[1] I pass on at length to the third kind of state, the completely absolute state which we call democracy. The difference between this state and the aristocratic state consists mainly in this, that in an aristocracy it depends solely on the will and the free choice of the supreme council that any particular person be made a patrician. Thus no one has a hereditary right to vote and to undertake1 offices of state, and no one can demand that right for himself by law, as is the case with the state now under discussion. For in this state all who are born of citizen parents, or on native soil, or have done service to the commonwealth,2 or are qualified on any other grounds on which the right of citizenship is granted by law, all, I say, can lawfully demand for themselves the right to vote in the supreme council and to undertake offices of state; nor can they be refused except for crime or dishonour.
[2] So if it is ordained by law that the right to vote in the supreme council and to manage affairs of state should be restricted to older men who have reached a certain age, or to eldest sons as soon as they are of age, or to those who contribute a certain sum of money to the commonwealth, then although this could result in the supreme council’s being composed of fewer citizens than that of the aristocracy which we have already discussed, yet states of this kind are still to be called democracies, because those of their citizens who are appointed to govern the commonwealth are appointed thereto not by the supreme council as being the best men, but by law. Now states of this kind, where it is not the best men who are appointed to govern but those who happen to be wealthy or to be eldest sons, may in this way appear as inferior to aristocracies. Yet if we reflect on what happens in practice, or on human nature in general,3 the result will be the same in both cases, for patricians will always think those are the best men who are wealthy, or near akin to themselves, or close friends. It is true that, if patricians were of such a nature that in choosing their colleagues they could free themselves from all bias and be guided only by zeal for the public good, there would be no state to compare with aristocracy. But experience has abundantly taught us that the very opposite is the case, especially with oligarchies where the will of the patricians, in the absence of rivals, is quite unrestrained by law. For in that situation the patricians take care to debar the best men from the council and to seek as colleagues men who are subservient to them, with the result that conditions in such states are far worse because election to the patriciate depends on the absolute free choice, unrestricted by any law, of a few men. But I return to my theme.
[3] From what has been said in the last Section it is evident that we can conceive different kinds of democracy. However, my purpose is not to discuss every one, but only that kind wherein all without exception who owe allegiance only to their country’s laws and are in other respects in control of their own right and lead respectable lives have the right to vote in the supreme council and undertake offices of state. I say expressly, “who owe allegiance only to their country’s laws” so as to exclude foreigners, who are deemed to be subject to another government. In addition to owing allegiance to the laws of the state, I added, “and are in other matters in control of their own right” so as to exclude women and servants who are under the control4 of their husbands and masters, and also children and wards as long as they are under the control of parents and guardians. Lastly, I said, “who lead respectable lives” so as to exclude especially those who are in bad repute for their crimes or for a dishonourable way of life.
[4] Perhaps someone will ask whether it is by nature or by convention that women are subject to the authority of men.5 For if this has come about simply by convention, there is no reason compelling us to exclude women from government. But if we look simply to experience, we shall see that this situation arises from their weakness. For nowhere is there an instance of men and women’s ruling together; wherever in the world men and women are to be found, we find men ruling and women’s being ruled and both sexes thus living in harmony. Against this, it is said of the Amazons who once held rule that they did not suffer men to stay in their native land, rearing females only and killing the males whom they had borne. Now if women were naturally the equal of men and were equally endowed with strength of mind and ability—qualities wherein human power and consequently human right consists—then surely so many and such a wide variety of nations would have yielded some instances where both sexes ruled on equal terms and other instances where men were ruled by women, being so brought up as to be inferior in ability. But as such instances are nowhere to be found, one is fully entitled to assert that women do not naturally possess equal right with men and that they necessarily give way to men. Thus it is not possible for both sexes to have equal rule, and far less so that men should be ruled by women. And if, furthermore, we consider human emotions, that men generally love women from mere lust, assessing their ability and their wisdom by their beauty and also resenting any favours which the women they love show to others and so on, soon we shall see that rule by men and women on equal terms is bound to involve much damage to peace. But I have said enough.
[The rest is lacking.]
1 [I read subeundi for subeunda.—S.S.]
2 [In this chapter Spinoza follows the convention of his time in referring throughout to the commonwealth as respublica, since the seventeenth-century defenders of democracy were known as “republicans.”]
3 [communem hominum conditionem. Spinoza uses this phrase and humana natura coextensively in the Ethica, but there he has taken pains (E2P40Schol1) to explain that “human nature” does not refer to a unique “essence” (in the sense of the mediaeval realists), but rather to a general set of individual properties.]
4 [Spinoza uses the Latin phrases in potestate and sub potestate for “under the control” here and in what follows.]
5 [sub potestate virorum. Lipsius, Monita et exempla politica, II, ii.]