The Crimes Allegedly Committed by James J. “Whitey” Bulger While an FBI “High-echelon” Informant
Drawn from the Superseding Indictment of Bulger and two other defendants, based on evidence produced by the Bulger unit of the Massachusetts State Police and DEA, and filed in the United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, on May 23, 2001.
One count of racketeering conspiracy, including extortion, loan-sharking, bookmaking, trafficking in narcotics, attempted murder, and murder.
The following twenty-six murders, committed by Bulger and the others in the conspiracy, all occurred in and around Boston, unless otherwise noted.
From the 1973–1974 war on “Indian Al” Notarangeli:
Michael Milano, Dianne Sussman, and Louis Lapiana, killed in the first attempt on the life of Notarangeli, on March 8, 1973
Al Plummer, Hugh Shields, and Frank Capizzi, shot to death in the second attempt on March 19, 1973
William O’Brien, the top Notarangeli associate and protector, killed March 24, 1973
Ralph DiMasi, another Notarangeli associate, murdered March 24, 1973
James Leary, a third associate, killed April 3, 1973
Joseph Notarangeli, the brother of Al Notarangeli, shot April 18, 1973
Al Notarangeli, the ultimate target of the war, assassinated on February 21, 1974
Other perceived threats, 1973–1984:
Jimmy O’Toole, an enemy of Bulger, killed December 1, 1973
James Sousa, a witness to a botched Bulger robbery, eliminated October 1974
Paul McGonagle, a member of the rival Mullen gang, shot November 1974
Edward Connors, knowledgeable about the death of O’Toole, killed June 12, 1975
Thomas King, an irritant to Bulger, murdered November 5, 1975
Francis “Buddy” Leonard, to divert attention from the disappearance of King, murdered November 6, 1975
Arthur “Bucky” Barrett, the bank robber and jewel thief who crossed Bulger, shot July 1983
Richard Castucci, thought to be an informant for the FBI, murdered December 30, 1976
John McIntyre, informant against Bulger, shot October or November 1984
The murders related to Callahan’s attempt to take over World Jai-Alai, 1981–1982:
Roger Wheeler, owner of World Jai-Alai, shot in Tulsa, Oklahoma, May 27, 1981
Brian Halloran, possible informant about Wheeler’s death; and Michael Donahue, his passenger, killed May 11, 1982
John B. Callahan, to protect the secret about Wheeler, shot in Miami, August 1, 1982
Steve Flemmi–related, 1981–1985:
Debra Davis, a former girlfriend of Flemmi, strangled late 1981
Deborah Hussey, another former girlfriend of Flemmi, strangled early 1985
Further Allegations of Racketeering:
In the context of his racketeering activities, the indictment also alleges that Bulger used his real estate properties, such as the South Boston Liquor Mart, to hide income obtained from illegal sources; kept an arsenal of weapons at the homes of George Kaufman and of Flemmi’s mother; concealed the remains of some murder victims; provided the fugitive John Martorano with financial assistance; and maintained surreptitious contact with law enforcement personnel to defeat electronic surveillance.
Other charges:
One count of a pattern of racketeering that affected interstate and foreign commerce
One count of extortion and demands for rent from bookies and drug traffickers Paul Moore, William Shea, Richard O’Brien, and many others
One count, extorting Kevin Hayes
One count, money laundering conspiracy
Twenty counts of money laundering through Bulger’s liquor business
One count of money laundering that affected interstate and foreign commerce
One count of possession of firearms to commit violent crime
One count of possession of machine guns for the same purpose
One count of possession of unregistered machine guns
One count of transfer and possession of machine guns
One count of possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers
One count of money laundering forfeitures pertaining to real estate property
Thomas J. Foley’s Letter to Don Stern at the Department of Justice, January 1999
Frustrated by and concerned about the developments in the case, I decided to send a letter to U.S. Attorney Stern. Knowing that at this time in the investigation we had little support from higher-ups and concerned by the many attempts made by the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) and the FBI to insert the FBI into the day-to-day developments in the investigation, I felt that the events that occurred to this date in January 1999 should be documented. At the time I was only a lieutenant serving in the uniformed branch as the operations officer for Troop C in the central part of Massachusetts. It was not common practice for a lieutenant of the State Police to send a letter of this type to the U.S. attorney, but I felt that there never had been an investigation of this magnitude and complexity in Boston. I sent a copy to Colonel Hillman and to Lieutenant Colonel Paul Regan of Investigative Services. (I never received comment from Colonel Hillman.) Even though many shocking developments had occurred in the case that had proved and expanded upon what we had alleged, we still were not receiving the support of the U.S. attorney, and in fact he continued to support the FBI and its involvement. I was concerned about the future of the investigation and about whether we could continue to peel away the layers of obstruction. I felt it was time to send a letter to Stern detailing our concerns, and I hoped to get Stern to take a closer look at what was happening. Not knowing how the investigation would proceed, I felt it was important to document the events that had occurred up until that time. The letter as written and sent to Stern is as follows.
Dear Mr. Stern,
In submitting this copy of the report on the interview of John Martorano, I feel I must also submit this correspondence to you detailing my concerns during this investigation and most recently the events that have occurred surrounding the actual interview process. I am not only concerned but also confused and bewildered about this process that your office has enacted and endorsed. I will be more clear about my concerns in the body of this letter.
This investigation has been difficult and demanding upon all involved to say the least. It would not serve the purpose of this letter to you to dredge up every negative aspect that has occurred during this investigation. I believe that as part of your position as United States Attorney that you are not always aware of the day to day decisions that occur during these investigations. Maybe some of the comments made in this letter will enlighten you; or maybe not. I feel that it must be said however.
I would like to provide you with some background to our relationship with your office and the FBI. I feel it is important for you to be aware of the history of this relationship. Neither yourself nor Mr. Mawn were present during some very significant time periods during this investigation. Some would like to portray us as being uncooperative but I believe we have gone above and beyond normal expectations in trying to make a relationship work. What is contained in these initial paragraphs I hope will show you that we have continued to try to develop a strong working relationship in spite of some very serious problems that have arisen. Contrary to what some have said this is not a case of professional jealousy, however it has much to do with professional courtesy.
My relationship with the United States Attorney’s Office began in 1984 when I was transferred to the State Police Intelligence Unit and assigned to work closely with the FBI and the Strike Force investigating Organized Crime. I quickly developed a close relationship with both AUSAs and Special Agents of the FBI due to several successful “joint” investigations. At times I was working more closely with federal prosecutors and agents than I was with my own agency. My trust in the federal government went so far that I risked my career and lost friendships based only on the information that the federal government provided me. I am referring to the investigation of Tpr. John Naimovich. During that investigation, I mistakenly believed in the FBI and the Strike Force and felt that as difficult as it was to investigate another Trooper, it was the “right” thing to do. I knew at the time that this was a very high profile investigation and that to some degree the investigation into a corrupt State Trooper was also a very “political” decision that would enhance the careers of several highly placed federal officials. I made my decision based upon information that I was provided and that I believed correct at the time. I can live with my decision knowing it wasn’t made for “political” purposes. To the contrary, it put me into a very difficult situation within my agency. I took the unpopular position of defending federal officials to those in my own agency who criticized the investigation. At the same time, I was accused of lining up with the FBI against my own agency. I did what I thought was right and what was my duty. Looking back at it now, I must admit I was somewhat naïve to place so much faith in the intentions of those federal officials. I later found out that the State Police was not provided all the information in the investigation of Tpr. Naimovich and that there was an attempt to cover up information that would have hurt the case against him. Adding insult to injury, when the truth was uncovered and it was disclosed that the information being leaked to organized crime members was coming from a clerk in the FBI Boston office, not Tpr. Naimovich, the FBI took administrative action against this clerk and deliberately decided not to gather evidence against her. It was a “political” decision to investigate and indict John Naimovich and it was a “political” decision not to pursue criminal charges against the FBI clerk. I want to emphasize to you that I am bringing this incident and other incidents to your attention for several reasons. As I continue with this letter I hope that by the time I am finished, my position and reasons will be clear. I want to state at this time that I am not speaking from hard feelings or vendettas like I have been accused. I am speaking from experience. Experience that has been accrued over fourteen years and experience that I do not believe you have been exposed to.
Even though the investigation into Tpr. Naimovich was very distasteful and extremely disappointing, I didn’t sever my relationship with the FBI or the Strike Force. I never liked the way the investigation was conducted and I made my feelings known. As I stated earlier, we had several very successful joint investigations with the FBI and the Strike Force and I believed that the most successful way to attack organized crime was on a cooperative, unified effort. Relationships and friendships that were developed with prosecutors and agents prior to the Naimovich investigation remained intact. A “work together” atmosphere was still a priority for all involved.
In 1990, I was promoted to the position Corporal. In the fall of 1990, newly appointed Colonel Charles F. Henderson placed me in charge of the Special Services Section which was responsible for investigation of organized crime among other things. Colonel Henderson stressed the importance of conducting these type of investigations and encouraged a strong working relationship with the federal agencies. He told me at the time that part of the reason he appointed me to command the Special Services Section was due to my good relationship with the federal authorities. I met immediately with Special Agent Ed Quinn and established open lines of communication between us. I re-established ties with the Strike Force and shared information. We began to exchange some information.
The State Police decided to pursue organized crime members through their primary revenue generator—the “rent collection system.” Targeting high level bookmakers, we attempted to infiltrate the upper levels of organized crime in Boston through intensive investigation and extensive state court authorized electronic surveillance. We were persistent, lucky and determined. When we began to meet some success in our efforts, we knew the federal statutes were more appropriate to the crimes that we were investigating. We asked Strike Force prosecutors if they would be interested in working together on the federal level in this investigation. An agreement was reached to investigate the case out of the US Attorney’s Office however the FBI never assigned an agent to the state side of the investigation.
It became clear over a period of time that the Bureau was not sharing information on a reciprocal basis. To the contrary, information was received that the Bureau did not want to participate in the investigation of Bulger/Flemmi and they were convinced that our efforts would be unsuccessful.
During this time period, three major incidents occurred that damaged relationships between all agencies involved and again illuminated the fact that the FBI and US Attorney’s Office were not operating in a genuine cooperative effort. In one instance, information was provided to Ed Quinn that a search warrant was to be served by the State Police in an establishment in a suburb of Boston. Quinn was not told that the State Police had an undercover officer in that location. Shortly after informing Quinn of our intentions, we were contacted by the undercover officer advising us to disregard our plans of searching the establishment. The undercover officer was told by the target that he couldn’t “book” there anymore as he was told by the FBI that the State Police would be executing a search warrant there in the near future. When I received this information, I called Ed Quinn. I picked him up at his office and we rode in my cruiser. I relayed the information I had received. Quinn apologized stating that the agent handling the source shouldn’t have said anything and that he has since been transferred. I told Quinn that it was a very dangerous practice to pass this information along as he did and that the life of the undercover officer could have been placed in jeopardy. I later found out that the alleged transfer of the agent was only a story and not the truth about the incident.
During this time period we were receiving significant information from state court authorized electronic surveillance detailing the activities of Boston and Providence based organized crime figures. In an effort to identify the individuals being spoken about, the Providence office of the FBI offered to review the information we had and to help provide us with the identities of the Providence faction. We were told that SA Bill Shea was very knowledgeable about the Providence OC family. We were also told that Shea was seriously ill but that he could still review the information to help us. On January 1, 1992 I met SA Mike Sutters on Route 146 in Uxbridge and provided him with the documented detailed information. On the very next day, the wiretap that had been very productive for five weeks and had great further potential was dead. I will go no further in this matter because I believe it is not necessary.
As our investigation continued, we began to indict numerous people working together with the US Attorney’s Office. On one occasion we were told by AUSA Jim Farmer that there was not enough to indict an individual whom we considered a major player in the investigation. Having worked for a significant period of time in the federal system, we knew that this could not be the case. After many difficult phone calls and meetings, Farmer and Quinn admitted that the individual was an FBI source and for that reason he was not being indicted. We expressed our concern over this matter and asked for a clarification from the US Attorney’s Office. We asked if this would continue to be the practice with State Police cases in the future. We have never received an answer from Farmer on this matter only his reply that the problem needs to be resolved between State Police and the FBI. We strongly disagreed then and we do now. Our relationship with your office should not hinge on conditions issued by the FBI. In a meeting with you shortly after you became US Attorney in Boston, Colonel Henderson and myself informed you of these issues in hopes of improving our working relationships. We went to you with our concerns in hopes of improving communication between agencies.
There have been other obvious and obscure issues that have only made this investigation more difficult. Some of which are minor. One such instance was the lack of cooperation in serving subpoenas. A process and time frame was agreed upon in a manner acceptable to all agencies but was never carried out properly by the FBI. Another incident involves the holding back of information that would have been crucial in our investigation of Bulger/Flemmi; specifically speaking the unavailability of witness Tim Connolly. It was only upon our finding out that Connolly was in the FBI’s protection and our inquiry as to why his information was not being provided to us, did we eventually bring his information forward. Conversations with Jim Farmer regarding Connolly impressed upon us that we did not have an ally in Jim Farmer. Farmer attempted to discourage the indictment of Bulger. And even after the issues mentioned here in this letter and others not mentioned had occurred we were still working with the FBI to locate and arrest Bulger/Flemmi et al. Only to find out that information was provided to them about pending indictments. In addition, never during any of the time we were investigating Bulger/Flemmi did the FBI provide us with the information that they were working for them.
All of which brings me to my reason for writing this letter. The atmosphere that the US Attorney’s Office has created for the investigators working on this case has been one of dishonesty and distrust. Your office has been divided in its support of this case. Prosecutors have been pitted against prosecutors and investigators have been pitted against investigators. Decisions have been made in your office admittedly for “political” reasons. It is for this reason that I am concerned. I have been down this road before. There is too much at stake to be making decisions on a “political” basis. It is wrong. It has gotten to the point that we cannot believe or trust information being provided to us. This feeling is not something that is grounded in speculation or assumption. The pattern has continued. Some like to diminish the significance of this investigation by saying it occurred a long time ago or call it ancient history. They cannot be any further from the truth. Nothing has changed. As result history will continue to repeat itself and these problems will continue to surface.
Within the defendants in this case, we were not responsible for developing a mistrust of the FBI. It was the activities of the FBI with Bulger/Flemmi that created this mistrust. It was upon the request of certain defendants that they wanted to speak to representatives of the DEA and State Police. It is our duty and responsibility to investigate these crimes in the best manner possible. It is also our duty to honor commitments and agreements made to these individuals. In fact, the underlying reason for our success is the fact that we do live up to our commitments and agreements with individuals. I cannot understand why the US Attorney’s Office is so insistent in putting demands upon us that can clearly effect the outcome of this investigation in a negative way. Once again it has been stated to us “it’s political.”
Throughout this investigation, there have been times where witnesses have been “handled” strictly by the FBI. Never has there been such a movement to insure the fair and equitable involvement of the DEA and State Police. We never saw the need to insist that we be involved in every interview. The case of Sonny Mercurio is an example of this fact. It is my opinion that the best case scenario for the FBI would have been to have an independent review of Mercurio’s information. It is a fact that the FBI handling of Mercurio is an issue in these hearings. Why would the FBI want to place themselves in a similar position as in the past with this individual? Once again it opens the Bureau up for questioning and criticism by defense attorneys and for future litigation. It appears again that decisions in these matters are “political”; what is best for the FBI, not what is best for the investigation.
Since the beginning of the negotiations with John Martorano and his attorney, a major concern within your office was the role that the FBI was to have in his cooperation. To your credit, you stood firm that the FBI would be told of these negotiations at a later time. You allowed us the opportunity to develop an atmosphere of trust with Martorano. This is where my earlier stated confusion lies. I do not know if you are aware or not of the pressure that is being applied by your office for us and Martorano to accept FBI involvement in his debriefings. In good conscience, I cannot accept this. Martorano and his attorney have specifically stated that he does not want to talk to the FBI at this time. This has been stated many times, under many conditions, to many people. He is satisfied with his current situation and we are making progress. Yet the pressure and deceit continues in your office. We have relayed to your prosecutors his information and his wishes; yet Mr. Herbert does not care to take our word in this matter. Mr. Mawn will not accept anyone’s word, including Martorano’s own words, in this matter. These individuals are openly questioning our integrity and in doing so threatening our ability to effectively conduct this investigation.
In July, the DEA and State Police made a significant commitment of manpower and resources in order to maintain the safety and security of Martorano and to provide a positive atmosphere for his debriefing. In attempting to obtain approval for Martorano to be housed in a secure State Police facility, DOJ Washington authorities questioned the State Police’s role in this matter due to the recent indictment of a Sergeant on the State Police. (Washington did not care that the investigation into the Sergeant was conducted in a joint DEA/State Police investigation.) DOJ was so concerned that it almost sidelined the whole arrangement. Once again, the integrity of our agency has been questioned even though we have willingly and aggressively pursued those that were suspected of wrongdoing. The recent revelation regarding improper relationships with the FBI and directly related organized crime figures however never has been a concern for DOJ.
It has been alleged that Martorano has specific knowledge of involvement by past and/or present members of the FBI. The question of the ability of the FBI to effectively conduct this investigation, regardless of Martorano’s intentions, has never been an issue in your office. To the contrary, your office has been relentless in your insistence for their involvement. This attitude concerns me. With the information that has recently been revealed in court it is not speculation that improprieties by the FBI have occurred. It is fact.
After we lost custody of Martorano and he was returned to the Bureau of Prisons, the process of interviewing him became more difficult to manage. For several weeks we were questioned and prodded to finish his debriefing. We were told that you were asking on a daily basis as to when we would complete the interview and that you were pushing for us to meet with Martorano. We advised Mr. Wyshak on August 21, 1998 that we would be going to interview Martorano leaving on August 30, 1998. We expressed our wishes to listen to more of the Flemmi testimony in court. We openly and in advance notified your office of our plans. Prior to leaving for the interview, I gained first-hand information regarding Martorano’s intentions. On August 21, 1998 SA Doherty and myself had conversation with Martorano attorney Frank DiMento. He informed us of a call he had received from SAC Mawn requesting that the FBI be allowed to participate in his client’s debriefing. He again told us Martorano did not want FBI involvement at this time.
On August 30, 1998 we went to Martorano’s location and resumed the interview process. After spending two days speaking with Martorano, we received a phone call from Wyshak stating that Herbert and John Durham wanted us to stay an extra day so that they could speak with Martorano. We asked what was the urgency and purpose of their trip. We were again told that Herbert wanted to speak to Martorano about getting the FBI involved in the investigation and that Durham wanted to speak to him about the corruption aspect of the case. We were told that it was “politics” and that the United States Attorney’s Office was under a lot of pressure to have the FBI involved. It was a difficult concept to accept. The most difficult part to accept is that Herbert and whoever sent him would jeopardize an investigation of this magnitude based upon the interests of the FBI image and “politics.” This is where it gets real scary. The government had been told numerous times by the defendant’s attorney that he did not want the FBI involved; yet Herbert insisted on meeting with Martorano. Durham was sent to speak to him regarding corruption; however the agreement with Martorano had not gone beyond the proffer stage. Herbert nor Durham had asked us at this point what kind of information had Martorano provided us. In addition, the defendant’s attorney was never contacted requesting permission to speak to Martorano prior to the arrival of Durham and Herbert. A two thousand mile trip without first obtaining authorization from the defendant’s attorney. I can imagine what your office would do if investigators totally disregarded a defendant’s attorney and insisted on speaking to him anyway. I can only say this is mind boggling. No other words describe it.
On the third and final day of our interview with Martorano we advised him of the impending arrival of Herbert and Durham. We could not answer his questions as to why Herbert and Durham would be traveling such a distance to speak with him. He spoke openly about the fact that he was providing us with the agreed upon information and that he would speak no further until a deal was finalized. He wondered as to why Herbert and Durham would not wait to see the report before any additional interviews were conducted. He had many of the same thoughts and questions that we had spoken about amongst ourselves. Clearly, this undermined our status with him. He had the understanding that we were representing the government yet we could not answer his questions. It was not difficult to see that the government was clearly divided in this process. It was a very improper and unprofessional message to send a defendant who is trying to make a deal with the government. Upon their arrival and after another of Herbert’s vigorous and relentless attempts to secure FBI participation, Martorano again refused to speak to the FBI.
Our dissatisfaction with this situation was made clear. It was totally unprofessional and highly questioned our integrity. With everything that has happened throughout this investigation it was very difficult not to question the motives of your office. But it still didn’t end.
On Monday, September 21, 1998 we met at the United States Attorney’s Office with Wyshak, Kelly, Herbert, and SA Doherty. We spoke about the meeting the next day with representatives of the various jurisdictions involved in the Martorano investigation. At no time did anyone indicate that the FBI would participate in the meeting. It was our understanding that our agreement with Martorano and his attorney would be honored and that FBI involvement would not occur at this stage of the investigation.
On the next day, just minutes before the meeting, I was unofficially informed that the FBI would be present at this meeting. No discussion, explanation or notification was given by the US Attorney’s Office. In the presence of various officials from various agencies, Wyshak entered the room and asked in a general statement if anyone minded if the FBI attended the meeting. The United States Attorney’s Office has been aware of the numerous attempts by the FBI to insert themselves into this process. Calls have been made by the SAC and others to Tulsa and Miami officials insisting on FBI involvement in the case. These agencies were informed that only the FBI has the statutory authority/jurisdiction to investigate this case. Each time these agencies have declined to work with them. In another blatant attempt to force this issue, these agencies were subjected to a very unreasonable and uncomfortable request. Once again the interests of the case were secondary to the interests and image of the FBI. It was an unprofessional tactic and unrealistic to expect cooperation from these agencies when they are subject to these methods. Wyshak was informed that FBI involvement was contrary to the agreement made with Martorano and his attorney. Wyshak then began the meeting. Several minutes later, despite the concerns indicated, Herbert entered the room with SA Stan Moody who spent the rest of the time in the meeting. Your office ignored and disregarded the request of the agencies in the room. Investigators that have been working this case for years were not even informed of the fact that no matter what anyone else felt, the FBI would attend.
After the meeting many who attended commented on the insistence of FBI involvement. They expressed concern that even though they had previously made clear what their feelings were that they were being forced to meet your standards. We were placed into a position where we had to make clear that we were not in agreement with this forced issue. The credibility of your office now becomes a question. Investigators directly working the case are being forced to conform to standards set by your office in direct conflict with our agreement with Martorano. We will not accept your office’s violation of the commitments and agreements that we make with defendants. We have worked closely with your prosecutors and have not misled or misinformed them regarding the agreements made with the defendant. Once again, due to your office’s relentless and questionable insistence for FBI involvement, a disunified front was exposed to those we were trying to get assistance from. Once again to the detriment of this case, the priority of your office was to insist on FBI involvement, no matter what the ramifications to the case. The time has come. We as investigators can no longer be a part of a process that clearly is unethical and extremely unprofessional. We cannot participate on decisions that are made for “political” reasons. Your office has used this excuse many, many times. This case demands more. We are not condemning the FBI, however we are trying to be realistic. There are many fine professional agents who are being unfairly injured by this investigation. It is my belief and the belief of others including some prosecutors in your office; that the worst move to be made would be to include the FBI in this stage of the investigation. Questions will be asked of all of us as to how an effective investigation could be conducted under these circumstances. It is unfair to the Bureau and it is unfair to the agent that would be put in that situation. The Department of Justice has sent an experienced and well respected professional prosecutor to deal with this aspect of the case. Why is this not acceptable? For the record, I will say again. We do not and will not investigate FBI agents. We have no interest or desire to do so. That job is the responsibility of DOJ.
It is time to review our role and involvement in this investigation. We must meet the responsibilities required of us as members of the Massachusetts State Police and we must protect the reputation of our agency. Just as the FBI is concerned about their image, you must understand that we are concerned about ours. We know that if the job is done in a honest and dedicated manner then the image takes care of itself. In this case it is becoming increasingly more clear that we have little or no control over how this investigation is being conducted. The tactics being employed in your office are causing a strain on respected relationships. Demands being placed on highly respected and overworked prosecutors such as Fred Wyshak and Brian Kelly are unreasonable. Your office is asking them to meet the political requirements in the first order and then use their relationship with the investigators to get us in line. Our friendship and respect for these professionals has carried us a long way, however now it has become insulting. We cannot subject our agency to the political concerns of other agencies. We all know that politics is a fact of life, however in this case it should not and cannot be the governing and deciding fact. When we make a commitment and we are unable to ensure that the commitment will be met, then it is time to review our involvement.
I wanted to come directly to you with my concerns. I will be forwarding this letter to Colonel Hillman and Lieutenant Colonel Reagan along with my suggestions for further involvement in this investigation. I do not set State Police policy however I feel that due to my extensive experience in this investigation that I must bring this matter to the attention of my superiors. There is nothing left to do.
Sincerely,
Thomas J. Foley, Lieutenant,
Massachusetts State Police