CHAPTER 5
The Tragedy of the European Union
“Wake Up, Europe”
(Excerpts from “Wake Up, Europe,” published in the New York Review of Books on October 22, 2014.)
Europe is facing a challenge from Russia. Neither the European leaders nor their citizens are fully aware of this challenge or know how best to deal with it. Russia has adopted the use of force that manifests itself in repression at home and aggression abroad, as opposed to the rule of law. What is shocking is that Vladimir Putin’s Russia has proved to be in some ways superior to the European Union—more flexible and constantly springing surprises. That has given it a tactical advantage, at least in the near term.
Europe and the United States—each for its own reasons—are determined to avoid any direct military confrontation with Russia. Russia is taking advantage of their reluctance. Violating its treaty obligations, Russia has annexed Crimea and established separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine. In 2014, when the recently installed government in Kiev threatened to win the low-level war in eastern Ukraine against separatist forces backed by Russia, President Putin invaded Ukraine with regular armed forces disguised as “little green men.” This violated Russian law that protects conscripts from being deployed abroad without their consent.
In seventy-two hours, these forces destroyed several hundred of Ukraine’s armored vehicles, a substantial portion of its fighting force. According to General Wesley Clark, former NATO supreme allied commander for Europe, the Russians used multiple-launch rocket systems armed with cluster munitions and thermal-baric warheads (an even more inhumane weapon that ought to be outlawed), with devastating effect. The local militia from the Ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk suffered the brunt of the losses because they were communicating by cell phones and could thus easily be located and targeted by the Russians. President Putin has, so far, abided by a ceasefire agreement he concluded with Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko on September 5, 2014, but Putin retains the choice to continue the ceasefire as long as he finds it advantageous or to resume a full-scale assault.
In September 2014, President Poroshenko visited Washington, where he received an enthusiastic welcome from a joint session of Congress. He asked for “both lethal and nonlethal” defensive weapons in his speech. However, President Obama refused his request for Javelin handheld missiles that could be used against advancing tanks. Poroshenko was given radar, but what use was it without missiles? European countries were equally reluctant to provide military assistance to Ukraine, fearing Russian retaliation. The Washington visit gave President Poroshenko a façade of support with little substance behind it.
The collapse of Ukraine would be a tremendous loss for NATO, the European Union, and the United States. A victorious Russia would become much more influential within the EU and pose a potent threat to the Baltic states, with their large ethnic Russian populations. Instead of supporting Ukraine, NATO would have to defend itself on its own soil. This would expose both the European Union and the United States to the danger they have been so eager to avoid: a direct military confrontation with Russia. The European Union would become even more divided and ungovernable. Why should the United States and other NATO nations allow this to happen?
The argument that has prevailed in both Europe and the United States is that Putin is no Hitler; by giving him everything he can reasonably ask for, he can be prevented from resorting to further use of force. In the meantime, the sanctions against Russia—which include, for example, restrictions on business transactions, finance, and trade—will have their effect, and in the long run, Russia will have to retreat in order to earn some relief from them.
These are false hopes derived from a false argument with no factual evidence to support it. Putin has repeatedly resorted to force and is liable to do so again unless he faces strong resistance. Even if it is possible that the hypothesis could turn out to be valid, it is extremely irresponsible not to prepare a Plan B.
There are two counterarguments that are less obvious but even more important. First, Western authorities have ignored the importance of what I call the “new Ukraine” that was born in the successful resistance on the Maidan. Many officials with a history of dealing with Ukraine have difficulty adjusting to the revolutionary change that has taken place there. The recently signed Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine was originally negotiated with the Viktor Yanukovych government. This detailed road map now needs adjustment to a totally different reality. For instance, the road map calls for the gradual replacement and retraining of the judiciary over five years, whereas the public is clamoring for immediate and radical renewal. As the mayor of Kiev, Vitali Klitschko, put it, “If you put fresh cucumbers into a barrel of pickles, they will soon turn into pickles.”
Contrary to some widely circulated accounts, the resistance on the Maidan was led by the cream of civil society: young people, many of whom had studied abroad and refused to join either government or business on their return because they found both of them repugnant. (Nationalists and anti-Semitic extremists made up only a small minority of the anti-Yanukovych protesters.) They are the leaders of the new Ukraine, and they are adamantly opposed to a return of the “old Ukraine,” with its endemic corruption and ineffective government.
The new Ukraine has to contend with Russian aggression, bureaucratic resistance both at home and abroad, and confusion in the general population. Surprisingly, it has had the support of several oligarchs, former President Poroshenko foremost among them. There are, of course, profound differences in history, language, and outlook between the eastern and western parts of the country, but Ukraine is more united and more European-minded than ever before. That unity, however, is extremely fragile.
The new Ukraine has remained largely unrecognized because it took time before it could make its influence felt. It had practically no trained security forces at its disposal when it was born. The security forces of the old Ukraine were actively engaged in suppressing the Maidan rebellion and were disoriented this summer when they had to take orders from a government formed by the supporters of the rebellion. No wonder the new government was at first unable to put up an effective resistance to the establishment of the separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine. It is all the more remarkable that then President Poroshenko was able, within a few months of his election, to mount an attack that threatened to reclaim those enclaves.
To appreciate the merits of the new Ukraine, you need to have had some personal experience with it. I can speak from personal experience, although I must also confess to a bias in its favor. I established a foundation in Ukraine in 1990, even before the country became independent. Its board and staff are composed entirely of Ukrainians, and it has deep roots in civil society. I visited the country often, especially in the early years, but not between 2004 and early 2014, when I returned to witness the birth of the new Ukraine.
I was immediately impressed by the tremendous improvement in maturity and expertise during that time both in my foundation and in civil society at large. Currently, civic and political engagement is probably higher than anywhere else in Europe. People have proven their willingness to sacrifice their lives for their country. These are the hidden strengths of the new Ukraine that have been overlooked by the West.
The other deficiency of the current European attitude toward Ukraine is that it fails to recognize that the Russian attack on Ukraine is indirectly an attack on the European Union and its principles of governance. It ought to be evident that it is inappropriate for a country, or association of countries, at war to pursue a policy of fiscal austerity as the European Union continues to do. All available resources ought to be put to work in the war effort, even if that involves running up budget deficits. The fragility of the new Ukraine makes the ambivalence of the West all the more perilous. Not only the survival of the new Ukraine but also the future of NATO and the European Union itself is at risk. In the absence of unified resistance, it is unrealistic to expect that Putin will stop pushing beyond Ukraine when the division of Europe and its domination by Russia is in sight.
Having identified some of the shortcomings of the current approach, I will try to spell out the course that Europe ought to follow. Sanctions against Russia are necessary, but they are a necessary evil. They have a depressive effect not only on Russia but also on the European economies, including Germany. This aggravates the recessionary and deflationary forces that are already at work. By contrast, assisting Ukraine in defending itself against Russian aggression would have a stimulative effect not only on Ukraine but also on Europe. That is the principle that ought to guide European assistance to Ukraine.
The new Ukraine has the political will both to defend Europe against Russian aggression and to engage in radical structural reforms. To preserve and reinforce that will, Ukraine needs to receive adequate assistance from its supporters. Without it, the results will be disappointing and hope will turn into despair.
It is high time for the members of the European Union to wake up and behave as countries indirectly at war. They are better off helping Ukraine to defend itself than having to fight for themselves. One way or another, the internal contradiction between being at war and remaining committed to fiscal austerity has to be eliminated. Where there is a will, there is a way.
It is also high time for the European Union to take a critical look at itself. There must be something wrong with the EU if Putin’s Russia can be so successful, even in the short term. The bureaucracy of the EU no longer has a monopoly on power, and it has little to be proud of. It should learn to be more united, flexible, and efficient. And Europeans themselves need to take a close look at the new Ukraine. That could help them recapture the original spirit that led to the creation of the European Union. The European Union would save itself by saving Ukraine.
What Went Wrong and How to Fix It
(Remarks delivered at the Brussels Economic Forum on June 1, 2017.)
I should like to dedicate my remarks to the memory of my great friend Tommaso Padoa Schioppa. My purpose today is to explain what Tommaso Padoa Schioppa and I would be working on together if he were still alive.
We would try to save the European Union in order to radically reinvent it. The first objective, saving Europe, has to take precedence because it is in existential danger. But we wouldn’t forget about the second objective either.
The reinvention would have to revive the support that the European Union used to enjoy. We would do it by reviewing the past and explaining what went wrong and how it could be put right. And that’s what I want to do today.
Let me start with the past. After the Second World War, Western Europe was rebuilt with the help of the Marshall Plan, but it was still threatened by the Soviet Union, which occupied the eastern part of the continent. A group of visionaries led by Jean Monnet wanted to bind the western part together into an organization whose members would never wage war with one another. The visionaries engaged in what Karl Popper called piecemeal social engineering. They set limited but attainable goals, established a time line, and generated public support, knowing full well that each step would necessitate a further step forward. The European elite of our generation responded enthusiastically. I personally regarded the European Union as the embodiment of an open society.
All went well until the Maastricht Treaty, which was signed in 1992. The architects knew that the treaty was incomplete: it created a central bank but did not establish a common treasury. They had reason to believe, however, that when the need arose, the necessary political will could be summoned and the next step forward would be taken.
Unfortunately, that is not what happened. Two things intervened: the collapse of the Soviet empire and the reunification of Germany, which were so intimately interrelated that they count as one event, and then came the crash of 2008, which is the second event.
Let me discuss German reunification first. Chancellor Helmut Kohl recognized that Germany could be reunited only in the context of a more united Europe. Under his farsighted leadership, Germany became the main driver of European integration. Germany was always willing to contribute a little bit extra so that every bargain could be turned into a win-win situation. President François Mitterrand wanted to tie Germany more closely into Europe without giving up too much national sovereignty. This Franco-German bargain was the foundation of the Maastricht Treaty.
Then came the Lisbon Treaty, which sought to transfer sovereignty to centralized institutions, notably the European Parliament and the Commission, but it was defeated by referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005. During the euro crisis that followed the crash of 2008, de facto political power migrated to the European Council, where the heads of state were able to make urgently needed decisions in the nick of time. This discrepancy between formal and de facto power is at the heart of what I call “The Tragedy of the European Union.”
The crash of 2008 originated in the United States but hit the European banking system much harder. After 2008, a reunited Germany felt neither politically motivated nor rich enough to remain the motor of further integration.
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the finance ministers of Europe declared that no other systemically important financial institutions would be allowed to fail, But Chancellor Angela Merkel insisted that every country should be responsible for its own banks. In doing so, she was reading German public opinion correctly. And that was the tipping point from integration to disintegration.
The European Union is now in an existential crisis. Most Europeans of my generation were supporters of further integration. Subsequent generations came to regard the EU as an enemy that deprives them of a secure and promising future. Many of them came to doubt whether the European Union can deal with a multiplicity of accumulated problems. This feeling was reinforced by the rise of anti-European, xenophobic parties that are motivated by values that are diametrically opposed to the values on which the European Union was founded.
Externally, the EU is surrounded by hostile powers—Putin’s Russia, Erdogan’s Turkey, Sisi’s Egypt, and the America that Trump would like to create but can’t.
Internally, the European Union has been governed by outdated treaties ever since the financial crisis of 2008. These treaties have become less and less relevant to prevailing conditions. Even the simplest innovations necessary to make the single currency sustainable could be introduced only by intergovernmental arrangements outside the existing treaties. That is how the functioning of European institutions became increasingly complicated and eventually rendered the EU itself dysfunctional in some ways.
The eurozone in particular became the exact opposite of what was originally intended. The European Union was meant to be a voluntary association of like-minded states that were willing to surrender part of their sovereignty for the common good. After the financial crisis of 2008, the eurozone was transformed into a creditor/debtor relationship, where the debtor countries couldn’t meet their obligations and the creditor countries dictated the terms that they had to meet. By imposing an austerity policy, the creditor countries made it practically impossible for the debtors to grow out of their debts. The net result was neither voluntary nor equal.
If the European Union carries on with business as usual, there is little hope for an improvement. That is why the European Union needs to be radically reinvented. The top-down initiative started by Jean Monnet had carried the process of integration a long way, but it has lost its momentum. Now we need a collaborative effort that combines the top-down approach of the European institutions with the bottom-up initiatives that are necessary to engage the electorate.
Brexit will be an immensely damaging process, harmful to both sides. Most of the damage is felt right now, when the European Union is in an existential crisis, but its attention is diverted to negotiating the separation from Britain.
The European Union must resist the temptation to punish Britain and approach the negotiations in a constructive spirit. It should use Brexit as a catalyst for introducing far-reaching reforms. The divorce will be a drawn-out process taking as long as five years. Five years seems like an eternity in politics, especially in revolutionary times like the present. During that time, the European Union could transform itself into an organization that other countries like Britain would want to join. If that happened, the two sides may want to be reunited even before the divorce is completed. That would be a wonderful outcome, worth striving for. This seems practically inconceivable right now, but in reality, it is quite attainable. Britain is a parliamentary democracy. Within five years, it has to hold another general election, and the next parliament may vote to be reunited with Europe.
Such a Europe would differ from the current arrangements in two key respects. First, it would clearly distinguish between the European Union and the Eurozone. Second, it would recognize that the euro has many unsolved problems and they must not be allowed to destroy the European Union.
The eurozone is governed by outdated treaties that assert that all member states are expected to join the euro if and when they qualify. This has created an absurd situation where countries like Sweden, Poland, and the Czech Republic have made it clear that they have no intention of joining the euro, yet they are still described and treated as “pre-ins.”
The effect is not purely cosmetic. It has converted the EU into an organization in which the eurozone constitutes the inner core, and the other members are relegated to an inferior position. There is a hidden assumption at work here, namely that various member states may be moving at various speeds, but they are all heading to the same destination. This has given rise to the claim of “an ever-closer union” that has been explicitly rejected by a number of countries.
This claim needs to be abandoned. Instead of a “multispeed” Europe, we should aim for a “multitrack” Europe that would allow member states a wider variety of choices. This would have a far-reaching beneficial effect.
Right now, attitudes toward cooperation are negative: member states want to reassert their sovereignty rather than surrendering more of it. But if cooperation produced positive results, attitudes may improve and some objectives that are currently best pursued by coalitions of the willing may qualify for universal participation. There are three problem areas where meaningful progress is indispensable. The first is the refugee crisis; the second, territorial disintegration as exemplified by Brexit; the third, the lack of an economic growth policy.
We need to be realistic. In all three areas, we start from a very low base, and in the case of the refugee crisis, the trend is still downward. We still don’t have a European migration policy. Each country pursues what it perceives to be its national interest, and it often works against the interests of other member states. Chancellor Merkel was right: the refugee crisis has the potential to destroy the European Union. But we mustn’t give up. If we could make meaningful progress on alleviating the refugee crisis, the momentum would change in a positive direction.
I am a great believer in momentum. I call it reflexivity in my conceptual framework. And I can see a momentum developing that would change the European Union for the better. This would require a combination of top-down and bottom-up elements, and I can see both of them evolving.
Regarding the top-down political process, I kept my fingers crossed during the Dutch elections, in which the nationalist candidate Geert Wilders fell from first to second place. But I was greatly reassured by the outcome of the French elections, in which the only pro-European candidate among many achieved the seemingly impossible and emerged as the president of France. I am much more confident about the outcome of the German elections, where there are many combinations that could lead to a pro-European coalition, especially if the anti-European and xenophobic AfD continues its virtual collapse. The growing momentum may then be strong enough to overcome the biggest threat, the danger of a banking and migration crisis in Italy.
I can also see many spontaneous bottom-up initiatives, and significantly, they are mainly supported by young people. I have in mind the Pulse of Europe initiative, which started in Frankfurt in November and spread to some 120 cities across the continent; the Best for Britain movement in the United Kingdom; and the resistance to the PiS Party in Poland and to Fidesz in Hungary.
The resistance that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán encountered in Hungary must have surprised him as much as it surprised me. He sought to frame his policies as a personal conflict between the two of us and has made me the target of his unrelenting propaganda campaign. He cast himself in the role of the defender of Hungarian sovereignty and me as a shady currency speculator who uses his money to flood Europe—particularly his native Hungary—with illegal immigrants as part of some vague but nefarious plot.
This is the opposite of who I am. I am the proud founder of the Central European University that has, after twenty-six years, come to rank among the fifty best universities in the world in many of the social sciences. I have generously endowed the university, and that has enabled it to defend its academic freedom not only from interference by the Hungarian government but also from its founder.
I have strenuously resisted Orbán’s attempts to translate our ideological differences into personal animosity and I have succeeded.
What lessons have I learned from this experience? First, that to defend open societies, it is not enough to rely on the rule of law; you must also stand up for what you believe in. The university I have founded and the organizations that my foundation has supported are doing so. Their fate is in the balance. But I am confident that their determined defense of freedom—both academic freedom and the freedom of association—will eventually bring the slow-moving wheels of justice into motion. Second, I have learned that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside; it needs to be asserted and defended by the people themselves. I am full of admiration for the courageous way the Hungarian people have resisted the deception and corruption of the mafia state the Orbán regime has established. I’m also encouraged by the energetic way the European institutions have responded to the challenge emanating from Poland and Hungary. I find the proposal made by Germany to use the Cohesion Funds for enforcement purposes very promising. I can see the revival of the European Union gaining more and more ground. But it won’t happen by itself. Those who care about the fate of Europe will have to get actively involved.
I must end with a word of caution. The European Union is cumbersome, slow moving, and often needs unanimity to enforce its rules. This is difficult to achieve when two countries, Poland and Hungary, are conspiring to oppose it. But the EU needs new rules to maintain its values. It can be done. But it will require resolute action by the European institutions and the active engagement of civil society. Let’s get started!
The Refugee Crisis
(Excerpts from remarks delivered at the European Council on Foreign Relations on May 29, 2018.)
Since the financial crisis of 2008, the European Union seems to have lost its way. It adopted a program of fiscal retrenchment that led to the euro crisis. As a result, many young people today regard the European Union as an enemy that has deprived them of jobs and a secure and promising future. Populist politicians exploited the resentments and formed anti-European parties and movements.
Then came the refugee crisis of 2015. At first, most people sympathized with the plight of refugees fleeing from political repression or civil war, but they didn’t want their everyday lives disrupted by a breakdown of social services. They were also disappointed by the failure of the authorities to cope with the crisis.
When that happened in Germany, the AfD was empowered, and it has grown into the largest opposition party. Italy has suffered from a similar experience recently, and the political repercussions have been even more disastrous: the anti-European parties almost took over the government. Italy is now facing elections in the midst of political chaos.
Indeed, the whole of Europe has been disrupted by the refugee crisis. Unscrupulous leaders have exploited it even in countries that have accepted hardly any refugees. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán based his reelection campaign on falsely accusing me of planning to flood Europe—Hungary included—with Muslim refugees.
He is now posing as the defender of his version of a Christian Europe that is challenging the values on which the European Union was founded. He is trying to take over the leadership of the Christian Democratic parties, which form the majority in the European Parliament.
In recent weeks not just Europe but the whole world has been shocked by President Trump’s actions. He has unilaterally withdrawn from a nuclear arms treaty with Iran, thereby effectively destroying the transatlantic alliance. This development will put additional pressure of unpredictable force on an already beleaguered Europe. It is no longer a figure of speech to say that Europe is in existential danger; it is the harsh reality.
What can be done to save Europe?
Europe faces three pressing problems: the refugee crisis, territorial disintegrations as exemplified by Brexit, and the austerity policy that has hindered Europe’s economic development. Bringing the refugee crisis under control may be the best place to start.
I have always advocated that the allocation of refugees within Europe should be entirely voluntary. Member states should not be forced to accept refugees they don’t want, and refugees should not be forced to settle in countries where they don’t want to go.
The voluntary principle ought to guide Europe’s migration policy. Europe must also urgently reform or repeal the so-called Dublin Regulation, which has put an unfair burden on Italy and other Mediterranean countries, with disastrous political consequences.
The EU must protect its external borders but keep them open for lawful migrants. Member states, in turn, must not close their internal borders. The idea of a “fortress Europe” closed to political refugees and economic migrants alike violates both European and international law and, in any case, is totally unrealistic.
Europe wants to extend a helping hand toward Africa (and other parts of the developing world) by offering substantial assistance to democratically inclined regimes. This would enable them to provide education and employment to their citizens. They would be less likely to leave, and those who did would not qualify as refugees. At the same time, European countries could welcome migrants from these and other countries to meet their economic needs through an orderly process. In this way, migration would be voluntary on the part of both the migrants and the receiving states. Such a “Marshall Plan” would also help to reduce the number of political refugees by strengthening democratic regimes in the developing world.
Present-day reality falls substantially short of this ideal. First and most importantly, the European Union still doesn’t have a unified migration policy. Each member state has its own policy, which is often at odds with the interests of other states.
Second, the main objective of most European countries is not to foster democratic development but to stem the flow of migrants. This diverts a large part of the available funds to dirty deals with dictators, bribing them to prevent migrants from passing through their territory or to use repressive measures to prevent their citizens from leaving. In the long run this will generate more political refugees.
Third, there is a woeful shortage of financial resources. We estimate that a meaningful Marshall Plan for Africa would require at least thirty billion euros a year for a number of years. Member states could contribute only a small fraction of this amount, even if they were ready to do so.
How might such a plan be financed, then? It’s important to recognize that the refugee crisis is a European problem and needs a European solution. The European Union has a high credit rating, and its borrowing capacity is largely unused. When should that capacity be put to use if not in an existential crisis? Throughout history, the national debt always grew during times of war. Admittedly, adding to the national debt runs counter to the prevailing addiction to austerity, but the austerity policy is itself a contributing factor to the crisis in which Europe finds itself.
“Europe, Please Wake Up”
(Article published on Project Syndicate on February 11, 2019.)
Europe is sleepwalking into oblivion, and the people of Europe need to wake up before it is too late. If they don’t, the European Union will go the way of the Soviet Union in 1991. Neither our leaders nor ordinary citizens seem to understand that we are experiencing a revolutionary moment, that the range of possibilities is very broad, and that the eventual outcome is thus highly uncertain.
Most of us assume that the future will more or less resemble the present, but this is not necessarily so. In a long and eventful life, I have witnessed many periods of what I call radical disequilibrium. We are living in such a period today.
The next inflection point will be the elections for the European Parliament in May 2019. Unfortunately, anti-European forces will enjoy a competitive advantage in the balloting. There are several reasons for this, including the outdated party system that prevails in most European countries, the practical impossibility of treaty change, and the lack of legal tools for disciplining member states that violate the principles on which the European Union was founded. The EU can impose the acquis communautaire (the body of European Union law) on applicant countries but lacks sufficient capacity to enforce member states’ compliance.
The antiquated party system hampers those who want to preserve the values on which the EU was founded, but it helps those who want to replace those values with something radically different. This is true in individual countries and even more so in trans-European alliances.
The party system of individual states reflects the divisions that mattered in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as the conflict between capital and labor. But the cleavage that matters most today is between pro- and anti-European forces.
The EU’s dominant country is Germany, and the dominant political alliance in Germany—between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Bavaria-based Christian Social Union (CSU)—has become unsustainable. The alliance worked as long as there was no significant party in Bavaria to the right of the CSU. That changed with the rise of the extremist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). In last September’s länder elections, the CSU’s result was its worst in over six decades, and the AfD entered the Bavarian Parliament for the first time.
The AfD’s rise removed the raison d’être of the CDU-CSU alliance. But that alliance cannot be broken up without triggering new elections that neither Germany nor Europe can afford. As it is, the current ruling coalition cannot be as robustly pro-European as it would be without the AfD threatening its right flank.
The situation is far from hopeless. The German Greens have emerged as the only consistently pro-European party in the country, and they continue rising in opinion polls, whereas the AfD seems to have reached its high point (except in the former East Germany). But now CDU-CSU voters are represented by a party whose commitment to European values is ambivalent.
In the United Kingdom, too, an antiquated party structure prevents the popular will from finding proper expression. Both Labour and the Conservatives are internally divided, but their leaders—Jeremy Corbyn and Theresa May, respectively—are so determined to deliver Brexit that they have agreed to cooperate to attain it. The situation is so complicated that most Britons just want to get it over with, although it will be the defining event for the country for decades to come.
But the collusion between Corbyn and May has aroused opposition in both parties, which, in the case of Labour, is bordering on rebellion. The day after Corbyn and May met, May announced a program to aid impoverished pro-Brexit Labour constituencies in the north of England. Corbyn is now accused of betraying the pledge he made at Labour’s September 2018 party conference to back a second Brexit referendum if holding an election is not possible.
The public is also becoming aware of the dire consequences of Brexit. The chances that May’s deal will be rejected on February 14 are growing by the day. That could set in motion a groundswell of support for a referendum or, even better, revoking Britain’s Article 50 notification.
Italy finds itself in a similar predicament. The EU made a fatal mistake in 2017 by strictly enforcing the Dublin Regulation, which unfairly burdens countries like Italy, where migrants first enter the EU. This drove Italy’s predominantly pro-European and pro-immigration electorate into the arms of the anti-European League Party and the Five Star Movement in 2018. The previously dominant Democratic Party is in disarray. As a result, the significant portion of the electorate that remains pro-European has no party to vote for. There is, however, an attempt underway to organize a united pro-European list. A similar reordering of party systems is happening in France, Poland, Sweden, and probably elsewhere.
When it comes to trans-European alliances, the situation is even worse. National parties at least have some roots in the past, but the trans-European alliances are entirely dictated by party leaders’ self-interest. The European People’s Party (EPP) is the worst offender. The EPP is almost entirely devoid of principles, as demonstrated by its willingness to permit the continued membership of Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in order to preserve its majority and control the allocation of top jobs in the EU. Anti-European forces may look good in comparison: at least they have some principles, even if they are odious.
It is difficult to see how the pro-European parties can emerge victorious from the election in May unless they put Europe’s interests ahead of their own. One can still make a case for preserving the EU in order to radically reinvent it. But that would require a change of heart in the EU. The current leadership is reminiscent of the politburo when the Soviet Union collapsed—continuing to issue ukazes as if they were still relevant.
The first step to defending Europe from its enemies, both internal and external, is to recognize the magnitude of the threat they present. The second is to awaken the sleeping pro-European majority and mobilize it to defend the values on which the EU was founded. Otherwise, the dream of a united Europe could become the nightmare of the twenty-first century.
Europe’s Silent Majority Speaks Out
(Article published on Project Syndicate on June 7, 2019.)
Last month’s elections to the European Parliament produced better results than one could have expected, and for a simple reason: the silent pro-European majority has spoken. What they said is that they want to preserve the values on which the European Union was founded, but that they also want radical changes in the way the EU functions. Their main concern is climate change.
This favors the pro-European parties, especially the Greens. The anti-European parties, which cannot be expected to do anything constructive, failed to make the gains that they expected. Nor can they form the united front that they would need in order to become more influential.
One of the institutions that needs to be changed is the Spitzenkandidat system. It is supposed to provide a form of indirect selection of the EU leadership. In fact, as Franklin Dehousse has explained in a brilliant but pessimistic article in the EU Observer, it is worse than no democratic selection at all. Each member state has real political parties, but their trans-European combination produces artificial constructs that serve no purpose other than to promote the personal ambitions of their leaders.
This can best be seen in the European People’s Party (EPP), which has managed to capture the presidency of the Commission since 2004. The EPP’s current leader, Manfred Weber, who has no experience in a national government, appears willing to enter into practically any compromise in order to remain in the parliamentary majority. That includes embracing Hungary’s autocratic prime minister, Viktor Orbán.
Orbán has posed a serious problem for Weber, because Orbán has openly flouted European norms and established what amounts to a mafia state. Nearly half the national parties constituting the EPP wanted to expel Orbán’s party, Fidesz. Instead of following through, however, Weber managed to convince the EPP to make a relatively easy demand on Fidesz: allow the Central European University (CEU, which I founded) to continue functioning freely in Hungary as an American university.
Fidesz failed to comply. Even so, the EPP did not expel Fidesz, but merely suspended it so that it could be counted as part of the EPP when the president of the Commission is chosen. Orbán is now trying to reestablish Fidesz as a bona fide member of the EPP. It will be interesting to see if Weber finds a way to accommodate him.
The Spitzenkandidat system is not based on an intergovernmental agreement, so it could easily be changed. It would be much better if the president of the European Commission were directly elected from a carefully selected list of qualified candidates, but that would require treaty changes. The President of the European Council could continue to be elected by a qualified majority of the member states, as the Treaty of Lisbon prescribes.
The reform that would require treaty changes is justified by the increased democratic legitimacy conferred by the European Parliamentary elections. Turnout in the recent election surpassed 50 percent, up sharply from 42.6 percent in 2014. This is the first time that turnout has increased at all since the first election in 1979, when 62 percent of eligible voters participated.
Strangely enough, on this occasion, the Spitzenkandidat system promises to produce a dream team. French President Emmanuel Macron, who is opposed to the Spitzenkandidat system as a matter of principle, is largely responsible for this development. At a dinner with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, the winner of Spain’s national general election, which preceded the European Parliament vote, the two leaders agreed to support two Spitzenkandidaten who would be ideal for the Commission and for the Council.
Germany is the main supporter of the Spitzenkandidat system. If Weber loses out, Germany will be pushing for Jens Weidmann, President of the Bundesbank, to become President of the ECB. He would hardly be ideal. In fact, he is disqualified by the fact that he testified before Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court against the ECB in a case seeking to invalidate the Bank’s so-called outright monetary transactions, a policy that was crucial to overcoming the eurozone crisis earlier this decade. I hope this fact will become more widely known.
Any other qualified candidate would be preferable to Weidmann as ECB president. As things stand now, France will not have any of the top jobs. It would be a good thing if Germany didn’t have one either, because it would leave more room for other countries.
There are many EU institutions aside from the Spitzenkandidat system that require radical reform. But that can wait until we find out whether, and to what extent, the promise held out by the parliamentary election results is realized. This is not yet the time to declare victory, relax, and celebrate. There is a lot of work to be done to turn the EU into a well-functioning organization that fulfills its great potential.
Post-Script
(August 5, 2019)
It is truly amazing that a dysfunctional system of choosing leaders has managed to produce the strongest leadership the European Union has enjoyed since the days of Jacques Delors. How did this happen?
The spitzenkandidat system was abandoned because Manfred Weber was widely rejected as totally unqualified. President Macron and Chancellor Merkel then came up with an inspired choice, Ursula von der Leyen. She is a more committed pro-European than anybody else in the CDU leadership with the possible exception of Norbert Röttgen, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Bundestag. But the appointment came as a total surprise to everyone, von der Leyen included, and it aroused considerable opposition in the European Parliament among those who were committed to the spitzenkandidat system. This made the parliamentary confirmation process very difficult. She barely squeezed through with a razor-thin majority. She made a number of commitments that will increase the influence of the European Parliament over the European Commission. This may weaken her hand.
The situation has had a harmful side-effect: Viktor Orbán claims to be responsible for von der Leyen’s election. I am convinced that his claim is false, but there is no way to prove it because the vote was secret. As a consequence Orbán’s claim is widely accepted and provides fodder to those who remain opposed to her. After the recent meeting between von der Leyen and Orbán, Orbán applauded their closeness, but von der Leyen emphasized that the Fidesz government’s respect for the rule of law was the main subject of discussion—a substantial difference.
Orbán is playing a duplicitous game. On the one hand he wants to remain a member of the European People’s Party; on the other, he continues to commit egregious violations of European law. He has abolished the independence of the Hungarian Academy of Science and taken away the properties belonging to it. The membership is up in arms but it is not getting the support of the EU that it deserves. I hope this will be high on the President’s agenda.
Having lost out with Manfred Weber, Germany started pushing Jens Weidmann for President of the European Central Bank. Fortunately, the job went to a much better candidate, Christine Lagarde. This created a vacancy at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which will be filled by Kristalina Georgieva of the World Bank. This will have the additional benefit that the IMF and the World Bank, where Georgieva remains influential, will work more closely together than in any time in their history. Gender- and regional balance has also been achieved. Things could not have worked out better.
I am an enthusiastic supporter of President Macron’s proposal that Guy Verhofstadt should be appointed to form a working group to explore better alternatives to the spitzencandidat system. Their report will take more than a year to prepare and is bound to be very controversial when it is published. This will allow both the European Commission and Parliament to make some progress on issues, such as climate change, on which there is greater consensus. In any case, the newly elected leaders of the EU will have their work cut out for them to fulfill the high expectations attached to their appointment.