Freedom is one of those things that just about everybody agrees on. It matters, is a good thing and is one of the most important political ideals—perhaps the most important. Freedom is also one of those things that just about everybody disagrees about. How much should we have? Is restriction necessary for freedom to flourish? How can your freedom to do one thing be reconciled with my conflicting freedom to do something else?
Tricky enough already, discussion of freedom (or liberty) is hampered still further by basic disagreement over its very nature. There lurks a suspicion that “it” may not really be an it at all—not only might the word “freedom” have several shades of meaning but it may refer to a number of quite distinct, if related, concepts. For shedding light on this murky scene, we are indebted to the influential 20th-century philosopher, Isaiah Berlin. At the center of his discussion of liberty lies a crucial distinction between positive and negative freedom.
Two concepts of liberty George is sitting with a glass of brandy in front of him. No one is holding a gun to his head, telling him to drink. There is no coercion and no impediment—nothing forcing him to drink and nothing preventing his drinking. He is at liberty to do as he pleases. But George is an alcoholic. He knows it’s bad for him—it might even kill him. He may lose his friends, family, children, job, dignity, self-respect … but he can’t help himself. He stretches out his trembling hand and lifts the glass to his lips.
Two very different kinds of freedom are at play here. We often think of freedom as the absence of external restriction or coercion: you are free so long as there is no obstacle preventing you from doing what you want. This is what Berlin calls “negative freedom”; it is negative in that it is defined by what is absent—any form of constraint or outside interference. In this sense George the drinker is completely free. But George can’t help himself. He is compelled to drink, even though he knows his interests would be better served by not doing so. He is not fully in control of himself and his destiny is not fully in his own hands. To the extent that he is driven to drink, he has no choice and is not free. What George lacks is what Berlin calls “positive freedom”—positive in that it is defined by what needs to be present within an agent (self-control, autonomy, the capacity to act in accordance with what are rationally assessed to be one’s best interests). In this sense George is clearly not free.
Negative freedom We are free, in Berlin’s negative sense, to the extent that nobody interferes with our ability to act as we please. But in exercising our liberty, we inevitably tread on each other’s toes. By exercising my freedom to sing loudly in the bath, I deny you the freedom to enjoy a quiet evening. No one can enjoy unfettered freedom without encroaching on the freedom of others, so when people live together in societies, some degree of compromise is needed.
“To manipulate men, to propel them toward goals which you—the social reformer—see, but they may not, is to deny their human essence, to treat them as objects without wills of their own, and therefore to degrade them.”
Isaiah Berlin, 1959
The position adopted by classical liberals is defined by the so-called “harm principle.” Most famously enunciated by the Victorian philosopher J.S. Mill in his On Liberty, this stipulates that individuals should be permitted to act in any way that does not bring harm to others; only where such harm is done is society justified in imposing restrictions. In some such way we can define an area of private liberty that is sacrosanct and immune to outside interference and authority. In this space individuals are allowed to indulge their personal tastes and inclinations without hindrance; and in a political sense they are at liberty to exercise various inviolable rights or freedoms—of speech, association, conscience, and so on.
While the negative understanding of liberty espoused by liberals is generally dominant, in Western countries at least, many thorny issues remain. In particular, we may wonder whether the liberty enjoyed by one who has neither the ability nor the resources to do what he is “free” to do really merits the name. This is the shadow of liberty that leaves any citizen of the USA free to become president. True, there is no legal or constitutional barrier, so all citizens are to that extent free to do so; but in fact many are effectively debarred because they lack the necessary resources, in terms of money, education and social status. In sum, they lack the substantive freedom to exercise the rights that they formally hold. But in remedying these deficiencies in order to transform merely formal freedom to real, substantive freedom, the socially minded liberal may be obliged to endorse forms of state intervention that appear to be more appropriate to the positive interpretation of liberty.
“O liberty! what crimes are committed in thy name!” So exclaimed Madame Roland before her execution in 1793. But the atrocities and excesses of the French Revolution are just one example of the horrors that have been perpetrated in the name of liberty—specifically liberty of the positive kind. Isaiah Berlin’s deep distrust of positive liberty was fueled by the enormities of the 20th century, especially those of Stalin. The trouble stemmed from a belief—the vice of the social reformer—that there is a single right course for society, a single cure for its ills. Against this view, Berlin himself was a strong proponent of pluralism in human values. There is a plurality of goods, he argued, that are distinct and incompatible, and from which people must make radical choices. His liberal attachment to negative freedom was underpinned by his view that this kind of freedom fostered the most propitious environment in which people could control and give shape to their lives by making such choices.
Positive freedom While negative freedom is freedom from external interference, positive freedom is usually characterized as freedom to achieve certain ends; as a form of empowerment that allows an individual to fulfill her potential, to achieve a particular vision of self-realization, to reach a state of personal autonomy and self-mastery. In a broader political sense, freedom in this positive sense is seen as liberation from cultural and social pressures that would otherwise impede progress toward self-realization.
Whereas negative freedom is essentially interpersonal, existing as a relation between people, positive freedom, by contrast, is intrapersonal—something that develops and is nurtured within an individual. Just as within George the drinker there is a conflict between his more rational side and his baser appetites, so generally the positive concept of freedom presupposes a division of the self into higher and lower parts. The attainment of freedom is marked by the triumph of the (morally, rationally) preferable higher self.
“The subject—a person or group of persons—is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons.”
Isaiah Berlin, 1959
It was in part due to this concept of a divided self, which Berlin felt was implicit in the positive understanding of liberty, that he was so wary of it. To return to George: the part of him that properly understands his best interests is assumed to be the higher, more rational self. If he is incapable himself of encouraging this part to prevail, perhaps he needs some outside help—from people who are wiser than he and better able to see how he should act. It is then a short step for us to feel justified in physically separating George and his bottle of brandy. And what goes for George goes for the state too, Berlin feared: marching beneath the banner of (positive) freedom, government turns to tyranny, setting a particular goal for society; prioritizing a certain way of life for its citizens; deciding what they should desire with no regard for their actual desires.
the condensed idea
Divided liberties
| Timeline | |
|---|---|
| c.AD1260 | Acts and omissions |
| 1953 | The beetle in the box |
| 1959 | Positive and negative freedom |
| 1971 | The difference principle |