On Divine Providence

Providence is nothing else than the striving which we find in the whole of Nature and in individual things to maintain and preserve their own existence. For it is manifest that no thing could, through its own nature, seek its own annihilation, but, on the contrary, that every thing has in itself a striving to preserve its condition, and to improve itself. Following these definitions of ours we, therefore, posit a general and a special providence. The general [providence] is that through which all things are produced and sustained in so far as they are parts of the whole of Nature. The special providence is the striving of each thing separately to preserve its existence [each thing, that is to say], considered not as a part of Nature, but as a whole [by itself]. This is explained by the following example: All the limbs of man are provided for, and cared for, in so far as they are parts of man, this is general providence; while special [providence] is the striving of each separate limb (as a whole in itself, and not as a part of man) to preserve and maintain its own well-being.

1. God cannot omit to do what He does; He has, namely, made everything so perfect that it cannot be more perfect.

2. And, at the same time, without Him no thing can be, or be conceived.

Against all this others object: how is it possible that God, who is said to be supremely perfect, and the sole cause, disposer, and provider of all, nevertheless permits such confusion to be seen everywhere in Nature? Also, why has He not made man so as not to be able to sin?

Now, in the first place, it cannot be rightly said that there is confusion in Nature, since nobody knows all the causes of things so as to be able to judge accordingly. This objection, however, originates in this kind of ignorance, namely, that they have set up general Ideas, with which, they think, particular things must agree if they are to be perfect. These Ideas, they state, are in the understanding of God, as many of Plato’s followers have said, namely, that these general Ideas (such as Rational, Animal, and the like) have been created by God; and although those who follow Aristotle say, indeed, that these things are not real things, only things of the mind, they nevertheless regard them frequently as [real] things, since they have clearly said that His providence does not extend to particular things, but only to kinds; for example, God has never exercised His providence over Bucephalus, etc., but only over the whole genus Horse. They say also that God has no knowledge of particular and transient things, but only of the general, which, in their opinion, are imperishable. We have, however, rightly considered this to be due to their ignorance. For it is precisely the particular things, and they alone, that have a cause, and not the general, because they are nothing.

God then is the cause of, and providence over, particular things only. If particular things had to conform to some other Nature, then they could not conform to their own, and consequently could not be what they truly are. For example, if God had made all human beings like Adam before the fall, then indeed He would only have created Adam, and no Paul or Peter; but no, it is just perfection in God, that He gives to all things, from the greatest to the least, their essence, or, to express it better, that He has all things perfectly in himself.

As regards the other [objection], why God has not made mankind so that they should not sin, to this it may serve [as an answer], that whatever is said about sin is only said with reference to us, that is, as when we compare two things with each other, or [consider one thing] from different points of view. For instance, if some one has made a clock precisely in order to strike and to show the hours, and the mechanism quite fulfills the aims of its maker, then we say that it is good, but if it does not do so, then we say that it is bad, nothwithstanding that even then it might still be good if only it had been His intention to make it irregular and to strike at wrong times.

We say then, in conclusion, that Peter must, as is necessary, conform to the Idea of Peter, and not to the Idea of Man; good and evil, or sin, these are only modes of thought, and by no means real, or any thing that has reality, as we shall very likely show yet more fully in what follows. For all things and works which are in Nature are perfect.