Fundamentalisms

In his account of the history of the term ‘fundamentalism’ in the previous chapter, James Dunn has described some of the cultural features of the American Protestants who first used the term to describe their religious position. It was entirely appropriate that sociologists should subsequently continue to use the term to denote a category of religious movements. For the culture of these Americans of the early twentieth century – their beliefs, values, and norms of behaviour – contained many of the features that differentiate fundamentalisms from other categories of religious movement.

So what are these differentiating features, and how do they affect the overall posture of fundamentalist movements towards the outside world? Various research projects, at least one of them global in scope,¹ have achieved a reasonable consensus regarding their identity. They are five in number. First, and most basically, fundamentalists are reactionary. They are reacting against the perceived marginalisation of their form of religion in the modern and late-modern world. They are particularly hostile to those elements of modernity that we associate with the Enlightenment, such as human and minority rights, human agency, cultural relativism, and so on. Secularisation, the process of the differentiating out of social systems, which had previously come under the purview of religion, and of the consequent increasing power of these systems² is another favourite target. Hence fundamentalism is, by definition, a modern phenomenon, since it is reacting against certain aspects of modernity.

Bolstering this reactionary stance is a second distinctive feature, a preference for moral and conceptual dualism. Actions are either sinful or holy, inspired either by Satan or by God. Persons are either saved or lost, faithful or infidel. Beliefs are either true or false, sound or unsound, and this present sinful and carnal world is contrasted with the glorious spiritual world to come. This contrast introduces a third element, an apocalyptic vision of the millennial rule of God. Some fundamentalists are willing to leave the achievement of his ultimate rule on earth to God alone, while others believe they have his mandate to hasten its arrival by their own efforts. In both cases, the vision involves a scenario in which either the faithful survive while all others are lost, or else they rule the world on God's behalf.

Fourth, fundamentalists, or at least those from the three great ‘religions of the book’, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, believe that their holy book is the word of God. It comes directly to them from the Almighty, through the medium of the Prophet, or the Old and New Testament authors. It provides all they need to know about belief and practice, and all other sources must be evaluated as to their truth and value in terms of their compatibility with its precepts. However, finally, their interpretations of their holy book are selective. They derive from it a perception of God as holy and given to visiting retributive justice on his enemies, while favouring the faithful, that is themselves.

These beliefs and assumptions necessarily and consistently carry through to the values and actions by which fundamentalists engage with other social movements and systems. Fundamentalisms are usually oppositional and hostile in their stance, frequently claiming that they are the victims of persecution. They sharply distinguish their boundaries, differentiating themselves clearly from other movements and maintaining a high degree of uniformity within their own culture. They tend to be led by powerful and charismatic leaders who nevertheless continue to demonstrate the prototypical characteristics of the ideal adherent.³ And they have strict norms of behaviour to which adherents are expected to conform.

These distinctive features of fundamentalism have been demonstrated across different religions, and by a variety of researchers. Whether or not a particular movement falls into the category is a matter for dispute on occasion, as is the question of whether it is primarily religious or nationalist in its basic aim (for example, in Northern Ireland and India). But overall, sociologists have been successful in persuading most scholars of religion that it is legitimate to use the term ‘fundamentalist’, and that its degeneration into a term of abuse in the popular media is no reason for abandoning its use in serious discourse.

Indeed, the discipline of sociology has contributed immensely to our understanding of fundamentalisms. For, in addition to defining them as a category of social system, it has also directed our attention to the importance of their historical, cultural, social, and political contexts. It is impossible, for example, to understand Protestant fundamentalisms in the United States without appreciating the lasting influence of the Puritan founding fathers.⁴ Radical Islam makes little sense without the Middle Eastern history of empire and nationalism.⁵ And such Jewish fundamentalisms as Gush Emunim are embedded in the nationalist and messianic culture of Israel.⁶

However, there are questions which sociologists, historians, and political scientists fail to address, perfectly reasonably since they are psychological in nature. The most frequently asked psychological question is: ‘What are the psychological characteristics which predispose people to be fundamentalists?’ Much research effort has been directed at this question, but with minimal success.⁷ None of the five basic personality factors (extraversion/introversion, neuroticism/stability, conscientiousness, friendliness/hostility, and openness)⁸ predict fundamentalist belief, and the only characteristic that has been shown to be reliably associated with fundamentalism is authoritarianism.⁹ Authoritarianism has three factors: respect for authority, hostility to outgroups, and conservative hostility to change.¹⁰

Perhaps, in the light of this overall failure of research, we may conclude that the question being asked is inappropriate. It is based on the North American emphasis on psychological differences as predictors of behaviour, and concentrates upon the psychology of the individual. A question that takes more account of the social context emphasised by sociologists runs as follows: ‘How do fundamentalist movements motivate ordinary people to believe and do extraordinary things?’ Of course, this question begs others: how can we say, for example, that they are ‘ordinary’ people, and that their beliefs and actions are ‘extraordinary’. The general failure of the psychology of individual differences to find differences that predict fundamentalism justifies the use of ‘ordinary’. And the sociological definition of fundamentalisms as reactionary, and therefore counter-cultural, permits that of ‘extraordinary’. This second question addresses issues regarding the relationship between fundamentalisms and their adherents (i.e. between social systems and their members), rather than questions of individual psychology. It is therefore appropriately answered using social psychological assumptions and theories.¹¹

Various theoretical areas have some explanatory power when we seek to understand the relationship between fundamentalisms and their adherents in a global context. For example, the areas of conformity and group influence; labelling, stereotypes and social judgement; and values and attitudes, all have obvious applications. However, easily the most promising is the classic social psychological theory of social identity,¹² on which I will concentrate. Social identities may be defined as ‘categories of person to which individuals believe they belong, and which they have internalised as part of their self-concept’.

This definition needs unpacking. First, it implies that we have multiple social identities, since we all believe ourselves to belong to at least several different categories. This multiplicity does not imply ‘schizophrenic’ confusion, however, but rather, the capacity to negotiate different social situations successfully as we access the appropriate social identity for each.¹³ Once accessed in the mind, an identity will direct socially appropriate behaviour. Second, the identity categories are not necessarily face-to-face groups of people, the members of whom can in principle be identified, for example the congregation of the local mosque. Rather, many categories are more abstract and general: for example, ‘the Umma’,¹⁴ or ‘Bible believers’.¹⁵ The fact that a category is conceptual in this way does not, however, imply that it does not guide one's actions. If one perceives a social situation as where one's fundamentalist faith is relevant, then the identity, for example Bible believer, will provide a range of approved behaviours.

The most important element of the definition, however, is that the categories are internalised into the self, becoming elements of the self-concept.¹⁶ Hence a perceived threat to the Umma or to Bible believers becomes a threat to me, personally. If the Umma is persecuted anywhere in the world, then I suffer with them. If they win an occasional triumph against the forces of godless secularism, then the triumph is mine. Or rather, it is not only mine but ours, in the continuous struggle between us and them.

Moreover, when a social category is internalised and becomes a social identity, it brings with it its culture.¹⁷ Its beliefs, values, and normative behaviours are all internalised too, providing resources for making sense of the social world and for acting within it. However, most people now have a wide range of social identities, living as they do in modernising or late-modern societies, where the basic social systems have become highly differentiated: the worlds of work, family, government, the arts, science, and religion, for example. The fundamental issue then arises: what happens when the cultures of one's different social identities are mutually incompatible? Many modern people seek to retain a degree of internal consistency, so that they maintain some sort of core individual identity, although simply playing the appropriate role is always an alienating option. Another solution, however, is to allocate a dominant position to one particular social identity, for example a fundamentalist one, so that it is salient in many and varied situations.¹⁸ A committed ‘Bible believer’ may treat a social party or a work conference as an opportunity for evangelism, while for a militant ‘defender of the Umma’, every contact with secular authority may become conflictual. If one's worldview consists of a simple ‘us versus everyone else’ distinction (the Islamic vanguard versus jahili society, for example,¹⁹ or ‘the saved versus the unsaved’²⁰), then every social situation will be interpreted in these binary terms.

Other basic aspects of social identity theory demonstrate its applicability in principle to an understanding of the relationship between fundamentalist movements and their adherents. The first of these is the distinction between social identity and personal identity.²¹ One's personal identity is one's conception of oneself as a unique individual, and a common value in late-modern societies is that it should be ‘authentic’. Individualism is a powerful social trend in late-modern societies,²² and hence personal identity often plays a prominent role within the self-concept of members of such societies. Thus the dominance of their particular social identity in the self-concepts of fundamentalists is counter-cultural within ‘Western’ societies. However, in more collectivist societies,²³ it is less so. As a caveat, we should note the artificiality of this distinction between social and personal identity. For example, one may be a unique individual because of one's unique set of social identities.

There are several different relationships suggested in social identity theory between social identities within the self.²⁴ Some identities, for example, are nested. The super-ordinate category of Bible believer may subsume an identity as a Southern Baptist, which in its turn subsumes membership of South Fork mega-church, within which one may be a member of the men's Bible study group. All of these lower-order, nested, identities reinforce the culture of the fundamentalist movement, while adding some additional beliefs, values, and behavioural norms that are, nevertheless, consonant with it. Movement, denomination, congregation, and small group are thus organised in such a way as to reinforce the movement's social identity. However, the possibility of subordinate identities becoming more central to adherents' selves than the movement identity may prevent the movement from mobilising successfully when it wishes to. There is always likely to be a distinction between immediate local and face-to-face identities, such as the congregation and its groups, and the much more abstract and ideological movement identity. Perhaps the most significant social unit in American Protestantism currently is neither movement nor denomination, but rather the local mega-church.

Other significant relationships between identities are those of dominance and salience, which I have already touched upon above. Dominance refers to the centrality to, and importance of, a particular social identity to the self-concept, while salience concerns the identity that becomes uppermost in the individual's mind in a particular social situation. Clearly, for some people it is primarily the situation that predicts the salience of an identity, whereas for others, including fundamentalists, the dominance of one identity renders that identity salient in a wide variety of situations.

At this point we need to ask a more basic psychological question: why are their social identities important to people at all? What are their motives for incorporating a social category with all its attendant baggage into their idea of who they are? Why can they not just ‘be themselves’? And why, in particular, would they want to take on board such a frequently counter-cultural and unpopular identity as a fundamentalist one? The answers are several, but probably the most powerful motive is the reduction of uncertainty which fundamentalist adherence provides.²⁵ The late-modern world is full of perceived uncertainties, despite our emphasis on seeking to control risk.²⁶ People are uncertain about the survival of patriarchy, the threat to their national culture of immigrant cultures, their social status and living standards in a world of ‘flexible’ employment, and the very survival of their religion in a secular world. Their social identity as a fundamentalist gives them a black and white worldview with a clear conception of their own position and status within it. It tells them what they should believe and how they should behave. And it assures them of their future survival and victory in the cosmic war of which they are part: certainty in an uncertain world.

A second powerful motivation to be a fundamentalist relates to self-esteem.²⁷ If I know that I am one of God's chosen few, fighting for his truth against this evil world, then I have a role in life and a part to play in cosmic history. The fact that the world mocks and derides me is only evidence that I am correct in this belief.²⁸ I may be a fool in the eyes of others, and a nobody in terms of the ungodly values of this sinful age, but in God's eyes, and in those of his true servants, I am a person of importance. And a final powerful motivation is that of affiliation.²⁹ I am accepted and affirmed by others like myself, and have a powerful sense of ‘us’, of belonging, not just to my local congregation but to a great and growing movement.

So how do fundamentalist social identities actually work? How do the leaders of fundamentalisms ensure that their adherents develop and maintain a powerful movement social identity that can motivate them to sacrificial commitment of time and money?³⁰ Their key strategy is to differentiate the movement as clearly as possible from all other social movements;³¹ and to ensure that the movement's culture remains homogeneous.³² In other words, it is to make the movement as different as possible from the outside world, but as homogeneous as possible within the fortress. By these means, adherents can develop an identity which is sharply distinct from other identities, with clear boundary lines drawn.³³ They can be clear who they are not, and therefore by implication who they are; and they can also be clear who they are because of the general conformity of fellow adherents to the movement culture. Such visible conformity gives a clear message as to which beliefs, values, and behaviour are expected of any adherent. Obvious signals such as dress codes (e.g. the niqab) are interspersed with an emphasis on correct doctrine (e.g. Calvinist predestination).

This need to sharply differentiate the movement, and therefore its social identity, is evident from the tendency of fundamentalist leaders to criticise most strongly those movements most similar to their own. Calvinist Bible believers, for example, are vocal critics of charismatic Christians who are actually, like them, theologically positioned on the Evangelical wing of the church.³⁴ For it is most important to distinguish oneself from those with whom one might most easily be confused.

Specific psychological processes are involved in firming up the opposition of us versus them, the in-group versus the out-groups. To ensure that adherents know what is expected of them, leaders embody in their person, and model by their actions, the prototype of the ideal adherent. Sayeed Qutb, hallowed radical Islamist prophet, humbly accepted imprisonment and martyrdom at the hands of the infidel. Phillip Jensen, Calvinist Sydney Anglican, rejects ritual and church hierarchy, and criticises the Anglican Church, charismatic believers, other religions, and secular Australian society. A prototype simply exemplifies the model social identity; it carries no hint of personal identity or individual difference. The fundamentalist social identity is what matters, not authentic individualism.

A similar process of depersonalisation is evident in stereotyping,³⁵ where movement leaders and members describe members of particular out-groups as all demonstrating the same set of (unfavourable) characteristics. Individual people become nothing more than instances of a category; personal identities become submerged under a single overwhelming social category. Prototyping and stereotyping thus result in the mutual perception of two depersonalised categories of person. This is an ideal scenario for inter-group conflict,³⁶ for in-group members simply elicit the behaviour only to be expected from the out-group, who usually oblige by exhibiting it. Conflict becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The theoretical account hitherto sounds remarkably cerebral, however. Ideas of categories and identities, of prototypes and stereotypes, are primarily cognitive, even though hints of emotions such as triumph and pride, fear and anger, have appeared when the self has been boosted or threatened by movement triumphs or persecution. Where, we may ask, is the ‘fire in the belly’, characteristic of so many fundamentalists, to be found? How are their emotions stirred sufficiently to inspire their typical sacrificial expenditure of time, energy, money, and general commitment to the cause?³⁷

A major source of motivation are the narrative stories that leaders tell and adherents internalise as their own. Such narratives are not primarily theological, since they are not constructed in the form of a rational and structured argument. Nor, however, are they personal stories, telling the individual adherent's own unique history. Rather, they are somewhere in between these two forms: a story for all. Their purposes are to firm up the adherents' social identity, and to enhance conformity and commitment by providing a clear worldview and a location for the adherents within that world. Typically, the worldview is of a cosmic struggle between God and Satan, while each adherent is a soldier in God's army, fighting and ultimately overcoming a variety of Satanic foes. Powerful symbols and themes of human experience permeate the narrative, and as a consequence it arouses powerful and motivational emotions. Pride and self-esteem are enhanced by one's status as God's soldier in the cosmic spiritual war, fear and anger are aroused by the wiles of Satan, and contempt and loathing are generated for those on ‘the other side’. The following is an attempt to encapsulate one fundamentalist narrative, which I have composed³⁸ on the basis of a study of American Protestant fundamentalist websites.

There once was a golden age, when godly men ruled the world on God's behalf. This original golden age has occasionally been reborn in the course of human history, notably at the time of the Reformation in Calvin's Geneva, the Puritan settlements in America, and the later Great Awakening. We are the true inheritors of this tradition, God's persecuted but faithful remnant, who keep alive the true faith and the vision of a Christian America by struggling with his foes, who would extinguish this precious flame.

The enemy, Satan the Prince of Darkness, takes on many forms. He even disguises himself as Christ's Church, compromising with the secular world and choosing which parts of God's Word it finds it convenient to obey. Or else he works conspiratorially, forming networks of global power such as the New World Order, or taking over the cultural establishment so as to advance the cause of secular humanism.

Sometimes, though, Satan is only too obvious. Some people don't hide their disgusting sexual perversions behind closed doors, but parade them in full view. They are blatantly challenging God's Word. Women fail to take their God-given role within the family. They even destroy God's gift of a child to fulfil their selfish desires. The Bible gives us a blue-print of a godly family, which secular humanists are trying to destroy. Instead, they want to ensure that gays, feminists, and abortionists have the same ‘rights’ as other Americans. Work-shy layabouts, single mothers, and even Muslim extremists get priority over hard-working Americans, though they are savagely persecuting Christian people abroad.

We, God's chosen covenant people, are at war on his behalf with these his enemies. We obey God's laws, as promulgated in his infallible Word the Bible, and especially in the Old Testament. We hold a Biblical worldview, for God's Word is all we need for guidance in what we should believe and how we should act. God's enemies are in open rebellion against him, holding an ungodly worldview. They deny that he created the world, and, more generally, they deliberately disobey his laws and persecute his people.

In this titanic struggle between God's people and the evil world, our strategy is not to sit back and wait for Christ's return; nor is it merely self-defence, fighting to save the faithful remnant. Rather, we must carry the fight to the enemy. Since this is war, we must win these battles using all the means God supplies. We must ally with any who share God's worldview. The world's rules can, however, sometimes be useful, as when we win properly democratic elections by using our superior organisation and resources. We are, after all, true Americans, not Islamic revolutionaries. Over the longer term, we must infiltrate and take over the so-called Christian denominations. We must reclaim America, his redeemer nation, for God, and ultimately reconstruct all the world's institutions, so that they all obey God's laws, as our forefathers did.

Christ already rules, but he depends upon us to reclaim his kingdom on earth. Then he will reign for the millennium dispensing biblical justice, administered on his behalf by us his faithful people. The great cosmic struggle of good versus evil, truth versus error, God versus Satan, will have been won once and for all. We will be vindicated at last.

This narrative is designed to arouse emotions and motivate for action. It highlights the threats to the fundamentalist identity, thereby eliciting fear and anger. It scapegoats specific out-groups, evoking contempt and disgust. It offers the prospect of power and glory, giving hope and ambition. And it provides a unique and privileged identity, a source of security and pride. Such narratives may sound ridiculous to many; but they are capable of eliciting powerful emotions and committed actions. It is hardly surprising that these are sometimes violent in nature.³⁹

So perhaps a perspective from social psychology sheds some light on the relatively unexplored relationship between fundamentalist movements and their adherents, and its implications for social conflict. However, the title of this volume poses a far more demanding question: Is fundamentalism a threat to the modern world? For the purposes of this chapter, I will sketch a particular worldview, since it is impossible to address the question without first providing an account of what is meant by the phrase ‘the modern world’. Then the task becomes one of applying a social psychological perspective on fundamentalisms to ‘the modern world’.

It is a truism to say that the context of religious fundamentalisms is the globalising world. However, the full implications of this truism have only recently begun to be explored. The key element of globalisation is the vast recent increase in connectivity.⁴⁰ The capability of making a social connection with anyone anywhere ensures that there are few limits to the free transmission of ideas and information. The increased mobility of labour and of capital likewise results in hitherto relatively self-contained cultures impinging upon others. The consequence of all this connectivity is a growing perception of the world as a single social system. While the majority of theorists and commentators have emphasised objective indices of globalisation, especially of the global reach of capital and of corporations, subjective perceptions are also of profound importance.⁴¹ In particular, the general perception of the existence of a global social system directs attention towards such areas as universal human rights, ethical principles, and theories of justice.⁴² It also permits the imagination of a common global fate.

The consequences of this global perspective are that at least two problems are widely recognised as urgent global issues. They are, first, the current growth of inequalities within and between nation states; and second, the threats posed by climate change and population growth to the availability of the resources necessary for a life worth living.⁴³ Such global issues can only be addressed by society at the global level. The differentiation of functions that is the essence of modern society suggests that global society can only function effectively as a set of global sub-systems.⁴⁴ Any solution to its pressing existential issues is therefore dependent on the collaboration of global sub-systems, which will each have to learn to appreciate the potential contributions of the others. Among these is the global sub-system of religion, which could contribute its appreciation of the transcendent, its powerful symbols and rituals, and its ethical imperatives. Such ‘soft power’ is at a premium in the late-modern world.

Collaboration on the part of religion would require a degree of integration with other global sub-systems, which is not commonly found. The form of integration required would not be structural but, rather, collaborative and dialogical. However, the degree of integration that would be necessary is more typically counteracted by religion's tendency towards the opposite pole of the dialectic, differentiation. Of course, a certain degree of differentiation is required for collaboration, otherwise religion would have no distinctive contribution to make. But at the very least, different religions would have to act together in an integrated and collaborative way to contribute at the global level. Furthermore, they would have to engage in dialogue with some other sub-systems with which they may have hitherto had an uneasy relationship, for example business, government, and science.

The essence of fundamentalisms, however, is their insistence on differentiating themselves from others. They only establish their dominant social identity and their power to mobilise and motivate by opposing other movements and institutions of their own religion, other religions, and the other social systems of ‘this evil world’. Hence their stance is in principle inimical to any attempt by global society to save humankind from itself, which requires a degree of integration and collaboration of which fundamentalisms are by their very nature incapable. Furthermore, by their oppositional programmes, fundamentalisms occupy the time, energy, and resources of the religious institutions which they are attacking. They are thereby incurring opportunity costs, in that they are preventing religion from contributing as fully as it might to the global project. They also present an image of religion that its enemies in other sub-systems are only too eager to exploit.⁴⁵ In this sense, therefore, fundamentalisms are indeed a threat to today's world. Perhaps more attention should be paid to this longer term and more indirect threat than to any more immediate concerns regarding security.

Are there any aspects of the social psychological analysis in terms of social identity that might help to mitigate this threat? In essence, I have argued, fundamentalisms are oppositional; they define their own powerful and dominant social identity in terms of their out-groups. However, their second source of identity is their strong internal group culture. As I have suggested, as well as enforcing conformity to this culture, fundamentalist leaders have the capacity to change it, provided that they do not themselves stray too far from the movement prototype. Indeed, fundamentalisms have survived and adapted to new contexts only as a result of innovative leadership.⁴⁶ Hence if any persuasive leverage is to be had, it is upon leaders. Unfortunately, it is of the essence of sectarian movements that any perceived falling away from purity of doctrine or practice is punished by the jettisoning of the leadership or the formation of breakaway sects.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the attempt may be worth making to incorporate fundamentalist leaders. Such a strategy is infinitely preferable to fighting them, since opposition is their lifeblood, and persecution their talisman.

Ultimately, however, we have to remind ourselves of why fundamentalisms continue to survive and flourish. It is because they meet human needs for certainty, self-esteem, and affiliation. It is only when we address the causes of uncertainty, low self-esteem, and isolation, causes such as inequality, poverty and injustice, that fundamentalisms will lose their attraction. And religion can play a vital role in such an enterprise.

1. G. A. Almond, S. R. Appleby and E. Sivan, Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms Around the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

2. J. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

3. J. C. Turner and S. A. Haslam, ‘Social identity, organisations, and leadership’, in M. E. Turner (ed.) Groups at Work: Advances in Theory and Research, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 2000).

4. K. Armstrong, The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (London: HarperCollins, 2000).

5. G. Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

6. B. B. Lawrence, Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern Age (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

7. B. Spilka, R. W. Hood, B. Hunsberger and R. Gorsuch, The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach (3rd edn) (New York: Guilford, 2003).

8. J. M. Digman, ‘Personality structure: Emergence of the five-factor model’, Annual Review of Psychology 41: 417–40 (1990).

9. R. Altemeyer and B. Hunsberger, ‘Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, quest, and prejudice’, International Journal of the Psychology of Religion 2/2: 113–33 (1992).

10. R. Altemeyer, The Authoritarian Spectre (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

11. P. Herriot, Religious Fundamentalism: Global, Local, and Personal (London: Routledge, 2009).

12. M. A. Hogg and D. Abrams, ‘Intergroup behaviour and social identity’, in M. A. Hogg and J. Cooper (eds), Handbook of Social Psychology (London: Sage, 2003).

13. S. C. Wright, ‘Cross-group contact effects’, in S. Otten, K. Sassenberg and T. Kessler (eds), Intergroup Relations: The Role of Motivation and Emotion (Hove: Psychology Press, 2009).

14. A. Wheatcroft, Infidels: A History of the Conflict between Christendom and Islam (London: Penguin, 2004).

15. M. Porter, Sydney Anglicans and the Threat to World Anglicanism: The Sydney Experiment (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).

16. J. C. Turner, ‘Social categorisation and the self-concept: A social-cognitive theory of group behaviour’, in Edward J. Lawler (ed.), Advances in Group Processes: Theory and Research (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1985).

17. M. Schaller and C. S. Crandall (eds), The Psychological Foundations of Culture (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004).

18. J. C. Turner, ‘Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group’, in H. Tajfel (ed.), Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

19. S. Qutb, Milestones along the Way (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 1981).

20. M. Lienesch, Redeeming America: Piety and Politics in the New Christian Right (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993).

22. A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

23. H. C. Triandis, Individualism and Collectivism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

24. R. J. Crisp and M. Hewstone (eds), Multiple Social Categorisation: Processes, Models, and Applications (Hove: Psychology Press, 2006).

25. M. A. Hogg and B. Mullen, ‘Joining groups to reduce uncertainty: Subjective uncertainty reduction and group identification’, in D. Abrams and M. A. Hogg (eds), Social Identity and Social Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).

27. H. Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

28. L. Festinger, H. W. Riecken and S. Schachter, When Prophecy Fails (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956).

29. R. A. Hinde, Relationships: A Dialectical Perspective (Hove: Psychology Press, 1997).

30. L. R. Iannacone, ‘Why strict churches are strong’, American Journal of Sociology 99/5: 1180–1211 (1994).

31. M. B. Brewer, ‘The role of distinctiveness in social identity and group behaviour’, in M. A. Hogg and D. Abrams (eds), Group Motivation: Social Psychological Perspectives (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).

32. R. W. Hood, P. C. Hill and P. W. Williamson, The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism (New York: Guilford, 2005).

33. M. A. Hogg and M. J. ‘Self-concept threat and multiple categorisation within groups’, in R. J. Crisp and M. Hewstone (eds), Multiple Social Categorisation: Processes, Models, and Applications (Hove: Psychology Press, 2006).

34. C. McGillion, The Chosen Ones: The Politics of Salvation in the Anglican Church (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2005).

35. K. A. Quinn, C. N. Macrae and G. V. Bodenhausen, ‘Stereotyping and impression formation: How categorical thinking shapes person perception’, in M. A. Hogg and J. Cooper (eds), Handbook of Social Psychology (London: Sage, 2003).

36. R. Brown, Group Processes: Dynamics within and between Groups (2nd edn) (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

38. P. Herriot, The Poisonwood Paradox: Why Christianity Succeeds Locally but Fails Globally (Kindle Direct).

39. M. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (3rd edn) (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).

40. J. A. Scholte, Globalisation: A Critical Introduction (2nd edn) (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

41. R. Robertson, Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture (London: Sage, 1992).

46. S. F. Harding, The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

47. W. S. Bainbridge, The Sociology of Religious Movements (New York: Routledge, 1997).

Almond, G A., R. S. Appleby and E. Sivan, Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

Altemeyer, R., The Authoritarian Spectre (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

Armstrong, K., The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (London: HarperCollins, 2000).

Brewer, M. B., ‘The role of distinctiveness in social identity and group behaviour’, in M.A. Hogg and D. Abrams (eds), Group Motivation: Social Psychological Perspectives (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).

Brown, R., Group Processes: Dynamics Within and Between Groups (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

Casanova, J., Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

Crisp, R. J. and M. Hewstone (eds), Multiple Social Categorisation: Processes, Models, and Applications (Hove: Psychology Press, 2006).

Festinger, L., H. W. Riecken and S. Schachter When Prophecy Fails (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956).

Giddens, A., Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

Harding, S. F., The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

Herriot, P., Religious Fundamentalism: Global, Local, and Personal (London: Routledge, 2009).

—— The Poisonwood Paradox: Why Christianity Succeeds Locally but Fails Globally (Kindle Direct, 2012).

Hinde, R. A., Relationships: A Dialectical Perspective (Hove: Psychology Press, 1997).

Hood, R. W., P. C. Hill and P. W. Williamson, The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism (New York: Guilford, 2005).

Hogg, M. A. and M. J. Hornsey, ‘Self-concept threat and multiple categorisation within groups’, in R. J. Crisp and M. Hewstone (eds), Multiple Social Categorisation: Processes, Models, and Applications (Hove: Psychology Press, 2006).

Hogg, M. A. and B. Mullen, ‘Joining groups to reduce uncertainty: Subjective uncertainty reduction and group identification’, in D. Abrams and M. A. Hogg (eds), Social Identity and Social Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009).

Hogg, M. A. and D. Abrams, ‘Intergroup behaviour and social identity’, in M. A. Hogg and J. Cooper (eds), Handbook of Social Psychology (London: Sage, 2003).

Juergensmeyer, M., Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2000).

Kepel, G. , The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

Lawrence, B. B., Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern Age (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

Lienesch, M., Redeeming America: Piety and Politics in the New Christian Right (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993).

McGillion, C., The Chosen Ones: The Politics of Salvation in the Anglican Church (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2005).

Porter, M., Sydney Anglicans and the Threat to World Anglicanism: The Sydney Experiment (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).

Quinn, K. A., C. N. Macrae and G. V. Bodenhausen, ‘Stereotyping and impression formation: How categorical thinking shapes person perception’, in M. A. Hogg and J. Cooper (eds), Handbook of Social Psychology (London: Sage, 2003).

Robertson, R., Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture (London: Sage, 1992).

Scholte, J. A., Globalisation: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

Spilka, B., R. W. Hood, B. Hunsberger and R. Gorsuch, The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach (New York: Guilford, 2003).

Tajfel, H., Human Groups and Social Categories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Triandis, H. C., Individualism and Collectivism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

Turner, J. C., ‘Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group’, in H. Tajfel (ed.), Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

Turner, J. C., ‘Social categorisation and the self-concept: A social-cognitive theory of group behaviour’, in E. J. Lawler (ed.), Advances in Group Processes: Theory and Research (Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1985).

Turner, J. C. and S. A. Haslam, ‘Social identity, organisations, and leadership’, in M.E. Turner (ed.), Groups at Work: Advances in Theory and Research, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 2000).

Wheatcroft, A., Infidels: A History of the Conflict between Christendom and Islam (London: Penguin, 2004).

Wright, S. C., ‘Cross-group contact effects’, in S. Otten, K. Sassenberg and T. Kessler (eds), Intergroup Relations: The Role of Motivation and Emotion (Hove: Psychology Press, 2009).