These internal and external developments raise the question of who would look after the holy sites of Jerusalem were Israel to redivide the Holy City—the Palestinian version of the Taliban?
Indeed, the whole story of the Gaza pullout demonstrates how in the Middle East well-intentioned plans for dealing with terrorism can totally backfire. Many in the international community thought that Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the addressing of the Palestinians' territorial grievances against Israel would reduce the flames of radical Islamic rage. That perception certainly underpins in part Solana's enthusiasm for a complete Israeli withdrawal, including in Jerusalem.
But instead, in the security vacuum that disengagement created, a new sanctuary for global jihad emerged. Even Egypt admitted that terrorists striking their Red Sea Sinai resorts had been trained in Gaza. The West got the very opposite of what it bargained for. Moreover, the fact that Israel faced a two-front war in August 2006 that was launched from the very territories from which it had unilaterally withdrawn—from southern Lebanon six years earlier and from the Gaza Strip the year before— indicated that the underlying motivation for the conflict on the part of the Islamist movements around Israel was not territorial but part of a larger antipathy against anyone associated with the West, including Israel.
Under such circumstances, withdrawals don't ameliorate hostile intentions but they can aggravate them. For what historically fed the growth of Islamic terrorism since 1989 had been its growing sense of victory and not its political grievances over any specific territorial dispute. When the Soviets finally ended their long war in Afghanistan and withdrew, that did not put an end to the mujahidin armies that multiplied there over the previous decade. Indeed, the Arab mujahidin regrouped to form al-Qaeda and were imbued with the conviction that they had just defeated one superpower and could even consider launching a jihad on the other superpower as well.
For the same reason, Hamas was not weakened by the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza which, according to the prevalent international view, should have diminished its influence among the Palestinians and caused them to see that new diplomatic options were possible. Instead, Hamas won the Palestinian elections in the wake of the Israeli pullout. It argued before the Palestinian public that its rocket attacks had succeeded in forcing Israel
out and that armed resistance worked. Few in the West understood the empirical evidence in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and now in the Gaza Strip proving that withdrawal in the face of a radical Islamic threat simply fuels jihad. It is like trying to put out a fire with gasoline.
In the case of Jerusalem, no one is proposing a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Old City. But even if negotiations were to occur and Israel lost its nerve by deciding, under enormous international pressure, to concede the ancient parts of its national capital, it is extremely doubtful that the flames of radical Islamic rage would be lowered. Jerusalem is not just another contested area like the Gaza Strip; it is a city loaded with layers of deep religious meaning of which most diplomats and policy makers who call for its redivision are hardly aware. All the evidence presented throughout this book in fact indicates that an Israeli withdrawal from the Old City could spur jihadist motivation to an all-time high.
In other words, the proposed redivision of Jerusalem risks reigniting the very rage that the Europeans are seeking to extinguish by diplomatic means. Understanding the impact of religious trends on political violence is not an exact science, but there are strong undercurrents in the Middle East that cannot be ignored. For radical Islam, Jerusalem was never a high priority, but if the West offers the Holy City on a silver platter, many radical groups would not be apathetic or indifferent. As things stand today, such a move will be perceived as confirming the apocalyptic scenarios that have captured the imagination of many in the radical Islamic camp (both Shiites and Sunnis) who believe that their future control of Jerusalem is the first step for spectacular jihadist victories against the West.
Among the Shiites, the driving force popularizing this mode of thinking has been no less than the president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose public appearances have been largely absorbed with the return of the lost Imam as the Mahdi, "the rightly guided one." In November 2005, he declared explicitly that his mission was to prepare the groundwork for the lost Imam's reappearance. 12 This Shiite eschatology has been directly tied to the issue of Jerusalem, given the timing and content of the Iranian president's comments.
For example, one Hizballah theoretician succinctly stated, "The liberation of Jerusalem is the preface for liberating the world and establishing
the [Mahdi's] state of justice and values on earth [emphasis added]." 13 In other words, the assault on Jerusalem is the first stage in a much larger campaign of global warfare.
This theme surfaces elsewhere. A Hizballah book published in Beirut in late 2006 titled Ahmadinejad and the Next Global Revolution expands on the upcoming return of the Mahdi and his worldwide campaign. In the earliest stages of the future conflict, the radical Shiite text, which goes out of its way to compliment the Iranian president, envisions Ahmadinejad taking command over the Mahdi's army in the battle to take Jerusalem, thus setting the stage for the worldwide campaign that would follow. The book is excerpted on a Sunni website expressing concern about the ideologies that it contains. 14 Rather than diminish such wild apocalyptic speculations with their clear jihadist overtones, ill-conceived Western policies on Jerusalem could just feed them and enhance their importance.
It would be one thing if this apocalyptic speculation were confined merely to peripheral individuals on the religious fringe. Yet not only is this literature extremely popular in Middle Eastern bookstores, but, as was shown, it also surfaces in the thinking of some of the most important clerics in radical Sunni Islam, including Sheikh Yusuf Qaradhawi, the highest religious authority for the worldwide Muslim Brotherhood. As noted earlier, he appeared on al-Jazeera in 2002 announcing that an end of days group called al-ta'ifa al-mansura, or the "victorious community," had already positioned itself in Jerusalem and is ready to fight the Dajjal, or Antichrist, in a great battle.
The same Qaradhawi invoked on other occasions what he called the prophecies of Muhammad by talking about Islam returning to Europe "as a conqueror." He foresaw the future fall of Rome, and he also dropped passing references to Andalus, once Islamic Spain (though he often conditioned this commentary by expressing his desire to recover these territories through preaching alone). The ideological energies of Qaradhawi and his followers are not confined to political change in the Middle East alone, but rather are directed to the West as a whole.
Thus a line of policy that has been adopted to enhance the security of London, Paris, and Rome, or of any European city where militant elements reside could unleash a new jihadist drive, energizing those who feel
empowered by the fact that their worldview will have been vindicated. Jerusalem, which had been a lower priority for al-Qaeda throughout the 1990s, if suddenly thrust onto center stage by misplaced Western diplomacy, could trigger ideological responses that would only complicate the efforts of the U.S. and its allies to contain the outburst of radical Islamic movements.
And what if Jerusalem were internationalized? Would that solve something? It was the European Union that in 1999 resurrected the internationalization concept contained in UN General Assembly Resolution 181. When the UN was still seriously considering internationalization back in 1949, it was Jordan's King Abdullah who vociferously opposed the idea on the grounds that this would put the "infidel" in control of the city. Abdullah was a moderate leader under strong British influence at the time, but he knew what chords to strike in the Islamic world to wage his struggle against internationalization among Arab audiences in states that opposed Hashemite authority in Jerusalem.
It doesn't take much imagination to consider how the idea of internationalization would be greeted by radical Islamist elements across the Middle East. Indeed, al-Qaeda had just waged a ten-year war to remove the "infidels" from the Arabian peninsula, which hosts the primary holy sites of Islam, Mecca and Medina. It should have come as no surprise that in the aftermath of Camp David, Arafat rejected proposals for the internationalization of the Temple Mount, even if they incorporated representation from the Organization of Islamic States and the Arab League. 15 He obviously cared far more how an idea would go over on al-Jazeera or in the Egyptian press than on the editorial pages of the New York Times. In short, internationalization would not provide a solution to the needs of the increasingly dominant radical elements of the Islamic world.
And even if the Arab world accepted internationalization, who would be in charge of protecting Jerusalem—the UN? The record of UN forces has been extremely negative over the last decade starting in the Balkans and Rwanda and more recently in southern Lebanon. Israel's own historical experience with the UN in Jerusalem has been nothing short of disastrous. The UN did not lift a finger when its Jewish population of 100,000
was put under siege, even though it had previously adopted the recommendation of the General Assembly to put Jerusalem under UN authority.
It was only the nascent Israeli army that broke through to resupply Jerusalem's civilians with food and water. The UN also failed to respond to repeated pleas to get the Arab Legion to halt its devastating bombardment of the synagogues of the Old City's Jewish Quarter. It is for these reasons that Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, concluded that the UN resolution recommending internationalization had lost all moral force and was "null and void."
True, the UN helped broker the postwar armistice agreements between Jordan and Israel in 1949. And a UN officer on the ground chaired the Mixed Armistice Commissions that the agreements created to oversee their implementation. But when the Jordanians violated Article VIII of the agreement by refusing to permit freedom of access of Israeli worshipers to the Old City in general and to the Western Wall in particular, the UN did nothing.
Nor did the Security Council seek the repeal of Jordanian laws restricting the rights of Christian institutions in Jerusalem. As already noted, possibly the UN's most significant religious intervention during the years of Jordanian rule was a letter by the UN Truce Supervision Organization on November 30, 1964, demanding that Israel switch off Chanukkah lights that were lit in the Israeli enclave on Mt. Scopus because they might offend the Jordanians. 16
The Peace of Jerusalem
If there is no realistic negotiated solution for Jerusalem and internationalization is not an option either, then what is the likely fate of the Holy City? Frankly, we can expect continuing Israeli sovereignty over a united city which, given the history of Jerusalem, is the best possible outcome. The historical record has shown that only a free and democratic Israel can truly protect the freedom of Jerusalem for all faiths.
What about Palestinian and broader Arab opinion? It needs to be made clear that no one is asking the Palestinian Authority to formally sign on to such an arrangement at another Camp David summit. Not all
conflicts are resolved by formal agreements negotiated at great summit meetings; sometimes the parties reach a modus vivendi that is not imposed from above, but rather built up from the ground. While not ideal, it nonetheless addresses many—though not all—of each side's principal concerns.
In the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, sometimes reaching an imperfect arrangement has been easier than the completion of formal negotiations. In the late 1920s, British high commissioner Sir John Chancellor presented Jerusalem mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini two alternatives— a political settlement with the Jews over the Western Wall or a much worse international solution. Husseini preferred the latter, as long as he did not have to sign a document relinquishing a single one of his perceived political rights. By refusing to compromise at Camp David and at all the negotiations that followed, Arafat and the Palestinian leadership around him appeared to be driven by the same set of considerations.
A number of measures need to be taken in the period ahead. First, there is already an Islamic authority representing the interests of the Muslim world with whom it is possible to work. For example, there is a Jordanian administrative role on the Temple Mount that was reinstated after the 1967 Six-Day War, leaving Israel clearly responsible for security. Thus despite the harsh memories on the Israeli side of Jordan's invasion of Jerusalem in 1948, the two sides have come a long way in building up mutual confidence, even with respect to religious administration in Jerusalem. This cooperation was formalized in a 1994 Israeli-Jordanian agreement known as the Washington Declaration that was incorporated into the treaty of peace between both countries. It stated, "Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines."
In 1988, King Hussein declared that he was cutting his kingdom's administrative ties with the West Bank, although he retained his religious ties to Jerusalem. Indeed, the Jordanian Ministry of Awqaf (Religious Endowments) Affairs has paid the salaries of Waqf officials to this very day.
During the years of Oslo, Jordan lost much of its influence over the administration of Islamic affairs on the Temple Mount to the Palestinian Authority, but it has been seeking to recover it as of late. Today, there is no Palestinian Authority Minister of Awqaf sitting in Jerusalem, as in the times of Arafat.
The latest evidence of this increased Jordanian interest was disclosed in mid-October 2006, when it was revealed that King Abdullah II had expressed interest in building a fifth minaret on the Temple Mount's eastern wall, near the Golden Gate. 17 The Jordanians also signaled their continuing religious role in the area, when they undertook renovations in the Dome of the Rock, especially the replacement of its carpets in October 2006. Before any further construction projects of significance on the Temple Mount are implemented, however, a broader change in the overall situation there should take place.
Right now, what goes on in the Temple Mount area is highly secretive; Israel opened up the Temple iMount to limited visits by members of all faiths. The entire area now needs to be fully accessible, including for purposes of archaeological oversight, in order to prevent the further destruction of ancient antiquities by irresponsible Islamic groups. This would be facilitated by giving the international media full access to the area at times that do not conflict with Muslim prayer.
Second, Arab states like Saudi Arabia should quietly support the moderate role of Jordan in these administrative issues. No state should have an interest in radical Islamic sermons in the al-Aqsa Mosque calling for the overthrow of current Arab regimes. It is not at all clear if the Saudi establishment is fully aware of what different groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood have been planning. For example, the proposal of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel to bring Zamzam water from Mecca to the Temple Mount is intended to elevate Jerusalem's Islamic credentials by adopting ceremonies normally reserved for Mecca.
Saudi Arabia may be opposed to Israel, but do the Saudis actually support such initiatives? Do they want to fund them? Centuries ago Ibn Taymiyya opposed religious innovations like the performance of rituals in Jerusalem that are reserved for Mecca. Moreover, these ideas today are
advanced in many cases by those supportive of jihadist tendencies, especially those seeking an immediate reestablishment of the caliphate to replace Arab governments. Since 2003, with the escalation of al-Qaeda attacks inside Saudi Arabia, there is a growing awareness in the Saudi leadership that these radicalizing trends can come back to haunt the kingdom and undermine its stability.
Third, it must be remembered that Jerusalem is not just a diplomatic question. It involves the relationships of the three great monotheistic faiths. For Jerusalem sits on an inter-civilizational seam and what happens in the Holy City can have implications—both negative and positive—for how these religions will relate to one another in the future. The visit of Pope John Paul II to the Western Wall closed a historical circle in the relations between Christianity and Judaism, breaking with older theological patterns of thought in the Church that needed the ruins of a defeated Jerusalem as proof of Christianity's emergence as a replacement for the earlier Israelite faith.
When Islam came out of the Arabian peninsula in the seventh century, it came into contact with other civilizations and religious groups. Part of that first contact involved direct military confrontation and outright conquest. But part of it was also surprisingly tolerant given the era in which it occurred. Radical Islamists who look back to the first four "rightly guided caliphs" perhaps forget that it was the second caliph, Umar bin al-Khattab, who allowed the Jews to return to Jerusalem after five centuries of Roman and then Byzantine rule. Saladin would do the same several hundred years later.
Since there were no existing synagogues under Umar's administration, the returning Jews had to erect new prayer houses, one of which was under the Temple Mount itself. And it was the very same Umar bin al-Khattab who would not pray at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, according to Islamic tradition, because he was concerned that future generations of Muslims might then turn it into a mosque.
The Islamic world will have to decide its own future course by itself, and outsiders can only hope that its future struggle for ideas will invoke those historical periods in which there was genuine curiosity about the
ideas and history of the earlier monotheistic faiths and not an effort to erase them or eradicate what is left of their historical archaeological legacy.
Keeping Jerusalem open for all faiths is a historical responsibility of the State of Israel. Yet, Jerusalem has been at the heart of a great internal debate in Israel and the Jewish world more broadly. Many with a more particularistic orientation understand its reunification in 1967 as part of the national renewal of a people who had faced centuries of exile and even extermination just a few decades earlier. It was where the Jews first restored a clear-cut majority back in 1863 at a time when the world began to recall and recognize their historical rights and title. Jerusalem was the meeting point between the nation's ancient history and its modern revival.
Others with a more universalistic view make a priority of integrating the modern State of Israel with the world community by using Jerusalem as a bargaining chip in a peace process presently under the auspices of the EU, Russia, the UN, and the U.S. In fact, the elaborate international ceremonies of world leaders orchestrated around the signing of each peace accord in the 1990s were intended to remind Israelis that their international acceptance as well as the normalization of their relations with their Arab neighbors was tied to this very diplomatic process.
The clash between the particularistic instincts inside Israel and its universalistic hopes has lain at the heart of the country's political debate for forty years. Jerusalem is where these two national instincts converge, for by protecting Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty, the State of Israel also serves a universal mission of keeping the holy city truly free and accessible for peoples of all faiths. Particularists will have to understand that there are other religious groups with a stake in the future of the Holy City, while universalists will have to internalize that they have a great national legacy worth protecting for the world and that conceding it would condemn it to total uncertainty at best.
This duality was once understood in ancient times, when protecting the freedom of Jerusalem meant keeping it open as a place of pilgrimage to Jews and Gentiles alike. As described earlier, the Temple service included offerings for the peace of all the nations of the world. These religious principles, reflected in the prophetic traditions of Isaiah and Alicah
as well, should be a source of current inspiration, even if the ancient services on which they were based are no longer practiced.
Modern Israel has faced a constant security challenge in recent years, forcing it to address tough dilemmas as Jerusalem's custodian. During times of elevated threat levels, for example, it has had to limit the age groups of Palestinians from the West Bank entering Jerusalem in order to reduce the risk of suicide bombing attacks. Clearly, in a more peaceful environment, such regulations would be completely unnecessary, as was the case before the current wave of militant Palestinian violence began. But circumstances presently require that a delicate balance be maintained between the needs of vigilance and a policy of wide-open entry to Jerusalem's most sensitive sites. Israel has also had to take action against a tiny internal faction who do not care about the holy sites of others, by employing its security establishment and its criminal justice system.
Israel's security challenge has required it to extend its security fence around Jerusalem as well, in order to prevent Hamas suicide bombers strolling unobstructed into the heart of the city to attack crowded public areas. Christian institutions near Jerusalem's municipal borders were concerned about being cut off from the Holy City, despite the many crossing points the fence will have. In response to the request by the main Christian churches, the Israeli defense establishment managed to include nineteen out of twenty-two Christian sites inside the new fence. 18 Of course, had the Palestinian Authority dismantled the terrorist groups in the areas under its jurisdiction, the fence would have been totally unnecessary. But after more than a thousand Israelis died from these attacks since the Oslo Agreement was signed, it has become essential for Israel's defense. Outside Jerusalem, the fence could make the movement of pilgrims on special holidays more difficult in certain areas, but it will save the lives of all Jerusalem's civilians, which is both Israel's paramount responsibility and ultimately the supreme religious value for all faiths.
Keeping Jerusalem united and free under the sovereignty of Israel is not a break from international norms or practice. Historically, there have been international claims that other holy cities be internationalized as well. This was the case with Istanbul, the seat of Eastern Orthodox Christian-
ity after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, some called for Mecca's internationalization after the Saudis captured the city in the 1920s, when Indian Muslims became concerned by the implications of Wahhabi rules for the practice of other Islamic traditions. But these challenges eventually abated. Ultimately, there is no reason why Israel's role in Jerusalem cannot come to be accepted as well.
It has now been close to forty years since Israel reunited Jerusalem after the 1967 Six-Day War. Access to the Holy City has grown, new religious seminaries have been built, holy shrines have been restored, and Jerusalem's ancient heritage has been unveiled as never before. Jerusalem's multitude of visitors has included peace-loving pilgrims from every continent, including from countries with which Israel has no diplomatic relations. What should now be clear is that no other state or international body can truly protect the peace, freedom, and religious pluralism of the Holy City for all mankind. Rather than fight against the unity of Jerusalem, the world community should come forward to embrace it.
Appendix
1. Excerpts from 1864 British Consular Report: Jerusalem Demographics in 1863
2. The Palestine Mandate: July 24, 1922
3. 1924 Supreme Muslim Council Guidebook to the Haram al-Sharif
4. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181: November 29, 1947
5. Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement: April 3, 1949
6. UN Security Council Resolution 242: November 22, 1967
7. UN Security Council Resolution 338: October 22, 1973
8. International Interpretations of the Negotiations over UN Security Council Resolution 242 and Subsequent National Positions: Selected Quotations
9. Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Declaration of Principles (Oslo Accords): September 13, 1993
10. The Washington Declaration: July 25,1994
11. Letter from President George W. Bush to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon: April 14, 2004
12. UN Charter—Relevant Articles—Chapter VI, Chapter VII, and Article 80
Excerpts from an 1864 British Consular report on Jerusalem demographics in 1863
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The Palestine Mandate
July 24, 1922
The Council of the League of Nations:
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandator} 7 selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and
Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and
Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and
Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and
WTiereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the
League of Nations; confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows:
ARTICLE 1. The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.
ART 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.
ART 3. The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.
ART. 4. An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration to assist and take part in the development of the country.
The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.
ART. 5. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of the Government of any foreign Power.
ART. 6. The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.
ART. 7. The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.
ART 8. The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.
Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately reestablished in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.
ART. 9. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights. Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Waqfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.
ART. 10. Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.
ART. 11. The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.
The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilized by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.
ART. 12. The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.
ART. 1 3. All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.
ART. 14. A special commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council.
ART. 15. The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.
ART. 16. The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.
ART. 17. The Administration of Palestine may organize on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defense of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.
Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine.
The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.
ART. 18. The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning
taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.
Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.
ART. 19. The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of Palestine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.
ART. 20. The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.
ART. 21. The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations.
(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A. D.
(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.
Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.
(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.
No antiquity may leave the country without an export license from the said Department.
(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.
(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorized by the competent Department.
(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.
(7) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorizations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.
(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.
ART. 22. English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.
ART. 23. The Administration of Palestine shall recognize the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.
ART. 24. The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate.
Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.
ART. 25. In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be en tided, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.
ART. 26. The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
ART 27. The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.
ART. 28. In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honor the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.
The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.
Done at London the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.
(emphasis added)
THE FIGHT FOR JERUSALEM
THE HARAM.
[
HISTORICAL SKETCH
The words al-Haram al-Sharif, which can perhaps best be
rendered by "The August Sanctuary", denote the whole of the
losure which it is the object of this Guide to describe,
n is roughly that of a rectangle whose major axis runs from
north to south; its area is approximately 145,000 square metres.
It you wis! idea of it- extern 1 and to see it whole
proceedi :amine it in detail, you would be well-
jed to begin your visit by walking to the north-wesl corner,
and t] sending the flight of steps which lead ap to the
! building on I you will see the whole area spread
you. The vj«-\\ shown on the le Fig. l was
taken, although at a considerable altitude, from the vers "d" 1 '
where you are -
The two principal »• the Dome of the Rock, on a
platform in the middle, and the mosque of al-Aqsa against
nth wall. Other buildings which we shall consider later lie
dotted about here and there. On the let! St wall, the
double portals of the Golden Gate appear. On everj side, trees
break the prospect . which lend a peculiar charm to the s
ie is one of the oldest in the world. f?> sanctity dates from
: perhaps from pre-historic) times. Its identity with the
site of Solomon's Temple is beyond dispute. This. tee, i.> the
spot, the universal belief, en which "David built
an altar unto the Lord . and offered burnt offerings and
. for the purposes of this Guide, which confines itself to the Moslem period, the starting-point is the year 637 A.D. In that year, the Caliph Omar occupied Jerusalem and one of ins first acts was ie repair to this site, which had already sacred
in the eyes of Moslems as the place to which the Prophet was one night miraculously translated. The site had long since been The Caliph and Ins four thousand followers found little I rubbish. There were the ruined walls of the Herodian and Roman periods, the remains of an early basilica probably on the present >ite oi al-Aqsa , and the bare Rock. Yet from this rock had the Prophet, according to the tra dition, ascended t<> heaven on his steed. So the (aliph ordered a mosque to lie erected by its side. His orders were executed, and the building was seen and described by Bishop Arculf who visited Jerusalem about d7<» A.I). But u< oi it remains to-day, save for the name "Mosque of Omar" which is still, but quite wrongly, sometimes used for the Dome of the Rock.
With tin Lbdul-Malek ibn Marwan, tin' Umayyad,
>."» A. D. . lie- history of the present buildings begins. Jeru-
]
(1) 2 SamuH XXIV. 2;
Selections from United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 181
November 29, 1947
Part Ill-City of Jerusalem
A. SPECIAL REGIME
The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations.
B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY
The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, 'Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B).
C. STATUTE OF THE CITY
The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed statute of the City which shall contain, inter alia, the substance of the following provisions:
Government machinery; special objectives. The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:
To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem;
To foster cooperation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any
constructive measures of development of the residents having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities.
Governor and Administrative staff. A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine.
The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.
Local autonomy
The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration.
The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of special town units consisting, respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part the present municipality of Jerusalem.
Security measures
The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.
Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-cooperation or interference of one or more sections of the population the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of administration.
To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order, especially for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.
Legislative organization
A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the Council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.
Administration of justice
The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the city shall be subject to it.
Economic union and economic regime
The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory City. The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all members of the United Nations and their nationals.
Freedom of transit and visit: control of residents
Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within the borders of the City shall
be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.
Relations with Arab and Jewish States. Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connection with the international administration of the City
Official languages
.Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required.
Citizenship
All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to Part 1, section B, paragraph 9, of this Plan.
The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory.
Freedoms of citizens
Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, assembly and association, and petition.
No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.
All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.
No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.
Holy Places Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.
Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.
No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation
than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.
Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine.
The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor. With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine, on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitution of both States, whether the provisions of the Constitution of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected.
The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine.
In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.
D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME
The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of experience acquired with its functioning. The residents the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of regime
Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement April 3, 1949
Preamble
The Parties to the present Agreement, Responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, calling upon them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an armistice;
Having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations chairmanship concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an Armistice Agreement;
The undersigned representatives of their respective Governments, having exchanged their full powers found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following provisions:
Article I
With a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine and in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which shall be fully observed by both Parties during the armistice, are hereby affirmed:
1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties;
2. No aggressive action by the armed forces-land, sea, or air-of either Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that the use of the term planned in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practised in military organisations;
3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected;
4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine.
Article II
With a specific view to the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are affirmed:
1. The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognised;
2. It is also recognised that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations.
Article III
1 . In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties-land, sea and air-is hereby established.
2. No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Lines set forth in articles V and VI of this Agreement; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party.
3. No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the Parties to this Agreement against the other Party.
Article IV
1. The lines described in articles V and VI of this Agreement shall be designated as the Armistice Demarcation Lines and are delineated in
pursuance of the purpose and intent of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948.
2. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Lines is to delineate the lines beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move.
3. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI.
Article V
1 . The Armistice Demarcation Lines for all sectors other than the sector now held by Iraqi forces shall be as delineated on the maps in annex I to this Agreement, and shall be defined as follows:
(a) In the sector Kh Deir Arab (MR 1510-1574) to the northern terminus of the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall follow the truce lines as certified by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation;
(b) In the Jerusalem sector, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall correspond to the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area;
(c) In the Hebron-Dead Sea sector, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be as delineated on map 1 and marked B in annex I to this Agreement;
(d) In the sector from a point on the Dead Sea (MR 1925-0958) to the southernmost tip of Palestine, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be determined by existing military positions as surveyed in March 1949 by United Nations observers, and shall run from north to south as delineated on map 1 in annex I to this Agreement.
Article VI
1 . It is agreed that the forces of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom shall replace the forces of Iraq in the sector now held by the latter forces, the
intention of the Government of Iraq in this regard having been communicated to the Acting Mediator in the message of 20 March from the Foreign Minister of Iraq authorising the delegation of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom to negotiate for the Iraqi forces and stating that those forces would be withdrawn.
2. The Armistice Demarcation Line for the sector now held by Iraqi forces shall be as delineated on map 1 in annex I to this Agreement and marked A.
3. The Armistice Demarcation Line provided for in paragraph 2 of this article shall be established in stages as follows, pending which the existing military lines may be maintained:
(a) In the area west of the road from Baqa to Jaljulia, and thence to the east of Kafr Qasim: within five weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed;
(b) In the area of Wadi Ara north of the line from Baqa to Zubeiba: within seven weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed;
(c) In all other areas of the Iraqi sector: within fifteen weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed.
4. The Armistice Demarcation Line in the Hebron-Dead Sea sector, referred to in paragraph (c) of article V of this Agreement and marked B on map 1 in annex I, which involves substantial deviation from the existing military lines in favour of the forces of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom, is designated to offset the modifications of the existing military lilies in the Iraqi sector set forth in paragraph 3 of this article.
5. In compensation for the road acquired between Tulkarem and Qalqiliya, the Government of Israel agrees to pay to the Government of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom the cost of constructing twenty kilometres of first-class new road.
6. Wherever villages may be affected by the establishment of the Armistice Demarcation Line provided for in paragraph 2 of this article, the inhabitants of such villages shall be entitled to maintain, and shall be protected in, their full rights -of residence, property and freedom. In the event any of the inhabitants should decide to leave their villages, they shall be
entitled to take with them their livestock and other movable property, and to receive without delay full compensation for the land which they have left. It shall be prohibited for Israeli forces to enter or to be stationed in such villages, in which locally recruited Arab police shall be organised and stationed for internal security purposes.
7. The Hashemite Jordan Kingdom accepts responsibility for all Iraqi forces in Palestine.
8. The provisions of this article shall not be interpreted as prejudicing, in any sense, an ultimate political settlement between the Parties to this Agreement.
9. The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI of this Agreement are agreed upon by the Parties without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto.
10. Except where otherwise provided, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall be established, including such withdrawal of forces as may be necessary for this purpose, within ten days from the date on which this Agreement is signed.
11. The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in this article and in article V shall be subject to such rectification as may be agreed upon by the Parties to this Agreement, and all such rectifications shall have the same force and effect as if they had been incorporated in full in this General Armistice Agreement.
Article VII
1. The military forces of the Parties to this Agreement shall be limited to defensive forces only in the areas extending ten kilometres from each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, except where geographical considerations make this impractical, as at the southernmost tip of Palestine and the coastal strip. Defensive forces permissible in each sector shall be as defined in annex II to this Agreement. In the sector now held by Iraqi forces, calculations on the reduction of forces shall include the number of Iraqi forces in this sector.
2. Reduction of forces to defensive strength in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be completed within ten days of the establishment of the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in this Agreement. In the same way the removal of mines from mined roads and areas evacuated by either Party, and the transmission of plans showing the location of such minefields to the other Party, shall be completed within the same period.
3. The strength of the forces which may be maintained by the Parties on each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall be subject to periodical review with a view toward further reduction of such forces by mutual agreement of the Parties.
Article Vin
1. A Special Committee, composed of two representatives of each Party designated by the respective Governments, shall be established for the purpose of formulating agreed plans and arrangements designed to enlarge the scope of this Agreement and to effect improvements in its application.
2. The Special Committee shall be organised immediately following the coming into effect of this Agreement and shall direct its attention to the formulation of agreed plans and arrangements for such matters as either Party may submit to it, which, in any case, shall include the following, on which agreement in principle already exists: free movement of traffic on vital roads, including the Bethlehem and Latrun-Jerusalem roads; resumption of the normal functioning of the cultural and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus and free access thereto; free access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions and use of the cemetery on the Mount of Olives; resumption of operation of the Latrun pumping station; provision of electricity for the Old City; and resumption of operation of the railroad to Jerusalem.
3. The Special Committee shall have exclusive competence over such matters as may be referred to it. Agreed plans and arrangements formulated by it may provide for the exercise of supervisory functions by the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article XI.
Article IX
Agreements reached between the Parties subsequent to the signing of this Armistice Agreement relating to such matters as further reduction of forces as contemplated in paragraph 3 of article VII, future adjustments of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, and plans and arrangements formulated by the Special Committee established in article VIII, shall have the same force and effect as the provisions of this Agreement and shall be equally binding upon the Parties.
Article X
An exchange of prisoners of war having been effected by special arrangement between the Parties prior to the signing of this Agreement, no further arrangements on this matter are required except that the Mixed Armistice Commission shall undertake to re-examine whether there may be any prisoners of war belonging to either Party which were not included in the previous exchange. In the event that prisoners of war shall be found to exist, the Mixed Armistice Commission shall arrange for all early exchange of such prisoners. The Parties to this Agreement undertake to afford full co-operation to the Mixed Armistice Commission in its discharge of this responsibility.
Article XI
1 . The execution of the provisions of this Agreement, with the exception of such matters as fall within the exclusive competence of the Special Committee established in article VIII, shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organisation designated by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement.
2. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at Jerusalem and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work.
3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation not later than one week following the signing of this Agreement.
4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by a majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting.
5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. Meetings shall be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members.
6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ observers, who may be from among the military organisations of the Parties or from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, or from both, in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event United Nations observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman.
7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.
8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement, other than the preamble and articles I and II, is at issue, the Commission's interpretation shall prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.
9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its activities as frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report shall be presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations.
10. Members of the Commission and its observers shall be accorded such freedom of movement and access in the area covered by this Agreement as the Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations observers only shall be employed.
11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this Agreement.
Article XII
1. The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force immediately upon being signed.
2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this article.
3. The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than articles I and III, at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than articles I and III. Participation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties.
4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine.
5. This Agreement is signed in quintuplicate, of which one copy shall be retained by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council and to the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine.
Done at Rhodes, Island of Rhodes, Greece, on the third of April one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine in the presence of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine and the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation.
For and on behalf of the Government of the Hashemite
Jordan Kingdom
Signed: Colonel Ahmed Sudki El-Jundi
Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed Maayte
For and on behalf of the Government of Israel Signed: Reuven Shiloah
Lieutenant-Colonel Moshe Dayan
(Geographic and weapons annex have been removed, see especially bolded sections above)
UN Security Council Resolution 242 November 22, 1967
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing farther that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the
States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting
UN Security Council Resolution 338 October 22, 1973
The Security Council,
1. Calls upon all parties to the present righting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the ceasefire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
International Interpretations of the Negotiations over
UN Security Council Resolution 242 and Subsequent
National Positions: Selected Quotations
Great Britain
George Brown, British foreign secretary in 1967, on January 19, 1970: "I have been asked over and over again to clarify, modify or improve the wording, but I do not intend to do that. The phrasing of the Resolution was very carefully worked out, and it was a difficult and complicated exercise to get it accepted by the UN Security Council.
"I formulated the Security Council Resolution. Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders. The proposal said 'Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied,' and not from 'the' territories, which means that Israel will not withdraw from all the territories." {Jerusalem Post, January 2 3, 1970)
Michael Stewart, secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, in reply to a question in Parliament, November 17, 1969:
Question: "What is the British interpretation of the wording of the 1967 Resolution? Does the Right Honourable Gentleman understand it to mean that the Israelis should withdraw from all territories taken in the late war?"
Mr. Stewart: "No, Sir. That is not the phrase used in the Resolution. The Resolution speaks of secure and recognized boundaries. These words must be read concurrently with the statement on withdrawal."
Michael Stewart in a reply to a question in Parliament, December 9, 1969:
"As I have explained before, there is reference, in the vital United Nations Security Council Resolution, both to withdrawal from territories and to secure and recognized boundaries. As I have told the House previously, we believe that these two things should be read concurrently and that the omission of the word 'all' before the word 'territories' is deliberate."
United States
President Lyndon Johnson, September 10, 1968:
"We are not the ones to say where other nations should draw lines between them that will assure each the greatest security. It is clear, however, that a return to the situation of 4 June 1967 will not bring peace. There must be secure and there must be recognized borders. Some such lines must be agreed to by the neighbors involved."
Joseph Sisco, assistant secretary of state, July 12, 1970, on NBC's Meet the Press:
"That Resolution did not say 'withdrawal to the pre-June 5 lines.' The Resolution said that the parties must negotiate to achieve agreement on the so-called final secure and recognized borders. In other words, the question of the final borders is a matter of negotiations between the par-
Eugene V. Rostow, professor of law and public affairs, Yale University, who in 1967 was under-secretary of state for political affairs:
"... paragraph I (i) of the Resolution calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces 'from territories occupied in the recent conflict,' and not 'from the territories occupied in the recent conflict.' Repeated attempts to amend this sentence by inserting the word 'the' failed in the Security Council. It is, therefore, not legally possible to assert that the provision requires Israeli withdrawal from all the territories now occupied under the cease-fire resolutions to the Armistice Demarcation lines." (American Journal of International Law, Volume 64, September 1970, 69.)
USSR
Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov, November 11, 1967:
" ... phrases such as 'secure and recognized boundaries.' What does
that mean? What boundaries are these? Secure, recognized-by whom, for
what? Who is going to judge how secure they are? Who must recognize
them?...There is certainly much leeway for different interpretations which
retain for Israel the right to establish new boundaries and to withdraw its troops only as far as the lines which it judges convenient."
France
Armand Berard, permanent representative to the UN, November 22, 1967:
"We must admit, however, that on the point which the French delegation has always stressed as being essential-the question of withdrawal of the occupation forces-the resolution which has been adopted, if we refer to the French text which is equally authentic with the English, leaves no room for any ambiguity, since it speaks of withdrawal l des territories occupe's,' which indisputably corresponds to the expression "occupied territories."
Canada
George Ignatieff, permanent representative to the UN, November 9, 1967:
"If our aim is to bring about a settlement or a political solution, there must be withdrawal to secure and recognized borders."
Brazil
Geraldo de Carvalho Silos, permanent representative to the UN, November 22, 1967:
"We keep constantly in mind that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East has necessarily to be based on secure, permanent boundaries freely agreed upon and negotiated by the neighboring States."
Selections from the Israel-Palestine
Liberation Organization Declaration of Principles
(Oslo Accord)
September 13, 1993
The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestinian team representing the Palestinian people agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles.
Article 1 AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The aim of the Israeli Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council, (the "Council") for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and 338.
Article V TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS
1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza strip and Jericho area.
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, border, relations and cooperation with their neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
4. The two parties agreed that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period
(emphasis added)
The Washington Declaration:
Israel-Jordan-The United States
July 25, 1994
A. After generations of hostility, blood and tears and in the wake of years of pain and wars, His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin are determined to bring an end to bloodshed and sorrow. It is in this spirit that His Majesty King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Mr. Yitzhak Rabin of Israel, met in Washington today at the invitation of President William J. Clinton of the United States of America. This initiative of President William J. Clinton constitutes an historic landmark in the United States' untiring efforts in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. The personal involvement of the President has made it possible to realise agreement on the content of this historic declaration.
The signing of this declaration bears testimony to the President's vision and devotion to the cause of peace.
B. In their meeting, His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin have jointly reaffirmed the five underlying principles of their understanding on an Agreed Common Agenda designed to reach the goal of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace between the Arab States and the Palestinians, with Israel.
1. Jordan and Israel aim at the achievement of just, lasting and comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbours and at the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between both countries.
2. The two countries will vigorously continue their negotiations to arrive at a state of peace, based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects, and founded on freedom, equality and justice.
3. Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines. In addition
the two sides have agreed to act together to promote interfaith relations among the three monotheistic religions.
4. The two countries recognise their right and obligation to live in peace with each other as well as with all states within secure and recognised boundaries. The two states affirmed their respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area.
5. The two countries desire to develop good neighbourly relations of cooperation between them to ensure lasting security and to avoid threats and the use of force between them.
C. The long conflict between the two states is now coming to an end. In this spirit the state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel has been terminated.
D. Following this declaration and in keeping with the Agreed Common Agenda, both countries will refrain from actions or activities by either side that may adversely affect the security of the other or may prejudice the final outcome of negotiations. Neither side will threaten the other by use of force, weapons, or any other means, against each other and both sides will thwart threats to security resulting from all kinds of terrorism.
E. His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin took note of the progress made in the bilateral negotiations within the Jordan-Israel track last week on the steps decided to implement the sub- agendas on borders, territorial matters, security, water, energy, environment and the Jordan Rift Valley.
In this framework, mindful of items of the Agreed Common Agenda (borders and territorial matters) they noted that the boundary sub-commission has reached agreement in July 1994 in fulfillment of part of the role entrusted to it in the sub-agenda. They also noted that the sub-commission for water, environment and energy agreed to mutually recognise, as the role of their negotiations, the rightful allocations of the two sides in Jordan River and Yarmouk River waters and to fully respect and comply
with the negotiated rightful allocations, in accordance with agreed acceptable principles with mutually acceptable quality. Similarly, His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin expressed their deep satisfaction and pride in the work of the trilateral commission in its meeting held in Jordan on Wednesday, July 20th 1994, hosted by the Jordanian Prime Minister, Dr. Abdessalam al-Majali, and attended by Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. They voiced their pleasure at the association and commitment of the United States in this endeavour.
F. His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin believe that steps must be taken both to overcome psychological barriers and to break with the legacy of war. By working with optimism towards the dividends of peace for all the people in the region, Jordan and Israel are determined to shoulder their responsibilities towards the human dimension of peace making. They recognise imbalances and disparities are a root cause of extremism which thrives on poverty and unemployment and the degradation of human dignity. In this spirit His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin have today approved a series of steps to symbolise the new era which is now at hand:
1. Direct telephone links will be opened between Jordan and Israel.
2. The electricity grids of Jordan and Israel will be linked as part of a regional concept.
3. Two new border crossings will be opened between Jordan and Israel-one at the southern tip of Aqaba-Eilat and the other at a mutually agreed point in the north.
4. In principle free access will be given to third country tourists traveling between Jordan and Israel.
5. Negotiations will be accelerated on opening an international air corridor between both countries.
6. The police forces of Jordan and Israel will cooperate in combating crime with emphasis on smuggling and particularly drug smuggling. The United States will be invited to participate in this joint endeavour.
7. Negotiations on economic matters will continue in order to prepare for future bilateral cooperation including the abolition of all economic boycotts.
All these steps are being implemented within the framework of regional infrastructural development plans and in conjunction with the Jordan-Israel bilaterals on boundaries, security, water and related issues and without prejudice to the final outcome of the negotiations on the items included in the Agreed Common Agenda between Jordan and Israel.
G. His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin have agreed to meet periodically or whenever they feel necessary to review the progress of the negotiations and express their firm intention to shepherd and direct the process in its entirety.
H. In conclusion, His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin wish to express once again their profound thanks and appreciation to President William J. Clinton and his Administration for their untiring efforts in furthering the cause of peace, justice and prosperity for all the peoples of the region. They wish to thank the President personally for his warm welcome and hospitality. In recognition of their appreciation to the President, His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin have asked President William J. Clinton to sign this document as a witness and as a host to their meeting.
His Majesty King Hussein—Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin—President William J. Clinton
(emphasis added)
Letter from President George W. Bush
to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
April 14, 2004
His Excellency Ariel Sharon Prime Minister of Israel Dear Mr. Prime Minister,
Thank you for your letter setting out your disengagement plan.
The United States remains hopeful and determined to find a way forward toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. I remain committed to my June 24, 2002, vision of two states living side by side in peace and security as the key to peace, and to the roadmap as the route to get there.
We welcome the disengagement plan you have prepared, under which Israel would withdraw certain military installations and all settlements from Gaza, and withdraw certain military installations and settlements in the West Bank. These steps described in the plan will mark real progress toward realizing my June 24, 2002, vision, and make a real contribution towards peace. We also understand that, in this context, Israel believes it is important to bring new opportunities to the Negev and the Galilee. We are hopeful that steps pursuant to this plan, consistent with my vision, will remind all states and parties of their own obligations under the roadmap.
The United States appreciates the risks such an undertaking represents. I therefore want to reassure you on several points.
First, the United States remains committed to my vision and to its implementation as described in the roadmap. The United States will do its utmost to prevent any attempt by anyone to impose any other plan. Under the roadmap, Palestinians must undertake an immediate cessation of armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere, and all official Palestinian institutions must end incitement against Israel. The Palestinian leadership must act decisively against terror, including sustained, targeted, and effective operations to stop terrorism and dismantle terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. Palestinians must undertake a comprehensive and fundamental political reform that includes a strong parliamentary democracy and an empowered prime minister.
Second, there will be no security for Israelis or Palestinians until they and all states, in the region and beyond, join together to fight terrorism and dismantle terrorist organizations. The United States reiterates its steadfast commitment to Israel's security, including secure, defensible borders, and to preserve and strengthen Israel's capability to deter and defend itself, by itself, against any threat or possible combination of threats.
Third, Israel will retain its right to defend itself against terrorism, including to take actions against terrorist organizations. The United States will lead efforts, working together with Jordan, Egypt, and others in the international community, to build the capacity and will of Palestinian institutions to fight terrorism, dismantle terrorist organizations, and prevent the areas from which Israel has withdrawn from posing a threat that would have to be addressed by any other means. The United States understands that after Israel withdraws from Gaza and/or parts of the West Bank, and pending agreements on other arrangements, existing arrangements regarding control of airspace, territorial waters, and land passages of the West Bank and Gaza will continue.
The United States is strongly committed to Israel's security and well-being as a Jewish state. It seems clear that an agreed, just, fair and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel.
As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders, which should emerge from negotiations between the parties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.
I know that, as you state in your letter, you are aware that certain responsibilities face the State of Israel. Among these, your government has stated that the barrier being erected by Israel should be a security rather than political barrier, should be temporary rather than permanent, and therefore not prejudice any final status issues including final borders, and its route should take into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities.
As you know, the United States supports the establishment of a Palestinian state that is viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent, so that the Palestinian people can build their own future in accordance with my vision set forth in June 2002 and with the path set forth in the roadmap. The United States will join with others in the international community to foster the development of democratic political institutions and new leadership committed to those institutions, the reconstruction of civic institutions, the growth of a free and prosperous economy, and the building of capable security institutions dedicated to maintaining law and order and dismantling terrorist organizations.
A peace settlement negotiated between Israelis and Palestinians would be a great boon not only to those peoples but to the peoples of the entire region. Accordingly, the United States believes that all states in the region have special responsibilities: to support the building of the institutions of a Palestinian state; to fight terrorism, and cut off all forms of assistance to individuals and groups engaged in terrorism; and to begin now to move toward more normal relations with the State of Israel. These actions would be true contributions to building peace in the region.
Mr. Prime Minister, you have described a bold and historic initiative that can make an important contribution to peace. I commend your efforts and your courageous decision which I support. As a close friend and ally, the United States intends to work closely with you to help make it a success.
Sincerely,
George W. Bush
(emphasis added)
UN Charter
CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.
Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 3 5
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.
Article 36
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
Article 37
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 3 3 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.
Article 38
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.
CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Article 43
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
Article 44
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.
Article 45
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Article 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Article 47
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Coun-
cil's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.
Article 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.
Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.
Article 50
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United
Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
CHAPTER XII: INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM
Article 80
1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.
Acknowledgments
Anyone who has taken upon themselves to write books knows that they cannot be finished without the support provided by friends and colleagues. In this case, this book would not have been completed without the constant encouragement of my own family, and above all my wife, Ofra, who stood behind my undertaking this project along with Yael and Ariel from day one.
During the years that I have been involved in researching and writing on the issues of the contemporary Middle East, I have been indebted to Ronald S. Lauder, who has been both a constant friend and mentor.
There are also a number of individuals with whom I shared the ideas behind this book. There is a scholar in England who follows the affairs of the Middle East and shall remain unnamed, with whom I discussed the urgency of this project. As in the past, Allen Roth provided ideas that helped me with the design and shape of this project at an early stage. I would also like to acknowledge the advice of Dr. Eilat Mazar, who was willing to share her extensive knowledge of the archaeology of Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, as well as her most recent work in the City of David. Rabbi Joseph Telushkin provided indispensable advice on Jewish history and theology. Dr. Martin Kramer took time out of his busy schedule to provide feedback on one particularly difficult chapter on Islamic apocalyptic thought. Dr. Rivka Fishman was extremely generous with her time commenting on both the Roman and early Christian (Byzantine) periods in Jerusalem, as well as her knowledge of ancient Greek texts. Dr. Joel Fishman read some of the early manuscript and shared with me his broad historical perspective. David Parsons, of the International Christian
Embassy, read through my text on Christianity and made extremely useful recommendations.
As in my previous books, I have had several important intellectual allies, who have been indispensable. First, Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan Dahoah Halevi again demonstrated his first-class research skills in the world of radical Islam, as he combed obscure websites and studied Arabic texts from all over the Arab world. Second, Jeffrey Helmreich read, re-read, and made detailed comments on every chapter of this book, sharing his first-class knowledge of legal theory, which he is studying at UCLA, and diplomatic history. Dr. Reuven Erlich, who heads the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, was always willing to share documentation and provide research tips in a timely fashion. He also introduced me to Dr. Yoram Kahati, who shared his extensive knowledge on radical Islamic groups. Reuven Berko shared his insights in the complexities of Jerusalem, as well. And finally, as in my last books, both Gene and Nadia Kleinhendler also read earlier chapters and provided both encouragement as well as useful criticism.
I owe a tremendous special debt to Yehuda Mali and David Beeri, who are opening the eyes of many visitors to Jerusalem and inspiring thousands with the latest discoveries about its ancient heritage.
James S. Snyder, director of the Israel Museum, and his team were extremely helpful in locating and explaining archaeological artifacts used for this book.
A virtual army of research assistants stood behind this book. Again, Zachary K. Goldman provided me with critical documents at a very early stage of this project. Amir Tsemach was highly motivated in providing materials as well. David Keyes resumed my past collaboration with him on studying the lessons of the Camp David/Taba period from 2000-2001 and produced first-class analytical work in this area. My daughter Yael Gold took time off from the Technion and went through historical materials in Hebrew from the same period and provided meticulous summaries and analysis as well. Benny Silberman volunteered to help in the final weeks of research and contributed his useful findings to this work.
Four individuals came in at the very end of this project and provided critical advice. Shammai Fishman shared his knowledge of the Muslim Brotherhood and Yechiel Leiter opened up before me his tremendous knowledge of Hebrew Bible. Aron U. Raskas came up with extremely important suggestions for the final text as did David Goder, who was intimately involved in my past writing projects.
I must express my appreciation for the entire team at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, who put in extra hours while I was busy with this book, especially our director general, Chaya Herskovic. I am especially grateful to Rachel Elrom, who put in long hours helping me put this manuscript in shape and whose watchful eye corrected errors before they were even typed.
I owe a special debt of gratitude to the whole team at Regnery, starting with Jeffrey J. Carneal, president of Eagle Publishing, and Marjory G. Ross, president and publisher of Regnery Publishing, as well as Harry Crocker, who understood at the outset the importance of this project. My daily contacts at Regnery were with Miriam Moore, who took the leading role as project director of the book, providing critical comments and constructive feedback as we progressed through the project. I would like to acknowledge as well the hard work of Jack Langer, who edited the text, and Amanda Larsen, who handled much of the graphic work. All of them demonstrated extraordinary patience and professionalism as we worked on this text together.
Finally, my agent Richard Pine read carefully my proposal for this book at the outset and provided important input into its refinement. His faith in this project and his encouraging messages while it was being written all contributed to its successful completion.
Notes
Introduction
1. The State Department's Aaron Miller later recalled, "On the event of the Camp David summit, I would argue to you, no atmosphere or environment was worse for a high-level meeting between Israelis and Palestinians. There was more suspicion on the part of Barak and Arafat in July 2000, as a consequence of broken promises, unfulfilled agreements, the power of the weak versus the power of the strong on the ground. It was not, in my judgement, an auspicious occasion for a high-level summit." "Lessons of Arab-Israeli Negotiating: From Negotiations Look Back and Ahead," April 25, 2005, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.
2. Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Sto?y of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 690.
3. Ruth Lapidoth and Moshe Hirsch, eds., Document 37, "Israel's Protection of the Holy Places Law, 5727-1967, 27 June 1967," The Jerusalem Question and Its Resolution: Selected Documents (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), 169.
4. "Palestinian Summer Camp Offers the Games of War," New York Times, August 3, 2000. The armed conquest of Jerusalem was clearly at the forefront of the camp's indoctrination efforts. According to the article, "many [camp attendees] predicted that their generation would someday take up arms against Israel over Jerusalem." A fifteen-year-old boy told the Times, "If we can get Jerusalem without weapons, it is better. But if there is a need to liberate Jerusalem with weapons, we will be ready for that."
5. Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), 496.
6. State of Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, "First Statement of the Government of Israel," December 28, 2000), 61-63.
7. Al-Safir, March 3, 2001, trans. MEMRI.
8. "Bus Shooting Caps Turbulent Day in Middle East," CNN.com, October 7, 2000.
9. Ibid.
10. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004), 224.
11. Ibid.
12. Bernard Lewis, "License to Kill: Usama bin Laden's Declaration of Jihad," Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998.
13. David Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005), 174.
14. Montasser al-Zayyat, The Road to al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Ladens Right-HandMan (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 62.
15. Ari Shavit, "End of a Journey," Ha'aretz, September 13, 2001.
16. Shlomo Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 270.
17. Ross, 756.
18. "High Marks: Ariel Sharon Gets Warm Greetings from the White House, Congress and American Jews," Baltimore Jewish Times, March 23, 2001.
19. Ross, 694.
20. Benny Morris, "Camp David and After: An Interview with Ehud Barak," New York Review of Books, August 9, 2001.
21. "Interview with Yasser Arafat," MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series No. 428, October 11,2002.
22. Al-Ayyam, July 27, 2000, trans. MEMRI.
23. Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East 1995-2002 (New York: Other Press, 2002), 272.
24. Le Monde, September 25, 2000.
25. Yael Yehoshua, "Abu Mazen: A Political Profile," MEMRI, April 29, 2003, quoting Kul Al-Arab, August 25, 2000; http://www.memri.org/bin/arti-cles.cgi?Area=sr&ID=SR01503.
26. Romesh Ratnesar, "The Peacemaker: An Israeli Colonel Tries to Keep Jerusalem's Temple, Sacred to Muslim and Jew, From Exploding," Time, October 5, 2003. See PaleoJudaica.com: http://paleojudaica.blogspot.com/ 2003_10_05paleojudaica_arhive.html.
27. Yitzchak Reiter, From Jerusalem to Mecca and Back: The Islamic Consolidation of Jerusalem (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2005), 40.
28. "Jordanian Professor/Terrorist on Saudi Al-Majd TV Says Kings David & Solomon Were Muslims Who Today Would Have Fought Israel, Supports Leading Holocaust Denier," MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series No. 1030, November 22, 2005.
29. Reiter, 48.
30. Israel Finkelstein and Neil Silberman, The Bible Unearthed: Archaeology's New Vision of Ancient Israel and the Origin of Its Sacred Texts (New York: Touchstone, 2001), 128.
31. David Van Biema, "Judaism's Stake: The Mysteries of Solomon's Temple," Time, April 16, 2001.
32. Nadia Abu El-Haj, Facts on the Ground: Archaeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 147.
33. Ibid., 250.
34. Daniel Lazare, "False Testament: Archaeology Refutes the Bible's Claim to History," (Criticism), Harpers, March 2002.
35. Eliat Mazar, "Did I Find King David's Palace?" Biblical Archaeological Review, January/February 2006.
36. Shahar Ilan, "Gems in the Dirt," Haaretz Magazine, October 14, 2005.
37. Baydawi writes that the masjid al-Aqsa was bayt al-maqdis, "because there was no mosque at that time behind it."
38. Yohanan Friedmann, trans., The History of al-Tabari: Volume XII, The Battle of al-Qadisiyyah and the Conquest of Syria and Palestine (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).
39. "Israelis and Palestinians Contest Holy Shrine," Associated Press, October 11, 2000.
40. CNN.com, "Bus Shooting Caps Turbulent Day in Middle East."
41. "First Statement of the Government of Israel," 86-87.
42. Associated Press, "Fire Breaks Out at the Church of the Nativity," May 2, 2002. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,51678,00.html.
43. "Greedy Monsters Ruled Church," Washington Times, May 15, 2002.
44. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil ajid Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 201.
45. "Arab Intellectual on the Worsening Situation of Christians in the Muslim World," MEMRI Special Dispatch, Reform Project No. 1150, April 28, 2006.
46. Ibid.
47. Richard Z. Chesnoff and Robin Knight, "A Helping Hand from Saudi Arabia: Who Funds Hamas?" U.S. News & World Report, July 8, 1996.
48. http://www.palestine-info.net/arabic/fatawa/index.htm.
49. "Al-Zarqawi's Message to the Fighters of Jihad in Iraq on September 11, 2004," MEMRI Special Dispatch Series No. 785, September 15, 2004.
50. "Leading Sunni Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi and Other Sheikhs Herald the Coming Conquest of Rome," MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series No. 447, December 6, 2002.
51. Philip Webster and Richard Ford, "Extremist Clerics Face Prosecution for Backing Terror," Times, July 14, 2005.
52. "Saudi Cleric Nasser bin Suleiman al-'Omar," MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series No. 1154, May 4, 2006.
53. David Cook, "Muslim Fears of the Year 2000," Middle East Quarterly, June 1998.
54. Timothy R. Furnish, Holiest Wars: Islamic Mahdis, Their Jihads, and Osama bin Laden (Westport: Praeger Books, 2005), 18.
55. Ehud Ya'ari, "'Harmagadun' Now," Jerusalem Report, May 12, 2003.
56. Shlomo Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 265.
Chapter 1: Jerusalem: The Legacy of Ancient Israel
1. Book of Deuteronomy, 3:25: see Commentary of Rashi, who defines "that goodly mountain" as Jerusalem.
2. The tribe of Judah briefly captured Jerusalem just after the death of Joshua ben Nun, according to Judges (1:8), but subsequently lost control of the city. Meir Ben-Dov, Historical Atlas of Jerusalem (New York: Continuum, 2002), 40-41.
3. The commentary of the great biblical commentator Rashi on this verse identifies Mt. Moriah as the location of Jacob's dream.
4. U. Cassuto, "Jerusalem in the Pentateuch," Biblical & Oriental Studies, Volume 1: Bible (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1973), 78.
5. Adapted from William G. Dever, What Did the Biblical Writers Know & When Did They Know It? What Archaeology Can Tell Us about the Reality of Ancient Israel (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmands Publishing Company, 2001), 218. YHWH refers to the Hebrew name for God.
6. Meir Ben-Dov, Mordechai Naor, and Zeev Aner, The Western Wall (Hakotel), (Bat-Yam: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1987), 81-89.
7. It is notable that the Hebrew word for these pilgrimage festivals in Jerusalem, hag, closely resembles the Arabic word for the pilgrimage to Mecca, hajj, that became one of the pillars of Islam centuries later.
8. Midrash Rabah, Chapters 45 and 49.
9. Zev Vilnay, Legends of Jerusalem (Jerusalem: Sefer Ve Sefel Publishing, 2004), 7-8. See also "Even Shtiah," Encyclopedia Talmudit (Jerusalem: Talmudic Encylcopedia, 1990), 85. The foundation stone is mentioned in Mishnah Yoma, Chapter 53, Mishnah 2. In Tractate Yoma of the Talmud (54:b), reference is made to the Mishnah and is explained as follows: "A stone was there in the Holy of Holies from the days of the early prophets, and it was called Shetiyah (foundation)." See Talmud Bavli, Tractate Yoma, Volume II, Schottestein Edition (Brooklyn: Mesorah Publications, 2005), 54b 1.
10. David Van Biema, "Judaism's Stake: The Mysteries of Solomon's Temple," Time, April 16,2001.
11. Daniel Lazare, "False Testament: Archaeology Refutes the Bible's Claim to History" (Criticism), Harpers, March 2002.
12. Eilat Mazar, "Did I Find King David's Palace?" Biblical Archaeological Review, January/ February 2006. Andre Lemarie, "The United Monarchy: Saul, David and Solomon," in Hershel Shanks, ed., Ancient Israel: From Abraham to the Roman Destruction of the Temple (Washington: Bibli-
cal Archaeological Society/Prentine Hall, 1999), 117. Kathleen Kenyon and Yigal Shiloh dated the stepped-stone structure to the time of David and Solomon; Amihai Mazar has also written that the "stepped structure ... may tentatively be attributed to the tenth century B.C.E." See Amihai Mazar, Archaeology of the Land of the Bible 10,000-586 B.C.E. (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 374. Israel Finkelstein has disagreed with these views. See Israel Finkelstein and Neil Asher Silberman, David and Solomon: In Search of the Bibles Sacred Kings and the Roots of Western Tradition (New York: Free Press, 2006), 270.
13. K. A. Kitchen, On the Reliability of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003), 93.
14. James B. Pritchard, ed., The Ancient Near East: Volume 1, An Anthology of Texts and Pictures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 209-210. The French scholar Andre Lemaire has examined the Moabite Stone in the Louvre. Upon rinding the phrase "the House of [D]avid;" he inserted the missing "D," which is the only reading that makes sense. See Kitchen, 92-93. The "Mesha Stone" today is kept at the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago.
15. Kitchen, 92.
16. Israel Finkelstein and Neil Asher Silberman, The Bible Unearthed: Archaeology s New Vision of Ancient Israel and the Origin of Its Sacred Texts (New York: Touchstone, 2001), 129.
17. Gabriel Barkay, "The Iron Age II-III"; Amnon Ben-Tor, ed., The Archaeology of Ancient Israel (New Haven: Yale University Press, with the Open University of Israel, 1992), 307.
18. Dever, 131-32. For a different view of the Solomonic gates, see Finkelstein and Silberman, The Bible Unearthed, 138-40. They argue that the prototypes in northern Syria for what Yadin concluded were Solomon's cities were built a half century after Solomon. But what if the north Syrian structures did not serve as the prototypes for construction by King Solomon?
19. Yigael Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, Volume Two (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), 288.
20. Simon Goldhill, The Temple of Jerusalem (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 43. Goldhill writes, "Ezekiel was a priest who was exiled to Babylon, where he was inspired to deliver judgments and prophecies which make up the Book of Ezekiel. Central to this book too is an image of the Temple." Amihai Mazar also notes that "Detailed descriptions of the Solomonic temple appear in 1 Kings 5:16-6:38 and 2 Chronicles 4. To those may be added the firsthand evidence of Ezekiel (Chapters 40-44), (emphasis added). See A. Mazar, 376.
21. Eilat Mazar, The Complete Guide to the Temple Mount Excavations (Shoham Academic Research and Publication, 2002), 9. See also analysis of Ernest-Marie Lapperrousaz, in Lemaire, 117.
22. Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 163. Michael Walzer, Exodus and Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
23. Norman Podhoretz, The Prophets: Who They Were, What They Are (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 191.
24. Pritchard, 198-201.
25. John Bright, A History of Israel (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1974), 288.
26. Ibid., 315-17.
27. Ibid., 318-19.
28. Rabbi Joseph Telushkin, Biblical Literacy (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1997), 270-73.
29. Bright, 321-22.
30. Midrash Rabbah, Chapters 45 and 49.
31. Ibid.
32. "For when Alexander while still far off saw the multitude in white garments the priests at their head clothed in linen, and the high priest in a robe of hyacinth-blue and gold, wearing on his head the mitre with the golden plate on it on which was inscribed the name of God, he approached alone and prostrated himself before the Name and first greeted the high
priest Then he went up to the temple, where he sacrificed to God
under the direction of the high priest, and showed due honour to the priests and to the high priest himself." See Josephus, Jewish Antiquities Books IX-XI (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 475-77.
33. David Golan, "Josephus, Alexander's Visit to Jerusalem, and Modern Historiography" in Uriel Rappaport, ed., Josephus Flavius: Historian ofEretz-Israel in the Hellenistic-Roman Period [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben Zvi, 1982), 29-55.
34. Talmud Bavli, Tracdate Yoma, Volume II, Schottenstein Edition (Brooklyn: Mesorah Publications, 2005), 69a4.
35. Herod was from an Idumean family that converted to Judaism. Though despised for murdering Hasmoneans and members of the Sanhedrin, his Jewishness was not challenged by Jewish sources. Eusebius, one of the Church fathers, nonetheless called Herod "a foreigner": "Herod was the
first foreigner to hold the sovereignty of the Jewish nation " Eusebius,
the Ecclesiatical History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 49.
36. The Romans captured Josephus and subsequently gave him Roman citizenship and a stipend, which allowed him to chronicle the revolt.
37. Josephus, The Jewish War (London: Penguin Books, 1981), 156-58.
38. Ibid., 164.
39. Ibid., 27.
40. Neil Faulkner, Apocalypse: The Great Jewish Revolt Against Rome AD 66-13 (Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing, Ltd., 2004), 288.
41. Ibid., 189.
42. Menachem Stern, Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism, Volume 2: From Tacitus to Simplicius (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1980), 64.
43. Karen Armstrong, Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths (New York: Ballantine Books, 1997), 153.
44. Gedaliah Alon, The Jews in Their Land i?i the TalmudicAge (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1984), 629.
45. Eric H. Cline, Jerusalem Besieged: From Ancient Canaan to Modern Israel (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 128-29.
46. Hadrian's name was Aelia Hadrianus, while the name Capitolina refers to the cult of Capitoline in Rome. See Cline, 131.
47. "Since the days the wicked empire has taken over, laying upon us its evil decrees, keeping us from the [study] of Torah and the life of mitzvot]..." Tractate Baba Batra 60b, cited in Alon, 584.
48. Maimonides, Mishna Torah, "The Laws of Judges," Chapter 11, Law 3 Jerusalem: Wagsal, 1990), 207.
49. Yigael Yadin, Bar-Kochba: The Rediscovery of the Legendary Hero of the Last Jewish Revolt Against Imperial Rome ( London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1971), 81-85.
50. Lawrence H. Schifrman, From Text to Tradition: A History of Second Temple and Rabbinic Judaism (Hoboken: Ktav Publishing, 1991), 245.
51. Cited in Alon, 593.
52. Josephus, 189.
53. Faulkner, 383-86.
54. Alon, 613-15. Historians do not have a unanimous view as to whether Bar Kochba captured Jerusalem. The Christian historian Eusebius writes of Hadrian as the last conqueror of Jerusalem after Vespasian. This implies that Hadrian captured the city from Jewish authorities during the Bar Kochba revolt. Jewish sources in the Midrash support this view. The fact that the Roman historian Dio Cassius is silent on the issue of Jerusalem constitutes a source of doubt about when Bar Kochba reached the Holy City.
55. Alon, 607.
56. Some of the Greek-named rebels may have been Hellenized Jews, but this does not negate the fact that Gentiles also participated in the revolt.
57. Alon, 628.
58. Lawrence H. Schiffman, Who Was a Jew?: Rabbinic and Halakhic Perspectives on the Jewish-Chrisitian Schism (Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House, 1985), 76. There are widely differing interpretations of Jewish-Christian relations in the first and second centuries. Lee Levine writes of the trend of "the Jerusalem authorities to persecute the church time and again." He also reports that the high priest Ananus ordered the execution of the Apostle James. See Lee I. Levine, Jerusalem: Portrait of the City in the Second Temple Period (New York: Jewish Publication Society, 2002), 206. Karen
Armstrong, in contrast, conveys a different version of James's death: the high priest condemned James to death in 62 C.E. for "breaking the law," but eighty Pharisees protest the sentence to Rome, on James's behalf, and die with him. See Armstrong, 151.
David Flusser explains that "Annas" was a Sadducean high priest who convened the Sanhedrin to judge James, but that the Pharisees charged that the session was illegal. David Flusser, Jesus (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1997), 146. In another account, Ananus was deposed after only three months in office for ordering the execution by the Jewish king Agrippas II and the Roman procurator Festus. See John Dominic Crossan and Jonathan L. Reed, Excavating Jesus: Beneath the Stones, Behind the Texts (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 35, 47.
59. Alon, 593.
60. Aharon Oppenheimer, "The Bar Kochba Revolt", in Z. Baras, S. Safrai, M. Stern, and Y.Tsafrir, eds., Eretz Israel: From the Destruction of the Second Temple to the Muslim Conquest Volume I (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Tzvi, 1982), 73.
61. Midrash Shmot Rabbah, 2:5.
62. Michael Avi-Yonah, In the Days of Rome and Byzantium [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: The Bialik Institute, 1970), 64-67.
63. Leonard Victor Rutgers, "Diaspora Synagogues: Synagogue Archaeology in the Greco-Roman World" in Steven Fine, ed., Sacred Realm: The Emergence of the Synagogue in the Ancient World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 84-88.
64. Steven Fine, "From Meeting House to Sacred Realm: Holiness and the Ancient Synagogue" in ibid., 26. See also Mishnah Rosh Ha-Shanah, 4:1-3.
65. Mordecai Naor, City of Hope: Jerusalem fi'om Biblical to Modern Times (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1997), 81.
66. Moshe Gil, A Histoiy of Palestine: 634-1099 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3.
67. Ibid., 2.
68. Ibid., 3.
69. Ibid.
70. Naor, 96. H. H. Ben-Sasson, ed., A Histoty of the Jewish People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 312.
71. Dan Bahat, "Jerusalem Down Under: Tunneling Along Herod's Temple Mount Wall," Biblical Archaeological Review, November/December 1995.
72. Gil, 72.
73. Ibid., 171.
74. Salo Wittmayer Baron, A Social and Religious Histoty of the Jews: Late Middle Ages and Era of European Expansion, 1200-1650, Volume 4 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 95.
75. Arie Morgenstern, "Dispersion and the Longing for Zion, 1240-1840," Azure, No. 12, Winter 2002, 86-87.
76. Ibid., 87.
77. Hans Lewy, Alexander Altmann, and Isaac Heinemann, eds., Three Jewish Philosophers (New Milford: The Toby Press, 2006), 109.
78. Ibid., 108.
79. The Twelve Prophets [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1990), 33.
Chapter 2: Christianity and Jerusalem
1. Hershel Shanks, "Where Jesus Cured the Blind Man," Biblical Archaeology Review, September/October 2005, 16-23.
2. John Dominic Crossan and Jonathan L. Reed, Excavating Jesus: Beneath the Stones, Behind the Texts (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 321.
3. Karen Armstrong, Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 159.
4. Ibid., 161.
5. David Chidester, Christianity: A Global History (London, Penguin Books, 2000), 29-31.
6. Gedaliah Alon, The Jews in Their Land in the Talmudic Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 295.
7. Lawrence H. Schiffrnan, From Text to Tradition: A History of Second Temple & Rabbinic Judaism (Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House, 1991), 152-54.
8. Peter Walker, "Jerusalem in the Early Christian Centuries," in W. L. Walker, ed., Jerusalem Past and Present in the Purposes of God (Cambridge: Tyndale House, 1992), 83.
9. W L. Walker, Jesus and the Holy City: New Testament Perspectives on Jerusalem (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996), 321.
10. Chidester, 46-64.
11. W L. Walker, Jesus and the Holy City, 322.
12. Armstrong, 171.
13. Bernard Wasserstein, Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 5.
14. Ibid.
15. James Carroll, Constantine's Sword: The Church and the Jews: A Histoiy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001), 166-71.
16. Kirsopp Lake, trans., Eusebius: The Ecclesiastical Histoiy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), See introductory essay, xi.
17. Chidester, 46-64.
18. W L. Walker, Jesus and the Holy City, ix.
19. Eusebius, The Proof of the Gospel, W J. Ferrar, ed. and trans., Book VIII.
20. James Carroll has traced this shift back to the time of the Gospels, whom he charged "deflected blame away from the Romans and onto the Jews " See Carroll, 85.
2 1. Beginning in the 1880s, many Protestants identified the site of Jesus' burial and resurrection at an alternative location in Jerusalem called the Garden Tomb.
22. Colin Chapman, Whose Holy City?: Jerusalem and the Future of Peace in the Middle East (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2005), 59.
23. Ibid., 180.
24. Carroll, 195.
25. Bat-Sheva Albert, "The Impact of Jerusalem on Liturgy and Architecture in the Carolingian Empire" [in Hebrew], Cathedi'a, July 2003.
26. Peter Walker, "Jerusalem in the Early Christian Centuries," 84-87.
27. Cited by Alon, 594.
28. Andrew S. Jacobs, The Holy Land and Christian Empire in Late Antiquity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 162.
29. Rivka Gonen, Contested Holiness: Jewish, Muslim and Christian Perspectives on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem (Jersey City: Ktav Publishing House, Inc, 2003), 82.
30. Cited in Eric Cline, Jerusalem Besieged: From Ancient Canaan to Modern Israel (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 138.
31. Gonen, 123.
32. Ibid., 84.
33. Jacobs, 150-51.
34. Meir Ben-Dov, Historical Atlas of Jerusalem (New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 2002), 161-62.
35. Gonen.
36. Armstrong, 252. Abdul Aziz Duri, "Jerusalem in the Early Islamic Period: 7th-l 1th Centuries AD," in Kamil J. Asali, ed., Jerusalem in History: 3000 BC to the Present Day (London: Kegan Paul International, 1989), 113.
37. Armstrong, 272.
38. Ibid., 259.
39. Cline, 160. See also Moshe Gil, "Political History of Jerusalem in the Early Islamic Period"; Joshua Prawer, The History of Jerusalem: The Early Islamic Period [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1987), 29.
40. Piers Paul Read, The Templars (London: Phoenix Press, 1999), 70.
41. Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 12.
42. These texts are taken from Fordham University's "Medieval Sourcebook"—"Urban II (1088-1099): Speech at Council of Clermont, 1095, Five Versions of the Speech" http://www.fordham.edu/ halsall/source/urban2-5vers.html.
43. Ibid.
44. Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 75.
45. Thomas Asbridge, The First Crusade: A New History (New York: The Free Press, 2004), 35.
46. Armstrong, 266.
47. Ibid., 272. See also Carroll, 255, where he concludes: "Crusading fever meshed with millennial fever, and soon enough the present moment was widely experienced as nothing less that the dawn of the apocalyptic age." See commentary by Professor Bernard McGinn of the University of Chicago on the Crusades on PBS Frontline's "Apocalypse: The Evolution of Apocalyptic Belief and How It Shaped the Western World," http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frondine/shows/apocalyse/explanation/cr usades.html and Richard Landes, Encyclopedia of Mille?iialism and Millenial Movements (New York: Routledge, 2000), 330.
48. Riley-Smith, 24.
49. Carroll, 257.
50. Riley-Smith, 24.
51. Ibid., 10-11: "The increased traffic had probably reflected that as the year 1000 approached the Last Days were near, for it was to be in Jerusalem that the final acts in this dimension—the appearance of the Anti-Christ, the return of the Savior, the earliest splitting of tombs and reassembling of bones and dust in the General Resurrection—would take place."
52. Armstrong, 266.
53. Asbridge, 48.
54. Ibid., 57-63.
55. Joshua Prawer, "The Political History of Crusader and Ayyubid Jerusalem" in Joshua Prawer, ed., The History of Jerusalem: Crusaders and Ayyubids (1099-1250), (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Publications, 1991), [in Hebrew], 2-3.
56. Asbridge, 300.
57. Joshua Prawer, "The Jewish Community in Jerusalem During the Crusader Period" in Prawer, 195.
58. F. E. Peters, Jerusalem: The Holy City in the Eyes of Chroniclers, Visitors, Pilgrims and Prophets from the Days of Abraham to the Beginnings of Modern Times (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1985), 285.
59. Riley-Smith, 43.
60. Prawer, "The Jewish Community in Jerusalem During the Crusader Period," 196.