Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, commander of the 21st Army Group
EISENHOWER HAD URGED his generals in Verdun “to avoid any discouragement or feeling of disappointment in the changed situation.” However, a new development left Omar Bradley not only discouraged and disappointed but also furious.
Bernard Montgomery made it clear to SHAEF’s deputy operations officer, Major General John Whiteley, “that Ike ought to place me in operational command of all troops on the northern half of the front. I consider he should be given a direct order by someone to do so.” Back in Versailles, British Major General Strong agreed that the Ardennes battlefield would best be managed by two commanders—Montgomery in the north and Bradley in the south—rather than by Bradley’s 12th Army Group alone. The decision was driven by the news from British intelligence on Tuesday evening that the road to Namur was vulnerable and that if German shock troops crossed the Meuse there, they could reach Brussels within hours.
Rousted from his bed by Whiteley and Strong on Tuesday night, Beetle Smith, the chief of staff, listened to their proposal to expand Montgomery’s role. He also heard their warnings of “further deterioration” at the front caused by Bradley’s distance from his armies on the ground. Bradley’s headquarters was in Luxembourg City, and neither he nor his ranking officers had yet visited the front. But then Smith rounded in anger on the staff officers. Clearly these two Britishmen did not consider the Yanks capable of handling the crisis, Smith charged. Where did their loyalties lie?
As Whiteley and Strong slunk away in the face of this tirade, Smith phoned Eisenhower, finding the supreme commander still in his office at eleven P.M. Fuming, Smith described the proposal while grudgingly conceding that it had merit: among other benefits, Montgomery would more likely commit British reserves to the battle if he commanded them. Eisenhower, staring at a huge wall map, promptly agreed. With a grease pencil, he drew a line on the map from Givet on the Meuse east through the Ardennes to Prüm in Germany. St.-Vith fell north of the line, Bastogne south.
The people of Brussels give British and Belgian troops a hearty welcome when the city was first liberated in September 1944.
While the supreme commander pondered this demarcation, Smith phoned Bradley in Luxembourg City.
Ike thinks it may be a good idea to turn over to Monty your two armies in the north and let him run that side of the bulge from 21st Group.… It seems the logical thing to do. Monty can take care of everything north of the bulge and you’ll have everything south.
Bradley answered cautiously. He noted that no hint of this scheme had arisen in Verdun that morning. Although three enemy armies were now positioned between his command post and the bulk of his army group to the north, he considered his communication difficulties insignificant. “I’d question whether such a changeover is necessary,” he added.
General Omar Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group
By Wednesday morning, when Eisenhower called personally to confirm the reconfiguration, Bradley had worked himself into a seething temper. “By God, Ike, I cannot be responsible to the American people if you do this. I resign.” Major General Strong, listening to the phone conversation in Eisenhower’s office, watched a deep flush creep up the supreme commander’s neck.
The British Chief of Staff Sir Alan Brooke in France, previously Commanding General of the Second Corps of England.
“Brad, I—not you—am responsible to the American people. Your resignation therefore means absolutely nothing.” Bradley continued to protest, if in a lower key, until Eisenhower ended the conversation: “Well, Brad, those are my orders.” He then phoned Montgomery at his command post in Zonhoven, Belgium. “We’ve now got two battles, two separate battles,” Eisenhower said, bellowing into the receiver. “I think you’d better take charge of the northern one, and leave Bradley to deal with the southern one.”
At 12:52 P.M., a SHAEF log entry confirmed that “Field Marshal Montgomery has been placed in charge of the northern flank.” He would command the U.S. First and Ninth Armies, as well as his own army group; Bradley’s 12th Army Group was left with only Patton’s Third Army. An officer in Bradley’s headquarters reported that he was “absolutely livid. Walked up and down and cursed Monty.”
The field marshal relished his new orders. He arrived at Courtney Hodges’s headquarters at 1:30 on Wednesday. Three hours later, the British and the Americans had a plan. First Army would dig in where it could and, with help from U.S. Lieutenant General William Simpson’s Ninth Army, assemble a strike force to counterattack the Germans from the north, complementing Patton’s blow from the south. British Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey’s Second Army would continue to feed forces down from Holland, and British supplies would reinforce U.S. losses to the tune of 100 twenty-five-pounder guns with 300,000 rounds of ammunition, 20,000 snowsuits, 2,000 trip flares, and 350 Sherman tanks fitted with cleats for better traction. By nine o’clock that evening, all Meuse bridges would be rigged for demolition.
A U.S. transport and supply column moves through the Ardennes Forest.
SHAEF ordered the new command arrangement to remain secret. Censorship, already tightened to prevent full disclosure of the AUTUMN MIST reverses, also ensured that Americans at home would be spared knowing that much of the U.S. Army in Europe now was led by a short Brit in a black beret. “They seemed delighted to have someone to give them orders,” Montgomery told Field Marshal Alan Brooke, with some justification. Brooke warned him not to gloat, but the field marshal could not help himself. “The Americans have taken a 1st Class bloody nose,” he wrote a friend in London. “I am busy sorting out the mess.”
Crossing a Meuse bridge in September 1944.
As for Bradley, Eisenhower proposed awarding him a Bronze Star as a conciliation for losing two-thirds of his command. He also asked George Marshall to consider giving Bradley a fourth star. “I retain all my former confidence in him,” Eisenhower wrote the chief. “It would have a fine effect generally.”