I shall say nothing about the definition of this Science, nor about its subject matter. My intention here is only to explain matters that are rather obscure and are commonly treated by writers on metaphysics.
[Definition of Being.] Let us begin, then, with Being, by which I understand ‘Everything which, when it is clearly and distinctly perceived, we find to exist necessarily or at least possibly.’
[The Chimera, the Fictitious Being and the Being of Reason are not beings.] From this definition, or, if you prefer, description, it follows that a Chimera, a Fictitious Being and a Being of Reason can in no way be classed as beings. For a Chimera, of its own nature, cannot exist. (N.B. By the term ‘Chimera’, here and in what follows, is to be understood that whose nature involves open contradiction, as is more fully explained in Chapter 3.) A Fictitious Being excludes clear and distinct perception, because a man merely according to his fancy—and not unknowingly, as in the case of the false, but knowingly and wittingly—joins together what he wants to join and separates what he wants to separate. Finally, a Being of Reason is nothing but a mode of thinking, which serves the more easily to retain, explain, and imagine things that are understood. Here it should be noted that by a mode of thinking we understand, as we explained in Schol. Prop. 15 Part 1, all modifications of thought, such as intellect, joy, imagination, etc.
[By what modes of thinking we retain things.] That there are certain modes of thinking that serve to retain things more firmly and more easily, and, when we wish, to recall them to mind or to set them before the mind, is an accepted fact for all those who make use of that well-known rule of memory. By this rule, in order to retain something that is quite new and impress it on the memory, we have recourse to another thing, familiar to us, that has something in common with it either in name or in actuality. Similarly, philosophers have arranged all natural things in fixed classes, to which they have recourse when they encounter something new. These classes they call genus, species, etc.
[By what modes of thinking we explicate things.] Again, we have modes of thinking for explicating a thing by determining it in comparison with another thing. The modes of thinking by which we do this are called time, number, measure, and such others as there are. Of these, time serves to explicate duration, number (discrete quantity), and measure (continuous quantity).
[By what modes of thinking we imagine things.] Finally, because we are also accustomed to depict in our fantasy images of all the things that we understand, it comes about that we imagine nonbeings positively as beings. For the mind, considered only in itself, because it is a thinking thing, has no greater power to affirm than to deny. But because to imagine is nothing other than to sense those traces found in the brain from the motion of the spirits, which is excited in the senses by objects, such a sensing can only be a confused affirmation. Hence it comes about that we imagine as beings all the modes that the mind uses to negate, such as blindness, extremity or limit, boundary, and darkness.
[Why beings of reason are not ideas of things, and yet are taken to be such.] Hence it is evident that these modes of thinking are not ideas of things and can in no way be classed as ideas. So they also have no object (ideatum) that exists of necessity or that can exist. The reason why these modes of thinking are taken for ideas of things is that they originate and arise so immediately from real beings that they are easily confused with them by those who do not pay careful attention. Hence they have even given them names as if to signify beings existing outside our mind; and these beings, or rather nonbeings, they have called beings of reason.
[Being is wrongly divided into Real Being and Being of Reason.] And so it is easy to see how absurd is that division whereby being is divided into real being and being of reason, for they are dividing being into being and nonbeing, or into being and a mode of thinking. Still, I am not surprised that verbal or grammatical philosophers fall into errors like these, for they judge things from words, not words from things.
[In what way a Being of Reason can be termed a mere nothing, and in what way it may be termed Real Being.] No less absurdly does he speak who says that a being of reason is not a mere nothing. For if he seeks outside the intellect what is meant by those words, he will find it is mere nothing, whereas if he understands them as modes of thinking, they are true real beings. For when I ask what is species, I am only enquiring into the nature of that mode of thinking that is in fact a being and is distinct from another mode of thinking. However, these modes of thinking cannot be termed ideas nor can they be said to be true or false, just as love cannot be called true or false, but only good or bad. So when Plato said that man is a featherless biped creature,2 he erred no more than those who said that man is a rational creature. For Plato knew no less than others that man is a rational creature, but he referred man to a certain class so that, when he wanted to think about man, by having recourse to the class that was easy for him to remember, he could immediately come to think of man. Indeed, it was Aristotle who was gravely at fault if he thought that by that definition of his he had adequately explained human essence. As to whether Plato was right, that is another question; but this is not the place for these matters.
[In the investigation of things Real Beings should not be confused with Beings of Reason.] From all that has been said already, it is obvious that there is no agreement between real being and the objects (ideata) of a being of reason. Hence it is also easy to see how carefully, in our investigation of things, we must beware of confusing real beings with beings of reason. For it is one thing to enquire into the nature of things, and quite another to enquire into the modes by which we perceive things. If these are confused, we shall not be able to understand either modes of perceiving or nature itself. Indeed—and this is a point of greatest importance—it will be the cause of our falling into grave errors, as has happened to many before us.
[How a Being of Reason and Fictitious Being are to be distinguished.] It should also be noted that many people confuse a being of reason with a fictitious being, for they think that a fictitious being is also a being of reason because it has no existence outside the mind. But if attention is correctly paid to the definitions just given of being of reason and fictitious being, a considerable difference will be found between them both from consideration of their cause and also from their own nature without regard to cause. For we defined fictitious being as the connecting of two terms by mere act of will without any guidance of reason, and therefore a fictitious being can chance to be true. But a being of reason neither depends solely on the will nor does it consist of any terms joined together, as is quite obvious from the definition. So if someone asks whether a fictitious being is a real being or a being of reason, we should reply by repeating what we have just said, namely, that to divide being into real being and being of reason is a mistake, and so the question as to whether fictitious being is real being or being of reason is based on error. For it presupposes that all being is divided into real being and being of reason.
[The division of Being.] But let us return to our theme, from which we now seem to have digressed somewhat. From the definition, or, if you prefer, the description of being already given, it is easy to see that being should be divided into being that exists necessarily of its own nature (i.e., whose essence involves existence) and being whose essence involves only possible existence. This last is divided into Substance and Mode, whose definitions are given in Arts. 51, 52, and 56 of Part 1 Princ. Philosoph.; so it is not necessary to repeat them here. But concerning this division I want only this to be noted, that we expressly say that being is divided into Substance and Mode, not Substance and Accident. For Accident is nothing more than a mode of thinking, inasmuch as it denotes only a relation [respectum]. For example, when I say that a triangle moves, motion is not a mode of the triangle, but of the body that moves. So motion is called accident in relation to the triangle, whereas in relation to body it is a real being or mode. For motion cannot be conceived without body, though it can without a triangle.
Furthermore, for the better understanding of what has already been said and also of what is to come, we shall try to explain what it is that should be understood by the terms ‘essence’, ‘existence’, ‘idea’, and ‘potency’. In so doing we are also motivated by the ignorance of some people who do not recognize any distinction between essence and existence, or, if they do recognize it, they confuse what essence is with what idea is or what potency is. So for their sake and the sake of truth, we shall explain the matter as distinctly as possible in what follows.
So that one may clearly grasp what should be understood by these four terms, it is only necessary to reflect upon what we have said about uncreated substance or God, to wit:
[Creatures are in God eminently.] 1. God contains eminently what is to be found formally in created things; that is, God possesses attributes of such a kind that in them are contained in a more eminent way all created things. See Part 1 Ax. 8 and Cor. 1 Prop. 12. For example, we clearly conceive extension without any existence, and so, because it has of itself no force to exist, we have demonstrated that it is created by God (last Prop. of Part 1.) And because there must be at least as much perfection in the cause as in the effect, it follows that all the perfections of extension are in God. But because we then saw that an extended thing is of its own nature divisible, that is, it contains imperfection, we therefore could not attribute extension to God (Prop. 16 Part 1), and so we were compelled to take the view that there is an attribute in God that contains in a more excellent way all the perfections of matter (Schol. Prop. 9 Part 1) and that can fulfil the role of matter.
2. God understands himself and all other things, too; that is, he also has in himself all things in the form of thought (Prop. 9 Part 1).
3. God is the cause of all things, and he acts from absolute freedom of will.
[What Essence is, what Existence is, what Idea is, what Potency is.] From this, therefore, it can clearly be seen what must be understood by those four things. First, that which is essence is nothing other than the way in which created things are comprehended in the attributes of God. That which is idea refers to the manner in which all things are contained in the idea of God in the form of thought. That which is potency has reference only to the potency of God, whereby from absolute freedom of will he could have created all things not already existing. Finally, that which is existence is the essence of things outside God when considered in itself and is attributed to things after they have been created by God.
[These four are distinguished from one another only in creatures.] From this it is evident that these four are distinguished from one another only in created things, but not at all in God. For we do not conceive God to have been in potency in another thing, and his existence and his intellect are not distinguished from his essence.
[A reply to certain questions concerning Essence.] From this we can readily reply to the questions that are commonly raised regarding essence. These questions are as follows: whether essence is distinct from existence; if so, whether it is something different from idea, and if that is the case, whether it has any being outside the intellect. To this last question we must surely give assent. Now to the first question we reply by making this distinction, that in God essence is not distinct from existence, because the former cannot be conceived without the latter, but that in other things essence differs from existence, seeing that it can be conceived without existence. To the second question we say that a thing that is clearly and distinctly (i.e., truly) conceived outside the intellect is something different from an idea. But then there is the further question as to whether this being outside the intellect is self-generated or whether it is created by God. To this we reply that formal essence is not self-generated nor again is it created—for both of these would presuppose that it is a thing existing in actuality—but it depends on the divine essence alone, in which all things are contained. And so in this sense we agree with those who say that the essences of things are eternal. It could still be asked how we, not yet understanding the nature of God, understand the essences of things, because they depend on the nature of God alone, as we have just said. In reply I say that this arises from the fact that things are already created. If they had not been created, I would entirely agree that it would be impossible to understand them except after an adequate knowledge of the nature of God, just as it is impossible—indeed, even less possible—to know the nature of the coordinates of a parabola without yet knowing the nature of a parabola.
[Why in his definition of essence the Author has recourse to the attributes of God.] Furthermore, it should be noted that although the essences of nonexisting modes are comprehended in their substances, and that which is their essence is in their substances, we have nevertheless chosen to have recourse to God so as to give a general explanation of the essence of modes and substances. Another reason for this procedure is that the essence of modes has been in their substances only since the creation of the substances, and what we were seeking was the eternal being of essences.
[Why the Author has not reviewed the definitions of others.] In this connection I do not think it worthwhile to refute those writers whose views differ from ours, nor again to examine their definitions or descriptions of essence and existence; for we would thus be obscuring what is clear. What can be clearer than our understanding of what essence is and what existence is, seeing that we cannot give the definition of anything without at the same time explaining its essence?
[How the distinction between essence and existence is easily learned.] Finally, if any philosopher still doubts whether essence is distinguished from existence in created things, he need not toil away over definitions of essence and existence in order to remove that doubt. For if he merely approaches a sculptor or a woodcarver, they will show him how they conceive in set order a nonexistent statue and thereafter bring it into existence for him.
[What is here to be understood by affections.] Now that the nature of being, insofar as it is being, has been explained, we pass on to the explanation of some of its affections. It should be noted that by affections we here understand what elsewhere, in Art. 52 Part 1 Princ. Philosoph., Descartes has termed attributes. For being, insofar as it is being, does not affect us through itself alone, as substance, and has therefore to be explained through some attribute, from which, however, it is distinguished only by reason. Hence I cannot sufficiently wonder at the subtlety of mind of those who have sought, not without great harm to truth, something that is between being and nothing. But I shall waste no time in refuting their error, because they themselves, in struggling to provide definitions of such affections, disappear from sight in their own vain subtlety.
[Definition of affections.] We shall therefore continue on our way, and we say that the affections of being are certain attributes under which we understand the essence or existence of each individual thing, although these attributes are distinguished from the thing only by reason. I shall here attempt to explain some of these affections (for I do not undertake to deal with them all) and to set them apart from those designations that are not affections of any being. And in the first place I shall deal with the Necessary and the Impossible.
[In how many ways a thing is said to be necessary or impossible.] There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary or impossible, either with respect to its essence or with respect to its cause. With respect to essence we know that God necessarily exists, for his essence cannot be conceived without existence; whereas, with respect to the contradiction involved in its essence, a chimera is incapable of existence. With respect to cause, things (e.g., material things) are said to be either impossible or necessary. For if we have regard only to their essence, we can conceive that clearly and distinctly without existence; therefore they can never exist through the force and necessity of their essence, but only through the force of their cause, God, the creator of all things. So if it is in the divine decree that a thing should exist, it will necessarily exist; if not, it will be impossible for it to exist. For it is self-evident that if a thing has no cause for existence—either an internal or an external cause—it is impossible for it to exist. Now in this second hypothesis a thing is supposed to be such that it cannot exist either by force of its own essence—which I understand to be an internal cause—or by force of the divine decree, the unique external cause of all things. Hence it follows that it is impossible for things, as we suppose them to be in the second hypothesis, to exist.
[A Chimera is properly called a verbal being.] Here it should be noted that: 1. Because a chimera is neither in the intellect nor in the imagination, we may properly call it a verbal being, for it can be expressed only in words. For example, we can express a square circle in words, but we cannot in any way imagine it, far less understand it. Therefore a chimera is nothing but a word; and so impossibility cannot be counted among the affections of being, for it is mere negation.
[Created things depend on God for their essence and existence.] 2. Not only the existence of created things but also, as we shall later on demonstrate with the greatest certainty in Part 2, their essence and their nature depend solely on God’s decree. Hence it clearly follows that created things have no necessity of themselves; for they have no essence of themselves, nor do they exist of themselves.
[The necessity that is in created things from their cause is either of essence or of existence; but these two are not distinguished in God.] 3. Finally, the necessity such as is in created things by virtue of their cause is so called either with respect to their essence or with respect to their existence; for these two are distinct in created things, the former depending on the eternal laws of nature, the latter on the series and order of causes. But in God, whose essence is not distinguished from his existence, the necessity of essence is likewise not distinguished from the necessity of existence. Hence it follows that if we were to conceive the entire order of nature, we should find that many things whose nature we clearly and distinctly perceive—that is, whose essence is necessarily such as it is—could in no way exist. For we should find that the existence of such things in nature is just as much impossible as we now see it to be impossible that a huge elephant should pass through the eye of a needle, although we clearly perceive the nature of both. Hence the existence of those things would be only a chimera, which we could neither imagine nor understand.
[The Possible and the Contingent are not affections of things.] So much for necessity and impossibility, to which I have thought it advisable to add a few remarks concerning the possible and the contingent. For these two are regarded by some as affections of things, whereas they are in fact nothing but a failure of our intellect, as I shall clearly show when I explain what is to be understood by these two terms.
[What is the Possible, and what the Contingent.] A thing is said to be possible when we understand its efficient cause but do not know whether the cause is determined. Hence we can also consider it as possible, but not as either necessary or impossible. But if we attend simply to the essence of the thing and not to its cause, we shall call the thing contingent; that is, we shall consider it as midway between God and a chimera, so to speak, because on the side of essence we find in it no necessity to exist, as in the case of the divine essence, nor again any inconsistency or impossibility, as in the case of a chimera. Now if anyone wishes to call contingent what I call possible, or possible what I call contingent, I shall not oppose him, for it is not my custom to argue about words. It will be enough if he grants us that these two are only the defect of our perception, and not anything real.
[The Possible and the Contingent are only the defect of our intellect.] If anyone wishes to deny this, his error can be demonstrated to him with no trouble. For if he attends to nature and the way it depends on God, he will find nothing contingent in things, that is, nothing that can either exist or not exist on the part of the thing, or is a real contingency, as it is commonly called. This is readily apparent from our teaching in Axiom 10 Part 1, to wit, that the same force is required in creating a thing as in preserving it. So no created thing affects anything by its own force, just as no created thing began to exist by its own force. From this it follows that nothing happens except by the power of the all-creating cause—that is, God—who by his concurrence at every moment continues to create all things. Now because nothing happens except by the divine power alone, it is easy to see that those things that happen do so by the force of God’s decree and will. But because there is in God no inconstancy or variability (by Prop. 18 and Cor. Prop. 20 Part 1), he must have resolved from eternity to produce those things that he is now producing. And because nothing has a more necessary existence than that which God has decreed should exist, it follows that the necessity to exist has been from eternity in all created things. Nor can we say that those things are contingent because God could have decreed otherwise. For because in eternity there is no when or before or after or any affection of time, it follows that God never existed prior to those decrees so as to be able to decree otherwise.3
[To reconcile the freedom of our will with God’s predestination surpasses human understanding.] As to the freedom of the human will, which we asserted to be free in Schol. Prop. 15 Part 1, this too is preserved by the concurrence of God, nor does any man will or perform anything except what God has decreed from eternity that he should will or perform. How this can be while saving human freedom is beyond our capacity to understand. Yet we must not reject what we clearly perceive because of what we do not know, for if we attend to our nature, we clearly and distinctly understand that we are free in our actions, and that we reach decisions on many things simply on account of our will to do so. Again, if we attend to the nature of God, as we have just shown, we clearly and distinctly perceive that all things depend on him, and that nothing exists except that whose existence God has decreed from eternity. But how the human will continues to be created by God at every moment in such a way as to remain free, we do not know. For there are many things that exceed our grasp and that nevertheless we know to have been brought about by God—for example, the real division of matter into indefinite particles, clearly demonstrated by us in Prop. 11 Part 2, although we do not know how that division comes about.
Note that we here take for granted that those two notions, the possible and the contingent, signify merely the defectiveness of our knowledge regarding the existence of a thing.
[What is Eternity, Duration, and Time.] From our previous division of being into being whose essence involves existence and being whose essence involves only possible existence, there arises the distinction between eternity and duration. Of eternity we shall speak later at greater length. Here we say only that it is the attribute under which we conceive the infinite existence of God. Duration is the attribute under which we conceive the existence of created things, insofar as they persevere in their actuality. From this it clearly follows that duration is distinguished only by reason from the total existence of a thing. For as much as you take away from the duration of a thing, so much you necessarily take away from its existence. Now in order that duration may be determined, we compare it with the duration of other things that have a fixed and determinate motion, and this comparison is called time. Therefore time is not an affection of things, but a mere mode of thinking, or, as we have previously called it, a being of reason; for it is a mode of thinking serving to explicate duration. Here with regard to duration we should note something that will be useful to us later when we speak about eternity, to wit, that it is conceived as longer and shorter and as if composed of parts, and, secondly, that it is an attribute of existence only, not of essence.
[What are Opposition, Order, Agreement, Difference, Subject, Adjunct, etc.] From our comparing things with one another there arise certain notions that are nevertheless nothing outside things themselves but modes of thinking. This is shown by the fact that if we wish to consider them as things having a place outside thought, we immediately render confused the otherwise clear conception we have of them. Such notions are opposition, order, agreement, difference, subject, adjunct, and any others like these. These notions, I say, are quite clearly perceived by us insofar as we conceive them not as something different from the essences of the things that are opposed, ordered, etc., but merely as modes of thinking whereby we more easily retain or imagine the things themselves. I therefore do not consider it necessary to speak of them at greater length, but pass on to the terms commonly called transcendental.
These terms are considered by almost all metaphysicians as the most general affections of being; for they say that every being is one, true and good even though this may not be in anyone’s thought. But we shall see what is to be understood regarding these terms when we examine each of them separately.
[What Unity is.] Let us begin, then, with the first, to wit, the one. They say that this term signifies something real outside the intellect. But they cannot explain what this adds to being, and this is a clear indication that they are confusing beings of reason with real being and are thereby rendering confused that which they clearly understand. But we on our part say that unity is in no way distinct from the thing itself or additional to being and is merely a mode of thinking whereby we separate a thing from other things that are similar to it or agree with it in some respect.
[What plurality is, and in what respect God can be called one, and in what respect unique.] The opposite of unity is plurality, which likewise obviously adds nothing to things, nor is it anything but a mode of thinking, just as we clearly and distinctly understand. Nor do I see what more remains to be said regarding a thing so clear, except that here it should be noted that, insofar as we separate God from other beings, he can be said to be one; but insofar as we conceive that there cannot be more than one of the same nature, he is called unique. In truth, if we wished to look into the matter more rigorously, we might perhaps show that God is only improperly called one and unique. But this question is of little importance—indeed, it is of no importance—to those who are concerned with things rather than words. Therefore we leave this and pass on to the second term, at the same time explaining what the false is.
[What is the true and what the false, both in the common acceptance and according to philosophers.] In order that these two, the true and the false, may be correctly perceived, we shall begin with the meaning of words, from which it will be evident that these are only the extrinsic marks of things, and it is only figuratively that they are attributed to things. But because it is the common people who first invent words that are then used by philosophers, it seems relevant for one who seeks the original meaning of a word to enquire what it first denoted among common people, especially when other causes, which might have been derived from the nature of language, are not available for the investigation. The first meaning of true and false seems to have had its origin in storytelling, and the tale was said to be true if it was of something that had occurred in actuality, and false if it was of something that had nowhere occurred. Later, philosophers made use of this signification to denote the agreement or disagreement of an idea with its object (ideatum). Therefore an idea is said to be true if it shows us the thing as it is in itself, false if it shows us the thing otherwise than as it really is. For ideas are merely mental narrations or accounts of nature. And hence these terms came to be applied metaphorically to lifeless things, as when we talk about true or false gold, as if the gold presented before us were telling us something about itself that either is in itself or not.
[The true is not a transcendental term.] Therefore those who have held that ‘the true’ is a transcendental term or an affection of being are quite wrong. For this term can be applied to things themselves only improperly, or if you prefer, figuratively.
[The difference between truth and a true idea.] If you go on to ask what is truth other than a true idea, ask also what is whiteness other than a white body. For the relationship is the same in both cases.
We have already discussed the cause of the true and the cause of the false. So now there remains nothing to be noted, nor would it have been worthwhile noting even what we have said if writers had not so tied themselves up in trifles like these that they could not then extricate themselves, always looking for a difficulty where there is none.
[What are the properties of truth? Certainty is not in things.] The properties of truth, or a true idea, are (1) that it is clear and distinct, (2) that it removes all doubt, or, in a word, that it is certain. Those who look for certainty in things themselves are making the same mistake as when they look for truth in things themselves. And although we may say that a thing is uncertain, we are figuratively taking the ideatum for the idea. In the same way we also call a thing doubtful, unless perchance in this case by uncertainty we mean contingency, or a thing that causes us uncertainty or doubt. There is no need to spend more time on these matters, and so we shall proceed to the third term, at the same time explaining what is to be understood by its contrary.
[Good and Bad are only relative terms.] A thing is not said to be either good or bad when considered in isolation, but only in relation to another thing for which it is useful in gaining what that thing loves, or contrariwise. Thus each single thing can be called good or bad at the same time in different respects. For example, the counsel that Achitophel gave to Absalom is called good in Holy Scripture, but it was very bad for David, being contrived for his death.4 And many other things are good, which are not good for all. Thus salvation is good for men, but neither good nor bad for animals or plants, for which it has no relevance. God indeed is said to be supremely good because he benefits all, by his concurrence preserving the being of each individual, than which nothing is more desirable. But no absolute evil exists, as is self-evident.
[Why some have maintained that there is a metaphysical good.] But those who keep seeking some metaphysical good not qualified by any relation are laboring under a misapprehension, in that they are confusing a distinction of reason with a real or modal distinction. For they are making a distinction between the thing itself and the conatus [striving] to preserve its own being, which every thing possesses, although they do not know what they mean by conatus. For although the thing and its conatus are distinguished by reason, or rather, by words (and this is the main cause of their error), the two are in no way distinct from one another in reality.
[The distinction between things and the conatus by which they endeavor to persevere in their state.] That this may be clearly understood, we shall take an example of a very simple kind. Motion has force to persevere in its own state. This force is surely nothing else than motion itself, the fact that the nature of motion is such as it is. For if I say that in this body A there is nothing else than a certain quantity of motion, from this it clearly follows that, as long as I am attending to the body A, I must always say that the body is moving. For if I were to say that it is losing its force of motion, I am necessarily ascribing to it something else beyond what we supposed in the hypothesis, something that is causing it to lose its nature. Now if this reasoning seems rather obscure, then let us grant that this conatus to motion is something other than the very laws and nature of motion. Because, then, you suppose this conatus to be a metaphysical good, this conatus will also necessarily have a conatus to persevere in its own being, and this again another conatus, and so ad infinitum. I cannot imagine anything more absurd than this. Now the reason why they make a distinction between the conatus of a thing and the thing itself is that they feel in themselves a wanting to preserve themselves, and they imagine a similar wanting in each individual thing.
[Whether God can be called good before things were created.] However, the question is raised as to whether God could be called good before he created things; and it seems to follow from our definition that God did not possess any such attribute because we say that a thing considered in itself alone cannot be called either good or bad. Many will think this absurd, but why I do not know. We attribute to God many attributes of this kind that did not belong to him, except potentially, before things were created, as when he is called creator, judge, merciful, etc. Therefore arguments like this ought not to be a hindrance to us.
[How perfection may be ascribed in a relative way, and how it may be ascribed absolutely.] Furthermore, just as good and bad are only relative terms, so too is perfection, except when we take perfection to mean the very essence of a thing. It is in this sense that we previously said that God possesses infinite perfection, that is, infinite essence or infinite being.
It is not my intention to go farther into these matters. The rest of what concerns the general part of Metaphysics I believe to be sufficiently well known, and therefore not worthwhile pursuing any farther.
1 [The end and purpose of this Part is to show that ordinary Logic and Philosophy serve only to exercise and strengthen the memory, enabling us to keep in mind things that are presented to us through the senses at random, without order or connection, and insofar as we can be affected by them only through the senses; but they do not serve to exercise the intellect.—P.B.]
2 [See Plato, Statesman, 266e.]
3 [In order that this proof may be well understood, attention should be given to what is indicated in the second part of the Appendix concerning the will of God, to wit, that God’s will or constant decree is understood only when we conceive the thing clearly and distinctly. For the essence of the thing, considered in itself, is nothing other than God’s decree, or his determinate will. But we are also saying that the necessity of existence is no different from the necessity of essence (Chapter 9 of Part 2); that is, when we say that God has decreed that the triangle should exist, we are saying nothing other than that God has so arranged the order of nature and of causes that the triangle should necessarily exist at a particular time. So if we were to understand the order of causes as established by God, we should find that the triangle must exist at a particular time with the same necessity as we now find, when we attend to the triangle’s nature, that its three angles are equal to two right angles.—P.B.]
4 [2 Samuel 17:14.]