[1] Now that the fundamental laws of both kinds of aristocratic government have been explained in detail, it remains for us to enquire whether by reason of any discernible fault they are liable to disintegrate or change into a different form. The primary reason why states of this kind disintegrate is the one noted by that acute Florentine in his Book 3 on Livy, Discourse 1, where he says, “A state, like the human body, has every day something added to it which some time or another needs to be put right.”1 It is therefore necessary, he continues, that occasionally something should occur to bring the state back to the original principle on which it was first established. If this does not happen in due time, its defects will develop to such an extent that they cannot be removed without destroying the state itself. And this restoration, he tells us, can come about either by chance or through the wisdom and forethought of the laws or of a man of singular virtue. We cannot doubt that this is a matter of the greatest importance, and where no provision has been made against this danger, the state will not be able to endure by its own strength, but only by good fortune. On the other hand, where a proper remedy has been applied to counter this evil, the state cannot collapse through any defect of its own, but only through some mischance that could not have been avoided, as I shall go on to explain more clearly. The first remedy suggested to meet this evil was as follows: Every five years a dictator with supreme powers was appointed for one or two months, having the right to make enquiry, judge, and pronounce upon the conduct of senators and all ministers, and thus to restore the state to its original basis. But he who seeks to obviate the troubles to which a state is liable should apply remedies that are in conformity with the nature of the state and follow from its basic laws; otherwise in his efforts to avoid Charybdis he will fall upon Scylla. It is indeed true that all men, both rulers and ruled, have to be restrained by fear of punishment or loss, lest they be permitted to do wrong with impunity or with profit. But on the other hand it is also a fact that if this fear is shared by good and bad alike, the state will inevitably find itself in great peril. So since dictatorial power2 is absolute, it is bound to be a terror to all, especially if, as is here required, there is a fixed time for a dictator to be appointed. For then every ambitious man would canvass for this office, and it is certainly true that in time of peace, virtue is not so much regarded as wealth, so that the more arrogant the man, the more likely he is to gain office. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Romans used to appoint a dictator not at any fixed time but under pressure of some chance emergency.3 Nevertheless, to quote Cicero’s words, “The distended status of a dictator was displeasing to good citizens.” And of course, since this dictatorial power is in essence regal, the state cannot occasionally turn into a monarchy, even for ever so short a time, without endangering its republican constitution. Furthermore, if no fixed time is assigned for the appointment of a dictator, no reckoning would be made of the time intervening between one dictator and another, though careful attention should be paid thereto, as we have said. Then again, the indefiniteness surrounding the whole business could easily result in its being overlooked. So unless this dictatorial power is permanent and firmly based, and thus of a kind that cannot be conferred on one man without destroying the form of the state, it will be very unsure, and consequently so will be the safety and preservation of the republic.
[2] But on the other hand we cannot possibly doubt (by Section 3, Chapter 6) that if it were feasible, while still preserving the form of the state, for the sword of the dictator to be permanent and fearsome only to the wicked, vices would never thrive to such a degree that they cannot be eradicated or corrected. So in order to secure all these conditions, we proposed the institution of a council of syndics subordinate to the supreme council with this in view, that the sword of the dictator should be permanently in the hands not of any natural person but of a civil body, whose members would be too many to make it possible to divide among themselves command of the state (Sections 1 and 2, Chapter 8) or to conspire together in any crime. In addition, they are debarred from undertaking any other offices of state, they are not the paymasters of the armed forces, and they are of such an age as to prefer present security to the dangers of innovation. Hence the state is in no danger from them, and consequently they cannot be a threat to the good but only to the wicked, and this in fact they will be. For as they are less in a position to commit crimes, so they are in a better position to suppress wickedness. For apart from the fact that they are well able to suppress its early manifestations4 (since their council is a permanent institution), they are also sufficiently numerous to venture to accuse and condemn this or that powerful figure without fear of incurring unpopularity, especially since voting is by secret ballot and judgment is pronounced in the name of the whole council.
[3] Now at Rome the tribunes of the people were also in continuous office.5 But they were not equal to the task of restraining the power of a Scipio; and furthermore, such measures as they thought salutary they were obliged to submit to the senate, who often frustrated their efforts by ensuring that the tribune from whom the senators had less to fear would be the one most in favour with the commons.6 In addition, the authority of the tribunes as against the patricians depended on the support of the commons, and whenever the tribunes summoned a meeting of the commons they appeared to be raising a revolt rather than convoking a council. Troubles of this kind, naturally, have no place in the state we have described in the last two Chapters.
[4] However, the authority of the syndics can effect only this, that the form of the state is preserved, thus ensuring that the laws are not broken and that no one is permitted to profit from transgression. But it will certainly not be able to prevent the proliferation of vices that cannot be forbidden by law, such as those to which men are prone when they have too much leisure and which not infrequently lead to the collapse of the state.7 For in time of peace men rid themselves of their fear, and from being fierce and savage they gradually become civilised or cultured, and from being cultured they become soft and sluggish, seeking to outdo one another not in virtue but in arrogance and extravagance. Hence they begin to despise the ways of their ancestors and to adopt foreign ways; that is, they begin to be slaves.8
[5] To prevent these evils, many attempts have been made to establish sumptuary laws, but in vain.9 For all laws that can be broken without injury to another become a laughingstock, and far from restraining the desires and lusts of men, they even stimulate them, because “we are ever eager for what is forbidden and desire what is denied.”10 Nor do idle men lack cleverness to evade laws enacted to deal with things that cannot be absolutely forbidden, such things as banquets, gaming, personal adornment, and so forth, which are bad only when excessive and should be be judged in relation to the individual’s fortune, and thus cannot be the subject of a general law.
[6] I therefore conclude that those vices that are prevalent in time of peace, and which we are now discussing, should never be directly prevented but only by indirect means, that is, by laying such a foundation to the state that most men—I won’t say will be eager to live wisely, for that is impossible—will be guided by such feelings as will conduce to the greater good of the commonwealth. So our chief objective should be this, that the wealthy, if they cannot be thrifty, should at any rate be eager for gain. For there is no doubt that if this love of gain, which is universal and constant, is nourished by desire for glory, most men will direct their main efforts to increasing their wealth by means that are not discreditable, so as to gain office and avoid utter disgrace.
[7] 11 Now if we examine the fundamental laws of both kinds of aristocracy as I have explained them in the last two chapters, we shall see that this very result follows from them. For in both of them the number of rulers is so large that most of the wealthy have access to the governing body and to office of state. And if it is furthermore ordained that patricians who become insolvent should be degraded from patrician rank, and those who have lost their possessions through misfortune should be restored to their former status (as I suggested in Section 47, Chapter 8), no doubt all will do their best to preserve their property. Moreover, they will never covet foreign style of dress nor disdain their native style if it is ordained by law that patricians and candidates for office are to be distinguished by a particular form of dress. For this, see Sections 25 and 47 of Chapter 8. And in each state additional measures can be devised that conform with the nature of its territory and the character of the people, always having as their main concern that subjects should do their duty willingly rather than under constraint of the law.
[8] For a state that looks only to govern men by fear will be one free from vice rather than endowed with virtue. Men should be governed in such a way that they do not think of themselves as being governed but as living as they please and by their own free will, so that their only restraint is love of freedom, desire to increase their property, and hope of attaining offices of state. As for statues, triumphal processions, and other incentives to virtue, these are symbols of servitude rather than of freedom;12 for it is slaves, not free men, who are assigned rewards for virtue. I do indeed admit that men are spurred on by such inducements, but whereas at first they were awarded to men of greatness, with the passage of time and the growth of jealousy they are granted to men of no account, exalted by their enormous wealth, to the great indignation of all good men. Then again, those who boast of their ancestors’ triumphs and statues think they suffer injustice if they are not granted precedence over others. Finally, to omit other considerations, this much is certain, that equality, the abandonment of which must entail the loss of general freedom, cannot possibly be preserved if extraordinary honours are conferred by public decree on some man who is renowned for his virtue.
[9] With these proposals in mind, let us now see whether states of this kind can be destroyed by some cause that might have been avoided. Now if any state can be everlasting, it must be one whose constitution, being once correctly established, remains inviolate. For the constitution is the soul of the state; if this is preserved, the state is preserved. But a constitution cannot stay intact unless it is upheld both by reason and by the common sentiment of the people; otherwise, if for instance laws are dependent solely on the support of reason, they are likely to be weak and easily overthrown.13 So since we have shown that the fundamental laws of both kinds of aristocracy are in conformity with reason and with the common sentiments of men, we can therefore affirm that, if any states can be everlasting, these will necessarily be so; that is to say, they cannot be destroyed by any avoidable cause, but only by some unavoidable fatality.
[10] But an objection can still be raised as follows, that although the constitutions set forth above may have the support of reason and the common sentiment of men, there are times when they can nevertheless be overthrown, for there is no emotion that is not sometimes overpowered by a stronger contrary emotion. We often see the fear of death, for instance, overpowered by greed for another’s property. Those who flee from the enemy in terror cannot be restrained by fear of some other danger; they hurl themselves into rivers or rush into flames to escape the enemy’s sword. So however well a commonwealth is organised and however good its constitution,14 yet when the state is in the grip of some crisis and everyone, as commonly happens, is seized with a kind of panic, they all pursue a course prompted only by their immediate fears with no regard for the future or the laws; all turn to the man who is renowned for his victories, they set him free from the laws,15 they extend his command—a very bad precedent—and entrust the entire commonwealth to his good faith. This was indeed the cause of the fall of the Roman state.16 But in reply to this objection I say, first, that in a properly organised commonwealth such a panic does not occur without good reason; and so this panic and the resulting confusion cannot be assigned to any cause that could have been avoided by human foresight. Next, it should be noted that in a commonwealth such as I have described above, it is impossible (Sections 9 and 25, Chapter 8) for any single man to attain such a high reputation as to become the centre of all eyes; he is bound to have several rivals who have strong support. So although widespread panic leads to some confusion in the commonwealth, no one will be able to evade the laws and appoint someone illegally to a military command without at once evoking the opposition of other17 candidates. To settle such a dispute it will finally be found necessary to have recourse to the constitution that was once ordained and approved by all and to order the affairs of state in accordance with existing laws. I can therefore affirm absolutely that, while it is true that the state whose government is in the hands of one city only will be lasting, this is particularly true of the state whose government is in the hands of a number of cities; that is, it cannot disintegrate or be changed into any other form by any internal cause.
1 [Machiavelli, Discourses III, 1.]
2 [Dictoria potestas is the term Spinoza uses in this passage.]
3 [The Roman dictator, appointed only in situations of emergency, held office for no more than six months. While Machiavelli (Discourses I, 34) held that this was highly beneficial to the state, Spinoza agrees with the contrary view of Cicero.]
4 [ita ad malitiam coercendam potentiores sunt. The phrase comes from Ovid, Remedia amoris, 91.]
5 [See Machiavelli, Discourses I, 3. The tribuni plebis were appointed to protect the plebeians against the patricians.]
6 [Machiavelli, Discourses III, 11.]
7 [On sumptuary laws, see the following section.]
8 [Machiavelli, Discourses I, 6.]
9 [Sumptuary regulations had recently been introduced in Amsterdam. The modern equivalent would be laws to prevent victimless crime.]
10 [Ovid, Amores III, iv, 17.]
11 [The Opera Posthuma skips from Section 6 to Section 8 without a break for Section 7. It is included as a separate section in the Nagelate Schriften.]
12 [Machiavelli (Discourses III, 28) approved of these positive reinforcers.]
13 [See TP7/2.]
14 [constitution = instituta jura hereafter.]
15 [Spinoza is probably thinking of the panic of 1672, during which William III was appointed stadtholder despite the Perpetual Edict of 1667.]
16 [Machiavelli (Discourses III, 24) argues that the prolongation of military law caused Rome’s loss of liberty.]
17 [I read aliorum for alios.—S.S.]