Moscow, 1993), pp. 174–5; and Timothy J. Colton, Yeltsin: A Life (Basic Books, New York, 2008), pp. 138–40. • 28. ‘Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 15 oktyabrya 1987 goda’, p. 137. • 29. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p.

35. • 30. Colton, Yeltsin, pp. 130–1. • 31. Ibid., pp. 131–2; and Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 110. • 32. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 169. • 33. Colton, Yeltsin, pp. 146–53. • 34. Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire, pp. 111–12. • 35. Ibid., p. 112. • 36. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986) (Random House, New York, 1995), pp. 622–6. • 37. ‘Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 30 maya 1987 goda’, Volkogonov Papers, NSA, p. 485. • 38. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 626. • 39. For discussion of the intellectual origins of the ‘New Thinking’ on foreign policy, see Robert D. English, Russia and the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (Columbia University Press, New York, 2000); Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1999); Stephen Shenfield, The Nuclear Predicament: Explorations in Soviet Ideology (Royal Institute of International Affairs and Routledge, London, 1987); and Silvio Pons and Federic Romero (eds.), Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations (Frank Cass, London, 2005). • 40. See on this Melvin P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (Hill and Wang, New York, 2007), pp. 403–14. • 41. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 622. • 42. Jack F. Matlock, Jr, Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (Random House, New York, 2004), p. 275.

25 The Dismantling of Soviet Communism, 1988–89

1. Der Spiegel interview with Alexander Solzhenitsyn, www.nytimes.com/2007/07/23/world/europe/23spiegel.html. Similarly, Solzhenitsyn told David Remnick: ‘As for freedom of speech, that’s the great achievement of Gorbachev and his policy of glasnost. Yeltsin just did not interfere in this process.’ See Remnick, Reporting: Writings from The New Yorker (Vintage Books, New York, 2007), p. 206. • 2. Sheila Fitzpatrick, ‘Like a Thunderbolt’, London Review of Books, 11 September 2008, pp. 13–15, at p. 14. • 3. Even though the article which appeared under Nina Andreyeva’s name was a collective effort, it reflected views which she expressed still more clearly in private, as she did – not least on the subject of Jews – in a long conversation with David Remnick. See Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire (Viking, New York, 1993), p. 83. • 4. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 13 March 1988, p. 3. • 5. V Politbyuro TsK KPSS…Po zapisyam Anatoliya Chernyaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiya Shakhnazarova (1985–1991) (Al’pina, Moscow, 2006), p. 307. • 6. Ibid. • 7. Ibid., pp. 302–9. • 8. Vadim Medvedev, V komande Gorbacheva (Bylina, Moscow, 1994), p. 71. • 9. For a variety of analyses of the development and significance of the unofficial organizations, see Geoffrey A. Hosking, Jonathan Aves and Peter J.S. Duncan, The Road to Post-Communism: Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union 1985–1991 (Pinter, London, 1992); M. Steven Fish, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995); and Alexander Lukin, The Political Culture of the Russian ‘Democrats’ (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000). • 10. With circulations already high in 1988–89, the journals of liberal, reformist and pro-perestroika orientation saw them rise still more by 1990, far outstripping the total readership of the Russian nationalist journals, although

subscriptions to the latter were not negligible. Thus in 1990 the journals of nationalist orientation, Nash sovremennik, Moskva and Molodaya gvardiya, had a total of 1.6 million subscribers, whereas the joint readership of their liberal counterparts, Novy mir, Znamya and Yunost’, was 6.6 million. See Yitzhak M. Brudny, Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953–1991 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1998), p. 230. • 11. As mentioned in the speech of Georgiy Baklanov, the chief editor of the journal Znamya, to the Nineteenth Party Conference: XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 28 iyunya–1 iyulya 1988 goda: Stenograficheskiy otchet (Politizdat, Moscow, 1988), Vol. 2, p. 21. • 12. Yu. N. Afanas’ev (ed.), Inogo ne dano: Sud’by perestroyki. Vglyadyvayas’ v proshloe. Vozvrashchenie k budushchemu (Progress, Moscow, 1988). • 13. Ibid., p. 126. • 14. Brudny, Reinventing Russia, p. 193. • 15. Ibid., pp. 252–3. • 16. Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, pp. 266–8. • 17. A number of people who worked with Gorbachev, including members of the Politburo who were opposed to the main thrust of perestroika, have testified to Gorbachev’s powers of persuasion. Thus, for example, Vitaly Vorotnikov (one of those who initially approved of Nina Andreyeva’s article) later wrote that in Politburo meetings he often had doubts about the reforms Gorbachev was advocating, but ‘in the end I often yielded to the logic of his conviction’, adding: ‘In that lies my guilt.’ See Vorotnikov, A bylo eto tak…Iz dnevnika chlena Politbyuro TsK KPSS (Sovet veteranov knigoizdaniya, Moscow, 1995), p. 264. • 18. ‘Vstrecha s pervymi sekretaryami obkomov, 11 aprelya 1988 goda’, Gorbachev Foundation Archives. • 19. ‘Vstrecha Gorbacheva s tret’ey gruppoy sekretarey obkomov, 18 aprelya 1988 goda’, Gorbachev Foundation Archives. • 20. Ibid. On the significance of labelling the socio-political order as a ‘command-administrative system’, see T.H. Rigby, ‘Some Concluding Observations’, in Archie Brown (ed.), The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2004), pp. 207–23, at p. 213; and Archie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), pp. 287–8. • 21. See, for example, the extracts from Anatoliy Chernyaev’s notes of the Politburo meeting of 19 May 1988, in V Politbyuro TsK KPSS…, pp. 361–3. • 22. ‘V kabinete u Gorbacheva na Staroy ploshchadi, iyun’ 1988 goda (Zapis’ Shakhnazarova)’, Gorbachev Foundation Archives. • 23. Jack F. Matlock, Jr, Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Random House, New York, 1995), pp. 121–2. • 24. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Little, Brown, London, 1993), p. 9. • 25. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (Scribner’s, New York, 1993), pp. 1103–4. • 26. ‘Politbyuro, 6 iyunya 1988 goda’, notes of Politburo meeting of 6 June 1988 of Anatoliy Chernyaev, Gorbachev Foundation Archives. • 27. The figures are those of the most reliable survey research organization in the last years of the Soviet Union – the All-Union (later All-Russian) Centre for the Study of Public Opinion. These data on Gorbachev’s popularity during his years in office were supplied to me by the late Professor Yuriy Levada, the centre’s director, in 1993. • 28. Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: How the Cold War came to an end. The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1990 (Jonathan Cape, London, 1992), p. 294. • 29. Ibid. • 30. XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Vol. 1, pp. 223–8, at p. 224. • 31. Mikhail Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroyku…pochemu eto

vazhno seychas (Al’pina, Moscow, 2006), p. 27. • 32. XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Vol. 2, pp. 20–3. • 33. Ibid., pp. 55–62. • 34. Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), pp. 183–4 and 360–1. • 35. Stephen White, Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes (Chatham House, Chatham, NJ, 1997), p. 28. • 36. Timothy J. Colton, Yeltsin: A Life (Basic Books, New York, 2008), p. 166. • 37. Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, p. 210 (italics in original). • 38. Nikolay Ryzhkov, Perestroyka: Istoriya predatel’stv (Novosti, Moscow, 1992), p. 291. • 39. Izvestiya, 26 May 1989, p. 4. • 40. Survey data on numbers viewing, and on reaction to the debates, were published in Izvestiya, 31 May 1989, p. 7, and the same newspaper on 4 June 1989, p. 1. • 41. On the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies, see Michael Urban, with Vyacheslav Igrunov and Sergei Mitrokhin, The Rebirth of Politics in Russia (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), pp. 159–69. • 42. For a fuller discussion of Gorbachev’s changing attitude to ‘the leading role of the party’, see Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World, pp. 306–9. • 43. Edward Kline, Foreword to Andrei Sakharov, Moscow and Beyond, 1986 to 1989 (Knopf, New York, 1991), pp. xiv – xvii. • 44. For a good analysis of the breakdown of authority within the command economy, see Stephen Whitefield, Industrial Power and the Soviet State (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993), esp. pp. 206–51. • 45. Archie Brown, ‘Gorbachev, Lenin, and the Break with Leninism’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2007, pp. 230–44. • 46. Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroyku, p. 373.

26 The End of Communism in Europe

1. Mikhail Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroyku…pochemu eto vazhno seychas (Al’pina, Moscow, 2006), p. 70. • 2. M.S. Gorbachev, in XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Stenograficheskiy otchet (Politizdat, Moscow, 1988), pp. 42–3. • 3. M.S. Gorbachev, ‘Vystuplenie v Organizatsii Ob” edinennykh Natsiy, 7 dekabrya 1988 goda’, in Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat’i, Vol. 7 (Politizdat, Moscow, 1990), pp. 184–202, at pp. 198–9; and Pavel Palazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter (Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 1997), p. 370. • 4. ‘Politbyuro 24 noyabrya 1988 goda’, Chernyaev notes, Gorbachev Foundation Archives, Moscow. • 5. Palazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, p. 370. • 6. Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat’i, Vol. 7, p. 188. • 7. Ibid. • 8. Vladislav M. Zubok, ‘New Evidence on the “Soviet Factor” in the Peaceful Revolutions of 1989’, in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 12/13, 2001, pp. 5–14, at p. 9; and Andrei Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble: Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Polity, Cambridge, 2008), pp. 166–7. • 9. Memorandum from Shakhnazarov to Gorbachev in advance of the Politburo meeting of 6 October 1988. See Georgiy Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody: Reformatsiya Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika (Rossika Zevs, Moscow, 1993), pp. 367–9. • 10. For numerous examples of Soviet political and especially military calls in 1989 for a hard line to be taken over Eastern Europe, see Mark Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 3)’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 3–96. • 11. ‘Politbyuro, 13 aprelya 1989 goda’, Chernyaev

notes, Gorbachev Foundation Archives. • 12. Roger Gough, A Good Comrade: János Kádár, Communism and Hungary (Tauris, London, 2006), p. 201. • 13. Ibid., p. 203. • 14. Ibid., pp. 1 and 254–7. • 15. Ibid., p. 251. • 16. David Stark and László Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998), pp. 20–2; and R.J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – and After (Routledge, London, 2nd ed., 1997), pp. 380–1. • 17. Rudolf L. Tkés, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution: Economic reform, social change and political succession (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), p. 299. • 18. Indeed, Gorbachev, although he did not attempt to interfere with Hungarian developments, expressed his disagreement with Pozsgay’s evaluation of 1956 in a conversation in early 1989 with Hungarian prime minister Németh. After Németh had said, ‘We should not eradicate everything with one stroke, because what we achieved is worth noting’, Gorbachev responded: ‘I believe that Pozsgay’s statements are quite extremist in this respect. The events of 1956 indeed started with the dissatisfaction of the people. Later, however, the events escalated into a counterrevolution and bloodshed. This cannot be overlooked.’ See ‘Document No. 2: Record of Conversation between President M.S. Gorbachev and Miklós Németh, Member of the HSWP CC Politburo, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Hungary, Moscow, 3 March 1989’, in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 12/13, 2001, pp. 76–7. • 19. Ivan T. Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 1944–1993: Detour from the periphery to the periphery (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), p. 274. • 20. Tkés, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution, p. 299. • 21. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 392–3. • 22. On Glemp, see George Weigel, The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism (Oxford University Press, New York, 1992), p. 147. • 23. Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ‘89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (Random House, New York, 1990), p. 33; and Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 392. • 24. Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern, pp. 45–6. • 25. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 392. • 26. Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 1944–1993, p. 266. • 27. Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR 1949–1989 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995), p. 205. • 28. Cited by Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997), p. 50. • 29. Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship, pp. 206–15. • 30. Maier, Dissolution, pp. 170–2. • 31. Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship, p. 206. • 32. Ibid., pp. 246–7. • 33. Mark Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 1)’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2003, pp. 178–256, at pp. 185–6; and Hans-Hermann Hertle, ‘The Fall of the Wall: The Unintended Self-Dissolution of East Germany’s Ruling Regime’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 12/13, 2001, pp. 131–40, at p. 133. • 34. Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism’, p. 186 (italics added). • 35. Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern, p. 65. • 36. Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship, pp. 257–60. • 37. Hertle, ‘The Fall of the Wall’, pp. 136–7. • 38. Ibid., p. 138. • 39. Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship, p. 289. • 40. Hertle, ‘The Fall of the Wall’, p. 140. • 41. Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern, p. 73. • 42. Frederick Taylor, The Berlin Wall 13 August 1961–9 November 1989 (Bloomsbury, London, 2007), pp. 588–90. • 43. Hertle, ‘The Fall of the Wall’, pp. 139–40. In addition to the excellent study by Maier, Dissolution, significant books on the

end of the GDR and the unification of Germany include Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (Jonathan Cape, London, 1993); and Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1995). • 44. See H. Gordon Skilling, Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia (Allen & Unwin, London, 1981). • 45. H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976), p. 823. • 46. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 384–5. • 47. Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdenk Mlyná, Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism (Columbia University Press, New York, 2002), p. 85. • 48. Jacques Lévesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997), p. 182. • 49. Ibid., p. 186. • 50. Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel (Free Press, New York, 1992), p. 217. • 51. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 396–7. • 52. R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd ed., 2005), pp. 212–15. • 53. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996), p. 349. • 54. Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy (Novosti, Moscow, 1995), Vol. 2, p. 392. • 55. Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, pp. 232–3. • 56. Ibid., p. 233. • 57. Lévesque, The Enigma of 1989, p. 198. • 58. Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, pp. 235–6. • 59. Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 1944–1993, p. 287. • 60. Nesti Gjeluci, ‘Albania: A History of Isolation’, in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone and Piotr Dutkiewicz (eds.), New Europe: The Impact of the First Decade, Vol. 2 (Collegium Civitas Press, Warsaw, 2006), pp. 13–47, at pp. 26–7. • 61. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 404. • 62. Gjeluci, ‘Albania: A History of Isolation’, pp. 27–8. • 63. One could even add the party organizations of the two ‘autonomous regions’ of Kosovo and Vojvodina, although their status was lower than that of the republics. • 64. Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 1944–1993, p. 293. • 65. Robin Okey, The Demise of Communist East Europe: 1989 in Context (Hodder Arnold, London, 2004), p. 144. • 66. Misha Glenny, The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy (Penguin, London, 1990), pp. 121–3. • 67. Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism (Polity, Cambridge, 1997), p. 96. • 68. Okey, The Demise of Communist East Europe, p. 151. • 69. Holmes, Post-Communism, p. 98.

27 The Break-up of the Soviet State

1. Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2nd ed., 1994), pp. 82 and 106. • 2. See Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine (Macmillan, London, 1985). • 3. Charles King, The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008), pp. 178–9. • 4. On the large issue of Russian statehood, in historical context, see Vera Tolz, Inventing the Nation: Russia (Hodder, London, 2001); Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire 1552–1917 (HarperCollins, London, 1997); and Hosking, Rulers and Victims: The Russians in the Soviet Union (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2006). • 5. I have noted elsewhere the various reasons why Gorbachev chose the path of indirect election to the newly-created presidency in 1990 and also why I consider this to have been a strategic error. See Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), pp. 198–205; and Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), pp. 209–10. Gorbachev himself came round some years after the Soviet Union had ceased to exist to the view that he should have taken the risk of calling a general election for the Soviet presidency. The risk was not just of losing the election, but of bringing forward the date of a hard-line coup by conservative Communists against him. For Gorbachev’s retrospective views on the issue, see Mikhail Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroyku…pochemu eto vazhno seychas (Al’pina, Moscow, 2006), p. 374. • 6. Reytingi Borisa Yel’tsina i Mikhaila Gorbacheva po 10-bal’noy shkale (VTsIOM, Moscow, 1993). • 7. Mark Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 2)’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2004, pp. 3–64, at p. 59. • 8. The system adopted in the Soviet republics, carried over into the post-Communist states, was not a purely presidential system, but what political scientists call ‘semi-presidentialism’. As in Fifth Republic France, there was, and is, a dual executive – a president and a prime minister. The distribution of power between these two branches of the executive can vary greatly from one semi-presidential system to another. In post-Soviet Russia and, still more, in the former Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union, what emerged was a highly presidentialized form of semi-presidentialism. See Robert Elgie, ‘A Fresh Look at Semipresidentialism: Variations on a Theme’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 3, July 2005, pp. 98–112, esp. p. 104. • 9. Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 2)’, p. 58. • 10. Cf. Hosking, Rulers and Victims, p. 377; Timothy J. Colton, Yeltsin: A Life (Basic Books, New York, 2008), p. 178; Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 2)’, p. 12; and M. Steven Fish, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995), p. 109. • 11. Hosking, Rulers and Victims, p. 377. • 12. Ibid., p. 378. • 13. Leon Aron, Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life (HarperCollins, London, 2000), p. 377. • 14. Colton, Yeltsin, p. 184. • 15. As Gorbachev later observed: ‘The presence of a strong conservative tendency in the Politburo, and in general in the higher echelons of the party, led to the fact that not infrequently we were late in taking urgent decisions’ (Ponyat’ perestroyku, p. 374). • 16. Cited in Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia (Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2007), p. 141. • 17. Ibid. • 18. Perekhod k rynku: Kontseptsiya i Programma (Arkhangel’skoe izdatel’stvo, Moscow, 1990), p. 3. • 19. Colton, Yeltsin, pp. 219–20. • 20. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 152. • 21. Yevgeny Yasin, ‘The Parade of Market Transformation Programs’, in Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich (eds.), The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System: An Insiders’ History (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1998), pp. 228–37, at p. 235. • 22. Ibid., p. 237. • 23. Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroyku, pp. 209–10. • 24. ‘The Tbilisi Massacre, April 1989: Documents’, in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 12/13, 2001, pp. 31–48. • 25. Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom (Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991), pp. 192–5; Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, pp. 264–7; and Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East

European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 2)’, pp. 27–32. • 26. Anatoliy Sobchak, Khozhdenie vo vlast’: Rasskaz o rozhdenii parlamenta (Novosti, Moscow, 1991), p. 97. • 27. ‘Politbyuro 13 aprelya 1989 goda’, Chernyaev notes, Gorbachev Foundation Archives. • 28. ‘Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 16 noyabrya 1990 goda’, Hoover Institution Archives, Fond 89, 1.003, opis 42, file 30. • 29. Ibid., p. 11. • 30. Ibid., p. 25. • 31. Ibid. • 32. Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 2)’, pp. 46–8. • 33. See, for example, George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (Knopf, New York, 1998), pp. 496–7; and Jack F. Matlock, Jr, Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Random House, New York, 1995), pp. 454–60. • 34. Aleksandr Yakovlev, Sumerki (Materik, Moscow, 2003), p. 520. • 35. Aleksandr Dugin, ‘Perestroyka po-evraziyski: upushchennyy shans’, in V.I. Tolstykh (ed.), Perestroyka: Dvadtsat’ let spustya (Russkiy put’, Moscow, 2005), pp. 88–97, at p. 96. • 36. Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 2)’, p. 20. • 37. Mark Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 1)’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2003, pp. 178–256, at pp. 218–19. • 38. Ibid., p. 222. • 39. Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdenk Mlyná, Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism (Columbia University Press, New York, 2002), p. 132. • 40. For a fuller account of this whole process, see my chapter, ‘The National Question, the Coup, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union’, in Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, pp. 252–305. • 41. Mikhail Gorbachev, The August Putsch: The Truth and the Lessons (HarperCollins, London, 1991), Appendix C, ‘The Crimea Article’, pp. 97–127, at p. 111. • 42. Ibid., p. 23. • 43. V.G. Stepankov and E.K. Lisov, Kremlevskiy zagovor (Ogonek, Moscow, 1992), p. 14. The authors were at the time procurator general and deputy procurator general of Russia. They quote from the transcripts of the interrogation of the putschists. Later the coup plotters were to change their story and suggest that Gorbachev was not really under house arrest and could have left Foros at any time. Some of Yeltsin’s supporters were happy to spread that calumny and a number of Westerners were gullible enough to believe it. For more detailed analyses of its absurdity, see Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev (Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 2000), ed. and trans. Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker, ‘Afterword to the US Edition’, pp. 401–23; and Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World, pp. 319–24. • 44. Colton, Yeltsin, p. 198. • 45. Ibid., pp. 198–9. • 46. Ibid., pp. 199–200. • 47. Ibid., p. 201. • 48. Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody: Reformatsiya Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika (Rossika Zevs, Moscow, 1993), p. 176. • 49. The full text of Gorbachev’s resignation speech is in Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy (Novosti, Moscow, 1995), Vol. 1, pp. 5–8, and in the abbreviated English-language Memoirs (Transworld, London, 1996), pp. xxvi – xxix.

28 Why Did Communism Last so Long?

1. Alec Nove, Glasnost’ In Action: Cultural Renaissance in Russia (Unwin Hyman, London, 1989), p. 4. • 2. Ibid. • 3. Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway, Russia’s Political Hospitals: The Abuse of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union (Gollancz, London, 1977). • 4. See Bernard Crick, George Orwell: A Life (Penguin, London, 1980); Stephen Ingle, George Orwell: A Political Life (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993); T.R. Fyvel, George Orwell: A Personal Memoir (Hutchinson, London, 1982); and Michael Sheldon, Orwell: The Authorised Biography (Heinemann, London, 1991). • 5. Lenin backwards turned into quite a nice-sounding Russian first name. Stranger personal names emerged in the 1920s, including Barrikada (Barricade) and Iskra, named after Lenin’s newspaper (Iskra – The Spark). See Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism. Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999), pp. 83–4. (Of these names, Iskra was not really new. It existed both as a first name and as a surname in the Russian Empire, especially Ukraine. One of the associates of the Cossack leader, Ivan Mazepa, was named Iskra. He appears as a character in Tchaikovsky’s opera Mazeppa (the double ‘p’ is the conventional English spelling), composed in the early 1880s and set in Ukraine at the beginning of the eighteenth century. However, Iskra was far from being a common name, and its re-emergence in the early Soviet period was in homage to Lenin and the Bolsheviks.) • 6. Especially illuminating on this topic is Alena Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998). • 7. Quoted in ibid., pp. 61–2. • 8. Ibid., esp. pp. 30–2 and 119–21. • 9. Alena Ledeneva, ‘Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China’, Contemporary Studies in Society and History, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2008, pp. 1–27, at p. 6. • 10. Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic System (Unwin Hyman, London, 3rd ed., 1986), p. 95. • 11. Boris Yeltsin, Against the Grain: An Autobiography (Jonathan Cape, London, 1990), p. 58. A detailed analysis of the economic role of regional party secretaries was provided by Jerry F. Hough in The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1969). • 12. Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia (Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2007). • 13. Ibid., esp. pp. 169 and 175–6. • 14. Ibid., p. 175. • 15. I disagreed with this fundamentally at the time. See Archie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), p. 223. • 16. Alexander Dallin, ‘Causes of the Collapse of the USSR’, Post-Soviet Affairs (formerly Soviet Economy), Vol. 8, No. 4, 1992, pp. 279–302, at pp. 297 and 299. • 17. Ledeneva, ‘Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China’. • 18. Ibid., pp. 3 and 9–10. • 19. Ibid., p. 3. • 20. Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, ‘The Resilience of Guanxi and its New Deployments: A Critique of some New Guanxi Scholarship’, China Quarterly, No. 170, 2002, pp. 459–76, at p. 464.

29 What Caused the Collapse of Communism?

1. Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR. Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik (Gosstatizdat, Moscow, 1956), pp. 193 and 221; and Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1984 godu. Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik (Finansy i statistiki, Moscow, 1985), pp. 29 and 509. • 2. The point has been elaborated earlier in this volume, especially in Chapter 23. • 3. János Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), pp. 292–301. • 4. Ibid., p. 297. Kornai excludes from his analysis military industry, and that, it should be noted, was the sphere in which Soviet technological innovation was strongest. • 5. Ibid., pp. 140–5. • 6. ‘East – West Relations: Papers by Academics’, Memorandum from N.H.R.A. Broomfield, 7 September 1983, Foreign Office Papers, RS 013/1 (document obtained under the UK Freedom of Information Act). • 7. For a good account of the Lithuanian independence movement, including the personalities of Brazauskas and Landsbergis, see Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2nd ed., 1994). • 8. Eric D. Weitz, Creating German Communism, 1890–1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997), pp. 374–5. • 9. As noted, for example, by Adam Roberts, ‘International Relations after the Cold War’, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2, 2008, pp. 335–50. • 10. The terminology ‘intrastructural dissent’ is used by Alexander Shtromas in Political Change and Social Development: The Case of the Soviet Union (Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1981), pp. 74–82. • 11. As always, it is necessary to make a distinction between the Soviet system and the Soviet state. Notwithstanding the great boost given to national separatism by Boris Yeltsin, a party member for thirty years and a party official for more than two decades, the main drive for national independence, resulting eventually in the break-up of the Soviet state, emanated from the broader society, rather than from within the party, in those republics which most actively pursued separate statehood. • 12. Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era (Little, Brown, Boston, 1990), p. 57. • 13. János Kornai, By Force of Thought: Irregular Memoirs of an Intellectual Journey (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2006), p. 63. • 14. Ibid., p. 64. • 15. See Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina vanden Heuvel, Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev’s Reformers (Norton, New York, 1989), pp. 39–40. • 16. I have argued elsewhere that Gorbachev’s psychological unwillingness to abandon his lifelong respect for Lenin led him to believe that he was in tune with the thinking of the ‘late Lenin’ (the Lenin of the NEP period), when in fact he had rejected what was fundamental to Lenin’s thinking at any stage of his career as a revolutionary. See Archie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), pp. 284–94. • 17. R.A. Safarov, Obshchestvennoe mnenie i gosudarstvennoe upravlenie (Yuridicheskaya literatura, Moscow, 1975). Safarov wrote (p. 214): ‘The greater the sum of information communicated to the society, the higher is the level of competence of public opinion in matters of control over the government, ministries and executive committees of soviets.’ Obviously, he had to exclude the Communist Party, although in the broad sense of government, the party was at the heart of it. • 18. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act (HMSO, London, 1975), p. 36 (italics in original). • 19. Safarov was just one of a number of scholars who carried out survey research in the 1960s and 1970s in the Soviet Union, but the most sensitive political questions had to be avoided, and there had to be doubts – which vanished only in the much freer atmosphere of the second half of the 1980s – about how willing citizens were to answer the questions frankly, even though they were promised anonymity. • 20. See Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia (Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2007), pp. 111–13; and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (Unwin Hyman, London, 1988), pp. 395–6, 498–500, and 513–14. • 21. Alec Nove, The Soviet System in Retrospect: An Obituary Notice (Fourth Annual W. Averell Harriman Lecture, Columbia University, New York, 1993), p. 31.

30 What’s Left of Communism?

1. Robert Skidelsky, ‘Crisis-hit Russia must scale down its ambition’, Financial Times, 31 October 2008, p. 15; and ‘Net Capital Outflows at $140 Bln’, Moscow Times, 1 November 2008, p. 4. • 2. Kommersant, 8 October 2008. • 3. Although not to be compared with Nepal, another place where the Communist Party retains influence is South Africa, where the CPSA is still a significant element within the increasingly divided ANC. • 4. Henry S. Rowen, ‘When Will the Chinese People be Free?’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 3, July 2007, pp. 38–52. at p. 42. • 5. Chris Patten, What Next? Surviving the Twenty-First Century (Allen Lane, London, 2008), p. 401. • 6. Kellee S. Tsai, Capitalists without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2007), p. 54. • 7. Ibid., p. 45. Rowen notes that the ‘urban-rural Gini coefficient went from 0.28 in 1991 to 0.46 in 2000’. A higher number means more inequality, and the Chinese figures may be compared with the European average of 0.30 and 0.45 in the USA. • 8. The figure for China is from an official source and cited in Arch Puddington (ed.), Freedom in the World 2008: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Freedom House, New York, 2008), p. 163. The British figure, from the Health and Safety Executive, is reported in the Financial Times, 30 October 2008, p. 4. • 9. My source for the information in this paragraph is a senior and well-connected Chinese Communist Party intellectual. • 10. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington DC, 2008), p. 81. • 11. See, for example, Cheng Chen and Rudra Sil, ‘Stretching Postcommunism: Diversity, Context, and Comparative Historical Analysis’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2007, pp. 275–301. • 12. Patrick J. Heardon, The Tragedy of Vietnam (Pearson Longman, New York, 3rd ed., 2008), p. 194. • 13. Owen Bennett-Jones, ‘Laos: 25 years of communism’, 30 December 2000: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_ correspondent/1092752.stm. • 14. Reported in Rory Carroll, ‘Cuban workers to get bonuses for extra effort’, The Guardian, 13 June 2008, p. 28. • 15. Heardon, The Tragedy of Vietnam, pp. 178–81. • 16. Ibid., p. 180. • 17. Mark Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 1)’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2003, pp. 178–256, at p. 198. • 18. Cheng Chen and Ji-Yong Lee, ‘Making sense of North Korea: “National Stalinism” in comparative-historical perspective’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2007, pp. 459–75, esp. pp. 461–3. • 19. Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007), pp. 204–5. • 20. Puddington (ed.), Freedom in the World 2008, p. 777. • 21. Rana Mitter, A Bitter

Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), p. 309. • 22. Chen and Sil, ‘Stretching Postcommunism’, p. 287. • 23. Chris Patten, Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths about World Affairs (Allen Lane, London, 2005), p. 279. • 24. Ibid. • 25. Rowen, ‘When Will the Chinese People be Free?’, p. 41; and Robert J. Barro and Jong-Whu Lee, ‘International data on educational attainment: updates and implications’, Oxford Economic Papers, 3, 2001, pp. 541–63, at p. 549. The same authors note that in international tests of students in mathematics and science, Asian countries occupy the top three places: Singapore, South Korea and Japan (ibid., p. 555). • 26. Tianjian Shi, ‘Cultural Values and Democracy in the People’s Republic of China’, The China Quarterly, No. 162, 2000, pp. 540–59, at p. 557. • 27. Dingxin Zhao, ‘China’s Prolonged Stability and Political Future: same political system, different policies and methods’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10 (28), 2001, pp. 427–44. Writing at the beginning of this century, Zhao asked (p. 441): ‘What will happen after another 20 years or so when the people who have first-hand experience of the Cultural Revolution have grown old? The people by then may take affluence and stability for granted, and the state will no longer be able to use them to justify its rule.’ • 28. See Lee Kuan Yew and Fareed Zakaria, ‘Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, 1994, pp. 109–26. • 29. Kim Dae Jung, ‘Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6, November – December, 1994, pp. 189–94. • 30. See Stephen Whitefield (ed.), Political Culture and Post-Communism (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005). • 31. See Yu-tzung Chang, Yun-han Chu and Chong-Min Park, ‘Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2007, pp. 66–80. The authors suggest (p. 78) that ‘the economic and geopolitical rise of China over the last decade’ has made the regional environment ‘more hospitable for nondemocracies’. • 32. Financial Times, 4 November 2008, p. 12. • 33. Howard Fast, The Naked God: The Writer and the Communist Party (Bodley Head, London, 1958), p. 24. • 34. Ibid., pp. 26–8. • 35. Ibid., p. 26. • 36. Milovan Djilas, Wartime (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1977), p. 450. • 37. Ibid. • 38. Mikhail Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroyku. Pochemu eto vazhno seychas (Al’pina, Moscow, 2006), pp. 18 and 25. • 39. Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1998), pp. 3 and 180. • 40. Ibid., p. 188.