The Marcomannic infantry phalanx/shield wall on Aurelius’ Column demonstrates how disciplined the Germanic combat formations could be. Source: Bartoli 1673.
T he early careers of both heroes of this study are very scantily known and most of what we know is based on the information provided by the Augustan Histories. Therefore readers are advised to take everything that follows with a grain of salt, but in the absence of any other evidence this is all we have to go on.
Our knowledge of the career of Aurelian is based almost completely on the scattered and unreliable evidence included in the Augustan Histories until the year 268. Only after that are we on more certain ground. A careful analysis of these details, however, can be used to bring to light much important information when they are put into context, and I have done that already in my biography of Gallienus.
The same is true of the career of Probus, but in his case the uncertainties persist until the year 275. The reader who is interested to read a detailed analysis of his career up to the year 268 is once again advised to read my biography of Gallienus. I will provide an analysis of what we know of his career between the years 268 and 275 in this book too, but going into less detail.
Lucius Domitius Aurelianus, as he is named in the coins, inscriptions and papyri, was born on 5 or 9 September – the exact date of his birth is not known. According to Malalas, he was 61 years old when he died, which, if correct, would place the year of his birth at 214. He was of humble birth and even his place of birth is not known with any certainty beyond the fact that he came from the Balkans like almost all of the emperors after the reign of Gallienus. Malalas (12.30 tr. by Jeffreys, Jeffreys and Scott p.164) describes Aurelian when he was already an emperor as follows: ‘Aurelian, the warrior,… was tall, slender, slightly bald, with small eyes and completely grey hair; he was magnanimous and quick moving. He wore a diadem decorated with a star.’
The Augustan Histories give us two alternatives for his origins: a Pannonian from the city of Sirmium (Aurel. 3.1, 24.3); a native of Dacia Ripensis, which he created so that he would have been a Moesian (Aurel. 3.2). Pseudo-Victor (35.1) states that he came from the area between Moesia and Macedonia, while the Epitome claims that he came from the province of Dacia Mediterranea (located between Dacia Ripensis and Macedonia and therefore the same as in Aurelius Victor). Eutropius (9, 13.1) also places his birth in Dacia Ripensis. On the basis of this cumulative evidence Eugen Cizek suggests that it is probable that Aurelian’s place of birth was indeed Dacia Ripensis, a province which he created when he became the emperor, which would have been a part of Moesia Superior at a time of his birth.1
Thanks to his humble birth we know next to nothing about Aurelian’s parents. According to Pseudo-Victor (35.1), Aurelian was a son of a colonus (tenant farmer) who farmed the lands of the clarissimus (a title with judicial privileges) senator Aurelius. It is more than likely that Aurelian’s father was a retired soldier, because as a youth he was taught how to use weapons. This tenant farmer would therefore have married a freedwoman belonging to the family of his landlord. The mother in her turn would have received her name at the time of her emancipation so that her son became Aurelianus. Aurelian’s background was therefore very humble indeed, but it did not prevent him from performing deeds of greatness later in life. The Historia Augusta (Aurel. 4.2) claims that Aurelian’s mother was a priestess of the temple of Sun God (Sol). Various forms of sun cult were favourites of the armed forced in the Balkans so it is likely that Aurelian’s father was a member of the same cult. The Vita (HA, Aurel. 4.3ff.) naturally gives a list of omens (prophecies and omens that signalled the rise of Lucius as emperor) that foretold of the great future that the young Lucius would have when he grew up. The listing of such omens formed a part of the historical genre, and it is entirely possible that many of these so-called omens took place in practice and that superstitious people interpreted them contemporaneously, while some other events came to be seen as omens only after Aurelian had already become an emperor. It is therefore possible that the ambitions of the young Aurelian were already inflamed in his youth by his priestess mother.2
It is perhaps no coincidence that the Historia Augusta (Aurel. 4.5–6) states that Aurelian’s priestess mother made swadding clothes for her son from the purple cloak which the emperor of the time (he would be Caracalla) had dedicated to the Sol. We shall find Aurelian later imitating some of the policies of Caracalla and we shall also find him paying his respects to Apollonius of Tyana and Sol Invictus and Heliogabalus (the Sun-God of Emesa and not the emperor who claimed to be the son of Caracalla) just like Caracalla had done. Perhaps this is the reason why Aurelian was so opposed to adultery and why he was known as a stern man.
In my opinion, the fact that Aurelian’s mother is likely to have been a priestess of the Sun God goes a long way to explain what Aurelian did later. The usual assumption among those historians who accept the veracity of this claim is that it explains Aurelian’s devotion to the worship of the Sol, but this is likely to be only a part of the truth. The fact that Aurelian’s mother was a priestess would have given Aurelian intimate knowledge of how religions worked and what methods were used by the priestesses and priests in the manipulation of their devout followers just like the emperors as high-priests (each emperor held the office of Pontifex Maximus) knew how to manipulate the superstitious minds of the soldiers. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that Aurelian as officer is claimed to have forbidden the consultation of haruspices (soothsayers) by soldiers as stated by the Historia Augusta (Aurel. 7.8) and that he clearly used the cult of the Sun with Apollonius of Tyana to improve the morale of his army. This obviously does not preclude the possibility that Aurelian himself believed in the gods and that he would have been a follower of the Sol. It is entirely possible for a man to believe in a god or gods and still use religion to strengthen his own position in a cynical manner.
According to Flavius Vopiscus (HA, Aurel. 4.1ff., 6.1ff.), the young Lucius grew up to become a tall handsome man who had a quick mind. From the very early days onwards, he was known for his bodily strength and muscular appearance. He also claims that Lucius trained to fight with the pilum, bow and other arms daily, even during feast days and holidays. There is no reason to doubt this statement. This is how all modern day top class athletes have trained in their youth. The ability to reach the top requires self-discipline bordering on fanaticism, and plenty of luck. It would have been these excellent fighting skills in combination with his tall stature and muscular strength that lay behind the phenomenal rise of this man of humble birth in the military ranks. It is likely that it was Lucius’s veteran father who taught his son these fighting skills and the necessary self-discipline to persist in his training. The next thing this man needed was a patron who would promote his career.
On the basis of the Historia Augusta (Aurel. 5.3ff.), the man who promoted the career of Aurelian was the emperor Valerian. On the basis of this account it is probable that Aurelian accompanied Valerian to the east in 254. The only details that Flavius Vopiscus gives us is that Aurelian was wounded in action and served as an envoy to the Persians, in the course of which he received an elephant as a gift which he then gave to the emperor. It was then that Aurelian received his nickname, Aurelian Sword-in-hand (Aurelianus manu ad ferrum), to separate him from his namesake who was subsequently captured by the Persians at the same time as they captured the emperor Valerian in 259.
Aurelian was always ready to draw his sword to discipline his men. He was known as a self-disciplined man who indulged in his passions of eating and drinking wine only rarely, while being feared by his men as a strict disciplinarian who punished all transgressions with the harshest severity. According to Flavius Vopiscus, Aurelian was in the habit of making warning examples so that once the soldiers had witnessed his severity they did not commit offences anymore. He gives as an example an incident in which one of his soldiers had committed adultery with the wife of the man at whose house he lodged. Aurelian had this man torn in two by bending down two trees. The second of his examples concerns an alleged letter of Aurelian to his deputy in a cavalry unit in which he instructed the man to prevent the men from looting the property of their hosts on pain of death. The officer was also to make certain that the men followed the other regulations to the letter.3
It is actually not surprising that Valerian promoted the career of such a man because both were conservatives by nature. Flavius Vopiscus claims that in a (probably fictitious) letter from Valerian to Antoninus Gallus, Valerian states that Aurelian was too stern and harsh for the times and that it was because of this that Valerian had joined his frivolous merry-making son Gallienus with Postumus rather than with Aurelian. The following account, however, makes it clear that Aurelian came to serve under Gallienus so that the two men met. These two men were the polar opposites of each other in character and habits. Aurelian was a lowly born disciplinarian with a Spartan lifestyle who opposed adultery, while Gallienus was an upper class dandy known for his luxurious lifestyle and libertarian habits. It was this that became one of the reasons why Aurelian became one of the principal plotters in the cabal to kill Gallienus.4
The next detail (HA, Aurel., 6.3ff.) that we have of his career proves that Aurelian was transferred to the Balkans by 255 where he appears to have joined the army operating under Gallienus. According to this text, Aurelian and his 300 men defeated the Sarmatian invaders facing them. It also claims that it was in this war that Aurelian killed with his own hand 48 men in a single day and in the course of several days he slew over 950. These figures have been suspected, but the killing of 48 men in a single day by a man of exceptional fighting skills is by no means impossible. One does suspect that the figure of over 950 would be the number of men killed by Aurelian and his 300 men rather than by him alone, but one cannot entirely exclude the possibility that he did indeed kill this number in the course of several days; it would certainly explain his phenomenal rise in the ranks.
The information in the Historia Augusta (Aurel., 7.1ff) suggests that Aurelian marched together with Gallienus to Gaul in late 255. It was then that he distinguished himself as a tribune of the Legio VI Gallicana5 at Mainz where he completely crushed one of the invading parties of the Franks, killing 700 and capturing 300 whom he sold as slaves. Flavius Vopiscus claims that his soldiers then composed a song in which they sang that they had killed Franks and Sarmatians by the thousand and that they were now seeking a thousand Persians to kill. It was at this point that Vopiscus placed the above-mentioned letter of Valerian to Antoninus Gallus (Aurel. 8.1ff.). The implication is that Valerian did not leave Aurelian with Gallienus but transferred him to the Balkans where we indeed find him next in Vopiscus’s text. If there is any truth in these allegations, it is clear that Valerian realized that Gallienus and Aurelian would not get along that well thanks to their very different character traits.
The next piece of information in the Augustan Histories (Aurel. 9.1ff.) is a (possibly fictitious) letter from Valerian to the Praefectus Urbis Romae/Praefectus Urbi (Urban Prefect of Rome/Prefect of the City of Rome) Ceionius Albinus who is probably to be identified with Marcus Nummius Celonius Annius Albinus who in his turn may be identical with Nummius Albinus who was the Prefect of the City in 256. In this letter, Valerian informs the prefect that he had appointed Aurelian as inspector of all camps and instructed the prefect to provide Aurelian with adequate resources as long as he stayed in the City of Rome. Aurelian had been promoted to this position thanks to his stellar performance in Illyricum and Gaul. This would obviously suggest that Aurelian had been dispatched from Gaul to Rome, but it is inherently more likely that this promotion actually belongs to the period after Aurelian’s next stay in the Balkans as a deputy of the dux (general) Crinitus.
Following this, the Augustan Histories (Aurel., 10.1) state that Aurelian acted as a deputy for generals and tribunes on about 40 occasions, and names as an example of this Aurelian’s role as a deputy of dux Crinitus in the Balkans, presumably also in 255 or in 256. This shows that he was used as a deputy officer wherever needed. However, in my opinion we should interpret the 40 occasions to refer to instances of combat when holding such positions rather as separate instances of holding such positions.
The possibly fictitious letter of Valerian to Aurelian (HA, Aurel., 10.1ff., 11.1ff.) refers to the period when Aurelian acted as Crinitus’s deputy. In this letter Valerian ordered Aurelian to take command of the war in the Nicopolis (presumably Nicopolis ad Istrum) area during the medical leave of Crinitus presumably in 255 or in 256. Aurelian was given 1,650 light cavalry (Itureans, Armenians, Arabs, Saracens, Mesopotamian auxiliaries), 800 equites cataphractos, Legio III Felix, 6 together with the Germanic chieftains Hariomundus, Haldagates, Hildomundus and Charioviscus and their retinues. Aurelian was ordered to find out where the enemy’s wagon train was, what type of enemy they were facing and what was its strength. In other words, Aurelian was sent to reconnoitre, but he acted on his own initiative and surprised the enemy in its encampment probably with a sudden cavalry attack.7 The invaders were the Tervingi Goths (HA Aurel. 13.2) presumably with their subjects and allies.
Vopiscus also claims that Aurelian restored the frontiers; distributed booty among the soldiers; enriched Thrace with captured cattle, horses and slaves; dedicated spoils in the Palace (the emperor’s spoils); and brought to Valerian’s private estate 500 slaves, 2,000 cows, 1,000 mares, 10,000 sheep, and 15,000 goats. In other words, Aurelian divided the booty as expected so that the emperor got his share of the loot. The details also make it clear that Aurelian did not only surprise the enemy on his own initiative, but also exacted vengeance on the enemy by crossing the Danube into enemy territory where he destroyed several enemy encampments and settlements. The grateful Valerian rewarded Aurelian with all kinds of crowns (at the time close equivalents of medals of honour) and other rewards. In fact it is this list of rewards that has enabled me to reconstruct the course of this campaign.
The list of rewards handed over to Aurelian included: four mural crowns/coronae (given for scaling the enemy wall first), five rampart crowns (forcing a way into the enemy camp), two naval crowns (boarding an enemy vessel first), two civic crowns (saving the life of a citizen), ten spears (hastae) without points, four bi-coloured vexilla (banners), four red tunicas of the duces, two proconsular cloaks, a bordered toga, a tunic with palms, a gold embroidered toga, and an ivory chair. On the basis of this list, it is probable that Aurelian engaged five enemy forces separately and destroyed their camps, quite probably when they were inside Roman territory. The naval and mural crowns in their turn imply that Aurelian crossed the Danube and boarded some enemy vessels. It is quite likely that he crossed the river using those very same boats. The tribes that possessed boats along the Danube included the Bastarnae and Peuci, but it is also possible that these were the Tervingi Goths or some of their subject tribes. The four mural crowns suggest that once inside enemy territory Aurelian destroyed four enemy settlements. The different crowns given here should probably be considered to be representative of 13 instances out of the total of 40 in which Aurelian acted as deputy, and if the spears, vexilla, tunicas of the duces and the proconsular cloaks are counted in, then this would already reach the figure of 33 out of 40. By including the other instances included in the Augustan Histories, the overall figure is already very close to the total of 40, so it is possible that Aurelian acted as a deputy only on one to three additional occasions which are not mentioned by the Augustan Histories – although it is entirely plausible that the rest of the instances also belong to the ones that were included in this text. It is probable that, while Aurelian was fighting in the eastern Balkans, Probus was fighting in the western Balkans against the Sarmatians and Quadi (HA, Probus 5). For this, see the career of Probus below.
I would suggest that it was thanks to this that Aurelian was then promoted to the position of inspector of army camps8 at a meeting of officers which took place at Byzantium either in 255 when Valerian was there or passing through it or in 256. Vopiscus claims that it was then that Aurelian was adopted into a senatorial family of Crinitus and was also appointed consul (undoubtedly consul suffectus), and given enough money to act according to his new status.9 This statement has been quite needlessly considered suspect by most modern historians. The claim is just as reliable as the claim that Gallienus appointed the Herulian chieftain as consul. It is clear that we are here dealing with consules suffecti, who were not listed in the Fasti as the consules ordinarii were, so there is nothing incredible in the statement.10 The appointment to the position of inspector of army camps was particularly suitable because Aurelian had demonstrated himself to be an incorruptible man who followed regulations to the letter.
It was then thanks to this promotion to the position of inspector of camps that Aurelian disappears from the sources until the great Gothic invasion of the years 267–70. Then once again we find Aurelian in charge of men in combat. The Augustan Histories (Aurel. 18.1) refer to one instance under the emperor Claudius II Gothicus in which Aurelian was promoted to be the commander of all cavalry forces after the other cavalry commanders had acted rashly contrary to the wishes of the emperor. It is actually very probable that this example belongs to the reign of Gallienus because Aurelian became the commander of all cavalry forces under him while Claudius was promoted to become the tribunus et magister officiorum who was the supreme commander of all bodyguard units (protectores) including the cavalry equites.11
Marcus Aurelius Probus, as he was called in most inscriptions, coins and papyri, was born at Sirmium in Pannonia on 19 August 232. However, there are also other versions of his name. The Historia Augusta (Probus 11.5) calls him Aurelius Valerius Probus; Pseudo- Victor (Epit. 36.2) and coins from Ticinum call him Equitius Probus; and Malalas (12.33) calls him Aelius Probus. But it is likely that his official name was the first mentioned. The Augustan Histories (HA, Probus 3.1.ff.) claim that his mother was of nobler birth than his father, and that his private fortune was modest and his kindred unimportant. The name of his father was either Maximus (HA, Probus 3.1.1–2) or Dalmatius/Delmatius (Epit. 37.1) or perhaps Maximus Dalmatius. Dalmatius started his career as a soldier but ended up as a tribune. He died in Egypt, leaving behind a wife, his son Probus, and a daughter called Claudia.12 This means that Probus had a slightly better start for his career than his compatriot Aurelian.13 Flavius Vopiscus (HA, Probus 3) claims that on the basis of one Greek author there were many who claimed that Probus was a relative of Claudius and that the name of his sister lends support to this claim. This is all that the author says of this claim, and since the source is very unreliable, it is usually dismissed by modern authors. Considering the poor quality of the period evidence, I would not dismiss this alternative altogether. It is possible to think that Probus’s higher ranking mother could have been a distant relative of Claudius, but the question is ultimately unsolvable.
According to Malalas, Probus’s appearance, when he had already become an emperor, was as follows: ‘Aelius Probus … was of medium height, with a large belly and straight, closely cropped hair, a bushy beard, dark skin, a ruddy complexion, good eyes and was very learned; he favoured the Green faction.’ (Malalas 12.33, tr. by Jeffreys, Jeffreys and Scott p.165.) If there is any truth in this description, then it is clear that Probus allowed his physical condition to deteriorate as he grew older or that it reflected gladiatorial diet.
However, according to the Augustan Histories (Probus 3.5ff.), the young Probus was famous for his bodily strength, and because of this he caught the attention of Valerian. Valerian appointed him tribune ‘almost before his beard was grown’ and recommended him in a letter to his son Gallienus as a man to be imitated. This possibly fictitious letter states that Valerian had nominated Probus as a tribune and had given him command of six cohorts of Saracens together with a number of Gallic auxiliaries and Persians that Artabassis Syrus14 (the Syrian) had handed over to the Romans. The important point in this account is that the information is once again a close fit with period circumstances just as it was with the above information regarding Aurelian. It is therefore very likely that Probus was dispatched to the Balkans at about the same time as Aurelian and the following account (HA Probus 5) confirms this. The same text also proves that Gallienus’s elite equites included at least some Persian cavalry units.
It comes as no surprise that the next piece of information in the Historia Augusta (Probus 5) shows the newly appointed tribune Probus distinguishing himself in combat against the Sarmatians and Quadi in the western Balkans in about 255–6 at about the same time as Aurelian fought with success against other barbarians in the eastern Balkans. The Augustan History gives us a list of rewards that Probus received in front of an assembly (possibly the assembly held at Byzantium in which Aurelian also received his rewards). The rewards included: four hastae (spears) without points, two rampart coronae (crowns) (for forcing a way into an enemy camp), one civic crown (for saving a citizen), two golden armillae (highest grade bracelets given for bravery), and a golden torque (a neck-ring given for bravery). According to Vopiscus, Valerian handed over the civic crown in person because Probus had saved his kinsman Valerius Flaccinus from the hands of the Quadi. This Flaccinus is unknown and has been used to prove the account suspect, but in my opinion it is the other way around. The information is once again in agreement with the rest of the information provided, on top of which the circumstantial evidence backs it up. It has been speculated that Valerian and Decius must have been related to each other and the presence of this Flaccinus in the Balkans does indeed lend support for such speculations.
The above details make it likely that Probus engaged at least the Quadi when they were returning to their home territory with their loot, and he was then able to free Valerius Flaccinus along with the other booty. The two rampart crowns imply that Probus destroyed two separate enemy forces operating within Roman territory, which must be Quadi and Sarmatians. The absence of mural crowns and naval crowns suggest that he did not pursue the enemy across the Danube like Aurelian. Probus was rewarded with the command of the legio III Felix at the same time as Aurelian was promoted to the position of inspector of army camps. Legio III Felix had been under Aurelian, which means that Probus was transferred to Thrace so that he became successor to Aurelian in the eastern Balkans.15
The next piece of evidence that we have of Probus’s career does indeed place him in the Balkans. The possibly fictitious letter of Gallienus to the tribunes of the armies in Illyricum in the aftermath of the revolt of some pretender and capture of Gallienus’s father Valerian by the Persians in 259, states that had Probus been present there the pretender would not have dared to usurp power. Gallienus therefore ordered the tribunes to obey Probus. On the basis of this I have speculated in my biography of emperor Gallienus that Gallienus must have promoted Probus from the command he had held in the eastern Balkans into his own entourage thanks to the loyalty he had show during the revolt of Ingenuus in the western Balkans (supported by the Pannonian and Moesian legions) so that he was not present in the Balkans to crush the next usurper Regalianus, who usurped power after the capture of Valerian by the Persians. It was then because of this that Probus was made supreme commander of all of the forces in Illyricum (i.e. in western Balkans up to Thrace in the east). I have also speculated in my biography of Gallienus that while Probus was serving in the personal army of Gallienus that he served as a commander of the elite bodyguard unit equites Mauri, because Zonaras 12.29 notes that Probus was a friend of Saturninus the Moor and Victorinus the Moor. Service in the same unit would be the natural place for the men to befriend each other. Obviously there is no definite proof of this – it is only my best educated guess. It is possible that he could have befriended these men also during his youth or after ca. 260.16
The sources do not give us any secure information about the whereabouts of Probus before the reign of Tacitus. All we have to go on are general statements or information in the Augustan Histories which appear to have confused the two Probi – Tenagino Probus and Marcus Aurelius Probus – with each other. The generalized information we can find in the Augustan Histories (Probus 6.1) states merely that Probus performed great exploits as a commoner (privatus) under Valerian, Gallienus, Aurelian and Claudius, and that he scaled walls, tore down ramparts, killed enemies in hand-to-hand combat and received rewards from the emperors for his services. It is in fact very likely that Probus participated in some of the military campaigns conducted by Gallienus in person against the usurpers in Gaul and the Balkans and then against the Goths and others in 267–8. The reference to hand-to-hand combat shows how important it was for commanders of the period to demonstrate personal valour in combat to encourage the men. It was this that had brought great fame to Caracalla and to Gallienus. In fact, it was this readiness to fight that the assassins of Gallienus had used to murder their emperor. The fact that Probus was not included in any of the lists naming the conspirators that assassinated the emperor Gallienus can be used to prove that he indeed did not participate in that plot, and it is the probable reason why he failed to hold any high positions under the emperor Claudius.
The above evidence suggests that the enemies Aurelian fought during his early career consisted at least of the Franks, Getae/Dacians/Carpi, Bastarnae/Sciri, Sarmatians, Heruls, Goths, Arabs, Armenians, Persians and fellow Romans. Probus had experience of facing at least the Quadi, Sarmatians, Marcomanni, Alamanni/Iuthungi, Getae/ Dacians/Carpi, Heruls, Goths, Arabs, Armenians, Persians and fellow Romans. This would have given them both very well-rounded military educations against all types of enemies, and it is therefore not surprising to see both commanders excel against all types of enemies once they became emperors.
The Germanic peoples consisted of three major groupings: 1) the Scandinavian tribes (Saxons and other tribes in the south of Denmark and north of Germany can be considered to belong to this group); 2) The Western tribes and confederacies (Saxons etc can also be considered part of this group, Franks, Alamanni, Suevi/Suebi, Marcomanni, Thuringians, Lombards, the western branch of the Heruls etc.); 3) Eastern tribes and confederacies (Goths, the eastern branch of the Heruls, Burgundi, Vandals, Gepids, Quadi, Taifali, Rugi, Sciri, Bastarnae etc.).
At this time most of the tribes or tribal confederacies were led by kings or high kings, but they did not possess the same authority over their subjects as the Roman emperors because the Germanic peoples valued personal freedom more than the Roman populace. The nobles and their retinues formed the military elite and were usually better equipped than all the rest. The Germanic peoples also required their entire free male population to serve in the tribal army when called to do so. Therefore the entire male population was divided into age groupings; the young ones were required to prove their manhood by fighting while the older married men were required to fight only in emergencies.
The Romans considered all Germanic tribes to be fearless warriors who preferred to fight in hand-to-hand combat. It was this that made them feared as enemies. Most Germanic cavalry forces preferred to avoid complicated manoeuvres, because they were usually not drilled in this. In practice, they often simply charged at a gallop straight at the enemy, which they sought to repeat by using spare horses if the enemy did not flee. Such a wild and impetuous cavalry attack was a frightful sight. Military men of the period expected that well trained and disciplined medium to heavily armed infantry forces would be able to withstand a cavalry attack of any kind when deployed in close order (e.g. close order or testudo/foulkon used against cavalry with shields rim-to-rim in width, or testudo/foulkon with shields rim-to-boss in width), but if the infantry force was deployed in open order, then elite forces would be required for the infantry to be able to deal with such an attack. Good examples of elite forces of this kind are the club/mace-bearers, whose specialty it was to engage cataphracts in open terrain. Green, poorly trained, and poorly disciplined infantry forces and the light infantry were not expected to be able to face such an attack. If the Romans possessed cavalry forces and they were similarly deployed in irregular order, then it was a question of morale whether the Romans could face such an attack. However, the units in close order gained moral ascendancy over those using irregular order because it made flight more difficult. Therefore it was probable that cavalry units in close order would prevail over the wild Germanic cavalry attack. However, this was always a matter of morale; many things could influence the outcome, and it was for this reason that it was important to outflank the enemy and prevent the enemy from outflanking one’s own array.
All the Germanic groupings were adept in the use of the infantry phalanx/shield-wall and knew how to form a wedge for attack and circle/hollow square in defence. In addition to this, when the Germanic tribes migrated with their families they took with them wagons which were used to form wagon laagers – a specialty of the East Germanic tribes. At unit level the Germans knew how to use their infantries in close order, tortoise, and in open order so that they could deploy their forces in whatever types of terrain they faced. In short, the Germanic peoples used all of the principal combat formations and unit orders, which made them dangerous foes for the Romans.
The principal weaknesses of the Germans were: 1) poorly organized logistical services; 2) poor siege skills; 3) tribal levies were not as well trained as the Roman professionals; 4) the missile arm was relatively weak; 5) the Germanic peoples wore in general less armour than the Romans. However, there were exceptions. There were differences between the major groupings and tribes and confederacies within them. For example, the eastern and Scandinavian tribes preferred to use armour and helmets whenever the warriors or their masters possessed enough wealth to obtain them.
The West Germanic peoples relied primarily on their infantry to win their battles. Their standard combat formations were the infantry phalanx, used both offensively and defensively, and the wedge, used offensively. Cavalry was usually used either for raiding, for protection of infantry flanks, or for outflanking and for pursuit. Most footmen consisted of spearmen who were armed with only spears, swords and shields. All tribes possessed light infantry archers, javelineers and slingers, but their role was minimal in comparison with the spearmen. The Franks, however, differed from others in that their infantry specialized in the use of the pilum-style tactic in which footmen threw either their throwing axe, called Francisca, or their heavy harpoon-like javelin, after which they advanced into contact with the enemy. There were also tribes who specialized in the use of cavalry. These included the Iuthungi and Lentienses from the tribal confederacy of the Alamanni, and the Tencteri from the Frankish Confederacy. The Chatti, who may have belonged to the Frankish Confederacy and who were famous for their infantry, were considered just as good and well-organized as the Romans by Tacitus (Germania 30–31). The principal West Germanic threats to the Romans were the Franks and the Alamanni/ Iuthungi. The following image depicting the Marcomanni from the Column of Marcus Aurelius also proves nicely that one should not underestimate the other Germanic peoples. All of them were able to put to the field large numbers of well-motivated warriors who were able to use all the basic infantry tactics.
The Marcomannic infantry phalanx/shield wall on Aurelius’ Column demonstrates how disciplined the Germanic combat formations could be. Source: Bartoli 1673.
The West Germanic tribes whose lands bordered the North Sea or Atlantic Ocean posed another kind of threat to the Romans. Most of these nations possessed seaworthy ships resembling the later Viking style ships with crews ranging from ca. 12 to 60/70 men (up to at most perhaps 100–150 men). The evidence suggests that at this time the vast majority of the naval vessels belonged to the smallest category of about 12 to 16 men per boat. However, even the largest were too small to oppose the average Roman war galley. The only problem for the Romans was to guard the coastline against raids conducted by these pirates. They had five methods at their disposal: 1) placing guard towers, forts and cavalry forces along the coasts; 2) engaging the enemy; 3) paying the raiders not to invade; 4) forming alliances with tribes that could be used against the raiders; 5) raiding their territories to force the enemy to submit to their will. But it was next to impossible to guard every part of the coastline all the time.
East Germanic Tribes
The principal difference between the West and East Germanic peoples was that the latter had adopted the use of the lancer/contarii cavalry and cataphracts from the Sarmatians, even to such an extent that their armies could consist solely of horsemen. There were some important tribal differences however. The Goths wore more armour than others, while the Heruls wore no armour at all; the rest were somewhere between these two extremes. The role of the infantry (spearmen and archers) among the East Germanic tribes was usually restricted to the holding of the wagon laager (carrago) or for the protection of the cavalry. The Sarmatian influence made itself felt also in the fact that their armies usually included mounted archers and multi-purpose troops able to use bows and mêlée weapons with equal ease. It was also typical for the East Germanic peoples to use wagon laagers/ fortresses for protection.
The most powerful of the East Germanic tribes were the Goths who consisted of the Tervingi and Greuthungi and their sub-tribes or allies. The allies consisted at least of the Dacians/Carpi (mostly lightly equipped cavalry and infantry) and of the Sciri and Bastarnae (no details of their military methods is known for certain). The ancient sources claim that these and their allies (the Bastarnae, Sciri, Dacians) were able to invade Roman territory with 320,000 warriors in about 267–8; one part of the force marched on land while the other part of the force sailed in ships. In fact, the naval threat (Roman style ships provided by the Bosporans; Germanic style longships and boats; local vessels built by the peoples of the coastal regions of the Black Sea) posed by the Goths and Heruls was just as important in the 250s and 260s as the naval threat posed by the Franks and Saxons.
Gothic combat doctrine was a combination of Sarmatian and Germanic influences, but the principal tactic was the cavalry charge with lances which could be accompanied with archery, and withdrawals and feigned flights when these were thought necessary. The following diagram shows their typical battle formation on land.
The Sarmatians and Alans were famed for their well-bred horses and for their cavalry charge with lancers (both katafraktoi and kontoforoi). The third century Alans were divided into three major groupings: 1) the western Alans who were subjects of the Goths; 2) the eastern Alans (the modern Ossetes) who inhabited the northern reaches of the Caucasus; 3) with Sarmatians the Alans formed the upper classes of the Bosporan kingdom (the eastern portion of the Crimea and some lands east of it).
The Romans faced the eastern Alans and their Sarmatian brethren only at such times as the ‘Ossetes’ or the armies of the Bosporan kingdom were allowed to pass through the Caucasus mountains either by the mountain tribes themselves or by their Georgian (the Dariel Pass/the Gates of the Alans) or Persian (the Derbend Pass) overlords. It is possible, even when the sources do not mention it, to deduce that there were units drawn from these peoples serving in the Persian armies. However, on the basis of the Georgian sources from ca. 270 onwards, some nomadic groups (possibly the eastern Alans and/or the Bosporans) appear to have fought against the Persians. This could only have happened with the tacit approval of the Alans and Bosporans, whose territories lay just west of the marching route taken by the nomads, which in turn may mean that the Romans had bribed them and the nomads in question.18 The eastern Alans were primarily mounted archers while the Bosporians possessed Sarmato-Alan style multi-purpose lancers armed with both spears and bows, and Romano-Gothic-Greek style infantry.
The so-called Kossika vase (Russia) l-3rd Century AD (drawn after Brzezinski & Mielczarek, 15). It is usually thought that the men represent duelling Sarmato-Alans, but it is possible that the man on the left could be Goth and the man on the right an Alan. Note the fact that the contus-bearer had shot at least two arrows before he charged.
It was only the western Sarmatians and Alans that posed an actual threat to the Romans at this time. There were these in the Gothic armies, and there were the independent Sarmatian tribes between the Danube and Roman Dacia. For the former, see above. The independent Sarmatians followed their traditional fighting style: the vast majority of their forces consisted of cataphract cavalry or lancers both of which were able to use bows when necessary. The standard tactical formation was to divide a cavalry line into skirmishers and defenders such that every other division consisted of either skirmishers or defenders. Their standard tactic was to invade Roman territory when the Danube was frozen and then raid and pillage as far and wide as possible after which they fled as fast as they had arrived. The idea was to be back in their own territory before the Romans could mount a counter-attack. The principal problem for the Sarmatians was that they were no longer real nomads. Now they had dwellings and villages which the Romans could target in revenge, which meant that the Romans were able to force the Sarmatians to follow their will when the Romans did not face any other serious troubles to distract them.
The Sasanian Empire was the most powerful of the enemies of Rome, but one should not underestimate the power of the Franks, Alamanni/Iuthungi and Goths either. The Persian realm, however, was the best organized and the only one of the enemies able to capture well fortified Roman cities. In 268 the Georgians, Armenians, Albanians and Arabs were either subjects or allies of Persia so that whenever the Romans fought against Persia they also faced these.
The military structure of the Sasanian Empire was based on the fourfold division of the Empire so that there was a vitaxa/spahbed (viceroy) in charge of the East, West, North and South. Persian society was feudal, kept together by strict social and religious control practised by the Zoroastrian Church. The King of Kings had to take into account the opinion of both the magnates and the Zoroastrian clergy. Sasanian military organization was hierarchial so that at the very top was the Shahanshah (King of Kings) himself whose second-in-command was the supreme commander of Iran, the Iran-spahbadh. Below them served the vitaxae and other generals and officers.
The Persian army (spah) consisted of bodyguard units (the best known of these were the 10,000 Immortals cavalry), cataphracts, light cavalry provided by mercenaries and tribal forces, elephants of the royal house, foot soldiers, navy, and logistical services. The cataphract cavalry provided by the mostly Parthian nobility formed the vast majority and the flower of the Sasanian army. The King of Kings possessed also his own units of bodyguards, which formed the crème de la crème of all forces. When not threatened by several major powers simultaneously the Sasanians had the capacity to put to the field cavalry armies of about 90,000 to 120,000 horsemen, in addition to which came the infantry and servants. However, this was not the case for most of the period after ca. 260 until ca. 285 because it was during those years that the Sasanians faced a series of enemies in the east which prevented them from placing this many men against the Romans. It is not known what number of men the Persians were able to put against the Romans during this time. Their subject nations – Armenians, Georgians and Albanians – certainly possessed the necessary numbers to bolster the Persian army to attain the maximum sizes mentioned above, but we do not possess any evidence for this. In fact, this inability of the Persians to mount any effective defence or offensives against the Romans rather suggests that the Persians feared to raise too many men from their allies during those years.
The Persian and Armenian cataphracts were the most fearsome cavalries of the era. Both of these possessed the ability to fight at long and short distances with their bows, spears and swords even if the Persian cavalry was better known for its preference to use prolonged periods of archery before engaging the enemy while the Armenians were better known for their immediate charge into contact with the enemy. The Persians delegated their infantry forces of spearmen, legionary style forces (the so-called Murmillones-style gladiators) and light infantry archers to secondary duties such as holding a camp or protection of cavalry (the infantry was placed behind) or for siege operations. Elite forces consisted always of cataphracts who were also dismounted for siege duties when necessary. The Georgians and Albanians usually contributed cataphract knights, but both of these nations could also provide cavalry with lighter equipment for the Persians. The Kushans and Sakas provided large numbers of mounted archers and small numbers of cataphracts. The Arabs, on the other hand, provided mainly lightly equipped cavalry lancers; these were fearsome warriors who rode camels during travel and then mounted horses for combat. Even if the Arabs preferred to raid and be gone before the enemy could mount a counter-attack, when the Arabs decided to fight, they were terrible foes to face because of their dogged determination to win.
The Sasanians were the most sophisticated of the enemies the Romans ever faced. They produced works of military theory to ensure the dissemination of military knowledge, which were copied by the Muslims later. The Sasanians combined ancient Indo-Persian military practices with Parthian nomadic cavalry tactics and Romano-Greek infantry tactics. Standard combat tactics was to use cavalry in two lines each of which consisted of outer left, left, centre, right, and outer right. If infantry accompanied the army, it was usually placed behind these in front of a fortified marching camp. Standard combat tactics were: 1) to encircle the enemy with a crescent array; 2) to encircle the enemy on one flank; 3) to place the battle formation on high ground to put the enemy under constant archery bombardment. The Persians usually closed in with the enemy only when it had been weakened enough with a prolonged archery barrage. The attack with the centre (convex array when the enemy outnumbered the Persians) and the defensive circle (cavalry dismounted or inside infantry circle) were used only in extreme emergencies.
When Gallienus had advanced against the invading barbarian hordes in the Balkans in 267, he had left Aureolus in charge of the defence of Italy, south of Gaul and Raetia, against the usurper Postumus (the emperor of the so-called Gallic Empire). Aureolus had joined ranks with Postumus in 268 while Gallienus was fighting against the Goths and Heruls in the Balkans with the result that Gallienus left Marcianus in charge of the war in the Balkans while he hastened back to Italy. Gallienus inflicted a defeat on Aureolus at the battle of Pontirolo and forced Aureolus inside the city of Milan which Gallienus then proceeded to besiege. It was then that the highest ranking military officers accompanying Gallienus formed a plot to kill him, possibly because he had abandoned the Balkans, the homeland of most of the officers, to the barbarian hordes so that he could deal with the rebel – a rebel whom Gallienus had pardoned earlier.
The three basic versions of the assassination of Gallienus in the sources are: 1) Claudius was unaware of the plot to kill Gallienus and was appointed by him to be his successor before his death; 2) Aureolus used a ruse and had a falsified letter dropped outside the walls of Milan, which indicated that Gallienus intended to execute certain officers; 3) Claudius was the man behind the assassination. The sources are also divided in their claims of how the murder was committed. The two basic variants are: 1) Gallienus was killed in his tent; 2) Gallienus was lured away from his tent and then killed.
Aurelius Victor (33.21) claims that Aurelian’s (in the variant text ‘Herculianus’, who is presumably Heraclianus) participation in the plot resulted from a ruse of Aureolus. Aureolus had falsified in the name of Gallienus a list of duces and tribunes that he intended to execute, which he then threw away from the wall secretly so that the besiegers obtained it. It was then thanks to this that Aurelian formed the plan for the assassination of Gallienus, which the other men accepted because Aurelian was highly respected by the soldiers. Aurelian then sent his cavalry to perform a fake attack against Gallienus’s lines in the middle of the night with the result that Aurelian’s other henchmen were able to lead Gallienus out of his tent to be assassinated by one unknown assassin who threw the spear that delivered the mortal wound. When Gallienus realized that the wound was fatal, he dispatched the imperial insignia to Claudius.
The principal problem with this account is the fact that the alternate reading for the chief conspirator is Herculianus, probably a misreading of Heraclianus, who is known to have been one of the chief plotters. Therefore the role of Aurelian is not absolutely certain on the basis of this account. However, since we know that Aurelian and Gallienus were polar opposites in character (see e.g. HA Aurel. 6, 7, 8, 36, 39, 46, 49 with Lactantius 6), it is quite likely that Aurelian was involved in the plot at some level. Aurelian was a lowly-born conservative person with very black and white views of what was acceptable, while Gallienus was an upper class libertarian. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that Aurelian punished adultery in all forms both as officer and emperor (Aurel. 7.3–4, 9.4–5) while Gallienus was adulterous in public view; and it is unlikely to be a coincidence that as emperor Aurelian forbade the keeping of free-born women as concubines as Gallienus had done with Pipa (HA Aurel. 49.8). Aurelian was also hostile towards Christianity while Gallienus was not (Eusebius EH 7.30.20ff.; Lactantius 6). In sum, it is highly likely that Aurelian was either the primus motor behind the plot or at least a very willing participant in it.
The Historia Augusta (Gall. 14) in its turn has preserved us the version according to which the principal plotters against Gallienus were the Praetorian prefect Heraclianus and Marcianus, and that these two men used the commander of the Dalmatian cavalry, Ceronius/Cecropius, to carry out the assassination. According to this version, it was Marcianus and Cecropius who sent the word to Gallienus that Aureolus had attacked. Gallienus then duly gathered his soldiers and advanced against the imaginary foe only to be slain by the assassins, so that the man who actually killed Gallienus with the spear was Cecropius. The reaction of the soldiers was hostile because they loved Gallienus, but Marcianus bribed the men to be silent and a council of officers chose Claudius as emperor. This version has at least one thing which is likely to be incorrect, namely the participation of Marcianus in the plot, because he had been left in charge of the operations in the Balkans. One possible way to reconcile this version is to think that in this case the Augustan History has purposefully hidden the role of either Claudius or Aurelian behind the name of Marcianus. It is clear that whoever this man was, he had a decisive role in the rise of Claudius on the throne, because it was thanks to his bribery of the men that this was possible. The likeliest candidates are actually Heraclianus as Praetorian Prefect so that the Historia Augusta has confused Marcianus and Heraclianus, or Aurelian because he was loved by the rank-and-file.
The most obvious point in the above accounts is the absence of the name Claudius from the list of conspirators. The three possible explanations for this are: firstly, the Latin texts follow the senatorial line which was very favourable towards Claudius; secondly, the sources sought to flatter the House of Constantine the Great, which claimed Claudius as its ancestor; thirdly, Claudius was indeed not party to the plot.
The Greek sources give us alternative versions, which also sometimes include the name of Claudius among the plotters. According to the version preserved by Zonaras (12.25) and by the most commonly accepted reading of Aurelius Victor (33.21ff.), Aurelian was one of the chief conspirators. Zonaras states that the mighty men of the state wanted to kill Gallienus with the help of Aurelian (Aurelianus), the commander of horsemen. The mighty men could be interpreted to include Claudius, but this is not stated clearly. Aurelian then sent horsemen (i.e. Ceronius/Cecropius, the commander of the Dalmatian cavalry, who according to the HA Gall. 14 was the killer of Gallienus) to lure Gallienus away from his bodyguards by claiming that Aureolus had attacked. When Gallienus then mounted his horse and galloped away, the horsemen (i.e. Cecropius) killed Gallienus. John of Antioch (f.232/f.152.3) also claims that the man who then killed Gallienus was the commander of the Dalmatian cavalry, but he claims that the murder took place at a dinner in which Claudius was present.
Zosimus (1.40–41) claims that the praetorian prefect Heraclianus and Claudius were the men who plotted to kill Gallienus. These men then gave the task to the commander of the Dalmatian cavalry (i.e. Cecropius). He informed Gallienus, who was at dinner, that Aureolus had attacked. Gallienus then armed himself, mounted his horse, and rode off without waiting for his bodyguards, with the result that the commander of the Dalmatian cavalry was able to kill him.
According to the second version preserved by Zonaras, the plotters were Heraclianus and Claudius. This version, however, claims that Gallienus was asleep at the time and was woken up with the news that Aureolus was attacking. When Gallienus jumped off the bed Heraclianus struck him. John of Antioch (f.232/f.152.3) in his turn states, as noted previously, that Gallienus was killed at dinner by the commander of the Dalmatian cavalry Heraclianus while Claudius was present. It is therefore clear that John’s version combines two different versions and men in the same account: commander of the Dalmatian cavalry Cecropius has become commander of the Dalmatian cavalry Heraclianus (in truth praetorian prefect). It is probable that this results from careless reading of the sources.
Synopsis Chronike (p.38) names as conspirators Heraclianus and Claudius, and states that it was Heraclianus who awoke Gallienus and claimed that Aureolus was attacking, and then killed Gallienus when he was attempting to find his arms.
In sum, while the Latin sources claim that Claudius was innocent of the murder, most of the Greek sources claim that the chief plotters were Claudius and Heraclianus, the two highest ranking subordinates of Gallienus. The only exception among the Greek sources is Zonaras who also includes the variant version which adds Aurelian to the list of plotters. The commander of the Dalmatian cavalry is not named, but we know his name from the Latin sources. If Aurelian was the commander of all cavalry forces at this time, as is very likely, then it is clear that he was the superior of Cecropius, as stated by Cizek, which in its turn makes it more than likely that Aurelian was also involved in the plot. It is indeed probable that he faked the cavalry attack against Gallienus’s forces while his accomplice Cecropius informed the emperor.
The way in which the murder was committed is open to question. The evidence does not allow us to definitely conclude whether Gallienus was killed in his tent or whether he was killed while galloping against the imaginary enemy.
The reason for the murder is also not known with certainty. It is possible that it resulted from a ruse and that it was because of this that Aurelian in particular felt intense hatred towards Aureolus (see later) or that the assassination resulted from the abandonment of the war against the barbarians in favour of dealing with rebel Aureolus as implied by Zonaras’s text (2.26) or that it was simply the result of personal ambition by the key plotters.
What is also notable is the absence of the name of Probus from the list of conspirators. This could have resulted from the fact that he had remained behind in the Balkans with Marcianus, or, if he had accompanied Gallienus to Italy, that he was known for his loyalty and was therefore not included in the plot; or that he was simply not important enough either to be included in the plot or named by the sources at the time.