part0004

help you You have to vote for Zanu-PF candidates ... before

government starts rethinking your entitlement to this food aid." One of Mugabe's closest colleagues, Didymus Mutasa, was even more explicit: "We would be better off with only six million people, with our own people who support the liberation struggle."

As opposition areas ran increasingly short of food, Archbishop Ncube raised his voice in protest once more. "It is criminal what this government is doing," he said in November 2002. "They don't care if people die. For the sake of political power the government is willing to sacrifice the lives of thousands. The government is starving areas that voted for the opposition in recent elections. It is the work of devils." A group of Danish doctors from Physicians for Human Rights who spent two months collecting evidence on the government's handling of the food crisis confirmed

that gross abuse was prevalent. "If it is not possible to increase non-partisan food supplies into the country," they warned, "it is our opinion that starvation and eventually death will occur along party political lines."

As day by day Zimbabwe plunged ever deeper into crisis, Mugabe continued to lash out at all and sundry, indifferent to the death and destruction his regime wrought. He threatened to impose new draconian measures to curb the independent press and to close down independent charities, describing them as "hatcheries of political opposition." He introduced a new law making it a criminal offence for anyone to make an insulting gesture or statement within range of his motorcade. And in a move intended to intimidate the judiciary further, he authorised the arrest of a retired white judge, Fergus Blackie, who, in one of his final judgements in July, had sentenced the justice minister, Chinamasa, to three months in jail for contempt of court. Blackie was detained in the early morning, held incommunicado without food or warm clothing, then paraded in handcuffs in the back of a police vehicle on his way to court to face spurious charges of misconduct.

There seemed to be no respite in sight from Mugabe's tyranny The opportunities for repression were unlimited. As one of Mugabe's young proteges, Vincent Hungwe, put it: "We may have to take this whole system back to zero before we can start it up again and make it work in a new way."

MURAMBATSVM

The exodus gathered momentum. Desperate to escape economic collapse, hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans left the country. By 2004, more than three million had fled—one quarter of the population—most heading for South Africa in the hope of finding work. The hardships facing those who remained grew ever more arduous. Except for the rich elite, each day turned into a struggle for survival. Unemployment reached 80 percent; food shortages were commonplace.

With parliamentary elections on the horizon in March 2005, the mood became increasingly despondent. The legacy of fear of the past five years ran deep. Few people expected the outcome to be anything other than another victory for Mugabe. "No way will elections kick him out," predicted Archbishop Ncube. "Mugabe has made all his plans. He has cheated in 2000 and 2002. They are very well schooled. They will cheat."

What was needed to get rid of Mugabe, said Ncube, was a peaceful mass uprising. "Zimbabweans have to be willing to risk their own lives for freedom," he said. "They need to fill up the streets, stop traffic, and bring the country to a halt." But he doubted

it would ever happen. "Knowing the temperament of Zimbabweans, I don't think they will do anything. They are too peace-loving and timid." They also lacked leadership. "We don't have convincing leaders. They are too comfortable and don't want to risk anything. We have no one like Gandhi, who was willing to give his own life for the cause."

The 2005 election was notable less for the level of overt violence and intimidation that Mugabe authorised than for the blatant rigging of the results. As before, voters' rolls were a deliberate shambles, packed with the names of hundreds of thousands of "ghost" voters; constituency boundaries were redrawn to suit Zanu-PF; election officials loyal to Mugabe were placed in charge of administration. During the campaign, voters were threatened with the loss of food aid if they failed to vote for Zanu-PF. On election day, polling stations swarmed with police and army personnel. Thousands of aspiring voters found they were not listed on the voters' roll and were turned away.

But the most crucial factor this time was the count. In between the closure of polling stations and the announcement of the final results, massive fraud took place. In Kariba constituency, as polls closed, election officials announced that 16,676 people had voted. The next morning they reported that Zanu-PF had received 13,719 votes and the MDC 9,540 out of a total of 24,142 votes—or 7,466 more than the total given the night before. In Manyame constituency, where one of Mugabe's nephews was standing for election, the electoral commission at first announced that 14,812 people had voted, giving the MDC candidate a clear majority. But in the final tally, an extra 10,000 votes were counted, handing victory to Mugabe's nephew. A similar pattern was repeated in some thirty other constituencies.

The outcome was that Zanu-PF gained 78 out of 120 contested seats; the MDC only 41. Elated by the result, Mugabe told reporters he intended to stay in office until he was "a century old."

But, significantly, the MDC managed to retain its support in all the main towns.

The repercussions for urban voters soon followed. Mugabe's target was the mass of disaffected Zimbabweans living in slums and shantytowns on the fringes of urban centres—the poorest of the poor eking out a living as best they could. What he feared was a popular uprising of the kind urged by Archbishop Ncube. Using the pretext that slums and shantytowns were a haven for criminals, Mugabe ordered armed police and youth militias to evict their inhabitants and raze them to the ground. The campaign was called murambatsvina, a Shona word interpreted as meaning: "Drive out the rubbish." Mugabe's police commissioner, Augustine Chihuri, spoke openly about its purpose: "We must clean the country of the crawling mass of maggots bent on destroying the economy," he said.

No warning was given. On May 19, police began rounding up thousands of street traders in Harare and other towns, seizing their goods—everything from chewing gum to second-hand clothes— and demolishing market stalls, regardless of whether they were licensed. Even the flower-sellers and curio hawkers on Harare's central square who had plied their trade there for decades were swept away in the blitz; as vendors watched in disbelief, their flowers and wood carvings were heaped onto fires. On the outskirts of central Harare, Mbare market, once recommended in guidebooks for a lively afternoon visit, was reduced to rubble. In the centre of Bulawayo, police descended on Fifth Street market, confiscated tons of fruits and vegetables, cooking oil, salt, sugar, and other basic supplies; and smashed down stalls, leaving behind a mass of twisted metal and charred wood. At the tourist resort of Victoria Falls, wood carvers were attacked, their carved hippos, giraffes, and elephants thrown onto fires. In one town after another, barely a vestige of street trade remained.

The onslaught against the population of slums and shantytowns began simultaneously. Using bulldozers and sledgehammers, police

squads obliterated one community after another. In Hatcliffe Extension, a shantytown of 30,000 residents on the northern outskirts of Harare, nothing was left but rubble; among the buildings destroyed were a Catholic refuge for AIDS orphans, a secondary school, a World-Bank-funded public lavatory, and two mosques. Across the country, thousands of families were left to fend for themselves in the open in the middle of winter. Church groups in the eastern Manicaland region said they were "shocked and numbed by the utter havoc and destruction." Babies, nursing mothers, the sick, and elderly had been left amid smoking ruins to face the cold. "What we have seen would reduce the hardest heart to tears." The plight of the homeless was made worse by obstructions placed in the way of charities and aid agencies trying to help them. Churchmen expressed their anger and frustration. "I feel helpless," said a Jesuit priest surveying a crowd of homeless families outside his parish house in Harare. "I keep telling them my little homilies, that the violent will not win, but I see a city ringed by fire. People who worked to look after their families—carpenters, metalworkers, street vendors, and caterers—have been turned into beggars by their own government. This is a crime against humanity and all we can do is give them black plastic sheeting."

For week after week the destruction continued. Despite international condemnation, Mugabe refused to end his campaign. Addressing the state opening of parliament on June 9, he described it as a "vigorous clean-up campaign to restore sanity" to Zimbabwe's towns. "The current chaotic state of affairs where [small businesses] operated ... in unregulated and crime-ridden areas could not have been tolerated for much longer." In a broadcast on state television, he congratulated the police for their work and claimed that government had allocated 3 trillion Zimbabwe dollars (£1.65 billion) for a reconstruction programme.

His ministers insisted that people had been moved "to an appropriate place." The reality, however, was that thousands of destitute families were dumped in "transit" camps on farms or dispersed into

rural areas. At Caledonia transit camp, ten miles east of Harare, the government provided neither water nor electricity nor sanitation. Families had to construct their own makeshift hovels from plastic sheeting, plywood, corrugated iron, and whatever scraps of material they could find. Around them they stacked wardrobes, mattresses, and other possessions salvaged from the destruction of their homes. The only source of water was from bowsers supplied by the United Nations Children's Fund. Supplies of food, blankets, and plastic sheeting also depended on aid agencies.

Not even when a special United Nations team arrived in Zimbabwe to investigate Operation Murambatsvina did the destruction stop. On June 28, armed police squads started to demolish a settlement at Porta Farm, 25 miles from Harare, where 30,000 lived. As residents watched helplessly, bulldozers reduced their homes and schools to rubble. Police then began to remove them forcibly in trucks. The following day, when the UN special envoy, Anna Tibai-juka, visited the scene, she said her team had been "shocked by the brutality" of what they had witnessed.

The verdict of UN investigators was damning. In a 98-page report published in July, Tibaijuka concluded that 700,000 people had lost either their homes, their source of livelihood, or both. A further 2.4 million people had been affected indirectly—one-fifth of the population. Nearly 100,000 homes and more than 32,000 businesses had been destroyed. Operation Murambatsvina, she said, had been carried out "in an indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with indifference to human suffering" and had precipitated "a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions." Tens of thousands of families and vulnerable women and children had been left in the open, without adequate protection, without access to water, sanitation, and healthcare, and without food security. Thousands of orphans had been made homeless by the destruction of orphanages and foster homes. Tabaijuka warned: "It will take several years before the people and society as a whole can recover."

A year later, despite Mugabe's promises about reconstruction, virtually nothing had been done. Some 2,000 new homes had been built, but most of them had been allocated to the police and army. Further work stopped when contractors went unpaid. But, in any case, Mugabe had no genuine interest in slum clearance or housing development. His purpose was to make clear the fate of anyone who voted against him.

In early 2007, Mugabe began developing his strategy for winning the next presidential and parliamentary elections, due in 2008. The task was more complicated than before. Not only was he deeply unpopular throughout much of the country, but prominent figures within Zanu-PF wanted him to retire, fearing that their own private wealth accumulated during the Mugabe years might be swept away in an economic collapse. When Mugabe tried to postpone the 2008 elections for two years, to keep himself in power for an extended term, he was thwarted by Solomon Mujuru, the former army commander and one of Zimbabwe's richest men. Within the army and police there were also signs of disaffection. Whereas Mugabe had previously been able to ensure loyalty by rewarding supporters with farms, government contracts, and other perks, his sources of patronage were much diminished. Nevertheless, by mobilising the secret police, youth militias, war-veteran groups, and the security forces at an early stage, Mugabe was confident he could beat back whatever resistance emerged.

His opponents were soon given a taste of what to expect. When a coalition of civic organisations, labour unions, and opposition groups arranged to hold a "prayer meeting" on a sports ground in the Harare suburb of Highfield on March 10 as part of a "Save Zimbabwe Campaign," Mugabe let loose the riot police. Scores of demonstrators were arrested, taken to.the local police station, and savagely beaten. The police, said Mugabe, had a "right to bash"

dissidents. When Morgan Tsvangirai arrived at the police station to investigate, he, too, was seized, held down on the floor in front of his arrested supporters, and beaten so badly that doctors thought his skull had been fractured. The aim of the police, said one witness, was to demonstrate "what they can do to the rest of us if they can easily inflict such harm on our leader." Mugabe subsequently told a gathering of African presidents in Dar es Salaam that he had authorised Tsvangirai to be beaten because his supporters had attacked the police. "I told the police [to] beat him a lot. He asked for it." Facing condemnation from Western governments, Mugabe retorted: "They can go hang."

In an address to mark Zimbabwe's twenty-seventh anniversary of independence on April 18, 2007, Mugabe warned the MDC to "brace themselves for a tough time" if they tried to act "outside the confines of the law."

At a time when they should be coming up with ideas that can develop the nation, they are busy concentrating on saying Mugabe should go. Ndinopika nambuya vangu Nehanda [I swear by my ancestral spirits] that will never happen. I will not allow Tsvangirai and his bosses to taste this seat. Never, ever!

Attending a memorial service for an opposition activist killed by police, a student leader observed: "If they make peaceful revolution impossible, they make violent revolution inevitable."

HOW LONG THE NIGHT?

In a radio broadcast from Mozambique in 1976 during the Rhodesian war, Mugabe summed up his view of electoral democracy:

Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have, shall have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer—its guarantor. The people's votes and the people's guns are always inseparable twins.

Mugabe has held fast to this creed. Whatever challenge his regime has faced, he has always been prepared to overcome it by resorting to the gun. So proud was he of his record that in 2000 he boasted about having "a degree in violence." His ministers followed suit. "The area of violence is an area where Zanu-PF has a very strong, long and successful history," Nathan Shamuyarira, one of Mugabe's closest colleagues, declared.

What propelled Mugabe to use violence so readily was his obsession with power. Power for Mugabe was not a means to an end, but the end itself. His overriding ambition, he once admitted, was to

achieve total control, and he pursued that objective with relentless sin-gle-mindedness, crushing opponents and critics who stood in his way.

Mugabe's single-mindedness was evident from an early age. Making few friends, he devoted his time to studying, encouraged by Jesuit teachers who recognised his intellectual ability and his aptitude for self-discipline. His Jesuit upbringing instilled in him a self-belief that he never lost. But teaching rather than politics seemed to be his destiny.

The colonial regime under which Mugabe grew up, however, engendered in him an abiding sense of bitterness. Rhodesia's whites were generally contemptuous of the African population, treating them as an inferior race, demanding unfailing obedience to white rule. "We feared the white man," Mugabe recalled. "He was power. He had guns." Fear and distrust of white society were part of everyday life, deeply ingrained.

The contrast that Mugabe found in Ghana when he arrived there on a teaching contract in 1958 was striking. In its first years of independence, Ghana was widely admired as a beacon of hope in Africa, bursting with plans for a new socialist order and keen to support the liberation of the rest of Africa from European rule. It was in this heady atmosphere that Mugabe became a convert to Marxist ideas and saw the prospect of a different future for Rhodesia. His commitment to teaching nevertheless remained firm.

Only by chance, during what was supposed to be a brief return visit to Rhodesia in i960, did Mugabe abruptly change course. Caught up unexpectedly in the turmoil of African protest against white rule, he threw himself into the nationalist cause with the same dedication he had hitherto devoted to teaching. He was among the first nationalists to advocate armed struggle, convinced that nothing else would overcome white intransigence.

Eleven years of imprisonment hardened his resolve. Whereas Nelson Mandela used his prison years to open a dialogue with South Africa's white rulers, Mugabe emerged from prison adamantly op-

posed to any idea of negotiation, as he made clear to African presidents at the Lusaka summit in 1974. His aim by then was to overthrow white society by force and to replace it with a one-party Marxist regime. In 1979, after seven years of civil war in which at least 30,000 people had died, when a negotiated settlement was within reach at Lancaster House in London, Mugabe still hankered for military victory, "the ultimate joy."

That he was denied the chance of a military victory was always something of a disappointment to him. Although the Lancaster House deal opened the way to his election as head of Zimbabwe's new government, he still aspired to the kind of power that military victory would have given him. The advent of democracy for Mugabe was not the final goal but a stepping stone towards achieving greater control through the establishment of a one-party state.

To that end, he unleashed a campaign of mass murder and brutality on the Ndebele and Kalanga people, determined to destroy their support for his main rival, Zapu.

The one-party system that Mugabe developed, following the demise of Zapu in 1987, lasted for twelve years. He accumulated huge personal power, ensuring that Zanu-PF's grip extended into every corner of the government's apparatus. One by one, the state media, parastatal organisations, the police, the civil service and, eventually, the courts, were subordinated to Mugabe's will, giving him control of a vast system of patronage.

Whatever good intentions he started out with—plans for improved education and health facilities—soon diminished in importance. For all his talk of striving for socialism, Mugabe never displayed much concern for the welfare of common people. The main beneficiaries of independence, all too clearly, were Zanu-PF's ruling elite, who engaged in a relentless scramble for jobs, contracts, farms, and businesses that Mugabe was content to condone as a means of fortifying his own power base. Under his one-party system, the scramble became ever more frenetic, spawning corruption on a massive scale.

His self-belief grew into a monstrous ego. Surrounded by sycophants, he knew few restraints. Only his first wife, Sally, managed to exert a calming influence on his ambition and anger. After her death in 1992 he became increasingly detached from reality. His destiny, he believed, was to rule for as long as he wanted.

The shock of his defeat in the referendum in 2000 was thus all the more profound. His reaction was to resort to the methods that had served him so well in the past: violence and intimidation. White farmers became his most immediate target, subjected to months of terror tactics. In a bid to whip up popular support, he also unleashed a torrent of racist abuse against the entire white community, displaying an innate fear and loathing of whites in general. Although most blacks ignored such incitement, Mugabe's followers took their cue from it, confident that acting in a hostile and aggressive manner towards white victims was part of official policy.

Mugabe's ultimate objective, however, was to destroy all opposition to his regime. Determined to remain in power, he used all the resources of the government to attack his opponents, sanctioning murder, torture, and lawlessness of every kind. "No matter what force you have, this is my territory and that which is mine I cling [to] unto death," he said in 2001.

The cost of this strategy has been enormous. Zimbabwe has been reduced to a bankrupt and impoverished state, threatened by economic collapse and catastrophic food shortages. But the impact goes even deeper. Looking to the future, Catholic bishops, in their pastoral letter at Easter 2007, warned of the effect of Mugabe's regime on the next generation. "If our young people see their leaders habitually engaging in acts and words which are hateful, disrespectful, racist, corrupt, lawless, unjust, greedy, dishonest, and violent in order to cling to the privileges of power and wealth, it is highly likely that many of them will behave in exacdy the same manner. The consequences of such overtly corrupt leadership as we are witnessing in Zimbabwe today will be with us for many years, perhaps decades, to come."

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander, Jocelyn. "Dissident Perspectives in Zimbabwe's Post-Independence War." Africa 68 no. 2 (1998): pp 151-182.

. The Unsettled Land: State-making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893-2003. Oxford: James Currey, 2006.

Alexander, Jocelyn, JoAnn McGregor, and Terence Ranger. Violence and Memory; One Hundred Years in the "Dark Forests" of Matabeleland. Oxford: Currey, 2000.

Astrow, Andre. Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost Its Way. London: Zed Press, 1983.

Auret, Diana. Reaching for Justice: The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1972-1992. Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1992.

Bhebe, Ngwabi, and Terence Ranger, eds. Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War. London: Currey, 1995.

. Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War. London: Currey, 1995.

Blair, David. Degrees in Violence: Robert Mugabe and the Struggle for Power in Zimbabwe. London: Continuum, 2002.

Buckle, Catherine. African Tears: The Zimbabwe Land Invasions. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2002.

. Beyond Tears: Zimbabwe's Tragedy. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball,

2002.

Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Legal Resources Foundation. Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980 to 1988. Harare, Zimbabwe: CCJP/LRF, 1997.

Caute, David. Under the Skin: The Death of White Rhodesia. London: Penguin, 1983.

Charlton, Michael. The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.

de Waal, Victor. The Politics of Reconciliation: Zimbabwe's First Decade. London: Hurst, 1990.

Flower, Ken. Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964-1981. London: Murray, 1987.

Godwin, Peter. Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa. London: Macmillan, 1996.

. When a Crocodile Eats the Sun. London: Picador, 2006.

Godwin, Peter, and Ian Hancock. Rhodesians Never Die: The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia, C1970-1980. London: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Herbst, Jeffrey. State Politics in Zimbabwe. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

Kriger, Norma J. "The Politics of Creating National Heroes: The Search for Political Legitimacy and National Identity." In Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger, eds., Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War. London: Currey, 1995.

. Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices. Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Lamb, Christina. House of Stone: A True Story of a Family Divided in War-Torn Zimbabwe. London: HarperPress, 2006.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. Zimbabwe: Wages of War. New York: LCHR, 1986.

Lessing, Doris. African Laughter. London: HarperCollins, 1982.

Lelyveld, Joseph. Move Your Shadow: South Africa Black and White. London: Joseph, 1986.

Linden, Ian. The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe. London: Longman, 1980.

Makumbe, John, and Daniel Compagnon. Behind the Smokescreen: The Politics of Zimbabwe's 1995 General Elections. Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 2000.

Mandaza, Ibbo, ed. Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-86. Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 1986.

Mandaza, Ibbo, and Lloyd M. Sachikonye, eds. The One-Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate. Harare, Zimbabwe: Sapes Trust, 1991.

Martin, David, and Phyllis Johnson. The Struggle for Zimbabwe. London: Faber, 1981.

McLaughlin, Janice. On the Frontline: Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe s Liberation War. Harare, Zimbabwe: Baobab Books, 1996.

Meldrum, Andrew. Where We Have Hope: A Memoir of Zimbabwe. London: John Murray, 2004.

Meredith, Martin. The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence. New York: PublicAffairs, 2005.

. The Past Is Another Country: Rhodesia, UDI to Zimbabwe. London:

Pan, 1980.

Moyo, Jonathan N. Voting for Democracy: A Study of Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe. Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 1992.

Mugabe, Robert. Our War of Liberation: Speeches, Articles, Interviews, 19^6-1^9. Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1983.

Mutasa, Didymus. Black Behind Bars: Rhodesia, 1959-1974. Harare, Zimbabwe: Longman, 1983.

Ncube, Welshman. "Constitutionalism, Democracy and Political Practice in Zimbabwe." In Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd M. Sachikonye, eds., The One-Party State and Democracy. Harare, Zimbabwe: Sapes Trust, 1991.

Nkomo, Joshua. The Story of My Life. London: Methuen, 1984.

Nyagumbo, Maurice. With the People. Salisbury, Rhodesia: Graham Publishing, 1980.

Palmer, Robin. Land & Racial Discrimination in Rhodesia. London: Heine-mann, 1977.

Ranger, Terence. Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe. London: Currey, 1985.

Shamuyarira, Nathan. Crisis in Rhodesia. London: Deutsch, 1965.

Sithole, Masipula. Zimbabwe: Struggles Within the Struggle, 1957-1980. Harare, Zimbabwe: Rujeko, 1999.

Smith, David, and Colin Simpson. Mugabe. London: Sphere, 1981.

Smith, Ian. The Great Betrayal. London: Blake, 1997.

Stiff, Peter. Cry Zimbabwe: Independence — Twenty Years On. Johannesburg, South Africa: Galago, 2000.

Stoneman, Colin. Zimbabwe s Prospects: Issues of Race, Class, State and Capital in Southern Africa. London: Macmillan, 1988.

Stoneman, Colin, and Lionel Cliffe. Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society. London: Pinter, 1990.

248 Select Bibliography

Vambe, Lawrence. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. London: Heinemann, 1976.

. An Ill-Fated People: Zimbabwe before and after Rhodes. London:

Heinemann, 1972.

Verrier, Anthony. The Road to Zimbabwe, 1890-1980. London: Cape, 1986.

Werbner, Richard P. "In Memory: A Heritage of War in Southwestern Zimbabwe." In Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger, eds., Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War. London: Currey, 1995.

. Tears of the Dead. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991.

Zimbabwe Human Rights Association. Choosing the Path to Peace and Development: Coming to Terms with Human Rights Violations of the 1982-87 Conflict in Matabeleland and Midlands Province. Harare, Zimbabwe: ZHRA, 1999.

Abuja agreement, 222

African National Congress (ANC),

24-25 AHT. See Air Harbour

Technologies Air Harbour Technologies (AHT),

98-99 Air Zimbabwe, 85 Amani Trust, 183 Amnesty International, 73 ANC. See African National

Congress Andoche, Julius, 173-174 Aquina, Sister Mary, 4-5, 118 Ascot Farm, 62-63 Auret, Mike, 154, 188 Bango, Chief Ngugana, 70 Barkley, Anthony, 219 Bennett, Roy, 178-179, 188 Bhalagwe, 70 Blackie, Fergus, 232 Blair, Tony, 158,227,229 Boka, Roger, 102-104, 129

Boyland, Malcolm, 211-212 Bradshaw, Tony, 35 Bredenkamp, John, 149 Britain, 26-28, 35-36, 46-47

colonialism, 1, 19-20, 113

and elections, 10-13, 227,

229

land invasions, 170-171

land resettlement, 119, 122,

127, 139, 164

peace conferences, 6-8, 38,

118-120,243

withdrawal of support for

Mugabe, 157 British South Africa Company, 19 Buckle, Cathy, 167-168, 171,

176-177, 182, 184, 196-197 Buckley, Jim, 14 Bulawayo, Bishop of, 70 Burl, Alan, 124 Capital Radio, 199 Care International, 214 Carrington, Lord, 8

Index

Catholic Justice and Peace

Commission, 118, 145

and atrocities, 1, 5-6, 67-68,

71,74

the land issue, 122, 125 Catholics

land acquisition, 112-113

and Mugabe, 4-5, 19-20, 68,

70, 108

protest, 18