While warfare has never lacked its enthusiasts, most theorists would sympathize with the sentiments of the poet Charles Sorley, writing in 1915, a few months before his death, at age 21, at the battle of Loos: “There is no such thing as a just war. What we are doing is casting out Satan by Satan.” However, many would agree that, while war is always an evil, some devils are worse than others. Yes, war is to be avoided if possible, but not at any cost. It may be the lesser of two evils; the motive may be so compelling, the cause so important, that recourse to arms is morally justified. In these circumstances, war can be just war.
The philosophical debate over the morality of war, as much a live issue today as ever, has a long history. In the West, questions originally raised in ancient Greece and Rome were picked up by the Christian Church. The conversion of the Roman empire to Christianity in the fourth century called for a compromise between the pacifist leanings of the early Church and the military needs of imperial rulers. Augustine urged such an accommodation, which was taken up by Aquinas, who developed the now-canonical distinction between jus ad bellum (“justice in the move to war,” the conditions under which it is morally right to take up arms) and jus in bello (“justice in war,” rules of conduct once fighting is underway). Debate in “just war theory” is essentially structured around these two ideas.
“There never was a good war, or a bad peace.”
Benjamin Franklin, 1783
Conditions for war The main aims of just war theory are to identify a set of conditions under which it is morally defensible to resort to force of arms and to offer guidelines on the limits within which fighting is to be conducted. The principles relating to jus ad bellum have been much debated and amended over the centuries. Some are more controversial than others; predictably, in most cases the devil has been in the detail of interpretation. It is generally agreed that the various conditions are all necessary, and none sufficient, to justify a move to war. Something approaching consensus has been reached around the following set of conditions.
Just cause The overriding yet most disputed condition for morally defensible war is just cause. In earlier centuries this was interpreted quite broadly and might include, for instance, some form of religious motivation; in the secular West such a cause would now generally be discounted as ideological, hence inappropriate. Most modern theorists have narrowed the scope of this condition to defense against aggression. Least controversially, this would include self-defense against a violation of a country’s basic rights—its political sovereignty and territorial integrity (e.g. Kuwait against Iraq in 1990–1); and most would extend it to cover assisting a third party suffering such aggression (e.g. the coalition forces liberating Kuwait in 1991). Much more controversial is preemptive military action against a potential aggressor, where definitive proof of intention is inevitably lacking. In such cases, it may be moot whether preemptive force is not itself aggression, and some argue that only actual aggression—after it has happened—can constitute just cause.
Right intention Closely allied with just cause is right intention. It is not enough to have just cause; it is necessary that the aim and only aim of military action is to further that cause. Aquinas talks in this connection of the promotion of good and avoidance of evil, but the crucial point is simply that the sole motivation should be to right the wrong caused by the aggression that provided just cause. Just cause cannot be a fig leaf for ulterior motives, such as national interest, territorial expansion or aggrandizement. So, liberating Kuwait as a response to Iraqi aggression is justified; doing so with the ultimate objective of securing oil interests is not.
“Bismarck fought ‘necessary’ wars and killed thousands; the idealists of the 20th century fight ‘just’ wars and kill millions.”
A.J.P. Taylor, 1906–90
Proper authority That a decision to take up arms can only be made by the “proper authorities” following due process appears obvious. “Proper” basically means whatever body or institution of the state holds sovereign power (its competence to declare war will generally be defined within the country’s constitution). “Declare war” is significant, as it is sometimes added that the intention to take up arms should be formally declared to a country’s own citizens and to the enemy state(s). This, however, seems perverse if doing so confers any strategic advantage on the enemy, which has certainly forfeited any right to such consideration by initiating aggression. “Proper authority” is itself an extremely knotty concept, raising tricky questions about legitimate government and the appropriate relationship between decision-makers and people.
“There is no middle course in wartime.”
Winston Churchill, 1949
Last resort Resort to war is only justified if—however just the cause—every other peaceful, nonmilitary option has been tried or at least considered. If, for instance, a conflict could be averted through diplomatic means, it would be categorically wrong to make a military response. Economic or other sanctions should be considered, weighing their impact on civilians against the probable impact of military action.
Prospect of success Even if every other condition for military intervention is met, a country should only resort to war if it has a “reasonable” chance of success. This stipulation sounds prudent enough: there is no point in wasting lives and resources in vain. However, how successful is successful? Is it actually wrong for a weaker power to take on a stronger aggressor, however much the odds are stacked against it? The strongly consequentialist flavor of this condition is offensive to many. Sometimes it is surely right to resist an aggressor—and immoral, even cowardly, not to—however futile the action appears.
“Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.”
Mao Zedong, 1938
Proportionality A balance between the desired end and the likely consequences of getting there: the expected good (righting the wrong that constitutes the just cause) must be weighed against the anticipated damage (casualties, human suffering, etc.). So, military action must be expected to do more good than harm; the benefit must be worth the cost. This is another prudential, strongly consequentialist consideration—though in this case almost irresistible if (a huge “if”) the resultant good and harm can be defined and accurately measured. In this area when we come to consider proportionality between military means and ends, we begin to stray into the territory of jus in bello—proper conduct in war.
The other aspect of just war theory is jus in bello—what constitutes morally acceptable and proper conduct once the fighting starts. This has a very wide scope, extending from the behavior of individual soldiers in their relation to both the enemy and civilians, all the way up to major strategic questions, such as use of weapons (nuclear, chemical, mines, cluster bombs, etc.). In this area, two considerations are usually taken as paramount. Proportionality requires that means and ends are well matched. To take the extreme case, almost everyone accepts that nuclear attack cannot be justified, however successful it might be in bringing about some military objective.
Discrimination requires that combatants and noncombatants are strictly distinguished. For instance, it is not considered permissible to target civilians, even if it might help erode military morale.
Clearly it is possible for a just war to be fought unjustly, and an unjust war justly. In other words, the requirements of jus ad bellum and of jus in bello are distinct, and one set may be satisfied without the other. Many aspects of jus in bello, in particular, overlap with the subject matter of international law (such as the Hague rules and Geneva conventions), and infringements on both winning and losing sides should in principle be assessed as war crimes.
Not just just war Among today’s philosophers, just war theory is probably the area of most active debate, but it is not the only perspective. The two extreme views are realism and pacifism. Realists are skeptical about the whole project of applying ethical concepts to war (or any other aspect of foreign policy); international influence and national security are the key concerns—real global players play hard-ball, morality is for wimps. Pacifists, in total contrast, believe that morality must hold sway in international affairs. Unlike the advocate of just war, military action, for the pacifist, is never the right solution—there is always a better way.
the condensed idea
Fight the good fight
| Timeline | |
|---|---|
| c.AD1260 | Just war Acts and omissions |
| 1785 | Ends and means |
| 1971 | The difference principle |