SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY
The doctrine of creation is intimately connected to the doctrine of Providence. After all, it is over the created order that God exercises his governance, and the choice of an omniscient Being to create in the first instance suggests that he had a plan that he will guide to completion.1 Christians have long believed that God’s choice to create (and all the details contained therein) was not accidental, and that therefore, each item in the created order, each process, each event in its history, was in some sense planned and fits into God’s plan. Thus, study of the natural world has implications for the doctrine of providence.
Science and Theology both make claims about the natural world, about natural processes and development, about how things have come to be the way they are, and about the ultimate end to which the universe is moving. Theologically, this has to do with the doctrines of creation, eschatology, and providence, and scientifically, it has to do with cosmology, physics, and biology, among others. The relationship between science and religion is unclear and lends itself well to controversy or hostility on the one hand, and collaboration or mutual strengthening on the other hand. In his Gifford Lectures delivered in 1989 at the University of Aberdeen, Ian Barbour helpfully set forth the four most common ways of understanding the relationship between the two: 1) Conflict, 2) Independence, 3) Dialogue, and 4) Integration.2 He initially presents the categories as if neatly defined, but it is clear that the lines between them are much more porous than normally thought.
Under the heading of “Conflict,” Barbour places both scientific materialism and biblical literalism, and notes that neither group really takes the claims of the other particularly seriously. Ratzsch agrees: “the less actual contact of competing ideas there is, the easier it is for favorite ideas—on both sides—to be credited within their respective camps with a status they really do not deserve. Indeed, each side can see the case as so utterly closed that the very existence of opponents generates near bafflement.”3
According to Barbour, scientific materialism makes both metaphysical and epistemological claims, namely that matter and energy are all there is, and the only appropriate approach to knowledge attainment is the scientific method. Everything is explainable by physical laws. By way of example, he points to sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson, who argues that social sciences and humanities will eventually be understood as sub-disciplines of biology, where human behavior, belief, and thought are reduced to neurology with no room for psycho-spiritual explanation. Barbour's discussion of biblical literalism is less clear because he offers no examples of religious who discount science as a means to knowledge.4 He points out incidents of conflict between particular interpretations of the Bible and the prevailing scientific view of the day (e.g., the Galileo affair, the ongoing battle between Darwinism and scientific creationism), but offers no specific statements denying science. In fact, he would be hard pressed to find anyone who makes such statements.5 Many evangelicals have expressed concern that the methodological naturalism presumed in scientific work may lead to metaphysical naturalism, but this does not automatically result in conflict between science and religion.6
Barbour appeals to neo-orthodoxy and existentialism as two representatives of the “Independence” model, wherein science and religion are viewed as distinct approaches to truth with their own discrete areas of concern. Typical dichotomies include depictions of science as objective, religion as subjective; science as public, religion as private; science focused on how-questions, religion focused on why-questions; science as quantitative, religion as transcendent or symbolic; and the like. John Polkinghorne, world-renowned physicist and Anglican priest, sees science and religion as complimentary in knowledge attainment, but he also sees them as addressing different questions.7 He sees science as more focused and limited in scope than religion because it asks questions of function or composition and not of meaning, purpose, or significance.8
The differences between “Dialogue” and “Integration” appear more a matter of degree than substance. Both positions see overlap between scientific and religious inquiry, and both believe knowledge may be gained through either or both approaches to investigation. “Dialogue” seems more tentative while “Integration” seems more optimistic about what science and religion can contribute to one another and to a comprehensive worldview. As Barbour puts it, dialogue has more to do with “indirect interactions” involving “boundary questions and methods” in the fields of science and religion, while integration refers to more direct relationships where scientific theories influence religious beliefs or both “contribute to the formulation of a coherent worldview or a systematic metaphysics.”9 While Barbour clearly prefers these interactive models to that of separation and conflict, his application of the model does not seem substantially different from that of conflict. He allows only a one-way influence in the integration (his favored) model: science may influence religious beliefs, but not vice versa, as he characterizes models that allow religion to influence scientific beliefs as conflict. This suggests that Barbour gives primacy to science rather than allowing for true mutuality and integration. The fluidity of all these models show that the reconciliation of scientific and religious interpretations of the natural world is more difficult than typically thought, and most persons make earnest attempts to integrate both areas into their total view of the world (in varying degrees of success). Evangelicals are no exception. Even though we have absolute fidelity to biblical truth, we acknowledge tentativeness not only in our scientific findings, but also many of our biblical interpretations.
There are numerous approaches to the doctrine of creation held by evangelicals and several models for understanding God’s activity in creation. Only a few will be mentioned here, and the interested reader may find more detailed analysis and a more nuanced discussion of the relevant issues in a number of other sources.10 Although they are often discussed as disparate models, it is best to view them as residing along a continuum, with immediate creation in the recent past at one end, and evolutionary creation over millions of years (theistic evolution) at the other end. Each model attempts to deal faithfully with biblical data and scientific findings.
Immediate creation, often referred to as young-earth creationism or special creation, is the belief that God created by means of pure supernatural act to bring creatures into existence in some kind of full-formed state. It is most commonly conceived of as God literally speaking creatures into existence according to species, and is often associated with belief in a young universe, typically 6,000–14,000 years old. The Genesis account of creation is thought to be a literal comprehensive description of God’s creative work, and the genealogies found in the book are used to date that work. While it is a popular view among conservative Christians, many have still found it unconvincing.
Some have accepted the scientific consensus on the age of the Earth, but also found the young-earth reading of Genesis creation convincing. In an effort to reconcile an old Earth with a literal six 24-hour-day creative work of God, these theologians offered a compromise position known as the Gap theory. The Gap theory proposes that God created the universe and planets millions of years ago but that original creation fell into chaos and disrepair (most often thought to be a result of Satan’s fall). This creation is described in Genesis 1:1. Beginning in verse 2 of chapter 1, the writer of Genesis describes God’s reordering of the cosmos for the creation of new living beings, culminating in the creation of humanity in his image. The gap theory allows that God created humanity and animals in the way described in the creation account (i.e., immediate special creation in the recent past), but also that death and destruction preceded the Fall, and that the Earth existed long before humanity.
A number of evangelicals have not seen a need to interpret the creation accounts in Genesis quite so literally, but still wish to hold to a strong account of divine work in the creative process. Progressive creation is a popular way of reconciling a concrete, direct work of God in creation with a long creative process for the universe and living creatures. It is sometimes associated with the Day-Age theory, which suggests that the days of the Genesis creation account were not twenty-four-hour periods, but rather were longer, unspecified periods of time, normally thousands of years each.11 The important point to note for progressive creation, though, is that it conceives God’s creative work, at least in terms of speciation (or bringing about new species) as a special, interventionist work of God (described in Genesis as speaking).
Some Christians have seen the Genesis account as having many literary features that make a literal reading tenuous, and have therefore seen the mechanics of God’s creative work best described by the work of scientists. Theistic evolution is the view that God created by means of evolutionary processes such as those described by Neo-Darwinism. It holds to an old Earth, and suggests that God has guided genetic mutations to give rise to new species, but views that guidance as more persuasive and less interventionist in nature. Whereas in progressive creation, God may insert new genetic information or even directly and immediately create a new species by fiat, in theistic evolution God guides the natural process of helpful genetic mutation that will lead to a split in the genes of a particular creaturely type, eventually resulting in the emergence of a new species.
The differences in these views are typically more pronounced in the literature than in reality. There are areas where they overlap, and sometimes it is difficult to tell where one theory ends and another begins. As such, it can be difficult to categorize one’s view because the specifics to which he holds belong to different models. For example, whether a particular model stands as a version of progressive creation or theistic evolution can be a matter of subjective opinion. Suppose one holds that creatures evolve through the accumulation of many genetic mutations that aid adaptability and survivability over many successive generations, but he also holds that God supernaturally and periodically inserts new genetic information that can spur such evolutionary development. The outcome will be virtually indistinguishable from natural evolution, but because of the direct work of God in driving evolutionary change, some may see it as a version of progressive creation. The mere presence of evolutionary processes does not automatically make the model theistic evolution.12 Similarly, most proponents of immediate creation believe some evolutionary development occurs, though they typically deny that speciation takes place apart from direct creative work of God. But things become murky here, because it is unclear exactly what distinguishes different species one from another, over against creaturely differences within species. Even scientists sometimes have difficulty knowing how to classify newly discovered creatures on the biological taxonomical chart. Thus, not only are the lines between theistic evolution and progressive creation unclear, but even the lines between progressive creation and immediate creation can begin to blur! While these issues are often presented in rather simplistic terms and models, Christians are increasingly becoming aware of their complexities, and attempting to account for the findings of science in their theological models. This, however, does not mean that they do not offer criticism where it is needed.
The theory of evolution has almost always engendered controversy. Certainly from the time of Darwin, it has been plagued by constant criticism, though it has had its defenders as well.13 Daniel Dennett nicely summarizes the mixture of reactions Darwin’s idea has engendered: “From the moment of the publication of the Origin of Species in 1859, Charles Darwin’s fundamental idea has inspired intense reactions ranging from ferocious condemnation to ecstatic allegiance, sometimes tantamount to religious zeal.”14
The most recent incarnation of criticism of Darwinism (especially as a theory of origins) has come in the form of the modern Intelligent Design (ID) movement. The theory of Intelligent Design was thrust into the limelight in the past few years largely due to the now infamous Dover legal battle, Kitzmiller v. Board of Education, in which concerned parents sued the school board after it sought to require science teachers to read a disclaimer regarding the scientific status of Neo-Darwinism and to offer an alternate book which proposed ID as an explanation for the origins and development of life. The school board lost the legal battle and the teaching of ID in public schools was ruled unconstitutional.15 Even though ID lost this battle, its merits continue to be debated. In this section, a popular criticism of ID will be examined, and an answer drawing upon middle knowledge will be presented.
One objection to the theory of Intelligent Design draws upon the existence of undesirable features in creatures that were supposedly designed. The existence of so-called “vestigial organs”—organs that, by definition, are vestiges of an earlier form of the creature which made use of the now defunct appendages, organs, or the like—is supposed to point to evolutionary development. As Michael Ruse points out, “Vestigial organs are another piece of evidence for the evolutionary case. . . . Why do these exist? On any theory that makes adaptation totally ubiquitous, they would not have been created. But on a theory of evolution, they follow naturally as relics and evidence of the past—of past ancestors, that is, shared with organisms that still (as did the ancestors) use these features for their own adaptive ends.”16 In many cases, though, these apparently useless (or minimally functional) organs are not only seen as pointing to evolution, but also as evidence against ID.17 If there were an intelligent designer, so the argument goes, then there would be no unused organs, appendages, or other body parts. This argument has wide appeal. Consider the words of atheist Sam Harris:
When we look at the natural world, we see extraordinary complexity, but we do not see optimal design. We see redundancy, regressions, and unnecessary complications; we see bewildering inefficiencies that result in suffering and death. We see flightless birds and snakes with pelvises. We see species of fish, salamanders, and crustaceans that have nonfunctional eyes, because they continued to evolve in darkness for millions of years. We see whales that produce teeth during fetal development, only to absorb them as adults. Such features of our world are utterly mysterious if God created all species of life on earth “intelligently”; none of them are perplexing in light of evolution.18
Similarly, Ken Miller, noted biologist and distinguished professor of biology at Brown University, makes precisely the same argument against ID. In his discussion of the fossil record of proboscidean lineage, Miller claims that ID theorists cannot accept that Elephas maximus (Indian elephant) and Loxodonta Africana (African elephant) evolved from a common ancestor, the comparatively smaller Moeritherium, who does not share their long trunks. He writes:
Like it or not, intelligent design must face these data by arguing that each and every one of these species was designed from scratch. . . . The hypothesis of design absolutely, positively requires the successive creation of increasingly elephant-like organisms over time. If some of the new “inventions” of structure and skeleton in Paleomastodon seem to be carried over in Gomphotherium, don’t be misled. It’s not because of ancestry. One organism has nothing to do with the other.19
This leads Miller to object to ID by calling the competence of the Designer into question. He writes, “Almost by definition, an intelligent designer would have to be a pretty sharp fellow . . . biologists can have great fun with that notion. . . . Our bodies do not display intelligent design so much as they reveal the evidence of evolutionary ancestry.”20 He points to the unused yolk sac developed in human embryos, imperfections of the human backbone and feet for upright bipedal locomotion, the appendix, and even the functioning of the human eye—vestigial organs and creaturely flaws—as evidence of evolutionary development and against ID: “Finally, whatever one’s views of such a designer’s motivation, there is one conclusion that drops cleanly out of the data. He was incompetent.”21
This form of argument against ID is based on some erroneous assumptions about the claims of ID. First, it makes the misguided assumption that the theory of Intelligent Design is the same as the doctrine of Special Creation. Clearly Miller has equated ID with the belief that each and every variation, even those within species, were specifically intended and created by direct action of God, but ID makes no such claims. For example, Dembski has explicitly stated that ID is compatible with evolutionary processes: “intelligent design is compatible with the creationist idea of organisms being suddenly created from scratch. But it is also perfectly compatible with the evolutionist idea of new organisms arising from old by gradual accrual of change.”22 It is thus a misrepresentation to suggest that ID requires the immediate, sudden emergence of creatures or that it attributes every variation to the direct causative activity of an intelligent designer.
This error could be an unintentional muddle caused by the large amount of support ID has received from creationists of all stripes, including young-earth creationists. This support, largely in the form of political pressure upon school boards to include ID in school science classrooms, has clouded the issues somewhat. Well-meaning creationists have often defended ID by means of creationist arguments, leading many critics (and reporters) to fail to distinguish the two movements. In fact, it has become a common tactic of the opponents of ID to lump it in with scientific creationism in an effort to discredit ID as science. Barbara Forrest and Paul Gross have argued that ID is just a subtle means by which creationists have sought to get their arguments equal hearing alongside Darwinism in the public school classroom; this same point has been made in the now-famous remark that Intelligent Design is “just creationism in a cheap tuxedo.”23 This line of argument is faulty because it is often based on comments about ID by non-specialists or on impugning ID because some of its proponents are religious, but neither of these tactics is fair. It is understandable because ID proponents have sometimes been sloppy in their work, as in the Dover case.
Second, this form of argument is based on the assumption that if ID were true, the designer would have to make a flawless creation. If a creature has flaws, then the designer is not intelligent or the creature was not designed. Either way, ID fails. A moment’s reflection will make clear that this objection is not scientific, but theological/philosophical.24 It may be referred to as the logical problem of creaturely flaws for belief in ID, and can be stated more formally: It is the claim that a logical contradiction exists in simultaneously holding to the following propositions: 1) Creatures are designed; 2) The Designer is intelligent; and 3) Creatures have flaws. If creatures have flaws, then either creatures are not designed, or the Designer cannot be intelligent (or both).25
One approach that many advocates of ID have taken to answering this objection is to deny that have flaws by denying vestigial or useless organs/structures. For example, Jerry Bergman and George Howe examine a hundred supposed vestigial organs and offer explanations for their now-discovered use.26 Similarly, Michael Behe has suggested that pseudogenes will eventually be shown to have a legitimate function, even if we do not now know what that may be.27 This approach seems best for Calvinists to follow, since the Designer [God] could presumably create whatever he wishes by whatever means he wishes, and therefore, every organ and/or structure was purposely included in the creature’s physiology.28
The strategy of denying useless organs has its problems; it is unproductive because it is purely reactionary and requires proof of purpose for every example of useless organs or structures. Only one example of creaturely flaws is sufficient to make the argument against ID stand, and new supposed flaws are continuously discovered. Therefore, this approach is ill-equipped to ever dispose of the objection. However, another answer to the objection is available to the proponent of middle knowledge.
The similarities of the argument against ID by appeal to vestigial organs to the atheistic objection to God’s existence by appeal to evil is not incidental. Answers given for the logical problem of evil and the emotive problem of evil can help in answering this objection to ID. Just as Christian philosophers have utilized the doctrine of middle knowledge and counterfactuals of creaturely freedom to demonstrate that the logical problem of evil has no force, so also the doctrine of middle knowledge and counterfactuals of genetic mutation may be employed to demonstrate that the logical problem of creaturely flaws has little to commend it; and the emotive problem of creaturely flaws reduces into the logical problem of creaturely flaws.
Recall that the logical problem of evil includes several assumptions regarding God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and love, specifically, that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being will always eliminate every evil it can, that there are no nonlogical limits to what an omnipotent being can do, and that an omniscient and omnipotent being can properly eliminate every evil state of affairs.29 In a similar way, the logical problem of creaturely flaws makes assumptions about what it means to say that creatures are designed, the designer is intelligent, and that creatures have flaws. For example, it seems beyond dispute that an intelligent designer will design items or creatures with as few flaws as he can, but this modest claim is insufficient to serve as a basis for the objection. Instead, the objection requires the designer to be omniscient and omnipotent.30
Finally, the logical objector to ID also makes assumptions about the kinds of creatures designed and their purposes. He has assumed that an intelligent designer will design creatures for optimal performance (for whatever purpose they are designed), and that creatures are designed with at least a primary purpose in mind, but ID makes no such claim, as Behe has made clear.31 Pennock has questioned Behe’s sincerity here, noting that Paley’s Designer was conceived as perfect and thereby obligated to make perfect objects and creatures perfectly suited to their habitats and purposes: “Does Behe really mean to deny that the perfect designer did a perfect job, or is he just making a virtue of vagueness?”32
The logical problem of creaturely flaws also assumes that creatures are designed with only one purpose in mind because multiple purposes could conflict and result in some useless organs. This assumption is suspect at best. There seems no good reason to think that there is only one purpose for each creature and thus, there are good reasons for rejecting the logical problem of creaturely flaws from the beginning. Flaws could exist as necessary fallout from more desirable outcomes. Nevertheless, suppose, for sake of argument, that creatures only have one purpose. Even if this is true, and the designer is conceived as omniscient and omnipotent, the belief that the designer can and must eliminate or prevent all creaturely flaws is hardly indisputable; In fact, it is doubtful.
Recall that the free will defense answers the logical problem of evil by claiming that at least some evil exists due to the free decisions of creatures, and that it is possible an all-powerful, all-loving God could not create a world where creatures are free but never commit evil [sin]. Put in biblical terms, the free will defense suggests that it is possible that in every case (possible world) where Adam is free with respect to the forbidden fruit, he chooses to eat. It does not require that this is the case or that it is even likely, but only that it is logically possible. Since there is no reason to think it impossible, it might be the case that God could not create a world where Adam is free and he does not sin, and the logical problem of evil fails. The justification for these claims was that a world containing free creatures who love and sometimes commit evil actions is better than a world containing no freedom, no love and no evil. This allows the proponent of the free will defense to claim that an all-knowing, all-loving, and all-powerful being could create a world with evil without violating his essential goodness.
Just as the theist only need show that it is possible that an all-powerful, all-loving God could not create a world where creatures are free but never commit evil in order to answer the logical problem of evil, so also in order to answer the logical problem of creaturely flaws, the proponent of ID only need show that it is possible that the intelligent designer could not have developed creatures with the complexity they have without the flaws they have.33 Note that this is not the claim that it has to be the case or that it is the case, but only that it is possible. If the ID theorist can do this, then the logical problem of creaturely flaws fails.34
He can make his case by calling upon the very mechanisms that the proponent of evolution does—random genetic mutation, but he can claim that these mutations still fall within the purview of an intelligent designer (or in the case of Christianity, God), and here is where the doctrine of middle knowledge may prove useful.35 Of course, the argument presented here to defend ID against its evolutionist critics can also be used to explain how God makes use of middle knowledge in a theistic evolutionary model.36 In fact, MacGregor has argued that middle knowledge is necessary to theistic evolution because the statistical probability of unguided evolutionary development is so low as to be a virtual mathematical impossibility, and middle knowledge allows God to guide the process without impugning the random nature of the genetic mutations.37
Consider the following two propositions:
If situation S prevails, then random genetic mutation, M, will occur
and
If situation S does not prevail, then random genetic mutation, M, will not occur.
If these propositions are possibly true, then it is possible that the intelligent designer could not have developed creatures with the complexity they have without the flaws they have because S could involve undesirable mutations or the existence of useless organs, and in this way, the proponent of ID has answered the objection. Suppose it is true that S is necessary for M to occur. In that case, if God wants mutation M to occur (at least randomly), he would have to actualize situation S (either strongly or weakly). At this point we have the beginnings of an explanation of how an intelligent designer (such as the traditional God of theism) could make use of random genetic mutation to guide evolutionary processes to the end he desires. However, it is not at all clear that these propositions are true or even possibly true. Several items merit further comment.
First, some may complain that they cannot be true because the very wording of the counterfactuals seems contradictory or self-referentially incoherent. This argument claims that there can be no truths regarding when random events would or would not (or will or will not) occur because truly random events must be indeterminate. The indeterminate nature of random events requires that the random mutation could occur (or not occur) whether S prevails or not. This form of argument against the truth of counterfactuals of random genetic mutation is similar in form to the grounding objection to the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and I would expect Calvinists and Open Theists to make use of it. There is not time to answer it here, except to say that there is no causal relationship between the antecedent and the consequent in the counterfactuals. Rather, their relationship is merely explanatory.38
Second, even if the aforementioned objection can be overcome, the basis for the truth of propositions regarding when a random event will or will not occur cannot be found in God’s will, for the random nature of the events preclude a deterministic cause behind their occurrence (even the will of God). This is not to say that God cannot cause genetic mutation, but it is to say that such mutations cannot properly be deemed random. This means that God’s knowledge of such propositions must be part of his middle knowledge.
Third, it should be noted that situation S could include a whole host of events, prior mutations, and scenarios. This means that for mutation M to occur, some other undesirable mutations may be required. It is hard to see how, following a random mutation process, one can require that the designer bring about all desired mutations without any undesirable mutations as well. Suppose that mutation, M, is necessary for the complexity of creature, C, and that situation, S, includes flaws in C. Such a supposition seems to not only be obviously possible, but also quite plausible. If creature C evolves by means of evolution, it can rightly be expected to do so by means of certain helpful mutations, and there seems no reason to suppose that situation, S, could not include flaws in C. The possibility of mutation, M, being necessary for the complexity of creature, C, and that situation, S, includes flaws in C, means that both of the aforementioned propositions [If situation, S, occurs, then random genetic mutation, M, will occur AND If situation, S, does not occur, then random genetic mutation, M, will not occur] are also possible and therefore, it is at least plausible that the designer could not create such complex creatures without flaws if he wished to use a process with randomness.
Two objections need to be considered. First, an explanation for why an intelligent designer might choose to create a world where adaptation is necessary must be given. It is not immediately clear that an intelligent designer would/should choose to include adaptability in his design. Note, again, that what needs to be shown is that an explanation is possible; it need not be the most plausible explanation (though such would be good to offer!). Second, an explanation of why an intelligent designer might choose to utilize a random, rather than determined, process for development must also be proffered. This seems to be the most difficult question to answer.
In the same way that the free will defense needed a basis for saying why God would prefer a world with evil and freedom rather than a world with no freedom and no evil, a defense of ID against the logical problem of creaturely flaws needs a premise to explain why an intelligent designer would prefer a world where creatures develop in a way which utilizes random genetic mutation and have flaws, rather than a world where creatures come to be by fiat creation and undergo minor, if any, developmental change and do not have flaws.
Just as there are many possibilities available to the theist for answering the question of why God, who is all-powerful and all-loving, would create a world with evil and suffering, there are also many possibilities available to the ID-theorist for answering the question of why an intelligent designer might use a process such as evolution. For example, he could argue that a world where creatures adapt to a changing environment is better (i.e., more reflective of intelligence) than a world where they do not so adapt. After all, if the environment changes, it just makes sense to give creatures within that environment a chance at survival. So the argument works given an environment characterized by change. However, some may wonder why an intelligent designer would not design a stable environment; they may claim that a stable/unchanging environment would be more reflective of the handiwork of an intelligent artificer. Here again, several possibilities exist.
For example, it could be argued that a dynamic environment is more beautiful, and that beauty reflects intelligence. Consider the following proposition:
A world characterized by change is more beautiful than a world that does not change.
This proposition needs to be augmented in order to get to a justification of an intelligent designer. That is, the further claim that a beautiful world is more reflective of an intelligent designer than a world that is not beautiful, would need to be proven. While this line of argument may be sound (and there is good reason to think it is), it is beyond the scope of this chapter to defend it. Such a defense would need to include an explanation of how change in the world is beautiful while stasis in the divine nature (as classically/traditionally conceived) is preferable. It suggests that an intelligent designer must create the most beautiful world, and so a defense may also require an argument for the supreme beauty of this world.
Fortunately, the aforementioned argument is not the only defense of the intelligibility of an environment characterized by change, and quite frankly, is neither the best nor the most straightforward. Consider the following argument:
An unchanging environment requires stasis;
Stasis prevents relationality among finite beings;
A world with relationality is more reflective of an intelligent designer than one with no relationality.
The argument here is admittedly basic, but seems sound. Some may wish to contest the last claim, but it is unclear what such an argument would look like. In fact, it is not at all clear how a world populated (in any meaningful sense of the term) with any sort of creatures could possibly not be characterized by relationality. (In this, relationality is being used in a most basic sense—to refer to the fact that there is interaction, in the very least, at the most basic levels.) In fact, a static world may not even be a possibility. No matter how intelligent or powerful the designer may be, it simply may not be within his ability to create a world without change because it simply makes no sense; finitude seems to require movement, interaction, and change. That is, it seems that a world with living organisms requires at least some change because of the relationality of finite beings with one another and their environment(s). Change is fundamental to any environment populated by finite beings and is therefore a constituent part of an intelligently designed cosmos. Thus, the claim that a world where creatures adapt is better than a world where they do not, can stand (it is, at least, defensible).
One objection to this argument is to question the intelligence of using random genetic mutation to spur evolutionary development. After all, it is terribly inefficient. It is hard to see why an intelligent designer would choose to create beings with an ability to adapt, but place that ability at the guidance of random events. Similarly, it is hard to see why it would not be more intelligent to use directed genetic mutations. If no good answer can be given, then there may be good reason to doubt the random genetic mutation defense of ID.
However, there are several avenues to follow in answering this objection. One could simply agree that it would be more intelligent to use directed mutations, but argue that this does nothing to detract from ID since it only requires that the process followed is intelligent, not that it is most intelligent. Although this answers the specific objection, most proponents of ID would find it unsatisfying. However, there are three answers available to the ID theorist who believes the designer is omniscient and omnipotent.
First, some cognitive psychologists have suggested that thoughts and actions are merely the expression of changes and movement at the atomic level in the brain. If all genetic mutations were controlled, then development of brain states would also be determined, and human freedom would be illusory (at least libertarian freedom), but as noted earlier, a good case can be made for preferring libertarian freedom to determinism. Randomness and indeterminacy at the genetic and quantum level may be necessary for (libertarian) human freedom.39 The problem with this approach is that it smacks of Identity-theory Physicalism, which is clearly antithetical to the idea of an intelligent designer. While some proponents of ID and some theists have made cases similar to this based on Non-reductive Physicalism, it still seems to be at odds with a broad-based dualist view of reality, which ID seems to imply.40 A better answer can be given.
Second, it could be argued that the use of random processes to produce an orderly system requires more intelligence than it does to use controlled process for the same purpose. Random genetic mutation leading to the evolution of complex life, then, actually points to the glory of God. Van Til hints at this line of reasoning when he calls his own [theistic evolutionary] position the “fully gifted creation perspective.”41 According to Van Til, the capabilities for self-organization and transformation necessary for evolutionary development—something he describes as “humanly incomprehensible”—are granted by God’s “unbounded generosity and unfathomable creativity.”42 This line of reasoning fits well with the doctrine of middle knowledge, for only an infinite mind could comprehend all of the virtually infinite possibilities regarding random genetic mutations and then bring about a world where the desired mutations occur. The fact that God is constrained by the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom and the counterfactuals of genetic mutation detracts nothing from his infinity, conceived either in terms of knowledge (omniscience) or in terms of power (omnipotence).
Third, the random character of mutations could be attributed to the Fall. That is, under a Christian interpretation, one could argue that as a result of the Fall and the emergence of sin into the created order, the cosmos has been characterized by chaos and randomness at the most basic level (e.g., quarks and gluons). Yet, until such time as God recreates or restores the heavens and the earth, he will preserve a measure of peace and order. His use of random mutation and survival of the fittest is due to his grace in extending the current age (2 Peter 3:8–10).
All three options provide a basis for answering the question of why an intelligent designer might use random genetic mutation to allow for creaturely adaptation. The second and the third can be combined to provide a powerful theological statement that is consistent with both theistic evolution and progressive creation.
The logical problem of creaturely flaws does not serve to unseat ID theory, as it is a move into the realm of philosophy and religion. At a minimum, it assumes the designer is both omniscient and omnipotent. A satisfactory explanation of why even a maximally intelligent and powerful being might produce flawed creatures is possible. While other answers can surely be given, the most satisfactory approach is to draw upon the doctrine of middle knowledge and argue that the designer could use his knowledge of how random genetic mutations would proceed in order to bring about the adaptations and changes in creatures he desires. However, his ability is constrained by the true counterfactuals of random genetic mutation and therefore, it is possible that undesirable mutations may be required. Satisfactory reasons can be supplied for why an intelligent designer might wish to create creatures with the ability to adapt and to do so by means of random mutation. Ultimately the very process points to the intelligence of the designer and the critique of ID fails.
Another area where Molinism may prove fruitful in the reconciliation of meticulous divine providence with the findings of modern science is quantum mechanics. Most scientists believe there is randomness at the subatomic level, while there is stability, orderliness, and even (dare I say) determinateness at the macro-level. As Heisenberg noted, this recognition of genuine randomness at the quantum level represented a shift in physical thought and in the philosophy of science itself: “quantum theory actually forces us to formulate these laws [of nature] precisely as statistical laws and to depart radically from determinism. . . . With the mathematical formulation of quantum-theoretical laws pure determinism had to be abandoned.”43 If this picture is correct, and there is no good reason to doubt it, apart from a priori commitments to some form of determinism, then it seems that Molinism has the necessary tools to handle randomness and orderliness better than its chief competitors, Calvinism/Determinism, Process Theology, and Open Theism.
Determinism/Calvinism is ill-equipped to deal with genuine randomness, as should be obvious. Barbour rightly takes issue with William Pollard’s suggestion that God’s providence is located in his control (in a deterministic way) of subatomic and atomic structures/movements; no matter how much the proponent wishes to engage modern physical theory, real indeterminacy is removed under any deterministic scheme of providence.44 Proponents of Determinism typically claim that there is an indiscernible (through scientific means) determining cause of all events (i.e., God’s sovereign will) and that the randomness in the universe is only apparent, more a reflection of our ignorance or lack of observational ability than of genuine indeterminacy in nature. As theologian Paul Helm puts it, “Heisenberg’s Principle does not have to be understood as a statement about the absence of causal preconditions in the case of those events which it says are uncertain, but to be about the limits of our knowledge,” and he is correct in this.45 However, he continues, “And it may be, for all we know to the contrary, that God has freely willed into being a succession of events, some of the latter of which are unspecified and unspecifiable in terms of the earlier.”46
One would be hard-pressed to take issue with the basic claim in the latter quote; surely God could bring about events that have no discernible relation to previous events. He could conceivably cause all things to go out of existence at each moment and bring it all back into existence at each successive moment. The problem is that there is simply no way to know this. For example, there is no way to know if God brings about the locations of photons in each moment in such a way that their locations have no real relation to anything previous. However, this seems to leave the Determinist with a steadfast faith-claim that is in opposition to observational reality (one that is, ironically enough, perilously close to that of the Process Theologian). Thus, he must presuppose that there is either some kind of indiscernible deterministic relationship causing subatomic particle movement, or God is bringing about the locations of subatomic particles at each moment without reference to earlier states. Neither seems particularly attractive.
It is also hard to see how a Process view of God can inspire the sort of confidence required in any sort of teleological understanding of reality and theology suggested by orderliness at the macro-level. While Process thinkers have consistently maintained the power of persuasion, set against what they see as the only alternative, coercion, it seems unable to ensure the kind of orderliness observed in the natural world and more importantly, to secure a cosmological future that Christian theism proclaims. According to Process Theology, God preserves each occasion so that in the midst of the coming-into and going-out-of existence of all actual entities, there is something akin to the continuity we observe in the world and infer in theological reflection on the doctrine of divine sustainment (and in scientific work as well), but this only maintains whatever process is already at work. It provides no mechanism for God to govern the process, and may actually result in God’s sustainment of processes that work contrary to his ends. The proponent of Process thought must maintain that the eschatological focus of God’s self-realization in becoming either cannot be guaranteed through persuasion alone, or is met no matter what happens because the process itself just is God’s self-realization and there is no proper eschatological goal. In the case of the former, God is hopelessly weak. As Basinger writes, “The process theist certainly can hope things will improve. But I see no basis within the system for justifiably coming to believe (having faith) such improvement is probable. . . . Furthermore . . . there is no basis in process thought for assuming that such a ‘triumph’ would be ‘ultimate.’”47 In the case of the latter, the result is relativistic universalism where being and becoming are equated, all states of being/becoming are equally ultimate, and randomness/chance and determinacy/orderliness meld into one and are thus, really illusory. But this imposes a metaphysic far more obscure than that of traditional theism, and conflicts with normal notions of observation, assessment, and coherence! Of course, the critique of occasionalism here (and in the previous section critiquing Determinism) could be accused of begging the question, but it still seems more in line with the observational data than the alternatives.
Open Theism is the only model, save Molinism, that seems capable of allowing for genuine randomness at the micro-level and orderliness at the macro-level. So at first glance, one may think it something of a toss-up between the two, with one’s proclivities determining (no pun intended) which one adopts. However, it seems that ultimately, Open Theism, like Process Theology, runs into serious trouble in ensuring orderliness. That is, the God of Open Theism may get lucky, as it were, so that the random processes at the micro-level just happen to organize themselves in such a way as to produce orderliness, but this outcome has little to do with Open Theism itself. More importantly, the God of Open Theism may not get so lucky, and may find the random subatomic activities leading to chaos. At that point, he has two choices: he can allow chaos to reign and simply work with the new situation as Plan B and hope he can non-causally influence things to turn around, or he can intervene and override the natural processes in order to get to outcomes he desires. Both options are available under Open Theist principles, but that they are the only seeming options available to God in this situation illustrates the problem: the only way the God of Open Theism can ensure orderliness at the macro-level by means of random processes at the micro-level is to violate the most basic principles of the model and, in essence, function like the Determinist/Calvinist God. This is due to the shared assumptions of the Determinist/Calvinist and the Open Theist proponents, namely incompatibilism regarding truths about future contingents and those events truly being contingent, i.e., the grounding objection.
By contrast, Molinism provides the interpretive means for understanding how God could ensure orderliness while utilizing random processes. In a way similar to how God could use (prevolitionally true) counterfactuals of random genetic mutation to guide an orderly process of evolutionary development, so also God could use (prevolitionally true) counterfactuals of random subatomic particle movement to establish order and determinateness at the macro-level while retaining genuine indeterminateness at the micro-level. That is, propositions such as
If situation S were to obtain, particle P would randomly move to location L;
could be used by God to guide and/or govern subatomic particles without causally determining their movements by weakly actualizing situations like S. Of course, a few caveats must be noted. First, there may be no true counterfactuals of random subatomic particle movement that result in the particle being where God wants it (and so God’s options are limited by the true counterfactuals). Second, it may be the case that some minor differences in location of subatomic particles have an effective impact of nil at the macro-level so that the limitations on options have no appreciable effect on God’s ability to accomplish his purposes through this random process. Third, there may be no explanation available for what makes counterfactuals of this sort true in that we may not be able to account for the reason why (for example) P moves to L in S rather than (say) L2. Note that all of the caveats presented are no different from the caveats that must be made regarding counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (i.e., regular Molinism); no special pleading is required here. As may be expected, some could object that there simply could be no true counterfactuals of random subatomic particle movement because they would not thereby be random or because nothing can be identified which makes them true, but such objections are simply versions of the grounding objection and are subject to the same criticisms/answers already given by Molinists (e.g., they beg the question of the incompatibility of the counterfactual conditionals being true, while the processes they describe are random). However, there are other objections that may demand more comment than reference to the still-unresolved issues of grounding.
First, some may question the feasibility of the process. There may be many ways for situation S to come about so that, on the one hand, there could potentially be many ways for God to weakly actualize S and get particle P to location L by means of random movement, but on the other hand, the virtually infinite layers of complexity involved here may seem to make such weak actualization virtually impossible, for to arrive at S, God would have to weakly actualize another set of random subatomic particle movements, such that an infinite regress results. But this potential complaint seems to just raise the issue of the complexity of the creative work of God in a universe characterized by some processes that are random, and while its comprehension poses problems for finite beings (e.g., humans), its execution poses no problems for an infinite Being. The possibilities regarding particle movement are virtually infinite, but they are not actually infinite, given the finitude of the creation (though even if they were, it would not, in principle, pose a problem for God anyway). If the concept of a truly infinite Being is coherent, then the many layers of complexity and the many factors involved in the governance of random processes do not make divine providence impossible. If anything, it highlights God’s majesty.
Second, some may complain that the randomness of the particle movement is removed due to God’s “coercive” activity in actualizing S. That is, they may not have a problem with the notion of true counterfactuals of random subatomic particle movement, but may argue that once any effort at regulating their destination(s) is made (even by weak actualization), randomness is, by definition, removed. Notice that this argument is different in structure from the grounding objection in that it allows for truths regarding results from random processes, and it does not require an accounting of how there can be such truths or what makes them true, yet it still has some of the same weaknesses and is based on some of the same assumptions as the grounding objection. At its base is a question-begging assumption that randomness and orderliness cannot be reconciled, and any move toward establishing orderliness is automatically deemed destructive of the random nature of subatomic particle movement. In addition, it fails to appreciate that in the model, God’s activity is not directly affecting the particle movement, so there is no coercive, governing, or other such controlling power acting upon the particle in order to determine its ultimate location. An analogous complaint to counterfactuals of creaturely freedom would be to accuse Molinism of destroying freedom because God may set up the conditions where the creature freely acts, but that can hardly be said to destroy freedom in itself unless some variation of the grounding objection has been assumed.
Some perceptive readers may complain that the criticisms of Open Theism and to a lesser extent, Process Theology, are unfair in light of the presentation of the strengths and defenses of Molinism here. For example, it must be admitted that the God of Molinism, like the God of Open Theism, might (as one Calvinist friend put it) “just get lucky” with respect to the true counterfactuals available to him (whether of creaturely freedom, of random genetic mutation, of random subatomic particle movement, etc.), and so, in one sense, Molinism is subject to a similar criticism to that leveled against Open Theism. It should also be admitted that Open Theism (and to a lesser extent, Process Theology) has/have available to it/them similar appeals to the idea that variances at the micro-level may have virtually no impact at the macro-level. However, the latter claim is more a function of true randomness than of the model itself, so it is not so much a strength of one model over another and more a recognition that all three models—Molinism, Open Theism, and Process Theism—can accommodate such randomness. The former charge (of luck) is also not as strong as it first appears, for it fails to account for the fundamental difference between the Molinist and Open Theist models of providence after God’s creative act. While there is good reason to question the use of the term “luck” here due to its pejorative (not to mention its a priori conflict with sound Christian theories of providence), it will be retained in the answer for consistency. Under Molinist principles, once God decides on a possible world and actualizes it, God is no longer subject to such “luck,” whereas neither Open Theism not Process Theology can make that claim at any stage in the history of the cosmos. God’s “luck” (or lack thereof) is considered at the front end and worked into the overall scheme such that his decision to actualize a particular world makes provision for all the cases of bad “luck” and he still gets what he desires in the end.
In this chapter, I argued that Molinism provides a strong interpretive lens through which theists who are favorably disposed toward Intelligent Design may understand God’s providence in creation in such a way that both randomness and orderliness are preserved. It affords the proponent of ID a mechanism by which the designer may intelligently bring about the intricate processes observed in nature, while also explaining the supposed problems in the natural order of development of individual creatures. That is, Molinism allows for creaturely adaptability to a changing environment while also providing an explanatory tool for seemingly useless organs or wasteful/inefficient processes, by appeal to divine middle knowledge of counterfactuals of random genetic mutation. God may use his prevolitional knowledge of these counterfactuals to actualize a world where the creatures he desires will emerge and evolve (through progressive creation wherein he inserts genetic information or through purely naturalistic means). God could know counterfactuals like, If I were to actualize a world with such and such initial conditions, these particular creatures will evolve, though they will have certain flaws; but he could also know counterfactuals such as, If I were to insert this genetic information into this creature’s gene pool, some of its descendants will evolve in this way, thus creating this new species, though those who remain the species they are will now have a minor flaw. In the case of the former, middle knowledge proves helpful to theistic evolution, while in the case of the latter, it serves progressive creation. In both cases, though, there is allowance for some aspects that are undesirable to come along with the desirable.
I have also argued that middle knowledge provides a sound basis for God’s providence over a world characterized by true randomness at the quantum level and orderliness at the macro-level, a vision of the natural order shared by most scientists. By appeal to divine knowledge of counterfactuals of random subatomic particle movement, Molinism can provide a powerful interpretive lens for holding to the cherished Christian doctrine of meticulous divine providence while also taking seriously the findings of modern physics and the claims of random movement at the quantum level.
The modern world is dominated by science, and although there is always room for questioning the broad claims of science or the metaphysical implications of a scientific worldview, most Christians still try to reconcile their religious beliefs with the general claims of the scientific community. Only Molinism is able to fully and adequately integrate meticulous divine providence with the claims of evolutionary biology and quantum mechanics. It can, at the very least, serve as an aide to those Christians who take seriously the current claims of science regarding the natural world, and who wish to make sense of the guiding, preserving and directing work of God in light of the extent and reach of those claims.
1. It is for this reason that many systematic theology textbooks place the doctrine of creation under the doctrine of providence or alongside the doctrine of providence under the doctrine of God.
2. His first series of lectures were published by Harper Collins: Ian Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1990).
3. Del Ratzsch, The Battle of Beginnings: Why Neither Side Is Winning the Creation-Evolution Debate (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1996), 9. He continues: “The attempts of both sides to achieve quick victory by decreeing that the other side fails to meet some favorite philosophical definition of science are nearly without exception unsuccessful.” Ibid., 11. For example, a favorite argument by anti-evolutionists is to utilize a Popperian criterion for science (i.e., falsifiability) and argue that Darwinism fails, but that is but one way of defining the heart of science.
4. For example, Henry Morris, in the preface to a book written as a grammar-school textbook (published in both public school and general editions), writes, “The latter book [public school edition] deals with all the important aspects of the creation-evolution question from a strictly scientific point of view, attempting to evaluate the physical evidence from the relevant scientific fields without reference to the Bible or other religious literature. It demonstrates that the real evidences dealing with origins and ancient history support creationism rather than evolutionism.” Henry Morris, Scientific Creationism, 2nd ed. (Green Forest, AR: Master Books, 1985), iv.
5. Those he most likely has in mind—proponents of creation science who read the biblical account of creation literally and therefore believe the Earth is about six thousand years old and Darwinism false—do not disparage the scientific method or eschew the work of scientists. While many are scientists themselves, they admittedly and unapologetically give primacy to the biblical text, but this is not an eschewing of science.
6. While there are legitimate reasons for concern, Ratzsch notes, a naturalistic method does not require a naturalistic metaphysic. One can follow a naturalistic approach to the study of nature without committing himself to the view that nature is all that there is to Reality. Even though the evolution model may incorporate naturalistic processes and may work well with a naturalistic metaphysic, it does not imply or require one. Ratzsch writes, “But the fact that the evolution model is inherently contrary to the creation model and that biological evolutionary theory is perhaps absolutely indispensable to the evolution model does not by itself suggest in the slightest that there is any logical tension between theism and the biological theory of evolution. That two worldviews are mutually inconsistent as wholes does not imply that every specific part of each must be inconsistent with the other.” Ratzsch, Battle of Beginnings, 182. Ratzsch explains what he means by “evolution model” and “creation model”: “If we understand the evolution model to be, basically, that the cosmos is self-existent and the creation model to be, basically, that the cosmos is not self-existent, then . . . those two options do, pretty clearly, about cover it—they are exhaustive. And they are mutually exclusive—only one can be true.” Ibid. While this way of putting things may add more confusion than clarity to the discussion, the basic point is that one who believes in God may still seek a natural explanation for natural phenomena. In discussing intelligent design complaints about methodological naturalism in science, Pennock points out that there are no similar intelligent design complaints about other spheres where naturalism is the drive: “Science is godless in the same way that plumbing is godless. . . . Surely it is unreasonable to complain of a ‘priesthood’ of plumbers who only consider naturalistic explanations of stopped drains and do not consider the ‘alternate hypothesis’ that the origin of the backed-up toilet was the design of an intervening malicious spirit.” Robert Pennock, Tower of Babel: The Evidence against the New Creationism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 282. Pennock is a bit unfair here because Christian philosophers of science have only complained that sometimes naturalistic explanations are seen as the only viable means to knowledge attainment. In addition, as intelligent design proponents have pointed out, there is an element of hypocrisy in assigning scientific status to the search for extraterrestrial life while rejecting that status to the hypothesis of an intelligent designer. Both make assumptions about intelligence undergirding observed patterns in the natural world. William Dembski has made this argument on several occasions, often by appeal to the SETI program (depicted in the movie, Contact). See, for example, William Dembski, No Free Lunch (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 6–7. See also William Dembski, The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance through Small Probabilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 26–32.
7. He writes, “I am very convinced of the unity of knowledge. There is one world of human experience and human understanding that we are trying to come to grips with. If we are to understand that world, we need the insights both of science and religion, and of a number of other forms of rational human inquiry as well. Therefore, I see science and religion as being complementary and not conflicting.” John Polkinghorne, Serious Talk: Science and Religion in Dialogue (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1995), 1.
8. So the two areas of inquiry both seek after truth from different perspectives, asking different questions, and may be conceived as existing along something of a continuum. He writes, “Science and theology lie at opposite ends of a spectrum of rational human enquiry into reality. At the scientific end is the realm of impersonal experience; at the theological end is the realm of the experience of the transpersonal. In between lie the realms of human personal encounter with reality, which are the subjects of disciplines such as aesthetics and ethics. The whole spectrum of enquiry makes up the rich many-stranded texture of human knowledge, surveying the encounter with the multi-leveled reality of the one world of human experience. Ultimately, all these insightful disciplines must find their mutual reconciliation and integration with each other.” John Polkinghorne, Science & Theology: An Introduction (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 128.
9. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, 16.
10. One particularly helpful and accessible book on the topic is Mark F. Rooker and Kenneth D. Keathley, 40 Questions about Creation & Evolution (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2014).
11. While in its early years the Day-Age theory divided cosmic history into six even parts (the seventh day being the present age or more commonly, the future), most modern proponents do not see a need for the days to be of equal length and instead view them as corresponding roughly to geological ages.
12. See John Jefferson Davis, “Is ‘Progressive Creation’ Still a Helpful Concept? Reflections on Creation, Evolution, and Bernard Ramm’s Christian View of Science and Scripture—A Generation Later,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 50 (December 1998): 250–59. Some evangelicals who hold to theistic evolution do not like that terminology, believing it to be too deistic-sounding, and thus prefer terms like “evolutionary creationism,” “fully-gifted creationism,” and the like.
13. Charles Darwin was not the first to propose evolution as a theory. Evolutionary thought can be traced back to the ancient philosophers of many cultures, including the Greek pre-Socratic philosopher, Empedocles. Darwin himself was influenced by the ideas of his grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, who had taught him something of selective breeding, and by the geological work of Charles Lyell, who proposed gradual change over long periods of time as an explanation for strata. These served as the philosophical foundation for Darwin’s biological gradualism. However, it is still Charles Darwin who is given credit for suggesting that it is the combination of natural and sexual selection over long periods of time that explains the diversity seen today among creatures. T. H. Huxley became one of its fiercest defenders (even though he was never convinced of the gradualism of Darwin’s own idea), being dubbed, “Darwin’s bulldog.” His debates with Samuel Wilberforce and Richard Owen drew large crowds and created something of a scandal in the British Association for the Advancement of Science.
14. Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 17. This comment is telling in its frank admission. Much of the debate surrounding Darwinism and evolution has metaphysical implications and sounds more like religious devotion than scientific detachment. Even Dennett’s own work sometimes appears polemical and dismissive of various theological approaches to the natural world. Commenting on the Design argument for God’s existence, Dennett boldly proclaims its obsolescence in the face of Neo-Darwinism’s proclamation of evolution guided by naturalistic processes based on chance mutation: “[Darwin’s theory] has done this by opening up new possibilities of imagination, and thus utterly destroying any illusions anyone might have had about the soundness of an argument such as Locke’s a priori proof of the inconceivability of Design without Mind. Before Darwin, this was inconceivable in the pejorative sense that no one knew how to take the hypothesis seriously. Proving it is another matter, but the evidence does in fact mount, and we certainly can and must take it seriously. So whatever else you may think of Locke’s argument, it is now as obsolete as the quill pen with which it was written, a fascinating museum piece, a curiosity that can do no real work in the intellectual world today.” Ibid., 83. Not all parties are so antagonistic. It is true that, in principle, a wholly naturalistic process of minute, random changes which are naturally selected or rejected based on adaptive advantage could lead to the emergence of life and the vast array of creatures present on Earth, but possibility, actuality, and probability are three very different things. Most Christians who admit that unguided natural selection fueled by means of random genetic mutation is possible, reject that it has been proven to be actual and rate its probability as quite low. Of course, the key word here is “unguided,” as there are a number of Christians who believe that natural selection and even random genetic mutation played/plays a substantial role in the emergence and/or development of life on Earth, though they see such activity as still subject to divine providence.
15. Tammy Kitzmiller, et al. v. Dover Area School District, et al., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
16. Michael Ruse, Darwinism and Its Discontents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 42–43 .
17. There is, in actuality, a rather spirited discussion about exactly what “vestigial” means. The common notion of useless or functionless organs is an oversimplification. One particularly helpful resource is the Talk Origins website: http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/comdesc/section2.html.
18. Harris, Letter to a Christian Nation, 75. Harris goes on to claim that the natural world has so many poor designs that it would take an entire book to catalog them all, suggesting that the evidence speaks against ID [and God as Creator!].
19. Kenneth R. Miller, Finding Darwin’s God (New York: Perennial, 1999), 95. Just in case the reader thinks this quote an anomaly: “This designer has been busy! And what a stickler for repetitive work! Although no fossil of the Indian elephant has been found that is older than 1 million years, in just the last 4 million years no fewer than nine members of its genus, Elephas, have come and gone. We are asked to believe that each one of these species bears no relation to the next, except in the mind of that unnamed designer whose motivation and imagination are beyond our ability to fathom.” Ibid., 97. Miller also writes, “This curious pattern of design that resembles succession is repeated countless times in the fossil record; and for each instance, Johnson, Berlinski, and their colleagues must claim that any impression of a sequence is just a figment of our imagination.” Ibid., 97, 99.
20. Ibid., 100.
21. Ibid., 102. It is interesting to note, at this point, that Miller refers to himself as a theistic evolutionist; that he claims to hold to a strong belief in God. While his words here may lead some to doubt the sincerity of such claims, it seems to me that such doubt is unwarranted. The better solution is that Miller has simply succumbed to the popular view which sees the spheres of science and religion as completely disparate. One’s views on science have no impact on his religion, and vice versa. This is a naïve position at best, but one that has been rather popular among scientists who wish to retain belief in God.
22. William Dembski, The Design Revolution (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2004), 178. Dembski seems to have progressive creation in mind here. Elsewhere, he has clearly placed ID in opposition to theistic evolution: “Design theorists are no friends of theistic evolution. As far as design theorists are concerned, theistic evolution is American evangelicalism’s ill-conceived accommodation to Darwinism.” William Dembski, “What Every Theologian Should Know about Creation, Evolution, and Design,” Center for Interdisciplinary Studies Transactions 3, no. 2 (1995): 3.
23. While both Forrest and Gross have contributed numerous articles on the general topic of criticisms of Darwinism, their most substantive work is the book, Creationism’s Trojan Horse: The Wedge of Intelligent Design, rev. ed. (2004; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). While many people attribute the quote to Richard Dawkins, it was actually made by paleontologist Leonard Krishtalka, professor at the University of Kansas and director of the University’s Natural History Museum and Biodiversity Research Center.
24. This is the heart of the complaint against the way Darwinism is presented in many science texts. While it is clearly the best naturalistic explanation for the development of life forms, it is lacking in its ability to address the more fundamental question of the origins of life. The proposed naturalistic answers to this question are necessarily speculative, yet they are not presented as tentative or mere possibilities. In this, then, the lines between science and metaphysics are blurred. But this is the very complaint most Darwinists have made against ID-theorists.
25. Some may object to my characterization of the claim because neither Miller nor Harris present a formal logical argument, and may therefore argue that I have set up a straw man. However, given the tenor of their claims and the sarcasm in tone, it seems to be a fair representation. The either/or option posited by Miller: Either creatures are not designed or the Designer is incompetent, suggests a logical argument, even if not laid out as a formal syllogism.
26. Jerry Bergman and George Howe, “Vestigial Organs” Are Fully Functional: A History and Evaluation of the Concept of Vestigial Organs (Chino Valley, AZ: Creation Research Society Monograph, 1990).
27. Michael Behe, Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 226.
28. Cornelius Hunter argues not only that many supposed vestigial organs may indeed have a yet-undiscovered function, but correctly points out that the labeling of organs as “vestigial” is question-begging: “If a penguin’s wing is highly efficient for swimming, then why should we think it is vestigial, aside from presupposing it was formed by evolution? . . . Therefore, when evolutionists identify a structure as vestigial, it seems that it is the theory of evolution that is justifying the claim, rather than the claim justifying the theory of evolution.” Still, the complaint of Darwinists is not that the organs are vestigial, but rather that they have no current use, so adjusting terminology from “vestigial” to “useless” does nothing to answer the substance of the objection. Cornelius G. Hunter, Darwin’s Proof: The Triumph of Religion over Science (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2003), 46.
29. Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 21–22.
30. It relies on the claim that an intelligent designer will design creatures with as few flaws as possible, but even here further assumptions about the level of intelligence of the designer have been made. After all, while human designers meet the qualifications of the first statement (they design items with as few flaws as they can), they surely do not meet the qualifications of the second, though nobody calls their intelligence into question. Consider the design of any car. The engineers who work for the auto manufacturer attempt to design their vehicles without any flaws, but if a flaw exists in the design, it does not mean that the engineers are not intelligent. So when the requirement to design items with as few flaws as possible is laid on, something beyond mere intelligence is in use; the designer would have to be maximally intelligent or even omniscient. While ID makes no such claim, it is beyond dispute that most proponents would not take issue with it.
Similar assumptions about the power of the designer have also been made because developing a design and bringing it to fruition are two different things. Intelligence is needed for one, and power/resources are needed for the other. For the argument to work, the designer must have power such that he cannot be thought of as lacking the ability to instantiate flawless creatures. Thus, the argument that the designer can and must properly eliminate/prevent all creaturely flaws requires that the designer is maximally intelligent and maximally powerful (i.e., omniscient and omnipotent).
31. Behe, Darwin’s Black Box, 223.
32. Pennock, Tower of Babel, 248. While Pennock is always quick to point out instances in which creationists are unfair to modern Darwinians by mischaracterization, anachronism, or misrepresentation, he himself is guilty of the same here, for modern Intelligent Design theorists, even traditional theists, are under no obligation to hold that God must make a perfect Creation and that insodoing, he only had one option (i.e., “the Best”).
33. Or, to be more precise, it is possible that the intelligent designer could not have developed a world with creatures that are as complex as those which exist without some creatures also having flaws.
34. One other point is worth noting, and this is related to the limiting of the discussion to the realm of possibility. The critic of ID may suggest that, while it may be possible that the intelligent designer could not have developed creatures with the complexity they have without the flaws they have, the preponderance of the evidence of vestigial organs still speaks against ID. That is, he may argue that the great number of flaws which exist in the natural world point to a purely naturalistic process devoid of any intelligent guidance or direction. He may argue that the fact that so many species have gone extinct speaks against an intelligent (or benevolent for that matter) designer. Let us call this objection the emotive problem of creaturely flaws, due to the fact that it makes a claim upon our emotional response to the evidence of flaws in the natural world. This would not be an unreasonable objection, especially since ID theorists such as Dembski have suggested that ID is really concerned with inference to the best explanation. However, we will see that this objection does have its problems.
Most first-year philosophy students will immediately notice the similarity of this sort of argument to the so-called emotive problem of evil (to belief in the existence of God). This form of argument, while seemingly persuasive, is really just a veiled form of the logical arguments, for the attempt to quantify acceptable negative states of affairs always fails. When atheologians are asked to quantify how many instances of evil would be acceptable for belief in the existence of God to be rational, they invariably claim none. This same strategy works with the a-ID theorist. If only one flaw speaks against the existence of an intelligent designer, then the Emotive Problem of Creaturely Flaws collapses into the Logical Problem of Creaturely Flaws. Therefore, if the logical problem is answered, then the objection from creaturely flaws is answered.
So in some ways, both the Molinist and Determinist could make use of the argument (if the determinist agrees that it is possible). However, if the desire is to move beyond merely responding to the argument and to reflect upon how the intelligent designer [for Christians, God] actually did create, then it must be admitted that the argument offered here is not available to the Determinist because he is committed to the claim that the designer must have the ability to have creatures with the complexity they have without the flaws.
35. I understand that many of the opponents of ID have made just this charge, that ID is a veiled attempt to insert Christianity into science, and that my reference to the designer as “God” adds credence to this claim. However, it is somewhat dishonest for me to refuse to refer to the designer as God if I do, indeed, believe him to be such.
36. While I am not a proponent of theistic evolution, I acknowledge that Molinism provides a powerful mechanism for explaining how God could guide evolution in a way that preserves the fundamental scientific claims of neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology without a commitment to naturalistic materialism.
37. Kirk R. MacGregor, “The Impossibility of Evolution Apart from God with Middle Knowledge,” paper presented at the national meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society, Milwaukee, WI, 2012. Greg Welty has turned MacGregor’s argument on its head, arguing that the statistical impossibility to which MacGregor appeals as proof of God’s activity actually speaks against the plausibility of Molinism itself! Greg Welty, “The Evolution of Molinism,” paper presented at the national meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society, Milwaukee, WI, 2012.
38. It is also the case that epistemological uncertainty does not imply metaphysical uncertainty; just because we do not know which of the counterfactuals is true, it does not follow that neither one can be true.
39. For example, Keith Ward suggests that preservation of libertarian freedom may serve as the reason God chose to create by means of random processes. See Keith Ward, “Theistic Evolution,” in Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA, eds. William A. Dembski and Michael Ruse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 261–74, esp. 262–63.
40. See, for example, Nancey Murphy and George F. R. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 32–37; Nancey Murphy, Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996), chapter 6, esp. 149–52.
41. Howard J. Van Til, ““The Fully Gifted Creation (‘Theistic Evolution’),” in Three Views on Creation and Evolution, eds. J. P. Moreland and John Mark Reynolds (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), 173.
42. Ibid.
43. Werner Heisenberg, The Physicist’s Conception of Nature (1958), excerpted in Edmund Blair Bolles, ed., Galileo’s Commandment: An Anthology of Great Science Writing (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1997), 349.
44. He first objects to the total control afforded God in this model because it leads to predestination, a doctrine Barbour sees as denying human freedom and the reality of evil. While there is good reason to doubt this interpretation of predestination itself, Barbour is surely correct that Pollard’s view is inconsistent with the reality of chance/indeterminacy. Barbour goes on to criticize the model for its lop-sided view of providence as divine use of unlawful aspects of nature and for its implicit reductionism. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, 117.
45. Helm, The Providence of God, 143.
46. Ibid., 144.
47. David Basinger, Divine Power in Process Theism: A Philosophical Critique (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 73.