On 9 July 1981 Danny Barrett, aged 15 years, of Havana Court, Ardoyne, Belfast, was shot dead by the British army about 9.30pm.
On the afternoon of 9 July his friend, George McErlean, aged 16, called for Danny at his home in Havana Court. They went over to the Pool Hut at the bottom of Brompton Park between 6.30pm and 7.00pm and came back about 7.15pm. They called for a few minutes at Joseph Brown’s house at Havana Court. He was watching ‘Top of the Pops’ so they left and came to Danny’s house. There they watched ‘Top of the Pops’ until about 8pm. They went out and met the rest of their friends at Brompton. There had been a Black Flag March, not an uncommon thing during the Hunger Strike at H Blocks, and there was a crowd there. They did not stand around so they went to the club at Herbert Street to go to the disco. There were four or five of them. There was no crowd at the disco so Danny, George, and Kevin Mullen returned to Danny’s house. There was rioting down at the waste ground beside Holy Cross School. They watched and then heard a couple of shots. They went back to Danny’s house.
James Barrett, Danny’s father, recounts that, despite some rioting at the bottom of Brompton Park, all was quiet at Havana Court. Havana Court is a small square of newly-built red brick houses. There is a main entrance from Flax Street. The high building tower of Ewart’s Mill, on top of which is a British army camera and sentry post visible to the eye, dominates the area and gives a clear visionary line right down the little front gardens of the row of houses where Danny lived. These small front gardens are surrounded by low brick walls about two feet high. A number of plastic bullets were fired at the rioters who were mainly children. The children threw stones; then ran to retrieve the plastic bullets. James Barrett also heard a number of shots fired but did not know from where or from whom. The shooting, he thought, seemed to come from the direction of Brompton Park. When Danny heard the first shots, he rushed into the house along with the other children. There was a short lull and Danny walked out to the front again and James went with him. James stood at the door. Danny sat on the low wall at right angles to the house and was facing towards Flax Street. George McErlean was standing in the hall of Danny’s house. Joseph Foster, aged 16, had been at the Pool Hut and had come over to Havana Court by himself. He sat down on the wall beside Danny. Kevin Mullen was standing further down the path to the house. Gerry Ferguson was standing between James Barrett and Danny. Then there was a further number of shots. Joe Foster said to Danny, ‘Get down!’ Danny said, ‘Ach, it’s all right’. Then there was a single shot and Danny fell back over the wall. James saw Danny fall back over the wall. He thought at first Danny had thrown himself back to get down for cover. Gerry Ferguson got up. James looked over the wall and saw his son lying bleeding. He thought he had hit his head when he fell over. He jumped over the wall and saw he was losing a lot of blood. He knew then Danny had been shot. He was unconscious and appeared to be dead. He said an Act of Contrition in his ear and held him in his arms. He took off his shirt and tried to stem the flow of blood. An ambulance was called.
Arrow marks spot where Danny Barrett was killed
When Danny was shot, there was panic among the children and neighbours who had been drawn to the doors by the rioting and shooting. There had been some running to and fro by parents to bring children away from Brompton Park. When Danny was shot, some others in hysteria thought they had been shot too. Some ran into Mrs Veronica Clarke’s house next to Barrett’s. Some were screaming.
Patrick Clarke, husband of Veronica, says that on 9 July he went to the local disco at around 8.45pm to bring home his eight-year old son. On his way home he saw two RUC land-rovers driving up Butler Street. A third land-rover was further down the street. He reached the junction of Butler Street/Flax Street at the same time as the land-rovers. He heard shots being fired from the direction of Etna Drive/ Brompton Park at the land-rovers. He grabbed his son and ran back to the old houses at Butler Street. The third land-rover came racing past him to join up with the other two. He heard a second number of shots which sounded different from the first firing and he assumed this was the RUC returning fire. The RUC land-rovers went into Ardoyne Avenue. Patrick crossed the waste ground and went home. He heard a lot of people shouting that a child had been shot. He saw young Danny Barrett lying on the ground; some neighbours were beside him; they were waiting for an ambulance. When it came, he went with Danny to the Mater Hospital. He realised that Danny was dead. Halfway down Flax Street, they were stopped by the British army. He was questioned as to who Danny was and all the details. This took about three minutes. At the bottom of Flax Street, they were again stopped by the British army who wanted to know details. The ambulance crew protested at the delay. They had to give all the information again and this took three minutes. The soldiers then said they would escort the ambulance to the hospital. One hundred and fifty yards down the Crumlin Road they were stopped by the RUC. The soldiers, who were in front of the ambulance, drove on. They had to give the RUC the same information again. The RUC went with them to the hospital. When they reached the Mater Hospital, the doctors were waiting at the gates. They came into the ambulance and pronounced Danny dead. The RUC asked Patrick to identify Danny. He did that and then they went to the morgue.
At the time of the shooting, Danny’s mother, Mrs Margaret Barrett, was visiting her friend Lily Canavan at Strathroy Park, Ardoyne. James went to the house to tell her. He was pale and shocked. Mrs Barrett was sitting with her back to the window. Lily Canavan said, ‘Here’s your Jimmy coming. There must be something wrong.’ Mrs Barrett said, ‘Jimmy, what’s wrong? Is it our Danny?’ He shook his head and she ran out and down the entry. He followed her and said, ‘Danny was shot’. People were out of their homes. Mrs Barrett did not know Danny was dead. She saw the British soldiers and the RUC. She wanted to go to the hospital. She saw the priest at the hospital. She ran away. She knew he was bad. The priest told her he was dead and she came back home.
Immediately after the shooting, the RUC and the British army came on the scene and searched the Barrett home. They looked through Tina’s schoolbooks. The officer in charge said they were looking for arms and not to go through trivial things. They searched through the yard, bin, coal-bunker and back-garden. They searched all the bedrooms and cupboards upstairs and down. They also searched Mickey Holland’s home, Danny’s chum. There was no one in the house at the time and they broke the back lock and window.
The next morning, 10 July, around 6am, the RUC, British army and forensic experts came to the outside of the house to examine a bullet hole in the next door neighbour’s house. James Barrett went out and spoke to them. They were pointing in the direction of the high-rise building in Flax Street which is a British army base. There is an observation post on top of it. The forensic men told James that was the direction the shot came from.
Danny Barrett was buried after 10 o’clock Mass on 14 July 1981 from Holy Cross Church. Some statements have been made to the RUC but as yet there has been no inquest or any other development in the case.
Danny Barrett is another victim of the British/Irish conflict. His life reflects his own people, the oppressed Catholic nationalists of the north of Ireland. His father Jimmy Barrett was born and reared in Hooker Street. He married in June 1963. His wife came from Unity Flats. They bought a wee house in Hooker Street and were there during the whole ‘troubles’ until the ‘peace line’ went up. They went up to Gormanstown College in County Meath the night of internment but only stayed a night. During the years they were often kicked about just like their neighbours, sleeping in schools in bad times. They left Hooker Street in June 1980 and moved to Havana Court. Danny loved the new house because of the bathroom and plenty of room to bring all his chums. In all the ‘troubles’ he never got hurt. James Barrett, his father, is forty years of age, an unemployed crane-driver. There are three other children, Susan (17), Conn (12), Tina (7). Mrs Barrett was always terribly afraid for Danny because of his age and the hunger strike. She kept him home from school the whole week before Bobby Sands died. His school, St Gabriel’s, is on the main Crumlin Road and she was afraid of any thing happening. Danny’s favourite pastimes were playing pool, discos and playing records. He was a normal boisterous lad of his age, liked the girls and had plenty of friends. He and his sister were due to go on holiday to Bray arranged by Ardoyne Youth Club each year. Danny was a member of Ardoyne Youth Club and around thirty children were going on the trip.
On 19 May 1981, five British soldiers were killed by a land mine in Camlough, South Armagh. On that day, about 4pm, his mother was called to where some soldiers had stopped him. They were accusing him of having hijacked a car. Danny told his mother, ‘The soldier is after saying to me – “You see the soldier in the observation post; if he identifies you as the one who hijacked the car from Brompton Park, you’ll be sent away for a right spell.”’ It was from the same observation post Danny was shot. In July 1980, he was arrested with two others for alleged rioting. It went to court and the case was thrown out.
Who will take an interest in the case of Danny Barrett shot by the British army? Is he to join the 11 other completely innocent men, women and children killed by the British army and no justice follow? Are we silent too long?
I wrote this account in November 1981 for the pamphlet, Danny Barrett, published by Mgr Denis Faul and myself in January 1982.
Amnesty International celebrated its thirtieth birthday in 1991. People involved in the campaign for human rights in Northern Ireland are grateful to them for their interest in the protection of citizens of the north from the illegal acts of those in charge of the law. One calls to mind their reports of February 1972 and June 1978 on ill-treatment of those detained under emergency laws in interrogation centres, and reports in 1988 and 1990 on Killings by Security Forces in Northern Ireland. In their report of 1991 entitled United Kingdom: Human Rights Concerns Amnesty International condemned British government secrecy in police and military investigations. It renewed its call for an independent judicial inquiry into disputed killings by security forces in Northern Ireland. The report said that Amnesty ‘believes that such an inquiry is vital to help prevent future unlawful killings and to ensure that all disputed killings by security forces are promptly investigated and publicly clarified’.
The British government has held inquiries before, but it is clear that they do not want to reveal the truth. On 30 January 1972, in Derry, British paratroopers shot dead 14 unarmed citizens in cold blood. Nevertheless, the inquiry under Lord Widgery into the events of Bloody Sunday did not fault the actions of the soldiers.
In May 1984, John Stalker, Deputy Chief Constable of the Manchester police force, was appointed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) to investigate three incidents in 1982 when 6 unarmed people were killed by undercover policemen. This did not result in the uncovering of the full facts surrounding these murders. The administrative cover-up became known as the Stalker Affair. Stalker was digging too deep, discovering damaging new evidence. He was suspended from the police on trumped up charges and removed from the case. The Stalker Affair clearly indicated that the authorities have something sinister to hide.
In 1989 Cambridge Deputy Chief Constable John Stevens conducted an inquiry into collusion of security forces with loyalist paramilitaries. His report touched only the surface of the iceberg. Its scope was deliberately limited.
Harassment, brutality, ill-treatment, torture, internment, severe prison conditions sanctioned or tolerated by the state have for 20 years distorted the face of Northern Ireland. The non-jury Diplock Courts, the acceptance by these courts of fictitious verbal statements, the use of supergrasses, the blackmailing of young people by the security forces, semi-official assassinations, the widespread and deadly use of plastic bullets and official shoot-to-kill policies have eroded confidence in law. The argument for this abuse of law is that the end justifies the means. Faced with the atrocities of the IRA and INLA the illegitimacy of the action of the security forces is blurred by public statements and pleading from the RUC, British army and British government that such counter-insurgency is justified in a warlike situation.
From the deaths of Samuel Devenney and John Gallagher in 1969 at the hands of the RUC to the shooting dead of Peter Mc Bride in Belfast by the British army in 1992, one can list some 150 direct administrative killings, many unjust killings and scores of indirect killings manipulated by the British Intelligence system.
In August 1992 the death-toll in Northern Ireland officially reached 3,000. Other compilations gave the figure as 3,022. I would regard the following killings in 1991–92 as unjust:– Colm Marks shot dead by the RUC in Downpatrick; Pete Ryan, Tony Doris and Lawrence McNally ambushed and shot dead by the SAS at Coagh, County Tyrone; Kevin McGovern shot dead by the RUC in Cookstown; Gerald Maginn shot dead by RUC in Belfast; Kevin Barry O’Donnell, Seán O’Farrell, Peter Clancy and Patrick Vincent ambushed and shot dead by the British army at Clonoe, County Tyrone; Peter Mc Bride shot dead by the British army in Belfast.
The forces of the state have been responsible for unjust killings, direct murder and indirect unjust killings and murder by collusion with loyalist paramilitaries. Mr Ed Moloney in an article in the Sunday Tribune, 9 June 1991, stated that since the 1982 killings investigated by John Stalker 67 civilians and paramilitaries had been shot dead in ‘Shoot-to-Kill’ operations. Twenty of these were civilians and 47 paramilitaries, of whom only two were loyalists. He wrote then :
‘A large proportion of the victims were unarmed when they were killed. Twenty-six, or 39%, had no weapon when shot, while four were carrying imitation handguns or rifles. Of the 37 who had access to arms there were claims afterwards that nine were in no position to use the weapons, mostly because they were on their way to arms dumps when killed’.
After the security forces kill people they seize the initiative by gaining a first story in the media. This is very hard to counteract. For example, when the British army shot dead an innocent young man, Daniel Rooney, in Belfast in September 1972 the commanding officer said he was a gunman, that he was engaged in a shooting incident at the time he was shot, that he got his just deserts. All these assertions were untrue. Even children killed by plastic bullets have been slandered. Now there is a distinct pattern – when the British army and RUC execute armed or unarmed IRA men, when they could have arrested them, they issue statements giving unsubstantiated and lurid potted biographies recounting the notoriety of the dead men and list the number of murders attributable to the weapons found on the scene. The idea is to show that they deserved to die, to divert attention from their own violation of the law, and to intimidate churchmen and politicians from criticising their action of shooting them.
There are four categories of killings carried out by the security forces:
1. A ‘bad’ soldier or ‘bad’ policeman who kills from a motive of revenge, hatred, bigotry, racism. He can prove to be an embarrassment to the senior people in the army, police and government, but because of the policy not to injure the morale of the forces the crime will be covered up and he will receive protection.
2. Murders and unjust killings by front-line regiments like the marines or paratroopers who do not relish the role of ‘peace-keepers’. They are eager for trouble. From the beginning of their tour of duty they harass, abuse, beat and threaten civilians. The senior district policemen do not deter them. On their rota these soldiers usually assure themselves of a kill. Their harassment inevitably ends in tragedy. Knowing that, the government still retains the paratroopers and marines on the rota tours of duty of British regiments in Northern Ireland. When they kill innocent civilians they are most often than not protected by the authorities.
3. Civilians executed in error by the SAS, other undercover soldiers, or the RUC when they enter an ambush. This is also an embarrassment but it is covered up.
4. Cold blooded ambushes of republican paramilitaries. No challenge, no arrest contemplated. These murders have the official backing of the British government. It is administrative policy. The Gibraltar murders are an example of that. The government will go to great pains to cover up the truth. The Prime Minister and cabinet ministers will lie publicly.
In November 1990 I published The SAS in Ireland. It may seem a narrow focus, a fraction of the state killings, but I wanted it to be symbolic of all the state killings. The SAS is an assassination squad, like the South American death squads, and it is acting outside the law. They kill persons when they have opportunities of arresting them and they are well known for shooting wounded and incapacitated persons lying helpless on the ground. Such actions are contrary to the moral law, the law of the land and the rules of war. There is no declared war in Northern Ireland between recognised insurgents and state forces. The law therefore is eminent and dominant and must be obeyed by every body including the forces of the law. The SAS are not therefore justified in killing civilians or IRA members in planned ambushes.
The state perverts justice by attempting to solve its dilemma following these killings by inquests with limited powers and political decisions not to prosecute members of the security forces for murder. If, for example, all the killings carried out by the SAS, and I list 45 fatal shootings in the book, are examined in a continuous account a pattern of defence on the part of the SAS at inquests emerges:– they intended to make arrests; there was a threat to life and limb; the other party ‘fired first’. There are cases where forensic and medical evidence, and the evidence of witnesses, do not seem to have prevailed against the word of security forces.
The inquest system is inadequate. The Amnesty International report United Kingdom: Human Rights Concerns, June 1991, outlined its worries on the restrictions on inquests in Northern Ireland, in particular that the coroner’s court cannot make the finding of an unlawful killing by a named or an unnamed person as is possible in England and Wales. The unfairness of the inquest system is outlined in a pamphlet Inquests and Disputed Killings in Northern Ireland issued by the Committee on the Administration of Justice in January 1992. Are citizens not entitled to fair institutions in matters of law?
What about the prosecution of security forces in matters of murder and unjust killing? Security forces are not subject to the same interrogation procedures as others and impartiality and persistence in cases involving police and army are in doubt. The DPP is not independent and the attorney-general is on record on restricting justice for reasons of public interest and national security. Are not political considerations and danger to morale of security forces prevailing over legal justice?
The Amnesty Report of 1991 noted:
‘There have been 21 prosecutions since 1969 of the security forces for using firearms while on duty in Northern Ireland (not including sectarian killings). Nineteen of these were found not guilty. One was convicted of manslaughter and given a suspended sentence. Just one – a soldier – was convicted of murder and released after serving two years and three months of his sentence and had been reinstated in the army. A total of 339 people have been killed by the security forces during the same period. Most of those killed were from the Catholic population and many were unarmed; many were killed in disputed circumstances.’
In the past decade 10 ‘joyriders’ have been killed by the British army in west Belfast. On 31 July 1991 six members of the parachute Regiment were charged with the fatal shooting of two teenagers and the wounding of a third in west Belfast in 1990. The charges followed a BBC Panorama programme on ‘Shoot-to-Kill’ which highlighted this shooting. It is highly unlikely that any soldier would have been charged with the murder of Fergal Caraher and the wounding of his brother on 30 December 1990 by marines if the Cullyhanna people had not organised an unofficial international inquiry to shame the British government into action.
One would like to know from those persons who run the High Court why soldiers or RUC men charged with murder or brutality have the good fortune to find such sympathetic judges. The few that are charged are acquitted in circumstances that are weird. It is almost impossible to have a British soldier convicted of murder in the courts of Northern Ireland. This is in direct contrast with the inordinate judicial revenge in the form of wholesale doubtful convictions against some forty people for the murder of two undercover British soldiers in Casement Park.
Catholics despair of getting fair treatment in human rights from the British government. Its image of keeping the peace between warlike factions is felt to be propaganda. It is beside the point when it comes to the forces of the state doing its share of unjust killing and murder. Catholics do not trust the RUC and the British army and they regard the UDR as a sectarian force. If the main motive and objective is to save human life it seems fruitless to inform the RUC who themselves pursue a ‘Shoot-to-Kill’ policy and allow the British army to take human life with impunity. The anger aroused in people when the security forces of the state engage in ill-treatment or killing outside the law, and then protect themselves by lies, can lead people into using violence with disastrous results for themselves and the whole community.
The government of the United Kingdom is deaf to pleas for justice and fair play. In its report of June 1991 Amnesty International called for an independent inquiry which should look into the legislation and regulations governing the use of lethal force, as well as into the procedures used to investigate disputed incidents. The government of the United Kingdom has constantly refused to do this.
In the past 20 years sectarian assassinations of Catholics have been carried out by loyalist paramilitaries and pseudo-gangs tolerated and often directed by the British secret service. The purpose of the 500 murders of the 1970s was to break the nerve and sap the morale of the Catholic population, weaken its powers of resistance and draw off support for the IRA. This included British intelligence support for the Ulster Workers’ Strike in May 1974 (which brought down the power-sharing executive government in Northern Ireland), the two Dublin bombings, 1 December 1972 and 17 May 1974, and other bombings in the Irish Republic, and cross-border assassinations and kidnappings. So close has been the collusion between the state and one loyalist paramilitary group, the Ulster Defence Association, that it took twenty years to proscribe them, even though this group has murdered more than 500 innocent Catholics, men, women and children.
The Stevens inquiry was set up in 1989 to investigate the collusion of police and army with the loyalist murder gangs. Collusion, however, has gone on for twenty years. The UDA has been switched on and off as a ‘third force’. The Nelson Affair gave the public a glimpse of this underground murder campaign on the part of the British secret service. The manipulation was noticeable after the murder of Airey Neave and the Brighton bombing atrocity. It continues in east Tyrone and south Derry where in the past two years 19 Catholics have been murdered and no one made amenable. At political high-points, too, when indications are that Catholics might have a share in power the loyalist gangs are switched on. The ‘taking out’ of Sinn Féin councillors and members is systematic. In October 1991 a combination of loyalists groups, UVF and UDA, conducted an assassination campaign which resulted in the murder of 8 Catholics. The campaign was believed to be aimed at forcing Britain to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards unionism in the pre-election period.
There are three main areas where the killing of Catholics takes place – north Belfast, south Derry/east Tyrone, and the Craigavon area extending into Lisburn. Murders of Catholics in these three areas have taken place in the past few years. Let us take the Derry/Tyrone area as an example. Since January 1989 21 Catholics have been murdered there by loyalist paramilitaries and security forces. The UDA under its cover name UFF shot dead Danny Cassidy a Sinn Féin election worker on 2 April 1992. He was hit seven times in the day time. His widow claimed that he had been constantly harassed by the DMSU – the District Mobile Support Unit of the RUC. At his funeral Mass Bishop Edward Daly said that a factor in his killing was the ‘undue attention paid to him by some units of police’. The bishop told the congregation that Mr Cassidy had suffered constant cruel and public harassment from some members of the RUC. ‘In a society such as ours,’ he said, ‘with more than its share of sectarian murders, it is unjust, irresponsible and wrong for police officers to pick out and highlight individuals in this public manner, thus putting their lives in mortal danger. This activity is wrong and unjust and it must stop.’ Bishop Daly said that a week before Danny Cassidy was murdered a complaint was made by a local representative to a senior RUC officer about the way he was mistreated.
Prosecutions for these crimes are nil. There have been few arrests. Only one person has been prosecuted for indirect involvement. This must be the worst record for any police force in the world. Catholics believe there is collusion between the RUC, the UDR and the loyalist paramilitaries. They come from the same background and are politically hostile to nationalists. The feeling of the people of south Derry is stronger than the words of Bishop Daly. They think that the RUC through collusion were responsible for Danny Cassidy’s murder.
The same pattern occurs in many of these killings. There is a presence of security forces before the shooting, then they disappear, the loyalist gunmen carry out the shooting, the UDR appear on the roads laughing and mock and harass Catholics. The RUC in most cases do not inform the relatives of the shooting or they do so in a cruel callous manner (like a phone call to Mrs Mc Govern in the early hours of the morning – ‘Your son is in the morgue’). They rarely take statements from the relatives as to recent events in the life of the deceased and his movements on the day of the shooting. It is almost impossible for relatives to have an interview with the investigating detectives.
Here is a list of the Derry/Tyrone killings of Catholics since January 1989. Unless otherwise stated these killings were carried out by the UVF:–
14 February 1989. John Joe Davey, Sinn Féin Councillor. Car ambushed near home.
29 November 1989. Liam Ryan and Michael Devlin. Shot dead in public house, Ardboe.
26 October 1990. Tommy Casey. Member of Sinn Féin. Shot dead at house, Cookstown.
3 March 1991. John Quinn, Dwayne O’Donnell, Malcolm Nugent, Thomas Armstrong. Shot outside pub in Cappagh.
3 June 1991. Three IRA men, Pete Ryan, Tony Doris, Lawrence McNally, ambushed by SAS at Coagh.
12 August 1991. Pádraig Ó Seanacháin. Member of Sinn Féin. Van ambushed.
16 August 1991. Thomas Donaghy. Kilrea. Shot outside work.
16 September 1991. Bernard O’Hagan. Member of Sinn Féin. Shot outside work at Magherafelt.
29 September 1991. Kevin McGovern shot by RUC in Cookstown.
25 October 1991. Seán Anderson shot outside his home in Pomeroy.
3 January 1992. Kevin McKearney shot dead in the family butcher shop, Moy. His uncle Jack McKearney wounded in the shooting died some months later.
6 September 1992 Charlie and Theresa Fox were shot dead near the Moy.
In revenge for loyalist killings in this area and in the absence of RUC detection of the killers the IRA on 17 January 1992 murdered by a landmine seven Protestant workers at Teebane near Cookstown with the ‘excuse’ that they worked for the security forces – William Bleeks, David Harkness, James Caldwell, Robert Dunseith, John McConnell, Nigel McKee, Robert Irons. An eighth man – Oswald Gilchrist died on 21 January 1992 from injuries. There was a further repercussion to this slaughter when the UDA murdered five Catholics in a betting shop in Belfast on 5 February 1992 – James Kennedy, Peter Magee, Christy Doherty, William McManus, Jack Duffin.
As regards the shooting dead of Thomas Donaghy on 16 August 1991 as he arrived for work at Portna Eel Fishery, an area covered by the Ballymoney UDR, there is some background information which leads relatives and friends to suspect collusion. Thomas Donaghy was an ex-prisoner who left the IRA several years before his release from prison and did not become re-involved. The RUC harassed and tormented him non-stop from the three years from his release to his death.
In the same area Gerry Casey was shot dead in his home on 4 April 1989 by a gang who smashed in his door minutes after he went to bed. The police had already drawn a plan of the bedrooms of his house on a previous raid. His murder came only weeks after two men with a sledge-hammer were stopped at a checkpoint on their way to kill a Dunloy man a few miles from where the Caseys lived. In the same area of Kilrea, John O’Kane survived a booby-trap attempt on his life, 5 March 1988; another man with him, Stephen Kennedy, received head and eye injuries. The UDR had been in the vicinity on the previous night. There was a second booby trap attempt on O’Kane’s life the following year 1989. A similar type of booby trap was used when a man was injured in an explosion at Kilrea GAA Club Rooms. Other ex-prisoners in this area are constantly harassed by the RUC, particularly by the District Mobile Support Unit. The RUC have told some of these men that their files are missing from Antrim RUC station.
I would suggest that international human rights organisations, besides carrying out post factum investigations and reports, should set up a ‘Red Adair’ type emergency team of lawyers, forensic experts, photographers, engineers, and doctors to fly immediately to the aid of families after they have a member shot dead by the security forces. Vital information may be lost through a cover-up. One no longer has full confidence in forensic evidence gathered by the authorities. It is important that the families have independent autopsies and that as much evidence as possible is gathered in statements from witnesses. Photography and mapping are also important. The legal experts should then attend the inquests and trials that may emerge. Those who dare to challenge the British authorities, such as solicitors, also are in danger of assassination. On 17 January 1989, Douglas Hogg, a junior government Home Office minister stated in Westminster that ‘there are in Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA’. This statement was interpreted as a warning to solicitors not to contest too vigorously cases against British government institutions. Three weeks later, as though to underline this point, Pat Finucane, one of the leading human rights’ lawyers in Northern Ireland, who had been particularly active in a number of the cases investigated by John Stalker, was murdered by the UDA in front of his family.
Amnesty International in its recent report focuses on this murder:
‘A year before his death Amnesty International had heard from a former detainee that during interrogation at Castlereagh the police had said his lawyer, Pat Finucane, would be killed ... Loyalist sources claimed that prior to the killing UDA members detained at Castlereagh had been told by detectives that Mr Finucane and a few other solicitors were IRA members and implied that they should be shot. Although some of them were later arrested by the Stevens team, apparently none of them were questioned about these allegations. Furthermore it was reported that Brian Nelson, the alleged (British) army and UDA intelligence officer questioned by the inquiry, knew that Patrick Finucane would be shot, and indeed had been involved in providing intelligence which led to the lawyer’s killing’.
All the information that has been disclosed about Pat Finucane’s murder would suggest that the decision to kill him was taken by British Intelligence agents. It is clear that the use of UDA death squads has and is being employed by the British authorities for their own sinister purposes.
One welcomes the recent proscribing of the UDA.
The present inquest system in the north of Ireland is inadequate. It is not a large demand to ask for instant reform. It would show some goodwill on the part of the British government in the matter of law and justice. Bereaved relatives are denied elementary standards of justice.
The DPP should give reasons for decisions not to prosecute in cases involving the security forces. He should be answerable to the citizens of the state.
Fewer than 8% of the large RUC force is Catholic. The police force needs restructuring to include nationalists and republicans who are strong elements in the society of Northern Ireland. One suspects that the violation of human rights on the part of the state is linked to this scandalous situation.
One would like an official explanation of ‘detention in military custody’ which is practised when soldiers are remanded pending trial.
Submission to Initiative ’92 and the Opsahl Commission. An abbreviated form was published by Relatives for Justice in 1991.
Relatives of those killed unjustly and murdered directly by security forces, and those killed indirectly by the state through collusion (witness the Nelson affair) wish to communicate their feeling that justice is formerly and officially perverted.
1. Callous attitude towards the victims. The RUC either never inform the relatives of the deaths of those killed unjustly or murdered by security forces or they act in a cruel manner. Examples – Leo Norney, Anthony Hughes, Kevin McGovern.
The relatives of these victims are targeted for consistent harassment by RUC, UDR and British army.
2. There is no urgent and vigorous investigation of these killings. Security forces are not subject to the same interrogation procedure as others. There is suspicion of lack of impartiality and persistence in the investigations.
3. The DPP is shrouded in secrecy. He should be responsible to the citizens of the state. He should give reasons for decisions not to prosecute. His independence in ‘state’ killings is flawed since killings involving the security forces are discussed with the attorney general.
4. Inquests in Northern Ireland are inadequate and designed not to reveal the truth. At least in Britain there is a verdict and the killers would have to appear at the inquest. Legal aid should be provided both in Northern Ireland and Britain.
5. Collusion in the name of the ‘fight against terrorists’ has lead to murder on the part of British Intelligence and security forces. The administrative bodies share guilt. Confidence in the administration of justice is eroded. Nationalists feel that collusion is indicated in the lack of prosecution of loyalist murderers in south Derry/east Tyrone, Craigavon and north Belfast; this ultimately leads to ‘revenge killings’.
1. Would the Northern Ireland Office supply reasons why there has not been prosecution in this category of killings if given a sample list of cases?
2. Demands for a public inquiry into these cases have always been turned down by the authorities. Necessity for a public international inquiry.
3. Change of law regarding (a) DPP (b) Inquests (c) use of legal force (d) provision of autopsy report as of right (e) independent forensic and autopsy.
On 23 January 1997 I submitted a report on human rights in Northern Ireland to Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman, House Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, Washington, DC. In the report I included two examples of unjust killings to illustrate the violation of the right to life. The shooting of a civilian, Aidan McAnespie, on 21 February 1988, when walking by a British army post at Aughnacloy, County Tyrone, is here related by his sister, Eilish. I give an account of the Gibraltar shootings of unarmed IRA members by the SAS on 6 March 1988. It is written by Niall Farrell, the brother of Mairéad, one of the victims. He is secretary of Relatives for Justice.
It is of paramount importance that the killing of my brother, Aidan McAnespie, on 21 February 1988, is not viewed as an isolated incident but rather as the result of systematic and routine victimisation for several years by British crown forces. These include members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Ulster Defence Regiment and the British army.
My brother, Aidan McAnespie, was the youngest of a family of six children. He was born in Aughnacloy, a predominantly loyalist village on the border with the Republic of Ireland. The area historically had a high unemployment rate, that is, for those nationalists living there. As a consequence, Aidan looked for work across the border and was fortunate enough to get a job in a poultry processing plant in Monaghan town, in the Republic of Ireland, some ten miles south of Aughnacloy. To go to work each day, Aidan had to pass through a permanent British army checkpoint at the southern side of the village. As a result, the security forces became familiar with him and often asked him to remove his car from the road for what was termed a ‘routine search’. They would then take the car apart, removing door panels and wheels. They would also search through his lunch with their bare hands saying, ‘You’ll be late for work today Aidan’. Aidan made complaints to his trade union about these incidents and they made representations on his behalf, but the harassment continued unabated. On other occasions they would ask him to remove his coat, shoes and socks in the rain. When he refused, they would put him on the ground and one soldier stood on his throat while another pulled off his shoes and socks. Aidan made complaints to the local RUC station.
It was not unusual for Aidan to be taken into the British army base for a vehicle search two or three times a week and the car pulled apart. The harassment got so bad that he stopped driving through the checkpoint; instead he would drive to the filling station just south of the checkpoint and would phone my mother. She would then cycle down through the town and out past the checkpoint and walk back through with Aidan. On one occasion a soldier shouted after them, ‘Are you trying to protect your son Mrs McAnespie?’
Aidan contacted newspapers seeking the protection that publicity might have given him and one national newspaper carried a story describing him as the most harassed person in Ireland. He could have wallpapered his room with official complaints made to the RUC both through solicitors and the local parish priest. Aidan’s life revolved around the continual threat of harassment and physical violence at best and the real threat of being killed at worst. A soldier stopped my father a year before the shooting and asked, ‘Are you Aidan’s father?’ When he said he was the soldier said, ‘We have a bullet here for him’.
On 21 February 1988, Aidan parked his car at the northern side of the checkpoint and walked towards the local GAA pitch, which was just south of the checkpoint. He had only walked three hundred yards when a single bullet from a heavy calibre machine-gun cut him down, in the prime of his life, on a lovely sunny afternoon, while on his way to a Gaelic football match. Aidan’s life was taken, his killer watched him walk towards the football pitch, aimed and fired to kill. This is the view of our family and many community and church leaders. The then Primate of All Ireland, Cardinal Tomás Ó Fiaich, described the killing as murder.
In stark contrast the British army described the incident as a tragic accident. They claimed, firstly, that the gun used was being passed from one soldier to another when it was accidentally discharged. This account later changed to one of accidental discharge when the gun was in the process of being cleaned. Because the Northern Ireland office’s statement of what happened supported this version, all subsequent investigations carried out by the RUC were mobilised to support this explanation of events. In actual fact, the security force explanation was so incredible that they had to create evidence to support their claim. For example, eye-witnesses saw a man coming out of a sanger from which Aidan was shot, wearing casual clothes and sports shoes. The next day the British army had a number of their people painting the checkpoint dressed in casual clothing. Aidan’s car was parked close to the checkpoint in a nationalist housing estate. On the day of the funeral eye-witnesses saw a man remove it. Our family phoned the local RUC station to report it missing. They said they knew nothing about it but to try CID (Criminal Investigation Department) in Dungannon. CID in Dungannon were not aware of the missing car. We then phoned the local police to report the stolen car. The press got to hear about the missing car and shortly after speaking to the local police, a local journalist could tell the family that the car was removed by police for its safety. It seems incredible that of all the cars parked in the housing estate this was the only car in some kind of danger.
In addition, the army claimed, that due to the accidental discharge of the weapon, three shots were fired, one of which ricocheted off the road hitting Aidan. Local people living nearby say the army reconstructed this account of things when, as darkness fell, a flashing light was placed at the spot where Aidan was shot and three shots were heard fired. It is widely believed that the army fired the shots to mark the road to support their ricochet theory. When challenged by the press, the army claimed that they came under fire from terrorists, a claim denied by the IRA and local people nearby who say no attack of any kind took place.
A soldier, David J. Holden, was charged with unlawful killing. While on this charge he was allowed to go home to his family in England. Approximately six months later all charges were dropped.
At Aidan’s inquest, the coroner, Roger McLernon, said the death was a cause of ‘profound regret’ and ‘was avoidable and should have been avoided’. The RUC stated at the inquest, and it was repeated by the coroner, that there was no suggestion that Aidan had ever been involved in any form of illegal activity. Guardsman Holden was not compelled to attend the inquest. The coroner advised the jury that, although the soldier was entitled under law not to attend, his unsworn statement should be treated with caution. The only other soldier in the sanger when the fatal shot was fired was conveniently absent without leave for the six months previous to the inquest. The coroner said this was ‘amazing’ and of ‘profound concern’.
Our family was not present at this inquest because we had no faith in its ability to discover the truth. We have a series of unanswered questions: Why did the gun that killed Aidan have ‘a live round in its breach while being cleaned’? Why was it cocked? Why was the safety catch off? How could David Holden’s hands still be slippery and wet ten minutes after he finished washing sanger walls? Is it possible to accidentally exert nine pounds of pressure on a weapon’s trigger, pulling it backwards and upwards? Why was Holden out of uniform, wearing what appeared to be a track suit when he left the sanger under police escort after the shooting? How could the Northern Ireland Office release a definitive statement of the shooting less than an hour after it had taken place? Was this a rigorous investigation?
It must be remembered that this is in no way the only incident of its type. The SAS, the British army and the RUC have been involved in the killing of many nationalists in controversial circumstances. On the day of Aidan’s funeral the only serving member of the British army, Private Ian Thain, convicted for the murder of an Irish person, Kidso Reilly, was set free after serving just over two years of a life sentence. He returned to active service (in fact he was never discharged from the British army). Holden was subsequently released and was charged before a military tribunal with not taking proper care of a weapon and was disciplined. He was later discharged on medical grounds and is a free man.
On 6 March 1988 Mairéad Farrell, Dan McCann and Seán Savage were shot dead in Gibraltar by members of the British army’s elite regiment, the SAS. While all three were members of the IRA they were all unarmed and could have been arrested. Indeed, independent witnesses stated that Mairéad, who was shot eight times, and Dan, shot five times, had their hands up in surrender when shot. Witnesses to Seán’s killing – he was shot sixteen times – said he was given no chance to surrender and was shot as he lay on the ground. In all three instances the scientific evidence pointed to the fact that all three were finished off on the ground.
These killings had all the hallmarks of other Shoot-to-Kill deaths carried out by the British security forces in Northern Ireland. The families of the dead decided to challenge these killings through the courts. Justice was not forthcoming through the British legal system, so seven long years later their case was heard by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France.
The court in a landmark decision found that Mairéad Farrell, Dan McCann and Seán Savage had been unlawfully killed, that the British government was guilty of having breached Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights, the Right to Life. In its judgement the court stated that the actions of the authorities lacked ‘the degree of caution in the use of firearms to be expected from law enforcement personnel in a democratic society’.[1]
The British government responded angrily to the verdict. The Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Michael Heseltine stated: ‘If we were faced with similar circumstances as those in Gibraltar, I have not the slightest doubt the same decisions would be taken again’.[2]
There is an eerie postscript to this case. Exactly a year later a young Irishman, Diarmuid O’Neill, was shot dead by the British security forces in a house in London. He too was unarmed and the authorities employed the same excuses for his death as they did when they murdered the three in Gibraltar. Within Relatives For Justice we firmly believe that the British government carried out the O’Neill killing with pre-meditation, as a bloody act of defiance against the highest human rights court in Europe, the European Court of Human Rights.
On Sunday the sixth of March 1988 at 3.41pm my sister Mairéad Farrell and a companion Dan McCann were shot dead in Gibraltar. Seconds later, Seán Savage who was approximately 100 metres behind them was also gunned down. The killings were carried out by members of the British army’s elite regiment, the SAS.
While all three were on active service for the IRA at the time of their deaths they were, however, all unarmed. They were in Gibraltar planning an attack against British army personnel. Since November of the previous year, both the British and Spanish authorities had been aware that such an attack was being planned. And on 6 March the three had been closely followed by the Spanish police as they travelled in two separate vehicles to Gibraltar from Marbella.
The Spanish police have stated since the killings that they informed their British counterparts that all three were unarmed and were not in possession of any explosive devices. It is worth noting that the day following the killings the British government in parliament thanked the Spanish for their co-operation.
At 12.30pm Seán Savage drove into Gibraltar in a white Renault 5 car. Indeed, he entered the colony using a passport in the name of Coyne, which was known to the authorities. He parked the car in a parking area where on the following Tuesday a British army band was to assemble. He did all this under the watchful eye of the British military. My sister and Dan McCann crossed the border at 2.30pm and met Seán Savage near the parked car. They then set out to return to Spain with Dan McCann and Mairéad walking together. Seán Savage, who was following behind them, turned at a road junction and walked back again in the direction of the town centre, away from the border.
As the pair passed a petrol station a police siren sounded and they turned to see at least two armed SAS soldiers in plain clothes approach them. According to one of the principal independent witnesses, Carmen Proetta, who lives in a flat overlooking the garage, both Dan and Mairéad raised their hands in surrender. Despite that the soldiers opened fired.
Carmen Proetta was discovered not by the police but by a researcher working for Thames Television which was making a programme on the shootings entitled Death on the Rock. The researcher believed Ms Proetta’s evidence because it coincided with another account she had received from a person who did not wish to come forward publicly.[3]
Ms Proetta told Thames television, ‘They [security forces] didn’t do anything ... they just went and shot these people. That’s all. They didn’t say anything, they didn’t scream, they didn’t shout, they didn’t do anything. These people were turning their heads back to see what was happening, and when they saw these men had guns in their hands they put their hands up. It looked like the man was protecting the girl because he stood in front of her, but there was no chance. I mean they went to the floor immediately, they dropped’.[4]
Another independent witness Stephen Bullock who was 150 yards from the shooting saw Dan McCann falling backwards with his hands at shoulder height. The gunman was about four feet away. At the inquest into the killings Mr Bullock, a lawyer by profession, stated, ‘I think with one step he could have actually touched the person he was shooting’.[5]
Both Carmen Proetta and Stephen Bullock gave further evidence, along with a third witness Josie Celecia, whose flat faces the petrol station, that the soldiers fired on Dan McCann and my sister as they lay on the ground.
The scientific evidence presented by the pathologist Professor Alan Watson at the inquest corroborated this evidence. Mairéad had been killed by three bullets fired into her back – at a distance of a few feet according to the forensic evidence – all of the wounds were within two and a half inches of each other. The upward trajectory of the bullets meant that the gunman was either kneeling and shooting upwards or that my sister was on the ground or close to it when these shots were fired. These three shots were the fatal ones. Mairéad had died from gunshot wounds to the heart and liver. She had also head wounds, but these were superficial. Professor Watson believed she had first been shot in the face and then in the back. In other words, even after initially shooting Mairéad in the face she was still alive and could have been arrested. In total she was shot eight times.
The pathologist further believed that Dan McCann had been first shot in the jaw. This had stunned him and then the lethal shots ‘when he was down or very far down’ were fired. Dan had two entry bullet wounds in his back which were again close together. The trajectory of the bullets were also upward. He had an entry bullet wound at the top left back of his head, which also strongly suggests he was on the ground when this shot was fired.
At the time Mairéad and Dan were shot Seán Savage was walking in the opposite direction towards the town centre. He was being followed by two members of the SAS (referred to as Soldiers C and D at the inquest) who said they were only five or six feet behind Seán when the shots that killed Mairéad and Dan rang out. According to the soldiers Seán spun round at this point and one of the soldiers claimed to shout a warning and then proceeded to open fire; the second soldier then followed suit.
There were three independent witnesses to this shooting. Diana Treacy told the inquest that she saw two men running towards her. After she was passed by the first one, who was Seán Savage, the second man who had a gun opened fire. She saw this same gunman fire up to five shots into Seán as he lay on the ground.
Another independent witness was a British holiday-maker, Mr Robyn Mordue. In the commotion of the shooting he was knocked to the ground when a woman on a bicycle collided with him. He thought there was a madman on the rampage, as he saw a man who had been walking towards him being shot again and again. He got up and ran behind a car where he was sick. He then looked back at the death scene, but what he saw is not clear. Mr Mordue was a very nervous witness. He had reason to be nervous. Before the inquest his identity was only known by the authorities. Nevertheless, in the weeks leading up to the inquest he received a number of threatening phone calls, ‘Bastard ... stay away’. Mr Mordue’s telephone number is ex-directory.
Kenneth Asquez was the third witness to this killing. He had alleged in two statements – one hand-written and the other before a lawyer but all unsigned in order to hide his identity – to Thames television that he saw a man with his foot on Seán Savage’s chest, firing at him at point blank range. Up until the inquest he had remained anonymous, but he decided to retract this statement. However, Asquez’s retraction must be treated with scepticism. As the handwritten statement said, the man with his foot on Seán’s chest was wearing a black beret and the shooting was prefaced by the shout ‘Stop, it’s okay it’s the police.’ In fact, one of the soldiers who shot Seán had donned a black beret and the shooting had been prefaced with these words. But until the inquest these two facts had not been publicised. At the inquest many observers believed that Kenneth Asquez had also been put under pressure by those who feared the truth. Mr Asquez must surely have feared being vilified by the British gutter press the same way Carmen Proetta had been for telling exactly what she saw. In fact, the Windlesham/Rampton Report records that ‘local people were afraid to speak about what they might have seen’[6] to Thames television researchers and that was before Carmen Proetta was slandered.
The scientific evidence produced by Professor Watson was damning. Seán had twenty-nine wounds in what the pathologist described as ‘a frenzied attack’. He believed that between 16 and 18 bullets had hit Seán. He had seven head wounds, five of them were presumed to be entry wounds. Our lawyer, Mr Paddy McGrory, showed Professor Watson at the inquest a photograph taken by the police of four circled strike marks within the outline of Seán’s head. This was the first time the pathologist had seen this photograph. He was asked by our lawyer whether it seemed as though these four shots had been fired into Seán’s head as he lay on the ground. Professor Watson replied: ‘Yes, that would be reasonable.’
The role of the police in investigating these three killings must be questioned. In the case of witnesses to Seán Savage’s death the inquest was told that there were some thirty people who saw the shooting. However, there were only three independent witnesses found and two of them were discovered by the media. The same was true for witnesses to the shooting of my sister and Dan McCann. The police failed, for example, to set up the customary incidents’ centres in the vicinity of the killings.
There is in police methodology a universal principle known as the preservation of the scene of the crime. It was applied sparingly in Gibraltar on that day. Within minutes of the killings, the police had ensured that it would be extremely difficult to reconstruct the killings. Spent cartridges were collected without first marking where they had been found. The bodies were removed without first photographing them in situ. The bodies of Mairéad and Dan McCann were not chalked around. The killers were not interviewed by the police until two weeks afterwards.
Normal police practice was disregarded just as it was in 1982 when six unarmed civilians were killed in County Armagh, Northern Ireland by an SAS-trained RUC team. There the police, too, failed to preserve the scenes of the shootings. As a result valuable evidence was tampered with and lost. Also the RUC, just like their Gibraltar counterparts, were recalcitrant in the search for eye-witnesses; they too failed to set up the customary incidents’ centres in the vicinity of the killings. The similarities between these killings would suggest a set plan for the execution of unarmed dissidents.
In the Gibraltar case the positive obstruction of the establishment of the facts concerning the shootings continued. The pathologist, Professor Watson, was not given the normal co-operation. The hospital had an X-ray machine, which he would need to trace the track of the bullets through the bodies, but it was not put at his disposal. The clothing had already been removed; torn fabric can help determine entry and exit wounds, while the spread of blood stains could indicate whether the three were upright or prone when they were shot. The photographs taken in the morgue were inadequate, the police photographer not being under Professor Watson’s supervision at the time. He was not supplied with surgical assistance. Subsequently he was not given any copies of the ballistic and forensic reports, nor the reports on the blood samples he had submitted in London on his return to Britain. The systematic disruption of routine procedures parallels exactly the persistent refusal to arrest the three suspects at numerous opportunities.
The forensic scientist, David Pryor of the London Metropolitan Police, had also been hampered in his work. The blood soaked clothes had been sent to him in bags. ‘The clothing was in such a condition when I received it,’ said Pryor, ‘that accurate determination of which was an entry site and which an exit was very difficult.’
Another peculiar feature was the fact that the evidence of the pathologist and the forensic scientist, although complementary, did not directly follow one another at the inquest. Instead, Professor Watson testified on 8 September 1988 and Mr Pryor on 27 September, with the result that the significance of the combined evidence was deliberately blurred. What Pryor’s evidence did make clear is that the powder marks found on Mairéad’s jacket and Seán Savage’s shirt indicated the gun that killed Mairéad was fired at her from a distance of three feet, and the gun fired at Seán’s chest was at a distance of four to six feet. In other words, the obvious question arising from the scientific evidence, too, was: why were these three unarmed people not arrested rather than killed?
By the time the inquest was held, six months after the killings, the British government had prepared what they saw as a credible story. Despite having publicly praised in the House of Commons the role of the Spanish police in the surveillance of the three, the British authorities began to claim that the Spanish had in fact lost track of the three on 6 March 1988 and that their appearance in Gibraltar took the British security forces by surprise. The British authorities believed, the story goes, that the Renault 5 driven into Gibraltar by Seán Savage – supposedly unnoticed – was packed with explosives. On top of that, the security forces were convinced that the bomb was to be detonated by remote control. The soldiers in their testimony claimed that the movements of the three seemed to indicate that they were about to use a ‘button job’, as they described it in tabloid-speak, and therefore had to be shot to death.
To back up the claim that the Spanish police had lost the three the Gibraltar police tried to present a copy of an alleged statement from a Spanish police inspector, Rayo Valenzuela, supporting this line. Our lawyer objected to its admissibility as the police inspector, who supposedly made it, would not be attending the inquest and therefore would not be available for cross-examination. It now transpires that this document is totally fraudulent. Not only was the statement unsworn, but the English translation delivered to the coroner was even unsigned.
However, a sworn statement does exist and was sent to the Gibraltar authorities. On 11 April 1990 the Spanish Minister of the Interior told the Spanish Senate that a Spanish police officer made a statement for the inquest, which was sworn before a judge. This statement was never presented to the inquest.
Any attempt by our solicitor, Paddy McGrory, to probe into the surveillance operation was made impossible with the issuing of a Public Interest Immunity Certificate by the British government. Nevertheless, this aspect of the official story was exposed when the head of Gibraltar’s Special Branch, Detective Chief Inspector Joseph Ullger, gave evidence. He admitted that the authorities had deliberately allowed the three to enter Gibraltar in order to gather evidence for a subsequent trial. It also became apparent that on 6 March a member of the Gibraltar police was present on the Spanish side of passport control with the aliases and passport numbers of the three. So when Seán Savage crossed the border using the known pseudonym in the name of Coyne he was immediately identifiable.
The British gave no real evidence to back-up their claim that the notional bomb in the white Renault would be detonated by remote control. The only fact presented by Mr O, a senior British intelligence officer, was that an alleged IRA arms cache had been uncovered in Belgium and it had contained a remote control device. This had supposedly led the authorities to believe that the Gibraltar bomb would also be detonated in such a way. This has since been shown to have been a lie, because what made the Belgian police believe they had discovered an IRA cache was the fact that the devices for detonating the semtex were not of a remote control variety. The remote control detonating theory totally contradicted what ‘official sources’ told the BBC on the evening of Sunday 6 March 1988, which referred to a bomb that was ‘timed’ to kill British army bandsmen on the Tuesday. The following day the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Mr Ian Stewart, repeated this point on the BBC’s Today programme.
The other argument put forward by Mr O to explain the flawed remote control theory was that the IRA by employing this device wanted to ensure that there was not a repeat of the Enniskillen bombing in which many civilians were killed. This argument contradicts the view instilled into the SAS soldiers who carried out the killings. They told the inquest that the three at all costs had to be prevented from using the remote control detonator. If the IRA did not want to incur civilian casualties why would they detonate this notional bomb in the Renault 5 car on a Sunday afternoon when only civilians would be injured? Besides, it was scientifically proven at the inquest that the three could never have detonated any bomb supposedly in the Renault from where they were killed. If the authorities were so certain that there was a bomb in the car, why then did it take them several hours to make the area ‘safe’? The probable answer to this question is that they simply did not think there was a bomb at all. Soldier G at the inquest testified that he thought there was a bomb in the car. Further information supplied by the British press since the inquest suggests he was accompanied on that day by two better qualified personnel who disagreed with his opinion. Their presence was concealed from the inquest. This suggestion has never been discounted by the authorities.
Nevertheless, according to the four killers, these three people, who were unarmed and did not have a bomb or possess any detonating devices, made threatening movements when they were approached by armed men. Why should they do such a foolish thing? The true answer to this question is that they didn’t make any threatening movements. This was revealed to Roger Boulton, the editor of the Thames television programme Death on the Rock, by a senior Conservative politician who said: ‘Of course there was a Shoot-to-Kill policy in Gibraltar just as we had in the Far East and in Aden’.[7]
In the days immediately following the killings, as we waited for the remains of our loved ones to be brought home, the families had to endure considerable harassment and intimidation from the RUC. For example, on 8 March I was spotted by the police leaving my parents’ home by car with my sister’s boyfriend. For no reason other than to insult us the RUC stopped my car and began to make obscene sexual remarks about Mairéad. All the other families were to experience similar harassment throughout this period and, in fact, the McCann family continue to this day to be harassed.
The McCanns own a butcher’s shop on Belfast’s Falls Road and British soldiers regularly shout obscene remarks in at the parents. Dan’s brother almost on a daily basis is stopped and abused by British soldiers while escorting his child to school.
But in the days leading up to the funeral the families were visited by an RUC officer who threatened us with dire consequences if we fulfilled the wishes of our loved ones to be buried as members of the IRA.
The remains of Mairéad, Seán and Dan were flown from Gibraltar to Dublin and from there they were to be brought by road to Belfast. From the moment we crossed the border into Northern Ireland the remains were literally kidnapped by the RUC. As we followed behind the RUC jeeps, it was noticeable how they deliberately slowed down when we passed hostile crowds making us easy targets for missiles. When we reached the M1, some ten miles from Belfast, an RUC road-block prevented the relatives from following the cortège. The remains of the three were not brought to their homes until much later.
After approximately 30 minutes, the relatives who were in three cars were allowed to proceed onto the motorway, while the other mourners were made to take another route. On the motorway, we were stopped by the RUC again and held for at least two hours. Many of the relatives were subjected to considerable abuse. Two aunts had accompanied me to meet the remains in Dublin and they stated afterwards that this period, stuck on the M1 surrounded by hundreds of RUC men, was without doubt the most frightening experience of the aftermath, including the gun and grenade attack on the actual funeral. The actions of the RUC throughout this whole period underlined time and again how sectarian a force it is. It exposed the nonsense of the Dublin government who considered it a breakthrough when they got the assurance of the British authorities that RUC men would accompany the Ulster Defence Regiment, another sectarian body, when on patrol.
Once the remains arrived home only the McCann’s household was subject to intense harassment. Their home was literally surrounded back, front and side by British army saracens. Only on the morning of the funeral, 16 March, did they withdraw.
Quite unusual for the funeral of IRA members there was no British army or RUC presence, despite the fact that the families had been threatened with a repeat of what happened at Lawrence Marley’s funeral when the RUC saturated the area and had refused to allow the remains to leave the Marley home until the Irish tricolour was removed from the coffin.
Many believe that the absence of the police and the attack carried out by a grenade-wielding gunman in the cemetery was no coincidence. In this attack three mourners were murdered. The killer made his retreat towards the motorway, which runs beside the cemetery. Parked on the motorway was a Ford transit van, and it seemed as though this was the killer’s accomplices waiting to help make good his escape. When the killer was overpowered near the motorway, the van quickly left the scene. It was claimed later that this was an undercover RUC van. A number of questions arise: why didn’t they intervene to halt the slaughter of mourners and how did the sectarian killer know that there would not be the usual police presence? Many believe that there was direct collusion between the so-called security forces and this murderer.
Five independent civil liberty organisations, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Inquest, the National Council for Civil Liberties (London), the International League for Human Rights (New York) and Amnesty International – all of which had observers at the inquest – have criticised many aspects of the proceedings and have called for further inquiries into the killings in Gibraltar.
The Amnesty International report stated that the inquest failed to answer ‘the fundamental issue ... whether the fatal shootings were caused by what happened in the street, or whether the authorities planned in advance for the three to be shot dead’.[8]
The inquiry by its very nature was not equipped to determine the truth. The British authorities, which might have had an interest in concealing aspects of the truth, had access prior to the inquest and during it to identities of witnesses, their statements or possible statements and were to some extent able, on grounds of availability, to dictate the order of calling some witnesses.
In contrast, our legal advisers had virtually no information except one ballistics’ report and a pathologist’s report.
Amnesty International in its report expressed its concern ‘that the legal representatives of the deceased’s families were significantly and unfairly disadvantaged in comparison with the representatives for the other interested parties. The system is inherently weighted against the deceased’s families in preparing for cross-examination’. Our lawyer, Mr Paddy McGrory, received the other forensic reports after the inquest began. He did not receive any of the witnesses’ statements in advance, and even during the inquest he did not receive the statements made by security force personnel shortly after the incident. Without access to these statements in advance he was not able to cross-examine witnesses on the basis of what other witnesses, who testified at a later stage, said about the same incident. Thus, for example, he was not able to question the soldiers, who testified in the second week of the inquest, about information which was presented in later weeks by police officers and civilian eye-witnesses. He also did not have witnesses’ earlier statements to compare with their court testimony.[9]
Our lawyer faced numerous obstacles including for example the price of the court’s daily transcripts being increased from 50p to £5 per page. Because the price was so prohibitive our lawyer could not avail of them – not so the British Ministry of Defence.
The use by the British government of Public Immunity Certificates prevented Mr McGrory, our lawyer, inquiring into many matters such as the planning of the operation, including the role of the ‘accessories before the fact’.
Finally there was the coroner’s summing up of the evidence to the jury, in which he told them to avoid an open verdict. By doing this he unduly influenced these eleven men. This is especially true as after six hours of discussion the jury was deadlocked, divided 7 to 4 in favour of a ‘lawful killing’ verdict. In normal circumstances an open verdict would have been a likely compromise, but this had been ruled out. The coroner then recalled the jury and gave them what seemed like an ultimatum to return a verdict. Two hours later they returned stating that they found, by 9 to 2 – the smallest majority allowed – the killings lawful.
Despite all the disadvantages faced by our solicitor, Paddy McGrory, a man with lifelong experience as a lawyer, he firmly believed that the verdict went against the weight of the evidence, that it was a ‘perverse verdict’.
The United Kingdom government insisted that the Gibraltar Inquest, despite its fundamental flaws, was the final word on these controversial killings. It consistently thwarted through the use of Public Interest Immunity Certificates any attempt by our families to have our case examined in the Northern Ireland courts.
Eventually we brought our case first to the European Commission of Human Rights and then in February 1995 to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. On 27 September 1995 – seven years and six months after the actual killings – the court found the British government guilty of having unlawfully killed our loved ones. It was a landmark decision, it being the first time that a signatory to the European Convention of Human Rights was found guilty of breaching Article 2 of the Convention, the Right to Life.
The British government said it would ‘ignore’ the verdict. The deputy Prime Minister went as far as to say that the government would do the same again. Almost exactly a year after the verdict a young Irishman, Diarmuid O’Neill, was shot dead in very similar circumstances in a house in London.
The stance of the British government must be viewed as quite unacceptable. If Britain continues to refuse to operate within the constraints of law, both national and international, if it continues to refuse to meet its specific obligations with regard to the ‘right to life’ under the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, then it must be ostracised and no longer treated as being part of the democratic family of nations.
The phone call shattered the silence of my bedroom. Pieces of sound seemed to shower down around me. To get a call in the night when you are on priestly duty always brings a sense of foreboding of tragedy. Almost in one action I pulled the light-string and lifted the phone. The quiet voice, so quiet, contrasted with the clamour of the phone. ‘This is the police. There has been a shooting. A priest is needed. Go out the Moy Road until you come to Trainors’ pub. Turn right and go on a mile until you come to a school. There is a road to the right opposite it. Turn down the road and go on until you come to a two-storey white house. There will be police there with a red light. Then you will be brought to the scene of the shooting’. I said I would go immediately.
I looked at the clock. It was a quarter to three. I dressed hurriedly and took the holy oils and blessed sacrament with me.
As I drove out the Moy Road, the silence of the night pressed against me. There was no traffic. Only the heavy stillness of night. I had asked no questions. I thought to myself: Is somebody wounded? Is somebody dead? Who could it be? Then a sudden thought, quickly dismissed, ‘Is this a trap? Was it really the police who phoned?’
I followed the directions. I met no car or person. Then as I turned right at the school, a red car halted at the junction coming from the other direction. A man in civilian clothes, but obviously a policeman, called out to me that I was on the right road. The white house soon showed up in the dark and then the waving blood-red light. I was directed by gestures to park my car. A group of uniformed police stood in the shadows. Nobody spoke. There was white tape, familiar sign of an incident, across a lane leading down by another house. A policeman came forward from the other side of the tape and introduced himself to me as an inspector. He was polite and friendly, so different from the sullen phalanx of uniforms I had just passed through. He guided me to the scene, past a farmhouse to an open yard. He told me two men were dead and that one of them was Desmond Grew. There was an open empty mushroom shed, of the old arc-shaped type. It had no frontage. A light was shining inside and there was a white car in it. In front of the shed was an apron yard of concrete. In the half-light I looked down at the black forms of two bodies lying on the ground. The inspector then directed his flash lamp on to them. The two men were lying within a few yards of one another, sprawled out. Beyond their heads, lying on the ground, were two Kalashnikov rifles. I said the Act of Contrition, gave them conditional absolution and anointed them. I recognised Dessie Grew. He was very badly shot in the head. The blood from the heads of the two men was thick and clotted and the dark intestinal-looking brain matter shone slightly red in the poor light. They were dressed in casual denim-like clothes, unmasked. The butt of a pistol protruded from a trouser pocket of Martin McCaughey. All was silence. I prayed at length. The bodies looked so small and thin and even vulnerable in death. We seemed to stand towering over them like giants. Such an impression I have experienced before at scenes of fatal accidents. Perhaps it is psychological, the power of life lording it over death.
I never asked any questions while I was there. I was on a spiritual mission. Anyhow, I knew I would not get answers. I learned, however, that they had been shot at mid-night. What happened? From my experience of writing a book on the SAS, I would ask: Were the weapons discovered and were they staked out? Did the two men come to move the weapons only or to pick them up for an IRA action? Could they have been taken prisoner, considering the soldiers were in a strong superior position? Were they shot without warning, with or without the rifles? Were they shot in cold blood and were the guns then planted beside them? To date, 1997, there has been no inquest and no explanation given. Only the police and soldiers who were present at the shooting know the full truth. Will they tell it?
On my way home my thoughts strayed to a lovely sunny autumn day in 1969. I was visiting the house of the Grew family who then lived in Knockaconey in my parish, a short distance as the crow flies from the scene of this shooting. Mrs Grew was peeling apples at the table. The front door was lying open. Suddenly two schoolboys ran in and pitched their schoolbags in the corner. They seemed delighted to see the priest. They wanted someone on whom they could bounce their ideas and questions. A running commentary on current politics, particularly that of the People’s Democracy, flowed from them. I can still see their eager excited faces. Little did I imagine that the same two boys would be shot dead some years later in the ‘troubles’ which were then just beginning. Séamus was shot dead along with Roddy Carroll on 2 December 1980 in one of the County Armagh ‘Shoot-to-Kill’ killings that were the subject of the Stalker Report. Both men were unarmed. Desmond was shot dead by the SAS on the night of 9 October 1990.
On 30 December 1990 Fergal Caraher was shot dead by the British army in his native village of Cullyhanna, County Armagh. His brother Mícheál was severely injured in the same incident. He was twenty years of age, was happily married to his wife Margaret and was the father of a one-year old son, Brendan. His father Peter John, a local farmer, and his mother, headmistress at the local primary school, are highly respected people in Cullyhanna. The nationalist population regarded the killing as part of the Shoot-to-Kill policy of the British government in Northern Ireland. The killing so affected the local community that they formed the Cullyhanna Justice Group in March 1991. With the aid of the Irish National Congress and other groups they organised an inquiry into the shooting. The inquiry, held in Cullyhanna, was made up of five international jurists chaired by Michael Mansfield, QC. Its aim was to inquire into the fatal shooting and wounding and also look at the Shoot-to-Kill policy. Four jurists found that there was ample evidence to charge the soldiers with murder and all the jurists raised questions about the Shoot-to-Kill policy. Mr Mansfield withheld his findings because of news he received from the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Twelve days after the launch of the jurists’ report two Royal Marines, L. Cpl Richard Elkington (25) and Marine Andrew Callaghan (21), were charged on 5 February 1992 with the murder of Fergal Caraher and with attempting to murder Mícheál Caraher and causing him grievous bodily harm. On 23 December 1992 the two soldiers were acquitted. The soldiers from 45 Commando claimed they fired twenty shots at the brothers’ car at a checkpoint to save another soldier they believed was being dragged away on the bonnet of the car driven by Mícheál Caraher. The Lord Chief Justice, Sir Brian Hutton, said he could not rely on the accounts given by the civilian witnesses for the defence or on those given by the accused and Marine B. He said the scientific evidence gave some support to the claim that the soldiers opened fire because the car hit Marine B and carried him off on the bonnet. He said he had to acquit them because he had a reasonable doubt of their guilt.
Reporting on their work over two years, before the trial, the Cullyhanna Justice Group, published the following account of the incident:
‘On Sunday 30 December 1990, the car of Dr Donal O’Hanlon broke down in the South Armagh village of Cullyhanna. As he tried to fix it, two locals, Liam Murphy and Mícheál Caraher, drove past and, seeing him in difficulty, stopped and assisted him in trying to re-start the car. Oliver McArdle, a qualified mechanic, arrived and succeeded in fixing the car. Oliver and the doctor then left.
‘As they drove off, Mícheál’s brother Fergal drove up in his white Rover. He got out to pass the time of day to his friend and brother. A patrol, consisting of four member of the British army, appeared and began questioning the three. They asked their names and addresses and checked the registration number of both cars. The patrol then left.
‘After a brief discussion the three agreed to go to Dundalk in Liam Murphy’s car. Fergal decided to leave his car in the car park of the local bar, the “Lite ‘n’ Easy”.
‘As Liam followed behind he remembered that he was to leave his car with his wife who was in the local shop a few hundred yards past the car park. He explained the problem to Mícheál. He told him he would drop him off at the car park where he could tell Fergal that they would take the white Rover and he himself would meet them further down the road. Approaching the car park, both cars were waved through a British army checkpoint.
‘When he parked his car Fergal was approached by a soldier. Mícheál then arrived to tell his brother of the new arrangements. Fergal asked the soldier, ‘Are we right?’ The soldier nodded. Mícheál decided to drive the car. He pulled out of the car park. Several of the soldiers then opened fire on them without warning. Both brothers were hit within seconds of each other. Mícheál, seeing the condition of his brother, continued driving in an effort to find a doctor. Liam Murphy and Jimmy Quinn, who had heard the shots, followed the car and found it about half a mile down the road.
‘Fergal Caraher was pronounced dead at 4.20pm on arrival at Daisy Hill Hospital, Newry. Mícheál was rushed to the Royal Victoria Hospital, Belfast, where he underwent emergency surgery.
‘That night the British army, through the RUC, released a statement implying that the car had failed to stop at the checkpoint and that two members of the British army patrol had been knocked down, one of whom was carried some distance by the car.
‘The next day several eye-witnesses made statements to a local solicitor contradicting the British army’s statement of events. At the funeral of Fergal, his father made a public statement that the family was not satisfied with the statement from the authorities. He called for an independent public inquiry’.
This evening we have gathered together to remember, in a loving and spiritual way, Fergal Caraher aged 20 years shot dead by the British army Royal Marines Regiment a year ago today. In the same shooting his brother Mícheál was severely injured. Tragedies come to us as they came to God’s own Son unbidden and unwanted. A tragedy is an occasion for deep and anguished faith. In the past year Fergal’s parents, wife and brothers and sisters have had to offer to God a weight of grief and tears. Our prayer for them throughout the year has been that the Spirit of God’s consolation would enfold them in his loving arms and strengthen their faith in the immense happiness, glory light and joy that surrounds Fergal in the everlasting life. May eternal light shine upon him.
Whilst we tread our pilgrim way here on earth we must live in charity, truth and justice. The great torch light procession we have seen here tonight not only reflects the 345 people killed by security forces but all the deaths. The death of any human person diminishes us all. We are all aware of the great mountain of suffering of all bereaved people in this sad and too long a conflict. There is an emphasis, however, this evening on this category of deaths by government forces because the tight control of media by the British government authorities attempts to hide the truth that more than half of these 345 deaths were unjust killings and sometimes murder. There has been no redress or justice for the families of victims of government killings. The cover-up not only includes senior officers in their forces but also civil servants, judiciary bodies and elements in the British cabinet.
On the night of 14 August 1969 John Gallagher was shot dead by ‘B’ Specials in Armagh. The Scarman Tribunal was able to unravel the facts relating to this fatal shooting. Justice was not done. Twenty-two years later no one has been charged with this unjust killing. The rot set in then and the government has followed a policy of lies and cover-up in similar shootings. It is my belief that there is a government policy not to injure the morale of their security forces and so the crimes of army and police are covered up and they receive protection. The only time they weaken in their resolution is when the media shames them into cosmetic action by the sheer weight of facts. Would six members of the Parachute Regiment have been charged with the killing of two teenagers and the wounding of a third a year after the incident if a BBC Panorama programme had not highlighted the facts to the public? Seventeen people including eight children have been killed by rubber and plastic bullets fired by lethal weapons and over 100 have been seriously injured. Any other government would hang its head in shame at these unnecessary and tragic criminal acts and would withdraw the use of these death-dealing missiles. The plastic bullet gun has never been used in riots in Britain. This underlines the contempt the British government has for the Irish people.
The Irish people should strongly urge that front-line regiments like the marines and paratroopers should not be sent in the rota of British forces service in Ireland. The build-up to the shooting of Fergal Caragher was a litany of harassment, verbal abuse, beatings and threats to the lives of citizens. This was tolerated by RUC authorities. Inevitably it ended in tragedy. The same scenario of pre-killing harassment was evident in the run-up to the shooting by the paratroopers of unarmed people like Brian Smith in Belfast and the teenage joyriders in 1990.
British forces have shot armed people when arrests could have made due to control of a situation. This happened for example at Coagh, Loughgall, and Drumnakilly.
There is a long list of men, women and children, unarmed persons who have been unjustly killed and some murdered.
Most sinister are the shootings of Catholics by loyalists acting in collusion with security forces like Loughlin Maginn and Pat Finucane. In the past two years 14 people have been murdered in the south Derry/ east Tyrone region by loyalists. Collusion is suspected. The success rate of the RUC in charging people for these murders is nil. That must be the worst statistic for vigorous investigation of any police force in the world. The murders of Catholics by loyalists in the Craigavon region and the absence of prosecutions there tells a similar story.
Add to these deaths the killings by the SAS, an assassination squad acting outside the law and the vulgarity of praise bestowed on them by government ministers for their bloody deeds.
Public opinion should call on the British government as a democratic right to have the law changed so that the Deputy for Public Prosecutions should give his reasons for his decisions not to prosecute in cases of disputed killings. We must be able to see behind the scenes what is going on. This is a matter of charity, truth and justice so that we can bring peace to our country.
The serious problem that the police force in Northern Ireland is drawn from only one section of the community must be faced. London and Dublin should set about setting up a second level police force which will also draw from the nationalist community; it is up to them to work out a solution to the complexities involved.
In the absence of fair play at home we must seek international help on the occasion of every fatal shooting carried out by the security forces. In that line the Cullyhanna community has to be commended for bringing Fergal Caraher’s death to the attention of the world. Their new-found expertise will be welcomed in other areas of the north. Furthermore we must encourage the non-governmental human rights’ bodies to set up teams of experts – legal, medical and forensic who will fly quickly to emergency situations here and give immediate help to local communities in their investigations, since they have no trust that the RUC vigorously and urgently carry out investigations into the shootings of people by the security forces.
The system of coroners’ inquests must be urgently reformed. They are unfair. Bereaved relatives are denied elementary standards of justice. The families should have access to legal aid to secure proper legal representation. They are unable to penetrate the veil of secrecy surrounding information on how their loved ones came to die. Because the outcome can influence subsequent civil or criminal proceedings the government authorities make sure they have a strong legal team. The dice is loaded against the relatives. A campaign to reform the system of inquests is necessary in the name of justice so that the public can have an idea for themselves that proper investigations are taking place and chances of a cover-up can be avoided. For bereaved families inquests in the north of Ireland lead to distrust and give minimum satisfaction.
This is an extract from the pamphlet Collusion 1990–1994: Loyalist Paramilitary Murders in North of Ireland published by Relatives for Justice, 1995. It lists murders committed by loyalist paramilitaries 1990–1994 and specifies those caused by South African weaponry.
For twenty-five years the counter-insurgency methods of the British government in Northern Ireland has involved a Shoot-to-Kill policy, in direct ambushes when both innocent victims and suspects have been shot dead without warning, and in a sinister indirect campaign of murder which involves manipulation of loyalist paramilitaries who are provided with security information and who then kill with the knowledge that they are free from prosecution. This policy is pursued by small groups of RUC personnel and British army and the secret intelligence network of MI5 and MI6. A section of the Northern Ireland administration is aware of this policy, protects it by withholding information, insincere cosmetic investigation, non-prosecution and curbing of inquests. The families and friends of the victims not only suffer the insult of cover-up and lies but they often become targets for harassment and abuse from the British army and the RUC. They seek redress in publicising the truth to the world and will not cease to bring their grievances before governments and international human rights’ bodies.
This Shoot-to-Kill policy has already been outlined in The SAS in Ireland 1969–1989 (Raymond Murray) and in a pamphlet entitled State Killings (Raymond Murray) published by Relatives for Justice. The policy became a virtual campaign in the 1980s.
From the time of Sam Marshall’s death in Lurgan on 7 March 1990 until John O’Hanlon’s death on 1 September 1994, loyalist paramilitaries have killed 185 people (3 others not in these figures were killed by an RUC member in a Sinn Féin office in Belfast in 1992). Of the 185 killings 168 of them were sectarian or political in motive. The remaining 17 deaths were internal and non-sectarian. There were also over 300 attempted killings and other attacks during the same period. In 103 of the sectarian/political type killings there is evidence of some form of collusion between loyalist paramilitaries and the security forces.
The RUC informed some of the victims that their personal details, contained in official British Intelligence files, were in the hands of loyalist paramilitaries. Some victims were killed by loyalist gangs with members of the security forces in their ranks. Some were killed by weapons reportedly stolen from members of the security forces before their deaths. Some were killed by weaponry acquired by loyalist paramilitaries with the assistance of a number of British Intelligence agents, Brian Nelson being the best known of these. Nelson, when he appeared in court in January 1992, was suspected to have played a vital role in 10 murders and the targeting of a further 16 people who were later murdered or wounded. An apparent deal was made and he was convicted of less serious offences.
Brian Nelson received a 10-year sentence in February 1992 for his role in loyalist violence. He was a British military agent. He was also the UDA’s intelligence officer, responsible for setting up people to be killed. He had unlimited access to security forces intelligence documents on nationalists and republicans. Such information was supplied to the UDA by himself or by security forces sympathetic to loyalist paramilitaries. The effects of Nelson’s work in refining the UDA’s intelligence department is still being felt.
‘The legacy is that since Nelson’s arrest another 6 people have been killed and 3 injured. These people’s names were among the 369 found in Nelson’s possession at the time of his arrest’. (BBC Panorama Programme The Dirty War 1992.)
The role of Nelson and other British agents in assisting loyalist paramilitaries to acquire an arms shipment from South Africa has had a great impact on loyalist violence. The significance of the South African weaponry to loyalist death squads, and how they acquired it, was exposed in a report on BBC’s Insight Ulster on 28 January 1993. British intelligence services alleged a breakdown of their own intelligence and surveillance. The shipment, it was reported, had been monitored by British Intelligence from South Africa to the north of Ireland, but a breakdown occurred when it arrived and they lost trace of it. The report pointed out how the South African weapons have enhanced the killing capacity of loyalist paramilitaries, revealing that before the arrival of such sophisticated weapons loyalist killers were more likely to have used home-made machine-guns, sawn-off shotguns and old revolvers.
The murders in Cappagh, at the mobile shop in Craigavon, the Hyster factory in Lurgan, the Ormeau Road and Oldpark ‘bookies’, and Castlerock, the pub massacres at Greysteel and Loughinisland, were all carried out by loyalists using weaponry imported from South Africa. They also used them in many individual killings. In fact from the Milltown killings in March 1988 to the slaughter of six men watching a football match on television in a public house at Loughinisland, County Down, in June 1994, all loyalist multiple killings have been carried out with South African weaponry.
Note the following comparison. In the six years before the arrival of these weapons, from January 1982 to December 1987, loyalist paramilitaries murdered 71 people of whom 49 were sectarian/political. In the six years following, from January 1988 to 1 September 1994, loyalists murdered 229 people, of whom 207 were sectarian/political.
Brian Nelson was arrested in January 1990, following the investigation of Cambridgeshire Chief Constable John Stevens into the leaking of security forces’ intelligence files. The UFF had boasted that they used security forces’ intelligence files in the murder of Loughlin Maginn in August 1989. Stevens ended his inquiry in May 1990. In his report he was able to conclude ‘that members of the security forces have passed on information to paramilitaries’ and that ‘there was no organised campaign of leaks’.
But, if his recommendations were introduced, he said, ‘then there is every hope that future collusion between the security forces and paramilitary groups will be eradicated’.
Among the 83 recommendations of John Stevens were the blurring of copies of files when files were photocopied and a system to identify user access to computer records on suspects. Amnesty International in a statement following the release of people charged with possession of leaked files in October 1990 said, ‘It is obvious from all the evidence that collusion remains a fact of life and that the government is not prepared to confront it’.
The belief of Amnesty International that the Stevens inquiry was a failure can be seen in the continuing evidence of security forces’ intelligence files going missing and ending up in the hands of loyalist paramilitaries.
The continuing flow of security forces’ intelligence files to loyalist paramilitaries led to the return of (now Northumbria) Chief Constable John Stevens to Northern Ireland in August 1993. As in September 1989, the content of his investigation was not disclosed. A report on the second investigation was sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in February 1994. In July 1994 the DPP asked Mr Stevens to make further inquiries. The DPP’s request, it was reported, was made following an examination of the findings of Mr Stevens’ recent inquiry. To date there has been no indication of charges being brought.
Amnesty International in reports published in 1993 and 1994 again criticised the British government and the RUC for their handling of the collusion issue and for their failure to establish an independent inquiry.
The Nelson case focused on another suspicion of the nationalist community, namely, that British troops patrolling nationalist areas have had on occasions a role in loyalist attacks. In the murders of Gerard Slane and Terence McDaid in 1988, both of whom were set up by Nelson, relatives claimed there was suspicious activity by the security forces near their homes prior to the loyalist attacks. Gerard Slane’s home was raided by the security forces two weeks before his death. Both families believed the activity of the security forces was a reconnaissance in preparation for the loyalist killings.
The most common accusations of collusion concern the removal of checkpoints, some of which were in place before loyalist attacks. Some areas where loyalist attacks have taken place have witnessed saturation levels of security forces patrolling and searching prior to attacks. The suspicion of collusion was supported in January 1993 by remarks made by their commanding officer in the north, Sir John Wilsey. When asked what was his attitude to employing agents like Nelson and the morality thereof, he replied that he was ‘certainly not ashamed of Nelson’s role’.
Information and weaponry are not the only forms of collusion between the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries. During the period covered by this article, 51 serving and former security forces’ members were charged or convicted of terrorist-related offences ranging from illegal possession of arms to murder.
Political and clerical leaders in the Catholic community and their local press have criticised the security forces’ lack of response to appeals for adequate protection. Loyalist death squads have used the same routes again and again to enter nationalist areas and to flee after murders. Lanark Way off the Springfield Road in west Belfast was opened in the summer of 1986 and, despite it being used as an escape route by loyalists in eight murders and numerous attempted killings, it was not closed until the murder of Philomena Hanna in April 1992. She was the ninth victim of loyalist violence. North Howard Street, Rosapenna Street and the Donegall Road are other examples where persistent pleas for closure of thoroughfares used by loyalist death squads have been ignored.
A recent example of security forces ignoring requests by Catholics for protection occurred on the night of 27 April 1994 in west Belfast. Paul Thompson and a friend were in a car and were making a U-turn at the bottom of Springfield Park, which is a cul de sac. Unknown to both men, loyalist gunmen had gained access to the street through a hole in the pallisade fencing which was part of the ‘peace line’. The gunmen opened fire on the vehicle killing Paul Thompson and wounding his friend who saved his life by driving away. One of the first on the scene was a woman resident of Springfield Park. She had noticed the hole in the fencing earlier that day and, realising the danger (there had been at least 16 murder attempts in the Upper Springfield Road area in the previous three and a half years), telephoned the RUC and the Northern Ireland Office immediately. She was told by those who received the calls that the matter would be looked into and resolved as soon as possible. But the fence was neither repaired nor security in the area increased. Several hours after her plea, as she stood at the front door, she witnessed what she feared might happen, the murder of an innocent person.
This inadequacy of the security forces in protecting nationalists was revealed again in the failure of British army and RUC bases, despite sophisticated surveillance equipment, to detect, deter or arrest loyalist murder gangs. The murders of Sam Marshall in Lurgan and Thomas Hughes, Martin O’Prey, James Carson, Kieran Abrams, Joseph McCloskey and Seán Monaghan in Belfast, are examples where the gangs responsible could have been observed by security forces in their bases. There are other examples of this situation in a number of attempted killings.
Another persistent complaint of nationalists concerns the failure of the security forces to respond promptly to some killings and attempted killings by loyalists. When they arrive on the scene their reaction has been misdirected. It is often nationalist areas which feel the brunt of follow-up operations rather than the areas to which the killers escaped. There have been murders and attempted murders where there have been no follow-up operations. Relatives and friends of the victims of loyalist violence have complained about the bad behaviour of security forces arriving in the aftermath of a murder or attempted murder. Their conduct at the scene of the Sinn Féin office killings, the Peter McTasney killing in Bawnmore estate, the Seán Anderson murder near Pomeroy, and the murder of Theresa Clinton in Belfast was insulting and oppressive. Funerals of some of the victims of loyalist violence have been disrupted by an undue heavy force of RUC and British army presence either around the family home while the body was waked or at church and graveyard. Mourners have been stopped, searched and on occasions abused. Mourners at the funerals of Thomas Donaghy, Kilrea, Kevin McKearney, Moy, and Conor Maguire and Mark Rodgers in Belfast were severely harassed.
RUC forensic teams investigating killings and attempted killings have sometimes failed to remove all relevant material from the scene of the incident. The bag, with spent shells inside, used by the RUC member who murdered three people in the Sinn Féin office on the Falls Road, was found in the office after the forensic team left the scene. Similarly, after the forensic team left the home of teenager Gerard O’Hara, having spent a number of hours in the house, bullets fired by the gunmen were found in the living-room where the young man was killed. One of the bullets had blood on it.
RUC forensic teams have been reluctant to disclose the ballistic history of weapons used by loyalists. In the mid-Ulster and north Armagh areas demands for this information by nationalist politicians and others have been ignored. When information has been released, it has tended to be general rather than specific. For example, following the murder of four men in Cappagh, County Tyrone, on 3 March 1991, the RUC confirmed that the weapons had been used before in seven killings in two years in the Lurgan, Stewartstown and Cookstown areas, but they did not specify which killings. ‘It is not our policy to give the history of firearms for evidential reasons’ was how an RUC spokesman responded to a demand for information on the weapons used to kill Tommy Casey in October 1990 near Cookstown. This attitude contrasts with the release of the ballistic history of weapons used by republican groups. The most recent example followed the shooting of Jimmy Brown in Belfast by the IPLO in August 1992. Within hours of his death the media had a full record of the weapon used to kill Brown and previous victims.
Catholic complaints about the British army and the RUC in regard to their attitude to loyalist violence may be summarised as follows:
1. Failure to respond to nationalist demands for protection.
2. How do RUC and British army bases fail to detect or deter loyalist murder gangs when they enter Catholic areas since they are equipped with sophisticated surveillance apparatus?
3. The response of the RUC after loyalist attacks is slow and complacent.
4. Injury is added to injury when the RUC and British army oppress Catholic areas following loyalist attacks. They do not direct their attention to the areas into which the loyalists have escaped.
5. There have been incidents when there have been no follow-up operation of the RUC.
6. British army and RUC have sometimes insulted and abused the families of the victims and have beaten and insulted mourners at funerals of their murdered relatives even when the funerals have had no paramilitary trappings.
7. RUC forensic teams have been wilfully negligent or incompetent in gathering evidence at the scene of murders carried out by loyalists paramilitaries.
8. The RUC is selective in releasing ballistic information in regard to killings. Prior to court cases it releases the history of weapons used by republican paramilitaries but withholds such information in regard to loyalist paramilitaries and of course state forces.
On 20 March 1998 investigative journalists John Ware and Geoff Seed, with Alasdair Palmer, published an article in The Sunday Telegraph unveiling documntary evidence that the British army colluded in murder with Brian Nelson. They called it assassination by proxy. A combination of Nelson’s diaries and the British army’s records show in their estimation that Nelson was involved in 15 murders, 15 attempted murders and 62 conspiracies to murder. Secret files provide evidence that the British army’s Force Research Unit (FRU), a branch of Military Intelligence responsible for running agents in Northern Ireland, was associated with murders carried out by the UDA between 1987 and 1990. The documents are secret records of meetings between FRU and Nelson, commonly known as ‘contact records’. The theme of the article is that British army handlers planted Nelson in the UDA, provided him with detailed profiles of republicans, and directed him to refine the UDA’s wide target of ‘any Catholic will do’ to ‘taking out’ republicans. This was a return to the tactics of the 1970s when army intelligence under the name of the Military Reaction Force had recruited ‘pseudo gangs’ to assasinate ‘republicans’. The return to such a risky course of action followed the thwarting of the ‘Shoot-to-Kill’ policy by the Stalker report. The journalists claim that Nelson was paid £28,000 a year by the British army. In the article they highlighted the attempted murder of Alex Maskey, Sinn Féin councillor, and the murders of Gerard Slane at 4.15am on 23 September 1988 and of Terence McDaid on 10 May 1998. Nelson organised and planned Slane’s murder, providing the assassins with his address, picture and logistics of surveillance. Slane was suspected by the UDA of having links with a republican paramilitary group. The evidence was flimsy. Nelson checked out Slane’s photograph with people who witnessed the murder of a UDA associate, William Quee. Two of these said he might have been the gunman but they were not sure. This was one of the killings which prompted Nelson’s British army handler to write, ‘his targeting information is already of a high quality and recent attacks have proved this accurate’.
Nelson also suggested Declan McDaid as a target to a UDA assassin called ‘Winkie’ Dodds. He believed he had a republican link. He provided Dodds with a photograph but mistakenly gave the address of McDaid’s brother Terence. The UDA murdered Terence McDaid who had absolutely no association with the IRA. The army handler placated Nelson when he discovered his mistake by telling him that Terence McDaid had been ‘traced as Provisional IRA.’
The journalists expand on Nelson’s background. he was born in 1947 and grew up on the Shankill Road, Belfast. He joined the Black Watch regiment when he was seventeen. Within five years he was discharged, officially on medical grounds but, as they say, ‘he had been absent without leave and was known to be wild and reckless’. He joined the UDA in the early 1970s. He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment in 1974 after his conviction of kidnapping and torturing a partially-sighted Catholic. After his imprisonment he rejoined the UDA but at the same time offered to work for British army Intelligence. He went to work in Germany in 1985 after being involved in shootings. In 1987 Colonel J of the Force Research Unit asked him to return. he was then planted in the UDA once more to target IRA activists. Naturally he became their chief intelligence officer since he had access to security files. The journalists speculate that there had been a ‘battle between the army and M15 as to who was to secure his services’. Of course M15 was fully aware of Nelson’s trip to South Africa to ship arms to the loyalists in January 1988.
In 1992 the BBC Panorama team in a programme drew on a 90,000 word account which Nelson wrote on his work for the military Force Research Unit.
It was the UDA themselves who laid Nelson open to discovery when they could not resist boasting of the excellence of their intelligence following the murder of Loughlin Maginn at his home in Rathfriland, County Down, on 25 August 1989. They published a confidential security force file on Maginn. Public opinion forced the RUC to hold an inquiry. It was led by the Deputy Chief Constable in Cambridgeshire, John Stevens. The army warned Nelson not to reveal to the inquiry that he worked for them. They called in Nelson’s entire collection of intelligence ‘P cards’ which they had helped to compile lest he should hand them over to the inquiry. Stevens first report concluded that the leakage of intelligence was occasional material available to every policeman and soldier. Then Nelson’s fingerprints, traceable from his criminal records, were found on confiscated leaked documents. The inquiry team planned to arrest him on 11 January 1990. Nelson, obviously tipped off, fled to England the evening before. That same night, by an extraordinary coincidence, many of the inquiry team’s statements and documents were destroyed by fire in their office within a secure area of Carrickfergus RUC complex. On his return to Belfast, Nelson was arrested. he revealed that he was an army agent. It was only when Stevens’s deputy, Detective Chief Superintendent Vincent McFadden, threatened to arrest senior army officers on a charge of obstruction of justice that the ‘Contact Forms’ written by Nelson’s handlers were handed over. Colonel J, head of FRU, told the inquiry that the policy was to use Nelson to persuade the UDA to target republicans rather than just Catholics. He indicated that the protracted time it would take the UDA to gain intelligence could give the army enough time to warn the RUC Special Branch who was at risk and thus save lives. 730 intelligence reports, he said, which identified threats to 217 individuals, had been passed to the RUC. The RUC denied the value of this information. One Special Branch superintendent testified that, ‘I have been asked if I can name an individual whose life was saved as a result of Nelson’s information and I cannot’. Special Branch officers testified that only two cases received from FRU were specific enough to anticipate an attack and put preventive measures into action. One of these intended victims was Gerry Adams. Notes of Nelson’s army handlers show that in at least 92 cases FRU knew who the UDA was going to murder.
The Stevens team compiled a second report. It was never published. John Ware and his associates wrote, ‘In that report, it set out the evidence that the army’s Force Research Unit had colluded with the UDA in targeting members of the Provisional IRa. The file was passed to the DPP, Northern Ireland. In consultation with Sir Patrick Mayhew, then the attorney general, it was decided not to prosecute Colonel J or any of Nelson’s army handlers: only Brian Nelson was to be charged. In the event, there was no trial. Nelson was persuaded to plead guilty to five charges of conspiracy to muder. In a hearing in 1992 before a judge on the length of his sentence, Colonel J once again stressed that he believed that Nelson’s intelligence had enabled his unit to pass on to Special Branch reports that identified 217 individuals. The judge at the hearing accepted this. In sentencing Nelson he said that he gave special weight to the fact that he passed on what was possibly life-saving information in respect of 217 individuals.
Nelson was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. He was released in 1997. The article continues, ‘(He) is now believed to be living with financial assistance from the army. But his legacy continues. Nelson distributed his “P” cards to several other Protestant paramilitary groups, which may have used them in the planning of assassinations. Colonel J was awarded the OBE. Some of Nelson’s handlers have been promoted and given medals. One went on to give lectures on “agent handling” to Military Intelligence.’
The Sunday Telegraph says that the Force Research Unit, set up for the sole purpose of running agents in Northern Ireland, had no authority to mount such an operation. It consisted of around 50 officers and soldiers and ran more than 100 agents. It was disbanded in 1990 after Stevens’ second report. It suggests that it was reconstituted under another name.
The editorial in the paper on 29 March 1998 was critical of the British army ‘No less than the police or the judiciary in Northern Ireland, the army has always been expected to observe the due process of law: soldiers face trial for murder if they fail to follow the procedures laid down for the lawful use of lethal force. Indeed, it is this belief in legality which has helped draw a completely unambiguous distinction between the necessary use of force by soldiers and the murderous violence of the terrorist gangs. It is this basic distinction which army intelligence jeopardised by colluding with loyalist paramilitaries and taking sides in the conflict. Those officers involved demeaned the moral authority of the crown. Their defence was little more than a moral fig-leaf: that, since the UDA was going to kill people anyway, it should kill identifiable republican terrorists, rather than randomly selected Catholics. But even judged by their own supposedly military criteria, Nelson’s handlers failed abysmally.’
The consignment of illegal weapons that British agents and UDA Intelligence Officer, Brian Nelson, had been instrumental in acquiring from South Africa arrived in the north of Ireland in January 1988. It consisted of 200 AK47 automatic rifles, 90 Browning 9mm pistols, c.500 fragmentation grenades, 30,000 rounds of ammunition, a dozen ROG7 rocket launchers and an unknown number of warheads. Because of Nelson’s position within the UDA, he also knew the storage locations of the weapons. On 8 January 1988, 60 AK 47 automatic rifles, 31 pistols, 150 grenades and 11,000 rounds of ammunition were recovered near Tandragee from the UDA. On 5 February 1988, 38 automatic rifles, 15 pistols, 100 grenades, one RPG7 rocket launcher, 26 warheads and 40,000 rounds of ammunition were recovered on the northern outskirts of Belfast from the UVF.
Since 1988, over 30 AK47 rifles, 3 RPG7 rocket launchers and a number of grenades have been recovered in other finds, including some from the Ulster Resistance Movement. Some of these weapons had already been used by loyalists to kill nationalists. Loyalist paramilitaries, therefore, still possess a significant amount of the initial consignment. BBC’s Insight Ulster programme on 28 January 1993, dealing with the South African weapon consignment, reported that British Intelligence services attributed the fact that loyalist paramilitaries had received the weapons to a breakdown of their own intelligence and surveillance services. The weapons shipment, the report continued, had been monitored by British Intelligence from South Africa to the north of Ireland, but a breakdown occurred when it arrived in the north. They lost trace of it.
Speakers from South Africa made a deep impression on the delegates at a conference held in Belfast, 6–8 June 1995, entitled Reconciliation and Community: The Future of Peace in Northern Ireland. Members of Relatives for Justice held discussions with Mr Dullah Omar, the South African Justice Minister during his visit. Mr Peter Madden, legal representative of Relatives for Justice, travelled to South Africa in June 1995 to present a submission on their behalf to the Cameron Commission on arms trade. I went to South Africa in November 1995 and met with Dr Alex Boraine, Justice in Transition Minister, to seek details of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and explore the possibility of the murders from South African weaponry in Northern Ireland being included also under that commission. Mr Martin Finucane followed up the South African contacts with a visit to South Africa in March 1998.
The Relatives for Justice submission was made at the same time as a Sinn Féin submission presented by Brian Currin (Lawyers for Human Rights) and Gregg Nott (Bell Dewyer and Hall, Johannesburg). The submissions were made in week two of the hearings which related specifically to ‘procedures’ which were under consideration for application to any future domestic arms trade policy which might be introduced by the government. The submissions were well received. Both were the only submissions from outside the country made orally.
The use of South African arms by loyalists in Northern Ireland to murder Catholics between 1988 and 1994 was sanctioned by the British government.
The pamphlet Collusion 1990–1994: Loyalist Paramilitary Murders in the North of Ireland contained a list of killings that can be attributed to imported weaponry from South Africa. I am indebted to Arthur Fegan for his research.
Submission to Cameron Enquiry into Alleged Arms Transactions between Armscor and one Eli Wazan and other related matters appointed by President Mandela on 14 October 1994.
The submission is made by a number of families of those persons who were murdered by weapons allegedly shipped from South Africa to Northern Ireland by loyalists in 1988.
We are concerned that the 1988 shipment may have been only the first of a number of shipments made and that further shipments may have been made between 1988 and 1994 (See our pamphlet Collusion 1990–1994 enclosed herewith). Details of arms shipments from South Africa to Northern Ireland were disclosed by several investigative journalists. Shortly after the weapons arrived in Northern Ireland in 1988 there was a clear upsurge in the use of weapons allegedly supplied from South Africa.
According to the investigative journalist Ed Moloney of the Dublin-based newspaper The Sunday Tribune, Brian Nelson, a British soldier working undercover in Northern Ireland, established links in 1985 with South Africa to set up an arms deal involving the purchase and shipment of a large supply of arms and ammunition for use in the murders of Catholics in Northern Ireland.
At the time Nelson was both a member of the British army under direct command of an officer of colonel rank and a senior intelligence officer in the UDA (Ulster Defence Association, the main loyalist group) [see The Sunday Tribune 26 January 1992].
A plan to forge links with loyalists and the South African government was established in order to transport weaponry originating from Armscor to loyalists in exchange for missile technology from the north of Ireland. The plan was that the South African government would obtain the technology for use in its wars with neighbouring African states and the loyalists would receive an arms arsenal of modern weaponry for its war against the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and the republican movement and for its ongoing terrorist campaign against the general Catholic population in Northern Ireland. It is suspected that, since the British government could not be seen to supply the loyalist groups directly, they used the South African arms industry and its international arms dealing policy to sanction the supplies of weapons to loyalist groups in Northern Ireland.
In April 1989 three loyalists and a South African government official were arrested in Paris along with an international arms dealer. It was alleged in the press that they were all involved in a conspiracy to exchange missile technology being developed in Belfast for arms shipments from South Africa. As a result of this, it is our concern that arms shipments were made subsequent to 1988.
In September 1989, as a result of a public outcry about collusion between British security forces and the loyalists, the British government set up an enquiry into collusion headed by John Stevens who was then deputy chief constable of the Cambridge constabulary. Stevens submitted a report of which only a part was made public.
Nelson was arrested in Belfast in January 1990 by police officers working for Stevens and was charged with the murder of Catholics and plotting to murder political opponents of the British government.
Two investigative journalists, John Ware and Geoffrey Seed, revealed that Nelson had spoken to them before and after his arrest. Both journalists obtained a ‘jail diary’ from Nelson and spoke to him at length about his role as a member of the British army and as a member of the UDA group responsible for hundreds of murders in the north of Ireland. Ware and Seed produced the BBC Panorama programme on collusion which was broadcast in February 1990, after Nelson’s arrest but researched in 1989.
Ware and Seed wrote an article for the London newspaper The Independent in January 1992, shortly before Nelson’s trial, in which they indicated that Nelson would disclose his actual role as both British soldier and UDA intelligence officer as part of his defence (see The Independent 9 January 1992).
At Nelson’s trial in Belfast, in February 1992, he plea-bargained a ten-year prison sentence in return for the dropping of the murder charges. A plea in mitigation was entered and it was not necessary for him to give evidence. It was admitted by the British attorney general’s counsel that Nelson was an important link between the British army and the UDA, since he was a member of both organisations at the same time.
It was further admitted that he was responsible for the selection and targeting of republicans and Catholics but had not supplied information to his superiors about many of the plots. This formed the substance of the charges against him.
The British attorney general, through the British army colonel who was Nelson’s superior officer and who was called as a witness at his trial, attempted to convince the court and the public that Nelson’s role was one of supplying information to his superiors so that steps could be taken to save lives. But Nelson’s role, both as undercover soldier and UDA intelligence officer, raised suspicions in Northern Ireland that he was not put in place in Northern Ireland by the British authorities to prevent murders of Catholics by the UDA but to set up and murder those persons who were considered enemies of the state by the British. The use of the UDA to murder military and political opponents of the British as well as random Catholics in a reign of terror was a clever tactic which made it difficult to blame the British directly for the murders. No documentary evidence was presented to the court to prove that Nelson’s role was benevolent.
Nelson was responsible for the murder of Patrick Finucane, a leading civil rights lawyer in Northern Ireland. Patrick Finucane was shot dead by the UDA in February 1989. He was murdered with a British army owned Browning pistol.
Pat Finucane represented many people who had been bereaved as a result of the use of lethal force by the British security forces. He also represented the families of those persons murdered by loyalists where there was evidence of collusion. He represented many families who are members of Relatives for Justice and who instructed him to get redress from the British government. He represented families at inquests and initiated legal proceedings to recover compensation for the bereaved families. He attempted to get the truth surrounding the murders of many people who were murdered by loyalists where there was widespread belief that the RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary) were colluding in those murders by supplying information and arranging safe passage for the loyalist assassins. He also represented the families of many people who were murdered directly by the British security forces.
For upwards of a year before his murder members of the RUC threatened that he would be shot dead by loyalists.
Three weeks before Patrick Finucane’s murder, the British government minister Douglas Hogg said in the British House of Commons on 17 January 1989: ‘there are in Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA’ and he went on to say ... ‘I state it on the basis of advice that I have received, guidance that I have been given by people who are dealing in these matters ...’
Nelson detailed his involvement in the murder of Patrick Finucane at his trial and gave more details to Ware and Seed.
It is suspected by many people in Ireland and abroad that Patrick Finucane was murdered on the direct order of the British government and that the order was conveyed to Brian Nelson who carried it out.
The British government has so far refused to hold an enquiry into the death of Patrick Finucane even though they have been accused of complicity and a large number of distinguished individuals and organisations have called for a full judicial enquiry into his death. (See the report of the New York based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal Defence in Northern Ireland: The Intimidation of Defence Lawyers, The Murder of Pat Finucane).
As far as the remit of your enquiry is concerned we would ask you to investigate the area relating to arms shipments from South Africa, particularly those shipments having their origin at Armscor for the period 1988 to date.
We suggest that there is at least a prima facie case that arms from South Africa were used to murder Catholics in Northern Ireland from at least 1988 and that there may be a current arrangement to supply arms whenever required by loyalists. Catholics have been murdered by these weapons as lately as 1994.
There are a number of lines of enquiry which we suggest could be initiated in South Africa:
1. Enquiries could be made to determine if Brian Nelson entered South Africa in 1985 or at any time between then and 1990. Were there any official or unofficial contacts with him by the South African authorities? Was his visit to South Africa the subject of South African government surveillance? Is there any official record of his visit?
2. The records of arms shipments in 1988 could be checked to determine if a shipment similar to that described by Mr Moloney in The Sunday Tribune left South Africa during that year for any destination, i.e., 200 AK47 rifles, scores of Browning pistols, 500 splinter grenades, rocket launchers and tens of thousands of bullets.
3. Enquiries could be made about the persons named in the Sinn Féin pamphlet Brian Nelson & the Re-arming of the Loyalist Death Squads (enclosed herewith) as to their alleged role in the affair.
There are a number of lines of enquiry which could be initiated in Northern Ireland and Britain:
1. The British government authorities could be asked for details of all weaponry captured or used in attacks against Catholics which have a South African origin or which fit the description of the weapons described by Mr Moloney. Even weapons of a foreign manufacture could have been purchased in South Africa. Those details will be retained by the RUC.
2. British government documents could be supplied to your commission to determine the extent of the connection between Brian Nelson and his role in the South African arms shipments from military documents from his superior officers.
3. The RUC could be directed to supply your enquiry with ballistics and other forensic reports in certain specific cases (see Collusion 1980–1994 by Relatives for Justice enclosed herewith).
4. Those parts of the secret Stevens report which relate to a South African connection between loyalist collusion with British security forces and the South African arms suppliers could be revealed to your enquiry.
5. The families of those murdered by South African weaponry could be consulted to obtain more detail of inquest and other court documents.
6. The journalists who have reported on the affair could be consulted to obtain further details and any documents in their possession could be examined.
Court records in Belfast and Paris could be inspected to determine the extent of the conspiracy. We are asking that your commission carry out a proper detailed investigation into this very serious matter in an attempt to bring those involved to justice and to set up procedures to ensure that there are safeguards in place to prevent as far as possible a recurrence of any link between South African arms and the murder of Catholics in Northern Ireland.
We think that we are entitled to enquire if arms from your country were used to murder our loved ones. We think we are entitled to know if the British government through Brian Nelson was involved either directly or indirectly in those murders.
We are confident that with the new spirit of truth and reconciliation which now prevails in South Africa that our submission will not go unheard. We too are part of a country in transition. We seek the truth in these matter so that no one, not even those in high places in sovereign governments, can escape liability for human rights abuses. Only when all parties to a conflict can accept their own share of responsibility for that conflict, can true healing and lasting reconciliation take place.
Representatives of the Relatives for Justice are willing to attend any hearing in South Africa to expand on this submission if necessary and to meet any members of your commission which may travel to Northern Ireland if it is considered necessary to gather evidence material to the investigation.
Enclosed with this submission:
1. Human Rights and Legal Defence in Northern Ireland: The Intimidation of Defence Lawyers, The Murder of Pat Finucane: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (New York).
2. Collusion 1990–1994, Relatives for Justice.
3. Brian Nelson & the Re-arming of the Loyalist Death Squads (Sinn Féin, Belfast).
4. The Independent, extract 9 January 1992.
5. The Sunday Tribune, extract 26 January 1992.
6. The Sunday Tribune, extract 9 February 1992.
We understand that a hearing into proposed procedures for the implementation of government policy in relation to international arms dealings will be held in Capetown later this month.
We refer specifically to page 10 of our previous submission sent on 5 June 1995.
We cannot and would not attempt to dictate policy to the South African government in relation to any of its affairs.
We express no view as to the moral or ethical questions arising from the manufacture and international trade in arms.
We are only concerned to ensure that innocent people are not murdered due to the unlawful purchase and transportation of those arms.
There is a widespread belief in Northern Ireland and beyond that South African arms have been used in the past to murder innocent people in Northern Ireland. We have set this out in our first submission. Although there is at present a cease-fire in force in our country, no proper negotiations have yet taken place between the parties to our conflict. The weapons referred to in our first submission remain in the hands of loyalist armed groups. We are hopeful that the question of removing these and all other weapons from those involved in the conflict will be addressed in future negotiations.
If there is any basis for our belief that the arms in question originated in South Africa, and that may be a matter for investigation or enquiry under a different remit, then we would implore the South African government to establish safeguards to ensure that arms transactions are conducted according to law and that international standards are applied.
We know that you are in a period of transition and that you have a difficult task to perform, but we only want to ensure that our people are protected in any future policy which may be implemented by your government.
We know that the majority of your people deplore the use of South African arms for the murder of innocent people.
We know that you are aware, as we are, that those who have no regard for the law or for the right of a people to live in peace without threat will ride roughshod over constitutions, laws, regulations and procedures to accommodate their own political expediency and they will find weaknesses in any system of control or supervision.
It is for that reason that we ask that particular care is taken to ensure that procedures will be established which will prevent as much as possible any future unauthorised transactions by unauthorised persons. We ask that such weaponry, if sold and transported, is carefully regulated and monitored to ensure that it arrives at their authorised destination and that proper identifying marks are applied to ensure that if allegations of improper dealings are made, then meaningful enquiries can be undertaken to establish the validity of any such allegations.
We know that our plea will not go unheard by your people and we wish you well in your very difficult task of formulating policies which accommodate the views of all your people and which must also comply with the basic requirements of human rights so that a harmonious and peaceful society emerges.
From January 1988 until 13 October 1994, the date of the loyalist paramilitaries’ ceasefire, loyalist death squads have carried out 207 sectarian murders.
The following list of fatalities are some of the killings that can be attributed to weaponry imported from South Africa.
16 March 1988. Thomas McErlean (20), John Murray (26), and Caoimhín Mac Brádaigh (30). Milltown Cemetery, Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistols and grenades. UDA/UFF.
15 May 1988. Damian Devlin (24), Paul McBride (27), Stephen McGahon (27). Shot in pub, Union Street, Belfast. AK47 rifles. UVF.
25 July 1988. Brendan Davison (33). In his home, Markets, Belfast. AK47 rifles. UVF.
8 August 1988. Séamas Morris (18) and Peter Dolan (25). On street, Ardoyne, Belfast. AK47 rifle. UVF.
24 November 1988. Phelim McNally (20). In brother’s home, Coagh, Co. Tyrone. AK47 rifle. UVF.
14 February 1989. John Davey (61). Near home, Gulladuff, Co. Derry. AK47. UVF.
10 March 1989. Jim McCartney (38). Springfield Road, Belfast. AK47. UVF.
19 March 1989. David Braniff (63). In home, Alliance Ave, Belfast. AK47. UVF.
29 November 1989. Liam Ryan (39), Michael Devlin (33). Public house, Ardboe, Co. Tyrone. AK47. UVF.
7 March 1990. Samuel Marshall (31). In Kilmaine Street, Lurgan, Co. Armagh. AK47. UVF.
25 April 1990. Brian McKimm (22). In Limehill Grove, Ligoniel, Belfast. AK47. UDA/ UFF.
4 June 1990. Patrick Boyle (60). In home, Annaghmore, Co. Armagh. AK47. UVF.
26 October 1990. Thomas Casey (60). Kildress, Cookstown, Co. Tyrone. AK47. UVF.
8 November 1990. Malachy McIvor (43). In garage, Stewartstown, Co. Tyrone. AK47. UVF.
5 January 1991. Gervase Lynch (26). In home, Magheralin, Co. Armagh. AK47. UVF.
27 January 1991. Seán Rafferty (44). In home, Rosapenna Court, Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistol. UDA/UFF.
3 March 1991. John Quinn (23), Dwayne O’Donnell (17), Malcolm Nugent (20), Thomas Armstrong (50). Cappagh, Co. Tyrone. AK47 rifles. UVF.
4 March 1991. Michael Lenaghan (46). Found shot in taxi, Heather Street, Shankill, Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistol. UVF.
28 March 1991. Eileen Duffy (19), Caitríona Rennie (16), Brian Frizelle (29). Near mobile shop, Craigavon, Co. Armagh. Browning 9 mm pistol. UVF.
17 April 1991. John O’Hara (41). In taxi, Dunluce Ave, off Lisburn Road, Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistol. UDA/ UFF.
25 May 1991. Eddie Fullerton (56). In home, Buncrana, Donegal. Browning 9 mm pistol. UDA/UFF.
12 August 1991. Pádraig Ó Seanacháin (33). In cab of van, Killen, Castlederg. AK47. UDA/UFF.
16 August 1991. Martin O’Prey (28). In home, Lower Falls, Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistols. UVF.
13 September 1991 Kevin Flood (31). In street, Ligoniel Road, Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistol. UVF.
25 October 1991. Seán Anderson (32). Near home, Pomeroy, Co. Tyrone. AK47 rifle. UVF.
14 November 1991. Desmond Rogers (54), Fergus Magee (28), John Lavery (27). Coming from work, Lurgan, Co. Armagh. AK47 rifle. UVF.
22 December 1991. Aidan Wallace. In public house, Finaghy Road North, Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistol. UDA/UFF.
3 January 1992. Kevin McKearney (32), killed, Jack McKearney (69), wounded. In shop, Moy, Co. Tyrone. Jack McKearney died of wounds 4 April 1992. Browning 9mm pistol. UVF.
9 January 1992. Philip Campbell (28). In mobile chip shop, Moira, Co. Down. Browning 9 mm pistol. UDA/UFF.
5 February 1992. Peter Magee (18), James Kennedy (15), Jack Duffin (66), William McManus (54), Christy Doherty (52). In betting shop, Ormeau Road, Belfast. AK47 rifle and Browning 9 mm pistol. UDA/UFF.
4 March 1992. James Gray (39). In cab of his lorry, Portadown. AK47 rifle. UVF.
29 March 1992. Terence McConville (43). In home, Barn Street, Portadown. Browning 9 mm pistol. UVF
29 April 1992. Conor Maguire (22). At work, Ligoniel, Belfast. AK47 rifle. UVF.
6 September 1992. Charlie Fox (63) and Theresa Fox (53). In home, Moy, Co. Tyrone. AK47 rifle, Browning 9 mm pistol. UVF.
27 September 1992. Gerard O’Hara (18). In home, North Queen Street, Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistol. UDA/UFF.
14 November 1992. John Lovett (72), Frank Burns (62), Peter Orderly (50). In betting shop, Oldpark, Belfast. AK47 rifle and grenades. UDA/UFF.
19 November 1992. Peter McCormack (42). In public house, Kilcoo, Castlewellan, Co. Down. Browning 9 mm pistol. UVF.
20 December 1992. Martin Lavery. In home, Upper Crumlin Road, Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistol. UVF.
3 January 1993. Patrick Shields (51) and Diarmuid Shields (20). In home near Dungannon. Browning 9 mm pistol. UVF.
28 January 1993. Martin McNamee (25). At work, Kildress, Cookstown, Co. Tyrone. Grenade booby trap. UVF.
11 February 1993 Thomas Molloy (32). In home, near Loughgall, Co. Armagh. AK47 rifle. UVF.
24 March 1993. Peter Gallagher (44). At work, Grosvenor Road, Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistol. UDA/UFF.
25 March 1993. James McKenna (52), James Kelly (25), Gerard Dalrymple (52), Noel O’Kane (20). At work, Castlerock, Co. Derry. Browning 9mm pistol. UDA/UFF.
25 March 1993. Damian Walsh (17). At work, Twinbrook, Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistols. UDA/UFF.
1 May 1993. Alan Lundy (39). In street, Andersonstown, Belfast. AK47 rifle. UDA/UFF.
2 June 1993 Brendan McKenna (29). In cab of lorry, near Comber, Co. Down. AK47 rifle. UDA/UFF.
8 August 1993. Seán Lavery (21). In home, Lr Antrim Road, Belfast. AK47 rifle. UDA/ UFF.
1 September 1993. James Bell (49). In street, Short Strand, Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistols. UVF.
12 October 1993. Joseph Reynolds (40). In workmen’s bus, east Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistols. UVF.
26 October 1993. James Cameron (54) and Mark Rodgers (58). Killed in place of work, Andersonstown, Belfast. AK47 rifle and Browning 9 mm pistol. UDA/UFF.
30 October 1993. James Moore (81), Karen Thompson (19), Steven Mullan (20), Joseph McDermott (60), Moira Duddy (59), John Moyne (50), John Burns (54), and from injuries received Samuel Montgomery (76) in April 1994. In public house, Greysteel, Co. Derry. AK47 rifle and Browning 9 mm pistol. UDA/UFF.
5 December 1993. Brian Duffy (15), John Todd (31). In taxi cab, Ligoniel, Belfast. AK47 and shot-gun. UDA/UFF.
14 April 1994. Theresa Clinton (33). In home, Lr Ormeau Road, Belfast. AK47 rifle. UDA/UFF.
26 April 1994. Joseph McCloskey (53). Killed in home, New Lodge Road, Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistols. UDA/UFF.
27 April 1994. Paul Thompson (25). In friend’s car, Springfield Park, Belfast. AK47 rifle. UDA/UFF.
8 May 1994. Rose Ann Mallon (70). In sister’s home near Dungannon. AK47 rifle. UVF.
17 May 1994. Éamon Fox (40), Gary Convey (24). At place of work, North Queen Street, Belfast. AK47 rifle. UVF.
17 June 1994. Cecil Dougherty (30), William Corrigan (32). At place of work, Rathcoole, Belfast. AK47 rifles. UDA/UFF
18 June 1994. Barney Greene (87), Éamon Byrne (39), Patrick O’Hare (35), Adrian Rogan (34), Don McCreaner (59), Malcolm Jenkinson (52). In public house, Loughinisland, Co. Down. AK47 rifles. UVF.
10 August 1994. Harry O’Neill (60). In place of work, off Castlereagh Road, Belfast. Browning 9 mm pistol.
There have also been many attempted killings using such weaponry which have resulted in serious injuries.
We are now in a period of transition, if we accept the permanency of the present cease-fires. Such transition has parallels in South American countries, South Africa and post-communist régimes.
The transition period here is called the peace process. It may be useful to accept that peace is founded on truth, justice and charity. Commissions for Truth were established with some success in some other countries during a period of transition. A Commission for Truth in a transition period must not delay in making investigations. It has to be independent and credible. It would demand considerable talent and resources. Secondly, will effective urgent investigations, prosecution and sentencing continue in the likelihood of an ‘amnesty’?
It will be in the interest of the three warring parties in the conflict, republicans, loyalists and the state, to draw a line through the violations of human rights of the past twenty-five years, including killings and murders. There will probably be a de facto undeclared amnesty. This will be connected with phased demilitarisation on all sides, the release of prisoners, no serious investigation or prosecution of those linked with killings in the past twenty-five years, the return to the north of those on the ‘wanted’ list, the delivering up of missing bodies. Immunity to further prosecution will include not only those responsible for casualties of war (members of state forces, paramilitaries and innocents caught in shootings and bombings) but also those who carried out blatant sectarian murders.
There is no hope, I think, of a powerful Commission for Truth unless it is agreed on by the Irish and British governments and the political parties who sit around the negotiation table. But paramilitaries and the state excuse the crimes they commit themselves – all maintain a high moral ground, the state, of course, the highest. It will be in the interest of all political sides to agree on an unspoken amnesty. A Commission for Truth goes against that.
Even though it is highly improbable that the negotiators will even contemplate such a commission, the proposal to set one up should be put in writing to the two governments and the proposal published. At least that establishes publicly the principle that concerned citizens do not want a cover-up. In the absence of a Commission for Truth, is there a substitute?
1. The very question of the necessity for the search for truth should at least be put before the public. The pursuit of truth re events of the last twenty-five years is something positive. Truth helps a peace process and has healing effects; in countries where this has not happened trauma remained and serious difficult political situations followed.
2. Justice and truth groups should attempt to put on record in the next few years the many violations of human rights that occurred here.
(a) In 1973 Penguin books published Political Murder in Northern Ireland by Martin Dillon and Denis Lehane. Malcolm Sutton has recently written An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland 1969–1993. It would be helpful to have a combination of the type of material in these two books, an expansion on the ‘index’ giving more details of the deaths and whether or not prosecutions took place. Besides information in newspapers, magazines, books already published and radio and television documentaries, there is a wealth of information to be gathered from the victims’ families, from living witnesses and from solicitors’ papers; if these sources are not tapped in the next few years, vital evidence will be lost.
(b) Individual books or in-depth studies on Bloody Sunday and many other killings by the state forces should be published. The Relatives for Justice hope to record in picture and story the deaths of all the children in the ‘Troubles’. A lot of writing has still to be done on collusion; at some time in the future members of the secret British forces will break rank and give part of the inside story. A detailed study has still to be written on the failed system of inquests in Northern Ireland.
(c) Even though, as I believe, there will be an unspoken but de facto amnesty, organisations and individual families should still pursue cases of state killings and sectarian killings of obviously innocent people in their homes and places of work. If, despite pressure, the police do not carry out vigorous investigation, it may be necessary for solicitors to have recourse to civilian actions and international bodies.
(d) Although the urgency in the transition period is to deal with truth, a new civil rights movement will be necessary to work for justice in the long term: justice re security, legal justice, social justice, equality of treatment, parity of esteem. Part of this campaign should be the revoking of all emergency laws, the establishment of a restructured police force, strict regulations re the appointment of judges, magistrates and coroners.
In October 1994, awaiting the setting up of a governmental Commission for Truth, a Campaign for the Right to Truth was initiated after consultation with and support of the following bodies:
1. Relatives for Justice
2. United Campaign against Plastic Bullets
3. Bloody Sunday Justice Group
4. Cullyhanna Justice Group
5. Casement Accused
6. Voice of the Innocent – Ballymurphy Seven
7. The Pat Finucane Centre, Derry
8. The Dublin–Monaghan Justice Group.
At a time when people are engaged in a process of healing and understanding, we believe that peace must be based on truth, justice and charity. Without these, political agreement will almost certainly be impossible. We note that whereas paramilitary organisations and political parties associated with them in Ireland have indicated their regret and remorse over their contribution to the deaths and suffering of innocent people, the British government refuses to acknowledge or apologise for the deaths and suffering of innocent people it has caused.
The Campaign for the Right to Truth seeks to win an acknowledgement by the British government that over the past twenty-five years it acted unlawfully and unjustly on many occasions.
We believe that victims of state violence and the public have the right to know the truth about the actions of the state and its agencies. We believe such an acknowledgement will have enormous moral power and help secure a better future for ourselves and our children. We believe that as victims and as citizens we have the right to know fully what injustices were done by the state and its representatives. Only when we know the truth can we identify the remedies needed to secure that these things never happen again.
We believe that the right to truth is:
(a) the inalienable right of all citizens.
(b) historically and ethically necessary for every society.
(c) necessary for the emotional healing of our people and the process of building a just society.
(d) essential for full freedom of expression for both the individual and the media.
(e) necessary to maintain the dignity and identity of the dead and of those who have suffered.
The Objectives of the Campaign for the Right to Truth are:
1. A full, public, comprehensive and binding acknowledgement by the British government that many of the activities carried out by the state and its representatives were unlawful. In particular this includes murder, collusion with paramilitary organisations to commit unlawful acts, including murder, the unlawful imprisonment and detention of those innocent of any crime, and the use of violence, torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.
2. A full identification of those responsible for authorising and carrying out such unlawful acts.
3. The right of access to all information concerning unlawful acts carried out by the state and its representatives.
4. A complete independent investigation into all unlawful acts by the state and its agents.
On 11 April 1995 the Campaign for the Right to Truth made oral submissions to the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation in Dublin Castle, 11 April 1995. Those who made the submissions were: Fr Raymond Murray (Introduction), Mrs Emma Groves (Plastic and Rubber Bullets), Tommy Carroll (The Armagh Killings), Eilish McAnespie (The Execution of Aidan McAnespie), Alice O’Brien (Collusion: The Dublin and Monaghan Bombings), Martin Finucane (The Murder of the Human Rights Lawyer Pat Finucane), Jim Kelly (Miscarriages of Justice: The Casement Accused ).
The following is the submission of Martin Finucane.
This submission is based on the proposition that the reconciliation between the people of Ireland will not be possible until issues relating to the abuse of basic human rights are addressed by both governments in their search for political agreement between unionists and nationalists as to the future structure of government of the island as a whole.
Pat Finucane was the Catholic solicitor who was shot dead in front of his wife and three children on 12 February 1989. He was born on the Falls Road in Belfast in 1949 and was a student at Trinity College Dublin in 1969 when his family in Belfast was forced out of their home by loyalists at the start of the present ‘troubles’. He pursued his studies at Trinity and, upon completion of his degree, returned to Belfast and commenced his study of law, eventually qualifying as a solicitor. He began to practice in 1979.
Throughout his short career he represented many people, Protestants and Catholics and anyone who requested his services. He turned no one away. He was known, however, for his fearless representation of nationalists and republicans in seeking the protection of law and establishing their rights in a hostile political system which discriminated against such clients since the establishment of the state itself. There is no doubt that his fearless representation caused resentment to the authorities who were attempting to paint a picture to the outside world that any complaints of human rights abuses in the north of Ireland were not only unfounded but were in fact part of a widespread propaganda campaign by those intent on destabilising the state. Pat Finucane was murdered on 12 February 1989 by the loyalist paramilitary group the UFF (UDA) directed by the British army agent Brian Nelson. Brian Nelson was also a member of the British army.
Pat’s murder followed shortly after the remark made by Douglas Hogg in the House of Commons on 17 January 1989. Hogg said, ‘There are in Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA’ and he went on to say, ‘I state it on the basis of advice that I have received, guidance that I have been given by people who are dealing in these matters.’
The murder was passed off by British government officials as just another sectarian killing carried out by lawless thugs. Tom King, the Northern Ireland Secretary of State at the time, said that Pat Finucane was murdered by ‘the other side’, implying that loyalists had attacked a republican in the on-going sectarian ‘troubles’. In February 1993, the New York based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, published Human Rights and Legal Defence in Northern Ireland: The Intimidation of Defence Lawyers, The Murder of Pat Finucane. It states that the ‘Lawyers Committee mission found credible evidence suggesting collusion between elements within the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries in the Finucane murder.’
Pat Finucane’s murder was no ‘ordinary’ sectarian murder. Pat Finucane was murdered because he defended those who were seen as enemies of the state. He was murdered because he was successful in many challenges to British authority in the north.
The British government was at war with the IRA and the republican movement. The loyalist paramilitaries were allies of the British government in this war. They carried out attacks against those enemies of the state as well as against ordinary Catholics. The work of Pat Finucane encapsulated the widespread abuses of British rule in the north of Ireland during the present ‘troubles’.
Loyalists undoubtedly murdered Pat Finucane. But was the murder sanctioned by the British government?
Was it planned by the British military and carried out as directed by British soldier, Brian Nelson?
Why did Douglas Hogg make his statement in the House of Commons on 17 January 1989, three weeks before Pat’s murder?
Why did he refuse to give any further details when pressed to do so?
Who were the advisers he referred to? Did the RUC, whose officers threatened to have Pat Finucane murdered by loyalists, advise Douglas Hogg?
In short, what is the connection between RUC death threats to Pat Finucane, Douglas Hogg’s statement, Brian Nelson’s role in the British army and the murder of Pat Finucane?
Is the fact that he was murdered with a British army gun just a coincidence? Is there a connection?
Why does the British government refuse to hold a public judicial inquiry into the murder of Pat Finucane when there is great public concern both in Ireland and abroad about their role in his murder?
Why does the British government refuse to give reasons for refusing to hold such an inquiry?
Are Douglas Hogg and his advisers and Brian Nelson and his superiors reluctant to give evidence at such an inquiry?
Are they reluctant to submit to cross-examination?
In order to achieve lasting peace in Ireland, reconciliation between the two traditions on the island is essential. Loyalists must sit down with republicans eventually. Unionists must sit down with nationalists eventually. A framework for the future government of the island of Ireland must be agreed between the two traditions eventually, otherwise the conflict will never be resolved. However, there are unresolved deaths of civilians caused by British soldiers and policemen which require satisfaction.
The compliance with internationally recognised documents enshrining fundamental rights and freedoms is a matter for governments. The right to life is the most important right of all and the investigation of deaths involving government agents must also be carried out in compliance with internationally recognised norms.
The British government must address the issues raised as it is obliged to do. It must answer questions asked and investigate properly any death which the public at large attributes to them or to their servants or agents. No satisfactory resolution of the conflict can be achieved until all these matters are dealt with satisfactorily.
In October 1997 Mr Dato Param Cumaraswamy, the United Nations special reporter on the independence of judges and lawyers, paid a ten-day visit to Britain and the north of Ireland to investigate complaints and to look into the killing of Pat Finucane. At the end of his visit he said there ‘seemed to be truth’ to the allegations by defence lawyers in the north that they had been subjected to harassment and intimidation by police officers and that the RUC made threats through the lawyers’ clients while they were in RUC interrogation centres. Mr Cumaraswamy accused the RUC of not treating the situation seriously. He called for an independent inquiry into Pat Finucane’s murder. Suspicion of security force involvement had ‘not been allayed’. There were serious suspicions that the state knew the lawyer was a target and did not fulfil its duty to protect him. He said his final report would be submitted to the UN Commissioner on Human Rights in 1998.
Cumaraswamy’s report on Northern Ireland, published as an addendum to his fourth annual report (98 paragraphs) on 5 March 1998, called for an independent judicial inquiry into Pat Finucane’s killing which he details at some length. He also called for an independent and impartial investigation of all threats to legal counsel in Northern Ireland.
In paragraph 21 of his report he writes, ‘The Chief Constable (Ronnie Flanagan) alluded to an agenda in which paramilitary organisations ensured that detainees remain silent and alleged that solicitors may be involved in conveying this message to the detainees. Further he stated that there is in fact a political divide in Northern Ireland and part of the political agenda is to portray the RUC as part of the unionist tradition. These allegations concerning police intimidation and harassment of solicitors is part and parcel of this agenda. The Assistant Chief Constable also admitted that during the course of an interrogation an officer may express the view that the solicitor is providing bad advice to the client and not acting in his interest, for instance, by advising the client to remain silent.’
Cumaraswany says that Brian Nelson claims in his prison diary that as early as December 1988 he informed the Force Research Unit of British Military Intelligence that Pat Finucane was targeted. Nelson provided the murderers with a ‘P-card’ three days before they killed him. The RUC denied that any information regarding the planned murder of Finucane was passed on to them. Stevens has publicly stated that he knows ‘absolutely’ who killed Pat Finucane. Cumaraswamy wrote to Stevens on 27 November 1997 asking whether the military knew that the killing of Finucane was planned by the loyalists and if so, did the military inform the RUC. If they did not tell the RUC, then why not, and why did the military not warn Finucane/or provide protection for him? If the RUC was told, why was Finucane not provided with police protection or warned of the threat?
Stevens replied on 14 January 1998: ‘As you will be aware the reports submitted by me are the property of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Chief Constable of the RUC. I am therefore not in a position to release the reports or indeed divulge any of the contents. The reports are highly classified and the authority of the above persons will be required before information is released’.
IRA from Thursday 1 September 1994.
Ended 9 February 1996. Renewed 20 July 1997.
INLA declared a cease-fire on 22 August 1998.
Combined Loyalist Military Command from Friday 14 October 1994.
The Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), centred in mid-Ulster, continued a campaign of murder until its cease-fire on 15 May 1998.
IRA dissidents the ‘Real IRA’ suspended all military operations from midnight 18–19 August 1998 following the Omagh bombing atrocity on 15 August and declared a cease-fire on 8 September 1998. Another dissident group the ‘Continuity IRA’ have yet to declare a cease-fire.
I am indebted to Very Rev. Seán Clerkin, Glaslough, for the recording and classification of these deaths. There is also a detailed analysis of deaths in Malcolm Sutton, An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Northern Ireland 1969–1993 (1994). In this period he gives a total of 357 killed by British forces. The British army were responsible for 294 of the total.
We are now in a period of transition in Northern Ireland and indeed there is a constant fluidity in the relations between Ireland and Britain. The Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Downing Street Declaration and change within the European Union are part of an evolutionary process towards a settlement of conflict within the island of Ireland, within Northern Ireland and between Britain and Ireland.
In the past 28 years external influences have been very great. The consequences of the single common market have not yet had a chance to fructify to the full but they will, now that there is relative peace, and this, together with a good economy in the Irish Republic, is leading to an all-Ireland economic union. One notices the new flow of trade south from the north and the great number of men from the north working in the building trade in Dublin. The opening up of eastern Europe has ended the 700 year British self-interest in Ireland. In time of war with Spain, France and Germany, Ireland was looked upon as a backdoor to invasion. This danger led to the Tudor conquest of Ireland when England became a nation state competing with continental powers. This security consciousness ensured the partition of Ireland and, as in the matter of the Act of Union of 1800, the Protestants were conveniently used as a support to bring it about. Ireland as a security risk to Britain was a factor until recently in the western alliance against Russia and the communist block. It affected politics as late as the Thatcher/Reagan close relationship, and then it suddenly collapsed with the Berlin wall. The eastern European threat has disappeared. Russia and the eastern European block are now vitally needed to boost a population-depleted and economic weak Europe, a Europe now dwindling in the global economic and political power context. In this picture Northern Ireland is a nasty embarrassing nuisance. Continental Europe will want to see it settled quickly and Britain, now freed for the first time in hundreds of years from its strategic tie to Ireland, has publicly declared that she has no longer a selfish interest in Ireland and will forego sovereignty if that is the will of the majority of people in Northern Ireland.
A century ago kith and kinship bound Britain to unionists in Ireland; there was a common strong Protestantism, a united Unionist-Conservatist party, an aura surrounding the royal family. This has diminished greatly and, what is more, there is a new post second world war Britain, empireless, tied to Europe, and with a more pluralist society, including a million southern-born Irish. It is important to mention this greater picture; while people in the north fight and squabble, the world leaves them behind.
The internal situation in Northern Ireland is still sad and fearful. On the ground parades were in the news. The loyalist marching season, which has jumped from some hundreds of parades to nearly three thousand, is now spreading beyond July and August to cover a period from Easter to October. Besides the Orange Order, the Black Preceptory and the Apprentice Boys, a new separate marching element has emerged – the ‘Kick the Pope’ bands and their followers. Some members of the Orange Order are not happy with this new element. They feel they are mistakenly identified with them. Sadly, once the war in a sense ended, underlying sectarianism rose to the top again. It was lying latent.
We have a second IRA cease-fire but before it we had the murder of two soldiers and two policemen. The viciousness of these murders are set against a strategy which might be called ‘to go out on a high’. There was no respect for the sacredness of human life. These murders shocked everybody and created a tremendous pathos in the Catholic communities at home and abroad. The mid-Ulster Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), a break-away from the Ulster Volunteer Force, are still active and in the past year have committed horrible gruesome murders. They murdered a girl lying on a bed, a teenager who took a lift, a GAA official locking up a pavilion and a young man walking home. In the case of the men and boy their faces were bashed in and they were horribly mutilated. The LVF has a perverse religious foundation: they will batter any Catholic to death; to them a Catholic boy or girl, woman or man, young or old, is evil in himself or herself. The INLA is always potentially dangerous but they have not killed recently; they say they will not strike first. The ‘continuity IRA’, another splinter group, exploded the hotel bomb in Fermanagh; they might gain some recruits as the republicans consolidate their political strength and grow into a constitutional party, leading logically to electoral pacts with the SDLP and perhaps ultimately merging with them into a single party.
The two governments are encouraging all sides to talk. This is welcome and of course the bright new words are dialogue and trust. The unionists have opened up dialogue with the Catholic Church. I praise them for that. All the political parties should now follow this example and go beyond their narrowed-minded selves and talk to representatives of the churches, the business people, the trade unions and the universities. The great charismatic leaders in South Africa, de Klerk and Mandela, could hardly have succeeded without the tremendous backing of the business people.
In my opinion the general population in the north at present want less party political activity. They just want a breathing space. People forty years of age have not known peace from their childhood. Most people are not over-anxious about an immediate political settlement; they want to hear less not more of entrenched politicians on the media. They would like direct rule to continue for a peaceful period for some years to allow healing and let good measures already taken to fructify. Nobody can see an agreement across a board from Ian Paisley to Gerry Adams in the Mitchell supervised talks. Realistically people know that the two governments will have to work out a settlement. The settlement, one hopes, will be a fair one. It will have to be based on a British dimension for unionists/loyalists and an Irish dimension for nationalists/republicans. No one of the two communities for the foreseeable future should be imprisoned within the absolute ruling authority of either Britain or Ireland. It was inevitable that the entrapped nationalists in the north would revolt against injustice. They did that in the 1960s when they had gained a little strength. The present solution will involve balancing change in the Irish constitution and the Government of Ireland Act. It will be joint sovereignty in fact if not in name. The stronger partner in the working out of this agreement will be Britain whose wielding authority is finance. Anything short of at least de facto joint sovereignty would ultimately undermine Adams’ republicans and would lead to a renewal of violence in the next generation. For the moment people are war weary. If the present deal turns out to be radical but fair, there is a good chance of permanent peace and good will, and the final solution of the government of the island of Ireland will be left to a future generation.
The continuance of a form of direct rule for some years is important. It is more important that society changes and all the injustices end than that we have a bitter short-lived, hastily cobbled together, devolved government. Let devolution come later. By that time some politicians, who are themselves an obstacle to peace, may be rejected in the ballot box.
In the meantime what is the immediate priority for Catholics in Northern Ireland? – the radical reform and restructure of the RUC. It is the one remaining important imbalanced structure of state. The RUC was raised from some 3,000 in 1969 to the present 14,000, which includes reserves, and is 94% Protestant. It has to change. It is not a matter of tinkering with minor things here and there; a major radical change is necessary. Ms Mo Mowlam, the Secretary of State, has already said there will be reform but she has not spelled out how radical that reform will be. If a major change in the RUC comes, it will upset the Protestant churches. The RUC has always been closely linked into the religious and cultural life of the Protestant churches and they are naturally aggrieved that many policemen lost their lives and many were injured in the conflict. The RUC were pushed to the front during the Ulsterisation of the 1970s and were established very formally in their traditional role as a standing army to defend the state. It hasn’t been easy for them to carry out normal policing as a secondary role. Catholics would welcome a Bill of Rights which would incorporate the United Nations ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ into domestic law and this could be the basis of policing and leave its ranks open to all shades of political adherence.
On 19 August 1969 Prime Minister Harold Wilson issued the first Downing Street declaration announcing an end to religious discrimination: ‘Every citizen in Northern Ireland is entitled to the same equality of treatment and freedom from discrimination as obtains in the rest of the United Kingdom’. With one stroke of the pen, the Labour government then abolished the housing discrimination in Northern Ireland that had lasted for 50 years and which was tied into the political and unjust manoeuvring of the unionist monolithic state. This was one of the grievances that had led to the Civil Rights Movement. This reform changed the face of Northern Ireland; wherever you travel in the north you can view with pride the new sprawling suburbs built under direct rule. The Fair Employment Agency has also done great work under the scrupulous leadership of Mr Bob Cooper. Its powers, however, have not been draconian. Inequality still exists. Catholic men in the north are over 2.5 times as likely to be unemployed as Protestants and are more likely to suffer long term employment.
A change to a society based on equality has been very difficult for unionists; a situation of dominance for Protestants was created by government in the Stormont parliament and so a whittling away of power and privilege to face fair competition and merit has met with opposition. The consequences of fair play arouse all the old bitterness of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Equality means a challenge to power; it means power sharing in government. A sudden change in demography has heightened the fear of Protestants. Even though the Catholic birth rate has fallen, the more just direct rule and the change to housing according to need and fairer employment has meant a sharp growth in the Catholic population in the north. That is also seen as a threat. Nationalists’ success in the recent local government elections underlined this new reality. The population is now 56% Protestant, 44% Catholic with an equal number of young people. It is a further argument for the inevitability of joint sovereignty. Can unionists face up to this fact? Many of them, heads in the sand, still talk pathetically in loaded words like ‘minority’, ‘the democratic majority’, ‘the people of Ulster’, ‘the mainland’, ‘the British Isles’.
What is it like to live in Northern Ireland now? A lot better. Even the absence of checkpoints is a blessing. During the twenty-eight years of virtual war, and the emotional trauma that went with it, there were many times when people would have asked would the ‘Troubles’ ever come to an end. There was a mountain of suffering and a mountain of prayers for peace. People let loose their pent-up inner joy of relief when President Clinton visited Derry, Belfast and Dublin. You can imagine then the harm that murder, torture, destruction of property, and imprisonment did to human relationships. Generally speaking the two communities in Northern Ireland have always lived separately. They grew more apart following the partition of Ireland; they grew still farther apart physically and mentally during the last twenty-eight years.
One hopes for a vision of people who might some time in the next hundred years come to respect one another and live in peace. I reckon it will take at least three generations of goodwill to bring about a real friendship. We should talk about one community but, unfortunately, the fact is there are two. At present there is little or no deep friendship between the two halves. There are some tiny pockets of people who live reasonably well together as a mixed community; there is a token dialogue between the heads of the churches; there are ecumenical services once a year; there are some mixed prayer groups of wonderful spiritual people; a few people of mixed religion work together and are good friends; there are mixed marriages and some mixed schools; there are many decent and good people who lead very quiet and private lives. Co-operation at local level has improved in local councils; conditions of cross-community promotion attached to funds has helped that. The local history societies have been doing wonderful work to help people realise that their traditions are not necessarily opposed to one another and that some aspects of traditions are mutually hostile and divisive. There are schemes of education for mutual understanding but these vary according to the depth of local prejudices. That is the good side but generally speaking the two communities live apart – the working class in every city and town are almost completely separated from one another. Even the well-to-do form into ghettos. This horrible war has brought about a polarisation. In some cases people simply were afraid following intimidation and murders and found security living in their religious background. Such polarisation affects trade and even simple things like greetings on the public street. I wonder do visitors sadly see us, who have only one life to lead, imprisoned in our minds and hearts.
Elsewhere in conflict situations we see a new emphasis on people and especially on the individual. So the importance of incorporating civil and political rights into domestic law in Northern Ireland. About a year ago, I attended a major seminar on reconciliation in Belfast; some countries from South America, the eastern bloc of Europe, South Africa and Israel and Palestine were present. The delegates from El Salvador and South Africa were impressive. Why? Because of their honesty and humility; they had learned to admit crimes on all sides; they saw the importance of a commission for truth as an integral part of the healing process. Yes it is important for the republican paramilitaries to tell the truth about their murders and crimes and repatriate missing bodies. Yes it is necessary for the loyalist paramilitaries to tell the truth about their murders and atrocities. Yes it is necessary for the British government to acknowledge that over the past 28 years it acted unlawfully, immorally, and unjustly in the murders and unjust killings of innocent people, in ill-treatment in interrogation centres and in corruption of courts. If honesty prevails, all this is tied into the question of the decommissioning of arms. It may scare all the three perpetrators of violence, republican and loyalist paramilitaries and the state from pursuing the issue. South Africa and El Salvador bravely faced up to the problem; they set up truth commissions. They saw that this was necessary for the emotional healing of people and the process of building a just society. Why do we lack this honesty and humility?
Talk given at a Mass for Peace in St Paul’s Church, Mullingar, 21 August 1997.
The Mailed Fist: A record of Army & Police Brutality from Aug. 9–Nov. 9, 1971. Issued by the Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland in collaboration with the Association for Legal Justice.
British Army and Special Branch RUC Brutalities. December 1971–February 1972. First printed 1972. Reprinted 1972. Compiled by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh.
Whitelaw’s Tribunals. Long Kesh Internment Camp, November 1972–February 1973. Compiled by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh.
The Hooded Men. British Torture in Ireland, August, October 1971. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh. July 1974.
The Iniquity of Internment. Long Kesh, August 9th 1971–August 9th, 1974. Compiled by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh.
Corruption of Law. Memorandum to the Gardiner Committee on the Working of Emergency Legislation in Northern Ireland, from Fr Brian J. Brady, Belfast, Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh. September 1974.
Internment 1971–1975. By Fr Brian Brady, Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1975.
The Shame of Merlyn Rees. 4th Year of Internment in Ireland, Long Kesh 1974 – 1975. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1975.
The Flames of Long Kesh 15–16 October 1974. By Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh. December 1974.
The Triangle of Death. Sectarian Assassinations in the Dungannon–Moy– Portadown area. By Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh. Three separate editions with added material. 1975.
A British Army Murder. Leo Norney (17 years) killed by Black Watch regiment, 13 October 1975. By Fr Brian J. Brady, Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. September 1975.
The RUC: The Black and Blue Book. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. First published 1975. Reprinted 1983.
Majella O’Hare. Shot dead by the British Army 14 August 1976. By Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray. September 1976.
British Army Terror. West Belfast, September, October 1976. (Brian Stewart). By Fr Brian J. Brady, Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1976.
The Birmingham Framework. Six Innocent Men Framed for the Birmingham Bombings. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1977. Reprinted 1984.
SAS Terrorism – The Assassin’s Glove. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. July 1976.
The Castlereagh File. Allegations of RUC Brutality 1976/1977. By Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray. Printed 1978. Reprinted in USA 1979.
Violations of Human Rights in Northern Ireland 1968 – 1978. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1978.
The Sleeping Giant. Irish Americans and Human Rights in N. Ireland. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1978.
H Blocks. British Jail for Irish Political Prisoners. By Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray. 1979.
Moment for Truth on Northern Ireland. By Denis Faul and Raymond Murray. 1980.
H Blocks and its Background. By Denis Faul and Raymond Murray. 1980.
Michael McCartan. An Innocent Catholic Boy Shot Dead by the RUC, 23 July 1980. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. September 1980.
The British Dimension. Brutality, Murder and Legal Duplicity in N. Ireland. By Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray. 1980.
Hunger Strike. H Blocks, Long Kesh, Northern Ireland 27 October 1980. Published by a group of lawyers and priests.
Rubber & Plastic Bullets Kill & Maim. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1981.
Danny Barrett. A British Army Murder. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1982.
Plastic Bullets – Plastic Government. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1982.
The Sacredness of Human Life: An Invitation to Debate. By Denis Faul, Raymond Murray. October 1982.
The Stripping Naked of the Women Prisoners in Armagh Prison 1982–83. By Denis Faul. Published by Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. Easter 1983.
Angela D’Arcy. Irish Catholic Girl Shot Dead by a British Army Soldier in Enniskillen 25 November 1981. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. Published 1983.
The Alienation of Northern Catholics. By Denis Faul, Raymond Murray. February 1984.
Collusion 1990 –1994. Loyalist Paramilitary Murders in North of Ireland. By Arthur Fegan and Raymond Murray. Issued by Relatives for Justice, 1985.
The SAS in Ireland. By Raymond Murray. Mercier Press. First published November 1990. Sixth Printing 1997.
Hard Time: Armagh Gaol 1971–1986. By Raymond Murray. Mercier Press, 1998.
Whitelaw’s Tribunals. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1 June 1979.
The Hooded Men. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1972.
The Shame of Merlyn Rees. Fr Raymond Murray, Fr Denis Faul. 9 August 1975.
The Birmingham Framework. Fr Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 4 July 1977.
SAS Terrorism – The Assassin’s Glove. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 6 July 1976.
The Black and Blue Book. Fr Denis Faul. Fr Raymond Murray. February 1975.
H-Blocks. ‘British Jail for Irish Prisoners’. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1979.
Michael McCartan. September 1980. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray.
Know Your Rights. Issued by Fr Denis Faul with NCCL (National Council for Civil Liberties) Abbey Printers (Cavan) Ltd. Undated (1975).
Legal Rights for Those Detained. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon. Printed both in blue and black. Undated (1976).
Legal Rights for Those Detained. Fr Denis Faul. June 1977.
Legal Rights. Fr Denis Faul. Dungannon, 1/3/78.
Legal Rights for Those Detained. Fr Denis Faul. February 1979.
Legal Rights for Those Detained. Fr Denis Faul. January 1980.
Whitelaw Violates Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1972.
The Courts. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh. 1972.
Anti-Catholic Bias in the Courts of Northern Ireland. A Sample Study March 1974. Association for Legal Justice.
Anti-Catholic Bias in the Courts of Northern Ireland. A Sample Study April 1974. Association for Legal Justice.
Anti-Catholic Bias in the Courts of Northern Ireland. A Sample Study May and June 1974. Association for Legal Justice.
Anti-Catholic Bias in the Courts of Northern Ireland. A Sample Study July to October 1974. Association for Legal Justice.
Anti-Catholic Bias in the Courts of Northern Ireland. A Sample Study November 1974 to June 1975. Association for Legal Justice.
Desert Labour. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh. Undated (1975).
The Law No Longer Protects Me. An Analysis of the Use of Supergrasses. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. October 1983.
20 Points against Internment. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon. Undated (1972).
List of Injuries and Inhuman Treatment meted out to Political Remand Prisoners in Cage 8 – since 11th September, 1972. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland.
List of Injuries sustained by Remand Prisoners in Compound 6, Long Kesh, on Friday, 22nd September, 1972. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Fr T. Connolly, Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray, Fr John McKean.
Long Kesh Internees. Patrick J. McClean. 1972.
Ill-treatment of Political Prisoners in Long Kesh, The Maze, July 4, 1973.
Selective Releases from Long Kesh Internment Camp – Christmas 1973. Association for Legal Justice.
Remember Long Kesh. May 20th, 1975. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon.
Remember Long Kesh, No Negotiations under Duress. Issued by Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh. Undated (1975).
20 Reasons why an Amnesty should be given to all imprisoned because of alleged misdeeds committed because of a lack of security or justice in society. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon. Undated (1975).
Amnesty. Holy year 1975. Fr Brian Brady, Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray.
Five Reasons why Political Status – Special Category – is a Fact of Life in Northern Ireland. Published by Fr Denis Faul with some families of political prisoners. 1976. Arguments for Politcal Status (or AMNESTY). Lurgan relations 1976.
Maladministration of Prisons. Published by the families of political prisoners, Lurgan April 1976.
H-Blocks Protest. The No Washing, Non-Cooperation Phase. April 1978. By Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray. Issued in blue and black.
H-Block. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1978.
H-Block. The Care and Welfare of Prisoners in Northern Ireland. Produced by Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray. Easter 1978. Issued in black, red, green, blue, pink.
Die Politische Häftlinge in Nordirland. Eine Frage von Krieg oder Frieden. 1978.
Rapport Fra et Faengsel i Nordirland. 1978.
An Information Sheet. From the Relatives Action Committee of South Derry and West Antrim. September 1978.
H-Block. Christmas 1978. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. Issued in red and blue.
Appeal to Irish Voters in Britain and Scotland. 1979.
Appeal to Irish Voters in Britain and Scotland. Issued by the County Tyrone and Armagh parents of families. Poster. 1979.
Remember H Block and Forget Labour. Parents of County Derry Prisoners in H Blocks. 1979.
H-Blocks. A Letter Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1 June 1979.
H-Block. The Year of the Child. Issued by South Derry and South West Antrim Relatives for Action Committee, November 1979.
H-Blocks. A letter from a blanket man to the Association for Legal Justice. 1979.
H-Block. Christmas 1979. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray.
American Delegation to H-Blocks and Armagh Jail. Issued by Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray. September 1980.
Remember H Blocks and Armagh Jail. Issued by South Derry and South West Antrim relatives Action Committee. Autumn 1980.
Hunger Strike 2. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. March 1981.
Hunger Strikes – The Search for Solutions. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. May 1981.
Deputation of Anti-Unionist Councillors, Dungannon District Council, to Mr Michael Alison, Minister of State, on Tuesday 21st July 1981. Prisons.
Prison Problems and the Alienation of Catholics in N. Ireland. Statement of Help the Prisoners, 13 June 1984. Issued by Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray.
Women in Jail in Northern Ireland. By Fr Denis Faul. July 1978.
Prevented from Going to Mass. Armagh Prison, Northern Ireland. Undated (1980).
Black February. Armagh Prison. Beating Women in Prison. Compiled by Fr Denis Faul. 1980.
Armagh Prison. The Parents Speak. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1980.
The Stripping Naked of Women Prisoners in Armagh Gaol. November 1982 January 1984. The Shame of James Prior and Nicholas Scott. Fr Denis Faul.
Stripping Girls Naked in Armagh Prison. A Letter to Nicholas Scott. Minister for Prisons by Fr Raymond Murray. 11 January 1985. Published by Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh Social Acion Group.
Torture, Torture. Torture. Association for Legal Justice. November December 1973. (Forced feeding of Dolours Price, Marion Price, Hugh Feeney, Gerard Kelly, Roy Walsh). In English, French, German.
Brutality in Albany Prison, Isle of Wight. Repression of Irish Catholics in the Fourth World. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh. 1976.
‘In Prison in England’. Christmas 1977. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh, with the help of Sister Sarah Clarke, London.
The Birmingham Pub Bombing Case. Synopsis of the forensic evidence, presented by Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray. February 1980.
Parole for Fr Patrick Fell. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. March 1980.
The Need for Security. Treatment of Prisoners in Portlaoise. By Fr Denis Faul, Dunganon, and Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh. 1977.
Questions a Candidiate should Answer. Issued by the Relatives of Prisoners. Undated (1981).
Portlaoise Prison. By Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh. June 1984.
The Murrays. Must they hang in Dublin? Issued by Murray Defence
Committee (Northern Ireland). Correspondence Secretary, Fr Denis Faul.
Some Examples of Attacks on Catholic Church Property. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. 1972.
The Plight of Catholics in Newtownabbey. 16th February 1974.
Short Brothers Limited, Belfast. A Case Study in Anti-Catholic Discrimination. By Rev. Brian J. Brady. Published by Irish National Caucus, Inc., Washington DC, April 1983. Reprinted by Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray, July 1983.
Memorandum to Members of Parliament taking part in the Debate on Northern Ireland, Westminster. June 3–4, 1974. The Ulster Workers Council Strike. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland.
The Alienation of the Catholic/Nationalist People in N. Ireland. 20 Reasons for Alienation. Reply to the Northern Ireland Church of Ireland bishops. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh, 30 November 1984.
25 Methods of Brutality by Military and Special Branch RUC, December 1971 – February 1972. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. 1972.
Ballykelly, RUC Special Branch Interrogation Centre. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh. 1973.
20 Reasons Why Catholics Should Not Give General Support to the RUC. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, November 1974.
Unacceptability of RUC in 1975. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Fr Denis Faul.
The Harassment of the Mulgrew Family. June to October 1976. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. By Fr Brian Brady, Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray.
Allegations of Brutality, Signing of False Statements and Threats of Assassination Made by Regional Crime Squad Members in the Strand Road RUC Station, Derry City, 22 – 25 November 1976. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh.
What Happened to Eddie Rooney on the Night of 28 February 1977? Oppression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh.
Allegations of Brutality in Armagh RUC Station. March 1977. Catholic families in Co. Armagh complain of RUC ill-treatment. Printed on white and green paper.
Serious Allegations of Ill-treatment in Omagh and Dungannon RUC Stations. April 23rd – May 12th, 1977. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh.
20 Methods of Brutality in Castlereagh and Other RUC Interrogation Centres. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh. 1977/78. Printed in blue and black.
Ten Years On: Violations of Human Rights 1968–78. A Letter. 25 October 1978. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray.
Brutality against Persons Arrested under Emergency Powers. Fr Denis Faul. March 22nd 1979.
Second International Tribunal of Inquiry into Deaths and Injuries by Plastic Bullets, Belfast, N. Ireland, 16 October 1982. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray
Plastic Bullets. Shootings that Shame the State. Raymond Murray, September 1985. Issued by Fr Denis Faul,, Fr Raymond Murray
RUC: Abuses of Law, 1985. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray.
An Alternative Police Force in Northern Ireland. By Fr Raymond Murray. Submission to Initiative ‘92 and the Opsahl Commission. May 1993.
65 Priests Working in West Belfast issued the following statement on Monday 20th November, 1972. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Presented at a Press Conference in Belfast by Fr Desmond Wilson, Ballymurphy, Fr Brian Brady, Andersonstown, Fr A. Reid, Clonard.
Statements by Luke McKiernan and Kevin Clancy of Derrygosh, Newtownbutler, Co. Fermanagh. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. August 1974. Issued by Fr Denis Faul.
The Amazing Dis-Grace of the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards at Eglish, Dungannon. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. June 5–6th, 1976. By Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon.
The Behaviour of the 3rd Parachute Regiment in South Armagh, June – July 1976. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. June 5–6th, 1976. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh.
The Behaviour of the Royal Marine Commandos in Crossmaglen on Tuesday evening, 31st August 1976. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh.
Terror Tactics of the British Army. Royal Marine Commandos at Crossmaglen. October, 1976. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray.
The Killing of Martin Malone. Catholic Youth of 18 Years shot dead by the Ulster Defence Regiment 30 July 1983. Published by Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray.
Second International Tribunal of Inquiry into Deaths and Injuries by Plastic Bullets, Belfast, N. Ireland, 16 October 1982. Conclusion of the Tribunal. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray.
State Killings in Northern Ireland. By Fr Raymond Murray. Issued by Relatives for Justice. 1991.
Unveiling of Memorial to Fergal Caraher, Cullyhanna. Fr Raymond Murray. 30 December 1991.
[1]European Court of Human Rights, Judgement, paragraph 212, Strasbourg, France, 27 September 1995.
[2]The Guardian, 28 September 1995.
[3]The Windlesham/Rampton Report on Death on the Rock, p. 92, paragraph 85, Faber & Faber, London 1989.
[4]Op. cit., p. 53.
[5]Op. cit., p. 55.
[6]Op. cit., p. 92, paragraph 86.
[7] Roger Boulton, Death on the Rock and Other Stories, p. 305, W. H. Allen Optomen, London, 1990.
[8] United Kingdom: Investigating Lethal Shootings: The Gibraltar Inquest: Summary, p. iii. Amnesty International, April 1989.
[9]Ibid.