Coin of Claudius II (source: Cohen)
Coin of Claudius II (source: Cohen)
T he reign of Claudius II is among the most difficult to reconstruct, because the reliability of the sources is suspect thanks to the fact that he was claimed to be a relative or ancestor of Constantius and Constantine the Great. It is thanks to this that many of the successful campaigns that took place under Gallienus have been placed during Claudius’s reign while his failures are placed under Gallienus’s. Most modern historians think that the connection between Constantius and Claudius was fabricated to create an illustrious ancestor for the emperor. Furthermore, the sources also give several versions of the family tree of Constantius Chlorus/Constantine the Great and Claudius. Constantius and therefore Constantine the Great either descended from Claudius or from his brother. However, I agree with those who, like Bray (321–4), suspect that there must have been at least a germ of truth in the claim. The reason for this is that the emperor Julian, who was himself a descendant of Constantius, is believed to be Claudius’s descendant (Julian, Oration/Panegyric 1.6.D; Oration 2.51.C-D).2
At the time Claudius assumed power the barbarians still ravaged the Balkans and the Aegean Sea, the Gallic Empire was still in existence, Palmyra was still in the hands of Zenobia, and Aureolus was still holed up in Milan. Therefore the assassination of Gallienus did not change the military reality, but it did create some new problems. Claudius needed to secure his own position among the army and the Senate. The first of these had already been done by some unknown officer who had bribed the soldiers to accept Claudius as emperor. This would naturally have been the donative that was given to the troops when the new emperor was nominated. The second of the problems facing Claudius was that the soldiers did not accept the killing of the relatives of Gallienus which was taking place in Rome and elsewhere.
We are actually in the dark as regards the fate of Gallienus’s relatives, because the sources give us different versions of what happened. It is likely that at least Gallienus’s brother Valerian (Valerianus) was killed in the camp immediately after Gallienus. The other persons who are claimed to have been killed immediately are the sons of Gallienus. Aurelius Victor claims that the Roman population and senators were elated when they learnt of the death of Gallienus and decreed that Gallienus’s relatives and friends were to be thrown down the Gemonian stairs. However, he also claims that after the capture of Milan Claudius gave the order to spare those who had survived this purge, because the army had demanded it. The implication is that Claudius, who had sought recognition from the Senate with a letter, 3 was the man who had ordered the purge but was forced to cancel it when the soldiers were no longer forced to obey commands thanks to the fact that Aureolus and his soldiers were no longer a threat. Aurelius Victor’s obvious intent was to demonstrate that Claudius was merciful, but when it is placed in context, as I have done here, it becomes clear that Claudius was the man behind the butchery. This proves that the soldiers had not just wanted to extort as much money as possible from the new emperor with their actions, but that they had really loved their emperor Gallienus and were therefore prepared to threaten the new emperor at the first opportunity they got, which was right after the siege of Milan had ended. Claudius was forced to placate the soldiers, so he ordered the Senate to put a stop to the killing. On top of this, he forced the Senate to declare Gallienus a god.
Trebellius Pollio (HA, Gall. 19.8) claims that there were still descendants/relatives of Gallienus surviving in Rome at the time of his writing. This implies that the siege of Milan cannot have lasted long because it is otherwise difficult to see how these descendants/ relatives could have survived the massacre, unless of course they fled from the city immediately. The latter alternative receives support from the readiness of Aureolus to surrender which could be the result of the problems that the Gallic Empire faced or the result of new foreign invasions that would have required the Romans to cooperate. In short, it is impossible to know whether the siege was short and ended in 268, or whether it was longer and lasted until 269.4
There are several versions of how the siege of Milan came to an end. The only common denominators are that Aureolus negotiated his terms of surrender with Claudius, and that Aureolus was killed in the end. The Greek sources state that Aureolus negotiated with Claudius and then surrendered to him, but the latter’s bodyguard killed him.The Historia Augusta (Aureolus, Claud., Aur.) gives us several versions: Aureolus asked terms from Claudius, but Claudius stated that Aureolus should have asked them from Gallienus, after which they fought a battle in which Aureolus was killed by his own men; Claudius fought a battle with Aureolus and killed him at the battle of Pontirolo; Aurelian killed Aureolus against the wishes of Claudius after Aureolus had surrendered; Aureolus was killed after the surrender by Aurelian because Claudius had ordered it; Aurelian killed Aureolus only after the death of Claudius. As can be seen, the name of Aurelian is present in several of these alternatives.
Let us now then analyze the different versions for their probability. It is possible that there were two separate battles of Pontirolo, but it is also possible that this is just another instance in which the successes of Gallienus are placed to have occured under Claudius. This is obviously only partially false because it is clear that Claudius would also have been present at the battle of Pontirolo that took place under Gallienus. The same has happened with the Gothic war. Claudius obtained the title ‘Gothicus’ because of the victories he achieved as a general of Gallienus, which were then transferred by the sources to have taken place during his reign.5
Let us now turn to the role of Aurelian in these events. On the basis of the above it is clear that Aurelian remained in Italy as long as the siege of Milan lasted, and if there was a second battle of Pontirolo it is probable that he participated in it. If Aurelian killed Aureolus against the will of Claudius, this implies that Aurelian probably had personal reasons for hating Aureolus. The three likeliest reasons for such a hatred would be: Claudius may have convinced Aurelian that the death of Gallienus would have been caused by Aureolus’s actions (ruse or assassins); Aureolus had indeed fooled Aurelian with the stratagem given above; the sources paint Aurelian as a stern conservatively minded person who saw things in terms of black and white with the implication that it is possible that Aurelian just wanted to punish Aureolus for his disloyalty. If Claudius had ordered Aurelian or his bodyguard to kill Aureolus, the implication is that Claudius considered Aurelian to be a man who could be trusted with delicate missions. If the killing of Aureolus took place only after Aurelian had become emperor, the implication is that Aurelian was probably not a party to the plot to kill Gallienus and that he exacted vengeance on all those implicated in the murder of Gallienus when this became possible, or that he just wanted to punish all those who had betrayed their rulers. It is impossible to know which of these is true, if any.
In the meantime, very significant events had taken place in Gaul. Postumus had just defeated Germanic invaders when Vipius Cornelius Laelianus (Lollianus of the HA) revolted against Postumus in about 268. Postumus had reacted swiftly and had put Laelianus under siege at Mainz, where Laelianus was killed by his own soldiers (HA TR. 5.3) probably also in 268 or at the latest in the spring of 269. The soldiers who had suffered the hardships of the siege wanted to pillage the city of Mainz, but Postumus forbade this, presumably because Mainz was a Roman city. This was a mistake that cost him his life. The soldiers killed him. The date usually given by historians for this is the year 268, but it is possible that it took place only later in 269 because, according to the Epitome 34.2–3, Victorinus began his rule at about the same time as Claudius defeated the Alamanni near Lake Garda (Benacus), which must have happened in 269. A general called Marius then usurped power and it is quite possible that he had been the man behind the murder of Postumus. However, it is also possible that Marius was used as a patsy for the murders of Postumus and Laelianus by Victorinus and by his mother Victoria/Vitruvia because the Historia Augusta (Tr. 5.3) claims that Victoria was behind the enthronement of Marius and Tetricus. Whatever the truth, Marius had had a phenomenal career behind him. Marius had begun as a blacksmith and had then risen to the position of dux before being enthroned as emperor. This, however, was not accepted by M. Piavonius/Piaonius Victorinus, who, according to the Historia Augusta, was the co-ruler with Postumus. He duly organized the assassination of Marius (after he had ruled for only two days or three days or twelve weeks depending on the source). According to the Historia Augusta and Aurelius Victor, the power behind Victorinus was actually his mother Victoria/Vitruvia so it is possible that it was she who orchestrated the whole sequence of events. Victorinus in his turn stayed in power for two years (268–70 or 269–71), but was then killed in a conspiracy organized by actuarius (quartermaster) Attianus. The reason for the killing was that, although a capable general, Victorinus was a man unable to keep the loyalty of his men because he either seduced or raped many women and when he then raped the wife of Attianus, Attianus exacted his own sweet revenge against the violator of his wife. According to Aurelius Victor, it was because of the power of the quartermasters over the soldiers that Attianus was able to incite the soldiers to kill their emperor. Victoria/ Vitruvia was one of the remarkable figures of the era and she used her influence and money to convince the soldiers to choose praeses Aquitaniae C. Pius Esuvius Tetricus as the next emperor in 270 or 271. Tetricus, however, rewarded her support by having her murdered. He did not want to be in her debt and to rely on her support. It is possible that this murder worsened his relationship with the soldiers.6
After the siege of Milan ended, Claudius II was finally free to visit Rome to secure the support of the Senate with a personal appearance.7 The visit was a great success. Claudius managed to gain the support of important power brokers in the city. These men included Aspanius Paternus, a sort of éminence grise who had been consul in 267– 8 and was therefore an important figure in Gallienus’s Rome. His influence ensured a relatively smooth transition of power. Now Claudius had the backing of both, the former supporters of Gallienus and his enemies. Claudius did not want to become too dependent upon the support of one party alone; he might use these two against each other in a game of power. Cladius was not a member of the Roman aristocracy and it was because of this that he needed their support more than Gallienus had.8
Claudius may have appointed Aurelian as commander of all cavalry forces (presumably comes domesticorum equitum or magister equitum) or he was just kept in the same office. Trebellius Pollio also claims that Aurelian was given the command of the legio X, which he claimed to signify that the commander was destined to become an emperor, in other words the intended successor. This legio X is probably not one of the known tenth legions, but a new formation. I have speculated that it had been created under Gallienus or before him, and that it was either the Ioviani or Herculiani known from the reigns of Diocletian and Maximian. The problematic part of this is that before the murder of Gallienus, Claudius had been tribunus et magister officiorum who would have been the superior of the comites commanding the protectores, and if Aurelian was only comes domesticorum equitum (or its equivalent) why had he been given command of the legio X and who was the new tribunus et magister officiorum if such was appointed? The giving of command of the legio X would imply that Aurelian was nominated as tribunus et magister officiorum or comes domesticorum peditum (commander of domestic infantry). However, it is also possible that Claudius did not nominate any man as tribunus et magister officiorum even if it is probable that he did appoint someone in charge of the infantry protectores. If Claudius appointed someone as tribunus et magister officiorum, the likeliest candidate would be the praefectus praetorio Heraclianus, but, as said, none of this is known with any certainty. In fact it is entirely plausible that Claudius would have also given the praefectus praetorio command over the commanders of the protectores without giving him the title that he had had.
Whatever his official title, Aurelian was dispatched back to the Balkans to take charge of operations there, with command of all of the armies posted in Thrace and Illyricum. This means that Claudius replaced Marcianus with Aurelian, the probable reason for the sacking being that Marcianus had not been party to the plot to kill Gallienus.9
The Historia Augusta (TR. 29.12, 33) has preserved us a problematic account of an otherwise unknown usurper – Censorinus – for the reign of Claudius. Trebellius Pollio claims that Censorinus was a soldier and a senator who had in him old-time dignity. He also claims that Censorinus was living on his own estates, possibly in Bologne where he was buried, at the time he was proclaimed emperor. This implies that Censurinus was in Italy at the time of his usurpation and that he probably usurped power in Rome. Pollio asserts that the usurpation resulted from a witticism of a jester who called him Claudius because he was lame in one foot as a result of a wound received in the Persian War under Valerian (claudus = lame).10
According to the Historia Augusta, Censorinus then made the serious mistake of trying to instill discipline among the soldiers (the Praetorians?) with severity. The result was the soldiers killed him. If there is any truth to this account, the implication is that the succession from Gallienus to Claudius was not quite as smooth as usually claimed. The likeliest date for the usurpation would be the immediate aftermath of the murder of Gallienus when Claudius was still preoccupied with the siege of Milan. This also implies that the Senate did not stand as united behind the real Claudius as the sources claim, which would indeed have made it necessary for the real Claudius II to proceed to Rome to secure his own position after the siege of Milan had ended, if the usurpation indeed took place early in his reign. The other possible dates for the usurpation attempt would be the time when Claudius was preoccupied with the war against the Alamanni/Iuthungi in 269, or when he had advanced to the Balkans in 270.11
According to the possibly fictitious letter from Claudius to Aurelian in the Historia Augusta, Claudius censured Aurelian for his lack of bold action against the Goths at some unknown point in time during his reign. Claudius hastened Aurelian on and asked why he was delaying in a situation in which the Goths were ravaging Haemimontum and Europe. Claudius ordered Aurelian to drive the Goths away from Thrace regardless of the cost. The letter also informed Aurelian that Claudius would send his brother Quintillus with reinforcements to assist him. As far as we know, he did not then send Quintillus possibly because he and his men were needed against the Iuthungi and Alamanni in 269–70, or because Claudius came to the conclusion that it was safer for him to lead the men to the Balkans in person rather than risk the possibility that Aurelian could tamper with the loyalty of the men when they were led by Quintillus.12
The contents of the letter ring true. The forces ravaging Haemimontum and Europe can be idenfied with the Goths besieging the cities of Nicopolis ad Istrum and Anchialus. True to its tendency to whitewash the events of the reign of Claudius, the Historia Augusta (Claud. 12) claims that it was thanks to the valour of the provincials that the Goths failed to seize Anchialus and Nicopolis when they retreated northwards. Fortunately we possess evidence from the more reliable Ammianus (31.5.16) for these events. He states that the barbarians sacked both Anchialus and Nicopolis. He adds that it was only after the death of Claudius that Aurelian drove the Goths out of Roman territory. Sextus Aurelius Victor (34.2–6) states basically the same by claiming that Claudius II consulted the Sibylline Books which stated that the first man of the Empire was to sacrifice himself to achieve a victory over the Goths, and that it was only after Claudius II had sacrificed himself like the Decii that the Goths were defeated and driven out of the Empire with no loss in Roman soldiers. Therefore it is clear that neither the locals nor Aurelian could defend Nicopolis and Anchialus. However, it is also possible that the sacking actually took place only after the death of Claudius in which case it would have resulted from the transferral of troops to the west by Aurelian who was trying to secure the throne for himself. The above-mentioned letter of Claudius to Aurelian in which Claudius censured Aurelian for lack of boldness, however, would suggest otherwise. And why was this so? Aurelian is known to be among the greatest military leaders Rome ever produced. The letter provides the answer. Aurelian did not possess enough men to defend the cities and it was because of this that Claudius promised to send reinforcements under Quintillus. And why did Aurelian have too few men for the task? The reason is that Claudius had overextended his resources by dividing his armies among too many fronts. Aurelius Victor’s statement that the Goths were driven out of the Roman Empire with no loss in men explains how the war progressed after the death of Claudius II. Aurelian left the scene of combat and marched west to usurp power, and it was then that the Goths evacuated Roman territory simply by retreating northwards.
The sources prove that Claudius: 1) dispatched praefectus vigilum Julius Placidianus to lead an invasion of Narbonensis in 269; 2) gave Tenagino Probus the task of clearing the Aegean Sea of the pirates (Heruls, Goths and others) in 269; 3) dispatched Heraclianus against the Persians also in about 269 (see below). As if this was not enough, Claudius was himself tied in Italy because the Iuthungi and Alamanni launched massive invasions of Raetia and Italy also in 269. The probable reason for this invasion was the power vacuum left as a result of the dispatching of forces to Gaul under Placidianus, the Balkans under Aurelian, and against the Persians under Heraclianus. The situation was also aggravated by Claudius’s other mistakes. The most important of these is that Claudius seems to have stopped the payment of subsidies to the Iuthungi which resulted in invasions of Italy and Raetia.13 The most costly of the mistakes, however, was the one that led to the break-up of the relationship between Claudius and Zenobia. This means that the forces that Aurelian would have needed for the mopping up of the remaining pockets of Gothic forces in the Balkans just were not there. In addition to this, it is quite clear that he would have been forced to give some of his forces to Heraclianus when he marched through the Balkans to fight against the Persians with the result that the Goths were able to break through the cordon of Roman troops as discussed above.
Julius Placidianus’s campaign, however, was a success. He was able to exploit the chaotic situation of the Gallic Empire. On the basis of the inscription at Gratianopolis (Gallia Narbonensis), Placidianus’s forces consisted of both vexillationes and equites (Saxer 57–8). It is probable that in this case we should take vexillationes in its traditional sense to mean infantry detachments because the separate use of the word equites implies this. Placidianus was able to capture Narbonensis while the Spanish provinces also declared their loyalty to the new emperor.14 Flavius Vopiscus (HA FSPB 9.5) claims that Saturninus, the future rebel against Probus, recovered the provinces of Spain for Rome. This would be easy to dismiss because of the source, but I see no reason to do so. Therefore, my suggestion is that once Placidianus had recovered Narbonensis, he dispatched Saturninus with some forces to recover Spain, while he himself protected the south of Gaul against Victorinus. The other possibility is that Saturninus invaded Spain from North Africa while Placidianus invaded Narbonensis, because Saturninus is claimed to have recovered Africa from the Moors. Saturninus’s recovery of the provinces of Gaul is likely to mean the campaign of Aurelian in 274 rather than the campaign of Placidianus, but this cannot entirely be ruled out either. On the basis of the praise that the sources give for the military talents of the new Gallic Emperor Victorinus, it is probable that he managed to stabilize the situation after the initial losses.15 It was partly because of these successes that when Autun revolted next year, they received no support from Claudius. Other reasons would obviously have been the troubles Claudius was facing elsewhere, the most important of which was the Iuthungi invasion and the fact that the Goths and their allies were still on the loose in the Balkans. It was then that the Palmyrenes revolted against Claudius.
The rise of Palmyra into a major power took place under Odaenathus during the reign of Gallienus. It was largely thanks to three developments. When Odaenathus had sought a peace from Shapur I, the latter had haughtily and foolishly decided to overlook his requests. Secondly, when Shapur I had defeated and captured Valerian, Odaenathus had managed to inflict a series of defeats on the Persians with the result that Gallienus rewarded Odaenathus with the title dux Romanorum. When the Macriani then revolted against Gallienus, it was Odaenathus who crushed their forces in the east, which earned him the gratitude of Gallienus who then gave Odaenathus the title corrector totius Orientis. This gave Odaenathus control over most of the Roman forces of the east for use against the Persians and others who could threaten Gallienus.16
Trebellius Pollio (HA, Gallienus 13.4–5) claims that the break-up in the relationship between Rome and Palmyra took place already under Gallienus after the murder of Odaenathus when Zenobia had become the ruler of Palmyra. He also claims that it was after the death of Odaenathus in about 267 that Gallienus finally gathered an army under the Praetorian Prefect Heraclianus against the Persians to exact vengeance on them for their treatment of his father Valerian, but then claims that the Palmyrenes destroyed this army in its entirety. The extant evidence proves otherwise. Coins prove that Zenobia continued to recognize Gallienus as emperor and that the break-up in relations took place only under Claudius. Furthermore, it is well known that the Praetorian Prefect Heraclianus was with Gallienus in 268 because he was one of the principal plotters against him. This means, as has already been suggested by Potter (p.266), that it is very probable that Heraclianus had actually been dispatched by Claudius in about 269 against the Persians, because the sources are in the habit of trying to place all Roman failures in the reign of Gallienus in their effort to exonerate Constantine the Great’s assumed ancestor of all blame.17 The wording and other information in the Historia Augusta suggests that Zenobia betrayed the Romans in the midst of their campaign against the Persians. It is probable that we should connect the negotiations between Zenobia and the Persians mentioned by the same source with this very same event. Zenobia had clearly come to the conclusion that a peace and alliance with Persia was preferable to being a subject of Claudius. This begs the question why? My educated guess is that Claudius had made the mistake of demoting Zenobia by placing her under Heraclianus in a situation in which Gallienus had accepted Zenobia as successor of her husband’s position.
In short, the thing that pushed Zenobia into revolt was most likely Heraclianus’s real mission, which was to place the Palmyrenes under secure Roman control, but in light of Zenobia’s actions in the desert regions it is probable that she had been planning to revolt from the beginning of her rule. However, it is possible that Heraclianus had some successes against the Persians before Zenobia crushed him, because one inscription gives Claudius the title Parthicus Maximus. The coins and other evidence places the beginning of the revolt of Zenobia to the spring of 270 with the implication that Heraclianus’s campaign against the Persians must have taken place either in 269 or in the winter of 269/70. The principal evidence for this conclusion is that the mint at Antioch was closed in the spring of 270, which dates the beginning of Zenobia’s revolt against Claudius to the spring of 270. The mint resumed its minting during the winter of 270/1 by issuing coins with the joint names of Vaballathus and Aurelianus. The apparent purpose was to declare loyalty to the new emperor Aurelian and to attempt to find reconciliation between the two parties.18
Therefore, the evidence suggests that Zenobia took full control of Antioch and Syria during the spring of 270. It is likely that she launched an invasion of Asia Minor approximately at the same time. The Palmyrenes decisively conquered the territory up to Galatia and Ancyra, but the Bithynians overthrew the Palmyrenes when they learnt of the rise of Aurelian on the throne. The Palmyrenes invaded Arabia approximately at the same time. The Palmyrenes were commanded by the general Zabdas (Zaba, Saba). Trassus, the dux of Arabia, had under him at least the local legio III Cyrenaica and some other local troops. The latter category may also have included legions (at least X Fretensis at Jerusalem)19 and other forces posted in Palestine/Judaea, but it is also possible that these surrendered without a fight or withdrew to Egypt. The case for the legio III Gallica which was garrisoned at Damascus is also uncertain. It is possible that it sided with the Palmyrenes, but it is also possible that it had surrendered without a fight or had withdrawn south to Bostra. The Romans were undoubtedly outnumbered but Trassus still confronted the invaders near his provincial capital Bostra. Unsurprisingly, Trassus was defeated and killed in action. Zabdas pillaged Bostra and advanced into the Jordan valley. Now that Zabdas had secured Arabia, Palestine and Judaea, he was ready to advance into Egypt.20
Palmyra was a rich city state – the most important commercial hub of the east largely thanks to its own efforts in the promotion of trade through its facilities. One modern estimate for the size of the population of the city is 150–200,000, but I would not preclude the possibility that it could have housed even more inhabitants. Despite being an oasis, Palmyra was entirely reliant on trade because the city possessed a far larger population than the oasis was able to support. This fact dominated its politics. Its leaders wanted to protect their position as the foremost trading centre of the east, through which went a significant amount of international trade. Most of this trade was in the form of silk, spices and other luxury items. The rulers, the city administrators and the merchant and banking houses of the city all sought to facilitate the transport of goods, either by providing transport and financial services or simply by renting animals or other necessary things for others. The persons with the title synodiarchês (possibly the same as archemporos) were probably the central figures in commercial transactions. They were rich landowners who provided transport animals, raised finances for a group of merchants making up a caravan, and then organized, led and protected the caravan to and from its destination. To be able to do this, they also possessed personal military retinues that specialized in caravan protection. The Palmyran state in its turn maintained military posts along the trade routes. The Palmyran merchant houses had colonies in the most important trading centres of Persia, Mesopotamia and Egypt. The state of war between Rome and Persia endangered this traffic, because the Persians were in a position to prevent access to Mesopotamia, Syria, Asia Minor, the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. When Zenobia broke up with Rome and concluded peace with Persia, she endangered the other trade route running from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, from there through Trajan’s Canal up to the Nile, and from there to the Mediterranean. Therefore it is not surprising that it became her goal to conquer Egypt immediately after she had revolted from Rome. It would give Zenobia complete control over all traffic from the east to the Mediterranean.21 However, in my opinion it is probable that the actual conquest of Egypt was done on behalf of Aurelian, even if it is still likely that it had been in Zenobia’s mind from the beginning, of which the best proof is her conquest of Arabia.
After the death of Odaenathus, the official head of the state of Palmyra was Vaballathus, but in practice power was in the hands of his mother Zenobia. As successor of his father, Vaballathus held officially the titles of King of Kings as an insult to the Persians, dux Romanorum and corrector totius orientis, the latter two of which had been granted to Odaenathus by Gallienus as a reward for his loyalty to him. However, as we have already seen, it is more than likely that Claudius II took away these titles when he dispatched Heraclianus with an army to take charge of the war against Persia.22 Zenobia was unwilling to give up the position that her husband had achieved, and revolted, the result being the destruction of Heraclianus’s army, after which followed the conquests of most of Asia Minor together with Arabia and that of Egypt for Aurelian.
When she revolted, Zenobia’s principal aim appears to have been to create a true Palmyran Empire which controlled all trade between East and West. In fact, her diplomatic efforts appear to have been quite successful because the Historia Augusta names among her supporters the Persians, Armenians, Iberians, Saracens, Arabs from Arabia Felix (Himyarites), Blemmyes, Aksumites, Bactrians, and Indians. This list of names suggests that her commercial and imperial ambitions found a ready audience among all those who were involved in the silk and spice trade.
We know very little about the Palmyran army. All that we know is based on the very few descriptions of it in the sources (mainly Zosimus), some works of art, and on some extant inscriptions. The inscriptions prove that the commanders of the Palmyran army were called strategoi and that these were not as high ranking as the strategoi in the Roman army because cohors XX Palmyrenorum, which was a regular Roman auxiliary unit posted at Dura Europos, had two strategoi of archers. It is also known that the Palmyrenes did not only contribute soldiers to the Roman army, but that they also possessed a sizable regular army of their own. On the basis of Zosimus’s account (see my analysis later), the most important part of this regular army was the elite katafraktoi/cataphractarii (cataphracts, both men and horses fully armoured) which this wealthy city possessed in abundance as we shall see. In addition to this, the Palmyrenes possessed Bedouin-style cavalry which used camels for transport and horses for combat, and probably also kontoforoi/ contarii cavalry, a lighter version of cataphract cavalry. In other words, their horses were not armoured and the men were also unarmoured or wore only small amounts of it. The hippotoxotai (mounted archers) could be either katafraktoi (cataphracted) or afraktoi (not armoured) as can be seen from one of the images preserved in Dura Europos. The extant works of art and other evidence proves that the Palmyrenes also possessed infantry forces consisting of armoured spearmen and light infantry archers. In addition to this, the Palmyrenes obviously had access to the Roman forces garrisoned in the area.23
The subsequent discussion proves that Palmyrenes possessed a massive number of cataphracts, so that they were able to mass together at least 70,000 of them for a single battle as they did at Emesa. It is probable that they could have massed together even more if they had acted more wisely, because this was the number of cataphracts the Palmyrenes had after they had already lost a very large number in the previous battle.
It is difficult to know which of the legions sided with the Palmyrenes in the initial stage of the conflict. When reading the following analysis, readers should keep in mind that it is possible or even quite likely that the legions mentioned here were not present in their entirety in the garrisons and that there were detachments from these forces also in Europe. The likeliest candidates to side with the Palmyrenes are the legions I Parthica, III Parthica, IV Scythica and XVI Flavia Firma because these were located in Syria, Mesopotamia and Oshroene which were under de facto Palmyran control. The case for the X Fretensis legio (Jerusalem), III Gallica (Damascus) and the possibly newly raised legion to replace the previously destroyed legio VI Ferrata (at Legio-Kefar Otnay/Caparcotna) is not certain. It is possible that these surrendered or deserted to the Palmyrenes, or were destroyed at Bostra or withdrew to Egypt. Similarly, it is impossible to know with any certainty what was the stance adopted by the legions XV Apollinaris and XII Fulminata when the Palmyrenes advanced into Asia Minor. It is possible that they withdrew, or that they surrendered or deserted to the Palmyrenes. In addition to these, the Palmyrenes would obviously have had in their control the auxiliaries from the areas controlled by them and the Classis Syriaca (Fleet of Syria) with the main base located at Seleucia. However, with the exception of Palmyrene and Arab auxiliaries, the loyalty of the rest of the Roman forces was suspect and many of them duly deserted back to the Roman side once the emperor reached the area. In fact, the list of forces serving under Aurelian in 271–2 (Asian forces from Tyana, Mesopotamia, Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine) suggests that all of the legions and other non-Arab forces deserted to the Roman side immediately, unless these forces consisted of the detachments previously sent to the west, which is indeed quite possible. Regardless, it is still likely that at least some of the Roman forces serving under the Palmyrenes remained loyal to their new master and one may estimate that the Palmyrenes could have had at their disposal at least about 10,000–15,000 infantry, and perhaps about 10,000 cavalry drawn from the Roman sources.
In addition to these, we should include the allies which consisted of the Armenians and Persians. Unfortunately for the Palmyrenes, these did not join forces with Zenobia but fought a separate war against the Romans in their effort to save Zenobia.
The principal striking forces of the Armenians and Persians were the cataphracts, as with Palmyra, and both of these nations possessed masses of these so that one can estimate that they could put against the Romans a minimum of 50,000–70,000 cataphracts even when the King of Kings and/or his main field army was fighting in the east, as was the case at this time.
The accompanying drawings of mine show what types of forces the Palmyrenes possessed on the basis of the extant works of art. Some of the images depict men who could be equally well Romans or Persians. The image of a procession of Palmyran nobles in about 100–150 AD depicts Palmyrene or any Arab cavalry as it would have appeared when it emerged from the desert to attack the sedentary peoples. The camels were used for transport and the horses for combat. Note the bow-cases and quivers attached to the rear of the saddles and the ends of the spears between the legs shown with the grey. The men depicted in this scene were multi-purpose troops able to fight at long distance with bows and at close quarters with spears and swords.
The two graffiti from Dura Europos give us a rough image of how the third century cataphracts would have looked. They can be seen to be representative of the cataphracts employed by the Parthians, Persians, Palmyrenes and indeed also by the Romans. These two graffiti divide the cataphracts into two major types, the lancers and mounted archers, but in practice the cataphracts could be equipped with both lances and bows. My own educated guess is that these two graffiti should be interpreted to mean different ranks in the same formation so that the lancers formed the front ranks and the archers the rear ranks, in the same manner as the sixth century Romans.
The Palmyrene footman armed with the spear and sword is based on a relief of a warrior god from Dura Europos dated early third century AD. A dotted line is added to show the missing portions. It is probable that the shield was in truth larger than shown in this image, but the small size still implies that it was not as large as the legionary scutum – my educated guess is that it represents a round shield with a width of 45–60 cm. The footman with the coif/hood of scale is drawn after the Battle of Eben-Ezer fresco in the synagogue at Dura Europos, ca. mid-third century. It is possible that the scale-like paintings actually represent mail because they reach the wrists, but on the basis of the appearance it is still safest to assume that this represents a man equipped with scale armour. However, we know from other sources (e.g. Vatican manuscript illustration of coifs; mail attached to Sasanian helmets) that it was possible that Roman soldiers also wore mail coifs, possibly even underneath their helmets. Note also the continued use of sexagonal shields and the possible use of a strap beneath the shoe to hold the trousers in place. This soldier can be seen to be representative of both Roman and Palmyrene footmen in the region.
Dura Europus. cataphract (drawn after von Gall)
Dura Europus. mounted archer on armoured horse (after fig. 17D James)
As a ruler Zenobia relied on the support of the friends of her husband Odaenathus and on her position as a guardian of her underage son Wahballath/Vaballathus. The court consisted of Zenobia, her sons, the friends of Odaenathus, and the cultural and religious circle of Zenobia. The principal military men of the court were Zabdas, the general-in- chief, and Zabbai, the commander of Asia. Stoneman notes that these two men were two separate people and are not to be confused with each other as has often been done today just like it was in antiquity. After the conquest of Egypt this circle of military men came to include also Timagenes. Zenobia sought to endear herself with these and other military men by joining their drinking feasts and by hunting wild game with them. The most important man in the court appears to have been the philosopher and rhetorician Cassius Longinus who was officially in charge of teaching Greek to the queen and to conduct her diplomacy in the same language, but his role as an advisor and confidant appears to have been even more important than this. As well as these, there must have been other men of importance about whom we know nothing. One could have been Septimius Vorodes. Under Odaenathus he had been procurator Augusti ducenarius, argapet (a Parthian title meaning commander of a fort) and the second most important man after the king, but his fate after the death of Odaenathus is not known. Stoneman speculates that Zenobia had either purged him, or, if he was still alive, that he was still one of the most important men of the Palmyran Empire. He suggests that the name Vorodes implies a pro-Persian stance, which would have been a recommendation under Zenobia.24
Just like Julia Domna before her, Zenobia surrounded herself with philosophers, intellectuals and religious teachers. Her aim was undoubtedly to project an image of learning. The most important of these was the already mentioned Cassius Longinus, but others may have included the sophist and historian Callinicus of Petra, the sophist Genetlius, and the historian Nicomachus of Trebizont. Zenobia is known to have supported the founding of the Neoplatonic school of Apamea. To make her rule as acceptable as possible to all the new subjects, Zenobia appears to have practised religious tolerance. She is also known to have shown interest in Christianity, just like Julia Domna, and Photius claims that Longinus converted her from the Hellenic superstition into Judaism, while some of the no-longer-extant Coptic papyri claim that she converted into Manicheanism. Her conversion to Judaism receives circumstantial support from the presence of a large Jewish community in Palmyra and from the fact that Zenobia is known to have improved their position in Egypt. If she was a Jew, as is quite possible, this would also have had important foreign policy consequences, because it would have been particularly helpful when dealing with the Jewish kings of Himyar.25
Zenobia’s interest in Christianity also had political consequences. As has been recognized for a long time, Paul of Samosata, who was a Bishop of Antioch from ca. 260– 268/9, was a supporter of Zenobia. Two church councils, in 265 and 268/9, denounced Paul as a heretic and forced him to leave his see in about 270. It is possible that it was then in 270 that the Antiochians sent an appeal to the new emperor Aurelian who duly removed Paul from office. According to Bar Hebraeus, Paul fled to Zenobia. However, I am inclined to agree with the traditional interpretation of what happened and accept the view that Zenobia then reinstated Paul to his see when she revolted against Claudius II in 270 so that Paul was not only Bishop of Antioch but also procurator ducenarius with a military retinue of his own. In other words, I agree with those who consider Paul of Samosata to have been a secular imperial financial officer in the service of Zenobia. The traditional view is that it was because of this that the Antiochians asked Aurelian to depose Paul when he arrived in the city in 272. However, it is possible that the appeal was already made in 270, as stated above.26
As a rule Zenobia sought to portray the rule of her and her son to project an image of grandeur. However, it was only in Egypt that she struck coins in her own name and it was also in Egypt that she portrayed herself as Cleopatra. In fact she claimed to be a descendant of Cleopatra. She also included the goddess Selene in her coins, but it is possible that this was a reference to Cleopatra because this was one of her names. The principal means of portraying her power was through the coins struck in the name of her son Vaballathus, and only secondarily through works of art or buildings.27
Flavius Vopiscus (HA Probus 9.1ff.) places M. Aurelius Probus in Egypt, but the problem with this is that we know from other sources that Claudius had nominated Tenagino Probus as praefectus Aegypti with the mission to clear up the eastern Mediterranean of the last remnants of the Heruls and Goths. It is clear, as has been recognized for a long time, that Vopiscus has confused the two Probi with each other. However, most historians are still of the opinion that M. Aurelius Probus, the future emperor, was also present in Egypt serving under Tenagino Probus, because Vopiscus’s account proves that M. Aurelius Probus was still present in Egypt later. The sending of M. Aurelius Probus to Egypt to serve under Tenagino Probus actually makes a lot of sense. Having spent his youth in Egypt, M. Aurelius Probus was familiar with the region. Tenagino Probus appears to have cleared the barbarian pirates by 269, but we do not know if M. Aurelius Probus had any role in this campaign. However, he seems to have been present as Tenagino Probus’s subordinate in the next campaign against the Moors. The inscriptions and the Historia Augusta prove that the Marmaridae and other Moors had started raiding Roman North Africa. Tenagino Probus marched to Cyrene where he defeated the Marmaridae and founded the city of Claudiopolis.28
The Moors consisted of lightly equipped infantry and cavalry, which meant that the Romans had a clear tactical superiority over them in pitched battles. The exact proportions of these depended upon the tribe. The attached eighteenth century drawing of Moorish cavalry on the Column of Trajan shows how lightly they were equipped. Javelins/spears should be added to it because these are no longer extant in the sculpture. Such tribes as the Garamantes still employed war chariots, but it remains clear that by Roman standards all of these tribes were inferior in their combat abilities. The fact that the Moors employed phalangial arrays in combat was not enough to change the situation. The Moors attempted to mitigate their comparative weaknesses through force of numbers or by avoiding contact with the Romans, which they usually did by retreating into the deserts.29 The details given by Vopiscus, however, suggest that at this time the Moors decided to fight it out, with poor results for them. It is quite possible that the large uprisings of the Moors and Egyptians (see below) against the Romans had all been fomented by the Palmyrenes and their diplomats.
According to Vopiscus, M. Aurelius Probus continued the march to Carthage where he defeated the rebels. It was there, according to Vopiscus, that M. Aurelius Probus fought a duel with one Aradio in Africa and killed him. On the basis of this it is uncertain whether Tenagino Probus accompanied his subordinate M. Aurelius Probus or whether M. Aurelius Probus conducted the latter portion of the campaign alone. Furthermore, it is uncertain who the rebels were. They could have been local Romans and/or Moors. If the former, then the likely rebel was Galliena (see my Gallienus). What is clear is that most of North Africa was in flames, and that it required the concerted efforts of the two Probi to crush these. The confusion of the material in Vopiscus (HA Prob. 9.1–5) also allows the possibility that the campaign of Probus should be dated roughly to the year 271, so it would have predated the reconquest of Egypt by the Palmyrenes in 272. I will discuss this matter in greater detail later.
Vopiscus (HA FSPB 9.5) states that Saturninus, the future usurper against Probus, recovered Africa from the Moors, which makes it possible that both M. Aurelius Probus and Saturninus fought together during this war, but since he also claims that Saturninus was the man responsible for the recovery of Spain in about 269 it is possible that he refers to another war against the Moors.
Probus' North African Campaign.
The revolt of Aureolus in Raetia and the subsequent transferral of a part of the army under Aurelian to Thrace against the Goths created a power vacuum in Raetia and the north of Italy, which the Alamanni and Iuthungi exploited by invading Italy during the spring or summer of 269. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the Marcomanni/Iuthungi who had been settled in Pannonia by Gallienus formed an alliance with the Sarmatians and Vandals against Claudius. The likeliest reason for this uprising was that Claudius was considered responsible for the murder of Gallienus who had been married to Pipara/Pipa, the daughter of their king Attalus.30 One may also assume that Pipa did not survive the murder of her husband. A fragment of Dexippus proves that Claudius had also stopped the payment of subsidies to the Iuthungi, which always resulted in the renewal of hostilities.31
The invasion took place when the emperor Claudius was in Rome. Consequently, he marched north where he defeated the Alamanni and Iuthungi near Lake Garda in 269.32 See the map of Verona on page xix. The likeliest route for these invaders was either through the Brenner Pass or via the Splüngen/Septimer Passes up to Lake Garda. It is probable that the battle took place somewhere east of the lake close to the road leading north. The location suggests the possibility that Claudius may have blocked the enemy’s route of retreat, so that could have protected his right flank against the lake and his left flank against the mountains. The other possibility is that Claudius pursued the retreating enemy and forced it to fight in this location. Considering subsequent events the latter is actually more likely, because the enemy renewed its war against the Romans next year with the implication that the Roman victory was by no means decisive. Regardless, the victory still enabled Claudius to take the title Germanicus Maximus to advertise his success.
We do not know for certain what went on in Claudius’s head, but he appears to have hesitated whether he should invade Gaul or whether he should pursue the defeated barbarians or whether he should move to the Balkans against other invaders which included the Marcomanni, Sarmatians, Vandals and Goths. The situation was ripe for the reconquest of Gaul. It is quite possible, as suggested by Watson (44), that it was now that Claudius uttered his famous words that war against the usurper was his personal concern, but the war against the barbarians was the state’s concern and the state’s concerns should always take precedence over his own. It was now, at the latest, that Claudius dispatched Placidianus to Narbonensis, but it is probable that he had done that already after the revolt of Aureolus had been crushed.33
It is not surprising that the Illyrian Claudius chose to march to the Balkans against the Marcomanni, Vandals and Sarmatians (HA Aur. 18.1–2; Dexippus fr. 7). This left the Iuthungian war unfinished with the Iuthungi renewing their invasion the next year. Dexippus’s text (fr. 6) proves that they were pillaging Italy at the time of Claudius’s death. We also know that Claudius appointed his brother Quintillus to take charge of the defence of Italy (HA Aur. 17.5). When in the Balkans Claudius was unable to achieve anything of note because he caught the plague, withdrew to Sirmium, and died probably in August 270.
The fame of Claudius as a great military commander is based solely on the claim that he was the man responsible for the defeat of the Goths and other invaders in the Balkans. This, however, has resulted from the falsification of the evidence. The two principal reasons for this are: 1) Constantine the Great and his successors claimed that Claudius was their ancestor; 2) the senators hated Gallienus and attributed all of his successes to his successor Claudius. As I have demonstrated in my biography of Gallienus, this last claim was not entirely unfair because Claudius did have a very significant role in the defeat of the Gothic invasion. But this took place when he was still only one of the generals of Gallienus, even if he was the most important of these.
Coin of Claudius II struck after his death (Divo). Source: Cohen
The real achievements of Claudius as emperor were far more modest. He crushed the revolt of Aureolus and defeated the Alamanni and Iuthungi near Verona. Gallienus had already inflicted the decisive defeat on the Goths and Heruls, so it was only the mopping up of the remnants of these forces that took place under Claudius. Furthermore, this was performed by Aurelian and Tenagino Probus. Claudius’s main contribution to the situation was actually two serious blunders. The first of these was the stopping of payments to the Alamanni, Iuthungi and Marcomanni, which predictably resulted in wars. The second, considerably more serious, was that his high-handed policies caused Zenobia of Palmyra to revolt. Therefore Claudius’s inheritance to his successor Aurelian was poisoned. His anti-barbarian policies had worsened the situation.
A Sarmatian draconarius from a tombstone at Grosvenor Museum, Chester, latter half of the 2nd cent. Note the loop stirrup. Drawn after Gawronski Fig. 146. Gawronski has now proven beyond doubt that the Romans used loop stirrups during the imperial period. However, this was not decisive in combat not even from the point of view of shock combat. The latest study to confirm this is by Williams, Edge and Capwell. Furthermore, the use of loop stirrups restricted the ability of the horseman to dismount fast. It was because of this that the vast majority of the Roman horsemen chose not to use the stirrups.
First century AD Kushan seal, British Museum. Drawn after Gawronski Fig. 145. Note the loop proto-stirrup, which according to Gawronski was probably used as a mounting aid. It is quite clear that the loop stirrups were very widely known in ancient world.