Notes INTRODUCTION
1. Gallup Poll Monthly 367 (Spring 1996), 7–9; ibid., 368 (May 1996), 2–6.
2. Charles Krauthammer, “Don’t Bail Out Clinton on Medicare!” syndicated in Washington Post, November 8, 1996, A2S.
3. Gallup Poll Monthly (April 1996), 7.
4. See Paul Craig Roberts, “Don’t Look Now but the U.S. Ship Is Sinking,” Business Week, November 1996, 22; and Jonathan Rauch’s nonpartisan appeal to reduce budgets, “Self-inflicted Budget Woes,” U.S. News and World Report, November 18, 1996, 94.
5. Maggie Gallagher, “It’s Not Abortion, Stupid,” syndicated in New York Post, November 8, 1996. Gallagher offers the entirely defensible view that the Republican appeal to “the self-sufficient man or woman” cannot attract socially isolated women; she shrewdly observes that “women voters hear the ‘It takes a village’ theme [of Hillary Clinton] not as a call to more government but as a call to community, unity, common ground.” But what exactly can be done by opponents of big government to change this female tropism? For it is precisely “more government” and more intrusive government that women increasingly see as evidence of “community.” Gallagher proves this point when she cites the reservations among women in regard to Republican plans to finance alternatives to public schools, now viewed as “the last remaining hub of vivid community life.” Whatever the merits of this position, it does indicate, according to Gallagher, that women generally oppose any movement toward the privatization of education.
6. Mary Ann Glendon, First Things 69 (January 1997), 23. For a provocative attempt to contextualize the sensuous, materialist ethos of mass democracy at the end of the Cold War, see Panajotis Kondylis, “Marxismus, Kommunismus und die Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Der Marxismus in seinem Zeitalter (Leipzig: Reclam Verlag, 1994), 14–36; and by the same author, “Die Antiquiertheit der politischen Begriffe,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 5, 1991; ibid., “Globale Mobilmachung,” July 13, 1996.
7. Sigmund Knag, “The Almighty, Omnipotent State,” The Independent Review 1, no. 3 (Winter 1997), 407–08; See also Robert A. Dahl and Edward Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); Thomas Molnar, Le Modèle défiguré, l’Amérique de Tocqueville à Carter (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978); and by the same author, L’hégémonie libérale (Paris: L’Âge d’Homme, 1992). Needless to say, the view of the American government as a zone of combat among “neofeudal” interests is popular among European traditionalists for different reasons from those that recommend it to American social engineers. One group is looking back to the European confessional state; the other is looking forward to a thoroughly managed democracy which is still being created.
8. For a confident statement of the triumph of the liberal tradition throughout the current political spectrum, from the socialist Left to the free-market Right, see The Economist, December 21, 1996, 17–19.
CHAPTER ONE
1. Karl Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights,” American Political Science Review 31 (June 1937), 417–32; ibid. (August 1937), 638–58; and David Reisman, “Democracy and Dissent,” Columbia Law Review 42 (1942), 729–80.
2. R. Alan Lawson, The Failure of Independent Liberalism, 1930–1941 (New York: Putnam, 1971), especially 155–68; and Gary Bullert’s angry but illuminating analysis of the value question in Dewey and his school, The Politics of John Dewey (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1983).
3. This subject is incisively treated in Christopher Lasch’s The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 430–50; also T. L. Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Sciences (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977); and B. Sicherman, The Quest for Mental Health in America 1880–1917 (New York: Arno Press, 1980).
4. New Republic, October 31, 1994, 4–6; see also Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (New York: Free Press, 1994).
5. New Republic, October 31, 1994, 25. According to Lind, “The crypto-nativist rationale for restricting high levels of immigration can only be strengthened by the fact that scholars as esteemed as Murray and Herrnstein fret over the danger posed by an immigrant population with low cognitive abilities. Not only must low I.Q. immigrants be kept out, according to Herrnstein, but low I.Q. native born Americans must be kept from reproducing.” Moreover, “though the authors of The Bell Curve refuse to endorse eugenic measures …, the logic of their arguments points in the direction of sterilization.” Since Murray and Herrnstein deny explicitly and repeatedly the moral and political wisdom of governmental policies of sterilization, Lind must rely on incriminating phrases about where the “logic of their arguments points.” Having read this work myself, I find nothing there pointing in the ominous direction suggested by Lind.
6. Ibid., 18.
7. Ibid., 15–16.
8. Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), xiv; also by the same author, “The Politics of Restoration,” The Economist, December 24, 1994, 33–36.
9. Guido Ruggiero, History of European Liberalism trans. R. C. Collingwood (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), especially 142 and 443 for Ruggiero’s expressions of concern about the antiliberal tendencies of the modern democratic state.
10. Holmes, Anatomy of Antiliberalism, 238–39.
11. For characteristic statements of Locke’s interest in property rights, see his Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 286, 309, 347–348. Chapter 7, section 94 of the Second Treatise indicates that “Government has no other end but the preservation of property” (ibid., 347).
12. Holmes, Anatomy of Antiliberalism, 240. Holmes infers from Locke’s refusal to grant an “hereditary privilege” to any member of the commonwealth as against any other a general “norm of equality” and a commitment to “universal education” and “universal suffrage.” This inference is certainly open to question, seeing that Holmes’s point of reference is Locke’s defense of equal obligation among citizens of civil society. Locke neither universalizes citizenship nor makes an argument for political equality for everyone who resides in a particular territory.
13. This limitation on citizenship in Locke’s conception of the social contract is well stated in Peter H. Schuck and Roger M. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); also Paul Gottfried, “Anatomy of an Apology,” Telos 97 (Fall 1993), 5–8.
14. J. Salwyn Schapiro, Liberalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1958), 4–6.
15. Norman Gash, Aristocracy and People: Britain 1815–1865 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).
16. Ludwig von Mises, Die Gemeinwirtschaft. Untersuchungen über den Sozialismus (1932; reprint, Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1981), 473.
17. Ludwig von Mises, Liberalismus (Sankt Augustin: Akademia Verlag, 1993). See Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s illuminating biography of Mises in the preface.
18. Ruggiero, European Liberalism, 442.
19. Ibid., 143–44.
20. Friedrich von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), 12–14; also Hayek’s article, “Tomorrow’s World: Is It Going Left?” New York Times Magazine, June 24, 1945, 12.
21. Hayek, Road to Serfdom, 70–71.
22. See, for example, Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).
23. Hermann Finer, The Road to Reaction, second edition (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963), 114. Two historical errors in Finer’s work are particularly glaring. On page 115 he confuses the recent mode of interpreting the Bill of Rights with its original reasons for existence. Thus he asserts that, contrary to the attempts of classical liberals to use a federal system to limit sovereignty in the United States, “it was the Bill of Rights that curbed the majority.” In its origin and well into the twentieth century, the Bill of Rights was seen as a bulwark against the expansion of national power at the expense of the states and their citizens. Finer also assumes that the social programs passed in Bismarckian Germany were intended to prepare the Germans for war. Almost all accounts known to this author attribute these programs to Bismarck’s hope of neutralizing German socialism by having the Reichstag introduce social pensions. This action had nothing to do with militarism.
24. Ibid., 115.
25. Ibid., 37.
26. Ibid., 29.
27. George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England, 1910–1914 (New York: Capricorn Books, 1935), viii.
28. L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism, ed. Alan P. Grimes (reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); also by the same author, The Labour Movement (reprint, New York: Macmillan, 1987).
29. This is the boldly stated and cogently developed argument of Arthur A. Ekirch Jr. in Ideologies and Utopias: The Impact of the New Deal on American Thought (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969); also James Gilbert, Designing the Industrial State: The Intellectual Pursuit of Collectivism in America, 1880–1940 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972).
30. Ekirch, Ideologies and Utopias, 327–40.
31. Ibid., 327.
32. John Dewey, “The Future of Liberalism,” Journal of Philosophy 32 (April 1935), 230.
33. John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 72– 73.
34. Lewis Mumford, Faith for Living (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1940), 330.
35. Ibid., 327.
36. Charles Austin Beard and Mary Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York: Macmillan, 1930); and Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 303–05.
37. Despite Charles Beard’s progressive politics and materialist interpretation of the American founding, his nationalism and his opposition to America’s entry into the two World Wars gained for this onetime follower of Dewey a certain sympathy on the isolationist Right. See George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 (New York: Basic Books, 1976).
38. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1988).
39. J. K. Galbraith, The Liberal Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960).
40. See J. S. Mill, Autobiography (reprint, New York: Columbia University Press, 1960); and the symposium on Mill’s “liberalism” in Political Science Reviewer 24 (1995).
41. This perception about the ongoing reconstruction of the past is stressed in John Lukacs’s Historical Consciousness (New York: Random House, 1968).
42. Elie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, trans. Mary Morris Clanden (London: Faber & Faber, 1934).
43. On the liberal internationalism of World War Two isolationists, see Justus D. Doenecke’s introduction to the papers of the America First Committee in In Danger Undaunted (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), 2–51; and Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 1729–42. In the conclusion to his memoirs, Hull warns specifically against the erection of trade barriers as a hindrance to international peace.
44. See Paul Gottfried, The Conservative Movement, second edition (New York: Twayne-Macmillan, 1993), 162–65.
45. On the attraction of imperialism for Fabian socialists and for others on the English Left, see Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform (London: Ashgate Publishing Co., 1993); on the globalist impulse in postwar American liberalism, see John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
46. See Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 2–3; also Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. and intro. by George Schwab (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1976), 35–36.
47. See Exporting Democracy, ed. A. F. Lowenthal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 234.
48. See Lester Frank Ward, Applied Sociology: A Treatise on the Conscious Improvement of Society by Society (reprint, New York: Ayer, 1974); and Planned Social Intervention, ed. Louis A. Zurcher Jr. and Charles M. Bonjean (London: Chandler Publishing Co., 1970).
49. Friedrich von Hayek, The Counter Revolution of Science (1955; reprint, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1980), 168–88.
50. Dewey, A Common Faith, 82.
51. Lowenstein, “Militant Democracy,” 657.
52. Ibid., 658.
53. Alonzo L. Hamby, Liberalism and its Challengers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
54. See, for example, Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
55. Thomas Molnar, Le Modèle défiguré: l’Amérique de Tocqueville à Carter (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978).
56. Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Literature and Society (New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1991); and Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1991).
57. Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), particularly 94–104.
58. William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 304.
59. Ibid., 4–18.
60. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 141.
61. Ibid., 60.
62. Ibid., 76–78.
63. Galston, Liberal Purposes, 272–73; also my review of Liberal Purposes in Review of Metaphysics 46 (September 1992), 153.
64. This remark comes from John Gray’s review of Rawls’s Political Liberalism in the New York Times Book Review, May 16, 1993, 35.
65. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 78, 102–112; Mises anticipates Rawls’s argument in Die Gemeinwirtschaft, 432–35, by defending a capitalist economic organization as beneficial to the least favored. See also Léon Walras, Elements of Pure Economics, trans. William Jaffé (Homewood, Ill.: American Economic Association, 1954), 51–64.
66. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 79.
67. Finer, Road to Reaction, 52–60.
68. Ibid., 38.
69. Friedrich von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 248, 148, and 489.
70. Mises, Liberalismus, 35; and Gottfried Dietze, Liberalism Proper and Proper Liberalism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).
71. Mises, Liberalismus, 36.
72. In Bureaucracy and in Omnipotent Covenant: The Rise of the Total State and Total War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), Mises treats public administration as either a pernicious legacy from the preliberal past (as in the Prussian case) or an accompanying feature of otherwise different regimes. Unlike Max Weber and James Burnham, he seems to have been unaware of the political revolutionary character of modern administration. Except for his remarks about Prussia, Mises usually speaks kindly about Berufsbeamte.
73. Detailed figures on the growth of the English public sector are available in R. Rose’s anthology Public Employment in Western Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Table 2.12, compiled by Richard Parry, indicates that already ten years ago 56 percent of British disposable income came out of public sources.
74. Michael Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), particularly 111–13, 253. One of Novak’s favorite synthetic terms is “social welfare democratic capitalism,” a concept whose problematic nature he fails to engage.
75. See Novak’s remarks in his own publication, Religion and Liberty (January/February 1991), 6.
76. John Lukacs, “The Stirrings of History,” Harper’s 281 (August 1990), 48.
77. John Lukacs, The End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1993), especially 6–9, 242–71.
78. Nation, April 6, 1927, 364.
CHAPTER TWO
1. James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, ed. Stuart D. Warner (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1993), 156. For Weber’s views on the growing relation between bureaucracy and modern democracy see From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 139; for Weber’s suggestion in “Politics as Vocation” that modern democracy must choose between soulless officialdom and charismatic leadership, ibid., 113–114; and Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, ed. Johannes Winklemann (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1958), 532–33. For Joseph Schumpeter’s arguments about the connections and differences betwen bourgeois liberalism and social democracy, see Joseph Schumpeter, “Sozialistische Möglichkeiten von heute,” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 48 (1922), 305–06; Francois Perroux, La Penséeéconomique de Joseph Schumpeter: les dynamiques du capitalisme (Geneva: Droz, 1965); and Schumpeter’s study of the decline of bourgeois liberal society, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (London: Unwin University Books, 1943), most particularly 81–87.
2. See Pierre Rosanvallon’s intellectual biography of the famed liberal statesman, Le Moment Guizot (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), 75–86, 132–40.
3. Ibid., 95–104; and Guizot’s address before the French Assembly on October 5, 1831, cited in Histoire parlementaire de France: Recueil complet des discours prononcés dans les Chambres de 1819 à 1848 par Mr. Guizot (Paris 1863–1864), 1: 316. Despite his reservations about popular rule, Guizot also praised France as “genuinely democratic” in ibid., 178. The statesman then went on to limit his definition of good democracy to the principle and operation of legal equality for French citizens.
4. William Lecky, Democracy and Liberty (reprint, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1981) 1: 303–04.
5. For a generally sympathetic, well-researched study of German socialism in English, see W. L. Guttsman, The German Social Democratic Party 1875–1933 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981).
6. Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, 1: 324. Also Donal McCartney, W.E.H. Lecky: Historian and Politician 1839–1902 (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 1994). A strength of McCartney’s biography is his attempt to relate his subject’s anxiety about democracy to Lecky’s observation of Irish peasants and English factory workers. Lecky’s upbringing in the British Ascendancy in Ireland contributed to his concern.
7. Panajotis Kondylis, Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk-und Lebensform. Die liberale Moderne und die massendemokratische Postmoderne (Weinheim: Acta Humaniora, 1991), 188–207.
8. Ibid., 169–88.
9. Ibid., 238–67; See also Kondylis’s analysis of the classical conservative, as opposed to classical liberal, worldview in Konservatismus. Geschichtlicher Gehalt und Untergang (Stuttgart: Klett, 1986).
10. See Hilton Kramer, The Revenge of the Philistines: Art and Culture, 1972–1984 (New York: Free Press, 1985); also the anthologized essays from Kramer’s magazine, The New Criterion Reader: The First Five Years (New York: Free Press, 1988).
11. Kondylis, Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk-und Lebensform, 208–26.
12. See Albert Thibaudet’s preface to Gustave Flaubert’s L’Education Sentimentale (Paris: Gallimard, 1965). In one particularly revealing scene, following the February 1848 Revolution in Paris, Sénécal, Dussardier, and other republican zealots featured in Flaubert’s novel exhort a crowd, without success, to accept lives of material austerity. One speaker, who speaks of the need to follow the primitive church, is shouted down by an alcohol vendor as a “calotin [religious fanatic]”; ibid., 323–33.
13. Quoted in Washington Post, September 9, 1995, A19.
14. Kondylis, Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk-und Lebensform, 167–69.
15. Ibid., 21–49.
16. John Plamenatz, Ideology (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), 21.
17. Rosanvallon, Le Moment Guizot, 53; and Robert Fossaert, “La Théorie des classes chez Guizot et Thierry,” La Pensée (January/February 1955).
18. F. G. Bratton, The Legacy of the Liberal Spirit (Boston: Beacon Press, 1943), ix.
19. John Gray, Liberalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 2.
20. Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); also my review essay on this book in Modern Age 37 (Spring 1995), 264–69; N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, La Ville Antique (Paris: Hachette, 1874), especially 131–265. Fustel notes (ibid., 238) that connubial restrictions were so severe in Greek city-states and in the early Roman republic that offspring were viewed as illegitimate if the parents were not from the same polity—or at least confederated ones. An Athenian law still in force as late as the fifth century B.C., and mentioned by Plutarch, declared that “nothos ho ek zenēs e pallakidos-hos an me eks astēs genētai nothon einai.” One who sprang from a stranger or concubine was considered “nothegenēs [baseborn].”
21. Gray, Liberalism, xi.
22. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 136; 137–164 passim.
23. Louis Dumont, Essais sur L’individualisme (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1983), 33–133.
24. Ibid., also his Homo aequalis, I: Genèse et épanouissement de l’idéologie économique (Paris: Gallimand, 1977).
25. This tendency to overgeneralize about the Reformation roots of what seem aspects of late modernity is already present in Dumont’s depiction of John Calvin; see Essais sur l’individualisme, 72–80. Dumont’s association of individual self-sufficiency and a revolution against established hierarchy with Calvin’s conception of predestined grace also bears a striking resemblance to French clericalist polemics against Protestant modernity. This theme dominates, for example, Jacques Maritain’s Trois Réformateurs: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1925), a work that also draws a provocative but not well-documented line from the Reformation to modern individualism.
26. Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age (New York: Knopf, 1984).
27. James T. Kloppenberg: Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 389.
28. Ibid., 387–88; also Walter Struve, Elites Against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890–1933 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
29. See especially Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, 1: 350–65.
30. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 156.
31. Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, 1:303.
32. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 180; also B. E. Lippincott, Victorian Critics of Democracy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1938).
33. François Guizot, “De la démocratie dans les sociétés modernes,” Revue française 3 (November 1937), 197–208; for a general discussion of the American political example as presented by Tocqueville on the French doctrinaires, see Pierre Manet, Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 93–106.
34. Guizot, “De la démocratie,” 197.
35. Two favorable biographical portraits are R. B. Nye, George Bancroft (New York: Knopf, 1944); and Lilian Handlin, George Bancroft: The Intellectual as Democrat (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).
36. George Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1882), 2:366.
37. Ibid.
38. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Knopf, 1966), 2:31–32.
39. George Bancroft, History of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1872), 10:592.
40. The debate about extending the suffrage in early and mid-nineteenth-century Europe centered on differing opinions concerning the political capacity of the working class and the advance of human consciousness. Without knowingly being part of that debate, Bancroft took a position in regard to it. Moreover, in Europe such democratizing views were associated generally with political centralization and eventually, with the adoption of social policy. See Jacques Droz, Réaction et suffrage universel en France et en Allemagne (Paris: Société d’histoire de la révolution de 1848, 1963). Rosanvallon aptly notes in Le Moment Guizot that a democratic franchise was seen in the mid-nineteenth century as an “anticipated recognition of a popular capacity more than as a consequence of the principle of civil equality” (136–37). Underlying it was the anticipation of continued human progress, which would result from an expanding human intelligence.
41. Gray, conversation with the author, June 25, 1993; also Herbert W. Schneider, Making the Fascist State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1928), 101–3; and Franz Borkenau, Pareto (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1936), 18–21.
42. Luigi Einaudi, La condotta economica e gli effetti sociali della guerra italiana (Bari: Laterza, 1933); and Renzo De Felice, Mussolini (Turin: Einaudi, 1965), especially 1:419–544.
43. Vilfredo Pareto, Le trasformazioni della democrazia, ed. Mario Missiroli (Milan: Capelli Editore, 1964), 111–12.
44. Ibid., 113.
45. Ibid., 162.
46. Ibid., 169–70.
47. See Missiroli’s preface to Le trasformazioni, 9–31; W. Rex Crawford, “Representative Italian Contributions to Sociology: Pareto, Loria, Vaccaro, and Sichele,” in An Introduction to the History of Sociology, ed. H. E. Barnes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); and Paolo Maria Arcani, Socialismo e democrazia nel pensiero di Vifredo Pareto (Rome: Volipe, 1966).
48. The Trattato was translated as The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology by Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston in 1935. See reprint (New York: AMS Press, 1983), especially 2458–72.
49. These last two written works by Pareto are attached to Missiroli’s edition of Le trasformazioni, 161–73. It should be stressed that we are here dealing with Pareto’s view of Italian fascism. Though Renzo De Felice may be right in treating the Italian fascist movement as a modernizing force associated with the historical Left, Pareto perceived it differently, namely, as a possible safeguard for the achievements of bourgeois civilization. See De Felice’s by now widely accepted view of the Italian fascist movement in Interpretations of Fascism, trans. Brenda Huff Everett (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).
50. Pareto, Le trasformazioni, 109.
51. Charles Krauthammer, “Jones Beach and the Decline of Liberalism,” Time, September 5, 1994, 82.
52. Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 87–88; and J. S. Mill, Three Essays on Religion (reprint, New York: Aris Press, 1995), 110.
53. Cowling insists that Mill’s conviction, as stated in Utilitarianism, that general happiness can best be advanced by making everyone rational and free of religious prejudice, undergirds his entire ethic. See Cowling, Mill and Liberalism, 52–53; and Mill’s Utilitarianism (reprint, New York: American Classical College Press, 1988), 192–93.
54. Cowling, Mill and Liberalism, 145.
55. Two of Weber’s extended observations on the need for plebiscitary authority in modern democracy to circumvent bureaucratic tyranny are found in Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, trans. Ephraim Fischoll (reprint, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1:268–69; and in Marianne Weber, Max Weber: A Biography, trans. Harry Lohn (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), 653.
56. Quoted in Wolfgang Mommsen, The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max Weber (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 87.
57. Max Weber, “Speech for Austrian Officers in Vienna,” The Interpretation of Social Reality, ed. J.E.T. Eldridge (New York: Scribner’s, 1971), 197. See also Roslyn Wallach Bologh, “Max Weber and the Dilemma of Nationality,” in Max Weber’s Political Sociology, ed. Ronald M. Glassman and Vatro Murvar (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), 175–86.
CHAPTER THREE
1. On the connection between the new monarchies and the novi homines, see Wallace Ferguson, “Toward the Modern State,” in The Renaissance (New York: Harper & Row, 1953), 1–27; Arnaud d’Herbomez, “Le fonctionarisme en France à la fin du moyen âge,” Revue des questions historiques, 85 (1903); and Gianfranco Miglio’s informative essay on the early modern foundations of the bureaucratic nation state, “Genesi e trasformazioni del termine-concetto ‘stato,’ ” included in Miglio’s Le regolarità della politica (Milan: Giuffrè Editore, 1988), 2: 799–832.
2. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, trans. Stuart Gilbert (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), particularly 32–87.
3. G.W.F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Ba¨nden, vol. 7 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970), sections 310, 473.
4. Rosanvallon, Le Moment Guizot, 124–31; reasons for the opposition from the democratic Left to the enfranchisement of French public officials in 1831 are given in Odilen Barrot’s Mémoires (Paris: Plon, 1875), 1:252–57.
5. James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972); and Samuel T. Francis’s unfairly neglected monograph on Burnham, Power and History: The Political Thought of James Burnham (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984).
6. See John P. Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); and John Lukacs, The Last European War, September 1939/December 1941 (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1976).
7. See Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed., Comparative Public Policy, second edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 176–81. On the difficulty of funding continental welfare states à coups de déplafonnements, by steadily raising the ceiling on payments for social programs, see A. Joubert, “L’assiette des cotisations sociales,” Droit social (June 1993); the contributions to the theme “La crise du financement du régime général,” Espace social européen, April 9, 1993; and Pierre Rosanvallon, La crise de l’état-providence (Paris: Seuil, 1981).
8. Karl Hardach, Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century (Berkeley: Unviersity of California Press, 1980); and Eric Owen Smith, Third Party Involvement in Industrial Disputes: A Comparative Study of West Germany and Britain (Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 1989).
9. Richard Rose, Politics in England, fifth edition (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1989), 8–19; idem, The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany, ed. W. J. Mommsen (London: Croom-Helm, 1981), particularly 343–83; and Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 141–47, 254–72.
10. On the personal and political ties between Macmillan and Wilson, see Leslie Smith’s biography Harold Wilson (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), especially 75–76; and Kenneth O. Morgan, The People’s Peace: British History, 1945–1989 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 358–433.
11. Harry Schwartz, “Health Care in America: A Heretical Diagnosis,” Saturday Review, August 14, 1971, 14–17.
12. Richard Rose and Rei Shiratori, eds., The Welfare State East and West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), particularly 3–37; and Phyllis Moen, Working Parents: Transformation in Gender Roles and Public Politics in Sweden (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 21–23.
13. U. S. Council of Economic Advisors, Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993–1995), tables on 232–33.
14. Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of Government (New York: Oxford Unversity Press, 1987), 20–27.
15. James T. Bennett and Thomas DiLorenzo, Underground Government: The Off-Budget Public Sector (Washington, D. C.: Cato Institute, 1983); and idem, “How the Government Evades Taxes,” Policy Review (Winter 1982), 71–89.
16. The American Enterprise (July/August 1995), 35.
17. Cf. Robert Higgs, The Transformation of the American Economy, 1865–1914 (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1971); and idem, “Eighteen Problematic Propositions on the Analysis of the Growth of Government,” Review of Austrian Economics 5, no. 1 (1991), 3–40.
18. The American Enterprise (July/August 1995), 41.
19. L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism, 25.
20. John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: Capricorn Books, 1963), 32.
21. Ibid., 90.
22. Ibid., 83.
23. Hobhouse, Liberalism, 25, 66.
24. Allan Carlson, The Swedish Experiment in Family Politics: The Myrdals and the Interwar Population Crisis (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989); Roland Huntford, The New Totalitarians (New York: Stein & Day, 1980), particularly 62–64; and Nicolaj-Klaus Kreitor, “The Conservative Revolution in Sweden,” Telos 98–99 (Winter 1993/Spring 1994), 249–54.
25. Rosanvallon, Le Moment Guizot, 25–46; and L. Trénard, “L’enseignement sous la monarchie de Juillet,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 12 (1965).
26. David P. Conradt, “West Germany: A Remade Political Culture,” Comparative Political Studies 7, no. 2 (July 1974), 222–38.
27. Time, May 7, 1945; “A Problem in Global Penology,” Saturday Review July 28, 1945, 7–12; H. Eulau, “Germans Have No Rights,” New Republic, July 16, 1945, 62; and J. Katz, “Germany Can Be Re-educated,” American Scholar 14, no. 3 (July 1945), 381–82. See also Herbert Ammon, “Antifaschismus, im Wandel?” in Die Schatten der Vergangenheit, ed. Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse, and Rainer Zitelmann (Frankfurt and Berlin: Propyla¨en, 1990), 568–94.
28. Dwight D. Murphey, Liberalism in Contemporary America (McLean, Virginia: Council for Social and Economic Studies, 1992), 131–32.
29. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, 72–73.
30. Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 545.
31. Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1914); on the profound effect of Croly’s work on the American Progressive Party and its political leaders, see J. T. Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 314–16. Herbert’s father, David, was a leading American exponent of Comtean positivism and sought to raise his son on this blend of social planning with faith in historical Progress. See David W. Levy, Herbert Croly of the New Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
32. Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (New York: Macmillan, 1909), 454.
33. Walter Weyl, The New Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1912), 327–28.
34. Ibid., 329.
35. Croly, The Promise of American Life, 409, 413.
36. Horace M. Kallen, The Liberal Spirit: Essays on the Problems of Freedom in the Modern World (New York and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1948), 190; 91–127.
37. Ibid. 47–67; see also The Future of Peace (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941).
38. Kallen, The Liberal Spirit, 218.
39. Ibid., 220. Kallen moves easily between apparently contradictory positions in his philosophic as well as social writings. Thus in “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy,” published in Creative Intelligence: A Recovery of Philosophy, ed. John Dewey (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1917), 409–67, Kallen insists that values are both subjective and irrational but are also guides for social progress. Some of these “interests,” which are “relations, responses, attitudes subjectively obvious and irrational,” can be transformed into “expressive ideas” and, most importantly, into the vision of experimental science. While this argument may be demonstrable, it is not clear that Kallen proves it in either this particular essay or his discursive observations about cognition in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method 9, (1915–16), 252–55.
40. Arthur Champagne and Stuart Nagel, “Minimizing Discrimination Based on Race and Sex,” Nationalizing Government, ed. Theodore Lowi and Alan Stone (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978), 334–35.
41. James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); and C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).
42. Samuel T. Francis, Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993), particularly 60–87, 95–117; and for another penetrating attack on the corporate state from the Old Right, see Murray N. Rothbard, “War Collectivism in World War I,” in A New History of Leviathan, ed. Ronald Radosh and Murray Rothbard (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1976), 66–110.
43. That managerial states are not ideologically interchangeable is a point that has not received sufficient attention, from Bruno Rizzi’s pioneering study of the Soviets onward. See The Bureaucratization of the World, trans. Adam Westoby (New York: Free Press, 1985).
44. See, for example, Wall Street Journal, January 26, 1990, A14; March 16, 1990, A14; April 30, 1990, A1; and New York Times, October 20, 1990, A20; December 9, 1991, A16; June 20, 1991, A22. All of these commentaries call for expanding Third World immigration and for broadening the right of asylum. Cf. also F. Fukuyama, “Immigrants and Family Values,” Commentary 96 (August 1993), 2.
45. Newsweek, August 9, 1993, 16–23.
46. See Congressman Armey’s remarks and the positive response to them in Wall Street Journal, May 24, 1995, A16.
47. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910–1917 (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), 19.
48. Herbert Croly’s editorial note in New Republic, November 21, 1914, 7.
49. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 239.
50. Raymond Moley, The First New Deal, foreword by Frank Freidel (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1966), 355–60; Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal, 1933–1938, fourth impression (New York: Capricorn Books, 1963).
51. Allan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: Knopf, 1995), 15–65, 86–174, 201–26, and 265–72. Brinkley is particularly thorough in demonstrating the almost hand-to-mouth redefinition of liberalism that went on during the New Deal. He recognizes the connection between American ideas about social planning in the interwar period and the “new liberal” legacy left by earlier Progressives and by European social democrats. Despite his obvious sympathy for New Deal liberals, Brinkley does not hide the disjunction between their views of government and society and those of traditional liberals.
52. New Republic, January 21, 1931, 259.
53. See Kallen’s endorsement of the Italian way in New Republic, January 12, 1927, 207–13; the rest of this issue, including the fulsome editorial note of Croly, is devoted to an “Apology for Fascism.” Such apologies do not prove that Kallen and Croly were fascists, any more than Tugwell, Dewey, and Dewey’s disciple Sidney Hook, all of whom were then celebrating the “Soviet experiment,” were Stalinists. These social planners were still shopping for models that might be applied to an American “liberal” managerial state. The New Republic in the late twenties characteristically stressed the merits of both the fascist and Soviet efforts at social reconstruction. See John Dewey’s series of six articles about his visit to Soviet Russia in New Republic, November 14, 1928; November 21, 1928; December 5, 1928; December 12, 1928; and December 19, 1928.
54. Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan, 1–19, 258–62.
55. Ibid., 256.
56. Gary S. Lawson, “The Rise of the Administrative State,” Harvard Law Review 107 (1994), 1231.
57. Bruce Ackerman, “Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law,” Yale Law Review 99 (1989), 510–15.
58. Lawson, “The Rise of the Administrative State,” 1253.
59. Kevin Phillips, The Politics of Rich and Poor (New York: Knopf, 1995); and “It’s the Republicans’ Turn to Go Too Far,” Philadelphia Inquirer, October 12, 1995, A7.
60. See, for example, John Ward Studebaker, “Salvaging Democracy through Education,” Parents Magazine, November 1934, 10; idem, “The Education of Free Men in American Democracy,” School Life 27, no. 1 (October 1941), 5–7; and Studebaker’s John Adams Lecture at U.C.L.A. on March 18, 1948, “Education and the Fate of Democracy.” The author also had access to a detailed but still unpublished essay on the educational thought of John Ward Studebaker by Stephen J. Sniegoski, a historian of the U.S. Department of Education.
61. David Fromkin, In the Time of the Americans: F.D.R., Truman, Eisenhower, Marshall, and MacArthur (New York: Knopf, 1995), preface.
62. Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen, “Rethinking Federalism,” Telos 100 (Summer 1994), 12–14.
63. Christopher Lasch, “The Revolt of the Elites,” Harper’s (November 1994), 40.
64. Pierre Rosanvallon, “Repenser la Gauche,” L’Express, March 25, 1993, 116.
1. Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995).
2. See, for example, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Feminism without Illusions: A Critique of Individualism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Jean Bethke-Elshtain, Democracy on Trial (New York: Basic Books, 1995); and the symposium on the “National Prospect,” in Commentary 100 (November 1995).
3. See Irving Kristol, Two Cheers for Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1978); idem, “Libertarian and Bourgeois Freedoms,” National Review, December 5, 1975, 1338–39; idem, “Countercultures,” Commentary 98 (December 1994), 35–39; and Mark Gerson’s “Reflections of a Neoconservative Disciple,” in The Neoconservative Imagination, ed. Christopher DeMuth and William Kristol (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1995). 165–72.
4. Jürgen Habermas, Die Moderne: Ein unvollendetes Projekt, third edition (Leipzig: Reclam Verlag, 1994), 75–85.
5. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, trans. L. Wirth (Boston and New York: Beacon Press, 1936), 208.
6. See, for example, R. J. Neuhaus, “Democratic Conservatism,” First Things 1 (March 1990), 65–67; Ben Wattenberg, “Back to Our Prime Mission,” syndicated in Washington Times, March 9, 1989; Gregory Fossedal, Exporting Democratic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and Paul Gottfried, “At Sea with the Global Democrats,” Wall Street Journal, January 19, 1989.
7. S. M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 403.
8. American Enterprise (July/August 1995), 31. See also Ben Wattenberg, The First Universal Nation: Leading Indicators and Ideas about the Surge of America in the 1990s (New York: Free Press, 1991). An already archaic testimony to Cold War perceptions is Paul Hollander’s Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
9. This reconciliation of the American capitalist Right with social democracy is the idée-maîtresse of my work, The Conservative Movement, revised edition (New York: Twayne-Macmillan, 1992).
10. For two critical treatments of this development, see Claes G. Ryn, The New Jacobinism (Washington: National Humanities Institute, 1991); and Christopher Lasch, “The Obsolescence of Left and Right,” New Oxford Review 56 (April 1989), 6–15.
11. Wolfgang H. Mommsen, “Wandlungen der nationalen Identita¨t,” in Die Identita¨t der Deutschen, ed. Werner Weidenfeld (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1983), 177. See also Ralph Giordano’s best-selling (in Germany) consideration of the burdens of German history, Die zweite Schuld oder von der Last Deutscher zu sein (Hamburg: Nasch & Rohring, 1987).
12. Jürgen Habermas, “Recht und Gewaltein deutsches Trauma,” Merkur 1 (1984); see also Stephen Eisel, Minimalkonsens und freiheitliche Demokratie (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1986), 50–182, 228–58.
13. Ben Wattenberg, “Is the Republican Contract with America All That Conservative?” syndicated in Washington Times, February 22, 1995.
14. This view is presented from different angles in Steven E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, sixth edition (New York: Penguin Books, 1991); Alonzo L. Hamby, Liberalism and its Challengers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Carl Gershman, “Democracy as the Wave of the Future,” Current 312 (May 1989), 18–25; and Claes G. Ryn, “The Democracy Boosters,” National Review March 24, 1989, 31–32.
15. See the feature stories on Patrick J. Buchanan in Time, November 6, 1995, and in Newsweek, March 4, 1996, 24–29.
16. For a politically sympathetic but methodologically critical treatment of Boas and the Boasians, see Carl Degler, In Search of Human Nature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 61–78; for a meticulously collected bibliography of critical writings on Boas and the Boasians, see the notes for chapter 4 of Dinesh D’Souza’s The End of Racism (New York: Free Press, 1995), 592–606.
17. Two books by the Swedish social planner Alva Myrdal can be seen as transitional works located between nineteenth-century eugenicism and Deweyite Progressivism: Kris i befolkningsfrågan, fifth edition (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1935); and Nation and Family: The Swedish Experiment in Democratic Family and Population Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968).
18. J. C. Burnham, “Psychiatry, Psychology, and the Progressive Movement,” American Quarterly 29 (1960), 457–65; idem, “Medical Specialists and Movements toward Social Control in the Progressive Era,” in Building the Organizational Society, ed. J. Israel (New York: Free Press, 1972); and idem, Psychoanalysis and American Medicine 1894–1918: Medicine Science and Culture (Madison, Conn.: International Universities Press, 1967).
19. H. A. Bruce, “Is Our National Vigor in Danger?” Delineator 93 (1918), 53.
20. Paul M. Dennis, “Psychology’s First Publicist: H. Addington Bruce and the Popularization of the Subconscious and Power of Suggestion Before World War I,” Psychological Reports 68 (1991), 755.
21. Thomas Szasz, Law, Liberty and Psychiatry (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 5, 39–71; see also his, The Myth of Mental Illness (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), and his Psychiatric Justice (New York: Macmillan, 1965).
22. The International Covenants on Human Rights (New York: U.N. Office of Public Information, 1976), 2–4.
23. Lasch, True and Only Heaven, 452.
24. Theodor W. Adorno (with Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel J. Levinson, R. N. Sanford), The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 269.
25. The advent of McCarthyism is made into a justification for the Studies in Prejudice series in the anthology The Radical Right, ed. Daniel Bell (New York: Doubleday, 1963); see especially Richard Hofstadter, “Pseudo-Conservative Revolt,” 75–97.
26. Lasch, True and Only Heaven, 460–61; also Lipset’s remarks on “Working Class Authoritariansim” in American Sociological Review 24 (1959), 482–501. For a critique of the Lipset-Adorno view of the working class, see S. M. Miller and Frank Riessman, “ ‘Working Class Authoritarianism’ : A Critique of Lipset,” British Journal of Sociology 12 (1961), 263–76.
27. Lasch, True and Only Heaven, 456–7; also Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics (New York: Knopf, 1965).
28. Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy (Boston: New American Library, 1955), 19.
29. Ibid., 106–7.
30. Ibid., 136.
31. Ibid., 137.
32. E. Beesley, “Why I Am a Liberal” (pamphlet published by the Liberal Party, London, 1885).
33. Lippman, The Public Philosophy, 136.
34. John H. Hallowell, Moral Foundations of Democracy (reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973). See also Charles Wellborn, Twentieth Century Pilgrimage: Walter Lippmann and the Public Philosophy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969). An engaged Christian disciple of Hallowell and then, like Hallowell, a professor of politics at Duke University, Wellborn presents the author of The Public Philosophy as a pilgrim whose spiritual journey is continuing.
35. Reinhart Koselleck, Kritik and Krise. Eine Studie zur Parthogenese der bürger-lichen Welt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973).
36. Horace M. Kallen, “Values and Existence in Philosophy, Art, and Religion,” in Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude (New York: H. Holt & Co., 1917), 461–62, and 408-67 passim.
37. Theodor J. Lowi, The End of the Republican Era (Narvon, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 190.
38. Ibid., 238; for a detailed critical treatment of Lowi’s book, see Wayne Allen, “Therapeutic Liberalism,” in The World and I 9 (October 1995), 265–69.
39. See Dumont, Essais sur L’individualisme, 11–32.
40. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (La Salle: Open Court Press, 1926), 408; and Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 180–200.
41. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, 135.
42. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 238–39.
43. Ibid., 232.
44. Max Weber, “Kritische Studien auf dem Gebiet der kulturwissen-schaftichen Logik,” in Gesammelte Aufsa¨tze zur Wissenschaftslehre, third edition (Tubingen: Mohr, 1968), 215–90. This originally Weberian notion is most fully developed in Carl Schmitt’s controversial essay “Die Tyrannei der Werte,” in Die Tyrannei der Werte, ed. Carl Schmitt, Eberhard Jungel, and Sepp Schelz (Hamburg: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1979), 31–40.
45. See Robert P. George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 94–109; John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 74, 120–24; and the critical observations about Dworkin’s notions of right and democracy in Joseph Raz’s “Professor Dworkin’s Theory of Rights,” in Political Studies 26 (1978), 123–35.
46. Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake, 129.
47. Ibid., 74–75, 120; and Dworkin, Taking Rights.
48. Amy Gutmann’s editorial commentary in Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of Recognition,’ ed. Charles Taylor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 17.
49. Ibid., 23.
50. Ibid., 22.
51. Ibid., 43–44.
52. Peter Gabel, “Affirmative Action and Racial Harmony,” Tikkun (May/June 1995), 33.
53. Ibid., 34; Michael Lerner, Tikkun: To Heal, Repair, and Transform the World (Oakland: Institute for Labor and Mental Health, 1992); and Mary Lefkowitz, “Jews and Blacks: Let the Healing Begin,” TLS, June 9, 1995, 15.
54. On manipulated identities and designated victims and on the practice of the administrative state in raising “particular values to the level of universality,” while pretending to be “value-neutral,” see Paul Piccone, “The Crisis of Liberalism and the Emergence of Federal Populism,” Telos 89 (Fall 1991), 3–14.
55. Adorno, The Authoritarian Personality, 7, 10.
56. Ibid., vii.
57. Ibid., 57.
58. Ibid., 36, 41–43.
59. Ibid., 50.
60. Ibid., 36, 44–47.
61. See T. W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, The Dialectic of the Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1975). For a study emphasizing the contributions of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Arendt as critics of political modernity, see Russell Berman, Modern Culture and Critical Theory: Art, Politics and the Legacy of the Frankfurt School (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1989).
62. Adorno, The Authoritarian Personality, 442–61; 474–84.
63. Ibid., 685–86.
64. Ibid., 676, 680–81.
65. Ibid., 788–820. For a perceptive methodological and substantive criticism of The Authoritarian Personality, see Tamotsu Shibutani, American Journal of Sociology 57 (1952), 527–29; and Joseph H. Bunzel, American Sociological Review 15 (1950), 571–73. Christopher Lasch (in The True and Only Heaven, 560) was right to notice how few of the reviewers criticize the study’s crude psychological reductionism. Many of them in fact share its cosmological premises.
66. On the political culture of Cold War liberalism, see Alexander Bloom, Prodigal Sons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 209–73.
67. For a recent restatement of this “vital center” position on foreign policy, see Arthur Schlesinger Jr., “Back to the Womb?” Foreign Affairs (July/August 1995), 2–7.
68. Chilton Williamson Jr., The Immigration Mystique (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 69–70.
69. Ibid.; and A. P. Maingot, “Ideology, Politics, and Citizenship in the American Debate about Immigration Policy: Beyond Consensus,” in U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy, ed. Mary M. Kritz (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), 29–30.
70. Peter Brimelow, Alien Nation: Common Sense about America’s Immigration Disaster (New York: Random House, 1995), 95–96.
71. Ibid., 109.
72. Deborah Sontag, “Calls to Restrict Immigration from Many Quarters,” New York Times, December 13, 1992.
73. Julian Simon, Economic Consequences of Immigration (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 45–46.
74. Earl Raab, Jewish Bulletin, February 19, 1993, 23.
75. Shikha Dalmia, “Cultural Purity Drives Anti-Immigration Cause,” Detroit News, October 11, 1995, A9.
76. See Wayne Lutton and John Tanton, The Immigration Invasion (Petoskey, Mich.; Social Contract Press, 1994) particularly 94–104. Indicative of what Brimelow calls “America’s one-way immigration debate” is that informed advocates of a more restricted immigration (e.g., Lutton and Lawrence Auster) can have their heavily documented books published only by small institutes. Until last year, Brimelow was the single exception to this rule. Immigration expansionists, by contrast, have works published by leading commercial presses, which are then favorably reviewed in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal. As Brimelow notes, the often problematic statistics cited by Julian Simon and other pro-immigration publicists receive indulgent treatment in mass publications.
77. The Federalist Papers (New York: The New American Library, 1961), 38. A work that shows the novel nature of the expansionist approach to immigration proposed by Dahmia, Simon, and the libertarian Cato Institute is Lawrence Auster’s The Path to National Suicide: An Essay in Immigration and Multiculturalism (Monterey, Va: AICF, 1990). For the same observations about Australia, see Katherine Bett’s Ideology and Immigration: Australia 1976 to 1987 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1988).
78. Stephen Brooks, “How Ottawa Bends: Plastic Words and the Politics of Social Morality,” in How Ottawa Spends 1994–95 ed. Susan D. Phillips (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), 71.
79. Ibid., 77.
80. Ibid., 87; also Uwe Pörksen: Plastikwörter. Die Sprache einer internationalen Diktatur (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1989).
81. Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism, 157.
82. Pat Shipman, The Evolution of Racism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 191.
83. Cited in Degler, In Search of Human Nature, 194.
84. See Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), 75–76, 106–16, 145–48; and David Southern, Gunnar Myrdal and Black-White Relations (Baton Rouge: Louisana State University Press, 1987).
85. See Degler, In Search of Human Nature, 210–20.
86. Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 6–8, 25–28; and Steven Goldberg, When Wish Replaces Thought (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991).
87. See Herbert Andrew Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold J.Laski (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 13–33.
88. Isaac Kramnick and Barry Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life on the Left (New York: Allen Lane/Peguin Press, 1993), 227.
89. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracv, 304.
90. John Dewey, Lectures ln China, ed. R. W. Clapton and Tsuin-chen Ou (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1973), 43–44.
91. On the transformational opportunities provided by the First World War for Dewey and other Progressivist intellectuals, see James Gilbert, Designing the Industrial State: The Intellectual Pursuit of Collectivism in America 1880–1940 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972), 232–34; Charles Hirschfeld, “Nationalist Progressivism and World War I,” Mid-America 45 (July 1963); and Murray N. Rothbard, “World War I as Fulfillment: Power and the Intellectuals,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 9, no. 1 (Winter 1989), 95–98.
92. Habermas, Die Moderne, 103.
93. Ibid., 103, 32–54.
94. Aristotle, Constitution of Athens Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), sections 26.4, 27.1.
95. Paul Veyne, Le Pain et Le cirque: Sociologie d’un pluralisme politique (Paris: Seuil, 1976), 87–92; 106–8.
96. The text of the Ontario Human Rights Code is available in English and French in the Canadian Human Rights Reporter (March 1992); the additions which were passed two years later can be seen in the [Toronto] Globe and Mail, January 15, 1994.
97. See Saul Bellow’s response in the Globe and Mail, March 15, 1994; Jonathan Rauch, Kindly Inquisitors: The New Attacks on Free Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); and Barbara Kulaszka, The Hate Crime Laws in Canada 1970–1994 (Ebticoke, Ont.: Canadian Association for Free Expression, 1994).
98. This law, no. 72–546, passed by the National Assembly, is reproduced in Le Monde, June 8, 1972.
99. Note Charrière’s remarks in Le Quotidien de Paris, September 23, 1988, 32; the account of his legal problems in Eric Delcroix, La Francophobie: Crimes et délits idéologigues en droit français (Paris: Editions Libres Opinions, 1993), 47–48; and Luc Rosenzweig’s discussion of LICRA in Libération, July 5, 1983, 7.
100. Achille-Fould’s remarks dealing with race consciousness can be read in the National Assembly’s Journal Officiel des Débats, June 7, 1972, 2281.
101. See Delcroix, La Francophobie, 40–41; and the Racismes/Antiracismes, ed. Pierre-André Taguieff et al. (Paris: Librairie des Méridiens, 1986), 309–13.
102. An impassioned but informative treatment of such anti–hate speech laws in Europe is Eric Delcroix, La Police de la Pensée contre le Révisionnisme (Paris: Diffusion, 1994).
103. Ibid., 25–43.
104. Le Figaro, May 25, 1993.
105. See Annie Kriegel’s extended criticism of l’affaire-Notin in ibid., April 2, 1990, especially 2.
106. Ibid., June 27, 1994; the apparent support given to these vigies by the World Zionist Organization is reported in the Daily News, September 19, 1993, 34.
107. The citations from Madame Boulouque are taken from Le Monde’s editorial on January 14, 1994. In this commentary, the paper defends criminal laws passed against the expression of racist or Holocaust-revisionist opinions as necessary to “prevent the transgression of our values of tolerance and universalism.”
108. See Federal Register 59, no. 47 (March 10, 1994), 11448–50.
109. Any comment about the family resemblance between themselves and the multiculturalists is one that “moderate” pluralists vigorously resist. Thus the anti-Communist and social democrat Deweyite Sidney Hook in his autobiography, Out of Step: An Unquiet Life in the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), attacks affirmative action as the “immoral practice of reverse discrimination” (350). Hook overlooks the historical development from the socioeconomic interventionism that he favored, including his adhesion to various humanist manifestoes, to a degree of administrative control he now finds excessive.
110. Quoted ln Robert Detlefsen, Civil Rights under Reagan (San Francisco: ISC Press, 1991), 141–42.
111. For the by now conventional criticism of affirmative action, see Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
112. For an analysis of affirmative action’s politically totalizing effect, see Nicholas Capaldi, Out of Order: Affirmative Action and the Crisis of Doctrinaire Liberalism (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1985); and on the judicial activism that has driven these programs, see P. C. Roberts and Lawrence Stratton, The New Color Line: How Quotas and Privilege Destroy Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1995). The Italian-American social theorist Paul Piccone is particularly effective in demonstrating the “rationality” of New Class therapeutic initiatives. In looking at the Canadian welfare state, Piccone stresses the pursuit of power in the way administrators create a “politically homogeneous community by reducing a normally recalcitrant population marked by group particularities to a clientele of abstract, manipulable individuals dependent on the state.” See Paul Piccone, “Riforma o secessione: il caso canadese,” in Ideazione 3, no. 4 (July/August 1996), 60. The only observation to be added is that once having finished this transformational task, the therapeutic-managerial state exercises further power by reassigning “abstract individuals” to concocted ethnicities.
113. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Newsletter (January 1995); and Herbert I. London, “When Civil Rights Protagonists Demand a Dictatorial Regime,” in Measure 128 (April/May 1995), 8. For observations on the connection between affirmative action directives and the enforcement on campuses of “politically correct” speech and behavior, see Lino A. Graglia, “ ‘Hate Speech’ Codes and ‘Political Correctness’: Fruit of ‘Affirmative Action’,” Northern Kentucky Law Review 23, no. 3 (1996), 505–14; idem, “ ‘Affirmative Action,’ Past, Present, and Future,” Ohio Northern University Law Review, 22–4 (196), 1207–25; and idem, “Podberesky, Hopwood, and Adorand: Implications for the Future of Race-Based Programs,” Northern Ilinois University Law Review 16, no. 2 (Spring 1996), 287–93. Although Graglia denies any legal or political link between civil rights legislation through 1964 and the abuses he attacks, he is relentless in searching out the administrative path going from the efforts of the EEOC to ban “discrimination” to the current applications of “political correctness.”
CHAPTER FIVE
1. On the essential liberalism of Hegel’s constitutional theory of the state, see Karl Rosenkranz, Hegel als deutscher Nationalphilosoph (Leipzig, 1870); Paul Gottfried, The Search for Historical Meaning, 3–19; and Steven B. Smith, Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989), particularly 98–149.
2. Rosanvallon, Le Moment Guizot, 246; and Guizot’s own justification for his plan of public instruction in “Rapport du Roi sur l’exécution de la loi de 28 juin 1833” (Paris, 1834).
3. John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party (1931; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), especially 261–71.
4. See Lasch, Revolt of the Elites, 92–114.
5. Jean-Marie Le Pen, Pour la France: Programme du Front National (Paris: Editions Albatros, 1985), 10.
6. For a composite picture of the electorate and ideology associated with the National Front, see inter alia Jean-Christian Petitfils, L’Extrême Droite en France (Paris: PUF, 1983); Pierre-André Taguieff, Le national populisme (Paris: Le Seuil, 1989); Anne Tristan, Au Front (Paris: Gallimard, 1987); Christopher Bourseiller, Extrême Droite (Paris: Editions François Bourin, 1991); and Guy Birenbaum, “Front national: Les mutations d’un groupuscule,” Intervention (March 15, 1988), 25–32.
7. On the electoral differences between the lepénistes and earlier postwar populist movements of the Right, see D. Drouin and Marc Pons de Vincent, Analyse comparative de l’émergence électorale de deux forces d’extrême droite: le mouvement poujadiste et le Front National (Univerité de Lyons III, 1986); Le Front National à découvert, ed. Nonna Mayer and Pascal Perrimeau (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1989), 37–52; and François Platone, “Histoire de l’électorat Le Pen,” Le Journal des élections (April/May 1988), 23–24. On the differences between interwar fascist sympathizers and supporters of today’s European populist Right, see Wolfgang Kowalsky’s informative essay, “Die Vergangenheit als Crux der Linken,” in Die Schatten der Vergangenheit (Frankfurt and Berlin: Propyla¨en, 1990), 595–613.
8. Mayer and Perrimeau, Le Front National, 56–58.
9. See Le Pen, Pour la France, 18–19.
10. For an account of this incident, see La République menacée: Dix ans d’effet Le Pen, ed. Edwy Plenel and Alain Rollat (Paris: Le Monde, 1992), 69–78. The defector in question, Jean Marcilly, had been responsible for the view of the FN president, still prevalent in some quarters, as a devout Catholic. In Le Pen sans bandeau, Marcilly creates a biographical portrait intended for Le Pen’s supporters on the Catholic Right. To this day French bookstores and French book distributors specializing in devotional literature sell copies of Le Pen’s defenses of Catholic social morality. In a revisionist portrait, Le Pen revu et corrigé, however, Marcilly tries to erase his earlier image-making by presenting Le Pen as a cynic who posed as catholique bon teint for electoral reasons. By 1991 the biographer-journalist had broken with his boss and gone off to live with Le Pen’s alienated wife Pierrette.
11. Le Pen, Pour la France, 54–85.
12. Ibid.; 20–21, 46.
13. Bourseiller, Extrême Droite, 80, 87, 104–5.
14. Typical of these proliferating invectives tracing Le Pen’s ideas and electorate to Nazi sources and sympathizers are Joseph Algazy, L’Extrême Droite en France (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1989); L’Extrême Droite en questions (Paris: Cercle Condorcet, Ligue des Droits de L’Homme, 1991); René Monzat, Enquêtes sur l’extrême droite (Paris: Le Monde Editions, 1992); and Harvey G. Simmons, The French National Front: The Extremist Challenge to Democracy (New York: Westview, 1996)
15. Quoted in Le Monde, September 13, 1987; and commented on by Patrick Jarreau in ibid., September 20–21, 1987.
16. In an extended interview with Alain Rollat that appeared in a condensed form in Le Monde, June 8, 1984, Le Pen attacks the French Left for not being evenhanded in its condemnation of Communist and Nazi mass murder. He also complains of the tendency of intellectuals “to stamp all over the old Nazi wolfskin when there are no longer Nazis inside. Nazism belonged to a historical epoch; it is not something existing in perpetuity.”
17. On the general lack of interest in civil liberties among French Jews and their representative argumentations, see Anne Kriegel, “Le leurre de l’antisémitisme,” Le Figaro, April 2, 1990; Paul Gottfried, “Crimes of Opinion,” Insight, June 10, 1996; and a provocative study of Jewish political behavior in relation to outside groups, Kevin B. MacDonald, A People that Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as an Evolutionary Group Strategy (Westport, Conn.; Praeger, 1994). See also Pierre Birnbaum, Anti-Semitism in France: A Political History from Léon Blum to the Present (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); and Norman Ravitch, “Your People, My People; Your God, My God,” The French Review 70, no. 4 (March 1997), 515–27. Though the FN leadership has shown inexcusably bad taste in joking about Jewish critics, Le Monde has not demonstrated that Le Pen is in fact a Holocaust-denier. All it can prove is that during interviews on September 13 and 18, 1987, Le Pen lumped together Nazi atrocities against Jews with other Nazi crimes committed against “gypsies, Christians, and patriots, as a detail of the Second World War.” His remarks about the French Left’s unwillingness to come to terms with the sordid history of Communism in France as well as in Eastern Europe has obviously hit a raw nerve, because they are entirely correct. Le République menacée, published by Le Monde, disparages the attempt to call attention to Soviet crimes or the fact that French Communists collaborated with the Nazis during the fall of France. The self-evident truth, however, is that Le Pen and his critics are equally guilty of sweeping aside the embarrassing details of the past, that is, the past anti-Semitism of the French nationalist Right.
18. See Franklin Hugh Adler, “The Decline of the French Left,” Telos 103 (Spring 1995), 191; and Pierre-André Taguieff, “Political Science Confronts Populism,” ibid., especially 18–20.
19. See, for example, P. A. Taguieff, “L’identité francaise et ses ennemis: le traitement de l’immigration dans le national racisme français contemporain,” L’homme et la société 77–78 (December 1985), 187–200; Michel Winock, “Les flambées du nationalisme francais,” L’Histoire 73 (December 1984), 11–25; Jean-Paul Honoré, “Jean-Marie Le Pen et le front national,” Les temps modernes 41 (April 1985), 1843–71; and the FN view of French history by Jean Madiran, ‘De millénaire capétien à la bataille de France,” Itinéraires (Winter 1987). On discontinuities between interwar fascist constituences and the electoral base of the FN, see Wolfgang Kowalsky, “Die Vergangenheit als Crux der Linken” in Die Schatten der Vergangenheit, 595–613.
20. Typical of the journalistic response to Le Pen’s identitarian argument is the view stated in La république menacée, 303–19, that the presence of (by now) more than three million North African Muslims in France is a “challenge [défi]” that requires a redefinition of the state’s role in dealing with citizenship. Henceforth the French administration should solve the “contradictory mixture” of a state-conferred citizenship based on “abstract universality” and a civil society which continues to make cultural and economic distinctions. The state is therefore invited to assume a therapeutic as well as redistributionist function in rendering the “social system more open and more flexible.”
21. For a detailed study of the antinatal trends in Western, and particularly European, countries, see Are World Population Trends a Problem?, ed. Ben Wattenberg and Karl Zinsmeister (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983).
22. Aristotle, Politica, Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), Section 1276a: 34–40.
23. In a study of FN voters in the suburbs of Paris between 1984 and 1988, Nonna Mayer finds an overrepresentation of professionals and business owners until 1986; from 1986 on, however, the Front managed to attract less educated voters, including unemployed workers. According to Mayer, disaffection with the political class remains a drawing card for the FN, which has not had to take sides decisively in social confrontations, except against non-European immigrants (see Le Front National, 249–63). François Platone and Henri Rey, who have done research on the Communist-leaning Parisian suburb of Seine-Saint-Denis, note that “a growing proletarianistation” of the Front votes has taken place (see ibid., 268– 81). See also Henry Roy, “Quelques réflexions sur l’évolution électorale d’un département de la banlieue parisienne: la Seine Saint-Denis,” Hérodote 43 (1986), 6–38.
24. On the pivotal importance of anti-immigration sentiment among the FN electorate, see the studies by Serge Etchebarne and Jean Viand in Le Front National, 284–321; and P. A. Taguieff, “La rhétorique du national populisme, les règles élémentaires de la propagande xénophobe,” Mots 9 (October 1984), 113– 38. An argument that needs further development but seems highly plausible is the one made by Franklin Adler in Telos, cited above, that the present electoral surge of the FN betokens not the ascendancy of “rightwing extremism” but the decline of the French Left. Like Taguieff, Adler questions whether “extrême droite” is a useful analytic term and whether it is accurate to portray the FN as unalterably procapitalist. According to Adler, both the insolvency of the French welfare state and the French Left’s lack of political credibility have caused French workers increasingly to turn to the FN for leadership and solutions. This in turn has led the Front into adopting the slogans of a European workers’ party.
25. Mayer and Perrimeau, Le Front National, 49–52; Jérôme Jaffré, “Le Pen ou le vote exutoire,” Le Monde, April 12, 1988.
26. Pierre Rosanvallon, La nouvelle question sociale (Paris: Editions Du Seuil, 1995), 36–44, 69–75.
27. Mayer and Perrimeau Le Front National, 54–57; Pascal Perrineau, “Quel avenir pour le front national?” Intervention, March 15, 1986, 33–41.
28. See Patrick J. Buchanan’s statement of personal belief in his autobiographical Right from the Beginning (Boston and New York: Little, Brown & Co. 1988), 58–79, 96–99, and 337–59. For his views on immigration, crime, and welfare, see “Dialogue is not for Hoodlums,” New York Post, May 11, 1991, 13; “D.C.: A Liberal Wasteland,” ibid., January 24, 1990, 17; and “Manitoba, USA?” ibid., April 14, 1990, 13. For a learned defense of Buchananite populism, see S. T. Francis, “The Buchanan Revolution,” Chronicles (July 1991), 12–13; for a critical but sympathetic treatment of the same phenomenon, see Paul Gottfried, The Conservative Movement, 159–66; Scott McConnell’s commentary “Buchanan: After the Flame-out,” New York Post, March 13, 1996; and Edward Luttwak, “Buchanan vuol dir no a Gates,” L’Espresso, March 8, 1996, 92–98. For a negative assessment of Buchananite conservative nationalism, see David Frum, Dead Right (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 124–58. For Buchanan’s most extensive statement of his isolationist foreign policy, see “American First—and Second and Third,” National Interest 19 (Spring 1990), 77–82. And on the presumed natural limits of Buchanan’s cultural stands, see Wall Street Journal, February 22, 1996, A16.
29. On the predominantly Catholic ethnic core of Buchananite populism, see my essay “Populism and Neoconservatism,” Telos 90 (Winter 1991–92), 184–88; the sarcastic identification of Buchanan with the Catholic Right in Charles Lane’s “Daddy Boy” in The New Republic, January 22, 1996, 15–19; and Michael Lind’s commentary “Buchanan, Conservatism’s Ugly Face,” New York Times, August 19, 1992.
30. See the polling information for Clinton and his Republican congressional opposition in New York Times, December 3, 1995, 31; ibid., December 14, 1995, 1; and Thomas Edsall’s comments in Washington Post, December 17, 1995, 12.
31. See the comments on the FP in the New York Times, October 13 and December 17, 1995; and Paul Hockenos, “Jörg Haider: Austria’s Far Right Wunderkind,” World Policy Journal 12, no. 3 (Fall 1995), 75–76.
32. See the detailed analysis of the FP’s electoral setback in December 1995 in Corriere della Sera, December 18, 1995, 7–8. Despite my repeated attempts to get in touch with the FP’s leaders in Vienna, I have received no response until now. Almost all my information on this subject was taken from the late Donald I. Warren, who was doing a biography of Jörg Haider at the time of his death.
33. For an overview of the League, see Ivo Diamanti, La Lega. Geografia, storia, e sociologia di uno nuovo soggetto politico (Rome: Donzelli, 1993); and the special issue on “The Leagues in Italy,” Telos 90 (Winter 1991–92).
34. See William Bluhm, Building an Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of a Western State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), especially 12–46.
35. Books in English that highlight the problematic nature of Italian state-building are Joseph LaPalombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); and P. A. Allum, Italy—Republic Without Government? (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973).
36. See Alessandro Campi, “Beyond the State: Gianfranco Miglio’s Challenge,” trans. Paul Piccone, Telos 100 (Summer 1994), 103–22; and the contributions by Miglio and his collaborators in Verso una nuova costituzione (Milan: Giuffré, 1994).
37. See Miglio, Le regolarità, 447–49, 901–26.
38. Ibid., 1095–98. According to sociologist Roberto Biorcio, Northern Italian “laboriosità” has become a sustaining myth in the Lombard quest for regional self-identity, in the absence of other viable cultural legacies. See Renato Mannheimer, ed., La Lega Lombarda (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1991), 68–72.
39. See Ivo Diamanti’s essay “Una tipologia dei simpatizzanti della Lega,” in Mannheimer, Lega Lombarda, 159–95. Despite Diamanti’s gratuitous value judgments about the ignorance and bigotry of the League’s voters, he is correct to stress its continuing dependence upon a rural electorate which until recently embodied Catholic as well as localist sentiments.
40. See Umberto Bossi, Io, Bossi, e la Lega: Diario segreto dei miei quattro anni sul carroccio (Milan: Mondadori, 1994).
41. Cf. the unflattering but detailed portrait of Haider in New York Times Magazine, April 21, 1996, 42.
42. Miglio, Le regolarità, 877–941; and Giorgio Ferrari, Gianfranco Miglio: Un giacobino nordista (Milan: Liber, 1993).
43. See New York Times, October 31, 1995, A12; and J. Parizeau, “The Case for a Sovereign Quebec,” Foreign Policy 99 (Summer 1995), 69–77.
44. Peter Brimelow, “Canadian Roulette,” Forbes, September 25, 1995, 46–48.
45. Le Pen, Pour la France, 10, 34–35, 125–34, 144–45.
46. See Gianfranco Miglio, Una costituzione per i prossimi trenta anni (Bari: Laterza, 1990); and Campi, Miglio’s Challenge; 118–20.
47. Investor’s Business Daily, November 15, 1995, 1.
48. See Christopher Shea’s “Defending Dixie,” in Chronicle of Higher Education, November 10, 1995, A9, A17; and Hill’s responses in Southern Patriot 26 (December 1995), 1–2. A social theorist claimed by the League is former Marxist-Leninist historian Eugene D. Genovese. Though still a self-described socialist (albeit social reactionary), Genovese sympathetically outlines the League’s critique of the “more disquieting features of the modern world” in The Southern Tradition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
49. Washington Post, October 29, 1995, C3.
50. On this quest by the Lombard League for a shared regional history, see D. Vimercati, I Lombardi alla nuova crociata (Milan: Mursia, 1990).
51. Lasch, Revolt of the Elites, 25–49; clearly Lasch’s harshest invectives are directed against the upper middle class as opposed to the lower middle and working classes.
52. Stanley Rothman, “The Decline of Bourgeois America,” Society (January/February 1996), 16.
53. Ibid., 16–17.
54. Veyne, Le pain et le cirque, 87–89.
55. Benjamin Ginsberg, The Captive Public (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
56. On the cultural and genetic presuppositions for citizenship in classical republics and democracies, see the provocative chapter “Athens’s Illiberal Democracy,” in Paul Rahe’s Republics Ancient and Modern, 186–218, and Ian Contiades, “Exthros kai Polemios eis tēn sugxronon politikēn theorian kai tēn hellenikēn arxaiotēta,” published by the Griechische Humanistische Gesellschaft (Athens, 1969). Contiades’s essay, which unfortunately has never been translated into English, underlines the centrality of the outsider in defining ancient political identities.
57. Aristotle, Politica, sections 1310b: 7–40, 1313a: 1–15; and Plato, Res Publica, Oxford Classical Texts, Book 9 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), sections 564–67.
58. See the essay “If the GNP Is Up, Why Is America Down?” by C. W. Cobb and others in Atlantic Monthly 276 (October 1995), 59–60; and the Bureau of Labor Statistics projections in Occupational Outlook Quarterly 39 (Fall 1995), 6–7.
59. Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family (New York: Basic Books, 1975).
60. Ibid., particularly 5–21, 255–80; and Edward Shorter, “Illegitimacy, Sexual Revolution, and Social Change in Modern Europe,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 2 (1971), 237–72.
61. William B. Hixson, The Search for the American Right Wing (Princeton: Princeton Unviersity Press, 1992), particularly 351–57.
62. Alan Wolfe, Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). See my review of Wolfe’s book in Society 27 (July/August 1990), 95–96.
63. Lasch, Revolt of the Elites, 102–4.
64. This argument is underlying or explicit in such feminist works as Andrea Dworkin, Letters from a War Zone (reprint, Chicago: L. Hill Books, 1992); Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution (New York: Morrow, 1993).
65. For indignant denunciations of the usage “Judeo-Christian,” see Alan M. Dershowitz, Chutzpah (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 216–19.
66. Bill Kauffman, America First (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1995), 231.
67. Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake, especially 144–87.
68. Ibid., 18–30; and John Gray, Beyond the New Right: Markets, Government and the Common Environment (London and New York: Routledge, 1993).
69. See L’Express, November 3, 1989, 6–9; and Le Monde Diplomatique (December 1989), 1, 22.
70. On the alliance between Third World immigrants and the social Left in various Western societies, see Katherine Bett, Ideology and Immigration: Australia 1976 to 1987, 157–72; Peter Brimelow, Alien Nation, 146–51; Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, Les immigrés et la politique (Paris: Presses de FNSP, 1988); W. A. Cornelius, P. L. Martin, and J. F. Hollifeld, eds., Controlling Immigration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 143–76; Wayne Lutton and John Tanton, The Immigration Invasion, 48–59; Leon Bouvier et al., “Shaping Florida: The Effects of Immigration,” (pamphlet, Center for Immigration Studies, 1995); and André Lebon, “Immigration en France, données, perspectives,” Revue françaises des affaires sociales (December 1992). The correlation being made does not involve a negative judgment. It merely challenges an assertion frequently heard among neoliberal and neoconservative immigration expansionists, like Ben Wattenberg, Francis Fukayama, and Julian Simon, that Third World immigration produces politically and culturally stabilizing effects. Despite Asian and Cuban exceptions, such immigration favors and reflects the ascendancy of social engineering and serves to encourage government efforts to enforce intrusive standards of tolerance. In the United States it has created a new clientele for affirmative action programs; see Frederick R. Lynch, Invisible Victims: White Males and the Crisis of Affirmative Action (New York: Praeger Books, 1991); and Peter Skerry, “Borders and Quotas: Immigration and the Affirmative Action State,” The Public Interest 96 (Summer 1989), 88–89. Ira Mehlman (of the Federation for American Immigration Reform in Los Angeles) is currently working on a book dealing with the electoral support for expanded public administration from Third World immigrants in the United States.
71. See Francis Fukuyama, “Immigrants and Family Values,” Commentary 95 (May 1993), 26–32.
72. Quoted in Leon Wieseltier, “Abracadabrant,” New Republic, January 6, 1992, 28.
73. Illustrative of the alliance between postmodernism and the alleged victims of Western values are Catherine Belsey and Jane Moore Clenden, eds., The Feminist Reader. Essays in Gender and the Politics of Literary Criticism (New York: Macmillan, 1989); Leonard Lentricchia, Criticism and Social Change (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984); and Stanley E. Fish, Political Change (New York: Clarendon Press, 1995).
74. See Franklin H. Adler, “Racism, Difference and the Right in France,” in Modern and Contemporary France, NS 3.4 (1995), 439–51; and P. A. Taguieff, “From Race to Culture: The New Right’s View of European Identity,” Telos (Winter 1993/Spring 1994).
75. See Alain de Benoist’s Europe, tiers monde, même combat (Paris: Laffont, 1986) as an affirmation of support for the Third World against the American Empire and Benoist’s diatribe against American materialism and puritanical morality, “L’ennemi principal,” Eléments 41 (March/April 1982), 37–40.
76. This and related topics are treated in a special issue of Telos, “The French New Right,” 97–98 (Winter 1993/Spring 1994).
77. From a letter to the author from Alain de Benoist (July 27, 1996); see also Alain de Benoist, L’Empire Intérieur (Paris: Editions du Labyrinthe, 1996) for a multinational reconfiguration of European political life.
78. Cf. the portraits of European populist leaders in Cosmopolitique 18 (February 1991); Roberto Biorcio, “The Rebirth of Populism in Italy and France,” Telos 90 (Winter 1991/92), 43–56; André Bejin’s critical observations about “antiracist ideology” in Racismes/Antiracismes (Paris: Librairie des Méridiens, 1989); and P.-A. Taguieff, Les fins de l’antiracisme (Paris: Librarie des Méridiens, 1995).
79. See the dossier on European education in Ideazione 3, no. 4 (July 1996) 131–94, especially 158–71.
80. One of the few studies that treat the snares of state-supported privatization of education is Jeffrey Tucker’s The Voucher Reader (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1995).
81. See Richard Morin and Dan Balz, “Americans Losing Trust in Each Other and Their Institutions,” Washington Post, January 28, 1996, A1; and The Gallup Poll (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1994), 32. Gallup polls indicate that whereas in January 1958, 73 percent of Americans “always or almost always” trusted their government, this figure by January 1994 had shrunk to 19 percent.
82. See the Roper survey figures on the attitudes of immigrants toward American society and life in The American Enterprise 104 (March/April 1995), 102–3.
83. On the Colorado amendment, see Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1996, B1; New York Times; May 21, 1996, A1; Human Events, October 20, 1995, 2–3; U.S. News and World Report, October 2, 1995, 2 and 7; and Lino A. Graglia, “Romer v. Evans: The People Foiled Again by the Constitution,” University of Colorado Law Review 68, no. 2 (Spring 1997), 409–28. On Proposition 187, see Economist, May 3, 1995, 58; New York Times, September 2, 1992; and the cover story in U. S. News and World Report, September 25, 1995, 4–5.
84. See H. Fineman, “Riding the Wave,” in Newsweek, May 22, 1995, 18–21; and H. Johnson, “Blowing in the Wind,” National Review, May 15, 1995, 46–47.
85. See Sid Blumenthal’s acidic observations about Wilson the populist, following his generally poor showing as a presidential candidate, in New Yorker, October 30, 1995, 46–50.
86. Although most Canadian political intellectuals resemble their American counterparts in supporting a large managerial state committed to social engineering, some have combined distaste for Manning with earnest attempts to understand his protest politics. See, for example, L. Fischer’s “Learning Tough Political Lessons,” Maclean’s, April 25, 1994, 14–15; K. Whyte’s “Cluster Bomb,” Saturday Night 109 (October 1994), 8–9; and idem, “Pols in a Pod,” Saturday Night 110 (March 1995), 10–12.
87. See the commentaries on Manning in Maclean’s, October 11, 1993, 16–19; October 18, 1993, 17; and October 25, 1993, 14–17.
CONCLUSION
1. Robert Merton, Sociological Ambivalence, (New York: Free Press, 1976).
2. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
3. Among books that make and document this point are Roger Kimball, Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education (New York: Harper & Row, 1990); George Marsden, The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment to Established Non-Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Thomas Sowell, Inside American Education (New York: Free Press, 1992). See also my own remarks in Insight, October 16, 1995, 18–20; and in “Postmodernism and Academic Discontents,” Academic Questions 9, no. 3 (Summer 1996), 58–67.
4. New Republic, August 29, 1955, 18; also the detailed critical study of the moral and scientific claims made by Dewey and his disciples in John Patrick Diggins’s The Promise of Pragmatism: The Crisis of Knowledge and Authority (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
5. See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. and intro. by George Schwab (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1976); and Paul Gottfried, Carl Schmitt: Politics and Theory (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990), especially 57–82.
6. Carl Schmitt, Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Ius Publicum Europaeum, second edition (Berlin: Duncker & Humblet, 1974), 220–60.
7. Ibid., 167–219, 290–98.
8. See the essay by Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), 4.
9. The political irrelevance of the “archaic Right” is a recurrent theme in Samuel T. Francis’s Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993); for a dispassionate treatment of the major forces and conflicts on the contemporary American Right, see George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America, second edition (Wilmington, Del.: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1996), 278–341.
10. An essay that broke ground in pointing to the intended vacuity of contemporary ideological debate is Christopher Lasch’s “The Obsolescence of Left and Right,” New Oxford Review 56 (April 1989), 5–15. See also Marco Tarchi, “In Search of Right and Left,” trans. Franco Sacchi, Telos 103 (Spring 1995), 181–88; and Thomas Molnar’s penetrating comments on American political character in Du mal moderne: Symptomes et antidotes (Cité de Québec: Beffroi, 1996), 83–91, 122–33.
11. On the connection in the United States between administrative consolidation and federally organized “crusades,” see Robert Nisbet’s The Present Age (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), particularly 20–40.
12. A reading of Renzo De Felice’s multivolume study of Italian fascism, particularly the second volume, Mussolini il fascista: L’organizzazione dello stato fascista. 1925–1929 (Turin: Einaudi, 1968), suggests the inchoate nature of the Italian national revolutionary attempt to structure a modern managerial state. De Felice depicts Mussolini as engaged primarily in a balancing act throughout the late twenties, trying to maintain civil peace between sindicalisti and industriali and between laicists and clericalists. Mussolini’s success in this period was not in laying the foundations of a “total state” (however much fascist theorists seized on that term) but in integrating rival groups into a political nation. Mussolini had to come to terms with a Catholic authoritarian presence that formed a state within his own. See De Felice’s discussion of that problem in ibid., 382-436.
13. Still the best work by an American, even after seventy years, on the hypocritical priggish attitude toward power among “public servants” is Irving Babbitt’s Democracy and Leadership (1924; reprint, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1979), particularly 274–78. For related opinions by an exponent of Babbitt, see Claes Ryn’s introductory essay to the new edition of Babbitt’s Rousseau and Romanticism (New Brunswick, N. J., and London: Transaction Publishers, 1991). After reading through textbooks on public administration by authors who obviously admired it, my student assistant Bill Patch compared the attitude toward power among his sources to the “unwillingness of some sex offenders to talk about human sexuality.” More interesting may be to speculate why public administrators and their advocates feign this innocence of power—or, will not identify any regime they favor with force. In contrast to authoritarian and theocratic regimes, caring administrative states are thought to enforce “human rights” and “fairness” without imposing their will at the expense of others.
One possible criticism of the preceding study is methodological. It may be objected that too much has been made about considerations of power but not enough about other causal explanations for the modern state. An international economy, high tech industries and a mobile work force are at least as responsible for cultural and political changes as the expansion of public administration (or so critics of my position might argue in pointing to a changing economic landscape). But in fact I do take into account industrialization and urbanization as preconditions for both democracy and the rise of the managerial state. These circumstances contributed to a political dynamic that has shaped the surrounding society. It is also possible for a highly advanced economy to coexist, as in Switzerland, with strong local government. Being tied to a large economy does not necessitate an equally large administration. Nor do educated professionals have to side with an expanding administrative state or with therapeutic politics. Much of the base for European populist movements, particularly the Lega Nord, comes from those associated with an urban economy and possessing university training.
There are features of the managerial therapeutic state that cannot be plausibly interpreted as mere responses to economic growth. Having the state interpose itself with increasing frequency between spouses and between parents and children, having government officials monitor conversations among employees of large firms and industries for actionable hate speech, and attaching to applicants for schools and jobs governmentally imposed victim and nonvictim statuses are not entirely nor primarily explainable as policies determined by economic change. Though the government and media both cite the overall material advantages of Third World immigration, detailed studies, such as Roy Beck’s The Case Against Immigration (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996), prove exactly the opposite. Brimelow, Beck, Edward Luttwak, and other analysts show that the present immigration, because of its character and level, impacts negatively on wages and damages particularly the employment opportunities of the underclass. Here as in other cases the political class pursues economically questionable practices for ideological reasons and social control. It then makes economic arguments to justify its course of action. Despite some overstatement, a useful corrective study dealing with the dubious connection between material well-being and political administrative centralization is Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989).