This final piece of catechetical work, dated 1711/12, may be regarded as the last installment on the “little manual” of divinity destroyed in the rectory fire of early 1709 but still very much alive in Susanna Wesley’s mind as late as May 1711. Her earlier intention, revealed in a letter to her son Samuel, had been to include details on both natural and revealed religion; her later plan, as sketched in the 1711 journal entry, speaks of explaining “the principles of revealed religion” and discoursing on the “being and attributes of God.”1 Though written as a dialogue between herself (“M” for Mother) and her eldest daughter (“E” for Emilia, at the time a young woman of 19), it is, as the epigraph indicates, intended for the edification of all her children. Nevertheless, it is worth underlining the seriousness with which fairly sophisticated theological teaching is set in the context of a mother-daughter interchange.
The content of the extended dialogue reflects the theological concerns of the age. Dozens of books and hundreds of sermons sought to prove Christianity’s reasonableness against the attacks of atheists, both ancient and modern.2 Some of the issues Susanna raises echo, for instance, those discussed in the Boyle lectures, endowed at the end of the seventeenth century. The well-known scientist Robert Boyle set them up “for proving the Christian Religion against notorious Infidels, viz. Atheists, Deists, Pagans, Jews and Mahometans,” and in the process “to answer such New Objections or Difficulties as may be stated, to which good Answers have not yet been made”—that is, to reconcile Christianity with, the new science represented by Newton and by Boyle himself3 Richard Bentley’s 1692 lectures are a significant example of the genre and, as notes to Susanna’s dialogue point out, they address some of the same issues she presents to Emilia. Among the common concerns are proving God’s existence from the existence of incorporeal substance (the soul), from the harmony and symmetry of the human body, and from the “frame of the world”; and taking particular aim at two notorious atheist positions, the Epicurean notion of creation by chance and the Aristotelian idea of the eternity of the world. While not breaking new theological ground, she has managed (in typical Wesleyan fashion) to break down difficult concepts for easier understanding and application. In the process she has shown herself to be a competent interpreter of apologetic theology, just as in other writings she clearly expounded moral theology and spirituality.
In addition, the essay shows the further influence of French philosopher and mathematician Blaise Pascal. We have already noticed quotations from Basil Kennet’s translation of the Pensees, Thoughts on Religion, and Other Subjects (London: A. and J. Churchil, R. Sare, J. Tonson, 1704), in her correspondance and spiritual diaries; here there are additional explicit references. However, as Augustin Leger argued early in this century, there are also several other evocations scattered throughout the dialogue.4
It is worth noting the interesting stylistic tension in the “Religious Conference” between her typical modest disclaimers (in this case, the phrase that recurs a number of times is “I do humbly conceive”) and her sometimes harsh attitude toward the “cultured dispisers,” whom she rails against as “stupid” or holders of “senseless opinions.” Even Emilia, her “constructed” dialogue partner, comes in for some fairly stern words at the outset (“don’t cavil or raise unreasonable questions!”), as if going too far in her inquiry somehow risks being tarred with the atheism under attack—there are limits to reasonableness and toleration! In fact, the cut and thrust of contoversy excite Susanna Wesley and occasionally pull her unawares beyond the self-deprecating modesty women were taught to affect. Emilia and her sisters, if they were paying attention, would have received that message along with the theologically correct line on the “being and attributes of God.”
The only extant manuscript appears to be a final copy, not a draft; it is written in Susanna Wesley’s fair hand with minimal mistakes or changes, and there is even a title page, indicating that this was intended for circulation, if not actual publication. Indeed it did pass through John Wesley’s hands, as an inscription in the flyleaf in his hand indicates: “My Mother’s Conference with her Daughter.” Owned by Wesley College, Bristol, it consists of a bound notebook with 61 pages of text, each measuring about 6 by 8 inches.
Though now long out of print, the “Religious Conference” was accurately edited (from the same manuscript) and published in the late years of the nineteenth century for the Wesley Historical Society in London.5 Though that edition has proved helpful as a reference, I have worked from the manuscript for this volume and have managed to correct one or two of the earlier edition’s misreadings.
A Religious Conference &C6
E. In obedience to your order, I come to be further instructed in the principals of religion. And as I do not apprehend that you have any design to deceive or deal unfaithfully with me, so I humbly beg leave to require, that things may be clearly and plainly proved before you demand my assent to the truth of them.
M. Provided that you do not come to cavil or make objections without or against reason, I am willing to allow what liberty you desire. But then I must tell you that moral truths must be proved by moral arguments, arguments agreeable to the nature of the things whence they are drawn, which, being spiritual and remote from sense, cannot be demonstrated by visible signs like a proposition in mathematics. Nor does their force usually consist in one single evidence, but in the united strength of several considerations, which, when duly weighed, if the mind perceive7 sufficient ground for a rational assent and that there is overweight enough in one scale to incline the judgement of a wise man, insomuch that he sees ‘tis more reasonable to believe than not to believe, in this case we ought to assent without further disputation.8
E. I should be very unreasonable if I desired other arguments than the nature of things will bear. Nor do I design to be troublesome if I can avoid it. My desire is to be informed of the truth, to have my judgment determined, that I may be able “to give an answer to every man that asketh me a reason of the faith that is in me.”9
M. I am very glad to find you so well disposed. For though the reason of our most holy faith is strong and clear, yet since man’s corrupt wit is more fit to pull down than to build up, ‘tis very difficult to bring an argument for any point of faith, but what a humoursome10 captious person may cavil at or find some exception against. And we may humbly conceive ‘twas for this reason our Blessed Savior required that his disciples should “become as little children,”11 should divest themselves of all pride, prejudice and passion, should be12 humble, willing and disposed to learn, capable of being instructed as little children are wont to be. And if our minds were always so prepared, and disposed to entertain the truth, we should not delight in wrangling and disputing as men usually do; but any one conclusive argument for the truth of a proposition would be as good as a hundred.
E. I am of the same opinion, and therefore desire you’d be pleased to give yourself as little trouble as possible. I shall propose my question in a few words; but since I’m very ignorant, I desire also that you would not be offended, though I sometimes ask the meaning of such things as to you may seem easy to be understood by the meanest capacity. In the first place then be pleased to give me a short explanation of the word religion.
M. By religion I understand such a firm persuasion of the being and perfection of God as influences our practice. That is, as makes us very serious in studying his nature and will and very careful to perform all the duties he requires of us, to the end we may honour and please him, so as to enjoy his favour. The consequence of which favour is eternal happiness.
E. By this explanation, I perceive that the belief of a God is the foundation of all religion. Tell me therefore, if you please, how you can prove the being of a God.
M. By the existence of all things or any one particular thing that hath a being “in heaven above or in the earth beneath or in the waters under the earth.”13 By the clear voice of universal nature that loudly proclaims the power, wisdom, goodness, &c, of the great Creator.14 Thus, as upon the sight of some noble fabric or curious piece of art we justly infer that some wise builder or cunning artificer has been at work, so when we behold this goodly system of beings, we may15 reasonably conclude that there must necessarily be some self-existent eternal Being, by whose almighty power all things are created. And this being is God.
There must be something supreme in the order of nature, some First Cause whence all things took their original. For ‘tis a self-evident truth that nothing could make itself. To make is to act, and nothing can act before it be; and to say a thing made itself is to affirm that a thing had being before it had a being, which is a palpable contradiction. The cause must necessarily precede the effect; nor is it possible for anything in the same respect to be both cause and effect. Action always presupposes a principle from whence it flows; as nothing hath no existence, so hath it no operation; otherwise, it must be something and nothing at the same time, which is impossible. Therefore, as was said before, there must be something eternally existing that gave being to all things: and every cause must be the effect of some other cause, till we come to the Original Cause of all tilings, which First Cause is God.
E. I can easily apprehend that neither the world or anything in it could make itself, nor do I suppose that ever any one was stupid enough to imagine it did so. But what absurdity is there in believing it eternal? This opinion hath been entertained by persons of more sense and learning than I can ever pretend to.
M. But this opinion was no effect of their sense or learning; but rather shows us that learning and sense are not always sufficient to preserve men from error. And we ought to learn by such men’s delusions not to trust to our own weak and fallible understanding, but rely on the assistance of the unerring Spirit of God, if we desire to be led into the way of truth.16
Those which have believed the eternity of the world or that the world is eternal should have told us what they meant by the words eternity, eternal, and infinite. I take them to be convertible terms, for we generally use them in the same sense, though with some difference in the application. Thus we apply the word eternity to the duration of existence, as likewise eternal and infinite, and so call it an eternal duration or an infinite duration without succession of parts, such as years, months, weeks, days, hours, also, as there is in time. Infinite and eternal we also apply to the thing or person so existing, signifying that the thing or person so existing is absolutely perfect, immense, or boundless, without beginning or end. Whatever is infinite must of necessity be absolutely perfect, to which perfection nothing can be added nor can anything be taken away. And if absolute perfection be incapable of accession or diminution, it must by consequence be immutable, since all change is wrought either by addition of something wanting or by loss of something it had before; but that can neither lose nor receive must necessarily be always the same, consequently eternal.
Now if you apply what has been said to the matter under debate, you’ll easily perceive that neither the world in general nor any particular part of it either is or can be eternal.
For, first, all things on earth are in their nature mutable, as appears by their being in a continual flux, always changing; and whatever is in its nature subject to change may end, and whatsoever may end had a beginning, and therefore cannot be eternal.
Again, all things in the world are of a finite nature. Trees, plants, herbs, flowers, etc., proceed from a small grain or seed, attract each their proper nourishment form the earth, augment and grow to such a point of perfection, and then return back to their original state. And as plants, so animals have their perfection bounded within certain limits. They pass through many sensible alterations from one degree of growth to another; there is not a day but they make some acquisition or suffer some loss, till at last by death they also are resolved into their first principles.
E. But though each individual had a beginning and be of a finite nature, yet might not the world have been eternally in the same state in which it is now?
M. No. For if the world were in the same posture as it is now, in a state of generation and corruption, corruption must have been as eternal as generation, and then things that eternally generate and corrupt eternally have been and eternally not have been.
The truth is, ‘tis impossible for man’s reason to avoid running into inextricable difficulties and endless contradictions, unless we conceive some First of every kind—one first man, one first animal, one first plant, etc., from whence the rest proceeded. And this first must have a cause, not of the same kind, but infinite and independent.
But to make the matter still plainer, pray tell me what you mean by the world. If you mean the whole system of visible beings, it appears plainly that each individual part thereof is mutable and finite, consequently not eternal.17 For finite added to finite ever so long cannot make an infinite. If you mean first matter, the matter whereof all things were made, is infinite or eternal, you must consider that matter cannot subsist without form nor put on form without the action of some cause, and this cause must necessarily exist before it could endue matter with form, since what has no being cannot act; and if this cause existed before matter, then matter itself could not be eternal, for that cannot be eternal before which another did exist. We must then after all be forced to acknowledge that there is one supreme, infinite, eternal Being, from whom the world and all things therein contained received their being; and this supreme, eternal Being is God!
E. But though the world could not make itself, and though it be not eternal, yet might it not be made by chance? I have heard of a sect of philosophers that believed all things were reduced into the order we now behold them by a “fortuitous concourse of atoms.”18 That the various innumerable particles of which this world is composed, being in a vigorous motion, did at last by a lucky hit strike on this goodly system of beings. Now, pray, what have you to object against this notion?
M. Some of the Epicureans did indeed profess to believe this; but I very much question whether they did really believe it for all that. If they did, if there was such a position held among them, it was certainly the most wild and irrational notion that ever entered into the minds of men. And shows the exceeding corruption and depravity of human nature, in that men will believe the most incongruous and impossible thing imaginable, rather than acknowledge the being of that God, from whose mere bounty they received their own.
But suppose for once that matter being in a vigorous motion should at last by a lucky hit, as you call it, give the various and almost innumerable forms to the several parts thereof; yet still the difficulty would recur. For whence was that first matter itself or who inspired it with that motion? It is in its own nature purely passive and therefore can have no principle of motion in or from itself. And if it had existed from eternity, yet still that would not alter the case; for it must have continued to eternity in its pristine state, if there had not been some Superior Power to put it in motion. What can we say then but that there is a God that created matter and inspired it with motion? Since, to suppose motion without a mover or anything to be effected without an active cause, contradicts the general reason of mankind and may justly be pronounced impossible.
Again, if all things were formed by chance at first, how comes it to pass that we see no such wonderful effects of chance now? We now observe a fixed and unalterable rule, a certain admirable method in the production of all things. Did chance appoint the various seasons of the year, and the alternate vicissitudes of day and night? What almighty power and wisdom must we ascribe to this blind cause, if we suppose it able to form the heavenly bodies, those stupendous globes of light, or to contrive their just positions and regular motions? Does chance sustain the earth, which hangs suspended like a ball in the air? Or did that bound the sea within certain limits and make its barriers of weak sand, which prevent it from overflowing the earth, notwithstanding the impetuous violence of its waves? Observe but the vegetable part of the world and tell me whether you think ‘twas possible for chance to produce the admirable variety of trees, plants, flowers, and herbs. Can it be chance that causes the earth to bring them forth in their seasons and inspires them with that spark of life that is in them and disposes them to attract nourishment, to grow, increase, and seminate for the preserving themselves and their kind, not to mention their various virtues for food and medicine? ‘Tis impossible to conceive this power in so stupid a cause, especially if we consider that the most powerful, the most learned and wisest of men are not able to create one single blade of grass, nay nor so much as to understand and clearly decipher the great varieties in the production, growth, and process of its short yet wonderful continuance.
Observe further the ordinary settled course of generation in animals. You do not see them spring out of the earth like mushrooms; but after such certain stated periods each species generate and produce their like. Nor does man generate man, or a sheep a lamb, as soon as they are brought into the world; but they get strength and vigor by degrees, for till they arrive at a due age, they cannot increase their kind. And as we see nothing but what doth arise from a mutual propagation from another, so all creatures propagate their kind by the same law; not as soon as they are brought forth, but in the interval of some time. Again, what is that which preserves the various species of animals entire and prevents unnatural mixtures, but the law of their great and wise Creator? Chance could never be the cause of such regular productions; nor could it ever endue the several kinds of animals with those curious instincts, by which each creature knows its food and how to avoid such things as would hurt or destroy them. All the brute creation, in working for an end unknown to themselves, do plainly demonstrate that there is a superior Power and Wisdom that directs and guides them in all their operations. For when things act regularly by a rule they know not, to an end they do not understand, and yet work together in the greatest harmony for the attainment of that end, we are compelled to acknowledge an infinite wisdom in the Supreme Cause that ranges all these inferior causes in the order we behold them and imprints on them the laws of their various motions according to their peculiar natures.
Order and harmony can never be the effects of chance. The motions of chance are contingent; but these are constant, uniform, and necessary. Nor will it suffice to evade the acknowledgment of a God, to ascribe all these wonderful effects to nature. For what is nature but the disposition of second causes? And a second proves a first, since the former could never have been but by the efficiency of the latter. Which way soever we turn we must be forced (if we act rationally) to own a First Cause of all things; nor can we possibly give any satisfactory or tolerable account of the world without it. ‘Tis therefore the greatest folly imaginable to deny that which all creatures in their existence, constitution, usefulness, and harmony do so strongly assert.
And if there be such stupendous effects of wisdom and power in the lower rank of beings as surpasses the wit of man to discover fully, what shall we say of man himself, or how shall we account for his original without acknowledging the being of a God? If we do but take a view of his grosser part and attentively consider the exact proportions of a human body, we shall be forced to confess with the heathen Galen, that none but a God could make it.19
I will not take upon me to read you a lecture of anatomy, but shall only make some general observations, which yet may be sufficient to show that even the body of man bears the impress of infinite power and wisdom in the order, fitness, and usefulness of every part of it.20 Indeed the whole model is grounded upon reason, every member hath an exact proportion, distinct office, and regular motion; yet all conspiring to make up one entire harmony amidst their diversity. Being all knit together by an admirable symmetry, they orderly perform their functions as acting by a settled law, none swerving from their rule, but in case of some predominant humour. Some parts of it are the organs of sense, some are for motion, some for preparing, others for dispensing, nourishment to the whole. It would be tedious to speak of each individual part; of the wonderful contrivance of the brain, the principal seat of sense, and source of those spirits which animate the whole body by means of the nerves, which take their original from thence. It is guarded outwardly by a skull to hinder ill accidents, and within by a strong membrane to prevent any oppression by the skull. Nor need I detain you long in contemplation of the mouth, though it is curiously framed for the reception of nourishment, wherein are placed two rows of teeth to rough-grind the meat and so prepare it for the stomach, where ‘tis more easily digested. And lest the drink should mistake its way in that narrow passage through which it is to pass, the epiglottis is appointed to cover that other passage leading to the lungs by which we respire. Nor shall I speak of the heart, of its admirable position and uses; or of the offices of the liver, diaphragm, spleen, gall, and reins, etc. “Tis sufficient to say that the wisdom which appears in any one of these (or indeed of any part of the body) is so great, that the dissection thereof would afford discourse to fill a volume. I shall confine my present observation to the organs of sense.
And, first, I would have you observe the noble fabric of the eye, which is placed in the head as in a watch tower, having the finest nerves, most soft for the reception of so many spirits as are necessary for the act of vision. Innumerable ideas enter this way to the soul, all which are represented to her, as it were, in a convex glass, made in an oval form, being most commodious to receive the various species of objects. See how ‘tis provided with defence by the variety of coats to secure and accommodate the little humour and part whereby the vision is made. Shaded by the eyebrows and lids that are at once both its ornament and safety, which refresh it when too much dried by heat and prevent the insinuation of too great a light which would offend it, cleanse it from impurities by the quickness of their motion, preserve it from an invasion, and by contraction assist it to discern things more evidently that are at a distance.
Let us next consider the ear and observe how curiously ‘tis formed with various turnings to prevent anything from entering that might offend the sense. By this organ the soul makes observation of sounds, which beat upon the drum as they pass through those hollow caverns, wherein is placed the finest echo in the world.
The sense of smelling is likewise of admirable use, and the organ of this sense is not only ornamental, but is also used as a sluice to drain the head of those superfiuous humors that would otherwise oppress the brain. Besides ‘tis an inlet to such odours as exceedingly comfort and refresh the spirits.
Nor is the sense of feeling of less regard than the former, which is not confined to any single part, but diffused through the whole body. By this power the soul sits like an Arachne in the midst of her loom and is aware of all motions that are made in it, and is awakened by every new impulse to stand upon her guard.
I shall not stay to discourse upon the amicable conjunction of heat and moisture, of the exact temperament of the several juices, or of the multitude of spirits that act in every part. Not the least or most inconsiderable thing in this wonderful machine is made in vain; but the whole symmetry of the body is a worthy object of our contemplation. Each member bears a signature of omnipotent Wisdom, which is visible to every attentive considerer in the formation and beauty of the parts and vigour of the whole. Now who but a fool could think or say that the eye was not made to see, the ear to hear, the tongue to speak, the hands to take hold of things, or the feet to walk, but that each of them being accidentally fitted for such purposes, we use them accordingly? Or who can be so stupid as to imagine that so glorious a fabric, wherein appear the most exquisite art and contrivance, is a work of blind contingency? Could we clearly perceive the successive methods of generation by which the embryo is formed in the womb, and discern how the first designs of the foetus is laid in its warm receptacle, impregnated with the prolific virtue of both sexes, and further observe how many dissimilar parts arise from those small principles, which are joined together in an accurate symmetry without any visible artist attending such excellent operations? What could we imagine but that a God is near, who says, “Grow there a bone, spring here a vein, let this be a heart, etc.?”21
But after all, should we grant that this noble fabric was the work of chance, that ‘twere possible for a fortuitous concourse of atoms to provide all these wonderful effects, yet how must we account for spiritual substances, such as the souls of men?22 Whence had they their being? Or how was gross, dull unactive matter disposed and modified to give them existence? What is this reasoning principle we bear within23 us? Or by what means does it check, control, and govern our outward senses, if it hath not a power superior to matter? Nothing can impart that perfection to another, that it wanteth itself. And since upon the most exact scrutiny we can possibly make into the qualities and properties of matter, we find it utterly void of reason and judgment, we must conclude that it could not possibly be the original of those excellent powers in the mind of man.
E. If there be in man an immaterial substance which we call soul, this last argument for the being of a God must be acknowledged to be unanswerable. But here the learned differ. Some have denied that the soul is a spiritual substance: and others tell us that, brutes have as much understanding24 as we, only they want speech and therefore cannot express their sense in words as men do.
M. To the first part of your objection I shall give this short and plain answer. If the soul of man hath perception, reason, and judgment and can exert these powers in operating about things invisible and remote from sense, if it be capable of knowing many things without the help of sensitive images, then it necessarily follows that it must be a substance different and distinct from body, and what is not body, is spirit. Body, which is mere matter, has not the power of thinking or reasoning; or if it had that power, it could think only of such things as are made of matter like itself. But it is manifest that the soul is capable of reasoning and judging of things spiritual, that is, of things which have no signatures in matter, and are not ideas of corporal beings derived through our senses or excited in us by the impresses of bodily motion. Such are our ideas of pure intellect, of the ever-blessed God, angels, etc. And I dare challenge the whole world to give a reasonable account how the notion of a God or any other spirit ever entered into the minds of men if there were neither God or other spirit in being. For ‘tis an evident truth that such ideas could never take their rise from anything material.25 I might add innumerable species of reason, the reflex acts of the mind, all our abstracted ideas; notions of moral good and evil, knowledge of truth, simple and complex, of the object and the subject.
E. I humbly beg pardon for interrupting you. But pray why did you say that ‘tis an evident truth that the ideas of God and other spirits could never take rise from anything material?
M. Because were there no God or spirit, nothing but material beings in the world, then all our ideas or notions could only be an effect of matter moving and reacting,26 and so our most sublime reasoning could arise no higher than imagination; which imagination can work upon the soul only by corporeal ideas, that is, by those images formed in the brain according to those various impressions which are made upon the organs of sense by the impulses of outward objects. But since ‘tis plain that the soul hath a notion of a God and of other spirits, and no such notion or idea could be conveyed to her by any instrument of sense, since ‘tis impossible for the imagination to receive an idea of an immaterial substance, for all such ideas are purely spiritual, it is as plain that there are such things as spiritual substances, and such notions are formed in her by the innate power of an immaterial principle reflecting on her own nature and properties.
E. But has not the soul power to collect several simple ideas together and by compounding them raise an idea of a thing that never was in nature? As suppose I take the idea of a horse, eagle, and fish, and joining these simple ideas together, imagine that I see before me an animal with a head like an eagle, a body like a horse, and27 a tail like a fish: now will anyone conclude from this wild imagination that there must necessarily be such a creature in the world?
M. Not to observe (though it may be very material) that all these ideas are objects of sense, I must tell you your objection answers itself; and while you would evade my argument, you do unwittingly prove the soul to be immaterial. For pray tell me how she doth or can collect the representation of sense and from simple raise compound ideas, unless she does it by virtue of her own spiritual powers? The eye may see a horse, and so by that means the idea of a horse may be conveyed to and painted in the imagination; but neither the eye [n]or fancy is capable of judging of this idea. “Tis the soul perceives the form, judges of its colour and proportion and knows it to be a horse. Nor does she only collect the representations of sense, compare and order the great variety of simple ideas that float in the imagination, but she can likewise form apprehensions of things very contrary to those that are conveyed to her by the organs of sense. Yet she does not say that either the senses or imagination is deceived, for she knows that they only represent their own passions, which are really such as they seem to be. But it knows withal that it would be deceived itself if it always believed things to be as they are represented by the sense or imagination. When the eye beholds a stick half under water, it is pictured in the imagination as crooked; but the soul, knowing that the representations of the sense which are carried to the brain by corporeal motion are without judgment, pronounceth the stick to be straight. So likewise when a man in a boat passes swiftly on water, the eye represents to the imagination the images of earth and trees by the river side moving from the man with equal swiftness. But the soul of the man, which hath a power superior to matter, cannot be so imposed on by the rapidity of corporeal motion and therefore knows that ‘tis the boat and man which moves and that the earth and trees stand still.
Thus much is sufficient to prove that the soul is a spiritual substance and that its powers are distinct from and superior to matter. What you would insinuate about beasts does not really deserve a serious answer. And I fancy that any man that is of that senseless opinion, would think himself highly affronted to be told that he has no more understanding than an ass or a parrot. Yet I would speak a few words in answer to this also.
It is very true that brutes have admirable properties and instincts given them by the wise God of nature for good and very useful ends. And such of them as are more immediately serviceable to man, as horses, dogs, etc., are more docile and have quicker perception than others. But still all this comes far short of reason, inasmuch as their perceptions and instincts are always confined to the present objects of sense. Nor can we discern that they make reflection on what is past or are solicitous about the future. But man has a great comprehension, a large scope and prospect of the whole universe and takes within his verge28 as well things past and to come as present. Nor doth he only consider things simply as they lie severally before him, but compares them together, judges of their natures, properties, qualities, mutual respects and influences, etc. And by means of these observations he infers, deduces, concludes, forms general maxims, brings things into order and method, and so raises arts and sciences. All which are the acts of a spiritual being and above any power we could observe in brutes. From whence we must be forced to conclude that man’s nature is far superior to theirs and that he was created for higher and more excellent purposes than they.
Furthermore, if we observe the perpetual and universal subjection of the brute creation to man, we may from thence infer that the nature of man must be superior to theirs; otherwise ‘twould be hard to conceive how he hath for so long a time preserved his sovereignty. Or why, if brutes have understanding, are they not conscious of their strength, and if conscious of their strength, how comes it to pass that they so long and tamely submit to man without once endeavouring to shake off his yoke? They have the powers29 of sense in greater perfection than man; and if they had reason to govern those powers and were capable of entering into combinations of forming designs and of using arts and stratagems for compassing such designs, it is impossible to conceive but they might ere now have found some way to communicate their thoughts to each other, though they wanted speech, and that at some time in some age of the world they might have outwitted him and found30 means to free themselves from the tyrannous usurpations of men.
To sum up all in few words. Since the world could not make itself, because nothing can act before its existence, and since it plainly appears that it is not eternal, by its being made up of finite parts which are in their nature mutable, limited and corruptible; since ‘tis as plain that it could not be the work of chance, as appears by the beauty, order and usefulness of the constituent parts and the admirable harmony of the whole, by the law of nature, which is constantly though unwittingly observed by all the vegetable and brute creation, by the exquisite art and contrivance that appears in the formation of the human body, and, what is still of greater regard, by the certainty we have that there are spiritual, immaterial substances, abstracted from and superior to matter, which could never be produced by chance or a fortuitous concourse of atoms; therefore I conclude that there is one Supreme Being who is a pure Spirit and comprehends within himself all perfection of being, which is the Cause of all causes, the Creator, Preserver and Governor of all things, and this Being is God!31
Have you anything further to object?
E. No. For though I really did never doubt the being of God, yet if I had questioned it, you have, I think, said enough to prove his existence. As I remember, the perfection of God is next in order to be discoursed of. Be pleased therefore to proceed.
M. From what hath been already said, ‘tis easy to collect that God is a being infinitely and absolutely perfect! For if he be the first, the original Cause of all things, he must necessarily by way of eminence possess whatever powers or virtues he has bestowed on his creatures, since he could not give that to another which he wanted himself.
E. This I can easily apprehend. But so much depends on our having a just and clear notion32 of God, that I must humbly entreat you to explain his nature more fully, what he is and wherein the perfection you speak of consists, that I may be better able to form my conceptions aright, since such a general notion cannot be supposed to have much influence on practice.
M. I must here answer you as once our Lord did two of his disciples in another case: “You know not what you ask.”33 All the angelic and human nature, if united in one mind, would fail in power to define his infinite perfection! God only knows what Godis!34 Nor can he be said otherwise to comprehend himself than that nothing in his essence or nature is hid. from or unknown to him. I must freely own I am of all others the most unfit and unworthy to speak on this boundless subject! I cannot so much as think of it but I feel my understanding confounded and overwhelmed with the least perception of his majesty and glory! And I am never at so great a loss for words as when I endeavour to express the little and imperfect sense I have of God so clearly as to be well understood by those I speak to. We know but very little of our own nature; how then shall we presume to speak35 of his that created all things, that infinitely transcends our most sublime apprehensions, who dwells in inaccessible light, unto which no man can approach!36
Yet since one of the first dictates of natural religion, is that we ought to worship and adore the Author of our being, that you may not pay your devotions to an unknown God, I shah endeavour as well as I’m able to assist you in your conceptions of that almighty Being.37
God is one pure essence! Fullness, perfection of being! Self-existent, necessary, infinite, eternal! Comprehending in his most blessed nature all the perfection a spirit is capable of! Such as power, wisdom, justice, goodness, truth, holiness, immutability, etc. He is whatever is great or good! Glory! Perfection in the abstract! Absolutely separated from all moral evil, from whatever pollution can possibly defile a spirit! In a word he is being itself!38
All these perfections, or to speak more properly, this his glory and perfection, is easily inferred, or rather demonstrated from his being the Creator of the universe. His unity is plain from his infinity! For ‘tis impossible there should be more than one infinite being; his self-existence, from his giving being to all things! For if he created all things, he himself must exist before anything else had being. Consequently he must be necessary, self-existent, eternal!
E. I don’t well understand what you mean by the infinity of God; therefore desire you would explain that word to me.
M. Tis impossible for me so to explain that term as to give you an adequate conception39 of what is above the brightest created mind to conceive. Finite can never comprehend infinite. There are no words in ours, nor in all the languages on earth whereby to express infinity. I said before that God is pure essence! Being in general! Which includes his infinity, indeed, all that can be said of him! Whatever glory we ascribe to him, as power, wisdom, justice, goodness, truth, and holiness, are not in him distinct powers or virtues acquired and superadded to his essence, but are his very essence itself! Therefore, though we often call him a wise, a powerful, a holy, a just God! Yet if we would speak properly, we should say he is Wisdom! Power! Justice! Goodness! Truth! Etc. For God is one! And those40 perfections [which]41 we attribute to him under various appellations are42 one and the same perfection in God! Distinguished only by several operations on different subjects, all perfection being exerted in every act of the Almighty Mind!
I mean, then, by the infinity of God that his being, his essential perfection is immense! That is, without bounds or limits! His power inexhaustible! His knowledge, wisdom, goodness, etc. absolutely perfect!
Each created being has a certain sphere of activity assigned by its Creator, beyond which it cannot act. But almighty power can effect what it pleaseth by willing it should be done! Therefore we justly style him Omnipotence! So he gave being to all things that are: the heavens and earth, the whole system of spiritual and material beings he called from nothing into actual existence by one pure act of his Almighty Will!
His knowledge is infinite in that he knoweth himself, the boundless perfection of his own essence! He fully understands his power, and whatever is possible to be effected by it, though those possibilities should never spring up into actual being. By knowing his own will he knoweth whatever hath been, is, or shall be executed or brought into being by it. All things that do actually exist he knows by his pure essence, that is, he sees their natures in the ideas of his own mind and the event of things in the decree or permission of his own will. Whatever things he is pleased to appoint, dispose, and execute, he views in their first original causes. He knows them in his power as the physical principle and in his will as the moral principle, as some have expressed it.43 Thus, he did as in a mirror behold in his pure intellect the various innumerable, substances and forms of all things! Their several powers, relations, etc., ere they existed in the universe, or they had never had a being. As God knoweth all things by one simple comprehension of their causes in himself, so he knoweth them distinctly, independently, and eternally by one pure act of intuition! Not by discourse and reasoning,44 by deducing one thing from another, and from common notions drawing rational conclusions as men do, whose knowledge is successive, being bounded by the measure of their being and capacities, insomuch that it cannot extend itself in an instant to a number of objects so as to make a distinct application of them. But he, by one simple act without any motion doth universally and eternally behold all things which we call past, present, and future! All the various lines drawn from the centre of his will to the circumference of his creatures.45
E. But if God knoweth all things by a simple comprehension of their causes in himself, is he then the cause or author of evil?
M. If you well considered what is evil, you would not ask that question. We call many things evil that are in their own nature indifferent, but accidentally become evil to us by reason of some circumstances attending them or from the imperfection of our present state or some acquired habit which makes such things necessary to our well-being which, but for that habit, would not be so. And the want of those things men commonly think the greatest evil. Of these I shall here say nothing; ‘tis sufficient for the present purpose to speak somewhat of what we call natural and moral evil, which includes whatever is really evil in itself. All evil properly speaking has no positive being. Natural evil is a defect of being, a privation of something necessary to that perfection of being in any creature which God in creation assigned to that species. Of this kind are the diseases, blemishes and defects in the body, such as want of sight, hearing, etc. Moral evil is also a defect; ‘tis a privation of the rectitude due to an act. God, when he created man, gave him a just and holy law, which was designed as a rule of action for every individual of human nature. And any voluntary deviation from this rule in thought, word, or action is moral evil. Of either of these evils God cannot possibly be the cause or author. All his works are in number, weight, and measure most perfect! And ‘tis impossible they should be otherwise; for the infinite perfection of his power, wisdom, and goodness permits not that anything maimed or imperfect should proceed immediately from God. Nor is it more possible he should be the cause of moral evil, since holiness is his very essence! And were he capable of doing anything morally evil, he could not be infinite purity; consequently he could not be God.
Some have questioned whether God could have so much as any knowledge of evil, because of the absolute perfection of his nature. But this is altogether unreasonable. Indeed I cannot see how evil formally taken can have a distinct conception in the mind, by reason ‘tis a privation, and all knowledge is by the apprehension of some being. But then the subject of evil hath a being, and so has a conception. And though what hath no being cannot be known by or in itself, yet it may be known by its contrary. As we know darkness to be a privation of light and folly to be a privation of wisdom. Whoever knows one contrary, knoweth the other.
Others have made it a matter of dispute how God knoweth evil, whether by its opposition to created or uncreated goodness. But this enquiry I think vain and needless. To be sure, he knows it as opposite to created goodness; but he knows it also radically by his own essential goodness. He is the fountain of being and in his being so hath a foundation in himself to know any defect in each degree of being he at first imparted to his creatures. He is the origin of man and endued the reasonable soul with all her powers, knoweth the extent of them and what they are able to effect. He gave man a law to direct and regulate those powers and therefore can’t possibly be ignorant of man’s deviation from the righteous law he hath given him. In a word God’s knowledge is boundless as his essence.
Knowledge is the foundation of wisdom, antecedent to it, and separable from it in man, being seated in the speculative understanding, as wisdom is in the practical. Now because we conceive of God in a manner agreeable to our own nature, we are wont to consider46 knowledge and wisdom as two distinct perfections in God, though really they are not so. For as the sun melts some things, hardens others, makes some things black, others white, produceth contrary qualities in different subjects, yet is it but one and the same quality in the sun which is the cause of those different productions,47 so the perfections of God, though they seem to be divers48 in our conceptions, are one and the same in him! All his operations proceeding from one pure essence!
We may define the knowledge of God to be his most perfect comprehension of, and his understanding, all things!49 And the wisdom of God, his skillful designing and acting all things! “Us that intellectual power in him which directs all his operations to the best and most noble end! 50 Forming, fitting, and disposing all things for attaining that end by the most proper and worthy means that can be! I have already observed that this divine attribute is eminently conspicuous in the works of creation! And ‘tis by the same almighty wisdom51 that God preserves and governs the creatures he has made! As he hath a distinct and certain knowledge of whatever has been effected by his omnipotence, so he hath an infallible wisdom which is the rule that guides and directs the manner of his actions! Nor can the experience of so many ages in the government of the world add anything to the immensity of it! But he eternally hath been and will be original, essential, universal wisdom!52
E. As I remember, the next thing mentioned is the justice of God! And here I desire you’d be pleased to tell me what justice is; for I think I have not a clear notion of it.
M. Justice is commonly defined by the masters of morality to be a desire to render all their due and is usually distinguished into two kinds, distributive and commutative.53 Distributive justice is an exact and impartial dispensation of rewards and punishments, a due retribution to every man according to his deserts, good or bad. This is properly the justice of a magistrate and judge or any superior towards their dependents in some measure.
Commutative justice is common to all men and respects all their civil contracts and dealings with each other. ‘Tis acting honestly, keeping promises, and using plainness, sincerity and truth in all our words and actions.
All kinds of justice are54 in God! Or rather he is justice itself! But we may consider it in him, first, as inherent. And then it is the absolute rectitude of his nature55 wherein all perfection is infinitely exact and regular, so that no one divine attribute does invade the property or restrain the exercise of another!
Secondly, with respect to his creatures. And here also as supreme Lord and Governor of the world his distributive justice is perfectly exact and impartial, utterly incapable of corruption and prejudice! And though it does not always appear in full lustre in this present life, where the methods of providence are sometimes very involved and intricate, far beyond the reach of our apprehensions, and there seems to be an unequal dispensation of what we usually call the good things of this world, yet since ‘tis absolutely impossible for the judge of all the earth to act unrighteously,56 ‘tis a strong presumption that a time will come wherein all things shall stand in their proper light; and divine justice will be plainly and fully manifested to angels and men by an impartial distribution of rewards and punishments according as men’s lives have been good or bad.
Of the other branch of justice I need say nothing here, because ‘twill be necessary to speak of it in another place.57 I shall therefore proceed to the goodness of God!
E. Pardon my interrupting you, but before you proceed farther, give me leave to say that I humbly conceive the definition of justice is not full and clear. For both in distributive and commutative justice, ‘tis insufficient only to desire to do justly. We should actually render all their due, or we cannot be accounted righteous before God.
M. The definition is just and good, being grounded on a true observation of the present state of mankind. Man is here considered as an imperfect impotent creature under the direction and government of divine providence. And let his desire or will be never so just, it often happens that he has not power to manifest the justice of his heart and intentions to the world. And where this is the case, his virtue is absolved in the desire and resolution of his soul and is doubtless accepted of God, who knoweth what he would do if he were able. I shall illustrate this by a familiar instance. Suppose two men indebted to a third for a considerable sum of money. Before the assigned time of payment the one, either by loss at sea, fire or some other calamitous accident, is rendered utterly incapable of discharging the debt and is compelled to break his word. The other, having it in his power, keeps his promise and satisfies his creditor. In this case, though the one was more fortunate, none can say but the other might be full as just.
If ever it please God to inspire our souls with a love of justice, and we heartily desire to render all their due, we certainly shall do it if it be in our power. But if any man say that he desires to do justly and in those instances wherein he has it in his power to act justly he does not do so, ‘tis plain, let him pretend what he will, his desire is not sincere, his heart is not just.
E. But how does this58 affect the magistrate? Can he be supposed to want power? And therefore he is strictly obliged to execute impartial justice in the place wherein he is fixed.
M. Most certainly the magistrate is obliged to strict and impartial justice. And so is each individual of the community in their respective stations. But it may so happen that he likewise may want power, as in the case of popular tumults and insurrections, wherein it hath fallen out that he has been compelled to suspend the course of justice till such tumults have been quieted. Justice is a moral virtue and as such is seated in the heart or mind. Rut the power of rendering this virtue conspicuous to the world belongs chiefly to God,59 who disposes all events. There is one part of justice too much neglected, which yet is rarely out of our power to practice, and that is speaking justly and truly of all men. This, if seriously considered, would teach us to use more advertence in what we speak (nay, and think, too) than we commonly do. For ‘tis certain we may really be as unjust in our thoughts and words as in our actions. But ‘tis time to return from this digression.
E. Be pleased then to define the goodness of God.
M. There are several sorts or kinds of goodness. Simple being is good, and there is a goodness of being which is the natural perception of a thing. And in this sense God’s goodness comprehends all his divine attributes. But what we call the goodness of God60 in distinction from his other glorious perfections I take to be, first, inherent, secondly, communicative and relative.61
The first I humbly conceive to be that perfection of God whereby he loveth himself and hath an infinite delight and complacency in his own excellence and blessedness! 62 But as it stands in relation to others, ‘tis that whereby he delights in the works of his omnipotence,63 and hath an inclination to deal well and bountifully with them64 out of a desire that each individual should be happy according to the measure of its capacity and the rank it holds in the order of beings.
E. But how could there be any relative or communicative goodness in God when there was no creature in being?
M. Whatever is in God was in him from eternity! His essence, as it is infinite, contains all degrees of being or is endued with all possible perfection! And so he hath in himself the perfection of all other beings, whereby he becomes the representative of them all. And though all creatures began to be, and there was a time when nothing actually existed but God,65 yet the simple essences of things are eternal and did always exist, not in their natural subsistencies, but in the divine intellect! And as all simple essences had their ideal existence in God before they were in rerum natura,66 so the same habitudes, respects and relation[s] that attend them and the same beneficent disposition in God towards them did after the same manner eternally exist! The external67 effluxes of divine goodness began in time, but the principle is eternal! But besides these metaphysical entities there were certain actual communications of the divine goodness from eternity! Hence the eternal generation of the Son of God,68 to whom the Father communicated the fullness of the Godhead from eternity!
As relative goodness in the notion69 of it is nothing else but a strong inclination to communicate or do good (which implies diffusiveness), so from this pure fountain of uncreated goodness all creatures derive their being! God did not make the world because he had need of it. His essential glory and blessedness is utterly incapable of access or diminution! Nor is it possible for finite creatures to add anything to infinite perfection! ‘Twas therefore to manifest and not increase his glory that he imparted being and happiness to his creatures! Being itself is good, as was said before, and of this common good all things partake, as well the smallest vegetable and most despicable insect as the brightest angel. But then there are as many degrees of good as there are of being. For though God hath liberally conferred on every creature the best being it was capable of in that station and order, and conducing to that end and use in the world he designed it for, yet some beings have greater perfection and far more noble and excellent natures than others. Herbs, plants and flowers are good as they answer the end of their creation in exhibiting the power, wisdom and goodness of God! But being void of sense and having no knowledge of their own virtues and usefulness, they are equally incapable of happiness or misery. Animals hold the next degree of being in the scale of nature. And as they are endowed with the powers of sense, so their bountiful Creator hath provided for each sense its proper object70 in the enjoyment of which they find a happiness suitable to their natures. But they, not being conscious of those powers nor capable of other pleasure than what animal life can afford, partake not so largely of the divine bounty as man, to whom the almighty Lord hath imparted not only the powers of life and sense but hath after an inexplicable manner to a beautiful body united a spirit71 of an immortal nature, endued with all spiritual powers, little inferior to the angels!72 For the whole system of matter, however modified and disposed into celestial or terrestrial bodies, is not comparable to the lowest mind or spirit, because spirit is capable of the knowledge of all things, whereas matter is utterly stupid and insensible. But the divine goodness to man extends yet farther. It hath not only vouchsafed to give him an immortal spirit,73 but hath also created him in his own image of moral goodness,74 whereby he is rendered capable of divine life and blessedness. For though spirit be superior to body, yet the whole system of intellectual powers is not fit to be opposed in value to the lowest degree of moral goodness or virtue!75
Can you remember what divine attribute we are to speak of next?
E. I think it is truth.
M. You are in the right. “lis so. And here I don’t think ‘tis necessary to trouble you with the various acceptations76 of the word truth, but shall with much brevity consider this perfection as we may humbly conceive it is in God!
E. But if ‘twas not too great trouble to yourself, I would be gladly informed of the nature of truth in general, because I don’t well understand it.
M. Although these digressions take up more time than I can well spare, yet in as few words as I can I will tell you what I know of it.
Truth hath commonly been distinguished into two parts, truth of the object and truth of the subject. Truth of the object is again divided into simple and complex truth. Simple truth is that whereby everything is what it is, which some call transcendental truth or verity and runs through the whole circle of beings. Truth of the object complex is certain habitudes77 and relations of things one towards another, whether affirmatively or negatively, which did necessarily and eternally attend them in their ideal subsistences78 and are inseparable from them in their actual existence.
Truth of the subject is likewise divided into two parts. First, a due conformity between the understanding and the object, when we think of things as they really are, which is logical truth. Secondly, an exact conformity or agreement between the understanding and the words, when we speak as we think, which is moral truth.
E. Pray give me leave to interrupt you a little. For though I can apprehend truth of the object simple, yet I have not a clear notion of the object complex, of the habitudes and relations of one thing towards another, which you say are inseparable from them and are eternal and immutable.
M. I think the one as easy to be understood as the other. For can anything be plainer than that there is a certain habitude between some premises and some conclusions?79 For anything will not follow from anything. That there is certain habitude and relation between some ends and some means, some objects and some faculties, and the like?80 Nor can it be denied that some habitudes are constant and immutable and, having never been made, they can never be unmade but are independent on any understanding or will whatever. The direct consequence of which is that there are necessary and eternal truths.
E. I wish you’d be pleased to give me some instances of those truths that are necessary and eternal.
M. Abundance of instances might be given of truths that are so; but ‘tis sufficient to justify the assertion to mention only some few propositions of eternal verity that cannot possibly have an arbitrary dependence on any will or understanding whatever. As in logic, that the cause precedes the effect in order of nature. In physics, that all local motion is by succession. In metaphysics, that nothing can be and not be at once. In mathematics, that parallel lines can never meet or come nearer each other. These truths are necessary and eternal.
E. But I think some have held that all truths have an arbitrary dependence on the speculative understanding of God! And that he does not understand a thing to be so, because it is so in its own nature, but that a thing is therefore so, because God is pleased so to understand it.81
M. Some have indeed advanced such a position, but ‘tis so monstrously absurd, and such a train of mischievous consequences follow it that wise and sober men generally reject it.82
E. Is then Plato’s notion of abstract essences true? And may we suppose there ever were any such things as universal natures, subsisting eternally by themselves, separate from a divine Being and all other particular beings? That a man, a beast, a bird, a tree, etc., did eternally exist according to which pattern all things were made?83
M. Though this is not much to the purpose, yet I must tell you that I believe Plato was a wiser man than to entertain any such notion; but he, like other great men, hath been misunderstood and abused. I don’t suppose he ever meant more by his ideas than that the exemplars and ideas of all created beings did eternally exist in the divine intellect! Which I think everyone believes as well as he. But the other opinion you mentioned just before, that all truths have a dependence on the speculative understanding of God84 is well answered and the matter set in a true light by Dr. Rust, Dr. More (if I mistake not) and after them by Mr. Norris, which is as follows.85
They consider the divine mind as conceptive and exhibitive. By the mind of God exhibitive they mean the essence of God as thus, or thus imitable or participable86 by any creature, which is the same with what they call an idea. By the mind of God conceptive they tell us is meant a reflex act of God’s understanding upon his own essence as exhibitive or thus imitable! Now ‘tis very certain that the divine understanding as conceptive or speculative does not. make but suppose[s] bits object, as all speculative understanding does; and the truth of the object is not to be measured by the understanding of God speculative, but the truth of his understanding speculative with its conformity with the object. But if we consider the divine understanding as exhibitive! Then its truth does not depend on its conformity with the nature of things, but on the contrary the nature of things depends upon its conformity with the divine understanding exhibitive! For the divine essence is not imitable because such things are in being, but such things are in being because the divine essence is thus, and thus imitable. For had not the divine essence been thus imitable, it had been impossible for such and such things ever to have had a being. But I shall proceed to speak something of truth, as it is one of the glorious attributes of the great and blessed God! And as such I shall consider it, first, as ‘tis an intellectual, secondly, a moral perfection: a perfection of the understanding and a perfection of the will.
The understanding is the highest and most noble power or faculty of the human soul! Truth is the object of it. Knowledge, which is nothing else but an exact agreement between the idea in the understanding and the object (which in other words is truth of the subject), is the proper business or employment of that sublime faculty. Amidst the various degrees of human understanding that is justly accounted the best that hath the largest comprehension and most clear perception of truth of the object simple and complex and that can with the greatest facility apprehend things as they really are. But notwithstanding the action of the mind is so quick that its successive motions are oftentimes imperceptible, yet we know that it can’t considerately attend to more than one perception at once. And though proportionable to the goodness of any understanding is its distance from ignorance and error, yet the brightest human understanding cannot comprehend all things and may err and does in fact rarely attain an adequate idea of an object even in view. Angels, who are not determined to such gross material vehicles as ours, may well be conceived to have all spiritual powers in greater perfection than we. But still their understandings are finite, consequently limited; yet is this comprehension and perception of truth vastly superior to ours.
But what are the understandings of all angels and men, could they be united in one mind, in respect of the understanding of God! In whom the original truth of all things does eternally exist! Or rather, who is himself the original Truth of all things! The brightness of such an understanding would not appear so great in his presence as the brightness of one spark when compared with the whole element of fire!
If we consider the divine understanding as exhibitive, his boundless mind comprehends distinctly and eternally the simple essences of all things with their several habitudes, respects or relations! Which is all truth of the object. And if we consider the understanding of God as conceptive, or reflecting on the multifarious ideas of his own exhibitive understanding, which contains within itself all degrees of actual or possible existence,87 we shall easily perceive that there must necessarily be the most perfect and exact conformity between his speculative understanding and the thing objectively united to it! For truth of the subject is one species of being, as well as truth of the object. Let us therefore contemplate the perfection of the divine understanding under any view we shall find. ‘Tis all pure light! Without the least mixture of shade! Absolutely incapable of ignorance or error!
Though there arc many practical lessons to be learnt from the contemplation of truth as it is an intellectual perfection in God! Such as the highest estimation,88 intense and fervent adoration, profound humility, a cheerful resignation of our own understanding to the89 understanding of God! The effect of which will be a full and ready assent to those truths he hath been pleased to reveal, which are above our comprehension. Yet ‘tis of as much, if not more, importance to us to study truth as it is a perfection of the divine will or a moral virtue in God!
The will is that faculty of the mind whereby we make our elections. That is, ‘tis the power by which we prefer or choose one thing before or rather than another. And though truth be always an intellectual perfection, yet it must have the concurrence of the will to make it a moral virtue. Good, as good, is the proper object of this faculty, and under the notion of good, truth affects the will. And it is here to be considered as opposite to falsehood, as falsehood is a moral evil. And then we shall find that with these respects the perfection of the will consists in a strong, uniform and constant adherence to truth, preferring and choosing it in all possible instances, which implies an absolute and perfect aversation90 from falsehood.
E. Pray give me leave—I don’t apprehend truth as a moral virtue in God.
M. Where lies the difficulty? I’ll ask you a few questions. Is there such a thing as the moral virtue of truth in any man? Or thus, is there any man that wills to act sincerely or speak truly, and accordingly does so as far as he is able?
E. This cannot be denied.
M. Does the sincerity of such a man’s words and actions ever proceed from his love of truth (for love in this case is to considered as an affection of the will) or from what other cause?
E. Though ‘tis possible sometimes for a man to compelled to act and speak sincerely, yet certainly the world is not so bad but someone may be found in it that is sincere in his words and actions because he loves truth and is willing to be so.
M. Very well. Then such a man’s sincerity or truth is a moral virtue in him. Now if a man that hath it in his power to deceive, forbears to do it because he loves and wills to act and speak sincerely, let me ask you,91 from whence did that man derive that will or power to prefer or choose truth rather than falsehood, since he did not make himself?
E. To be sure he received it from God, who gave him being.
M. God could not give man any powers or virtue that he wanted himself. So I need not say more, for you may plainly perceive you’ve answered yourself.
E. I have indeed. But yet I’m not entirely satisfied; for methinks moral virtue must be a conformity to some law. Now God being the supreme Lord of all, who can give law to him?
M. Himself! His own infinite perfection is the rule of his actions! And therefore he is said to act not only according to his will, but “according to the counsel of his own will!”92 And herein consists the perfection and spotless integrity of the divine will, in that having no superior which might awe, impel, allure or persuade, so that all the motions thereof are absolutely free, yet is it ever under the direction of his infinite wisdom, justice and goodness! And so immutably bent towards or fixed on truth that ‘tis impossible for him to err or swerve the least from the most perfect truth and purity in his elections, but he ever wills what is certainly and absolutely best! Nor is he capable of fraud, or falsehood, which are diametrically opposite to his nature! And as it is impossible for him to be deceived, so ‘tis as impossible for him ever to deceive!
E. But I thought moral virtue had been a duty.
M. Justice, goodness, purity, and truth as it respects the will, are moral virtues. The practice of these virtues in obedience to the command and law of God is duty. All moral laws have an antecedent foundation in the nature of God and man, as he was created in his image. For indeed, the moral law which was given to man is a transcript of the pure and blessed nature of God as far as it is imitable by us! And consequently the duties resulting from that law93 are of perpetual obligation while there is a man in being. But to make the matter still plainer, we must first consider virtue as it is a moral perfection. Secondly, as it is a duty.
As virtue is a moral perfection, it consists in being voluntarily just, good, pure, true, etc.
As virtue is a duty, ‘tis a voluntary practice of these or any other virtues in obedience to the law and command of94 a superior Being.
Now virtue according to the first part of this distinction has its consummate perfection in God! But as ‘tis a duty performed in obedience to the command of a superior Being, it neither has nor can have place in him who hath none above him! But if you have nothing more to object, I’ll go on.
E. I am fully satisfied as to this point. But if you please, I would know the reason of your saying that it is of as much if not greater importance to us to study truth as it is a moral virtue in God95 than as it is an intellectual perfection in him!
M. This question will be more properly answered when we come to discourse of revealed religion, and therefore I had rather not reply to it here.
E. Pray follow your own method. And proceed to define the holiness of God96 which is next in order.
M. Holiness and purity are the same and signify in God a perfect simplicity of essence! Of all perfection of Being! A thing is said to be pure and simple when it is unmixed or uncompounded of contrary or different qualities. Thus we call gold pure that is refined from all alloy. The purity of God is so transcendent and sublime97 that he is absolutely separated from all moral evil! From all things, as was said before, that can any way pollute or defile a spirit! Nor is holiness properly a distinct perfection in that most blessed Being! But rather, ‘tis the supreme glory of his other attributes!
‘Tis the glory of his power that it is perfectly holy! Hath no mixture of weakness! No capacity of being employed in any act of injustice, oppression or cruelty! But is ever under the conduct of his infinite wisdom, justice and goodness! His knowledge and wisdom are pure in that they are absolutely perfect! Unstained by ignorance and error, nor can possibly be applied to any end or use but what is infinitely best! His justice is holy because immutable and strictly impartial! Entire and above all corruption or prejudice! ‘Tis the glory of his goodness to be pure! Free from interest and absolutely separated from whatever implies impotence or instability! ‘Tis the glory of his truth to be eternal, simple, undisguised,98 infinitely incapable of being polluted by guile and falsehood! In a word, he is holiness in the abstract! Every perfection in that all glorious Being is altogether simple! So incomprehensibly pure99 that no words, nay, no thought can reach his immense simplicity! And to crown all, whatever perfection is in God is necessary, essential and by just consequence ever the same! Which leads to the last divine attribute I mentioned, namely, the immutability of God!
I’ve already observed that what is absolutely perfect can never change, but must be always the same. For all change denotes some imperfection in the subject and is wrought either by addition or subtraction.100 But what can be added to the infinite fullness of God! What farther access of glory can there be to him that comprehends all degrees of being in his most perfect nature! And for the same reason nothing can be taken from him! For he that is all being and received not that being from himself or any other, but is necessarily and eternally what he is! As he can never change for the better, so neither can he change for the worse! Creatures may be made in some sense immutable by the power and favour of God, but as all things underwent a notable change once, when they passed from nothing into being, so they are still in their own natures capable of increase and diminution and may again be reduced to their original state of nothing by the same power that made them what they are. So ‘tis more proper to say of the blessed angels and “the spirits of just men made perfect”101 that they are unchanged, than immutable, because they are not immutable by nature, but by the sovereign grace of God. For it is the sole incommunicable privilege of the Deity to be immutable in and by his essence! In all perfection he only, by a blessed necessity of nature, is eternally the same! And in him “is no variableness, neither shadow of turning!” 102
Thus I have, with as much brevity as I could, endeavoured to give you some (though a very imperfect) notion of the infinitely great and all glorious God! And from what has been said the inference is very just that a God of such immense perfection,103 from whom we received our being and whatever we have that does any way render that being pleasing to ourselves or useful to others, hath a just right to our worship and service. And this is the foundation of all practical religion.
But how to worship and serve God after an acceptable manner is the grand inquiry, in which we ought to use the greatest application and seriousness, because our present and eternal happiness depends on a conformity to the will of our great Creator. Now in order to do the will of God ‘tis necessary that we should know it. But we could not know it in our present state had it not pleased Almighty God to reveal his will unto us, what he would have us believe, what do, that we may so please and honour him as to enjoy his favour, the consequence of which I told you is eternal happiness!
E. You seem to infer a necessity of divine revelation. Whereas some affirm that God in creation impressed a sense of good and evil, of his laws and man’s duty, on the heart or mind of man. And from these innate ideas arises that universal consent of mankind in the being of a God, which they make one great argument for his existence.
M. Far be it from me to endeavour to104 invalidate any good argument that has been used to prove the being of God. But I’ve often thought that too much stress bath been laid on this, because I think a universal consent in this point is somewhat dubious and is more easily supposed than proved. Besides, if it could be proved, I see not the consequence that therefore there mast be innate ideas or that the being of God is one of those innate ideas, if there be any. For since God hath given understanding to all men, now man that makes the least use of it can withhold his assent to the being of a God, it being, if not a self-evident, yet one of the most obvious truths in the world.105
E. Are there then no principles of virtue or ideas connatural106 with the soul of man?
M. I do not think there are and could say somewhat to justify my opinion, but that I don’t care to enter into any dispute about it. If people will believe there are such things, let them believe so.107 Only this I shall observe by the bye, that there is a certain congruity between moral virtue and right reason. And though in the lapse of human nature reason was greatly impaired, yet it never was so totally lost but that sometimes even in bad men it will exert itself; and whenever it does so, this congruity is perceived which compels them often to approve the virtues they do not practice. And I am persuaded that such men’s giving their suffrage sometimes108 on the side of virtue hath induced others to believe that their approbation of virtue proceeds from some innate ideas they have of it, which they have not power to efface.
E. What then is the meaning of that passage in the 2nd of Romans, 14–15; “For when the gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts …”?109 What is the law here spoken of, which the apostle says was written in the heart? And who does he mean by those gentiles? I think this text hath been often urged in favour of innate ideas or principles of virtue connatural with the soul of man.
M. I have known this passage applied to the purpose you speak of, but I think without reason. For when God at first made man, he endued him with understanding, which consists of these three powers: perception, reason and judgment. And this understanding he gave as a law or rule of action to the whole human nature; and it is therefore called the great law or light of nature. There can be no doubt that this is the law which the apostle saith is written in the heart, it being indeed an essential part of man. St. Paul was speaking110 here to the Jews, who valued themselves exceedingly on account of the Mosaic dispensation and thought it impossible for the uncircumcised gentiles to be saved. This vainglory he reproves and tells them that “God is no respecter of persons,” 111 but “as many as have sinned without law shall perish without law; and as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law. For not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified.”112 For when the gentiles, which have not the written law, or law of Moses, perceiving by the light of nature the congruity between virtue and reason, do accordingly practice the moral duties required by the written law, these having not the law of Moses are yet a law unto themselves. And therein do greatly reproach you Jews that make your boast of the law and yet notwithstanding lead worse lives than those gentiles whom you despise and condemn for want of it.113
Most interpreters agree that those gentiles which the apostle says did “by nature the things contained in the law,”“‘114 were not the idolatrous gentiles, but such as lived before the law of Moses, as Melchizedek 115 and Job,116 or were worshipers of the true God, as Cornelius,117 or repented, as the Ninevites.118 And I believe he did principally intend them, not excluding any other gentile that obeyd the dictates of reason. But then if any of the gentiles did indeed fear God and work righteousness,119 I do humbly conceive they did not this by the mere light of nature without any direction or assistance of God’s Holy Spirit, which was necessary to preserve them from the powers of “the world, the flesh and the devil.” 120 And if God owned any of them as righteous, it was by virtue of their faith in him: that faith by which they believed “he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.”121
E. This shows, however, that divine revelation is not so absolutely necessary, but that ‘tis possible for a man to be saved without it.
M. ‘Tis possible for a man oppressed with heavy weight to walk over a narrow bridge in the dark without falling into the water. But what man in such a case would refuse a friendly guide that might secure his passage?122
Suppose once in an age there did appear a person of superior sense and learning that by the force of his genius and adverting to the dictates of his reason might endeavour to break through the evil customs of the world. Suppose Almighty God, when he beheld such a one struggling under the weight of his corrupt nature, did afford him some assistance of his Holy Spirit in composing his irregular appetites and passions and vouchsafe him such perceptions of himself123 as enabled him to acknowledge and worship the true God! Yet what are a few such instances to the bulk of mankind? For one such soul, saved thus by way of prerogative,124 perhaps many millions perished. Rare and exempt cases, wherein God is pleased to give extraordinary grace to some extraordinary persons, must not be insisted on or brought into computation with his ordinary dealings with the children of men.
I do not deny but that God, to whom all things are possible, may save a man without his having an explicit knowledge of Jesus Christ; but I think ‘tis impossible for us to be certain whether he will do so or no. This we are sure of, that such a man must be saved (as before) by way of prerogative and not according to the stated method of salvation which God has established in his church. Faith and repentance are the conditions of salvation by Jesus Christ! But how ‘tis possible for us to know what to believe or that (if we could repent) our repentance will be accepted in lieu of perfect obedience, unless God had revealed these things unto us, I cannot conceive. Christian religion, as distinguished from natural religion, is a complete system of rules for faith and practice, calculated for the present state of mankind. And ‘twas necessary this religion should be revealed, because man had forgotten his God and was perfectly ignorant of himself. Nor was it in the power of human reason to discover it unto him;125 and none but the Christian religion ever taught man the true knowledge of God and of himself. Ever represented the divine Being so awful, yet so amiable! So full of majesty and purity, yet so full of love and tenderness towards his creatures!126 ‘Tis revelation has instructed us in the knowledge of our own condition, how human nature became corrupted and by what means ‘tis capable of being restored to its primitive purity, and hath assured us of the certainty of future happiness, if we perform the conditions on which ‘tis promised. We might in these matters study, project and propose, but ‘tis hard trusting to nice and curious speculations when eternal misery is the consequence of a mistake.
E. But pray then what is that natural religion which deists and free thinkers affirm to be sufficient to save us without any revelation?
M. Those that in opposition to Christianity affect to call themselves by such names seem to me to have the least knowledge of natural religion of any men in the world; neither do they well understand what they say or whereof they affirm. I do very much question whether we should have known anything at all of natural religion, if it had not pleased God to afford us the light of the gospel. For in our corrupt state “such knowledge is too wonderful and excellent for us; neither can we attain unto it.” 127
I suppose their notion of natural religion is some kind of religion that they fancy we are capable of finding out and practicing by the mere light of nature without any divine revelation or assistance. But in truth had we no other than what that very dim and imperfect light could discover, and were we left to our own conduct without any direction and128 assistance from above, the far greatest part of mankind would have no religion at all.
Natural religion is the religion of the genuine uncorrupted nature of man. The religion of Adam in paradise, while he remained under the conduct of right reason and exactly conformable to all the dictates thereof in “thought, word, and deed.” 129
I do humbly conceive that it consists in a sincere fervent130 love of God, which presupposes all necessary knowledge of him. In an imitation of his divine perfections, as far as they are imitable and our limited powers will permit. And in a uniform impartial obedience to the whole will or law of God, which includes not only our duty towards him, but also our duty to ourselves and neighbour. But this pure religion Adam lost with his innocence; and as he was excluded paradise for his offence, so all his unhappy offspring are born out of it. Nor have we power to approach the tree of knowledge or any right to the tree of life 131 by virtue of the covenant God made with our first parents.132 But all the power or capacity we have of attaining to the knowledge of God and ourselves, all the right we have to the tree of life (or eternal life) is only on account of the second covenant made in and by the Lord Jesus!133 Who united his divine person not to this or that particular man, but to the whole human nature. For which reason he is called the second Adam, or man in general, as the name Adam signifies. That “as in Adam all died, so in Christ all might be made alive.” l34 I.e., as in or by the sin of the first Adam all men were brought into a state of mortality in danger of an endless separation from God with all the dreadful consequences thereof, so by the second Adam all men are brought into a salvable condition, may have the lapse of their nature cured and thereby become capable of enjoying God’s favour and presence, the effects of which is life eternal!
E. I wish you would be pleased to inform me of the difference between natural and revealed religion. And for what reason those people do so earnestly contend for the one while they reject the other?
M. Do you think our Saviour taught any other than natural Religion? If you do, you are mistaken. For true religion, like Almighty God, the supreme object and author of it, is but one! Nor is there any essential difference between the religion of Jesus Christ and that of Adam in paradise. And one reason why deists and free thinkers contend for natural in opposition to revealed religion is because they don’t understand it. AH the ordinances and positive precepts of the gospel which have been thought sufficient to justify a distinction between natural religion and that revealed are in truth necessary 135 ways and means of religion, or a course of duties adapted to our present state for the purifying our natures and restoring us to that divine resemblance we lost in the lapse of our first parents. Again, they reject our blessed Lord, because he obliges them to observe greater strictness and purity of life than is consistent with those sensual pleasures they are unwilling to part with and to mortify that pride of nature which is wont to suggest that man is a law to himself and therefore need not be brought under subjection to the law of Christ, never considering that the rules of right reason are as severe as the precepts of the gospel, being in truth all one. Nor that ‘twould be impossible for man in his present condition to live according to those rules, had it not pleased God by revelation to put him in the way and promised him the assistance of his Holy Spirit that he may be able to do it. For there’s a mighty difference between man innocent and pure, endued with perfect knowledge of his duty and sufficient strength to perform it, and man fallen from a state of innocence, light and strength into a state of sin and misery, his understanding dark and perpetually subject to ignorance and error, his will impotent to the last degree, naturally averse from God and moral goodness, by consequence under the divine displeasure, and liable to suffer the sad effects thereof forever. But these things they do not apprehend, nor have they any sense of the depravity of human nature. For if they had, they would easily perceive that this inversion of nature necessarily requires a course of duties that were altogether needless in a state of innocence. That it was requisite there should be some way appointed to vindicate the honour and authority of God, to satisfy his justice for the violation of his laws, and means used to heal the lapse of human nature, in order to reconcile God to man and man to God. Since ‘tis impossible for a creature guilty and impure to be capable of divine favour or to have any title to eternal life and blessedness. This therefore was the very end for which Jesus Christ was promised in paradise and in the fullness of time appeared in the world, namely, to vindicate the honour and satisfy the justice of God! To instruct us in the ways and means of healing the diseases of our nature; and to conquer in and for us those spiritual enemies which without him we could never overcome; and to give us a new and better title to eternal happiness. In a word, our Saviour came not to teach us a new, but to retrieve the old natural religion and to put us again under the conduct of right reason by the direction and assistance of his Holy Spirit. And if we do but bear in mind a constant sense of the present state of mankind, we shall plainly discern that the system of the gospel is a most noble and reasonable institution. All its precepts are pure and holy as the incarnate God that gave them! All the positive laws thereof are such as136 directly tend to the healing and perfecting our nature! All the sanctions used to enforce them are weighty and proper to excite and work on reasonable free agents! The whole design is worthy of God! Agreeable to primitive human nature and finally conducive to God’s glory! And the happiness of mankind!
E. It seems by what has been said that the whole system of the gospel stands upon the supposition of the fall of man. But I think these gentlemen do not grant the authority of scripture, nor will allow human nature to be corrupted and depraved.
M. What the}r will allow or grant I neither know nor care, since the truth of the fact is too obvious to be denied by any man of common sense. And let anyone otherways account for the prodigiotis contrarieties in human nature137 and for our moral impotence and utter insufficiency for attainment of solid piety and virtue by our own strength, notwithstanding the congruity between virtue and right reason. We may plainly perceive138 in our minds some faint ideas of a divine resemblance, a native principle of grandeur within us, directing us to despise a sensual life and aspire to a happiness beyond what the world can give. Yet at the same time we feel an innate concupiscence which subjects us to present things and renders us incapable and unworthy of that happiness. Insomuch that men, though by far the most noble and excellent, are yet the. most despicable and wretched creatures of the visible creation. Excellent in their powers and capacities, despicable and wretched by the abuse of those powers and voluntary subjection of them to serve the propensions139 and pleasures of the animal life. And indeed I can’t conceive how a man that has made the least observation of mankind or reflection on his own mind and has withal a just sense of the absolute perfection of God l40 ° but he must acknowledge it was utterly impossible for that all glorious Being 141 to make man so corrupt and imperfect as he is. And this the wiser sort even of heathens were well apprised of, though how human nature became so depraved was beyond the power of their natural light to discover. Much less could we have known how that deadly wound might be healed, had not God of his boundless mercy revealed it unto us in the gospel of his Son!
E. But did not they tell us that all the distempers of our minds might be cured by making a right use of our reason? And that reason, if not diverted by interest or passion, always tends directly to what is honourable and just?142
M. Plutarch does indeed tell us so.143 But what is this more than begging the question? For any man that will use his reason may know that reason itself is depraved and has as little liberty as any other power of the soul. This will evidently appear upon a sober advertence to the general conduct of the world. There we shall find that many have little or no understanding scarce enough to distinguish them from “the beasts that perish.” 144 And oftentimes what we call reason in men of brighter parts is little better than fancy and conjecture. In truth very few make a right use of the small share of reason they enjoy, but men commonly act as much without, and oftentimes as contrary to, reason, as if they had none at all, even in the ordinary affairs of life, where one would think it should not fail them. And if we turn our eye inward and strictly observe the powers and motions of our own minds, we shall not much mend the prospect; for we shall quickly perceive that our own understanding is like that of our neighbours, weak and fallible. Unable to regulate and compose our roving desultory thoughts and fix them at pleasure or to apprehend and clearly discern between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, good and evil. Nor has our reason such power to direct and govern our passions as to reduce them to a true mediocrity,145 insomuch that they shall never err either by excess or defect. And human reason is still at a greater loss to direct in matters of the highest importance and such whereon man’s eternal happiness depends, even answering the end of our creation, worshipping and serving God after a manner acceptable to him.146 This is plain by the practice of all those that have nothing to guide or govern them but what we call reason. By the old heathens, who notwith standing they had a confuse[d] idea of some supreme being and that some honour ought to be given him, yet when they came to apply it to particulars, they ran into such idle and147 ridiculous extravagancies as evidently showed they knew not what to do.
E. Ought we then to discard our reason from having anything to do in matters of religion?
M. By no means. For though it is of itself too weak and insufficient to direct us the way that leads to eternal life,148 yet when enlightened and directed by God’s Holy Spirit, ‘tis of admirable use to strengthen our faith, and those are alike to blame that either idolize149 or despise it. A little learning and study will serve to convince us that there are innumerable things which surpass the force of human understanding. Nor is it hard for an honest mind that is willing to know the truth to discern when reason ought to submit and when ‘tis able to comprehend, where it should doubt and when it should rest assured. And if we would act reasonably, we shall neither stifle the principles of reason nor build too much upon them. For by doing the first, we make our religion childish and ridiculous; and by the other, we exclude all supernatural assistance and mysterious truths from it and thereby cut off all hope of salvation by Jesus Christ. As M. Pascal has well observed.150
E. But pray what do you mean by saying that ‘tis not hard for an honest mind that is willing to know the truth, etc.? I don’t understand what the will has to do in this case.
M. I say so because I’m. of opinion that most errors in point of religion take their rise rather from the depravity of our wills than from defect of151 understanding. We commonly choose one side of the question and then employ all our wit to find out a reason for doing so; and ‘tis odds but we choose that side which seems most to favour our corrupt animality. Whereas we ought by all means, if we would know of any doctrine whether it be of God,152 to endeavour first to correct the moral impotence and disinclination of the will to divine truth and throw that bias (of the will) on the side of virtue, which having done, we shall find a sensible alteration in the understanding. For then all things will appear in a different light, and we shall have other views than we had before. We shall have a better sense of spiritual objects and be able more clearly to perceive, reason and judge of moral truths than we were wont to do.
E. I believe it may sometimes be as you say. Yet certainly there are some people which are willing to embrace truth, if they knew where to find it and, for want of some distinguishing characters whereby to know it from falsehood, are unwittingly led into error.
M. Those characters will be easily found and discerned by a sincere lover of truth. We may lay this down for a general rule that I think will admit of no exception: whatever doctrine or point of truth is worthy of God, perfective of man’s nature, and conducive to his spiritual and eternal happiness is certainly true. And I hold to my first assertion, that if we are but heartily willing to know the truth in this case, we shall certainly know it. But men are apt to impose upon themselves and to conclude without good ground that they are willing to know and embrace truth, when in reality they arc not so. I do not take every simple act of volition for willing here; but I mean by willing153 when the will is so strongly bent towards and fixed on truth as to carry the affections of love and desire along with it, insomuch that it peremptorily resolves to embrace and adhere to it without regarding the consequences of doing so. A man thus disposed will use his utmost efforts to bring under subjection the powers of his animal154 nature, will endeavor to preserve great purity of life, and improve all advantages of time, study or155 converse. Will divest himself of all pride and prejudice as much as possibly he can, that he may more easily and clearly discern truth; and to his own endeavours he will be sure to add fervent and constant prayer to Almighty God156 for his direction and assistance. Now ‘tis inconsistent with all the notions we have of divine goodness to suppose that God, to whom all power belongs,157 should suffer such a man to fall into any damnable error or withhold from him the guidance of his Holy Spirit in his search of truth. Especially if we consider the blessed promise of him that cannot deceive, Proverbs, second: “My son, if thou wilt receive my words […], so that thou incline thine ears unto wisdom and apply thine heart to understanding: yea if thou criest after knowledge and liftest up thy voice for understanding: If thou seekest her as silver, and searchest for her, as for hid treasures: Then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord; and find the knowledge of God.” 158 If all men were thus prepared and disposed to receive the truth in the love of it, there would be no such thing as an Arian, Socinian or heretic of any denomination whatever in the Christian world. For the great truths of the gospel are so legible that he which runs may read;159 and those on which our happiness does more immediately depend carry in them such a congruity with all the unprejudiced sense and reason of mankind as upon proper application to the study of them will effectually serve to convince our judgments and direct and regulate our practice.
E. But since the desire of happiness is equally natural to all men, why do not all men alike apply themselves to find out the true way that leads to it?
M. Men differ more in their notions of the thing than about the true way of finding it. For almost every man believes that he already knows what would make him happy. And this is one reason why ‘tis one of the most difficult things in the world, to make men apprehend wherein their true happiness consists, so as to have such a deep and solid sense of it as will excite them to use their utmost endeavours to attain it. For since the heart is wont to apply the name of good to the object of its love, men naturally believe that their happiness lies in the possession and enjoyment of that good, be it what it will. And this is the reason that, though all men equally desire happiness, yet they pursue it in such various ways and take such different methods to obtain it. Man is a compound being, a strange mixture of spirit and matter. Or rather a creature wherein those different principles are united without mixture, yet each principle subject to the influences of the other. The happiness of man thus considered consists in a due subordination of the inferior to the superior powers, of the animal to the rational nature, and of both to God. And the inversion of this order is the true source of human misery here and hereafter. Now, though this truth will appear very evident to a sober unprejudiced mind, yet ‘twould be exceeding hard, if not impossible, to make anyone assent to it, whose animal part has got the ascendant of his reason.160
1. To Samuel Wesley Jr. 11 October 1709; Journal, entry 52 (24 May 1711).
2. An early and encyclopedic essay in this genre was by the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe … Wherein, All the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism Is Confuted … (London: Richard Royston, 1678). A more accessible work is John Ray, The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation (London: Samuel Smith, 1691), which covers much of the same territory (e.g., an extended description of the human eye) as S. W. but does not seem to have directly influenced her. Another example, much briefer and in the same dialogue format as S. W.’s “Conference,” was the 56-page pamphlet of Samuel Wesley Sr.’s collaborator on the Athenian Mercury, Richard Sault, A Conference betwixt a Modern Atheist, and His Friend … (London: John Dunton, 1693). Though there seems to be no direct influence, Sauk’s work demonstrates that people in the Wesleys’ intellectual and ecclesiastical circle were dealing with similar issues in a nearly identical format.
3. See Richard Bentley, The Folly of Atheism, and (What Is Now Called) Deism … in Eight Boyle Lectures on Atheism, 1692 (New York and London: Garland, 1976); reprint of eight sermons (London: Tho. Parkhurst and H. Mortlock, 1692–1693, sig. A2f. Another important voice in the effort to harmonize theology and the new science was John Wilkins, Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion … (New York and London: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1969); reprint of London: T. Basset et al., 1693.
4. Augustin Leger, Lo Jeunesse de Wesley … (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1910), pp. 48–49.
5. G. Stringer Rowe, ed., Mrs. Wesley’s Conference with Her Daughter: An Original Essay by Mrs. Susannah Wesley, Hitherto Unpublished, Publications of the Wesley Historical Society, no. 3 (London: Charles H. Kelley, 1898).
6. See 1 Corinthians 15:43 for the source of the second epigraph.
7. Rowe, Conference, misreads “receive.”
8. Leger finds this paragraph reminiscent of Pascal. See Jeunesse de Wesley, p. 49, n. 1.
9. Paraphrased from 1 Peter 3:15, changed to first person singular and substituting “faith” for the AV “hope.” Quotation marks added.
10. Capricious, peevish.
11. Matthew 18:3; quotation marks added.
12. “Should be” is inserted in place of the crossed-out “which would render them.”
13. Close paraphrase of Exodus 20:4, the commandment against graven images; quotation marks added.
14. Cf. Addison’s ode, still sung as a hymn. Composed the same year as S. W’s Religious Conference, it expresses the same natural theology:
The spacious firmament on high.
With all the blue ethereal sky,
And spangled heavens, a shining frame,
Their great Original proclaim… .
15. Written heavily over the original “must.”
16. See Richard Bentley’s approach in his Boyle lectures, A Confutation of Atheism from the Origin and Frame of the World … , 3 parts (London: Henry Mortlock, 1692–1693), especially part 1, pp. 2Off.
17. Followed by the beginnings of a crossed-out sentence: “If you mean first matter, the matter whereof all things were made… .” Evidently copying from an earlier draft, S. W mistakenly inserted the sentence too soon. Note its inclusion after the next sentence.
18. Quotation marks added. The OED attributes the phrase to the English translation of Cicero explaining Leucippus and Democritus on the origin of the world (s.v. concourse, 3). By the time S. W wrote, however, it was a staple of theological debate. See Edward Stillingfleet, Origines Sacrae or a Rational Account of the Grounds of Christian Faith … (London: Henry Mortlock, 1666), p. 37.5: “it must necessarily follow according to the different principles of the Aristotelian and Epicurean Atheists, that either the world was as it is from all eternity, or else that it was at first made by the fortuitous concourse of Atoms.” Cudworth, True Intellectual System, p. 674, remarks on the absurdity of supposing the world “to have Resulted from the Fortuitous Motion of Sensless Atoms… .” Cf., closer to the end of the century, Richard Bentley on the odds against “fortuitous hits” explaining the wonders of the human body if “divine Wisdom and Skill” were not involved: A Confutation of Atheism from the Structure and Origin of Humane Bodies. The Third and Last Part (London: Henry Mortlock, 1692), p. 32. In his next to last Boyle lecture, Bentley uses the same phrase: “as to that ordinary Cant of illiterate and puny Atheists, the fortuitous or casual concourse of Atoms. …” A Confutation of Atheism from the Origin and Frame of the World … Part II (London: H. Morlock, 1693), p. 4. Cf. also Sault, A Conference, p. 18: “the first Trees cou’d not be made by the fortuitous justlings of Atoms and fine Particles of Matter, but […] there is an Intelligent, Wise Author… .”
19. Galen of Pergamon (130-c. 200), along with Hippocrates, was a primary influence on Western medicine. His works, like Aristotle’s, were preserved in the Arab world and by the eleventh century began to be introduced into Europe. The Greek originals became available at the time of the fall of Constantinople in the mid-fifteenth century. English translations were published beginning in the sixteenth century, and, despite the anatomical advances of William Harvey (1578-1657), Galen continued to have considerable influence. Here, of course, S. W is following other theological apologists in employing this “pagan” support for the teleological argument for God’s existence. See, for example, Wilkins, Principles and Duties, pp. 80–82, writing of human bodies, “upon consideration of which, Galen himself, no great Friend of Religion, could but acknowledge a Deity.” Wilkins cites Galen’s de formatione Foetus as his source. Cud-worth, True Intellectual System, pp. 671–672, also drew on Galen to make similar points, citing Of the Use of Parts.
20. Cf. Richard Bentley’s Boyle lecture, A Confutation of Atheism from the Sturcture and Origin of Humane Bodies … , parts I—III (London: Thomas Parkhurst and H. Mortlock, 1692), particularly part I, pp. 8–9; part II, p. 14.
21. Quotation marks added.
22. See Richard Bentley’s Boyle lecture, Matter and Motion Cannot Think: Or, A Confutation of Atheism from the Faculties of the Soul … (London: Thomas Parkhurst and Henry Mortlock, 1692), particularly pp. 32–33.
23. Replaces the crossed-out “about.”
24. Followed by the crossed-out “as well.”
25. This entire sentence was at first left out, then inserted above the line.
26. Rowe, Conference, misreads it as “reaching.”
27. Replaces the crossed-out “with.”
28. That is, within his area of power, control, or jurisdiction.
29. Rowe, Conference, misreads “power.”
30. Followed by “some,” now crossed out.
31. Trying to preserve its flow, I have punctuated this summary as one long sentence, even though S. W broke it up into numerous fragments.
32. Replaces the crossed-out “idea.”
33. Nearly exact quotation of Mark 10:38; my quotation marks.
34. This sentence is written in large script; I have emphasized it in boldface.
35. Rowe, Conference, misreads “think.”
36. Paraphrase of 1 Timothy 6:16.
37. Note the similar tack on the “Excellencies and Perfections of the Divine Nature” taken by Wilkins, Principles and Duties, chaps. 8–11, pp. 100–175.
38. Note the similarity of expression in her letter to her son John, 27 November 1735, with its echoes of Malebranche and/or Norris.
39. Replaces “idea,” now crossed out.
40. Rowe, Conference, misreads “these.”
41. Inserted above the line, not in S. W’s hand.
42. Inserted above the line in S. W’s hand, replacing the crossed-out “is.”
43. S. W is playing with the same assumptions Wilkins outlines in Principles and Duties, p. 102, when he divides the “communicable” attributes of God into three categories: the divine understanding, the divine will, and the divine “faculties of acting.” The first encompasses knowledge, wisdom, and particular providence; the second, goodness, justice, and faithfulness; the third, power, “dominion over us in this life,” and “distributing of future rewards and punishments.”
44. An “and” appears here in the MS, crossed out; Rowe, Conference, mistakenly inserts it in his edition.
45. On God’s “perfect comprehension of all things” see Wilkins, Principles and Duties, pp. 126–127.
46. Followed by the crossed-out “his.”
47. S. W originally wrote, then crossed out, “contrary operations,” replacing it with “different productions.”
48. Rowe, Conference, has “diverse,” but S. W’s original makes more, or at least adequate, sense: several, sundry, more than one (rather than unlike in nature or qualities, varied, changeful).
49. Cf. Wilkins, Principles and Duties, p. 126, on God’s universal knowledge: “He hath a perfect comprehension of all things, that have been, that are, or shall be… .”
50. Ibid., p. 128: “As Knowledge doth respect things absolutely; so Wisdom doth consider the relations of things one to another, under the notion of Means and End, and so their fitness or unfitness for the various purposes to which they are designed.”
51. S. W. puts an exclamation point after “wisdom,” not for punctuation but for emphasis.
52. Again the MS has exclamation points inside the sentence, this time after “original” and “essential.”
53. Aristotelian terms; see OED, s.v. “commutative” and “distributive.” I have been unable to trace the actual source of her definitions. Wilkins, Principles and Duties, p. 139, does not go into such detail, defining justice merely as God’s “dealing with his creatures according to the desert of their deeds.”
54. Replaces the crossed-out “is.”
55. S. W adds an exclamation point here.
56. S. W puts an exclamation point here.
57. Discussions of moral issues (which might fit under the label of “commutative justice”) are sprinkled throughout the rest of the MS.
58. “This” is inserted in place of an awkward-sounding phrase, which S. W crossed out: “what you speak of want of power.”
59. S. W adds an exclamation point here.
60. S. W adds an exclamation point here.
61. I have eliminated S. W’s mid-sentence exclamation points: “goodness of God!” and “glorious perfections!”
62. 62. The MS also has an exclamation point after “excellence.”
63. 63. S. W has an exclamation point here.
64. The following phrase is crossed out (and recast later in the sentence): “according to the measure of their capacities, and.”
65. S. W adds an exclamation point here.
66. Latin: “in nature”; emphasis added.
67. Rowe, Conference, misreads “eternal.”
68. S. W adds an exclamation point here.
69. S. W originally wrote “nothing” but realized her mistake and crossed, it out—a further indication that she is copying from, another source or draft.
70. S. W has added an exclamation point here.
71. Replaces the crossed-out “soul.”
72. Paraphrase of Psalm 8:5.
73. She has crossed out her original word, “soul.” Before that change she also altered the sentence from its original form, “vouchsafed to make him a reasonable creature.”
74. S. W adds an exclamation point here.
75. John Barker, Strange Contrarieties: Pascal in England during the Age of Reason (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1975), p. 182, follows Leger, Jeunesse de Wesley, pp. 48–52, in indicating that this passage is S. W’s gloss and paraphrase of Pascal’s observation, Thoughts, chap. 14 (“Jesus Christ”), par. 1, p. 120: “The whole System of Bodies, the Firmament, the Stars, the Earth and the Kingdoms of it, are not fit to be opposed in Value to the lowest Mind or Spirit: because Spirit is endued with the knowledge and apprehension of all this, whereas Body is utterly stupid and insensible. Again, the whole united Systems of Bodies and Spirits are not comparable to the least Motion of Charity; because this is still of an Order infinitely more exalted and Divine.
“From all Body together we are not able to extract oire Thought. This is impossible, and quite of another Order. Again, all Body and Spirit together are unable to produce one Spark of Charity. This is likewise impossible, and of an Order above Nature.”
76. Received meanings.
77. Manner of being with relation to something else; relation, respect.
78. Existence as a substance or entity; substantial, real, or independent existence.
79. My question mark; S. W uses a colon here.
80. My question mark; S. W uses a period.
81. Probable reference to Malebranche’s theory that “we see all things in God.” De la recherche de la verite, 3, 2, 6; quoted in Frederick Coppleston, A History of Philosophy, 6 vols. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Image Books, 1963), 4:200.
82. See Locke, An Examination of Malebrache’s Opinion of Seeing All Things in God, in Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke (London: A. and J. Churchill, 1706), written in 1695 but not published until two years after the author’s death.
83. My question mark; S. W ends with a dash.
84. S. W adds an exclamation point here.
85. For an example of such language among the “Cambridge Platonists,” see George Rust, Two Choice and Useful Treatises: The One Lux Orientalis … the Other a Discourse of Truth … with Annotations on Them Both (London: James Collins and Sam. Lowndes, 1682). pp. 264–265: “Pg. 194. Now all that Truth that is in any created Being, is by participation and derivation from this first Understanding (that is, from the Divine Understanding quatenus Exhibitive) and Fountain of Intellectual Light. That is, according to the Platonick Dialect, of those steady unalterable and eternal Idea’s [Greek: to gar eidos phos] of the natures and respects of things represented there in the Divine Understanding Exhibitive in their Objective Existence; In conformity to which the Truth in all created things and Understandings doth necessarily consist.
“Pg. 195 Antecedently to any Understanding or Will, &c. That is, Antecedently to any Understanding Conceptive, Observotive or Speculative whatsoever, or to any Will; but not antecedently to the Divine Understanding Exhibitive. For that is antecedent to all created things, and contains the steady, fixt, eternal and unalterable natures and respects or habitudes, before they had or could have any Being. I say it contains the Truth and measure of them; nor can they be said to be truly what they are, any further than they are found conformable to these eternal, immutable Idea’s, Patterns and Paradigms, which necessarily and eternally are exerted, and immutably in the Divine Understanding Exhibitive. And of these Paradigmatical things there, what follows is most truly affirmed.”
Also, cf. this passage, from John Norris, “A Metaphysical Essay toward the Demonstration of a God, from the Steddy [sic] and Immutable Nature of Truth,” in A Collection of Miscellanies … (Oxford: John Crosley, 1687), p. 207: “that celebrated Distinction of the Platonic School, of the Divine Mind into [Greek: nous noeros?] and [Greek: nous noetos], Conceptive and Exhibitive. Truth does by no means depend upon any mind as Conceptive, whether Human or Divine, but is supposed by it… . But upon mind as Exhibitive it may and does ultimately depend; so that if there were no God or Eternal Mind, there could be no Truth… .”
Leger also detects an evocation of Pascal in the ensuing discussion. See Jeunesse de Wesley, p. 49, n. 1.
86. Liable or entitled to participate or share.
87. My comma replacing S. Ws exclamation point.
88. Exclamation point omitted.
89. Originally “that,” now crossed out.
90. Aversion, turning away.
91. S. W originally followed with “again,” then crossed it out.
92. Close paraphrase of Ephesians 1:11; quotation marks added. The exclamation point is S. Ws.
93. Crossed out: “those laws.”
94. S. W follows with “some,” then crosses it out.
95. Exclamation point omitted.
96. Exclamation point omitted.
97. Exclamation point omitted.
98. Exclamation point omitted.
99. Exclamation point omitted.
100. S. W uses the archaic alternative, “substraction.”
101. Hebrews 12:23; my quotation marks.
102. James 1:17; my quotation marks; S. Ws exclamation point.
103. Exclamation point omitted.
104. “Endeavour to” omitted by Rowe, Conference.
105. S. W here alludes to the debate over innate ideas. Against prevailing opinion, Locke argued there were none; rather, the mind gets its ideas from two sources, sensation and reflection. Though Locke’s opponents felt that this argument destroyed the credibility of Christianity, he believed he was setting the truth of religion on a stronger, experiential basis. See S. Ws references to Locke’s An Essay concerning Humane Understanding … 5th ed. (London: Awnsham and John Churchill and Samuel Manship, 1706), in her journal, particularly her entries 19, 169, and 182.
106. Belonging to as a natural accompaniment or as a property inherent by nature or from birth; congenital, innate, natural.
107. Ever the practical theologian, S. W does not insist on Locke’s epistemology, though she prefers it. Rather, she opts for something akin to her son John’s “catholic spirit,” permitting people to “think and let think” about issues she believes are not central to the faith.
108. “Sometimes” inserted above the line as an afterthought.
109. My quotation marks and question mark.
110. S. W originally wrote “writing” but then crossed it out.
111. See Romans 2:11, though the more familiar quote she is using is from Peter’s speech in Acts 10:34: my quotation marks.
112. Romans 2:12–13; my quotation marks.
113. S. W here paraphrases, glosses, and summarizes Paul’s argument from verse 14 to the end of the chapter.
114. My quotation marks.
115. See Genesis 14:17–20; Psalm 110:4; and Hebrews 5:6, 10, 6:20–7:22.
116. See the book of Job, especially chaps. 1 and 42.
117. A primary Gentile convert to Christianity, whose story is told in Acts 10–11.
118. For their conversion, see Jonah 3:5–10.
119. See Acts 10:35.
120. BCP, Litany; my quotation marks.
121. Hebrews 11:6; my quotation marks.
122. The illustration is as least as old as St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109); see his meditation quoted in Paul Hindley et al., eds., The English Spirit: The Little Gidding Anthology of English Spirituality (Nashville: Abingdon, 1987), pp. 17–18. Leger again sees reflections of Pascal in the ensuing two paragraphs. See Jeunesse de Wesley, p. 49, n. 1.
123. S. W capitalizes “Himself”; the reference is to God.
124. The power, usually associated with royalty, “to act according to discretion … without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it.” OED, s.v. prerogative, quoting Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690), II, xiv, 160.
125. The clause originally concluded “discover this religion to him,” but S. W crossed out the final four words and completed it as in the text.
126. A classic example of Rudolph Otto’s description of the Holy as mysterium tremendum et fascinans. See The Idea of the Holy (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1932). I have omitted the exclamation point S. W used mid-sentence after “purity.”
127. Close paraphrase of Psalm 139:5, BCP; my quotation marks.
128. Rowe, Conference, mistranscribes “or.”
129. BCP, Communion, General Confession; my quotation marks.
130. “Fervent” originally preceded “sincere,” but S. W crossed it out there and wrote it in to follow.
131. Genesis 2:9ff.
132. Shorter Catechism, Q. 13. Larger Catechism, Q. 21. Cf. John Milton, Paradise Lost, 3:65 and 4:6.
133. See the Larger Catechism, questions 30–31.
134. Close paraphrase of 1 Corinthians 15:22; my quotation marks.
135. Replaces crossed-out, indecipherable word(s) (possibly “more necessary”), followed by “than,” also crossed out.
136. Crossed out at this point: “are necessary and.”
137. Cf. Pascal, Thoughts, heading of chap. 21: “The strange contrarieties discoverable in Human Nature, with regard to Truth, and Happiness, and many other things.” Barker has taken part of that as the title of his helpful book, Strange Contrarieties, p. xii.
138. Followed by the crossed-out “so.” Apparently, S. W began to write “some” before deciding it fit better a few words later.
139. Inclinations, leanings, propensities.
140. Exclamation point omitted.
141. Exclamation point omitted.
142. My question mark.
143. Plutarch was a favorite author of both Renaissance and Enlightenment England. His works were available in a number of contemporary translations. The allusion here is probably to either Plutarch’s Lives … , S vols. (London: Jacob Tonson, 1693), translated by Samuel Wesley’s friend John Dryden and others and first published in 1683 (with more than a dozen editions or reprintings by 1770), or Plutarch’s Morals … , 5 vols., 4th ed. (London: Tho. Braddyll, 1704), first published in 1684. Each of these major works was also abridged or abstracted early in the eighteenth century. Or S. W may have taken the quotation from a collection, such as the now rare Miscellany Poems and Translations by Oxford Hands (London: Anthony Stephens, 1685).
144. See Psalm 49:20; quotation marks added.
145. Moderation, temperance.
146. Cf. Shorter Catechism, Q. 1: “Man’s chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever.”
147. Followed by the crossed-out “such.”
148. See Matthew 7:14.
149. Rowe, Conference, misreads “indulge.”
150. Loose paraphrase of chap. 5 (“The Submission and Use of Reason”) par. 3, Pascal’s Thoughts, p. 52: “If we bring down all things to Reason, our Religion will have nothing in it Mysterious or Supernatural. If we stifle the Principles of Reason, our Religion will be absurd and ridiculous.”
151. Followed by the crossed-out “our.”
152. See 1 John 4:1.
153. Followed by the crossed-out “I speak of.”
154. Followed by an indecipherable, crossed-out word.
155. Rowe, Conference, substitutes “and.”
156. Exclamation point omitted.
157. Exclamation point omitted.
158. Proverbs 2:1–5; nearly exact quotation but missing the second half of verse 1: “and hid my commandments with thee… .” S. W. has set the passage off in her MS by writing it in a slightly larger hand; I have done so with quotation marks.
159. See Habakkuk 2:2.
160. The essay ends rather abruptly here at the top of MS p. 61.
