Coins of Quintillus, the brother of Claudius II (source: Duruy)
A t the time of Claudius II’s death the Roman Empire was a shadow of its former self. In the west there was the separatist Gallic Empire, which had lost Spain and a part of Gaul to Claudius’s forces, and in the east there was the Palmyran Empire which had declared its independence from Claudius and was about to conquer Egypt, a major supplier of grain for Rome. On top of that, Claudius’s field armies had been divided into separate armies to oppose the different invasions. In the east, in the Balkans, there were the forces placed under Aurelian who served as commander of all forces posted in Illyricum, Dacia and Thrace against the Goths and their allies, with the title of commander of all cavalry (hipparchos, which I interpret to mean either magister equitum or comes domestici equitum), 1 and just west of him there were the forces that Claudius had brought with him to Sirmium. In Italy at Aquileia there were forces under Quintillus, brother of Claudius, presumably meant to oppose the invading Iuthungi. In Gaul there were forces that had been brought there by Placidianus, but these proved insufficient even to threaten the Gallic Empire. At the time of Claudius’s death the massive concentration of naval and land forces in Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean under Tenagino Probus were about to be annihilated by the Palmyrenes so that by the end of 270 the only loyalist forces left in Africa were their remnants and the remaining forces posted in Libya and west of Libya.
When news of the death of Claudius II was brought to Aquileia, the troops there naturally raised his brother Quintillus as emperor, and his nomination was soon confirmed by the Senate at Rome so he became the legitimate emperor of the Roman Empire. Quintillus and the Senate, however, had not taken into account the ambitions of Aurelian and the support he had among the troops. Even though Zonaras (12.26) and Cedrenus (p.454) claim that Claudius nominated Aurelian as his successor on his deathbed at Sirmium, it is clear that this is a fiction created afterwards by Aurelian himself. Aurelian was nowhere near Sirmium at the time of Claudius’s death, and it was thanks to this that Quintillus was universally recognized as emperor in all those areas where Claudius had been the nominal ruler, and the mint at Siscia was able to mint a coin in his name. Thanks to the fact that Aurelian had the command of the operations against the Goths, it is very likely that he was conducting a not-so-successful defence of the cities of Nicopolis and Anchialus, and when news of the death of Claudius reached him, he abandoned both cities to their fate and marched at the double to Sirmium to test the loyalty of the forces and their officers there before declaring himself emperor.3 When Aurelian then got the reassurances he wanted, he had himself declared emperor by the forces present at the scene. On the basis of the rapid collapse of support for Quintillus, it is also likely that he was in some contact with the officers serving under Quintillus at Aquileia before he announced his bid for power. It is also certain that Aurelian considered himself the only legitimate successor of Claudius because he dated his reign to begin on Claudius’s death. It is very unfortunate that we do not known whether Claudius had made any such promises at the time of his own accession in order to gain Aurelian’s support.
Coins of Quintillus, the brother of Claudius II (source: Duruy)
The sources give different lengths for Quintillus’s reign, but all are unanimous that it was short. Saunders summarises the information as follows: seven days (Cedrenus p.454; Synopsis Sathas p.39); a few days (Epitome 34.5); seventeen days (Eutr. 9.12; Jerome, Chron. 222b; HA Claud. 12.5; Malalas 12.29; Syncellus AM5763; Zonaras 12.26); twenty days (HA Aur. 37.5–6); seventy-seven days (Chronica urbis Romae p.148); a few months (Zos. 1.47); or about a year or two (Zonaras 12.26). On the basis of the abundance of extant coins, some researchers believe that Quintillus must have ruled for seventy-seven days/a few months, but as Saunders notes this is not conclusive. On the basis of the Egyptian papyri and coins, he thinks that the lower figures are more likely, but in my opinion the Egyptian evidence suffers from the same problems of not providing a definite answer. All that we know for certain is that Quintillus ruled long enough to be universally recognized and that he lost the support of the army serving under him relatively soon after the news of Aurelian’s usurpation reached it. One cannot even entirely rule out the possibility that Quintillus could have been a co-ruler with Claudius so that he would have ruled for one or two years. Cizek (87) suggests an attractive solution to the above problem which is that those accounts which put the reign of Quintillus to last only days actually refer to the time that Quintillus and Aurelian reigned together as opposing emperors. My own educated guess is that Quintillus’s reign lasted indeed about seventy-seven days/a few months, because the evidence from Egypt does suggest in no uncertain terms that Zenobia’s invasion of Egypt was done as an ally of Aurelian against Quintillus.
There are two versions for the death of Quintillus. Most Latin sources claim that his troops killed him, but I am inclined to agree with Saunders that the Greek sources are correct in stating that the desperate Quintillus committed suicide by slitting his own veins. This kind of suicide for an emperor was a rare occurrence and therefore sounds quite plausible.
If we interpret the evidence as I have suggested above, so that Quintillus ruled for about seventy-seven days, this influences the way in which the two wars that took place during the year 270 – namely the Iuthungian invasion of Italy and the Palmyrene invasion of Egypt – have to be reconstructed. The circumstantial evidence does indeed back up this.
The Iuthungian war had started already when Claudius was alive and it was because of this that Quintillus had been posted at Aquileia. Quintillus appears to have been unwilling to risk a battle with them when he faced the revolt of Aurelian. Aurelian in his turn appears to have exploited this by demonstrating his military mettle by ambushing the Iuthungi in a situation in which Quintillus had done nothing. See below. It was this that would have then undermined Quintillus’s position as the legitimate successor of Claudius.
The death of Claudius also brought a change in the relationship between Aurelian and Zenobia, which can be detected from the coins minted in the east which depict Aurelian and Vaballathus simultaneously. The implication is that Aurelian and Zenobia concluded a peace. There are two possible ways this could have happened. It was either Zenobia who sent envoys to Aurelian immediately she had heard of the death of Claudius, with the task of concluding a peace with Aurelian. The other alternative is that it had been Aurelian who sent envoys to Zenobia to form an alliance with her in a situation in which he still needed to secure his own position. None of the narrative sources mention such an alliance, but the timing of the events, as well as the official recognition that Zenobia gave to Aurelian, are highly suggestive. If it was Aurelian who suggested such an alliance, and I would suggest that he is the likelier candidate, this would have been believable because Quintillus was Claudius’s brother and therefore the natural enemy of Zenobia. It is also possible that Aurelian and Zenobia had met each other in 254 when Aurelian was in the east, so there would also have been a personal aspect to the alliance. I would also suggest that it is very likely that Zenobia invaded Egypt on behalf of Aurelian with the intention of denying grain supplies if Quintillus had managed to hold on to Italy and Rome. As we shall see, Aurelian’s plan was not to keep his word but to crush the Palmyrenes. His intention was clearly to act like Caracalla had acted before him and fool all the enemies he could. Zenobia, however, attempted to keep the peace to the very end because she continued to mint coins portraying Aurelian as the superior emperor/Augustus until the spring of 272.4
Coin of Vaballathus/Zenobia recognizing Aurelian as Augustus. Source: Duruy.
The date for the beginning of the invasion of Egypt is controversial. We know that the Romans still controlled most of Egypt in late September which is proven by the fact that the papyrus finds at Oxyrhyncus still recognized Claudius as emperor in late September, while the mint at Alexandria minted its first coins in Quintillus’s name after 29 August 270, but Quintillus’s series was just as shortlived as was his reign. The region south of Memphis never recognized Quintillus. Their papyri were dated according to Roman consuls from 12 October until mid-November or mid-December with the implication that the situation was volatile during those months. After this, the papyri named Aurelianus and Vaballathus jointly, which means that the Palmyrenes had conquered the area and Zenobia was attempting to reach a reconciliation with Aurelian, which she probably obtained in some form because there is no evidence for her withholding any grain shipments bound for Rome. I agree with Pat Southern that the evidence in papyri and coins does not mean that the invasion of Egypt could not have started during the reign of Claudius as implied by Zosimus, but I am still of the opinion that Alaric Watson is correct in stating on the basis of the papyri and coins that the main offensive of the Palmyrenes started in early October when Aurelian was already the emperor. The invasion apparently took place at the same time as the Probi were conducting their counter-attack against the Moors. It would be really nice to know whether Palmyrene diplomacy had played any role in inducing the Moors to invade Roman North Africa at this moment, because it certainly facilitated the Palmyrene invasion. Furthermore, we know that the Blemmyes captured Coptos in 268 and held it until 270. It has also been suggested that Palmyrene diplomacy was behind this invasion. This is a distinct possibility, but it is also possible, as suggested by Pat Southern, that one of the reasons for the Palmyrene invasion of Egypt would have been to secure the trade route by destroying such enemies as the Blemmyes who were causing disruptions to the trade networks. It is unfortunately impossible to know for sure which of the versions is correct, if any.5
In sum, my own educated guess, which is based on the circumstantial evidence, is that Zenobia actually fought as an ally of Aurelian against Claudius’s brother Quintillus. This evidence consists of the above-mentioned dating of the coins and papyri and on the fact that Zenobia recognized Aurelian as the senior Augustus in her coins immediately after she had gained control of Egypt. This alliance also explains why Zenobia recognized Aurelian as emperor and why Zenobia did not withhold the grain shipments of Egypt.
Battle of Babylon in Egypt in 270.
Zosimus is our best source for the Palmyrene conquest of Egypt and it is worth quoting him at length because there are some serious misunderstandings regarding the events in modern studies of the war.
The Scythians being thus dispersed, with the loss of a great part of their troops [this refers to the successes of Tenagino Probus and others against the Goths and Heruls], Zenobia began to think of extending her dominion, and therefore sent Zabdas to Egypt, because Timagenes an Egyptian attempted to place Egypt under the government of the Palmyrenians, Syrians, and Barbarians, to the number of seventy thousand, which was opposed by fifty thousand Egyptians. A sharp engagement ensued between them, in which the Palmyrenians had greatly the advantage. He [Zabdas] then departed, leaving them a garrison of five thousand men [this appears to mean the garrison placed at Alexandria].
During these transactions, Probus [Tenagino Probus], who had been appointed by the emperor [Claudius] to clear the sea of pirates, having heard of the subjugation of Egypt by the Palmyrenians [he was clearly fighting against the Moors at the time], marched against them with his own forces, and with as many of the Egyptians as were averse to the Palmyrenians, and drove out their garrison. The Palmyrenians rallying with fresh forces [it is probable that there were other Palmyrenes or their allies like the Blemmyes and Aksumites present in Egypt], Probus, having levied a body of Egyptians and Africans, gained another victory, and drove the Palmyrenians out of Egypt. But as Probus was encamped on a mountain near Babylon, thereby cutting off the passage of the enemy into Syria, Timagenes, who was well acquainted with the country, seized the summit of the mountain with two thousand men, and attacked the Egyptians by surprise. Probus being taken with the rest killed himself [this means Tenagino Probus, because Vopiscus/HA Probus 5 states quite clearly that M. Aurelius Probus managed to flee despite he too being almost captured]. [Zosimus 1.44., 1814 tr. p.23 with changes and comments.]
Vopiscus (HA Probus 9.6), in his account of the career of M. Aurelius Probus, claims that after the Moorish campaign M. Aurelius Probus fought next against the Palmyrenes who had taken control of Egypt. He claims that M. Aurelius Probus fought first with success, but was then almost captured thanks to his recklessness, only to claim that he later returned with reinforcements when Aurelian had become emperor. The former describes clearly the campaign of Tenagino Probus which is also described by Zosimus. The latter campaign will be dealt with later. The other alternative is that both the reckless fighting and the renewal of the fight indeed took place during the reconquest of Egypt in 272, but the other alternative is more likely because it fits the sequence of events better.
As we have seen, the evidence for the Palmyrene conquest of Egypt is full of problems. However, what is known for certain on the basis of Zosimus, the coins and papyri is that the Palmyrene commander Zabdas with 70,000 men defeated the local Egyptian forces consisting of 50,000 men in a major battle and that the Palmyrenes gained possession of the north of Egypt after September and that the situation remained volatile because Tenagino Probus then launched his counter-attack so that by late October or early November in 270 he was in control of Alexandria.6 The Palmyrenes gathered reinforcements, but Probus defeated the Palmyrenes again and forced them to retreat south past the city of Babylon so that Probus pitched his camp on the nearby mountain with the idea of preventing the flight of the Palmyrene army to Syria. However, it was then that he was surprised in his camp by Timagenes, so the Palmyrenes regained control of Egypt by December when the mint at Alexandria struck coins in the name of Vaballathus and Aurelian.
As noted above, it is probable that this war took place while Quintillus was still alive, with the implication that Aurelian’s decision to engage the Iuthungi was meant to be a propaganda gesture to undermine Quintillus’s standing among the soldiers. However, since this is not known with certainty, it is possible that this war took place immediately after Quintillus had committed suicide. It is indeed possible that the crushing of the Iuthungi invasion was Aurelian’s first challenge as sole ruler in a situation in which Aurelian had not yet even gained the support of the Roman Senate. The former alternative, however, appears more likely. This was also not to be the last of the invasions Aurelian would face.
According to the Historia Augusta (Aurelian 18.2–3), Aurelian faced a succession of invasions at the very beginning of his reign. The first of these was the invasion of the Suebi, which was followed up by the invasions of the Sarmatians and Marcomanni. What is notable about this is that the Historia Augusta actually preserves for us the most complete version of the events, which stands once again as a good proof of its value as a much-too-overlooked source. The archaic names mentioned by the Historia Augusta hide behind them a number of more recent names. On the basis of Dexippus’s fragment (see below) we know that the Suebi means the Iuthungi. Similarly we know on the basis of another fragment of Dexippus (Skythika 7) that the Sarmatian invasion included the Vandals. However, it is also known that Aurelian faced the real Sarmatians as well because he received the title Sarmaticus Maximus. We can add further details into this account from the already mentioned fragment of Dexippus which refers to a separate force of Vandals, which is likely to mean that the Sarmatians campaigned separately from them. We can also identify the Marcomannic invasion of the HA with the invasion of the Iuthungi (Dexippus frg. 7.4), Alamanni (Victor 35.2) and Alamanni and neighbouring peoples (Zos. 1.49.1). Some historians think that this third massive invasion at the beginning of Aurelian’s reign in 271 included all of the peoples mentioned, while others think it meant only the Iuthungi or alternatively the Alamanni or the Alamanni and Iuthungi. My own educated guess is that it included all of the above because these tribes lived right next to each other and it is quite easy to see that they could have formed an alliance.
These invasions were not the only troubles that Aurelian faced. He had also inherited the old problems of the breakaway Gallic Empire and the aggressively expansive Palmyran Empire to deal with. But the solving of these problems had to wait for a more opportune time. The Iuthungi needed to be punished.
Saunders (168ff.) is likely to be correct when he states that the Iuthungian invasion had begun when Claudius was still alive and that Quintillus had placed himself at Aquileia to oppose it. It is also likely that just before Claudius’s death Quintillus had asked Claudius either to send reinforcements and/or to return to Italy in person because he (Quintillus) apparently felt unable to oppose the vast numbers he was facing. Saunders suggest that the Iuthungi invasion began at Augusta Vindelicum and progressed from there to Verona – Aquileia – Virunum – Lauriacum for a distance of some 694 miles. This is a plausible suggestion, but if the usual emendation to change the Rhodanus (Rhône)8 into Epidaurus (Po) in Dexippus’s Skythika is correct, then the invading force would have naturally marched past Verona up to the Po before starting their return journey. None of the sources mention the sacking of Verona or any other major city in Italy, which means that the Iuthungi probably did not try to attack any of the walled cities, but this is obviously an argument from the silence of the sources.
We do not know this with certainty, but it is very likely that Aurelian had immediately started to advance towards Aquileia after he had been declared emperor, because the first thing he needed to do was eliminate Quintillus and to secure the support of the forces serving under him. However, it is also possible that Aurelian advanced first against the Iuthungi and only then against Quintillus, who was duly killed or committed suicide. Still another possibility is that Aurelian advanced against the Iuthungi after Quintillus was dead and went to Aquileia only after he had defeated the Iuthungi. In normal circumstances the next thing in order of importance would have been to secure the support of the Senate of Rome, but this was now of secondary importance to the defeating of the Iuthungian invaders who appear to have been in the process of withdrawing from Italy at the time Aurelian usurped the power. Gallienus’s murder proves that his officers, Aurelian included, considered foreign invasions more important to deal with than usurpations and it was thanks to this that Aurelian now prioritized the pursuit of the enemy.9
Due to the uncertainties of the sources we do not know when Quintillus died, or whether Aurelian marched to Aquileia before turning against the invaders. It all depends on how long Quintillus reigned. My own educated guess is that Quintillus reigned about seventy-seven days and that it was because of this that Aurelian actually engaged the Iuthungi while Quintillus was still alive. Therefore I accept as the likeliest alternative Saunders’ suggestion that Aurelian marched directly to the Danube.10 In short, my educated guess is that Aurelian did not enter Italy, but led most of his cavalry forces north-east to ambush the Iuthungi while he left his infantry behind, possibly in the Julian Alps, to block Quintillus’s route to the Balkans.11
The reconstruction of the following events is a hotly debated issue among modern historians and is based upon their individual interpretations of the two extant fragments of Dexippus’s Skythika (frg. 6–7).12 It has long been recognized that fragment 6 of Dexippus’s Skythika belongs to the very beginning of Aurelian’s reign because Aurelian’s speech in Dexippus’s text refers only to the Roman victories over the Goths and Galmionoi (galmionôn of the text is usually emended to mean alamanôn/Alamanni) that took place before his reign and that it should be connected with the invasion of the Suebi mentioned by the Historia Augusta. Consequently, Aurelian was unable to continue his march to Rome to secure the support of the Senate for his nomination. Aurelian had to march north on the double to crush the Iuthungi whom he engaged and defeated and forced against the Danube (exact location unknown). It is a hotly debated topic whether these Iuthungi were the remnants of the Alamanni who had escaped the defeat of the Alamanni at Lake Garda, or whether these were a separate force that had just exploited the absence of Claudius II or his death. What is certain is that they had a legitimate grievance against the Romans, as the Romans had discontinued the payments to them agreed by the previous emperors. I agree with Drinkwater that it is probable that the original agreement to which the Iuthungi referred had been concluded under Gallienus in about 260 and that this agreement had been broken by the Romans presumably already under Claudius II, but it is also possible that this referred to an agreement made by Claudius with the Iuthungi after the battle of Lake Garda in 269.13 Whatever the truth, it is still clear that the result of the Roman perfidy was the invasion of Roman Raetia and part of Italy, and the immediate counter-strike by Aurelian.
Unsurprisingly given the problems with the textual interpretation of Dexippus’s fragment 6, historians have interpreted the evidence in it very differently. All that is known with certainty is that Aurelian defeated the Iuthungi at the Danube so severely that they sent an embassy to ask for terms of peace. According to Gibbon (pp.306–8), the Romans were deployed on the opposite bank of the Danube in an ambush and allowed about half of the enemy force to cross the river before attacking. Aurelian advanced the two horns of a crescent over the river to enclose the enemy host inside. Saunders (168ff.) suggests there was a pursuit of the Iuthungi up to the Danube where the Romans defeated them, without attempting to interpret the details of the battle. White (65ff.) suggests that Aurelian collected an elite force of light infantry and ambushed the Iuthungi on both sides of the river.
My own suggestion is that we should interpret the battle between Aurelian and the Iuthungi as a cavalry ambush in which Aurelian had concealed his cavalry forces on the northern bank of the Danube. In other words, I interpret the battle so that Aurelian first bypassed the Iuthungi by making a circuitous march with his cavalry, so they would have marched eighty kilometres a day for four or five days to get enough time to cross the Danube and then conceal themselves on the opposite side before the Iuthungi scouts arrived on the scene. After having crossed the Danube, Aurelian would also have advanced northwards with a wide front so that the locals would have been forced to flee northwards with the result that they would have been unable to provide any warning to their fellow countrymen. Aurelian would then have returned southwards, but only as much as was necessary. He would have stayed far enough from the Danube so that the enemy scouts would not have been able to detect the ambush and he would have launched his own ambush only when his scouts informed him that substantial numbers of the enemy had crossed the river. When about half the enemy force had crossed the Danube, Aurelian launched his ambush so that his cavalry ‘with all its might’ overthrew all of the ‘Iuthungi- Scythians’ who had already crossed the Danube back to the other side, after which the survivors asked for a truce to negotiate a peace. According to Zosimus 1.49, Aurelian killed myriads of Alamanni barbarians in a battle near the Danube. The reference must be to this battle. The cavalry attack formation, however, would not necessarily have been a crescent, as it was during the audience next day, but a modified version of the regular cavalry formation so that it could be hidden inside a forest or on another suitable piece of ground hiding its presence, although it is still possible that it was a crescent to enable the wings to outflank the enemy immediately. Whatever the formation was, the decisive factor for the way in which the ambushing formation was formed would have been the lay of the land.14
When the Iuthungi embassy arrived to negotiate terms of peace, Aurelian equipped his whole army for combat to frighten the enemy and arrayed it in a crescent. Then he took his seat at a raised platform just as Contantius II did later when receiving enemy ambassadors.15 The leading generals (‘archas’) stood beside their horses on both sides of the emperor. Behind the emperor were the standards (and/or shield emblems ‘sêmata’) of the picked army (‘epilektou stratias’), and on silvered xyston-spears (standard poles) the golden eagles (the legionary standards), images/icons of the emperors, and the names of the units of the army/encampment (‘stratopedôn katalogoi’) engraved in golden letters. The inclusion of the legionary eagles does not necessarily mean that their footmen would have been present because it is entirely plausible that only the legionary horsemen were present. Furthermore, since the purpose was to amaze the enemy, it is clear that all of the unit emblems (including those that were in truth under the Gallic Empire or Palmyran Empire) were displayed, as were images of the emperors.
It is unfortunate that Dexippus fails to clarify who the picked soldiers were. It is possible that they were Praetorians (or rather their cavalry component) or equites singulares Augusti or the newly created bodyguard units variously called aulici, scholae, protectores, and domestici in the sources, or all of those together. My own educated guess is that the picked soldiers included all of these, and whatever other units (like the equites Mauri) had been included in the cavalry bodyguards of Gallienus.16 It is also quite obvious that, as under Gallienus, the army also included the legionary cavalry and auxiliary cavalry so that the entire corps accompanying Aurelian would have been the equivalent of Gallienus’s equites corps. Therefore it is quite possible that the katalogoi (= arithmoi, numeri) meant the auxiliary cavalry units, but it is also possible that this generic term meant all of the units accompanying Aurelian.
However, the enemy was not prepared to be impressed. On the contrary, according to the probably invented speech of Dexippus, they demanded that the tribute that they had previously been entitled to receive be reinstated to them in return for peace.17 They also boasted that they had penetrated deep into Italy and that they had 40,000 pure-bred (katharos)18 Iuthungi horsemen who excelled in cavalry combat (‘hippomachia’), and 80,000 shield-bearing footmen. In other words, the Iuthungi bragged that their cavalry fought better than the Roman and that it was only thanks to the division of the Iuthungi by the river that the Romans had defeated them. The reference to the 40,000 horsemen and 80,000 shield-bearers should be seen to mean the remaining Iuthungi on the opposite side of the river. The idea was to attempt to frighten Aurelian with the size of their host. However, since we know that the references to numbers in the speech were put into the mouths of the Iuthungi envoys by Dexippus, we do not know whether this statement was ever made and furthermore we do not know how many Iuthungi there had been originally and how many were left after the battle. If the Iuthungi really claimed to have had so many men on the opposite side of the river, it is probable that this would have been an exaggeration meant to frighten Aurelian. However, one cannot preclude the possibility that they did because Dexippus may have used a period report as his source and similarly it is possible that Dexippus may have used an estimated size of the defeated overall force as his source for the figures. In my opinion, it is entirely plausible that the Iuthungi had at least the number they claimed to possess because that would explain why they had been able to raid northern Italy without any interference from the army under Quintillus.19
Aurelian responded by noting the recent Roman victories [see Syvänne, Gallienus, 129ff.] over the 300,000 Scythians (Goths) and Galmionoi (probably a corrupt reference to the Alamanni) and by stating that he could not allow them safe passage after their plundering. He left them only the choice of unconditional surrender because in his opinion the Iuthungi would have to surrender soon anyway. Unfortunately the fragment ends at this and we do not know what happened next. My own educated guess is that some sort of agreement was reached with the Iuthungi, because Aurelian was then able to continue his march to Rome. The later events (see below) suggest that the Iuthungi were allowed to return to the lands previously given to them by Gallienus with the same requirements but without the payments.
The quick conclusion of the war enabled Aurelian to return to Italy for the purpose of obtaining the Senate’s support, but as we shall see the quick conclusion of peace with the Iuthungi was a mistake. Aurelian should have eliminated the enemy force and not let it go free. However, it is easy to see why Aurelian engaged the Iuthungi before he had dealt with Quintillus. The fast victory over the Iuthungi gave him the leverage he needed to turn the soldiers of Quintillus to his side. Whatever the truth, it is clear that Aurelian still needed to secure the support of the Senate after the death of Quintillus, and it is possible that even this need would have sufficed in this case to make Aurelian prepared to negotiate with the Iuthungi. The fast end to the war enabled Aurelian to march to Italy. When Aurelian reached Ravenna he received an embassy of senators, which conveyed the Senate’s declaration of loyalty for the new emperor.20 Aurelian was ready to accept the excuses of the senators and the Senate for their initial declaration for Quintillus and their newly found readiness to declare their loyalty to him.21 Once again, Aurelian preferred the conciliatory approach to unnecessary confrontation while his grip on power and the army was not secure enough.
Aurelian was a man who sought to rule his army and officials with an iron hand, and he sought to remove all indiscipline and corruption in the ranks. Both Zonaras (12.27) and Peter the Patrician (frg. 190, Anonymous Continuator of Dio, frg. 10.1) contain references to an incident that took place when Aurelian reached the city of Ravenna at the very beginning of his reign. Both of these have been conveniently translated and analyzed by Thomas M. Banchich. Aurelian convened a council of advisors at Ravenna and asked them how he should rule. One of the men advised him to gather gold and iron, and use iron against those who caused him discomfort while giving gold to those who served him well. This was a sound piece of advice, but it was also an instance of corrupt behaviour that Aurelian detested heart and soul. Consequently, the man who gave this advice was the first one to taste the iron. This was to be the first sign of Aurelian’s anticorruption and anticrime policies which he pursued with ruthless brutality.22
It is very probable that Aurelian visited Rome after this even if this is only implied by Zosimus (1.48) when he states that Aurelian marched from Rome against the Scythians (Vandals). The length and purpose of his visit is not known, but Saunders is surely right in his speculation that Aurelian’s sole purpose was to show his respect to the Senate, because he would have remembered what happened during Maximinus Thrax’s reign when he had not visited Rome – namely the revolt of the Senate against Maximinus. Like him, Aurelian had humble origins. It is also possible that Aurelian stayed in Rome long enough to assume his consulship on 1 January 271, but it is equally clear that he did not linger there because the Sarmatian-Vandal invasion also took place in early 271.23
I would suggest that it was on his first visit to Rome that Aurelian launched his campaign against crime and corruption among the imperial officials and provincial governors, and enacted the first pieces of his legislation meant for the upkeep of public morals, which included the law against the keeping of free women as concubines as Gallienus had done. In short, his aim was to bring back the good old times by restoring law and order and the old morals. This was naturally detested by corrupt officials and senators who duly revolted against him as we shall see. It is also probable that Aurelian began his economizing immediately after assuming power, by cancelling the grandiose project initiated by Gallienus to build a colossal statue of Gallienus as Sol. If it did not take place now or during Aurelian’s next trip to Rome, it certainly took place during the third visit when Aurelian initiated his project to promote the worship of Sol.24
But Aurelian could not yet rest on his laurels. The barbarians intended to take advantage of the Roman troubles. According to Zosimus, the reason for the invasion was famine, which times the invasion to the winter/spring of 270/1.
Aurelianus, having regulated the empire, went from Rome to Aquileia, and from thence into Pannonia, which he was informed the Scythians were preparing to invade. For this reason he sent orders to the inhabitants of that country to carry into the towns all their corn and cattle, and everything that could be of use to the enemy, in order to distress them with famine, with which they were already afflicted. The Barbarians having crossed the river into Pannonia had an engagement, the result of which was nearly equal. But that same night, the Barbarians recrossed the river, and as soon as the day appeared, sent ambassadors to treat for peace. [Zosimus 1.48.1–2, English tr. 1814, p.24 with some changes by the author.]
In short, Aurelian was forced to march from the city of Rome to Pannonia either in very late 270 or early 271, but before he did that he had already sent an advance warning to the inhabitants and garrisons of the impending invasion. On the basis of Dexippus’s Skythika fragment 7 we know that the invaders were the Vandals. The Historia Augusta (Aurelian 18.2) calls the first invaders Sarmatians, and it is possible that the invaders included also these, but my suggestion is that the Sarmatian invasion was a separate invasion which followed in the footsteps of the Vandal invasion at the same time as the Alamanni/Marcomanni descended on Italy. See below. Aurelian immediately sent an order for the people to take all their livestock and food supplies inside fortified cities. His strategy was to use a war of attrition to weaken the Vandals before engaging them in battle.25 The enclosing of grain supplies inside the fortified cities and the lack of forage ensured that the Vandal horses would soon lose their stamina, while the men would begin to suffer from the effects of hunger. If the Vandals used steppe ponies, these did not suffer similarly from a lack of barley, but by harassing the enemy continually the Romans could also limit the amount of time the enemy could use for grazing, and if the Vandals used normal European horses the situation was even worse. After the enemy had been weakened through skirmishes and Aurelian had assembled his forces, he engaged the enemy in Pannonia. My suggestion for the route taken by Aurelian against the Vandals is that he passed through Aquileia and the Julian Alps after which he marched north-east so that he would have engaged the Vandals somewhere between Carnuntum and the modern Lake Balaton. According to Zosimus, the resulting battle was indecisive, but when night fell the barbarians crossed back over the river so that they placed the river between the armies, and at daybreak sent heralds to sue for peace. It is unfortunate that we do not know the exact date of the invasion, but my suggestion is that at least the battle between Aurelian and Vandals took place during the spring or early summer 271 because the river could not have served as a defence if it was still frozen.26
According to Dexippus (Skythika frg. 7), Aurelian gave his soldiers the final word in making the decision of how to respond to the peace proposal made by the Vandals. The soldiers opted for peace. Aurelian’s idea was clearly to involve the soldiers in the decision so that he would not face similar problems with the officers who opposed the granting of peace to the barbarians as Gallienus had. He had evidently learnt from the mistakes of Gallienus who had been criticized for his readiness to make peace settlements with the barbarians. I would also suggest that the Iuthungi-Alamanni-Marcomanni invasion of Italy had already taken place and that it was because of this that Aurelian and presumably also the soldiers were prepared to grant peace to the invaders. The Vandals agreed to give the Romans hostages and 2,000 horsemen in return for peace and enough food supplies to reach the Danube. They also returned captives and booty. However, a war party of 500 warriors did not abide by the treaty and were duly killed by the Vandals, presumably because they wanted their hostages safely returned and because they wanted to reach the Danube safely.27
Campaign against the Vandals and Sarmatians in 271.
The following quote from Zosimus shows what happened next:
The Emperor, hearing that the Alamanni and the neighbouring nations intended to overrun Italy, was with just reason more concerned for Rome and the adjacent places, than for the more remote. Having therefore ordered a sufficient force to remain for the defence of Pannonia, he marched towards Italy, and on his route, on the borders of that country, near the Ister [Danube], slew many thousands of the Barbarians in one battle [These would be the Sarmatians of the Historia Augusta, Aurel. 18.2]. [Zosimus 1.49, English tr. 1814, p.25 with some changes by author.]
According to Dexippus (Skythika frg. 7), Aurelian sent the bulk of his infantry and cavalry on ahead to Italy while he himself stayed behind with his bodyguards/Companions (‘auton taxin hetairiken’) to ensure that the Vandals followed the treaty to the letter. After that, he, together with the 2,000 Vandal retainers, marched at the double to join the main army. This means that Aurelian escorted the Vandals to the Danube, after which he would have marched along the Danube towards the city of Mursa. It is likely that Aurelian joined forces with those that he had sent in advance before engaging the Sarmatians somewhere north of the River Drava near the Danube. What is certain is that it was after this war that Aurelian was awarded the title of Sarmaticus Maximus and this in itself should be seen as evidence that the unknown invaders who were defeated by the Danube were the Sarmatians.
It is possible that it was during the above-mentioned Sarmatian war that there took place an incident described by Vopiscus which involved Probus. The reason for this is that he mentions the Alans (which could easily be Sarmatians) but it is also possible that this incident took place only later during the Gothic wars because the Alans were usually present in the Gothic armies. The latter option is likelier, but I have still included this piece of information here just in case Vopiscus was referring to this earlier Sarmatian war. It is also valuable for another reason, which is that it describes the influence Probus had in the policies of Aurelian. It is unfortunate that we do not know when Aurelian appointed Probus as commander of all protectores/domestici bodyguards, because this would enable us to determine Probus’s position during the reign of Aurelian. A fuller discussion of this matter is included at the end of the chapter dealing with the reign of Aurelian.28 It is possible that Probus was appointed to this position at the very beginning of Aurelian’s reign after he had returned from Egypt in about January 271 because Probus had served as one of the commanders of the protectores probably since the reign of Gallienus and because Probus was entrusted with the important task of conquering Egypt at the same time as Aurelian marched against Zenobia, or that Probus was appointed supreme commander of the protectores as a reward for the conquest of Egypt. In my opinion the former is more likely in light of the fact that Probus was given the command of an expedition as important as the campaign against Egypt. This implies that Probus’s influence on the policies of Aurelian was very important, as the quote from Vopiscus claims it was.
The love of the soldiers toward Probus was always very great. He never permitted them to commit any wrong. He often prevented Aurelian from committing great acts of cruelty. [This implies that Probus as the supreme commander of Aurelian’s bodyguards influenced Aurelian’s policies significantly because Aurelian pardoned several enemy leaders in the course of his reign.] He visited the maniples, and examined their clothes and boots, and whatever booty was at any time taken, he divided it all amongst them, and reserved nothing to himself except darts and arms. Amongst other things, whether taken from the Alani or some other barbarian nation I know not, but there was a horse, which was neither handsome nor large, but the prisoners said that he was so good a runner that he would go 100 miles a day and continue it for eight or ten days together. [This shows that the Alan horses were particularly good and that the Alans and at least some Roman cavalrymen preferred horses that had good stamina over size and appearance.] Everyone thought that Probus should have kept this beast to himself, but Probus said that such a horse was fitter for one that was for running away than a brave man. [Unless meant as a way to convince the soldiers to keep the horse for themselves, this implies that Probus considered sizable stallions which were used for a shock attack as better suited for Roman cavalry tactics, but as we shall see the Roman cavalry under Aurelian actually fought in the Alan-Sarmatian manner in which the stamina of the horse was the preferred quality.] He ordered the soldiers to draw lots for the horse. They wrote their names and put them all into an urn. Four of the soldiers had the same name as himself. But he for his part put in no name. They drew and the first name that came up was Probus. The four soldiers of the name of Probus not agreeing to which of them the horse should go because each challenged the lot, he ordered all the army to draw a second time. The lot came up the second time for Probus, and so it was for a third and fourth time… all the army, together with those of that name who had drawn the lots, dedicated the horse to their commander Probus [The lottery was clearly fixed by the soldiers so that their commander would be forced to accept the horse. This shows how much his subordinates loved Probus]. [Vopiscus, HA Prob. 8.1ff. tr. by Bernard with emendations, changes and additions.]
The Alamanni-Iuthungi-Marcomanni invasion of Italy so soon after the Iuthungi invasion of 270 suggests strongly that Aurelian had left the war unfinished. While Aurelian was fighting against the Vandals and Sarmatians, there was a window of opportunity for others to invade. It is probable that the previously defeated Iuthungi allied themselves now with the Alamanni and Marcomanni to exact revenge on Aurelian. It is probable that these tribes invaded immediately after the snows had melted in the early spring so that they were able to pass through the Alpine passes.29
Meanwhile, the Alamanni-Iuthungi-Marcomanni (the Alamanni and neighbours in Zosimus) had managed to penetrate the Roman defences and reach Italy. It is probable that the invaders marched through the Septimier Pass past Milan to Placentia (Placenza). Another possible route they could have taken is through the Brenner Pass past Verona to Placentia (Placenza). A third possibility is that they used both passes and united their forces at Placentia because the inclusion of all three tribal groupings would have made this possible. However, the use of the Septimier Pass by all is the likeliest because the Historia Augusta (Aurel. 18.3) specifically notes that the invaders devastated the area around Milan (Mediolanum). The invaders had captured the city of Placentia by the time Aurelian arrived on the scene. In light of this, it is probable that Aurelian had committed the mistake of weakening the defences of the Alpine passes. In fact, the presence of the infantry corps with Aurelian in the campaign against the Vandals suggests that he had collected his entire field army with its separate cavalry and infantry components for the war against the Vandals and Sarmatians. This in itself suggests that he had withdrawn whatever elements of infantry he may have posted at the passes of the Alps during the first Iuthungi War of 270 with the result that the direct invasion route lay once again open in the spring of 271. Aurelian would probably have followed the route Mursa–Siscia–Emona–Aquileia–Verona–Cremona–Placentia to reach the scene as fast as possible.
Then Aurelian committed the gravest mistake of his military career. A fragment of Peter the Patrician30 has preserved for us the initial exchange of words between Aurelian and the invaders. When Aurelian learnt of the presence of a detachment of Iuthungi inside Placentia he ordered them to surrender and treat him as their master, but if they wished to fight, he said that he was ready. The Iuthungi in their turn answered that they had no master and that Aurelian should prepare to fight against the free men tomorrow. Aurelian foolishly swallowed this bait. On the basis of the other sources, the men inside Placentia consisted of the Iuthungi, the Alamanni and Marcomanni, and hid themselves in some close by forest.
… Under him, it is true, a disaster was inflicted by the Marcomanni as a result of this blunder. For, while he was making no plan to meet them face to face during a sudden invasion, but was preparing to pursue them from the rear, they wrought great devastation in all the region around Milan. Later on, however, he conquered even the Marcomanni also. …Aurelian, however, since he wished, by massing his forces together, to meet all the enemy at once, suffered such a defeat near Placentia that the empire of Rome was almost destroyed. This peril, in fact, was caused by the cunning and perfidy of the barbarians’ mode of attack. For, being unable to meet him in open battle, they fell back into the thickest forests, and thus as evening came on they routed our forces. [This implies the use of feigned flight by the barbarian cavalry to the place of ambush and the foolish pursuit of them by the Roman cavalry.] And, indeed, if the power of the gods, after the Books [this refers to the consulting of the Sibylline Books/Oracles] had been consulted and the sacrifices performed, had not confounded the barbarians by means of certain prodigies and heavensent visions, there would have been no victory for Rome.’ [Flavius Vopiscus (HA, Aurelian 18.3, 21.1–4), tr. by Magie.]
In short, this account of the battle of Placentia by Flavius Vopiscus implies that thanks to the massing of the forces together by Aurelian, the Alamanni-Iuthungi-Marcomanni were unable to meet the Romans in open battle, and that their solution to this problem was to use an ambush. This means that Aurelian had amassed a huge force because on the basis of the previous references to the size of the Iuthungi contingents (40,000 cavalry and 80,000 infantry), it is clear that the invading force consisted at least of this number. The barbarian invaders lured the Romans with a feigned flight into the thick forest near Placentia where they then routed the Roman forces by evening.31 It is clear that the severe defeat concerned only the cavalry portion of the Roman army because it would have been impossible for the Roman infantry to pursue the fleeing enemy cavalry at the necessary speed. The reference to the pursuit in the Historia Augusta (Aurel. 18.3) confirms this interpretation. The Romans suffered a crushing defeat. It is likely that the Alamanni- Iuthungi-Marcomanni infantry had the advantage of terrain over the Roman cavalry in the forest; the forested terrain negated the superior speed and mobility of the cavalry. The previous boast of the Iuthungi that they outshone others in cavalry combat was not entirely without basis when they used infantry to support their cavalry.
Campaign against the Alamanni-Iuthungi in 271.
It is quite probable that Aurelian squandered a very significant portion of the remaining elite cavalry forces of Gallienus in this one disastrous battle. The reason for this conclusion is that when Aurelian encountered the Palmyrene cataphracts in 272 his cavalry consisted mainly of the lightly-equipped Dalmatian and Moorish cavalry (Zosimus 1.50.1–53.3). When we combine this with the information provided by the sixth century Strategikon of the locations of each type of cavalry force (Dalmatian cavalry identified here with the Illyriciani of the Strategikon) and when we remember the fact that under Gallienus the Moorish cavalry had been placed in the second reserve line, 32 it becomes probable that Aurelian lost his entire left cavalry wing (the Vexillationes of the Strategikon) and centre of the first line (the Foederati of the Strategikon) with its more heavily equipped units but not his right wing units (the Illyriciani). The diagram opposite of the battle shows the main features of this massive disaster. The boxes have purposefully been drawn by hand to show that the cavalry lines were not straight lines.
When the news of the crushing defeat reached Rome and the provinces, it caused widespread panic. Usurpers appeared in Rome and even in Gaul and Dalmatia. According to Zosimus (1.49.2), the usurpers were Septimius, Urbanus, and Domitianus. Septimius/Septiminus usurped the throne in Dalmatia while, based on coin finds, Domitianus usurped power in South-East Gaul. Domitianus may have been Gallienus’s former general. White, however, has suggested an alternative interpretation. He suggests the possibility that Domitianus could have been the son of Aurelian’s sister Domitia, on the grounds of his name.33 Domitianus II represented himself as a descendant of the Emperor Domitian and Domitilla and propagated his friendship with the military rather than the Senate.34 It is because of this that I am inclined to agree with those who identify Domitianus II with the general of Gallienus.
Coin of C.L. Domitianus. The drawing by Patin 1671.
After the crushing defeat, according to the Historia Augusta (Aurelian 20.4ff.), Aurelian sent a letter to the Senate demanding them to consult the Sibylline Books and bring help to their princeps through the sacred ceremonies. He supposedly even promised that he would provide the senators and pontiffs with all the necessary expenses and would give them whatever sacrificial captives (i.e. human sacrifices) or animals that would be needed so that the gods would grant their aid. Even though it is quite plausible that the calculating Aurelianus could have sent this sort of order to the senators in his state of panic to get the aid of the gods and also to calm the restless senators and populace, one still cannot entirely rule out the possibility that it is a fabrication. Nevertheless. it is clear that the information contained in the Historia Augusta is believable. On the basis of this text it is easy to see that what seems to have actually happened is that the senators and the populace panicked when the news of the defeat arrived and resorted to consulting the Sibylline Books on their own accord, as was required by the ancient custom. What the senators found was that they should make human and animal sacrifices in certain places to block the routes of advance from the enemy. In their panic, they even installed their own emperor Urbanus (Zosimus 1.49.235). The Historia Augusta (Aurelian 18.3–6) says there were great revolts in Rome and it was the rebels who consulted the Sibylline Books first. The Historia Augusta (Aurelian 19.4) also claims that some of the senators had previously maintained, before the arrival of Aurelian’s supposed letter, that the books should be consulted because Aurelian himself revered the gods and would therefore support such an action with the implication that Aurelian’s position on the question was not known. This suggests a rather different personality from the one put forward by the Historia Augusta. It is quite probable that Aurelian was not as religious as claimed, but rather a typical military commander who used and turned to religion only when it suited his own political purposes, and this appears to have been such an occasion. The intention of the letter to the Senate, which confirmed that their own actions were legal, would merely have been a measure meant to secure their support.36 Aurelian even promised human sacrifices from the ranks of the captured enemies if the senators after the consultation of the Books wished this. On balance it would appear probable that the senators simply lost their wits and resorted to human sacrifices. They then revolted against Aurelian because they were well aware that they had acted without his permission and knew his severity. The letter in which Aurelian ordered the senators to consult the Sibylline Books after they had already been consulted should therefore be seen as an effort to create divisions among the senators, because this letter removed the fear that the senators would be punished for having acted without Aurelian’s permission. However, this was merely a stratagem, because after Aurelian had reached Rome he started a purge of senators.37 The senators most ready to resort to the use of human sacrifice and to the setting up of the new emperor would have consisted of those who had previously been the most vehement supporters of the traditionalist Claudius and his brother Quintillus. This would best explain why, after having defeated the invaders, Aurelian marched to Rome and unleashed his army and military police (statores Augusti) on the city.
The Alamanni-Iuthungi-Marcomanni sought to exploit their victory by advancing against the city of Rome itself. The fact that Rome was in the hands of Aurelian’s enemies made the strategic situation very problematic for Aurelian. The invaders’ planned route was to march along the Via Aemilia and then use the Via Flaminia to get over the Appenines into Central Italy and Rome. The enemy had divided themselves into several marching columns to facilitate foraging and pillaging. After Aurelian had managed to regroup the remnants of his army, he gave chase. He caught up with one of the marching columns of the enemy near Fanum on the banks of the Metaurus River. This was not difficult to achieve, since the barbarians were slowed down by the amount of booty they had amassed. The invaders were trapped against the river. This time Aurelian won the battle resoundingly. A great number of barbarians were drowned in the river in the ensuing rout. The Romans later celebrated the great victory with a pair of commemorative inscriptions. The remaining marching columns of the Alamanni-Iuthungi-Marcomanni began their homeward march while Aurelian’s forces shadowed them, waiting for the right moment to strike, which came when the barbarians reached the open plains near the River Ticinus/Ticinum (Pavia). Aurelianus unleashed his army and crushed the remnants of the invading army. In my opinion the locale implies that Aurelian had preserved the decisive role for his cavalry forces because their mobility could be used to the fullest advantage only in the open plains – this would not be a surprising tactic for a cavalry general. This must have happened some time during the summer of 271. The rest of the campaign consisted of the rounding up of fugitives and the killing of those who resisted. Aurelian assumed the title Germanicus Maximus to celebrate his victory.38
Aurelian was now free to settle scores with the usurpers Septimius, Urbanus and Domitianus (Zosimus 1.49.2). The news of the defeat of the Alamanni-Iuthungi- Marcomanni seems to have taken care of most of the willingness of his enemies to resist. Septimius was killed by his own men (Epitome 35.3). We do not know what exactly happened to Domitianus II in South-East Gaul, but it seems likely that he too was killed by his own men or, alternatively, as suggested by Watson, Julius Placiadianus suppressed it. That leaves out Urbanus.39
According to the Historia Augusta (Aurelian 21.5), Aurelian was extremely violent by nature and now filled with rage, and he advanced to Rome in person to exact retribution for the revolts. Practically all of the extant sources claim that Aurelian was over-violent, cruel and bloodthirsty. But in truth he was a pragmatist who was moderate and lenient when he considered it advantageous to be so, and used harsh punishment and merciless cruelty when it served his and his Empire’s best interests. If some unscrupulous person was stupid enough to take advantage of his clemency, he meted out merciless punishment on him or her to make it absolutely clear that such behaviour would not be tolerated under his rule. This was particularly true of cases of corruption and public morality. Aurelian did not accept any abuse of power by those holding public offices and he punished even relatively minor offences with extreme severity. It was this that brought him his reputation for cruelty.40
I would also suggest that Aurelian purposefully cultivated a reputation for cruelty, at least among his soldiers to keep them disciplined and united, as was later advocated by Machiavelli. Machiavelli (Prince, 17, tr. by Bull, 97) puts the matter thus: ‘When a prince is campaigning with his soldiers and is in command of a large army then he need not worry about having a reputation for cruelty; because, without such a reputation, no army was ever kept united and disciplined.’
The sources tell that Aurelian executed the leaders of the revolt, which included a number of Roman aristocrats/senators – sometimes on the basis of information provided by only one informant. This leaves open both the possibility that the Praetorians present in the city41 had already killed the usurper and allowed Aurelianus inside the city without fighting, and also the possibility that there was some serious fighting in the streets of Rome before the revolt was crushed, though the former appears inherently more likely. The killing of the real and supposed aristocratic plotters also had the benefit of bringing money to the imperial coffers that Aurelian could use to bribe his own troops and supporters, as previously advised by someone to his own detriment. According to Ammianus, Aurelian found the state coffers empty after the reign of Gallienus and the disasters suffered (in truth mainly under Claudius) with the result that he inflicted punishments and torture on both the guilty and innocent in order to get reinforcements and to be able to pay his troops. It was because of this that he went after money like a torrent. But this was not the entire truth. As noted by Watson, Aurelian also needed money for the forthcoming campaign against Palmyra. For the time being, however, Aurelian was ready to act as if he would accept Zenobia’s and Vaballathus’s position in the east. The best evidence for this is that Zenobia continued to mint coins portraying Aurelian as the superior emperor/ Augustus until April 272.42
The narrative sources state that there was a very serious and bloody revolt of the mint workers instigated by the treasurer/finance minister (rationalis) Felicissimus at Rome, which Aurelian also crushed. The reason for the revolt was that they had been filing off silver from the coins. It has been suggested that the coins in question were the so-called Divus Claudius series of coins that Aurelian issued at the beginning of his reign to claim his right to be the successor of Claudius because the coins minted in Rome were well below the silver standard of the day.43 According to Sextus Aurelius Victor and the Scriptores Historiae Augustae, the mint workers gathered on the Caelian Hill and fought so fiercely that they killed about 7,000 soldiers (militia), boatmen (lembariarii), border troops (riparienses), castle-troops (castrensiani) and Dacians.44 The rebels were massacred, but we do not have numbers. Unfortunately the sources do not state whether the revolt of the mint workers was connected with the revolt of the upper class senators or Urbanus or whether it occurred only after Aurelian had already crushed the usurper and senators.45
The fact that the revolt of the mint workers is mentioned separately suggests that it occurred only after the main revolt or revolts had already been crushed. The large number of soldiers killed would suggest that there would have also been other men involved in the combat besides the mint workers. However, since the reason for the revolt was the alleged corruption of the treasurer and the workers, it seems probable that their revolt followed the revelation that Aurelian would not overlook or tolerate any kind of corruption among the civil servants, which would have become obvious only after Aurelian had already retaken power in the capital. In other words, there seems to have been two revolts in Rome: 1) One led by the Senate and usurper Urbanus; 2) Another by Felicissimus and the mint workers. It is possible that Felicissimus had actively participated in the crushing of the first mentioned revolt only to find out that his embezzlement would still not be overlooked. However, it is also possible that Urbanus and his senatorial friends had armed the mint workers of Felicissimus and used them as soldiers because they were an organized body that could be used for such a purpose. After the revolt, the mint was closed.
It is probable that Aurelian sent his soldiers against the mint workers on the Caelian Hill mainly from the north and west (shown with arrows on the map) because it is probable that the mint workers would have occupied the Servian Wall making it difficult to approach from this direction. However, the presence of the camps of soldiers outside this wall would have isolated the mint workers from that side. It is also probable that the attack would have been supported by ballistae and onagri placed on the Palatinus Hill (the Imperial Palace complex) and on the Mons Esquilinus. The fact that the attackers lost 7,000 men proves that the fight was still very difficult. After all, the attackers were forced to attack a well prepared enemy by advancing uphill.
My educated guess is that it is possible that the urbaniciani (the urban cohorts) of Rome had stayed loyal to Aurelian throughout the usurpations and revolts because they now received new barracks from Aurelian, which must have been a reward, or alternatively that they had fought with particular distinction during the uprising of the mint workers. The building of the new barracks also proves that they remained important for military, security and policing purposes.
The bloody purge of Aurelian’s real and imagined enemies among the senators, and the purge of corrupt officials cleared the table. Despite the hostility that this caused among the conservative senators, the elimination of all potential troublemakers in the capital together with the two usurpers in the provinces ensured that Aurelian did not have to fear another usurpation in the territory controlled by him for the next three years. To the dismay of the conservative senators there were plenty of other senators who were ready to lend their support to Aurelian in return for high offices and honours. It should be remembered that the purge of Aurelian’s enemies created vacant posts to be filled by his friends and supporters, who were thereby rewarded for their loyalty. Though, according to the Historia Augusta (Aurel. 45.3), he did this with moderation and wisdom.
Having crushed the revolts, Aurelian wanted to make certain that the capital of the Roman Empire would be better protected in the future so that its inhabitants and senators would not feel it necessary to take action of their own or to set up their own rulers to protect them. Aurelian’s solution was the building of the wall which bears his name, the Aurelian Wall.46 The circuit of the wall was almost nineteen kilometres and it encompassed most of the fourteen Augustan regions and important buildings of the city, but not all of the inhabited parts. Defensive needs dictated the course of the wall so that the enemy would not be able to exploit any terrain against the defenders. It was extended across the Tiber to incorporate the important flour mills and the Mausoleum of Hadrian (Castel Sant’Angelo). The wall was also designed with defensive artillery fire in mind so as to position ballistae throughout the wall for the purpose of subjecting any enemy which approached the walls to a barrage of bolts.
Aurelian could not spare his soldiers for the building project so he assigned the city guilds to perform the labour. These were allowed to add the title Aureliani to their name as a form of thanks. The guilds worked to a preconceived plan and their work was supervised by professional engineers and architects some of whom certainly came from the ranks of the military. However, due to the inexperience of the workforce and the human tendency to build as fast as possible, the quality of the resulting work varied greatly. In my opinion, it is also likely that corruption played a role in this. However, it is still clear that haste was the primary reason for the poor workmanship because the wall was finished within six years (it was completed under Probus).
The Aurelian Wall was 6.1 metres high and 3.65 metres wide. It had a core of concrete which was brick- or tile-faced. It had two variants. The first was a solid curtain wall with a rampart walk that had a parapet 1 metre high with 60cm-high merlons. The second variant consisted of galleried curtain walls, the galleries placed at a height of 3 metres where there were windows for ballistae and archers. There were towers every 30 metres so there were 381 towers altogether. These projected 3.35 metres in front of the curtains and rose about 4.5 metres above the rampart walk. The towers along these galleried sections of the wall had similar galleries with windows placed at a height of 3 metres for the same purpose. The wall had 18 gateways and 29 entrances altogether with the postern gates included. The gateways were of four categories. The first were the four gateways (the Flaminia, Appia, Ostiensis east, and Portuensis gates) that had double archways. These had more imposing defences with round-fronted towers. The second category, with single archways (the Salaria, Nomentana, Tiburtina and Latina gates), were meant to protect roads of secondary importance. These were also flanked with round-fronted towers. The third category (Pinciana, Chiusa, Asinaria, Metrobia, Ardeatina and Septimiana gates) were those that were designed for local traffic. These did not have flanking towers. The fourth category consisted of the postern gates and doorways.
It has usually been assumed that the defences were meant solely to deter barbarian invaders long enough for a Roman relief army to arrive and that the city would not have possessed enough men able to use the ballistae so they could not be placed along the entire length of the wall which would have required at least 700 ballistae. In my opinion, the wall was indeed primarily meant to deter the barbarians with poor siege skills, but it is still clear that it actually worked well against Romans too, contary to the assumption that the walls and its defences were not strong enough to withstand an attack by skilled besiegers. The best proof of this is the successful defence of the city by Maxentius against Severus and Galerius in the next century. Furthermore, this approach overlooks the overwhelming amount of evidence for the successful use of ballistae and stone throwers by civilians during the sieges. The likeliest place for such training would have been in the citizen militias. It is likely that most Roman youths (iuvenes) were trained to use such equipment.
The accompanying images show the Porta Appia (the type one, i.e. the strongest version) and the line of the Aurelian Wall on the map on page 87.
At the beginning of his reign Aurelian’s internal policies can be summarized as follows: 1) securing the army, done by killing Quintillus and by campaigning against the invaders; 2) securing the capital by purging enemies; 3) looting the rich with various excuses to cover expenses and to finance his forthcoming campaigns; 4) building the wall; 5) stopping the drainage of bullion to the east; 6) preparing for the war against Zenobia.
The barbarian invasions of Italy under Gallienus and Aurelian, and the resulting problems in the capital, had brought home the lesson that the capital had to be secured with a wall and other measures when Aurelian’s intention was to march against Zenobia. It was because of this that he needed to find a way to replace the bread of Egypt, now held by the Palmyrenes. In the meantime Aurelian instituted a free supply of pork to the populace. The populace had to be kept happy to make certain that unscrupulous noblemen could not exploit their unhappiness in a situation in which the Palmyrenes could cut off bread supplies from Egypt. It seems likely that it was at this time that Aurelian refused to dress in silk or buy silk for others to use, the reason being that a pound of silk cost a pound of gold. It only helped his enemies in the east if he kept buying silk and other similar items. Possibly Aurelian forbade the buying of silk for the time being even if this is not stated by the sources.47
Flavius Vopiscus claimed that Aurelian had records of debts due to the state burned in the Forum of Trajan. The obvious intention was to please those who owed money to the Exchequer so they would have no urgent need to revolt against Aurelian while he was away from the city. It would also have been good for the economy because the removal of debts would have given the populace more money to spend.48 Vopiscus also states that Aurelian gave a general amnesty to those who had committed offences against the state. This measure might have the same intention if it took place now, but more importantly it would have been a very useful tool to calm fears among those who were currently serving under the Pamyrenes. If it took place in 274, its intention was to calm the fears of the Gallic nobility and soldiers that Aurelian would exact vengeance against them. My suggestion is that probably Aurelian would have promised the same amnesty in both cases, to make it easier for the Romans to surrender to him. This was actually quite easy to do in the aftermath of the purge which had removed most of Aurelian’s enemies. It was also necessary, because it removed the fear of being purged from the remaining rich and made them less likely to revolt in his absence.49
The break-up with the Palmyrenes was not immediately apparent, since it was not in Aurelian’s interest to warn them. On the basis of Zenobia’s coinage depicting both Vaballathus and Aurelian, Zenobia seems to have simultaneously tried her best to stress her loyalty to Aurelian and the Roman Empire; it was not in Aurelian’s interest to rock the boat before his preparations were completed.
The crushing of the revolt of the mint workers of Rome resulted in the closure of its operations until the summer of 273. Most of its workers were transferred to Milan where they operated under Gaius Valerius Sabinus who received the title agens vice rationalis. Sabinus became effectively the finance minister of Aurelian; it has been speculated that he was the man behind the monetary reforms of Aurelian. The first part of these reforms was the improvement of the weight standard of the billon (debased silver) coinage back to the standard it had been before the corrupt debasement of the Divus Claudius coinage by the Roman Mint. In addition to this, Aurelian tightened the general control over all the rest of the mints, so they issued propaganda designs that were uniform in their design and intent. The surviving mint workers of Rome were transferred to two new mints which Aurelianus set up in the Balkans for the forthcoming campaigns both in the Balkans and in the East. The first of the mints was set up at Serdica (Sofia) which lay on the road from Milan to Byzantium. The second was set up at some unknown place, possibly a maritime port, in the Balkans from autumn 271 until spring 273. The most likely location for the mint is Byzantium. Aurelian faced the Goths in the autumn 271 and the Palmyrenes in 272 so the coins from these mints were highly useful for keeping the soldiers paid.50
The accompanying images of coins of Aurelian are from Beger 1696. Note how Aurelian, like so many other emperors, used his coins as tools of propaganda, advertising his military victories, the reconquest of territory lost (Restitutor Orientis, Restitutor Orbis), loyalty of the army, virtus, and, most importantly, that he was the favourite of the gods who brought victories.
