WHILE THE DEBATE WAS GOING ON ABOUT THE CREATION OF A federally appointed Halifax Relief Commission, and the civil lawsuit was wending its way to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, a number of other issues had to be settled. There was a discussion, for example, about the fate of the emergency hospitals. There was a debate about when the disaster would be considered over. There was the question of housing and wages for construction workers, and the pressure to get the soldiers who had been sent to assist out of Halifax and on their way to war. Finally, there were demands from the military for an accounting of the material handed out without charge. Those concerns ended with the great blanket hunt, a chase that resembled a silent-movie comedy.
Once the initial medical problems had been resolved, Lieutenant-Colonel Bell wished to achieve two objectives: he wanted the emergency hospitals shut down, and he wanted the military hospitals filled with soldiers, not disaster victims. By 15 December, less than ten days after the explosion, he was on the way to meeting those goals. He had managed to move all disaster victims from the Infectious Diseases Hospital in Dartmouth, and to reduce the number of victims still in Camp Hill to one quarter of what it was a few days after the explosion. Equally important to him, of the 260 soldiers in hospital, 248 were in military hospitals, 198 of those at Cogswell Street.
Although both of Bell’s goals may have seemed logical, his desire to shut down the emergency hospitals was strongly opposed by the superintendent of the Victoria General. He argued that if the emergency hospitals shut down, the patients from those hospitals would be sent to the Victoria General. That would prevent it from carrying out its normal function as a provincial hospital. The superintendent told Bell he was already getting criticism from physicians throughout the province because of the Victoria General’s inability to accept their patients. It was crucial that the emergency hospitals remain open. As Table 2 shows, Bell accepted that argument. As the total number of victims in hospital dropped off, and as one after another emergency hospital was closed, the remaining victims were gradually transferred to the YMCA, which remained as an emergency hospital until spring. By then, there were only sixteen victims at Camp Hill and the Victoria General combined.
Name of Institution |
10 Dec. |
14 Dec. |
22 Dec. |
28 Dec. |
2 Jan. |
7 Mar. |
1 Apr. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Camp Hill |
377 |
269 |
90 |
70 |
53 |
9 |
8 |
Victoria General |
135 |
140 |
109 |
75 |
68 |
16 |
8 |
St. Mary’s College |
114 |
110 |
113 |
102 |
90 |
– |
– |
Halifax Ladies’ College |
86 |
70 |
102 |
29 |
10 |
– |
– |
YMCA |
66 |
60 |
124 |
115 |
117 |
88 |
67 |
Bellevue |
152 |
60 |
54 |
25 |
53 |
21 |
– |
Infectious Diseases (Dartmouth) |
120 |
110 |
2 |
– |
– |
– |
– |
As the patient load decreased, Bell arranged to shut down New Glasgow’s West Side School and the emergency hospitals in Truro. New Glasgow shut down on 8 January and its remaining sixteen patients were transferred to the Aberdeen Hospital. Truro still had twenty-eight patients on 9 January, but informed Bell three days later that most were ready to move to Halifax. The exceptions were the Drake family—the mother was all right, but the two children, Kathleen and John, were not fully recovered—and Mrs. Harry Hotchkiss, who was still hemorrhaging. Others, even Mrs. William Conrad, who had been unconscious for three weeks, were recovering.
Although the closing of the West Side School in New Glasgow went quietly, there was a short-lived row over the closing of facilities in Truro. Bell had sent a wire to Mayor Dunbar asking when the facilities could shut down. The people of Truro took that as an indication funds would be cut off. George Stuart wrote Lieutenant-Colonel Bell that he was “surprised and shocked” to see Bell’s telegram. He accused him of lack of co-operation. The citizens of Truro donated $9000 in cash to pay the costs of staying open. Bell apologized: “I am sorry there should have been any misunderstanding with regard to their removal, as we feel that the patients are quite as well in your hands as they would be in Halifax, and the Medical Relief Committee appreciates greatly the excellent service, which all the citizens of Truro rendered during the disaster.”
One problem that hit all the hospitals after the explosion was that many patients, both explosion victims and others who had been in hospital at the time of the explosion, had no home to go to. As an American Red Cross report indicated: “Because the friends and relatives of those injured were often injured or dead, there was often no one to give the patients hospital aftercare. Hence, many remained in hospitals much longer than they would have stayed ordinarily.” The problem was resolved by social workers who set up an outpatient care system that attempted to find places for patients other than in hospitals, and attempted to identify their needs, financial and otherwise. This support system was essential to reducing the patient load in the hospitals.
Another concern was getting agreement as to when the disaster ended. Halifax physicians said they had no objection to providing free services to the victims of a disaster. They had done so and kept doing so. At some point, however, they had to return to their normal practice of charging their patients. A few said that if no decision was made as to when the disaster ended, they would send bills to all the people they could remember treating. Lieutenant-Colonel Bell suggested the doctors should receive an honorarium of $200. The relief committee considered this and rejected it. The issue was finally settled when the relief committee and the new relief commission met jointly with Dr. J.G. MacDougall and decided that the emergency period formally ended on Thursday, 20 December. A later meeting decided that all local physicians who had been involved in the response should receive an honorarium of $300. For any work done after that, physicians could charge their usual fees. Smaller amounts were paid to those who had come from outside Halifax.
The physicians were not the only ones who were complaining. J.H. Christie of Amherst, head of the firm that supplied 3000 coffins to Halifax, wrote to the Halifax Relief Commission on 26 April 1918: “It would seem strange that since large sums of money have been voted for Halifax that there should be any disposition on the part of the authorities to get the undertakers to work without compensation…. If there is a legitimate purpose more binding than any other it is the burial of the dead promptly to protect the living.” The coal dealers were also concerned. They supplied coal at cost and delivered it free for ten days. They were prepared to continue as long as the relief committee asked them to, but they thought it was time the matter was reviewed.
While others were arguing about when the disaster ended, the insurance companies were interested only in the fact that it was a disaster. That, they said, eliminated most of their liability. The companies said they were not responsible for damage caused by the explosion. The fires—for which they were responsible—occurred after homes were demolished. Insurance covered only the value of the property at the time of the fire. In others words, they were prepared to pay only for fire damage to the wreckage. The Halifax Relief Commission said the legal questions this raised were unusually difficult and that any court case would take a long time to settle. The amount involved was not minor. The commission placed the value of homes and contents destroyed at just less than $10 million. They estimated the loss of schools, churches, other institutions, public buildings, private businesses, and manufacturing plants at a little more than $16 million. In today’s terms, that is easily a billion dollars.
These disputes were probably just the tip of the iceberg, because many records on the civilian side have been lost. There are, however, detailed records of some of the requests that flowed from Militia Headquarters in Ottawa to Halifax in the days, weeks, and months after the explosion. Those show that altruism may be appropriate and understandable in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, but it will inevitably lead to extensive paperwork later. They also show that political interests soon become involved.
The first pressing issue was housing. Civilian families were doubled up and even tripled up in damaged homes. Soldiers were in woefully inadequate quarters. Major-General Benson decided to try to rectify the problem by building temporary huts. These could be used first by homeless civilians and then, as civilian housing became available, turned over to his soldiers. He wired his intentions to Ottawa and received immediate approval from his minister, Major-General S.C. Mewburn. The contract was issued to Bate, McMahon & Company. As soon as Mewburn’s cabinet colleague, the Honorable Frank Carvell, heard about the decision, he demanded that the work stop. Carvell, minister of Public Works, was also responsible for patronage in the Maritimes, and he told Mewburn, “If any such work is to be done by the Government, I have the organization ready to proceed.” Mewburn defended Benson’s action and his decision to support that action. He sent his colleague a lengthy telegram:
After consulting with local and military authorities General Benson recommended on Tuesday, 11 December, the erection of temporary huts for the housing of troops on military ground—huts to be placed at the disposal of the civilian population temporarily. Huts will be needed by troops for the duration of the war and after. Benson recommended also that contract be given to Colonel Low of Bate and McMahon who was on the spot, on seven and one half percent basis I immediately approved Benson’s recommendation and instructed him to proceed. If you want contract held up better consult Benson and contractor. You may be able to adjust matter to your satisfaction. I acted in best interests of public in view of urgent need for immediate action in present emergency.
Carvell, who was in Saint John, New Brunswick, immediately wired back instructing—not asking—Mewburn to hold up the contract. This time, Mewburn got the message: the issue was not public interest but politics. It was a sober awakening for Mewburn. He had come to the Cabinet from the army and believed Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden on 24 October when he appeared to promise to abolish patronage, a promise the Halifax Herald headlined the next day: “PATRONAGE IS ABOLISHED BY UNION GOVERNMENT.” What Borden actually said was there would no longer be patronage lists kept for government appointments or contacts. He did not mention that the government did not need lists to reward its political friends. Faced with a specific order from a powerful cabinet colleague, Mewburn ordered General Fiset to wire Major-General Benson: “By Minister’s instructions stop at once construction of huts pending further instructions. No immediate action please. Government wants to co-ordinate actions of all branches of federal administration and determine policy of reconstruction. You must co-operate.”
The matter was particularly embarrassing because Benson had not only announced the decision to build the huts, he had also told the relief committee which firm was building them. The army never did build new huts, but the reconstruction committee did, and then tried to get the army to take them over and pay for them. Benson would have none of that. He wrote the secretary of the Militia Council in Ottawa, stating flatly, “No intention was expressed or implied by any person … as to crediting the Committee with the value of any buildings so taken over.” It was one of his few victories in the bureaucratic struggle that engulfed him in the aftermath of the explosion. It was also a costly triumph. For months, the soldiers in Halifax lived in inadequate quarters. Sunday mornings, some were forced to get up after working all night so dormitories could be used for religious services.
Another issue involved the federal government’s determination to control wages as workers poured into Halifax to assist with reconstruction. A few days after the explosion, officials from the newly formed reconstruction committee and four federal government departments—Public Works, Railways & Canals, Marine & Fisheries, Militia & Defence—held a secret meeting with local contractors. At that meeting, the contractors said they could not afford the rates paid in central Canada or neighbouring US states. Furthermore, because they were locked into contracts, they would be hurt if the reconstruction committee paid higher wages. The argument was accepted. Wage rates satisfactory to the contractors would be set and adhered to by all persons employing skilled trades in Halifax.
On 12 December, the hourly rates were announced: carpenters, 40 cents; glaziers, 45 cents; plumbers, 45 cents; stonemasons, 50 cents; bricklayers, 50 cents; labourers, 30 cents; single teams, 40 cents; and double teams, 65 cents. These rates applied to all private and federal government work and all work by the reconstruction committee. The manager for reconstruction, Colonel Low, explained on 10 January, “It will be more pleasant for all concerned if we all pay the same rate as it would keep men from jumping from one job to another.”
Almost immediately, the agreement created difficulties. Skilled tradespersons began leaving the private contractors to work for the reconstruction committee, even though the pay rates appeared identical. That was partly because Colonel Low was known to be a good employer. If all wages were the same, tradespersons preferred to work for him. The local contractors—the same ones who said they could not afford higher wages—immediately broke the secret agreement and started paying carpenters 45 cents rather than 40 cents per hour. (Most carpenters worked nine-hour days, seven days a week, so that raised wages from $25.20 to $28.35 a week, a healthy 12.5 per cent increase.) The army, desperate to repair Wellington Barracks, matched that increase. That seemed to end the problem, so no objections were raised.
However, a few days later, another issue arose: overtime. Normally, carpenters got time and a half between 6 and 10 p.m., double time for work between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m., and double time on Sunday. Since it was December, when little work went past 6 p.m., night overtime did not matter. But Colonel Low refused to pay any overtime. Instead of getting double-time on Sundays, his employees received a regular day’s pay, or $3.60 less than their union felt they deserved. Local 83 of the United Carpenters & Joiners of America publicly condemned Low and the people who brought him to Halifax. That brought the federal Department of Labour into the situation. It asked Colonel Low for an explanation. On 9 January, Low wrote a lengthy letter to the deputy minister of Labour, A.C. Acland. First, he told Acland about the wage deal—a deal Acland learned about for the first time. Then Low said he was not paying overtime because the workers had not asked for it: they wanted to help the people of Halifax and make this a donation toward the relief effort.
Low also frankly explained the rather complicated arrangements by which he was able to sweeten the compensation. Realizing the difficulty of getting local tradesmen willing to work for 40 cents per hour, the reconstruction committee “figured that by applying to every village and town in the provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, through the press and through the Mayors of the Towns, we could get sufficient labour … at the wages agreed upon.” To these workers the committee provided room and board at $4 a week rather than the standard rate of $7 a week.
As for the condemnation from the Carpenters Union, or any other union, I am not worrying much about it. Halifax is in a pretty serious condition financially from this disaster and all my endeavours have been to do this work as economically as possible and as rapidly as we could not only to relieve the distress but to make every dollar go as far as possible. It is impossible, my dear Mr. Acland to please everybody and when I find that my men are protesting against the wages and against the treatment they are getting, I will be only too happy to discuss it with my committee and see if we can not meet their desires in this matter…. I have done an enormous amount of work for the Militia & Defence … and he [the Minister] can safely leave this matter in my hands. I certainly have no intention of embarrassing the Department of Labour in any way.
The subsidization of accommodation for out-of-town workers was fine for Colonel Low, but the army’s carpenters came from Halifax. They were living at home. Unless the army wanted to lose its carpenters, it had to continue to match the pay increase. That should not have mattered, because the complaint that reached Ottawa was not against the army but against Low. However, another player entered the debate. The Department of Railways and Canals complained to Militia Headquarters that Major-General Benson was breaking the secret wage deal. On 10 January, Militia Headquarters wired Benson: “Report received from the Department of Railways and Canals that one of your officers offering forty-five cents per hour for carpenters which is more than agreed rate between Reconstruction Committee and Government departments at meeting in Halifax. Please inquire at once and report as to facts.”
Benson’s staff told him that if they did not pay 45 cents, their carpenters would go to the private contractors. Benson found this sensible, so he wrote Ottawa defending his subordinates: “The reduction of carpenters to 40 cents an hour at the present moment, I am convinced, will result in the loss of all our best men unless the local contractors are compelled to make the same reduction.” Since no one had bothered to tell him about the secret wage deal, he added that he was not aware of any agreement about a 40-cent pay rate. Benson sent those comments by mail on 13 January, an indication that he did not see the issue as overly sensitive. He was wrong.
On 15 January, there was a second wire demanding a quick answer to the query about the 45-cent rate. Benson answered that one the next day: yes, he was paying 45 cents, adding that the contractors in Halifax were all paying that rate. That telegram was answered immediately and in very strong language: “Minister directs you will immediately discontinue paying any carpenters more than 40 cents as was agreed when Minister was in Halifax. Reply by wire what civilian labour you are employing. If reduction 40 cents affects situation, please report why.”
Despite the peremptory tone of this telegram, Benson failed to recognize that once again he had trodden on political toes. Instead of immediately cutting wages, he took the final sentence in that telegram—“please report why”—as another chance to explain his position. He sent a telegram this time direct to the secretary of the Militia Council: “Your telegram, while positively directing a reduction in the rate paid, also asks for the effect of this reduction and the number of carpenters employed. I have not ordered the discontinuance of the rate paid until I was quite sure you were in possession of all the facts…. The loss of these carpenters following a reduction to 40 cents an hour would seriously interfere with our work.”
To Ottawa, that was the last straw. On 25 January, Major-General Benson received a wire from Ottawa saying that they understood he was still paying 45 cents. “Is it to be understood,” he was asked, “you have ignored or disregarded definite instructions of Minister sent to you by wire?” Benson was beaten. He wired back that same day that civilian carpenters would be paid 40 cents. Nevertheless, on 30 January he got another wire demanding an explanation of his behaviour:
Notwithstanding your wishes on this matter there would not appear to be any justification for not having complied at once with the instructions of the minister…. Your actions in this matter have been most embarrassing to all departments of the Government, and a cause for much unpleasant criticism.
The Hon. the Minister, therefore, desires that you will forward at once an explanation as to why his definite instructions have been disobeyed.
On 3 February Benson wrote a long and apologetic letter to the Militia Council:
I regret exceedingly that the correspondence in this matter does not appear to justify my action in not immediately upon receipt of the Minister’s wire … give directions to reduce the rate of pay for carpenters.… I regret further that that delay has been embarrassing to the Departments of Government and a cause of unpleasant criticism. My explanation is that the Minister’s telegram was dispatched before my letter could have been received and I felt when advised that such firms as Brookfield’s, Rhodes Curry and others were still paying the higher rate, he might be disposed to approve of the rate remaining unchanged.
Benson’s apology came too late. Already on 30 January headquarters in Ottawa had instructed an officer in whom they had more confidence, Major-General F.L. Lessard, the inspector general for Eastern Canada, to depart for Halifax to assume command. On 4 February, headquarters informed Benson that he should turn over to Lessard on about 10 February. There was no new appointment for Benson; he would be retired. Major-General Mewburn, the minister, showed some sympathy in a personal note: “After the disaster that befell Halifax, it was thought best to effect a change, to make a fresh start, and to appoint the Inspector General, Eastern Canada, to deal with the scheme of re-construction; but I should be sorry indeed if your feelings were hurt by the course which events have taken.” Mewburn noted Benson’s thirty-five years of good service, and concluded: “You have won the esteem, I might say the affection, of all whose privilege it has been to work with you.” In fact, by the time Mewburn sent this letter, Benson had been vindicated. On 23 February, Lessard warned headquarters that the reduction in carpenter’s wages from 45 cents to 40 cents ordered on 25 January had such dismal results that wages would have to be increased:
For a time the carpenters continued at their work in hopes that as their Union was taking the matter up with the Department of Labour, the matter would be adjusted favourably to them, but they have apparently given up the hope and our force of carpenters is gradually being depleted. The men are naturally going where they can get the best wages.
Previous to the reduction in wages we were employing over 80 carpenters, whereas now this force is reduced to less than fifty and these are for the greater parts the culls [workers fired for poor performance by other employers]. Under the present circumstances it is impossible to replace the men who are leaving.
Major General H.M. Elliott, master-general of the ordnance, who had recently visited Halifax, confirmed that the effort to keep down the level of wages had collapsed in the face of effective action by the union with the private contractors. Mewburn, already once burned by his efforts to support a respected district commander against the wishes of his political colleagues, asked for the advice of the ministers who had set up the secret wage agreement. J.D. Reid, minister of Railways and Canals, dodged any discussion of the wage agreement by observing that the Halifax Relief Commission was now the lead federal agency in the reconstruction of the city, so the militia department should follow their pay scale. Early in May, Lessard visited the commission chair, T.S. Rogers, who confirmed the commission had recently accepted the wage agreement reached between the union and the private contractors; in doing so, the commission had abandoned Colonel Low’s scheme of subsidized room and board. Lessard was thus able to authorize the Royal Canadian Engineers to pay the standard rates, exactly as Benson had attempted to do five months earlier.
Although Benson’s misstep on carpenters’ wages provided the occasion for his dismissal, he had also raised the ire of headquarters by refusing to return troops with trades skills who had been rushed from other districts immediately after the explosion for emergency reconstruction work. Some of those soldiers had been with units getting ready to move overseas. Those units wanted their men back, and headquarters was determined that should happen. The great urgency in early 1918 was to increase the flow of reinforcements overseas to prepare the Canadian Corps for upcoming offensives. This was why the government had introduced conscription with the Military Service Act of 1917, and was now implementing its provisions aggressively in order to raise sufficient manpower. Another part of the solution was to hasten the movement overseas of as many troops in Canada as possible. One aspect of Lessard’s duties as inspector general, an appointment that he retained while also commanding Military District No. 6, was to ensure the most efficient use of manpower. This was likely the key reason why he had been selected to replace Benson. Halifax was the largest home garrison, and the headquarters staff was convinced its strength could be significantly reduced, a notion Benson had repeatedly resisted.
Lessard would understand what was wanted and the continuing resistance from Halifax would end—at least that was headquarters’ belief. They were wrong. Early in March 1918, he responded to headquarters’ calls for the return of the troops sent for reconstruction in the same way as he had to the wages issue, by siding with Benson:
I do not think that Headquarters or any other place in Canada understand fully the extent of the damage which the disaster did to Halifax; for instance, all Wellington Barracks became a shell, leaving 1,000 men homeless. The station hospital was also knocked about and became the first to be repaired. It is impossible to get workmen from the outside; even the Bate-McMahon Company has difficulty in getting men and Lowe [sic] is a master at getting people to work for him.
Stunned by this about-face, on 12 March 1918 Brigadier-General R.J. Gwynne, the acting adjutant general, wrote the deputy minister: “It is evident therefore, that GOC6 has no intent of returning any of these men without a direct order and, under the circumstances, I do not feel justified in giving any such order, without a reference to the Minister but, as you know all the details perhaps you will ascertain his wishes.”
There was in fact some understanding at headquarters of the difficulties in Halifax. Major-General Elliott, master general of the ordnance, whose branch was responsible for construction, had now visited the city. Thus, appeals from Toronto for the return of their tradespeople brought the response from Elliot’s staff that the needs in Halifax were more urgent, and that Toronto had a much greater pool of civilian tradespeople on which to draw. There was, however, another aspect of the issue: the impatience of the troops who had been sent to Halifax. Early in April, Mewburn received an important complaint from Robert James Ball, the Unionist member of Parliament for Grey Southeast in Ontario. Ball had received a letter from one of his constituents, a soldier who was part of the relief party from Ontario; the letter was also signed by several of his fellow soldiers:
Owing to the very pressing need for more men on the Western front we the undersigned beg to be sent to the front. Being all Category A men, we feel we are not doing our full duty by this country or by the Allies in this work of reconstruction of Halifax. We feel that this work could be carried on equally well by men unfit for Overseas Service of which there seems to be a large percentage. Hoping that this may meet your favourable attention. We are yours for service.
Ball did not enclose the letter and said he did not want to make the matter a public issue. “I am not giving you his name,” he explained, “but I know this young man and think his statements are largely correct…. I believe a great deal of this just comes from carelessness of officers or those in charge.”
Mewburn told Ball that he had already ordered all men fit for overseas service to be returned to their units. Men of lower categories could be sent to Halifax. Orders had been issued to Military Districts 1, 2, 3, and 4—London, Kingston, Ottawa, and Montreal—to find men not suitable for overseas service and to send them to Halifax. He now intended to see these orders carried out. Mewburn increased the pressure on Halifax by having the adjutant general, who was the chief disciplinarian of the forces, issue the following order on 6 April 1918:
In view of the fact that these troops were hastily dispatched from districts to meet immediate and urgent requirements, and that many of these men are required for overseas reinforcements … and that since the date of the disaster a large number of troops have enlisted in Military District No. 6 under the Military Service Act, the following decision has been reached and will be carried out immediately. All troops forwarded to Halifax as an emergency measure … will be immediately returned to their respective districts.
Mewburn told Ball what he had done and confided in him:
The whole Halifax situation was, for some time, disturbing. It was never contemplated that these men would be kept in Halifax anything like the length of time they have been. General Lessard was making a complete and thorough investigation … but, unfortunately, he was called to Quebec during the recent trouble there.24 I took up a few days ago the question of getting these men released … immediately so they could proceed overseas as they were originally enlisted to do.
In the face of persistent hasteners from headquarters, including news that 105 members of the Ontario contingent had signed a petition demanding they be allowed to go overseas, Military District No. 6 dispatched—although not until 13 May—the last of the troops that had been sent for reconstruction duty. On that date, the whole of the Ontario contingent, two officers and 234 other ranks, left for Toronto. By that time, the district had spent about $137,000 of the $150,000 allocated for repair of military buildings damaged in the explosion. This had been sufficient to “weatherproof” the buildings, with the installation of new doors, windows, and roofs, and included substantial sums needed for the extensive refits of the Rockhead hospital and the Pier 2 debarkation hospital that had been rushed to completion in the days immediately after the disaster. Considerable work remained, however. Lessard’s staff estimated another $45,000 was needed on top of the $13,000 remaining from the initial allocations to make other badly damaged buildings in the North End (especially Wellington Barracks) fully habitable. Although headquarters let outside troops of low category transfer to Halifax units, and conscription was making available additional troops locally, the Halifax staff asked headquarters to provide 200 additional low-category troops from other districts. Headquarters agreed to find 100 men, and ultimately provided four officers and 154 other ranks for engineering duties, but not until mid-August 1918.
By then, Lessard had overseen his principal mission to undertake a sweeping reorganization of the forces in Military District No. 6 in conjunction with similar changes across the country. The government’s implementation of the Military Service Act allowed the military finally to unite Canada’s two armies, the militia (including the permanent force and the part-time active militia called out for war service and liable for duty in Canada only) and the CEF. The militia units that made up the bulk of the Halifax garrison were all demobilized, and the personnel liable for conscription (the vast majority) were consolidated into large CEF units, one for each branch, that is the artillery, engineers, infantry, and so forth. All A-category men were transferred into overseas reinforcement drafts, and replaced by lower-category conscripted personnel who were fit for home service. Even so, the net result was to require the dispatch to Nova Scotia of conscripts from other districts, much as was necessary with engineering personnel for reconstruction. As Benson had long insisted, effective defences required more rather than fewer personnel, no matter how well organized.
Officials in Ottawa had another concern in wrapping up relief work in Halifax. This was to square the accounts for the very large quantities of military equipment and supplies that had been expended with little of the meticulous paperwork normally required to track goods purchased with taxpayers’ money. In the wake of the explosion, the Canadian Army Medical Corps used its supplies to treat civilian as well as military injured. Medical equipment was shared with the civilian hospitals and used to equip the emergency hospitals. When there was warning of a second explosion, many survivors who fled the North End were scantily clad—soldiers from the 1st Depot Battalion, Nova Scotia Regiment, and the 1st Quebec Regiment spontaneously covered shivering people with their own coats and wrapped them in army blankets. Other soldiers took army blankets to the hospitals or used them to cover the dead. Army blankets went to many households that lacked windows and heating. The Canadian Army Service Corps gave meals to those who were hungry, and supplied all rations for the emergency hospitals. The troops pitched the tent city on the Commons, each tent outfitted with a canvas floor, bedding, stoves, and lanterns. The ordnance corps distributed tools and other equipment to the soldiers and civilians who were digging in the ruins in search of survivors and to recover bodies.
On 17 January 1918, Major-General Benson unwittingly began what would become a blizzard of correspondence and ledger sheets with a letter to Militia Headquarters. The army service corps had thus far provided rations costing $3354.90 to the emergency hospitals and he wanted to know the “intention of the Department” about the settlement of the account. Should his command bill the Halifax Relief Committee? He noted there were many other supplies provided to civilian authorities, the quantities of which his staff were still tracking, and the decision on the rations might set a precedent for the handling of the other accounts. The quartermaster general in Ottawa, Brigadier-General (later Major-General) James Lyons Biggar, a veteran of the South African War and one of the most experienced and senior supply services officers in the Canadian army, took the matter to the Militia Council. The minister of militia, Major-General S.C. Mewburn, presided at the meeting, which ruled the Cabinet should be asked to pass an order-in-council that would write off all the relief supplies as a “charge against the public.” Biggar wrote Benson on 2 February asking that he “submit at once” “all accounts in connection with clothing, stores, supplies, and so forth, which were handed over to the hospitals and others in connection with the Halifax Relief” so that the draft order-in-council could be prepared.
The tone was unusually peremptory as Benson’s headquarters had already been slow in responding to a barrage of increasingly testy telegrams from Ottawa demanding further information: “Please submit at once.” “Hope to have information tomorrow.” “Information asked on January 27 need for 30th not supplied.” “Will you please explain for the information of the Honourable the Minister the cause of the delay?” Benson did not blame his beleaguered supply officers, but rather noted his people were working in difficult conditions. He gently chided headquarters for sending a sharply worded telegram demanding a hastened reply to a letter that was not identified by a file reference. The result, he explained, was a search for the letter that had to go through the files of two departments in different locations in the city. The dispersal of facilities in Halifax among the various scattered locations where the British army had erected buildings (now cramped and inadequate) from time to time since the late eighteenth century was a long-standing problem. Just when the staff was able to assemble the required information, Benson left the command and it was his successor, Major-General Lessard, who signed the report on 16 February 1918.
The list of material given out from the main ordnance corps depot ran to some 150 different types of items. Among them were tools, lanterns, clothing, towels, kitchen equipment, dishes, cutlery, tents, mattresses, and bedding, including the largest single item, 11,691 “Blankets G[eneral] S[ervice] Barrack.” Accounts from the engineers most directly evoked the tragedy: gunpowder to blast graves in the frozen ground of Fairview Cemetery, and the costs for fitting the Chebucto School as a mortuary. The lists of supplies issued from the garrison medical stores—drugs, laboratory equipment, bandages, surgical clothing, and instruments—ran to more than forty closely typed pages. Detailed as these reports were, they just started a bureaucratic ball rolling. Completing the accounts to the satisfaction of officials in Ottawa would drag on for more than a year, the whole of Lessard’s tenure.
One source of delay was that the garrison was still providing relief. Rations for the last two emergency hospitals were delivered until the remaining patients were transferred to municipal hospitals in mid-April 1918, and so the figures had to be updated. What evidently struck the officials in Ottawa was that the new Halifax Relief Commission, which had superseded the emergency Halifax Relief Committee organization at the end of January 1918, specifically asked for the extended support to the emergency hospitals. The officials also noted that the Royal Canadian Engineers had sent an invoice to the new Halifax Relief Commission for the $399.15 it cost to convert Chebucto School to a morgue. Later, the new commission returned to military stores in Halifax several thousands of dollars’ worth of supplies the military had provided. Might the commission be liable for some or all of the military supplies provided during the crisis? In a letter dated 22 November 1918—eleven days after the Armistice that ending the fighting on the Western Front—Biggar dispatched new instructions to Halifax:
It is observed with regard to several items in your statement that you state such are recoverable from the Halifax Relief Commission, having been issued at their request. What was the understanding with the Commission in this regard[?] Did they undertake to refund to this Department the cost of the stores so issued[?] If so it will only be necessity to obtain the approval of the Governor General in Council [that is, the Cabinet] to write off such stores for which no repayment is to be made[?] Full particulars should be given of all the transactions relative to the issuing of these stores i.e. under what circumstances they were issued, and at whose request in each case, and upon what authority.
The supply officers in Halifax were surprised by the evident lack of understanding in Ottawa about the chaotic circumstances in the wake of the explosion. What especially struck the officers was the suggestion that the commission, a new organization chartered by the federal government some seven weeks after the disaster, might be held accountable for the assistance given to the emergency Halifax Relief Committee organization that had been created as a temporary stopgap—with the full participation of Military District No. 6—to hold the breach immediately after the explosion. Lessard responded on 13 December 1918 by quoting the responses of his staff:
Ordnance:—
There was no such thing as a Relief commission when these stores were issued. The stores were delivered to various buildings in the City, as directed by District Headquarters.
It was impossible to get any responsible person to sign, assuming the responsibility for safe custody.
A.D.S & T. [Assistant Director Supply and Transport]:—
The articles in question were issued in consequence of the Halifax Disaster and on the verbal authority of the then G.O.C. who instructed that the request of the Halifax Relief Committee … should be met and decision obtained later as to who should bear the cost of same.
With regard to the item of $162.00 for bread issue to “soldiers families and citizens” this was rendered necessary owing to the sources of food supply being destroyed … and a large part of the population being unable to procure same.
C.R.C.E. [Commanding Royal Canadian Engineer]:—
The Gasoline was issued to various cars doing relief work the day of the explosion, and for a few days after. There was no agreement with any person regarding a refund.
…
Chebucto St. School was fitted up as a morgue at the request of Mr. A.S. Barnstead. The understanding being that the money would be refunded. There was no definite agreement with the Relief Commission as that did not exist at the time.
An account for this amount was rendered the Relief Commission on February 1st, last but no action was taken by them.
Nevertheless, on 5 February 1919 the Militia Council ruled that the Halifax Relief Commission should be billed for all the unaccounted supplies. General Biggar instructed Military District No. 6 to “please have this done and report whether they are prepared to pay these accounts.” By this time Lessard had fallen ill and departed for Ontario on sick leave, which proved to be the end of his tenure in Halifax. Colonel W.E. Thompson, now district commander, sent the bill. The commission replied politely, making the same points as had Lessard and the supply officers in Halifax:
These stores were issued hurriedly and voluntarily in order to relieve an extraordinary situation. At the time, there was a hastily organized committee but so far as we can now ascertain the distribution was made largely if not altogether directly by the military authorities and there is no way whatever by which the distribution can be checked.
In like manner, supplies and stores were distributed throughout Halifax from other sources some of them local and many of them from outside. The Commission does not think that in any of these cases there was any expectation that payment would be called for. In fact, if we recognized your bill it would be only fair for us to call upon all persons who furnished supplies at that time to render their accounts to us. This would be an impossible situation for us to assume and would involve in the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars, and for these moneys no estimate was made.
The negative reply, in fact, was all that headquarters needed. It confirmed that everything possible had been done to settle the accounts and allowed the staff to complete the submission to Cabinet. On 15 April 1919, the government approved the submission, which allowed the Department of Militia and Defence to write off $72,403.96 worth of relief supplies—the sum arrived at after some fourteen months of gathering, checking, and rechecking the accounts—as a “charge against the public.”
Yet had all the supplies truly been expended? Nearly half of the sum written off, $35,713.50, was for 10,204 army blankets, almost all of the 11,691 originally distributed. How could so many have been lost or destroyed or still be required to meet emergency conditions? According to Major R.M. Watson, chief of the military police in Military District No. 6, the blankets were hiding in plain sight. “Wherever these blankets are found in the possession of hackmen, taxi drivers, milkmen, and even colored people carrying on piggeries, they invariably advance the plea, that the blankets were issued to them at the time of the explosion and still required them. They simply bring them out in the day time to keep their horses warm, and use them on their own beds at night.”
Major Watson’s statement could well be taken to show that the blankets were indeed being used by those who truly needed them, the poorest part of the population who had suffered most in the disaster. Still, there was also evidence of a black market in military stores. On the evening of 21 February 1919, military and municipal police officers seized twenty-eight blankets and some other military kit in a store on Upper Water Street and arrested the owner for illegal possession of government property. The difficulty was that the government markings had been removed from the blankets, an erasure achieved by scrubbing them with petrol. There would be little chance of convincing a court that the blankets had indeed come from the military. The answer was to place a notice in local newspapers that the blankets had been supplied only for the emergency and should now be returned, with the warning that possession of government property was an offence that would be prosecuted. The files do not reveal if any were returned, but the subject came up yet again.
In the fall of 1919, the military police learned that Bate McMahon Construction Company had some 200 army blankets in the barracks of one of their work camps. Investigation showed that the company had in fact purchased the blankets for a discounted price of $250 from the Halifax Relief Commission in September, long after the military had published its general notice that all items issued after the explosion must be returned. Should the Department of Militia and Defence seek to recover the $250 from the commission? The senior legal authority in the military, the judge advocate general’s office, quickly—and finally—laid the question to rest. It would be “ludicrous” for the Crown in the form of the defence department, to bill the Crown, in the form of the commission, for supplies that the Crown had already written off by order in council as a Crown expense.