ADVENTUS coin of Probus (source: Cohen)
On the basis of the title Gothicus, which Probus is attested to have possessed by 277, we know that Probus’s first war was against the Goths in about 276/7. These would have been the very same enemies against which he, Tacitus and Florianus had fought in the spring of 276. And where was this war fought? The usual assumption is that it was fought in Asia Minor, but I would suggest that it was actually fought in Thrace. The reason for this conclusion is that since Florianus had blocked the route of retreat from the Goths with his army on the Bosphorus, it is probable that his withdrawal from there to fight against Probus had allowed the Goths to cross the Bosphorus into Thrace so that they were pillaging it at the time Probus began his march west.
Probus’s march to the west is confirmed by coins bearing the text adventus and the laws preserved in the Justinian Code, which place Probus in Cyzicus and then in the Balkans at Serdica, Sirmium and Siscia. The date for his stay at Sirmium is 5 May 277, which would imply that the war and reorganization lasted quite a while.1 Probus would therefore have first marched to the naval headquarters of the Classis Pontica at Cyzicus probably with the intention of using its naval resources for the shipping of his forces to the European side of the straits. We should not forget that Probus had previously commanded the naval expedition to retake Egypt from the Palmyrenes. He therefore knew well how to use naval forces for amphibious and naval operations and also for the provisioning of armies in the field. It is therefore not surprising that his first object was to make certain that the naval resources in the region were used in support of his land campaign.
The only sources which describe the Gothic war of Probus are Armenian and Georgian and these describe the war only because the Armenian hero Trdat/Tiridates the Great had an important role in it. These sources are: Agathangelos (1.2, 37ff., p.53ff.); Moses (2.79); and the Georgian Chronicles (pp.80–81). The following discussion is based on these as well as on my Military History of late Rome Volume 1, and has some new conclusions.
According to Agathangelos (p.39), the ruler of the Goths assembled an army to fight against the ruler of the Greeks who was none other than the emperor Probus. This implies that the Gothic and Herul fugitives had managed to cross into Thrace and from there to the Danube where they would have met their brethren, and that the Gothic king, who had dispatched these forces previously to support Aurelian, had now assembled a fresh force with which he had invaded Thrace in revenge for the treatment the Goths had received. The Gothic king challenged Probus to a duel, presumably because Probus was well known for his skills as a duellist, but unfortunately for Probus his days as a duellist appear to have been in the past because Agathangelos states that he was at the time weak in bodily strength. According to Malalas (12.33, tr. by Jeffreys, Jeffreys and Scott p.165), ‘Aelius Probus … was of medium height, with a large belly and straight, closely cropped hair, a bushy beard, dark skin, a ruddy complexion, good eyes and was very learned; he favoured the Green faction.’
Probus was only 44 years old at the time, but the reference to the large belly could suggest that he had allowed his physical condition to deteriorate. Furthermore, Agathangelos states in no uncertain terms that he was now simply too weak to fight. However, on the basis of later references to Probus’s personal bravery in war (see later), it would seem that this only applied to the winter of 276/7; the implication is that Probus was just suffering from some illness/flu during the winter season and that it was this that prevented him from fighting the duel. It is also quite easy to explain why Probus would have had a big belly: he could have done as the gladiators and added extra girth around his waist for extra protection against cuts and thrusts. A big belly does not mean that the man would not have been fully fit and ready to fight; consider modern sumo wrestlers. According to Agathangelos, Probus was also unable to bring the enemy to a decisive battle because the Goths refused to fight a pitched battle with armies deployed for combat, army opposing army. This means that the entire Gothic army consisted of cavalry and that the Gothic ruler was a true expert in this style of fighting. The fact that Probus was also a learned man means that he was well versed in the history of warfare and all aspects of the art of war – the ability of the Gothic king to avoid all the snares set up by his skilled enemy shows that he was a very able commander.
It was then that the comes Licinius (the future emperor) and the exiled Armenian king Trdat/Tiridates came to the rescue. These two men were friends because Trdat had been educated in the household of Count Licinius. According to both Agathangelos and Moses, Tiridates was an expert martial artist. Moses goes on to claim that Trdat had defeated in a boxing match the boxing champion Clitostratos of Rhodes, whose favourite technique was the neck grip, and that he had also defeated Cerasos of Argos in like manner. In addition to this, Tiridates drove chariots in competitions. He was a man with capital letters just like Probus. Agathangelos’s account (39–42) implies that the war between the Goths and Probus lasted for a significant amount of time because he not only states that Probus was unable to force the enemy to fight a decisive battle, but that he was also forced to issue an order that all available forces were to be marched immediately to his assistance. It was these reinforcements that included Licinius and Tiridates. When these two men and their forces had reached the city (Serdica?) where Probus was, the gates had already been locked so that there was not enough forage available for the horses of their vast army. The implication of this is that the reinforcements consisted primarily of cavalry, which Probus needed sorely for the purpose of forcing the cavalry-based enemy to fight a battle. It was then that Tiridates gave a demonstration of his strength. He saw a walled pen with a great pile of hay, and then climbed the wall after which he threw heaps of hay to the troops together with the guards and donkeys, and then climbed back.
Licinius could hardly believe his eyes, and when the gates of the city were opened in the morning, Licinius went to meet Probus. It was then at a meeting of officers that Licinius learnt from Probus that the king of the Goths had challenged Probus to a duel. Licinius had a solution to the problem. He suggested that Tiridates fight in disguise against the king of the Goths, and when Tiridates was brought before Probus, he agreed to the plan. The personal appearance of Tiridates must have been quite imposing.
Next morning, the Romans dispatched Tiridates, robed in imperial garb to fight the agreed duel. Tiridates and the Gothic king whipped the flanks of their horses and charged at a gallop against each other. It was Tiridates who gained the upper hand. He tilted the king onto the ground, seized him and brought him before Probus. It is very unfortunate that the sources fail to tell us what happened next. However, we can make some educated guesses based on what we otherwise know. On the basis of the Georgian Chronicles, the Romans exploited the capture of the Gothic king by attacking the enemy, which was routed. See below. It is likely that the Gothic King was ruler of the Greuthungi Goths, because the invaders were from Lacus Maeotius (the Sea of Azov) and they subsequently withdrew past the Bosporan kingdom. It is also very likely that the victory in the duel enabled Probus to conclude a treaty with the captured king, most probably a treaty of friendship and alliance with the Goths, so that they would become Roman allies (foederati). They were apparently initially attached to the Roman army because Vopiscus (HA Prob. 18.1–2) claims that Probus settled the captured Greuthungi as allies in the Balkans only after he had concluded peace with the Persians. This actually makes a lot of sense. The Greuthungi Goths had been originally summoned to fight against the Persians because as cavalry lancers they were particularly effective against them, and Probus therefore kept the Goths with him until the time when he knew that the Goths were no longer needed against the Persians. In sum, the Armenian sources imply that the Gothic war lasted for so long that Probus was forced to summon reinforcements, which in its turn would mean that it is possible that Probus indeed reached the city of Sirmium very close to the date 5 May 277, when the Justinian Code states he was there.
If the Gothic king concluded the alliance, which I suggest he did on the basis of Vopiscus’s account, this did not concern all of the Greuthungi Goths because we know from the other sources that the last remnants of these Gothic forces were destroyed by Tejran, King of the Bosporans. It was he who intercepted and massacred the survivors so that Probus was able to strike coins with Victoria Pontica (this refers to Probus’s success as a general) and Victoria Gothica (which refers to Probus’s success during his reign).2
Agathangelos’s account of the subsequent exploits of Tiridates is important because it enables us to reconstruct events in the east from 277 onwards. According to him, the grateful emperor rewarded Tiridates with a great army, which Tiridates then used for the invasion of Armenia. Tiridates defeated the Persians in a pitched battle in about 277/8 so that the surviving Persians were forced to flee back to Persia.3 The principal reason for this success was that the Persians were unable to concentrate their forces against him in a situation in which most of their forces were in the east fighting against the rebel Hormizd and because the nomads had broken through the Darubend/Darbend Gate (see below). It has been suggested that Probus was able to claim the title Persicus Maximus on 21 October 279 largely thanks to the efforts of Tiridates, but in this study I am making the claim that it is probable that Probus had a personal role in these events, which will be analyzed later in the right context.4
It is thanks to the Georgian Chronicles (pp.80–81) that we know why Narses, the High King of Armenia, failed to block the invasion of Tiridates in 277/8, and other things which took place not mentioned by the Armenian sources. This text proves that the Khazars, an anachronistic term which may mean the proto-Turks or proto-Huns, or some other nomadic group, tried to force their way through the Derbend Pass as they had done before. This text claims that the nomads were opposed by Mihran/Mirian, who is actually to be identified with Narses because the Georgian Chronicles are in the habit of hiding the client status of Georgia (Georgia means at this time its eastern portion which was called Iberia while its western portion Colchis was under Roman rule) and its ruler to the Armenians and Persians. An account of the Gothic invasion follows this, which in all its principal elements is the same as that preserved by the Armenian sources. The Chronicles state that when the Goths invaded, the Roman emperor assembled his army and marched against the invaders. The Gothic king proposed a duel. The emperor disguised Tiridates as himself and dispatched him against the Gothic king. Tiridates then duly captured the king and the Romans routed the Goths. This account implies that the Romans attacked the Goths after their king had been captured. Most of these defeated Goths would presumably have fled only to be butchered later by the Bosporans close to their homes.
The Chronicles once again note that Tiridates was given Roman troops, but adds at the same time that Tiridates was crowned king of Armenia and sent to Armenia. Tiridates then expelled Mihran’s (i.e. Narses’) soldiers and Persian governors from Armenia. On the basis of Moses (2.91) it is possible to calculate that Tiridates was crowned king of Armenia in about 278, which corresponds nicely with the timeline I have suggested here. The situation changed when Narses and Mihran/Mirian had defeated the nomads so that he was able to turn his forces against the Armenian king. We do not know when this happened, but one may presume that it was in about 278. To be able to crush the Armenians, Narses ordered the Persian nobles to bring reinforcements from Persia. These reinforcements included a relative of Narses who bore the name Peroz. Narses dispatched this Peroz to reinforce Mihran/Mirian in Georgia/Iberia. The Chronicles claim that Mihran/Mirian gave this Peroz his own daughter as wife together with the strategically important land in Georgia/Iberia called Xunan. Now the Persians outnumbered the Armenians so that Tiridates was forced to resort to guerrilla warfare. This enabled Tiridates to avoid defeat by prolonging the war. It was during the following years that Tiridates increased his already great renown as a duellist – he was possibly the best duellist of his day.
Probus could not rest on his laurels after the Gothic victory because the invasion of Gaul, which had begun during the interregnum, had resulted in the loss of sixty or seventy major cities in the area. The Romans were in deep trouble. Therefore, once the campaign against the Goths was finished, Probus marched to Sirmium, where he is attested to be 5 May 277, after which he continued his journey to Siscia, which he would have reached about mid-May. The probable route to Gaul would then have taken him to Emona, Aquileia, Patavium (Padua), Genua, Mutina (Modena), Placentia (Piacenza), Forum Iulii (Fréjus), Aquae Sextiae (Aix-en-Provence) and Arelate (Arles), and from there to Lugdunum (Lyon), which he would have reached towards the end of September or beginning of October. Historians have speculated that Probus would have visited Rome briefly on the basis of the ADVENTUS coins, which he could have easily done by taking a small detachment of cavalry with him while the rest of the army continued its march towards Gaul. If Probus did this, as is probable, he would have continued from Aquileia to Ravenna, Ariminum (Rimini), Fanum (Fano), and Reate (Rieti), to Rome, which would have taken about nine days after which he would have returned back north via the route which connected him with the forces sent in advance. The problem with this is that there is no definite evidence for the visit to Rome at this time so it is quite possible that Probus marched straight to Ludgunum where he is known to have minted ADVENTUS coins with him riding a horse towards the end of 277. However, I am still inclined to accept the view that Probus made a short visit into the city of Rome to secure his own position. This would not have taken many days to accomplish and it would have kept the senators happy – and we know that the senators were happy under Probus’s rule.5 The march from the south of Gaul northwards was a logistically sound decision because it enabled the shipping of supplies from the Mediterranean along the Rhône for the army.
The subsequent campaign to regain possession of Gaul from the invaders and its follow-up campaign in Germania is described by two sources, Vopiscus and Zosimus, but Vopiscus places it in its right place at the very beginning of the reign of Probus while Zosimus places it after the revolt of Saturninus, which probably took place either during the Gallic campaign or right after it. The following discussion presents the evidence first and then the conclusions, but it is necessary to point out at the beginning of the analysis that Probus divided his huge force so that he gave his generals the task of defeating the Franks while he himself took on the task of defeating the Alamanni and other Germanic tribes or tribal confederations. This becomes apparent when one compares the accounts and it has also been recognized in the previous research.6
ADVENTUS coin of Probus (source: Cohen)
In the next place he set out with a huge army [cum ingenti exercitu] for Gallia, which first fell into confusion after the death of Postumus, but was overrun by the Germans after the death of Aurelian. He fought there several so great and successful battles that he recovered 60 noble cities which had fallen into the barbarian hands and recovered all the booty… While they were roaming up and down along our bank or rather throughout all Gallia, he slew 400,000 of them [This figure is usually considered inflated, like the similar figures for the Goths and their allies for the reigns of Gallienus and Claudius, or the Helvetii against Julius Caesar, 7 or the numbers involved in the great barbarian migrations of the fifth century. In my opinion it is probable that Probus’s forces did not kill all of these, but rather that the 400,000 represents the entire armed strength of all of the invaders raiding Gaul, or alternatively the total number killed during the fight in Gaul and the subsequent invasion of enemy territory. It is consistent with all of the previous instances in which great masses of barbarians invaded Roman territory. It is quite easy to believe that when the Franks, Alamanni, Iuthungi, Burgundians, Vandals, Longiones and others invaded en masse that their overall numbers could easily approach 400,000, and the barbarians, who were unskilled in besieging, certainly needed huge numbers of soldiers to be able to take 60 major cities in Gaul which were protected by garrisons, citizen militia and walls at this stage of history. It is therefore not surprising that Probus needed the huge army mentioned to deal with this trouble.] and the remainder he drove back beyond the river of Neckar and Alba [This is usually identified with Swabian Alb/Jura in modern Swabia. This is the area between the Neckar, Danube and the Black Forest which is located to the west of Alb. Swabia comes from the tribal name Suebi/Suevi, which formed at this time a part of the Alamannic Confederacy. However, Bernard, who translated the text in the seventeenth century, identified Alba with the river Albis, today called the Elbe. Considering the terminology used by Vopiscus – ultra Nicrum fluvium et Albam removit – this is a sensible conclusion. In light of the number of kings and the use of the Neckar, the Alamanni were the more likely target of Probus’s operations, so the Alba is probably the Swabian Alb. But on the basis of Zosimus’s text it is actually more likely that Alba would be the Elbe because Probus continued his march eastwards where he defeated the Burgundians and Vandals both of whom were located close to the Elbe. Since it is impossible to know for certain what Vopiscus meant, I have here given both alternatives.] and he took as much booty as the barbarians had taken from the Romans. Besides this, he built opposite the Roman cities on barbarian soil forts [castra] in which he placed garrisons. He assigned fields, barns, houses and magazines of grain for all the forces which he placed on the other side of the Rhine. Heads of the barbarians were brought to him daily at the price of one aureus[gold coin] apiece, and he did not stop fighting until nine minor kings [reguli] threw themselves at his feet and from whom he received hostages first and then corn, cows and sheep. Some say he commanded them not to use swords again because they could now rely on the protection of Rome in case they needed to be defended. It seemed that this could not be achieved unless the Romans advanced the frontier to cover the whole of Germania as a province. However, he severely punished those, with the approval of the minor kings, who did not return the booty as promised. He also took 16,000 recruits who were scattered throughout the provinces and incorporated into the numeri and milites of the limes-frontier [i.e. among the so-called frontier troops which were called limitanei, which at this time consisted of legions and their auxiliary forces.] in groups of 50 or 60 men8 saying that the assistance of the barbarian auxiliaries must be felt rather than seen. [Vopiscus, HA Prob.13.5ff. tr. by Bernard, 289–90, with emendations, corrections and additions.]
The granting of one gold aureus for each head brought by the soldiers by the emperor Probus was an old and tried method to encourage the soldiers in their duty. Headhunting made the soldiers eager to fight and kill for two reasons. It enriched them and the trophies in the form of heads were proofs of their manhood in the eyes of other soldiers. The use of this method to encourage the men to do their duty proves quite nicely how well-versed Probus was with the ways of fighting.
He sent the following letter to the Senate. Fathers of the Senate, I give thanks to the immortal gods that they approved and justified your judgment in your choice of me. All that broad and extended country of Germany is subjugated. Nine minor kings of different tribes have humbled themselves and prostrated themselves at my feet, or should I say at your feet. Now they all plough and plant for you, and serve against the enemies of the interior… 400,000 of the enemies are slain; and 16,000 other with their arms have come into our service. Seventy noble cities [note the discrepancy of 60 vs. 70 cities, but it of course possible to think that the 70 cities would include the cities liberated in Agri Decumates] are recovered out of the slavery of the enemy and all Gallia is entirely liberated… The fields of Gallia are ploughed with the cattle of the barbarians, and the German beasts yield their captive necks to our yokes. All their sheep graze now upon our pasture, the flocks of the tribes nourish our troops, and the herds of their horses are now bred for our horsemen, and our barns are full of their corn… It is our wish, Fathers of the Senate, that you appoint a new governor for Germania [The subsequent revolt of the military commanders left in charge of Gaul proves that this governor of Germania was not in charge of military forces. In other words, the details that we have imply that the civilian and military duties in the provinces were already separated in most cases.] [Vopiscus, HA Prob.15.1ff. tr. by Bernard, 290–91, with emendations, corrections and additions.]
Having performed these affairs as I have related, Probus obtained several victories over the barbarians in two different wars; in one of which he himself commanded, but left the other to the conduct of his lieutenant. Perceiving that it was necessary to assist the cities of Germany which lay upon the Rhine, and were harassed by the Barbarians, he marched with his army towards the river. When the war began there, a grievous famine prevailed throughout the surrounding country; but a heavy shower of rain and corn fell together, so that in some places were great heaps of it made by its own descent. [If true, I would suggest a natural explanation for this miracle would be that there were great heaps of grain on the ground because the fleeing barbarians had abandoned them when the Romans approached, and that Probus then claimed that this had resulted from a miracle to encourage the men in the same manner that Aurelian had encouraged his men with visions. It is of course quite possible that the whole thing had been stage-managed from the start. The other natural explanation would of course be a powerful storm which had raised grain into the air which would then have dropped, but this sounds too good to be true. The third natural explanation is that Zosimus or his source has mistaken the rain miracle of Marcus Aurelius to have taken place under Marcus Aurelius Probus. This is probably the likeliest alternative.] At this prodigy, all were so astonished that at first they dared not touch the corn to satisfy their hunger; but being at length forced to it by necessity, which expels all fear, they made bread of it, which not only allayed their hunger, but enabled them to gain the victory with great ease. The emperor terminated several other wars, with scarcely any trouble; and fought some fierce battles, first against the Longiones, a German nation [belonging to the Alamanni], whom he conquered, taking Semno [possibly after the Semnones, a tribe which belonged to the Alamannic confederacy. He would have been one of the nine minor kings mentioned by Vopiscus.] their general, and his son, prisoners. These he pardoned upon submission, but took from them all the captives and plunder they had acquired, and dismissed, on certain terms, not only the common soldiers, but even Semno and his son. Another of his battles was against the Franks, whom he subdued through the good conduct of his commanders. [Zosimus 1.67.1–1.68.1, English tr. 1814, p.32–3 with some changes and additions by author.]
The above quotes make it obvious that Probus’s plan for the campaign season of 277 was to divide his massive army into two army groups so that his generals (possibly Proculus and Bonosus) were in charge of liberating the north of Gaul from Frankish hands while Probus himself liberated central Gaul, the upper reaches of the Rhine and Raetia from the Alamanni. One may make the educated guess that Probus’s generals and Probus both had a minimum of about 70,000 men for them to be able to defeat the enemies they faced. It is probable that the Alamanni were supported by the Burgundians and Vandals because Probus campaigned against them next year. The principal reason for the troubles was that the abandonment of Agri Decumates during the reign of Gallienus had left a gaping hole in the Roman defensive structures. In other words, the first stage of the operations consisted of pushing the invaders away from Gaul and from the establishment of the beachheads on the other side of the Rhine frontier.
The accounts of Zosimus and Vopiscus make it clear that Probus and his generals soundly defeated their enemies and forced them across the Rhine so that Probus pushed the enemy past even the Neckar and received the surrender of nine minor kings. It is probable that one of them was King Semno (after Semnones, a part of the Alamannic confederation) mentioned by Zosimus.
Column commemorating the victories of Probus possibly over the Alamanni found at Merten near Metz. Restored drawing by Duruy.
ShapurI It is possible that the helmet is a Roman helmet so that the coin would depict a trophy
(source: Rawlinson).
Hormizd I (source: Rawlinson)
Bahram I (source: Rawlinson)
Bahram II (source: Duruy)
Narses (source: Rawlinson)
These victories enabled Probus to demand and obtain the booty back, together with hostages, grain, cows, sheep, and 16,000 barbarian recruits which were distributed in groups of 50 and 60 along the frontiers. See Appendix 2. Probus also restored the borders by building castra- forts (consisting mostly of the so-called quadriburgia) on both sides of the Rhine and presumably also along the Danube, because the borders facing the Agri Decumates required the building of forts along the entire length because the previous line of forts was now in barbarian hands. The Alamanni were naturally forced to become allied foederati, but Probus and the Romans could not put too much trust in their loyalty, as was also noted in Vopiscus’s account. The soldiers who were settled on the frontiers were given farms, store-houses, homes and rations of provisions to support them. At least at this stage of his career Probus’s policy was not to enlarge the Empire in the west but to provide it with better defensive structures. He fortified both banks of the Rhine so that the outpost forts on the barbarian side provided intelligence of enemy activities, acted as staging posts for operations into the enemy territory, and acted as the first line of defence against any possible barbarian aggression. In light of Probus’s future actions it is possible that this formed only the first stage in Probus’s plans which would have been to conquer the whole of Germania.
As I have noted previously, most of these new forts followed the so-called Tetrarchic model so that the forts were smaller and better protected than previously. These forts were typically square in shape (quadriburgia); walls were thick; barracks were placed against the walls; and the towers projected outside from the walls. The purpose was to make these forts more defensible than had been the case with the typical Principate fortresses. However, the term ‘Tetrarchic fort’ is highly misleading, because modern research has proved that this type of defensive structure had been in existence since the late second century (Le Bohec, 2006, 98ff.) with the implication that Probus was following up a quite old and traditional model.9
It is also probable that Probus created the so-called Barcarii (ND Occ.35.32) on the Lake Constance at this time as suggested by Reddé (p.630) and it is similarly possible that he created the Fleet of Lake Como. The events of the reigns of Gallienus and Claudius would have shown that there existed a need for such naval units in case the enemy managed to penetrate Roman defences. As I have noted previously, it is clear that Probus’s strategy along the Rhine frontier set a precedent for his successors to follow.10
It is thanks to an extant inscription that we know that there was also trouble in Mauretania Tingitana in 277. It proves that the Baquates had revolted and ravaged Mauritania Tingitana, but the local governor was able to force them to sign a peace treaty in 277. But the fact that the peace had to be concluded again in 280 means that the Baquates resumed their raiding afterwards. The evidence clearly shows that the Roman forces, which consisted of auxiliary forces, proved quite adequate for the task at hand.11
He made war on the Burgundi and Vandili. [This makes it very likely that the Burgundians and Vandals had joined the Alamanni in their invasion of Gaul.] But seeing his forces were too weak, he endeavoured to separate those of his enemies, and engage only with a part. [If the Burgundians and Vandals had united their forces, this would not be surprising, because according to Jerome a.373 and Cassiodorus 1119, in 373 the Burgundians were able to provide the Romans with 80,000 mercenaries and one should add to this figure those who were left behind to protect their homes. The Vandals possessed at least the same number of men. In short, if the Burgundians and Vandals united their forces, they could have had 200,000–300,000 men. However, let us assume that they did not unite their forces, but fought two separate wars. Even in this case Probus would have faced enemy forces consisting of about 100,000–150,000 men in each case. In either case it is not surprising that Probus resorted to the use of the stratagem, of luring the enemy to cross the river, which is likely to have been either the Elbe or one of the rivers close to it.] His design was favoured by fortune; for the armies lying on both sides of the river, the Romans challenged the Barbarians that were on the further side to fight. This so incensed them, that many of them crossed over, and fought until the Barbarians were all either slain or taken by the Romans; except a few that remained behind, who sued for peace, on condition of giving up their captives and plunder; which was acceded to. But as they did not restore all that they had taken, the emperor was so enraged, that he fell on them as they were retiring, killed many of them, and took prisoner their general Igillus. [It is possible that this was only an excuse for the attack because after all Zosimus was using Roman sources. It is entirely plausible to think that Probus actually ate his words and attacked the enemy for a second time unexpectedly. In other words, I would consider it is quite possible that Probus resorted to the use of a second stratagem to finish the job.] All of them that were taken alive were sent to Britain, where they were settled, and were subsequently very serviceable to the emperor when any insurrection broke out. [The sending of the Burgundians to Britain was a wise move because it isolated the barbarians from their countrymen and basically forced them to fight for the Romans in their new alien surroundings.] [Zosimus 1.68.1–3, English tr. 1814, p.33 with some changes and additions by author.]
From Gallia he went into Illyricum, on his way to which he so secured and established the peace of Raetia as not to leave the least suspicion of any danger. [This would presumably refer to the campaigns against the Burgundians and Vandals, because Probus had already pacified the Alamanni during the previous campaign. What is notable about Vopiscus’ account in this case and after is that he referred constantly to the territory in Roman hands when the actual fighting was conducted north of it.]. In Illyricum he so severely beat the Sarmatians and other tribes [In light of Zosimus’ text it is probable that Probus continued from the lands of the Siling Vandals straight to the lands held by the Hasding Vandals and Sarmatians so that Probus actually attacked the enemies from an unexpected direction, possibly when they had returned from Illyricum which they had apparently pillaged. The other tribes would therefore include at least the Hasdings, but may also have included the Quadi and some Dacian groups and others.] that he so easily recovered all the spoil which they possessed that it seemed like there was no fighting. He carried his arms into Thrace, where all the Getic tribes either became allies or submitted to him because they were frightened by his fame. [This presumably implies that Probus marched along the Danube River in a show-of-the-flag campaign and received the submission of the tribes north of it. The other possibility is that Probus crossed the Danube and then marched along it on enemy soil to make the case even more pressing, because in the above instances Vopiscus had clearly referred to fighting north of Roman territory when he referred to a specific locale within the Roman territory. However, in the accompanying map on page 184 I have still reconstructed Probus’s route south of the Danube, but readers should keep their minds open also to the other option.] Then he went into the east. [Vopiscus, HA Prob.16.1–3, tr. by Bernard, 291–2 with emendations, changes and comments.]
The Germanic campaign of Probus was an unprecedented success for the times and it is not surprising that Vopiscus’s account of Probus’s life is basically a panegyric. The Romans had not conducted a raid so deep into Germania after the reigns of Caracalla and Maximinus Thrax. The only comparable invasion of enemy territory in the past was that by Caracalla; he defeated all of the tribes from the mouths of the Rhine and Elbe up to the mouth of the Danube, and Probus achieved almost the same with his two year campaign when he also defeated the Sarmatians and subdued the Getic tribes. Probus’ campaign in the area can therefore be called a true triumph, and I would suggest that it was only after this triumph had been accomplished that he sent the letter (which is possibly fictitious, but undoubtedly based on some letter of Probus which he sent to the Senate to announce his great victories). According to Vopiscus, Probus killed about ‘400,000’ Germanic invaders and drove all the rest back over Niger (Neckar) and Alba (Elbe). It is the figure of 400,000 and the Elbe which suggests that the announcement was only made after the second campaign had been accomplished. Probus would also have deserved the title of Magnus (the Great) added to his other titles. Obviously his successes owed everything to the sometimes frantic efforts of his two great predecessors, Gallienus and Aurelian, but this does not diminish his achievements.
The events and whereabouts of Probus after early 278 are controversial and there exists no consensus view among historians regarding this.12 The view adopted here is that Probus followed up his campaigns in Germania, ‘Illyricum’ and ‘Thrace’ with a campaign in the east. And why did Probus not complete the conquest of the Germanic territories at this stage? There were three reasons for Probus to march to the east immediately. The first of these is that the Blemmyes had invaded Egypt and threatened the important taxes that were earmarked for Rome. The second is that Probus had received the news of the impending Persian invasion in a situation in which Narses as the Great King of Armenia, had managed to force Tiridates on the defensive (see above). The third is that the Isaurians had also revolted; but this problem was handled en route to Egypt and was of secondary importance in comparison with the other problems, the most important of which was naturally the state of war with Persia. Regardless, the Isaurians were to be the first enemy Probus faced in 278 while en route to Egypt.
In 278 Probus faced a serious revolt in Isauria. There are three sources for this war:1) Zosimus, who provides the most detailed account; 2) Vopiscus (HA Prob.16.4–17.2);3) An inscription from Cremna, which is dated securely to between the summer of 278 and the beginning of 279 so that the likeliest date is the summer or autumn of 278. The siege has been thoroughly analyzed by Stephen Mitchell and his team and the following discussion is entirely based on this study.13
Mitchell provides a full text, translation and analysis of the inscription, which dates the war. On the basis of this inscription we know that the man in charge of the siege of Cremna was Terentius Marcianus, vir perfectissimus, praeses provinciae Lyciae Pamphyliae (governor of the province of Lycia and Pamphylia). The campaign also took place between summer 278 and the end of 278 before Probus became consul for the third time in the beginning of 279. This means that Probus had continued his march from Siscia immediately, through Thrace where he had received the surrender of the Getic tribes, after which he had marched against the Isaurian rebels.
The details in the Historia Augusta and Zosimus differ. According to the former, the rebel in Isauria was called Palfuerius and Probus defeated him in person and liberated Isauria and Pamphylia before continuing his march to the east. According to the latter the rebel was called Lydius and he was then besieged at Cremna by Probus’ generals. Some historians consider Lydius and Palfuerius to be one and the same man while others consider these to be two different rebels who revolted in the same area against the Romans. The question is ultimately unsolvable but the details in the sources are not entirely irreconcilable because it is possible that Probus defeated Lydius/Palfuerius first and then left the conduct of the siege of the defeated enemy for Terentius Marcianus to finish when he marched forward against the more important enemies.
Then he went into the east and while he was on his way, he captured and slew a robber of great power called Palfuerius, and thereby set free the whole of Isauria and restored obedience towards the laws of Rome among the tribes and cities. And when he had done that, he said that it was a country in which it was easier to drive the bandits from one place to another than extirpate them. Therefore, in order to get rid of them, he settled his veterans on private holdings in all those places which were difficult of access on condition that their sons should be sent to the army at the age of eighteen so that they would not became bandits. [Vopiscus, HA Prob.16.4–6, tr. by Bernard with some major changes and emendations.]
The wars upon the Rhine being thus terminated, a circumstance happened in Isauria which should not be omitted. There was an Isaurian named Lydius, who had been a robber from his youth, and with a gang like himself had committed depredations throughout Pamphylia and Lycia. This gang being attacked by the soldiers, Lydius, not being able to oppose the whole Roman army, retreated to a place in Lycia called Cremna, which stands on a precipice, and is secured on one side by large and deep ditches. Finding many who had fled there for refuge, and observing that the Romans were very intent on the siege, and that they bore the fatigue of it with great resolution, he pulled down the houses, and making the ground fit for tillage, sowed corn for the maintenance of those that were in the town. But the number being so great that they were in need of much more provisions, he turned out of the place all that were of no service, both male and female. The enemy, perceiving his design, forced them back again; on which Lydius threw them headlong into the trenches that surrounded the walls, where they died. Having done this, he constructed a mine, from the town beyond the enemies’ camp, through which he sent persons to steal cattle and other provisions. By these means he provided for the besieged for a considerable time, until the affair was revealed to the enemy by a woman. Lydius, however, still did not despond, but gradually retrenched his men in their wine, and gave them a smaller allowance of corn. But this not answering the end, he was at length driven to such straights, that he killed all that were in the town, except a few of his adherents, sufficient as he thought to defend it, and some women, whom he ordered to be in common among them all. [On the basis of this it is very unlikely that Lydius and his men would have been locals because it is difficult to see how the men would have agreed to such an order if their families were in the city. This means that Lydius had been forced to seek a place of refuge in Cremna after he had been defeated in battle.] But when he had resolved to persevere against all dangers, there happened at length this accident. There was with him in the town a man who was expert in making engines, and in using them with such dexterity, that when Lydius ordered him to shoot a dart at any of the enemy, he never missed his aim. It happened that Lydius had ordered him to hit a particular person, whom either accidently or on purpose he missed, for which he stripped and scourged him severely, and, moreover, threatened him with death. The man was so exasperated on account of the blows he had received, and so affrighted at the menaces, that he took an opportunity to steal out of the town; and falling in with some soldiers to whom he gave an account of his actions and sufferings, he showed them an aperture in the wall, through which Lydius inspected all that was done in their camp, and promised them to shoot him as he was looking through it in his usual manner. The commander of the expedition on this took the man in his favour; who, having planted his engine, and placed some men before him that he might not be discovered by the enemy, took aim at Lydius as he looked through the aperture, and with a dart shot him and gave him a mortal wound. He had no sooner received this wound, than he became still more strict with some of his own men. Having enjoined them upon oath never to surrender the place, he expired with much struggling. [The defenders did not keep their oath, but surrendered.] [Zosimus 1.69–70, English tr. 1814, p.33–4 with some changes and additions by author.]
Mitchell and his team have conducted thorough archaeological work on the city of Cremna and have analyzed the finds in detail. It is thanks to this research that we are now in a position to know that the Romans used a double siege wall with turrets/towers placed on prominent rocky outcrops. The idea was to isolate the defenders completely with these two walls. The east wall opposite the city was constructed stronger 1.8–2 metres wide and 2–2.5 metres high with several turrets/towers, while the rear facing wall was 180–280 metres west of the former and not more than one metre thick. This has led Mitchell and his team to speculate that the idea behind the building of the west wall was that two walls made the blockade more effective and that the building of it kept the men busy. In their opinion it was not strong enough to have been built as a protection for the rear. This is a possibility, but I would not preclude a purely defensive purpose either, because an even smaller obstacle would have sufficed to keep the Roman army secure from fast surprise attacks.
The archaeological finds suggest that the Romans used three different methods of attack against the city: 1) stones shot by ballistae/catapults/onagri; 2) an assault mound brought close to the city; 3) undermining of the wall below tower 5 of Cremna.
Archaeological finds prove that the Romans used the siege mound, and that it is also likely that they had used the city aqueduct both for the purpose of aiding the approach close to the wall and also to provide secure foundations for the mound. The finds have similarly demonstrated that the Romans concentrated their stone throwers, ballistae, slingers and archers against the spot in the wall opposite their siege mound, which is only natural. See the map drawn after Mitchell et al. The defenders built a more modest counter-mound opposite the Roman one, but it is not certain whether it would have been big enough to counter the Roman assault mound if the siege had not ended in surrender. Mitchell has noted that the Roman siege mound had reached to within 20 metres of the wall by the time the siege ended. On the basis of this he speculated that it was the imminent approach of this mound to the wall that precipitated the surrender rather than the death of Lydius. This is probably taking the evidence a bit too far because it is clear that the death of the leader was actually the cause of the surrender, as stated by Zosimus. Had Lydius survived, there is every reason to believe that the defenders would have fought to the bitter end – which was fast approaching. But it is clear that the city would have fallen when the siege mound reached the wall. It was only a matter of time.
Towers 5 and 6 of Cremna and the intervening curtain wall show heavy damage and emergency repairs. This section is right opposite the Roman siege mound and it is possible that the damage was caused by the siege engines brought on top of it, but it is also possible, as Mitchell et al note, that some of the damage was caused by artillery pieces placed just north of Roman turrets 5 and 6, which would have been used to protect the workers and engineers when the mound was being built.
Mitchell et al also suggest it is probable that the Romans attempted to undermine tower 5, because there are signs of such work, but the disturbance of the site during the 1960s makes it impossible to prove without a doubt. The location of this mine would have been conveniently protected by the Roman mound right next to it. It would have been easy to sap the ground underneath tower 5 when the workers and engineers were simultaneously protected by the sheds and also by the covering fire of the artillery pieces, archers, and slingers on the mound.
Mitchell and his team have found several 25 kg (1 talent) balls on the site, which was the standard size shot for the Roman stone throwers (both for the catapult/ballistae and onagri), but they have also found one 102 kg and one 135 kg stone ball on the site. Mitchell et al have speculated that these large shots may have been rolled downhill by the defenders, even if the sources also include information that the Romans used such stones in exceptional circumstances. My suggestion is that the latter is true in this case because the siege lasted quite a while and Romans would have wanted to resort to such extraordinary measures.14
The damage done to the wall of Cremna proves that the Roman stone throwers who shot 25 kg stones caused serious damage to towers 9 and 10 of Cremna and the section of the wall between them. This damage would have been caused by the onagri placed near turret 4, which was only 130 metres from the wall and therefore within the effective range of the stone throwers.
The attached map of Cremna and its siege works is entirely based on Mitchell’s study.
Once the revolt was over it was time to ensure peace.Vopiscus states that Probus sought to do this by settling veterans with their families in the strategically most important places, such that their livelihoods were secured, and their sons were required to perform military service when they reached the age of 18. There is no definite evidence for this outside Vopiscus, but in my opinion it is likely that he has preserved for us one of the means Probus adopted for pacification of this dangerous region of Pamphylia, Pisidia, and Isauria, which the sources call collectively Isauria. There is no doubt that Probus was a well-read man and knew that the Romans had used such methods in the past.
This was standard policy adopted by Republican-era Romans and also by Augustus after conquering new territory, namely the creation of colonies of settlers to secure conquered territory. Mitchell et al note that Diocletian reorganized this territory and it was then that three new legions, I, II, III Isaura, appear in the sources. Mitchell presumes that these legions were recruited and deployed in this area for the purpose mentioned by the Historia Augusta.15 This is a good example of the legions raised in the third century becoming visible only under the Tetrarchs.
As noted above, it is probable that the counter-offensive of Narses against Tiridates posed a threat to Roman territory. On the basis of the Georgian Chronicles(p.81), 16 we are fortunately in a position to reconstruct the strategy adopted by Probus in this situation. Once he had defeated the Isaurians and had left the siege of Cremna to Terentius Marcianus, he dispatched reinforcements to Tiridates while he himself continued his march to Egypt, if we are to believe Vopiscus, but there is a discrepancy between Vopiscus and Zosimus which may be very significant for the analysis. It is possible that Probus actually marched against the Persians and left the campaign against the Blemmyes to his generals.
According to the Georgian Chronicles, Narses and his subordinate Mirian, King of Georgia, had previously forced Tiridates on the defensive after they had received reinforcements from Persia. Now that Probus sent reinforcements to Tiridates, it was the turn of Narses to flee Armenia. Then the Persians received new reinforcements with the result that Tiridates was forced to retreat. According to the Chronicles, this situation persisted for years so that whenever Tiridates received reinforcements, the Persians were forced to retreat and vice versa.
Agathangelos leaves out the setbacks and merely states that once Tiridates had regained his kingdom he went to the province of Ayrarat where he wintered in the city of Valarshapat in the East of Armenia. After this, Tiridates spent his whole reign devastating the Persian kingdom and the land of Asorestan. He threw his enemies into disarray and exacted vengeance against the Persians. Agathangelos claims that Tiridates ravaged many regions of Syria, which presumably refers to the fighting against the rebel Saturninus (see later), that he destroyed many Persian armies and obtained a huge amount of booty. Agathangelos states that Tiridates became the commander of the Roman cavalry, which presumably means that Tiridates was simultaneously King of Armenia and Roman magister equitum just like we find many foreigners to be in the Roman army in the following century. It was then in this dual position that Tiridates defeated many armies of the ‘Huns’ (presumably meaning the Alans and other nomads) and conquered many regions of Persia.17
The problem with Agathangelos’s account is that it leaves out all the setbacks and fails to give any timeline for the events. I would suggest that it is possible that Tiridates received the Roman title during the reign of Probus. He had definitely received this title by the reign of Carus because it was then that Tiridates is known to have accompanied the Roman army during its campaign against Persia (see later). Despite its uncertainties and the leaving out of setbacks, it is still clear that Agathangelos’s account confirms what the Georgian Chronicles state, namely that Tiridates and the Romans were able to force the Persians out of Armenia in 278/9.
There remains the problem of what Probus did during this Armenian war. At the heart of the problem are the conflicting statements in Vopiscus and Zosimus regarding Probus’s role in the Egyptian campaign and it is therefore worthwhile to quote both:
Ptolemais in Thebais, having revolted from the emperor, commenced a short war. Probus, by the good conduct of his generals, compelled both that place and its allies the Blemmyes to surrender. [This account implies in no uncertain terms that the enemies were defeated by Probus’ generals. However, it is possible that there is actually no contradiction in the sources if we assume that Probus achieved his success with his generals and not through them. Zosimus’s account also implies that the Egyptians had revolted and had called in the Blemmyes to assist them. In such situations it was typical for the emperor to take charge of the campaign in person, but in this case I am inclined to accept the literal meaning of the language used by Zosimus.] [Zosimus 1.71.1, English tr. 1814, p.34 with some changes and additions by author.]
He reduced unto peaceable subjection all the parts of Pamphylia, and the other provinces adjoining Isauria, and so followed his journey into the east. He conquered the Blemmyes of whom he sent some prisoners to Rome, who were a wonderful spectacle for the amazed people of Rome. The cities of Coptos and Ptolemais in Egypt he liberated from the barbarian yoke, and restored them to the Roman laws. He achieved such fame with this that the Parthians sent ambassadors to him and confessed their fear and sued for peace. [This account implies that Probus was personally in command of the campaign, but, as said, Zosimus’s account contradicts this.] He received the envoys very arrogantly and then sent them back home with worse thoughts than they had before. He refused the presents, which they brought him from the king, and wrote thereupon a letter to Narseus: [Narses, the Great King of Armenia. This has falsely been used as evidence of forgery by Vopiscus, because the king of kings at this time was Bahram II. This fails to take into account the division of powers in the Persian realm at this time. On the basis of all of the extant sources, it is clear that the defence of the western border of Persia was at this time in the hands of Narses, because Bahram II, the king of kings, was fighting in the east against Hormizd and his allies] ‘All that you have will be mine; I wonder therefore that you should think to gratify me with such a handful of things. Keep all things that you take such a pleasure for yourself for the time being. If we want them, we know how to get them.’ This letter was a matter of great concern for Narseus, especially as it was accompanied by the news of the recovery of the cities of Coptos and Ptolemais from the Blemmyes, and the putting of those to the sword who before this had made themselves the terror of nations. After the peace with Persia was made, Probus returned to Thrace. [Vopiscus, HA Prob.17.1–18.1, tr. by Bernard, 292–3 with emendations, changes and comments.]
To summarize, the above account provides us with conflicting information regarding the whereabouts of Probus. On the basis of Zosimus it is probable that the Egyptians of the cities of Coptos and Ptolemais had actually revolted against Roman rule and called in the Blemmyes as their allies rather than the other way round. The obvious reason for such hostility towards Roman rule would be the taxes imposed by Aurelian for Egypt, but this was just the latest incident in a long succession of grievances and revolts against the Romans beginning with the reign of Gallienus. It is clear that the Egyptians were at this time very dissatisfied with the Roman rule and this hostility did not end with the reign of Probus.
I would also suggest that it is likely that Probus did indeed leave the campaign against the Egyptian rebels and their Blemmye allies to his generals, as stated by Zosimus, because there was a much more pressing danger in the form of the war with Persia. However, if the revolt of Saturninus is dated to the years 278/9, then Probus would have taken care of this personally after which he would have sent his generals to Egypt while staying in Syria to protect it against the Persians. Vopiscus (HA Prob.18.4–5, 19.1–20.118) also clearly implies that the revolt of Saturninus took place before the revolts in Gaul, but in this study I have adopted the view that it is more likely that the revolt of Saturninus took place later in 280. The fact that Vopiscus fails to give the revolt of Saturninus any role in the events of the year 278/9 when Probus was said to have fought against the Isaurians and Blemmyes supports this conclusion. The revolt of Saturninus would surely have been of greater importance than either of these in a situation in which the Romans and Persians were at war; hence my conclusion.
It is probable that one of the commanders of the Egyptian campaign was Saturninus the Moor. I would also suggest that it was after the Egyptian campaign and peace with Persia that Probus nominated Saturninus as supreme commander of eastern forces probably with instructions not to visit Egypt because this area would have been left outside his jurisdiction just as before under Aurelian.19 The idea behind such an order would of course be that Egypt was considered the personal domain of the emperor. Furthermore, it is clear that Probus understood well that any potential usurper in the east would require the riches of Egypt for him to be able to revolt. Therefore, it was in his interest to forbid his military commanders in the east from entering Egypt because this could have given them local connections in Egypt that they could have used in case of revolt. Vopiscus (HA FSPB 7.1) claims that Saturninus was a native of Gaul, but I agree with the majority view that Zosimus (1.66.1) is right to call him Saturninus the Moor. The reasons for my readiness to accept Zosimus’s statement are: 1) Probus’s other close friend was Victorinus the Moor (Zos. 1.66.2); 2) Probus had in all probability once been a commander of the Moorish bodyguard cavalry.20 This means that Probus promoted his former comrades, subordinates and friends to higher positions. Saturninus the Moor, like Victorinus the Moor, were such men.
The title Probus gave Saturninus on this occasion has been a source of disagreement. Jordanes (Roma 293) calls Saturninus magister militum. Jerome/Hieronymus (Chron. 281/265th Olympiad) calls him magister exercitus. Zosimus (1.66.1) calls him tën Syrias archên implying some sort of governorship of Syria. Vopiscus (HA FSPB7.2) claims that Aurelian appointed him dux limitis Orientis. It is possible that Aurelian did indeed nominate Saturninus to a command in the east, and that Probus then gave him the same post, possibly with a grander title. The titles referring to the position of magister are usually considered anachronistic, but as I have shown in the previous studies and in this study there is every reason to believe that the Romans had already started to use the title magister for their higher-ranking military commanders during the third century, well before its supposed reappearance under the Tetrarchs. The reason for such a grandiose title would of course have been that Probus wanted to reward his loyal friend well so that he would stay loyal to his emperor.
The main problem with the above reconstruction is that none of the sources, including the Georgian Chronicles and Agathangelos, states that Probus led a campaign against the Persians in person. The only evidence for it is circumstantial, namely that Probus was not apparently present at the siege of Cremna nor was he fighting against the Blemmyes, but he still received the title Persicus maximus and Medicus maximus both of which are attested in papyri in 279 and 280.21 Furthermore, the Georgian Chronicles clearly state that the Romans sent reinforcements to Tiridates and that it was thanks to these that Tiridates forced the Persians away from Armenia. I would suggest that Probus led these forces in person and that the Georgian and Armenian sources, which are in the habit of hiding the Roman role in their victories, hide the fact that the man responsible for the great victory was none other than Probus. This leaves the problem of why this is not mentioned in the Roman sources. This is inexplicable, but it might be explained by the fact that none of them pays any attention to Armenian matters so none even mentions the sending of Tiridates with Roman forces to retake Armenia. It is inherently more likely that Probus received the titles Persicus maximus and Medicus maximus as a result of some military action rather than as a result of merely concluding a peace with Persia.
And why was Probus ready to conclude such a peace in a situation in which he had the upper hand, as is so well attested by the possibly fictitious letter included by Vopiscus? The reason for this would be the revolt of Proculus and Bonosus in Gaul, Spain and Britain, which must have taken place in about 279. However, if the revolt did not take place then, the other alternative is that Probus was planning to continue his unfinished campaign in Germania. Conversely, why were the Persians ready to conclude the peace with Probus in 279? The reasons for this are simple. Firstly, Bahram II was still fighting against his brother Hormizd in the east and this was more threatening to the very existence of the Sasanian realm than a war with Rome. Secondly, the Romans and Armenians had already defeated Narses and forced him to evacuate Armenia and now that the Persians had learnt of the crushing of enemies in Egypt, they had every reason to fear that Probus would conduct the next major invasion into Persian territory proper this time, strengthened with forces that had previously fought in Egypt. It is probable that the Persians were unaware of the revolts in Gaul (if these took place in 279) because they were ready to conclude peace now, but this of course is an argument from the silence of the sources.
It is not known how the two superpowers dealt with the Armenian question now. The only thing certain is that Tiridates retained at least the possession of the western portion of Armenia, because the Romans marched through it in 283 and it was then clearly in Armenian hands (see later). Yet, it is possible that Tiridates actually retained all of Armenia, because the Persians had been driven out, but it is equally possible that the peace with Persia was bought with concessions so that the Romans withdrew their forces from Armenia, and left it for Tiridates and Persians to fight it out to decide who would be the master of the Armenian Highlands. The titles Probus received and the possibly fictitious letter in the Historia Augusta, however, suggest that Probus had the upper hand in the negotiations, so it is likelier that the Persians conceded the whole of Armenia to the Armenians and that it was because of this that the Romans then withdrew their forces from there. Ultimately this question remains unsolvable unless some new evidence for the period resurfaces. From the Roman point of view the most important point was that the peace with Persia released forces for the campaigns against the usurpers in the west so that the next mission for the fireman Probus was to quell the fires raging in the west. Subsequent events prove that Probus had no intention of honouring the peace agreement with Persia. His only intention was to buy a temporary peace for the purpose of crushing the usurpers and then continue his campaign against the Persians at the first opportunity. One may imagine that the Persians had no intention of honouring their word either, but had just bought enough time to finish the civil war in the east. Thomas Artsruni (p.121) states that the war between the Armenians with Roman support and the Persians lasted until the reign of Probus, who finally concluded a peace with them. This statement suggests that the two empires were at peace from 279 until 283.
En route to crush the usurpers in Gaul or to continue his unfinished campaign in Germania, Probus had to deal with the sudden refugee problem in the Balkans. According to Vopiscus, the Bastarnae and many other tribes including the Gepids, Greuthungi, and Vandals asked to be resettled on Roman soil. This suggests that there existed some sort of pressure behind these tribes in the barbaricum which made mass migration to Roman territory preferable. The Greuthungi however may have been the foederati of Probus which he had obtained in 277 and who now wanted similar terms as the rest of the tribes. I have suggested in an appendix to Britain in the Age of Arthur that it is possible that this pressure in the barbaricum was caused by Odin and his folk who were migrating from what is today Russia into what is today north Germany, Denmark and Sweden.22 The Bastarnae remained loyal to Probus, but unfortunately for him the rest of the tribes and the Franks, who had either been settled in this area in 278, now all revolted when Probus was fighting against the rebels in Gaul. The settlement of these barbarians on Roman soil must have taken place in the summer to early autumn of 279.
After the peace with Persia, Probus returned again into Thrace; where upon the lands of the Roman Empire he planted 100,000 Bastarnae, who all kept their faith with him; but others of the barbarian nations whom he transplanted in great numbers in like manner, that is the Gepids, the Greuthungi [the largest of the Gothic confederacies], and the Vandals, all these broke their faith, and while Probus was fighting against the tyrants [This means that the barbarians revolted when Probus was fighting against Proculus and Bonosus.], they rose against him and overran the entire world on foot or in ships and damaged the reputation of Rome until Probus overcame and defeated them several times and only a few lucky ones returned home to enjoy their joy of managing to escape from the hands of Probus. [This means that after Probus had crushed the rebels in Gaul he did not continue operations against the remaining rebels in Britain but rather marched against the barbarians in the Balkans.] And these were the exploits of Probus among the barbarians. [Vopiscus, HA Prob. 18.1–3, with emendations, changes and comments.]
He likewise left in Thrace the Bastarnae, a Scythian people, who submitted to him, giving them land to inhabit there; on which account they observed the Roman laws and customs. But the Franks having applied to the emperor [This suggests that the Franks had until then served as foederati and now sought the same terms as had been granted to the Bastarnae], and having a country given to them, a part of them afterwards revolted, and having collected a great number of ships, disturbed all Greece; from whence they proceeded into Sicily, to Syracuse, which they attacked, and killed many people there. At length they arrived in Africa, whence though they were repulsed by a body of men from Carthage, yet they returned home without any great loss. [Zosimus 1.71.1–2, English tr. 1814, p.34–5 with some changes and additions by author.]
The coins such as shown above were often used when the loyalty of the soldiers was suspect. It was then that the emperors usually felt it was necessary to advertise the loyalty of the armies.
(Source: Beger, 1696)
In sum, it is probable that when Probus was en route to Gaul, he faced a sudden refugee crisis in the Balkans, which he solved by settling the refugees on Roman soil. The Bastarnae remained loyal, but the rest did not (see pp.207–208). Zosimus’s text proves that the Franks had until then served as foederati and that they demanded and got the same terms as the Bastarnae. It is also probable that the Greuthungi who were settled in the Balkans now were actually the Gothic foederati obtained in 277, and it would not be too far fetched to think that even the Vandals would have served in the same capacity until then and that all of these groups now demanded the same terms as had been given to the Bastarnae, and which were duly granted. The case is less certain for the Gepids, but it is similarly plausible to think that Probus could have had Gepids among his army as a result of the treaties conducted in 278. And if the Franks, Greuthungi, Vandals and Gepids were foederati, why was Probus now ready to settle them in the Balkans when there was an urgent need for soldiers for the war against the usurpers in Gaul or for the continuation of the war against the tribes of Germania? My suggestion is that Probus settled all of these nations in the Balkans as laeti (enemies who had been defeated, but who were given land in return for military service) so that he was able to transfer the local higher quality regular forces into his army. It is also clear that if the Goths, Vandals and Gepids had been intended for use against the Persians, they were no longer needed, and it would not have been wise to use the Franks against their fellow tribesmen present either in the usurpers’ army (if they had already rebelled) or against the native armies across the Rhine if Probus intended to conquer the whole of Germania up to the Elbe. Whatever the plans of Probus were at this stage, it would seem probable that it was now that Saturninus the Moor revolted and put a stop to all of these. The other alternative is that Saturninus revolted only later in about 281 so that Probus was forced to march there in that same year. However, I have here adopted the former alternative as more likely even if the latter cannot be ruled out.
We do not possess any definitely secure information of when Saturninus revolted and how Probus dealt with this. In this study I have adopted the view that it took place approximately in 279–80.23 According to Zonaras (12.29), Probus trusted his friend Saturninus so blindly that when the news of the revolt was brought to him he disbelieved it and punished the messenger. According to Vopiscus (HA FSPB 71.ff.), Saturninus was declared an emperor when he visited Egypt after which he returned to ‘Palestine’ and presumably went from there to Syria where the other sources claim that he was either building a New Antioch or repairing the old one (e.g. Syncellus AM 5770; Jordanes Rom.293). In my opinion the visit to Egypt was part of a planned usurpation and that Saturninus was not made an emperor against his own wishes as claimed by Vopiscus. It is clear that Saturninus visited an area which was not under his own jurisdiction to secure Egypt and its resources behind his revolt, and that his plan was to withhold grain and other shipments to cause trouble for Probus in Rome.
A coin of Saturninus drawn by Strada (1555) in the collection at Mantua. Provenance of the coin is uncertain.
A coin of Probus by Cohen
It is usually assumed that Vopiscus and Zosimus offer conflicting evidence for the course of the war against Saturninus, but on closer look there is actually no definite reason to think so, as the following analysis will show, even if the evidence remains open to many interpretations:
His other troubles were such as he suffered from the attempts of particular ambitious subjects who were for setting themselves as emperors, one of whom was Saturninus, who usurped the Empire in the east, and who engaged Probus in several battles till Probus by his known gallantry overcame him [This implies that Probus had improved his physical shape after 277 so that he was able to fight in battles again. The big belly was apparently not an obstacle for this. Rather it protected his vital organs from killing blows], and with the same conquest established such a firm peace in the east that not a mouse dared to stir more there. [Vopiscus, HA Prob 18.4, tr. by Bernard with emendations, changes and comments.]
This Saturninus was set up in the time of Probus and killed against his wishes. For Probus wrote several kind letters to him and promised a pardon, but the soldiers who were about him would not believe it. So the party of Probus, which was sent against him, besieged him in a castle/fortification [castrum] and killed him sadly even though Probus did not desire it. [In Zosimus’s version Saturninus was killed by his own soldiers so there is a discrepancy here.] [Vopiscus HA FSPB 11.2–3, tr. by Bernards with emendations, changes and comments.]
While Probus was thus employed, Saturninus, a Moor, the most familiar friend of the emperor, and for that reason entrusted with the government of Syria, threw off his allegiance, and rebelled against the emperor. When Probus learnt of this, he resolved to punish him [The verb used, metrechomai, is problematic because it can be used to mean to attack/go after, or to avenge/punish. The 1814 version translates the clause ‘to frustrate his designs’ while Ridley translates it as to punish and Paschoud translates it that Probus planned to confront that attack. I have adopted in this study the translation of Ridley mainly because it reconciles the two sources with each other], but was anticipated by the soldiers in the east, who destroyed Saturninus and all his associates. [Zosimus 1.66.1, English tr. 1814, p.32 with one change and comment by author.]
At the root of the problem therefore is how one translates one verb in Zosimus. If it is translated that Probus intended to attack Saturninus, but Saturninus was killed by his own soldiers before this, it is in conflict with the text of Vopiscus which refers to fighting before the killing. However, if it is translated that Probus intended to punish Saturninus, but Saturninus’ own soldiers killed him before this, it does not conclusively preclude the existence of fighting before this took place, even if it still leaves that option also open. In other words, it is also possible to interpret even the latter translation in two different ways. In this study I have adopted the translation which refers to the intended punishment because it reconciles all of the sources with each other, most importantly because Vopiscus is not the only ancient source which refers to the fighting between Probus and Saturninus before the killing of Saturninus. The Epitome (37) and Jordanes (Rom.293) also state that Probus defeated Saturninus. Jordanes adds the detail that Saturninus was killed at Apamea. Orosius (7.24) states that Probus fought two bloody civil wars (one against Saturninus and another against the Gallic usurpers), and that Saturninus was defeated and captured. The Epitome, Jordanes and Orosius therefore confirm the account of Vopiscus with the implication that we should interpret the text of Zosimus in the manner I have done here. The only discrepancy that remains relates to the identity of the killers of Saturninus. One may assume that Zosimus has actually used such a source that has purposefully hidden the assassination of the usurper by Probus’s own men, but obviously one cannot entirely preclude the possibility that Saturninus’ own men would have attempted to save themselves with their desperate action when it became apparent that their cause was hopeless.
My reconstruction of the course of the revolt is therefore as follows. It is probable that Saturninus usurped power when Probus was in the Balkans in 279, or at the latest in early 280, so that he was immediately forced to return to Asia Minor and march against the usurper. Probus and Saturninus then fought several battles in which the forces of Saturninus were bested in bloody battles. According to Vopiscus, the bravery of Probus was one of the reasons for his successes. It is probable that the above-mentioned battles of Tiridates in Syria, mentioned by Agathangelos, took place now so that Tiridates served as Roman magister equitum for Probus.
Probus is claimed to have been unwilling to have his old friend Saturninus killed despite his betrayal, and it was because of this he offered a pardon. If Proculus and Bonosus had revolted by then in Gaul, as is quite probable, the main purpose of offering terms would have been to end the war as fast as possible. However, it is quite probable that this was meant only as a ruse from the start so that Probus would not have to fight against the usurper. Vopiscus’s text at least makes it clear that Saturninus’ men did not believe Probus’s promises. It was thanks to this that Probus was forced to fight a series of bloody battles and then send a detachment of soldiers to pursue Saturninus, which then managed to force him to seek shelter from the city of Apamea, where he was then killed by the soldiers sent by Probus or by his own men. However, if Vopiscus is correct in his statement that Probus had not wanted to kill his old friend then it is possible that Probus was actually angry over the killing and disobedience and that this played a role later when Probus disciplined his men with menial labour which led to his own demise. However, I would rather suggest that, in light of the fact that Aurelius Victor (37.2–3) likened Probus to the treacherous Hannibal, that Probus had planned to have his disloyal friend killed from the start and had just attempted and failed to achieve this through a stratagem.
The war against Saturninus was probably over by about April-May 280 so that Probus was able to march against the usurpers Proculus and Bonosus in Gaul, which he would have reached in about September-October. The fighting against Saturninus had undoubtedly caused casualties so that he was forced to leave some of his men behind.
We do not know when Probus reached Italy and Gaul, but one may assume that he invaded the south of Gaul in about September-October 280. He began his campaign by securing the south just as he had done before in 277. This made logistical sense because it was possible to ship supplies along the Rhône from the Mediterranean for the army. The only description of the resulting fighting comes from the pen of Vopiscus. It is thanks to him that we know the reasons for the sudden revolts. The commanders who revolted shared one thing in common which was that both suffered from personal weaknesses which united them in vice in a situation in which both knew Probus’s reputation for being a disciplinarian in the mould of Aurelian so both feared punishment if Probus learnt of their failures.
The other pretenders were Proculus and Bonosus at the city of Colonia in Gaul [Cologne] and they claimed for themselves all of Britain, Spain, and Further Gallia [The fact that Britain joined this revolt was to cause Probus trouble when the barbarian foederati revolted in the Balkans. This text also suggests that Proculus and Bonosus cooperated and revolted together, with the implication that both must have exchanged messages before they declared themselves emperors. Eutropius’s text 9.17 and the Epitome 37 suggests the same because these stated that Proculus and Bonosus usurped power together at Agrippina], but these were defeated with barbarian help… All the Germans refused to assist Proculus when he asked for their help, preferring to serve under Probus rather than under Bonosus and Proculus. After this, as a reward Probus permitted to all Gallia, Spain, and Pannonia the right of planting vines and the making of wines. He set his own soldiers upon digging the Mountain Almus, which is by the city of Sirmium in Illyricum [in the province of Lower Pannonia], and he planted it himself with chosen vines. …
Proculus was a native of Albingauni in the Maritime Alps. He was a nobleman, but his ancestors had been great robbers so he was very rich in cattle and slaves and all things that could be got by such means. It is said that at the time he took upon him the Empire he armed 2,000 of his own slaves. He had a masculine wife called Samso as wife and she drove him into the madness of usurping power. Her name was originally Vituriga. They had a son called Herennianus… It cannot be denied but that Proculus was an extraordinary and brave man although also accustomed to a life of robbery and he always passed his life under arms. He had commanded many legions as tribune in the course of which he had done actions of great valour. … ‘From Proculus to Maecianus his kinsman, Greetings, I have taken captive 100 virgins from Sarmatia, ten of which I lay in one night, and all of them I made women in the course of fifteen days.’ As is obvious he boasted about a foolish and very licentious deed reckoning it a fine thing that was otherwise a crime. However, even with his military honours he still lived a life of depravity and lustfulness. He always acquitted himself with great courage so that the people of Lugdunum, who appeared to have been harshly treated by Aurelian and who feared Probus, solicited him to declare himself emperor. Onesimus tells us… that he was made an emperor as a result of a game of ‘Brigands’ in a banquet [According to Magie/HA pp.408–9, the game of Brigands resembled chess but with thirty pieces on each side]. …One of the company who wanted to show himself witty saluted him as emperor… Regardless, Proculus showed himself beneficial for the Gauls because he defeated with glory the Alamanni, who were at that time still called Germans, even if it was in the manner of a brigand that he fought always. [This suggests that Proculus disliked open battles and preferred to use ambushes and surprise attacks.] Regardless, Probus forced him to flee to distant lands so that he sought aid from the Franks whom he pretended to be his ancestors, but Probus defeated and slew him because the Franks betrayed him as was their custom to do with laughter. …
Bonosus was a Spaniard by origin but descended from a Briton father and Gallic mother. His father was a rhetorician…, or as I have found from others, grammarian [paedagogi litterarii]… He served first among the front ranks [inter ordinaries: this means he was either a decanus or a centurion, the latter being more likely], and then in the cavalry. Next he commanded the ordinarii [duxit ordines, meaning either that he rose to the position of centurion or that he became the highest ranking centurion, namely primus pilus, the latter being more likely], after which he became tribune [The tribunes could be commanders of legions or even higher ranking commanders when they were members of the bodyguards. I would suggest that the tribuneship in question meant a rise to the command of some unit of bodyguards.] and then dux limitis Raetici [general in charge of the Raetian Limes/Raetian Frontier.]. No man ever drank like Bonosus. The emperor Aurelian said often of him that ‘He was born to not to live, but to drink’, but he still held him in high honour because of his ability in war. … It happened at one time that the Germans had burnt the Roman galleys on the Rhine. He feared that he might be punished for this neglect and usurped power. He held this position longer than he deserved before he was finally defeated by Probus after a long and hard fight, after which he hanged himself. [This suggests that Bonosus and Proculus possessed some loyal soldiers who put up a stiff fight despite the fact that the Franks betrayed them with a laughter. The decisive battle or battles took place close to Cologne, on the basis of Aurelius Victor 37.3; Epitome 37; Eutropius 9.17; Orosius 7.24.]… He left two sons and a wife. The sons Probus forgave. The wife he obliged by giving her a pension for life. For besides that she was a woman of wit and merit, … she was a princess of royal Gothic blood, and one whom the emperor Aurelian had purposefully married to Bonosus that through her and him he might the better penetrate into all the affairs of the Goths… ‘From the emperor Aurelian to Gallio Avitus, greetings. I wrote to you previously about the Gothic noblewoman at Perinthus… I wish that Hunila be married to Bonosus.’ [This letter may once again be fictitious, but I would still suggest that it contains the truth so that it was really Aurelian who married the Gothic princess to Bonosus, as claimed by Vopiscus, for the intelligence-gathering reasons mentioned.] [Vopiscus HA Prob.18.5–8, FSPB 12.1–15.10, tr. by Bernard with emendations, changes and comments.]
He likewise suppressed an insurrection in Britain, by means of Victorinus, a Moor, who had persuaded him to confer the government of Britain upon the leader of the insurgents. Having sent for Victorinus, and chosen him for his consul, he sent him to appease the disturbance; who, going presently to Britain, took off the traitor by a stratagem. [Zosimus 1.66.2, English tr. 1814, p.32 with some changes and additions by author.]
Coins of Bonosus according to Cohen
Coins of Proculus
Drawings of coins by Strada (1555) in a collection located at Mantua.
Coins of Bonosus
Provenance of the coins is uncertain at best.
The above accounts suggest strongly that the two usurpers Proculus and Bonosus cooperated with each other and that their usurpation was a premeditated move by both men. The reference to the dissatisfaction of the inhabitants of Lugdunum (Lyon) as a result of their punishment by Aurelian is symptomatic of the trend in Gaul. The Gauls had first created their own Gallic Empire under Postumus and were still dissatisfied with the central government, and were also to be so in the near future when the so-called Bacaudae emerged in Gaul under the Tetrarchs. It is possible or even likely that Proculus and his ancestors had been the precursors of these bandits so that they had operated on both sides of the law simultaneously. The likely reason for Proculus’s usurpation was that as a famous robber he feared the punishment of these actions. The likely reason for the usurpation of Bonosus was his neglect of duty as a result of which his fleet (presumably the fleet of the Rhine) had been destroyed by barbarians. The torching of the Roman fleet and the defeat of the Alamanni by Proculus suggest that Gaul did not enjoy a state of peace even after the campaigns of Probus in 277–8. In the case of Proculus’s action against the Alamanni there is another possibility – because it took place only after the usurpation – which is that these had been incited to invade Gaul by Probus while he was still in the east or in the Balkans. Both men had personal weaknesses: Proculus was a robber and rapist while Bonosus was a drunkard, which undoubtedly endeared the men to each other as so often happens with men of such character. These persons always consider upright men like Aurelian or Probus as posing a potential danger to their very existence.
Probus’s campaign clearly progressed so that he approached Lugdunum from the south along the Rhône so that his army was supplied by the fleet. When Probus reached the vicinity of Lugdunum, he inflicted a serious defeat on Proculus who duly fled north to join his comrade-in-arms Bonosus. Bonosus and Proculus both called the Franks to their assistance, but it is uncertain whether the Frankish betrayal of the usurpers took the form of denying them help or of betraying them in the middle of a battle that took place near Cologne. The battle itself appears to have been hard-fought – although it is possible that there were actually a series of battles because Orosius (7.24) specifically refers to a series of great battles. This could mean that the single battle near Cologne lasted for several days or that the decisive battle in front of it was preceded by a series of battles which forced the usurpers to seek shelter from Cologne while vainly asking the Franks to assist them. The other possibility is that the series of battles actually means only two battles, the first one in which Proculus was defeated by Probus and the second in which Probus defeated both usurpers. It is impossible to know for certain which alternative would be correct. All we know is that there were at least two battles and that the decisive battle took place near Cologne.
Unfortunately for Probus the battle near Cologne did not end the war, because Zosimus (1.66.2) and Zonaras (2.29) both refer to the revolt of the governor of Britain. According to both, Probus blamed his friend Victorinus the Moor for this because he had recommended him for the post of governor of Britain. It is uncertain whether this man was a new separate usurper as usually thought, who usurped power soon after Proculus and Bonosus or after their defeat, or whether this was Proculus who is not listed among the killed. We know from Vopiscus that the usurpers were able to flee because Bonosus was able to hang himself after the battle. This means that Proculus could have fled to Britain. Britain was one of the provinces which joined the rebels Proculus and Bonosus when they declared themselves emperors, and Britain was still in revolt after they had been defeated at Cologne. On the basis of the statements of Zosimus and Zonaras, I would suggest that the governor of Britain was not Proculus, but a supporter of him and Bonosus, and that he declared himself emperor after his friends had been defeated. Could this man be the otherwise elusive Silbannacus?24 There was no chance that this problem could have been solved fast by purely military means because the Franks had burned the Rhine Fleet which meant that Probus would have been forced to build a new fleet or transfer it from the Mediterranean to be able to ship his men across the Channel. In short, the crushing of Britain would have taken a major effort and Probus did not have the time for that because the barbarian laeti in the Balkans had revolted. It is also possible that the revolt of Saturninus the Moor took place at this time, making it all the more urgent for Probus to march east.
In these circumstances Probus accepted Victorinus the Moor’s advice that he should be sent to Britain to correct his mistake. Therefore Victorinus pretended to be a fugitive in fear for his life, and fled to Britain where his story was believed by all thanks to the reputation of Probus. Consequently, Victorinus was able to assassinate the usurper during the night and return the island to the fold of the Roman Empire. One wonders whether the barbarian settlers previously sent to the island by Probus had a role in this. This had been a very bold special operation to kill a usurper. When Victorinus then returned on board ship Probus was there to greet him. Victorinus had thrown his military belt into the sea and when he approached Probus beltless this led Probus to make the hasty conclusion that Victorinus had failed, so he flew into a rage. Victorinus, however, calmed his friend soon enough with his words. Victorinus asked to be relieved of his duties and asked his friend to allow him to retire. Probus duly gave his friend Victorinus gifts and granted his wish of being allowed to retire. Victorinus clearly had a conscience. The killing of a friend had not been an easy task.25
This time Probus sought to secure the peace through enlightened economic policies. He allowed the Gauls and Spaniards to grow vines and produce wine so that they could earn an income. The readier availability of cheap wine would also have led to greater consumption of wine in general which would have made the people happier. The export of this wine abroad would also bring economic benefits for the Empire. The policy of promoting the production of wine and its ready availability for the population followed up the policies adopted previously by Aurelian and can be seen as a continuation of them.
It is probable that the war in Gaul with its sideshow in Britain lasted from about September/October 280 until about January/February 281, but it could have taken until about April/May 281 for the situation to be solved. However, if Probus crushed Saturninus only later in 281, then the events described here took place one year before.
After this, Probus marched back to the Balkans against the foederati/laeti who had revolted (see pp.197–9). If Probus began his journey back to the Balkans in about February 281, he would have reached the theatre of operations by about the beginning of June, or at the latest in September if the crushing of the revolts in the west took longer. It is actually very likely that Probus conducted a winter campaign, because most of his soldiers originated from the Balkans and it would have been relatively easy for him to convince them to fight for their families. In fact, it is possible that it was because of this that Probus was forced to prioritize the war in the Balkans, as he had done in 278, even when the wars in the west had been left unfinished.
On the basis of Vopiscus and Zosimus, it is clear that Probus defeated the enemies on land in several battles so that the remnants of these forces were more than happy to flee back to their territories north of the Danube. The war against the barbarians would probably have lasted from about June 281 until about September/October 281, or from about September 281 until about January/February 282. The former is more likely on the basis of the coins and medallions that date Probus’s triumph at Rome.
Probus enlarged the same project of promoting the growing of wine to cover also the Balkans for the same reasons as he did this in Gaul and Spain. This policy undoubtedly entailed the export of wine to the barbarians, which was good for the economy of the Empire and its border regions. The Franks, however, conducted an epic campaign in the Mediterranean and were able to reach their compatriots north of the mouth of the Rhine. What followed after this depends on how one interprets the evidence regarding the revolt of Saturninus and is therefore open to many views. It is therefore possible that it was only now that Probus advanced against Saturninus so that the campaign in the Balkans would have taken place in 281 and the war against Saturninus in 281–2. However, on the basis of the coins and medallions which date the triumph of Probus, this is less likely than the version I have given above.
The only description of the Triumph which Probus had in Rome in about 281/2 comes from the pen of Vopiscus:
Coming to Rome, he entertained the people there with public games and pastimes in a manner which was most magnificent. Besides he gave them largesses. He celebrated a triumph for his conquest of the Blemmyes and the Germans [It was not usually considered proper to celebrate a triumph against any other but foreign foes] which had throngs of men [drungi/droungoi] from all nations with up to fifty men [note that in this case the drungus/droungos means a group of up to fifty men with the implication that in irregular combat order the men could have been similarly deployed into small groups of up to 60 men; see Appendix 2] in each marched before in triumphal procession… In the circus wild-beast hunt… the whole circus was turned into a forest… Next appeared three hundred couple of gladiators amongst which were several of the Blemmyes which had been led in triumph, several Germans and Sarmatians and also some Isaurian bandits. [Vopiscus, HA Prob.19.1–8, tr. by Bernard, 295–6 with emendations, changes and comments.]
The date of the triumph can be counted from the medallions and coins dated to the years 281 and 282. The two medallions from 281 and 282 have obverse legend Gloria orbis and the reverse legend invictus Probus p. f. aug. Other coins which date from the triumphal celebrations have the legends pacator orbis, ubique pax and victorioso semper. On the basis of the coins dated tr. p.V cos. IIII and tr. o. VI cos V, it has been suggested that the triumphal celebrations began after July 281 and ended before July 282. The existence of large numbers of medallions supports the claims of Vopiscus that Probus distributed largesse during his Triumph.26
An incident took place in Rome while Probus was there to celebrate his triumph. It is described as follows by Zosimus:
This circumstance likewise happened during the reign of Probus. Eighty gladiators conspiring together, and having killed their keepers, ran out into the city, and plundered all in their way, many other persons, as is usual in such cases, without doubt mixing with them. But the emperor sent a party and suppressed them. When Probus, who was a brave and just prince, had done this… [Zosimus 1.72.2, English tr. 1814, p.35.]
Coins of Probus advertising his victories and manly qualities and the benefits that this brings for the Romans,
(sources: Beger 1696 and Cohen)
This incident in question was evidently of little importance, but it shows nicely how the emperor could be forced to act as police chief when residing in Rome. The duties of the emperor were manifold.
In 282 Probus marched from Rome to the Balkans to begin the final preparations for war against the Persians which had been on the books ever since 275. The situation remained opportune because the Persians were still engaged in civil war.
After these things, as Probus was preparing for a war with Persia and was on the march through Illyricum, the soldiers treacherously plotted together and killed him. The reasons for the murder were these. First because he never let them be idle because he employed them in many works and said that soldiers ought not to eat bread for nothing. He added to this the remark that he hoped in a short time he would make it so that the state should have no need of soldiers. With this he intended to say that … the Romans shall reign universally and possess everything in safety… There shall be no more wars… the Roman laws and their magistrates shall prevail… When he came to Sirmium, desiring to enrich and enlarge his native place, he set several thousand of his soldiers to drain the marsh which was to be done by constructing a great canal with outlets flowing into the Save, and so the ground would become of use to the people of Sirmium. [According to Aurelius Victor 37, the winter rains had damaged the reservoirs and canal and it was because of this that Probus put his soldiers to work. According to Eutropius 9.17, Probus planted vineyards on Mount Alma near Sirmium and on Mount Aureus in Moesia Superior and was then killed in the Iron Tower at Sirmium. This implies that Probus also ordered other works to be done in the Balkans besides the building of the canal just before he was killed.] The fatigue of this piece of work enraged the soldiers so that they assaulted him, and as he fled for safety into an iron tower, which he had built there to serve as a watch tower, they killed him in the fifth year of his reign. However, afterwards, the army built for him a mighty tomb on a large mound whereon was carved an inscription: ‘Here lies the emperor Probus, who was a man of probity, and conqueror of all barbarian nations, and the conqueror of pretenders too.’ … he finished so many wars in so many parts of the world unaided that it is a wonderful thing… He did many valiant deeds with his own hand. [This implies that Probus continued to fight duels as emperor and that he also took part in combat to encourage his men.] He trained many of the famous duces: Carus, Diocletian, Constantius, Asclepiodotus, Hannibalianus, Leonides Cecropius, Pisonianus, Herennianus, Gaudiosus, Ursinianus and all the others whom our fathers have admired. [Vopiscus, HA Prob.20.1–22.3, tr. by Bernard 296ff. with emendations, changes and comments.]
When Probus was still at Sirmium, Carus revolted between 29 August and 13 September 282. The exact reason for the usurpation is unclear. A fragment of Peter the Patrician has preserved for us the reason that Carus gave to the soldiers. On the occasion of Carus’ proclamation, he stated that he had come to the throne to correct the ills caused by the Persians, but this is obviously only the official version, meant to gain the support of the soldiers.27 The real reason would have been Carus’ personal ambition and the situation was now opportune. Instead of leading the army against Persia, Probus had forced the soldiers to perform civilian duties, on top of which he had insulted them with statements that there would be no need for soldiers in the future – a statement which can be found in Vopiscus and Aurelius Victor (37.3) and Eutropius (9.17) and is therefore likely to be true. It is probable that Probus’s intention was not to insult the soldiers but to encourage them. Subsequent events make it clear that Carus knew how to please the rank-and-file and how to act as their comrade-in-arms, and this was certainly one of those instances. Carus clearly contrasted himself with the disciplinarian Probus who put the men to perform menial work – work fit for slaves and not for soldiers. The following events also prove that Carus’ words were not exaggerated – he was an able commander who exacted revenge against the Persians. This gives some credence to the expected impact of the above statement. The soldiers apparently knew that Carus was an able commander and their comrade-in-arms who could be expected to lead them to success against the Persians.
The principal reasons for the success of the usurpation were clearly Probus’s poorly timed actions and careless words. They made him hated among the rank-and-file and they began to prefer Carus over Probus. Carus, despite being ten years older than Probus, was still in tip top physical shape. However, the fact that Vopiscus credits Probus with personal bravery for this period of his rule proves that he was also strong. Probus continued to be a man who put his life on the line for his soldiers. Regardless, it is still possible to think that his obese appearance might have angered the soldiers in a situation in which Probus demanded physical labour from them. In any case, the likeliest reason for the murder of Probus is simply his ill-timed and thoughtless disciplining of soldiers with menial work which was made worse by his thoughtless words in a situation in which they expected to be led against the Persians. It is strange that he forced his men to do this in a situation in which the Persians were fighting a civil war and the time was ripe for an invasion. There are three possible ways to explain his behaviour. It is possible that the disobedience of the soldiers previously during the last stages of Saturninus’ revolt had angered Probus so that when the area of Balkans was in need of large scale improvements he decided to put the soldiers to work as a form of disciplining them, but I would still suggest that Probus did not want to punish the soldiers for the murder of Saturninus because it had been his plan all along even if the sources whitewash him from all the guilt. The second alternative is that Probus felt it necessary to use the soldiers in this manner for the benefit of the civilians, which indeed seems likely. The third of the possible reasons would have been to mislead the Persians who were probably expecting the Roman invasion. Postponing the invasion would have caused the Persians to relax. Furthermore, it is possible that Probus thought that the best time to invade Persia was the winter season when his European soldiers would not need to be acclimatized and when the Romans would also be able to avoid the season when mosquitoes and other nasty insects bothered the men the most. I would suggest that both the second and third of the alternatives played a role in Probus’ planning. He intended to delay the invasion until winter and ordered the men to perform menial work for the benefit of the civilians so that they would not grow lazy in the meantime. This, however, was a grave mistake because the soldiers expected to be led against the Persians.
A fragment of Peter the Patrician (Banchich frg. 197) has preserved for us important details of the beginning of Carus’ revolt and Probus’ reaction to it. According to this text, when Probus heard of the plans of Carus to revolt, he assembled a council to discuss what to do with him. The only one who spoke was chiliarchos (probably tribunus militaris) Martinianus who stated that Probus’ hesitation was bringing ruin and that he should act immediately and declare war against the tyrant. On the basis of an extant inscription, this Latinius Martinianus was vir egregious and procurator Augusti.28 The fragment suggests that the principal reason for the success of Carus was Probus’ initial hesitation of what to do. It was this that sealed his fate. In this case, he clearly had good intelligence of what was afoot thanks to an efficient intelligence/security apparatus, but failed to act. When Probus finally decided to do something it was too late. It is clear that Probus’s position at the time of Carus’ usurpation was very weak because he had managed to enrage his soldiers with his thoughtless words. Although, I would suggest that it is quite probable that Probus’s statement had been taken out of context, if he ever even said such things. I would suggest it is quite possible that Carus skillfully twisted Probus’ originally innocent public statement that the soldiers would not be needed in the future into something that angered them, and the henchmen of Carus then ‘stirred the pot’ to prepare the ground for his well planned usurpation.
According to John of Antioch (Roberto ed. frg. 243), the forces posted in Raetia and Noricum declared Carus emperor, and when Probus dispatched an army against Carus, it deserted to his side, and when the others learnt of this, they killed Probus. Zonaras (12.29) claims that Carus was reluctant to become an emperor and asked Probus to relieve him from office before the soldiers forced him to become emperor, but that Probus refused and the soldiers forced Carus to become their emperor. Probus then dispatched an army against Carus, but it deserted to Carus’ side. When the bodyguards of Probus learnt of the desertion, they killed their emperor. It is possible that Zonaras is correct in stating that Carus was reluctant to become an emperor and knew the mood of the soldiers so well that he wanted to be removed from office, but it is even more likely that this was just an excuse put forth by Carus later and that he had actually formed a well orchestrated plot to usurp power.
According to Vopiscus (HA Prob.24.1ff.), the descendants of Probus fled from Rome after his death and settled near Verona and Lakes Benacus and Larius (Garda and Como) where they lived in a quiet and unassuming way. If true this was certainly the right thing to do in a situation in which they could have otherwise been seen as a threat to those in power. The Senate and people reacted to the killing of Probus with mourning and fear. Vopiscus also claims that when they were informed that his successor was Carus, who was known as a good man, but who had Carinus as son, they feared the future.
Left: A coin of Probus. The text on the reverse depicts Probus as a man really well. He was an honourable man. (Source: Cohen).
Two coins of Probus. The one on the left celebrates his martial qualities by connecting him with Mars Victor and the one on the right celebrates the eternal city. (Source: Beger 1696).
