Coin of Zenobia
(source: Cohen)
D ating has been relatively secure up to the fall of Palmyra thanks to the existence of coins and papyri which have enabled historians and numismatists to put the events into their rightful places. However, from this date onwards dating is insecure. It is often impossible to date events even to the right year with any uncertainty. I will offer in the following discussion two alternative timelines with all of the uncertainties included. I will first give the usually accepted sequence of events, after which I will present my alternative timeline for the wars that took place after August 272 but before October 273.
It is usually suggested that when Aurelian had finished the war against Zenobia he marched to Europe in the same year and that he then fought a war against the Carpi who had invaded and defeated them in a battle somewhere between Carsium and Sucidava, after which he settled the Carpi as farmer-soldiers in Thrace. Saunders dates this war to January/early 273. Watson dates the campaign to the winter of 272/3. White dates the Balkan campaign to the period late November 272 to January 273. Southern and Homo suggest the end of 272 and the beginning of 273. Cizek dates the wars against the Carpi, and the revolt of Palmyra and Firmus, to take place during the period after July 272 but before the end of 272. Therefore, with the exception of Cizek the historians are roughly unanimous in their dating. In my opinion Cizek’s timetable is too tight. All historians are also united in their view that it was after the Carpic war that Aurelian marched against the Palmyrenes who had revolted again and after that against the rebels in Egypt. With the exception of Cizek, all other historians place these campaigns to take place in 273.1
Now I will present my theory, which is based on the apparent back and forth travels of Aurelian in both Zosimus and Historia Augusta. I will now also present the evidence for each of the wars in greater detail.
The only two narrative sources for the war against the Carpi in the Balkans after Palmyra had been captured are the Historia Augusta (Aurel. 30.4–5) and Aurelius Victor (39.43). The former merely states that after Aurelian had subdued the East, he returned to Europe where he defeated the Carpi. The latter merely states that Aurelian had settled some Carpi on Roman soil. In addition to this, there exists a restored inscription2 which refers to a battle which Aurelian fought in the area between Carsium and Sucidava, and we also know that Aurelian received the title Carpicus maximus before 17 October 273 when it is included in a papyrus. Taken together this means that Aurelian defeated the Carpic invaders and then settled some of them somewhere in the Balkans probably as laeti farmer-soldiers.3 The list of captured enemies in the Historia Augusta (Aurel., 33.4) refers also to the Roxolani (white Alans, a Sarmatian tribe), which may mean that they took part in this invasion, but most scholars, Saunders included, dismiss this because of the source. My learned opinion, however, is that it is very likely that the Roxolani did indeed take part in this campaign. The above evidence therefore dates the war to the period after the capture of Zenobia but before 17 October 273.4
Let us now return to Zosimus and the Historia Augusta which, when read carefully, seem to refer to two separate instances in which Aurelian was forced to return to the east.
Zosimus, Nea Historia
Aurelianus marched towards Europe, carrying with him Zenobia, her son, and the rest of the confederates of this rebellion. Zenobia is said to have died, either of disease, or want of food, but the rest were all drowned in the strait between Chalcedon and Byzantium. (This account, which precedes the return against the Palmyrenes, does not actually state that Aurelian crossed the straits, but states merely that the Palmyrenes were drowned in them.)
[Zosimus 1.59, English tr. 1814, pp.29–30 with some changes by author.]
Vopiscus, Historia Augusta
The peace of the east being established, Aurelian returned to Europe a conqueror. He defeated the Carpi and when the Senate in his absence gave the title Carpicus, he sent as a jest to the Senate the message [I would suggest that this absence was caused by the revolt of Firmus in Egypt] that they might as well call him Carpiculus because carpisculum is a kind of boot. To him the cognomen appeared ignoble because he was already called Gothicus, Sarmaticus, Armeniacus, Parthicus and Adiabenicus.
[Vopiscus, HA Aurel. 30.4–5, tr p.228
by Bernard but with many changes and additions.]
Zosimus, Nea Historia
When Aurelianus was on his way to Europe [I have changed the translation here on the basis of the Paschoud edition/translation p.52 because it is more accurate than either of the English translations. The original Greek text suggests as stated in the French translation by Paschoud that Aurelian had not yet reached Europe before he returned. See also above.] he was informed by a messenger that a party he had left at Palmyra, having won over Apsaeus, the principal author of all that was past, was tampering with Marcellinus, whom the emperor had appointed governor of Mesopotamia and of the east, to assume to himself the imperial robe. Under the pretence of taking time for deliberation, he delayed them so long that they again importuned him repeatedly. He was forced therefore to frame ambiguous answers to their demands, until he had given notice to Aurelianus of their design. In the meantime the Palmyrenes, having clothed Antiochus in purple, continued to Palmyra. Aurelianus, being informed of this, hastened into the east, without any preparation, and arriving at Antioch, surprised all the people, who were then attending a horse-race, and were astonished at seeing him. From thence he proceeded to Palmyra, which he took and razed without a contest, but not thinking Antiochus worthy of being punished, on account of the meanness of his condition, he dismissed him.
[Zosimus 1.60.1–61.1, English tr. 1814,
p.30 with some changes and additions by author.]
After this action, he speedily reduced the Alexandrians, who were disposed to a rebellion, being already in commotion. (This does not include any referrals to a new march to Europe or a war against the Carpi, but all the same it is likely that Aurelian was indeed in Thrace at the time he learnt of the Egyptian revolt.)
[Zosimus 1.61.1, English tr. 1814, p.30.]
Vopiscus, Historia Augusta
It is rare, and a hard thing for the Syrians to keep their faith. No sooner was Aurelian employed about the affairs of Europe, but the Palmyrenes, who had so very lately been beaten and crushed, broke out into another rebellion. They killed Sandarion, whom he [Aurelian] had left Governor of Palmyra, and six hundred archers that were in garrison; designing to set up one Achilleus [Antiochus in Zosimus], a kinsman of Zenobia, as emperor anew. But Aurelian, who was always prepared, returned from Rhodope [this referral would mean that Aurelian had already reached Europe when he learnt of the revolt, but the information in Zosimus suggests otherwise. It is therefore possible that Vopiscus has confused the two separate occasions when Aurelian returned east] and punished them by destroying the city as they deserved.
[Vopiscus, HA Aurel. 30.4–5, tr p.229
by Bernard but with many changes and additions.]
Secure now therefore of the state of the east, he returned again to Europe; and with his accustomed bravery he defeated all the roving enemies. While Aurelian was active in Thrace and Europe, there arose in Egypt a certain Firmus, [this places Aurelian in Thrace when the revolt took place] who not setting himself up as an emperor [In the HA FSPB 1ff. Vopiscus claims that he was a usurper after all, contrary to the claims of Aurelian who just called him a bandit.], pretended to make that province rather a free-state. Aurelian made no delay to oppose this evil. Nor did his wonted success abandon him. For he presently recovered Egypt again.
[Vopiscus, HA Aurel. 32.1–3, tr p.230
by Bernard but with many changes and additions.]
He [Firmus], then seized the imperial power in opposition to Aurelian with the purpose of defending the remainder of Zenobia’s party. Aurelian, however, returning from Thrace defeated him [This means that Aurelian was in Thrace when he heard of the revolt.] [Vopiscus, Historia Augusta, FSPB 5.1, tr. by Magie p.395 with my comment.]
On the basis of the above, I would suggest that Aurelian had reached Chalcedon when he heard of the revolt of Antiochus at Palmyra from Marcellinus and that it was because of this that he drowned most of the Palmyrene prisoners in the straits between Chalcedon and Byzantium. Aurelian did not want to be slowed down by prisoners. The march from Emesa to Chalcedon could easily have taken seventy days for Aurelian to complete because he was in no hurry.5 If Palmyra was conquered in late June or early July, then one may make the guess that Aurelian could have reached the city of Chalcedon in mid- October if he spent the whole of July in settling the pressing matters in the east. It would not have taken that long for Aurelian to learn of the revolt because according to Procopius (Anecdota 30.1ff.) the couriers could be expected to travel at a speed of 200–250 miles a day, 6 which means that if Marcellinus had sent the message from the city of Antioch it would have reached Aurelian in three days.
Once Aurelian had learnt of the revolt, he acted with great determination. He reached the city of Antioch faster than the news of his arrival reached the city. This means that Aurelian probably prevented the movement of postal couriers for security reasons and that he probably left infantry marching behind while he advanced with the cavalry on the double, and it means that he had a very well organized security apparatus for this to be possible. Zosimus’s text does not state what the status of the city of Antioch was when Aurelian reached it. My suggestion is that it was still in Roman hands so that the reason for Aurelian’s speed was the danger that the Antiochenes could join the Palmyrenes, especially so if the above-mentioned revolt of the monetarii had been crushed just recently as I have suggested above.
After this, Aurelian would probably have waited for his infantry forces to arrive. With forced marches it would have been possible for the cavalry to reach Antioch in 15 to 18 days and the infantry 30 to 38 days. In other words, Aurelian and his cavalry forces would have been at Antioch before the end of October while his infantry would have reached it by about mid-November. Since the sources claim that Palmyra was now conquered and then razed to the ground without trouble, I would suggest that Aurelian had previously removed the pieces of mural artillery that had caused him so much trouble. As discussed above, the walls were no obstacle. It is also likely that the defenders would have been quite demoralized to see their conquerers before them so quickly.
According to Vopiscus (HA Aurel. 31.4–32.1) Aurelian destroyed the city and ordered his soldiers to kill women, children, old men and peasants, and the leader of the revolt Antiochus/Achilles was pardoned because of his insignificance. However, there may have been another reason for this: that he was a relative of Zenobia. If Aurelian intended to marry Zenobia’s daughter, which according to Zonaras (12.27) he did, there was every reason to pardon this man – and my suggestion is that this was indeed the reason. On the basis of the letter from Aurelian to Cerronius Bassus (unknown) included in this text, Aurelian had put a time limit on the butchery so that there would remain some people to inhabit the place. The text, however, states that most of the population was put to the sword to serve as a warning example for the few remaining. The letter also claims that the Temple of the Sun, which had been pillaged by the eagle-bearers of the Third Legion and by the vexilla-bearers, the draco-bearers, buglers and trumpeters, was to be restored to its former condition by using the booty previously captured from Palmyra which was under the control of Bassus. It is obviously impossible to verify the veracity of this letter, but its contents would fit the circumstances. The rebels needed to be made a warning example of, while Aurelian still wanted to promote the cult of the Sun throughout his Empire. According to the Historia Augusta, Aurelian then marched back to Europe where he crushed the roving enemies, who must be the above-mentioned Carpi possibly with the Roxolani. If we assume that Aurelian left some of the forces that had already previously been left with Marcellinus, he would not have needed to stay long in the Palmyra-Emesa region. Allowing for regular marching speed, Aurelian would have reached Byzantium in January 273. Consequently, I would suggest that Aurelian engaged the Carpi and Roxolani in the winter-spring of 273 and that he then returned to the East to crush the revolt of Firmus.
It is unfortunate that we do not know what type of enemy the Carpi represented for Aurelian, because there are no extant descriptions of their fighting tactics. However, we can make some educated guesses on the basis of what were the fighting tactics of the Dacians (the Carpi were the so-called Free Dacians) and what type of tactics one would expect in this location. One would expect the Carpi to have possessed both cavalry and infantry and that they did not wear much protective equipment, so their forces could be considered to have been lightly equipped as far as their mobility is concerned. Most of the infantry would have consisted of spearmen and javelineers who also carried shields. Similarly, most of the cavalry would have consisted of spearmen. In addition to this, they would naturally have had some foot archers and mounted archers. In fact the inclusion of the Roxolani and the location suggests that the Carpi may have possessed Sarmatian-style cavalry of their own, so these would not have consisted solely of the allied Roxolani. We should also expect that the Carpi employed shield-wall phalanxes and close order units for combat when they decided to engage the enemy in a pitched battle, and in this case they apparently fought a pitched battle which they lost. The location given by the above inscription suggests the likelihood that Aurelian forced the invaders against the river Danube so that they were forced to fight. This in its turn suggests the possibility that the invaders consisted solely of cavalry whose only intention was to raid and then flee in the Sarmatian manner before the Romans could mount a response. Whatever their tactics, the Carpi were still by Roman standards only a barbarian horde and nothing more. The history for the wars between the Carpi and the Romans was one-sided. The Romans defeated the Carpi repeatedly from the reign of Philip the Arab (Philippus Arabs) onwards until they simply disappear from the sources.
The revolt of Egypt took place probably some time during the spring of 273. The above account has already made it clear that the rebels in Egypt consisted primarily of those who had previously supported Zenobia and Palmyra, and that the leader of the revolt was Firmus. On the basis of the list of captives in Aurelian’s triumph, Firmus’s allies may have included Indians, so it is possible that the revolt was timed according to the monsoon winds. So Firmus decided to revolt in support of the Palmyrenes in June/ July 272 and dispatched his ships to India in July 272 bearing the news of the catastrophe that had hit Egypt and Palmyra, and these ships reached India by early September 272. They would have returned with the contrary monsoon winds, so they could have started their return journey at the earliest in November/December 272 or at the latest in January 273, and they would have reached the Red Sea ports at the latest in February 273. If so, then when the ships brought Firmus an affirmative answer to his suggestion of forming a grand alliance, he would have finished his final preparations for the revolt, so the actual revolt would probably have taken place in about March 273.
Coin of Zenobia
(source: Cohen)
Coin of Aurelian
(source: Cohen)
The reason for the revolt is obscure, but in my opinion the likeliest reason is just the rebellious spirit of the Egyptians against the Romans at this time. It was because of this that Timagenes and others like him had joined the Palmyrenes. This was not the only revolt in Egypt during the tumultuous third century and more were waiting over the horizon. The Egyptians were clearly dissatisfied with their Roman rulers. The best evidences of this are the two revolts of Egypt that took place in 294–98. The fact that there were usurpations and revolts all around must have encouraged everyone who had anything against anyone to act. It was the spirit of the age. There must also have been commercial reasons for this because the leader of the revolt was a merchant and he was supported by his foreign trading partners. These commercial connections had clearly been established during the Palmyran interlude of 270–72. If my suggestion regarding the alliance structures and the influence of monsoon seasons is correct for the timing of the revolt, then Firmus and other Egyptians who supported the Palmyrenes had decided to revolt against the Romans immediately after the Romans had regained control of Egypt under M. Aurelius Probus. It was only thanks to the time it took to form the alliances that the revolt was delayed until the spring of 273.
The identity of the rebel leader has been considered suspect solely on the basis of the fact that the name comes from the Historia Augusta so it is claimed to be a forgery or a mixup with the prefect/corrector Claudius Firmus who is known to have been in charge of Egypt in 274.7 This, however, does not take into account the actual text of the Historia Augusta which quite clearly separates three different persons with the name Firmus from each other. Vopiscus (HA FSPB 3.1) states in no uncertain terms that there were three different men called Firmus, one of them prefect of Egypt (presumably the corrector of Egypt Claudius Firmus who was in office in 274), another dux limitis Africani and also proconsul, and the third who was the friend and ally of Zenobia. In short, Vopiscus did not have any trouble in distinguishing between the men with the same name unlike most modern historians.
According to Vopiscus, the third Firmus was a swarthy huge man with prominent eyes and curly hair. He was known to eat a huge amount of meat and to be a real powerhouse. He was known for his publicity stunts which included the holding of an anvil on his chest while in a crab position, swimming among crocodiles, driving an elephant and the riding of hippopotami and ostriches. According to Vopiscus (HA FSPB 4.3–4), Firmus was able to outdrink Aurelian’s duces in drinking contests and also the vexillum-bearer Burburus who was particularly well known for his ability to withstand wine. This is a nice vignette to the lifestyles of the period soldiers which is also known from other sources. Soldiers have always been known as heavy drinkers, because this is one of the means by which they can alleviate their stress, and there is nothing incredible or unbelievable in this statement. This incidental reference is also valuable for another reason, which is that it shows Firmus at his best. He lulled the Roman officers in charge of the defence of Egypt into a drunken stupor while he undoubtedly milked every piece of information he could out of them. This was first rate intelligence gathering. It was probably largely thanks to this that he was able to overcome the Roman garrisons protecting Egypt. Once in power, he immediately put a stop to the grain shipments to the city of Rome (HA FSPB 5.4). It made it absolutely necessary for Aurelian to crush the revolt promptly.
According to Watson (p.135), Aurelian set up a supplementary mint at Tripolis (Tripoli in northern Lebanon) in or about late summer 273. It is unfortunate that we do not know the exact date for the opening of this mint. All that is known with certainty is that it was opened in 273. Watson suggests that the intention may have been to give the soldiers a reward in the form of a donative to celebrate the victory over Palmyra or to encourage the troops to fight with greater eagerness against the enemies in Egypt. It is also possible that the opening of this new mint is connected with the previously mentioned punishment of the monetarii of Antioch.
Flavius Vopiscus offers us valuable information in a roundabout way regarding the commercial and military aspects of Firmus’s policies in two places: HA Aurel. 33.4–5 and FSPB 3.1ff. The latter states that Firmus was a rich merchant who kept a close relationship with the Blemmyes (subjects of Aksum at this time), Saracens and Indians and often sent merchant vessels to India. The former contains a list of captives in Aurelian’s triumph which includes Egyptians, Blemmyes, Aksumites, Arabes Eudaemones (Arabs of Aden who would be the Yemenites), Saracens and Indians.8 All of these were nations along the Red Sea route to India and on the basis of the fact that they were captives it is clear that they were allies of Firmus. When these two lists are combined with the letter of Aurelian to the Roman people included by Vopiscus (HA FSPB 5.3–6, esp.5.3), it becomes clear that the vast majority of Firmus’s forces consisted of his barbarian allies, because the text claims that he rose in revolt with the barbarians and gathered together the remaining supporters of Zenobia. This means that his forces consisted of quite a mix of different nationalities, all with differing fighting tactics. One may assume that Firmus’ allies arrived both on land and on ships in about February/March 273 while the remaining supporters of Zenobia launched their attack from the inside so that Firmus surprised the Romans completely.
In short, I would place the beginning of the revolt roughly to the period February/ March 273. All of the nations mentioned are known to have fought by using close order formations, but by Roman standards all of these were lightly equipped (mostly without armour and equipped only with shields, javelins, spears, swords and bows) and poorly organized, so that in all known instances the Romans were able to defeat them with far fewer men than their enemies had.9 They cannot have posed any serious threat to the elite forces that Aurelian brought to the scene. It is because of this that the war assumed an ‘I came, I saw, I won’ (veni, vidi, vici) character.
If the revolt took place in March, the news of the revolt could have reached Rhodope in nine to ten days in ships, or by land in about the same time. Let us assume that Aurelian was at Rhodope when he learnt of the revolt of Firmus, because this is where the Historia Augusta claims Aurelian was when he learnt of the Palmyran revolt. As I have hopefully shown above, this is likely to be a mistake for the location where Aurelian learnt of the revolt of Firmus because Zosimus clearly states that Aurelian had not crossed into Europe when he learned of the Palmyran revolt. It would have taken about ninety days for Aurelian to reach Egypt if he began his march at Rhodope. However, we should add to this figure the time it took for Aurelian to complete the reorganization of the defensive structures in Thrace in the aftermath of settling the Carpi and the time it took for him to organize supplies and ships for the campaign against Egypt. These could have easily taken a whole month, but obviously one cannot know this for certain. If one adds a month to the figure then Aurelian would have reached Egypt in about June-July 273. If Aurelian used a fleet, then he could have reached Alexandria in 10 days in favourable winds and in 19–20 days in unfavourable winds.10 It is unfortunate that we do not know what means Aurelian used to reach Egypt. One thing, though, is certain, which is that it involved the use of the fleet because in all cases Aurelian would have needed a fleet to transport his supplies and to place the city of Alexandria under siege if that were necessary.
We do not know any details of the military action that took place in Egypt beyond the fact that Aurelian routed the enemy and gained a complete victory with relative ease. Vopiscus (HA FSPB 5) claims that there were some who claimed that Aurelian had Firmus strangled, but at the same time he claims that Aurelian’s letter to the people of Rome stated otherwise. The main purpose of the letter appears to have been to calm down any possible disturbances in Rome by convincing the populace that the grain supply would soon return to normal. This indeed would have been a convincing reason for the writing of such a letter once Aurelian had possession of the city of Alexandria with its courier ships. According to the same letter, Aurelian had captured Firmus who was then tortured and killed. Considering Aurelian’s famed cruelty it is probable that he watched and supervised the torture and killing just as he did when he punished his slaves (HA Aurel. 49.3–5) – or perhaps he even participated in it.
The Egyptians were also punished for their revolt. Aurelian increased the tax on them by increasing the amount of grain they were required to contribute to Rome. Egyptian revenue in kind, in glass, papyri, linen and hemp were also to be paid to the city of Rome. He appointed additional boatmen on the Nile in Egypt and also on the Tiber in Rome. The Tiber was dredged and its banks supported to ease the transport of supplies along it to the city of Rome. The Historia Augusta does not specifically state that these would also have been paid for by the Egyptians, but this is more than likely because the addressee of Aurelian’s letter in the Historia Augusta is praefectus annonae Flavius Arabianus (otherwise unknown). Aurelian also demolished the walls of Alexandria and separated a large part of Bruchium from the city as a punishment. The idea was to prevent the occurrence of similar revolt in the future.11
As noted above, there is every reason to believe that Aurelian’s joking letter to the Senate, which referred to the granting of the title Carpicus to him, could actually be correct. Aurelian was indeed absent from Rome at the time the Senate gave him the title because the earliest known specimen of the title Carpicus maximus can be found on a papyrus dated 17 October 273. This may even mean that Aurelian was still in Egypt, making arrangements in the area including the improvement of the communications along the Nile. The sequence of letters from Egypt to Rome mentioned by the Historia Augusta would probably have been that the first letter was the letter to the populace meant to calm fears of famine followed up by the other two letters (the Carpicus letter to the Senate and the organization of grain supplies for the praefectus annonae).
Aurelian could even have conducted a punishing expedition south along the Nile and/or along the Red Sea against the Blemmyes and Aksumites (Ethiopians/Eritreans), and it is also possible that the Meroites were used as allies during such a campaign. If Aurelian punished the Saracens of the Arabian Peninsula and the Yemenis (Arabs of Aden/Arabia Felix), this would have required a naval campaign, and so would the attack against the Axomitae/ Aksumites who were opposite the Yemenis. The fact that these nations had provided military support for Firmus would have made a punishing expedition necessary. The list of nations in the Historia Augusta (Aurel. 41.10), which worshipped Aurelian as a god in 275, proves that some sort of punishing expeditions were probably conducted, but by whom is not known. The worship of Aurelian as a god should be interpretated as a payment of tribute (i.e. protection money) in the form of gifts to the emperor god so that the nature of these payments as a tribute could be veiled as a worship of a god. The list in question mentions the Saracens, Blemmyes, Axomitae (Ethiopians/Eritreans), Bactrians, Seres (Chinese), Hibernians (Georgians), Albanians of Caucasus, Armenians and the peoples of India.
In the case of Bactrians and Chinese it is clear that Aurelian did not conduct any punishing expeditions against them. The best educated guess for their inclusion would be that these had sent some gifts to Aurelian (which could be interpreted as worship) in an effort to form an alliance with him in a situation in which the new Persian ruler Hormizd was fighting somewhere close to Bactria – unless of course the worshippers in question were the prisoners taken from the Persian army. In fact, I would suggest that in the case of the Chinese it is likelier that they meant the captured soldiers because China would be too far away for them to ask Aurelian to ally with them unless there was some unknown war between the State of Western Jin and Persia in Central Asia. However, in the case of the tribute paid by the Armenians, Georgians, Albanians, and Saracens, it is clear that their aim would have been to convince Aurelian to liberate them from the Persian yoke. If this is the case, and I would suggest that it was, then their joint effort appears to have paid dividends, because Aurelian was on his way against Persia when he was killed in late 275. The reason for the tribute paid by the Indians could be the same, but in this case it is possible that the Romans did make a show-of-the-flag expedition there too because they certainly did that during the reigns of Constantine the Great and Constantius II with the same result, which was the payments of tribute to the Romans.12
The Saracens (Kinda?), Blemmyes, Aksumites and Yemenis would of course have paid their tribute as a result of having been punished by the Romans because of their support of Firmus. All these nations would have been under the Aksumites at this time, which is proven by the information provided by the Monumentum Adulitanum II and the information provided by Vopiscus (HA Aurel. 33.4–5; FSPB 3ff.). The list of peoples paying tribute to Aurelian suggests that the Romans conducted a major joint and combined operations campaign along both shores of the Red Sea so that they were able to liberate the Arabs, Kinda and Blemmyes from the Aksumite yoke. In other words, the support the Aksumites gave to the Palmyrenes proved very costly for them and resulted only in their own subdual by the Romans. On the basis of the above and Vopiscus (HA Prob. 17.1) and Zosimus (1.71.1) it is clear that the Aksumites lost control of the tribes that they subdued so that we find for example the Blemmyes operating independently during the reign of Probus.
It is not known whether Aurelian participated in any of these probable punishing expeditions, but he easily could have. He could even have sailed to India and back if he began his journey in July 273 and returned back in February 274. This would still have left him plenty of time to crush Tetricus in 274. However, I would suggest that he did not join any such show-of-the-flag expedition because the Historia Augusta shows him reorganizing shipments of grain from Egypt to the city of Rome. Furthermore, it would be quite incredible if the sources had left such a spectacular adventure unmentioned, on top of which it would have been very irresponsible for the emperor to conduct such a campaign in a situation in which he had not subdued the Gallic Empire. However, I would not entirely rule out the possibility that he could have joined a punishing campaign against the Blemmyes, Saracens, Axomitae and Yemenis, because such an expedition from Alexandria along the Nile and Canal of Trajan and the Red Sea up to Aden and then back would have encompassed ca. 3,500 nautical miles which could have been covered in favourable winds with an average rowing speed of 5 knots in 30 days, and in unfavourable winds in 90 days plus whatever fighting and negotiations there were – and we should remember that it is very unlikely that the winds would have been unfavourable constantly, so the entire expedition could have easily been performed within 90 days. If the Romans dispatched a show-of-the-flag expedition to India, its ships would have continued from Aden to India while the rest of the fleet would have turned back. In short, there was plenty of time for such a campaign to take place after June-July 273. Regardless, I am still of the opinion that if this punishing expedition took place, as is very probable, then it would have been conducted by some dux or duces rather than by the emperor himself because it is once again difficult to see how the sources could leave Aurelian’s participation unmentioned. Furthermore, none of the other known campaigns in this area were conducted by the emperors themselves, with the exception of Septimius Severus who was planning to invade Axum/Aksum before he cancelled the campaign thanks to the outbreak of a pestilence.13
It is possible that Aurelian started his famous reform of the monetary system while in Egypt because the Alexandrian mint started to issue new reformed coins in the autumn 273. The defeat of Palmyra and the revolt in Egypt enabled Aurelian to instigate the next stages in his financial reforms which had undoubtedly been suggested by his ‘financial minister’ Sabinus who also transferred the principal mint of the Empire from Milan to Ticinum at the same time. The most important portion of the reform was the improvement of the quality of the coins to the standard it had been under Caracalla. In fact, Watson suggests that Aurelian and his advisors may have used the monetary system of Caracalla as their model when they reformed the coinage. The second portion of the reforms was the making of tax gathering more efficient.
Alaric Watson is undoubtedly correct in suggesting that even if it is obvious that Aurelian wanted to root out corruption and loved law and order for their own sake, his primary intention was to keep his armies paid, fed, housed and ready to fight. He was a military man who understood that if he wanted to have a well functioning military he needed a well functioning economy in which taxes were efficiently gathered for use by the army.
The exact timing of the reform is contested; some historians claim that it started in the autumn of 273 while others place it in the next year; the latest date for the reform would have been the end of August 274. The fact that the Alexandrian mint started issuing coins in autumn 273 that reflect the reforms that became apparent later in other mints, suggests that the earliest date is to be preferred.
At the heart of the reform was the improving of the standardization of the coins. The silver content in the coins was raised five per cent on average while the range of variance in their size and content was reduced significantly. Aurelian recalled the old debased silver coins and replaced them with these newly issued improved coins. The tighter control exercised by Aurelian is apparent from the fact that with the exception of Lyon all mints followed these standards and also followed the centralized coin designs that Aurelian used in his propaganda. The quality of gold coins was also improved so that the weight of the aureus was increased to 6.6g, which had also been the standard under Caracalla. The improved quality of the silver and gold coins also meant that the minting of bronze coins became once again affordable – the debasing of silver coins had made bronze coins next to useless for commercial purposes. The state now introduced three denominations of bronze coins; these once again resemble those in use under Caracalla.
The aim was to restore the trust of the people, merchants and soldiers in the quality and value of the coins issued by the state so that commercial transactions would not be hindered. By and large this appears to have worked because the major problems with inflation took place only later under the tetrarchs when Diocletian famously tried to correct the situation with his price edict. The reform, however, was still not a great success because the improved quality coins were too valuable for daily transactions and the state and the cities did not issue enough bronze coins. This was particularly true in Gaul where the pre-reform coinage remained the preferred form of payment. It is therefore not surprising that the Lyon mint continued to mint below-standard coins. The other result of this was the increase in the numbers of forged coins which were minted to look like the older coins. Newly issued coins restored the credibility of the currency, but they did not put a stop to inflation largely thanks to the fact that daily commercial transactions continued to be made with the older debased coins.
The presence of the Chinese forces in the Persian army makes it possible that the mail and scale hoods visible in the paintings of Dura Europos could have been borrowed from the Chinese.
Chinese horseman from the Dunghuang painting (first half of the fourth century). Aurelian and the Romans faced Chinese cavalry in the Persian anny so that they could have easily encountered similarly equipped Chinese in combat. Note the clear Central Asian influence on the equipment.