MOLINISM: THE BIBLICAL EVIDENCE
The beginning point of theological reflection for many is not natural theology or existential encounter with God, but revealed theology in the Bible. If middle knowledge is true, we should expect the biblical description of how God works to confirm it. Ironically, even though the bulk of the discussion surrounding middle knowledge has taken place among Christian scholars, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to examination of the biblical evidence for its truth. Arguments have tended to remain in the realm of analytical philosophy. Yet, it should go without saying that Christians interested in the doctrine of middle knowledge should search the Scriptures to see if what Molina said was true, much like the Bereans did with Paul’s claims about the resurrection (Acts 17:11), and if Molinism is true, it should be adopted.
As noted earlier, the major objection to Molinism is the so-called grounding objection.1 It has a variety of manifestations, from the simple question of what grounds the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, to the more complex complaint that middle knowledge is viciously circular.2 The basis of most of these complaints against Molinism is the claim that counterfactuals of (libertarian) creaturely freedom cannot be true. For ease of study, they will be categorized as Arminian and Calvinist.3
Arminian opponents of Molinism—opponents of Molinism who subscribe to libertarian freedom—are typically Open Theists and object to the very concept of true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. They argue that nothing can serve as the basis for the truth of statements about what persons would have freely done in situations that never arise (i.e., counterfactuals proper). They also often contend that if there are true statements about what persons will definitely do in the future, then libertarian freedom is abrogated. Since Arminian objectors deny the truth of counterfactuals of freedom, what needs to be shown is that the Bible supports the belief that there are such things as true counterfactuals of freedom.
Calvinist (and Thomist) opponents of Molinism—opponents of Molinism who hold to compatibilist freedom—do not normally have difficulty with the concept of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom per se, but rather with the Molinist claim that they are counterfactuals of libertarian freedom. One way determinist objectors have attacked this claim is to call into question the prevolitional nature of counterfactuals of freedom.4 What needs to be shown is that those counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true independent of God’s will, or are true logically prior to God’s knowledge of his will, and inform his creative and providential decision(s).
In this chapter, I will argue that the Bible supports the belief that there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, contrary to Open Theist claims and (contrary to compatibilist claims), that God’s knowledge of these propositions informs his pre-creative decisions. Molina himself cited three passages as support of his claim that God has knowledge of counterfactuals, but he did not offer proof that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom can be true because it was assumed to be the case. However, if there are passages which teach that God knows counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, then it is obvious that the Bible supports the claim that they can be true. Each of the passages Molina referenced, in addition to three others that support middle knowledge, will be examined, if only briefly.
The first passage to which Molina appealed is found in the Gospel of Matthew, in which Jesus's words of rebuke to the inhabitants of the cities of Chorazin and Bethsaida are recorded: “Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the deeds of power done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes” (Matt. 11:21 NRSV). Molina argued that Jesus was here making a factual claim regarding how the Tyrians and Sidonians would have responded (repentance) if he had performed the same miraculous works in their cities as he had in Chorazin and Bethsaida. Although the wonders were not worked in Tyre and Sidon, God can and does still know it or the truth it represents.5
Kenny has criticized Molina, arguing that Jesus was not seriously implying anything factual about what the Tyrians and Sidonians would really do in those circumstances. Rather, Kenny argues, “the passage about Tyre and Sidon is clearly rhetorical,” and he is basically correct.6 Jesus's chastisement of Chorazin and Bethsaida goes on to say, “But I tell you, on the day of judgment it will be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon than for you. And you, Capernaum, will you be exalted to heaven? No, you will be brought down to Hades. For if the deeds of power done in you had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day. But I tell you that on the day of judgment it will be more tolerable for the land of Sodom than for you” (Matt. 11:22–24, NRSV). A consistent hermeneutic demands that Molina read these words of Jesus just as literally as those regarding Chorazin and Bethsaida, but this means Jesus was making several questionable assertions. For example, he appears to claim that on the day of judgment, Tyre and Sidon will receive fewer/less severe punishments than Chorazin and Bethsaida, and Capernaum will receive a greater judgment than Sodom. This suggests various levels of punishment meted out by God at the last day, and while the idea may comport well with modern sensibilities of making the punishment fit the crime, it doesn’t fit the biblical description of eschatological judgment, though there is certainly room for disagreement. In addition, Jesus seems to make the rather odd claim that Capernaum will be cast down into the realm of Hades; cities may be destroyed by God, but they do not literally go down to the realm of the dead. The language is clearly metaphorical. Jesus also claims that Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum will receive worse punishments because the inhabitants of Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom would have repented if the same deeds of power had been performed in those cities, but a literal reading here would mean the level of punishment one receives is based upon what that individual would have done if circumstances had been different, and thus, punishments and rewards have less to do with what one has actually done, and more to do with the true counterfactuals about him. These are questionable theological positions at best and fail to reflect the point Jesus was making. He was not trying to make comparisons about the relative amount of divine wrath to be poured out on particular individuals or cities, and he was not making claims about the relocation of particular cities at the time of God’s judgment. It is also doubtful that he was making the theological claim that God punishes (or rewards) individuals or groups based on how they would have acted in any number of possible but nonactual situations. The Bible explicitly states that persons are judged on the works they performed while alive (Rev. 20:12–13), and God’s justice and mercy demand that he not punish persons based on what they would have done.7 It is true that God judges the heart in addition to actions, but this fact in no way allows for punishment for sins not committed or sins that would have been committed in non-realized situations. Jesus meant to condemn the cities of Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum by offering an unfavorable comparison of their spiritual conditions with the worst cities the Hebrew Bible had to offer. Thus, it seems that Kenny’s critique should be sustained.8 At a minimum, this passage cannot establish the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.
The second passage Molina used to defend God’s knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom is found in 1 Samuel 23. It tells of a time when David escaped from Saul because he was given special insight into how Saul and the men of the city in which he was hidden would act given certain conditions. The text reads as follows:
Now it was told Saul that David had come to Keilah. And Saul said, “God has given him into my hand; for he has shut himself in by entering a town that has gates and bars.” Saul summoned all the people to war, to go down to Keilah, to besiege David and his men. When David learned that Saul was plotting evil against him, he said to the priest Abiathar, “Bring the ephod here.” David said, “O LORD, the God of Israel, your servant has heard that Saul seeks to come to Keilah, to destroy the city on my account. And now, will Saul come down as your servant has heard? O LORD, the God of Israel, I beseech you, tell your servant.” The LORD said, “He will come down.” Then David said, “Will the men of Keilah surrender me and my men into the hand of Saul?” The LORD said, “They will surrender you.” Then David and his men, who were about six hundred, set out and left Keilah; they wandered wherever they could go. When Saul was told that David had escaped from Keilah, he gave up the expedition (1 Sam. 23:7–13, NRSV).
Molina believed the passage to affirm that if David were to remain in Keilah, Saul and his men would (freely) besiege the city, and had they done so, the men of Keilah would (freely) surrender David to Saul, and that although neither of these scenarios would occur, God still knows how they would play out. So God knows two counterfactuals of creaturely freedom:
If David were to remain in Keilah, Saul would freely besiege the city;
and
If David were to remain and Saul were to attack, the men of the city would freely hand David over to Saul.
Molina writes, “Notice, God knew these two future contingents [counterfactuals of creaturely freedom], which depended on human choice, and He revealed them to David. Yet they never have existed and never will exist in reality, and thus they do not exist in eternity either.”9
Kenny thinks these claims are excessive since the instrument of divination (ephod) was so crude. He notes that the ephod probably only had two sides (yes and no), and therefore, contends that it “would be incapable of marking the difference between knowledge of counterfactuals and knowledge of the truth-value of material implications.”10 Kenny concludes, “Since the antecedent of David’s questions was false, the same answers would have been appropriate in each case.”11 Kenny’s argument is twofold: on the one hand, he suggests that counterfactuals proper serve as instances of material implication and therefore, offer no value to divine knowledge, and on the other hand, since the ephod could only yield a “yes” or “no” answer, it is unclear if God knew what Saul and the men of Keilah would definitely do (freely), or if he only knew what they would probably do. If God knows that Saul would definitely attack the city and that the men would definitely hand David over, the appropriate answer to David’s questions is “yes.” However, if God only knows that Saul will probably attack the city or the men will probably hand David over, the appropriate answer to David’s question is also “yes.” Therefore, Kenny concludes, it is not clear from the text that God really possesses middle knowledge.12
This objection may work from a logical standpoint, but it is not the most plausible interpretation of the passage. The most natural reading of the story lends itself to the belief that God indeed had knowledge of how Saul and the men of Keilah would actually act, and not merely of how they would probably act.13 Two related passages lend insight into the story and support this assertion. One relates to Kenny’s understanding of what the ephod was and how it was used, and the other deals with the nature of answers given by consultation of the ephod (i.e., probabilistic or definitive).
Exodus 28 describes many of the robes and other attire utilized by the Levitical priesthood in the Israelite cultus. It is here that the ephod is described as a garment, and not as an object with a “yes” and a “no” side. Attached to the ephod was a breastplate which housed, among other things, the Urim and Thummim (Exod. 28:30). Most scholars believe it was these items, and not the ephod itself, which were consulted in ascertaining the will of God. It is unclear whether they were used only to gain either an affirmative or negative answer to simple questions, or were used for more explicit guidance. The Babylonian Talmud suggests that they were part of the high priest’s breastplate and gave answers to open-ended questions. Some scholars believe they were used by the priest in conjunction with oral prophecy to deliver the LORD’s words.14 This fits well with normal procedure when one sought guidance from the Lord; he would consult the priests of God after bringing a sacrifice. Since the ephod was reserved for use by the Levitical priesthood, David probably did not consult the LORD directly, but rather consulted him through the mediation of Abiathar the priest. Thus, David would have brought his question to God by way of the priest, and it is unclear if consulting the ephod yielded only a “yes” or “no” answer as Kenny claims, or provided more detailed direction.
A parallel passage exists in which David consulted with Abiathar again, and in this case, he was given more explicit instructions through the ephod (1 Sam. 30:1–19). The Amalekites had attacked the city where David and his men lived, and carried away all their possessions and family members. When David and his men returned, they wanted revenge, but David first sought the guidance of the LORD:
David said to the priest Abiathar son of Ahimelech, “Bring me the ephod.” So Abiathar brought the ephod to David. David inquired of the LORD, “Shall I pursue this band? Shall I overtake them?” He answered him, “Pursue; for you shall surely overtake and shall surely rescue.” So David set out, he and the six hundred men who were with him. . . . David attacked them from twilight until the evening of the next day. Not one of them escaped, except four hundred young men, who mounted camels and fled. David recovered all that the Amalekites had taken; and David rescued his two wives. Nothing was missing, whether small or great, sons or daughters, spoil or anything that had been taken; David brought back everything (1 Sam. 30:7–9a, 17–19, NRSV).
The text implies that God knows that if David and his men were to pursue the Amalekites, they will definitely overtake them, and if they pursue the Amalekites and overtake them, they will definitely rescue their families and possessions. David is told what to do and is given definite answers to his questions regarding his success. These are not answers based on probabilities or material implications, but rather based on a knowledge of how things will turn out if David freely pursues the Amalekites. Kenny’s analysis of divine knowledge imparted by the ephod suggests God does not know that David and his men would overtake the Amalekites and rescue their families and possessions, but only that they would probably do so if they took pursuit. But, the answer given by God is a more definite admonishment to go forward to success than one based on probable success. The inclusion of the Hebrew phrase ki-haseg in verse 8 does not allow for a probabilistic interpretation of the information known and conveyed by God.15 Rather, it is certain: David and his men will definitely overtake the Amalekites if they pursue them. Similarly, they will definitely rescue their families and possessions if they pursue. In addition, David received more information than he requested. David asked if he should pursue the Amalekites, but he was told to pursue them and that he would rescue that which had been taken. It is likely that David was given this additional information because he was in conversation with a person rather than consulting an impersonal device. The role of the priesthood was to function as mediator between the LORD and humans, and Abiathar fulfilled that role for David. Kenny’s claim that David could have only received a “yes” or “no” answer without additional information is most likely false. But even if it is not, the passage from 1 Samuel 30 clearly speaks against Kenny’s understanding of divine guidance derived from consultation with the ephod. The Hebrew of the passage connotes definitiveness in tone, even if the English is unclear.
Two possible objections to the use of 1 Samuel 30 for understanding 1 Samuel 23 exist. First, it may be complained that propositions describing the knowledge imparted here are not counterfactuals proper. Instead, it refers to events that will (and did) in fact occur, and therefore cannot be compared to the circumstances described in chapter 23, which are counterfactual. The basic substance of this claim is true—David and his men pursued the Amalekites and rescued their families and possessions—but this is inconsequential to the argument. The purpose of comparing the two passages was to show that Kenny’s claims regarding the kind of knowledge available via consultation with the ephod were wrong, and 1 Samuel 30 is appropriate for this task. In addition, at the time of the consultation, the propositions were still future conditionals.
Second, it may be complained that propositions regarding David’s pursuit and rescue do not refer to free actions and therefore, even if the text requires a rejection of the probabilistic interpretation of David’s success, it does not follow that the same should be said for the propositions regarding Saul’s and the men of Keilah’s actions if David were to remain. Two points can be made in response to this objection, depending on what the objector is really saying. First, as in response to the first objection, the purpose of the comparison is to refute the specific claims of Kenny. Admittedly, the infinitive absolute construction is absent from 1 Samuel 23, but it still seems that counterfactuals about what Saul would definitely do if David were to remain and what the men of Keilah would definitely do if Saul were to attack are implied, and the reading of 1 Samuel 30 seems to confirm that 1 Samuel 23 should be read in definite as opposed to probabilistic terms. Second, if this objection seeks to tie the absence of definiteness in 1 Samuel 23 to the free nature of Saul’s and the Keilites actions if David were to remain, then it seems that the objection is really a form of the grounding objection, which has already been addressed. This interpretation of the difference between 1 Samuel 23 and 1 Samuel 30 as a problem, seems to presuppose incompatibilism, rather than to present an argument for it.
The third passage Molina cited for support of his claim that God possesses knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom is found in the apocryphal book, Wisdom of Solomon, and will not be discussed here, but other passages also suggest divine knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.16
There is a passage in Proverbs which has to do with human awareness of another’s tragedy. It refers to some persons being led away to death and includes an indictment of others for their lack of action to save or help:
Deliver those who are being taken away to death, And those who are staggering to slaughter, O hold [them] back. If you say, “See, we did not know this,” Does He not consider [it] who weighs the hearts? And does He not know [it] who keeps your soul? And will He not render to man according to his work? (Prov. 24:11–12, NASB)
While the identity of those being led away is not made clear, the majority of commentators favor a literal rather than figurative or metaphorical interpretation of their fate; the condemned face physical death, and those indicted face God’s judgment for failing to rescue or attempting to rescue them.17 Toy suggests that those being led away were captives of some sort who could be ransomed through various legal means.18
The passage also includes a charge against those who did not act, and the charge seems to be based on the fact that God is aware of human motive, thoughts, and feelings. On this basis, Ross believes the principles involved can be universalized, and closer examination of the arguments reveals how this passage supports belief in the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.19 The defense of those indicted seems to be based on a claim of ignorance; to wit,
{D1}: Since we did not know of the plight of the prisoners, we cannot be held guilty for failing to act or supposed callousness.
Implicit in this defense is the claim that, had they known of the plight of the prisoners, those indicted would have done something about it.
The indictment is less clear, for it could be based on their lack of action or on their poor attitude (that would have resulted in their doing nothing even if they knew). That is, God’s indictment could be of one of the following forms:
{I1}: You knew of the plight of the prisoners (and weighed the pros and cons) and did nothing to help them. Therefore, you are to be held guilty for your inaction and callousness.
or
{I2}: You did not know of the plight of the prisoners, but even if you had known, you would not have done anything about it. You did nothing to help the prisoners, and therefore, you are to be held guilty for your inaction and callousness.
Two related questions are worth considering. First, which of {I1} or {I2} presents a stronger case against the person(s) indicted? Second (and more importantly), which of {I1} or {I2} serves as the basis of the indictment in the passage? Of course, if {I1} is correct, the passage fails to support the doctrine of middle knowledge because no true counterfactual of creaturely freedom is included in the argument. Although the defense makes use of a counterfactual, it does not support middle knowledge because the accused could be lying or just mistaken. In the structure of the passage, comments made in the indictment (most likely because they come from God) are presented as true, while comments made in the defense are not necessarily so. Thus, the passage only supports counterfactual truth if {I2} is true.
Several considerations favor {I1} over {I2}. First, {I1} appears to present a stronger case against the violator because of the volition required by its construction. That is, a conscious choice had to be made to ignore the plight of the prisoners. By contrast, {I2} includes an element of ignorance, and this may remove guilt under biblical law. The Levitical sacrificial system included sacrifices for sins committed in ignorance, but they were separated from the other sacrifices, suggesting a different standard. Second, it is unclear whether God holds persons responsible for actions they would have committed if things had been different than they were. As noted earlier in the discussion of Matthew 11, condemnation based on sins one would have, but did not commit, seems unjust and out of step with God’s holy character. Third, it may be the case that the defense presented above is not an accurate interpretation of the passage. Scott has suggested an alternate translation of the key defense section (verse 12): “If you say, ‘See, this is none of our business,’ will not he who weighs men’s hearts take note of it? He who keeps watch on your life will know, and will requite a man according to his acts.”20 If Scott is right in seeing the construction as a colloquialism similar to the expression, “I was just minding my own business,” then the defense may look something like the following:
{D2}: We were aware of the plight of the prisoners, but it was none of our business to interfere with the actions being taken against them. Therefore, we cannot be held guilty for our inaction or callousness.
In this case, the indictment presented in {I1} would probably need to include the additional point that it was/is the business of persons to interfere with the actions being taken against others.
This approach to the passage presents at least two problems for opponents of Molinism in using {I1} and rejecting true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. First, there seems to be no good reason for translating the passage this way. There is virtual unanimity regarding the translation of yada in verse 12; it refers to knowledge or awareness, and since Scott offers no reasons for his alternate translation [not our concern], it must be concluded that the passage speaks of claimed ignorance.21 Second, if the passage were translated this way, it would reintroduce counterfactuals of creaturely freedom into the argument because the defense is based on the additional claim:
If it were our business to interfere with the actions being taken against the prisoners, we would have freely intervened.
While the indictment would certainly dispute this claim, the converse counterfactual would not be necessary for the argument to stand. Ultimately, the alternate translation adds nothing to the argument presented by {I1}, and its defense {D2} has a weaker claim to legitimacy than the original {D1} and therefore, it should be rejected. However, there are good arguments in favor of {I2}, some of which seem to stem from the passage itself.
First, it may be argued that {I2} is stronger than {I1} because it is more inclusive. While {I1} is based only upon inaction of the individual, {I2} includes both inaction and callousness (a problem of the heart). The strength of the indictment is tied to the strength of the defense and thus, we must ask if the additional claim of what the indicted party would have done had they known makes the defense stronger than it would be with only a claim of ignorance. Adding comments about how the indicted would have acted differently only presents a stronger case if the indictment is for both inaction and an unrighteous attitude. The more inclusive indictment {I2} leads to a stronger defense, namely the one which claims they would have intervened had they known.
Second, the requirement of a sacrifice for sins committed in ignorance under the Levitical system speaks for the argument presented by {I2} rather than detracts from it. The fact that a sacrifice is required speaks to the culpability of the perpetrator, regardless of his intentions or awareness. The seriousness of the situation is highlighted by the fact that the offering for unintentional sins is the same as that for intentional sins, an unblemished bull, goat, lamb, or ram (Lev. 4:3, 14, 23, 28, 32; 5:15, 18), and the blood of the sacrifice is applied to the horns of the altar by the priest. The differentiation in the situation was on the part of the human who erred, not on the part of God—sins committed in ignorance are still condemnable and the offending party is still culpable (Lev. 5:19).
Third, the passage itself indicates that the indictment includes subjective as well as objective elements. As already noted, the claim that they would have acted as a defense suggests that the indictment was understood by the accused as being closer to {I2} than {I1}. In addition, God’s weighing of the heart indicates that the judgment is primarily for a lack of love or concern for his fellow man. Thus, it seems that {I2} serves as indictment, and therefore, the counterfactual,
If you had known the plight of the prisoners, you would not have done anything about it;
is true. The passage supports the claim that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom can be true.
In another supporting passage, the Apostle Paul refers to a message of wisdom the mature possess, as distinguished from the wisdom of this age or the wisdom of the rulers of this age.
Yet we do speak wisdom among those who are mature; a wisdom, however, not of this age, nor of the rulers of this age, who are passing away; but we speak God’s wisdom in a mystery, the hidden [wisdom,] which God predestined before the ages to our glory; [the wisdom] which none of the rulers of this age has understood; for if they had understood it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory; but just as it is written, “THINGS WHICH EYE HAS NOT SEEN AND EAR HAS NOT HEARD, AND [WHICH] HAVE NOT ENTERED THE HEART OF MAN, ALL THAT GOD HAS PREPARED FOR THOSE WHO LOVE HIM.” For to us God revealed [them] through the Spirit; for the Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God. For who among men knows the [thoughts] of a man except the spirit of the man, which is in him? Even so the [thoughts] of God no one knows except the Spirit of God. Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God, that we might know the things freely given to us by God, which things we also speak, not in words taught by human wisdom, but in those taught by the Spirit, combining spiritual [thoughts] with spiritual [words]. But a natural man does not accept the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness to him, and he cannot understand them, because they are spiritually appraised. But he who is spiritual appraises all things, yet he himself is appraised by no man. For who has known the mind of the LORD, that he should instruct Him? But we have the mind of Christ (1 Cor. 2:6–16, NASB).
The identity of the mature is somewhat ambiguous. Some have thought it refers to those who are mature in their faith, over against new Christians, but it seems to be a more general reference to believers.22 The contrast with the wisdom and rulers of “this age” in verse 6, along with the continuing contrast between the natural (psychikos) or carnal (sarkinos) on the one hand, and the spiritual (pneumatikos) on the other hand, supports this assessment.23 Thus, those who understand God’s secret wisdom are the regenerate who have the Holy Spirit. The identity of the rulers of this age should also be clarified. While it is possible that Paul is here referring to spirits, demons, or demonically controlled humans, the most likely meaning is human rulers, specifically those responsible for Jesus's crucifixion.24 Paul’s reference to their lack of understanding accords well with Jesus's prayer for forgiveness of those who crucified him (Luke 23:34).
In verse 7, Paul speaks of God’s secret wisdom that was “hidden” (en musteriō) for a long time but has now been made known to all who receive it. While Paul could be referring to a special knowledge (gnōsis) reserved for a select group, this is doubtful, in spite of the fact that he calls it a mysterious wisdom (musterion sōphia; literally, he calls it the “wisdom of God, a mystery”). Rather, the wisdom seems to be the gospel of Jesus Christ in its totality.25
In the next verse, Paul states that the rulers of this age did not understand the secret wisdom, as evinced by their crucifying Christ. This suggests a truth about what would have been the case if things had been different. That is, it appears that Paul is here affirming the truth of the counterfactual of freedom,
If the rulers of this age understood God’s secret wisdom, they would (freely) refrain from crucifying the Lord of glory;
and denying:
If the rulers of this age understood God’s secret wisdom, they would (freely) crucify the Lord of glory.
The Open Theist may argue that Paul’s words are not meant to be taken as a statement of what actually would be the case if the rulers had understood God’s secret wisdom, but rather only of what probably would be the case. Under this view, Paul is seen as making the weaker claim that
If the rulers of this age understood God’s secret wisdom, they would probably (freely) refrain from crucifying the Lord of glory;
is true.26 On this interpretation, the rulers still might have crucified the Lord, even if they understood God’s secret wisdom. How is the Molinist to respond to this interpretation of the passage? While this interpretation is possible, it is not the most likely for two reasons, one grammatical and the other theological.
The grammatical problem has to do with the conditional statement presented in verse 8. Paul’s use of the aorist indicative here leads Robertson to conclude that it is a determined as unfulfilled conditional, or second class conditional, with the conclusion following logically from the premise.27 Thiselton agrees, noting that Paul’s words indicate that the rulers of this age “would not have lent their aid unwittingly to furthering these purposes.”28 At first glance, this point may seem to undermine libertarian freedom, but it does not. While Robertson uses the language of logical inference, his point is merely that the conditional is definite; there is a fact of the matter about what will be the case if the conditions (i.e., the rulers understanding God’s secret wisdom) are met.29 There is no formal logical connection between antecedent and consequent.
The theological problem is that it suggests Christians could participate in the crucifixion, which contradicts Scripture. In order to see why, consider the following principle: to curse someone is to wish ill fortune, even death, for him. If this principle is true, then it seems that if one is willing to kill another, he is willing to curse him. Robertson and Plummer suggest that cursing functions this way in the Bible, noting that Jesus was cursed by the very persons who crucified him.30 Jesus also seems to have viewed cursing in this way when he condemned those who curse as being in danger of hellfire (Matt. 5:22; cf. James 3:9–11, 15–16, where blessing is a work of God and cursing is a work of earthly and demonic forces). Of course, all that needs to be shown is the weaker claim that if one is willing to kill another, he would be willing to curse him, and this seems obviously true, at least if murder is a sin of equal or greater consequence than cursing. Later in the letter, Paul sets up a parallel contrast, noting that “no one speaking by the Spirit of God says, ‘Jesus is accursed’; and no one can say, ‘Jesus is Lord,’ except by the Holy Spirit” (1 Cor. 12:3, NASB).31
A straightforward reading of Paul’s words regarding the ability of those who have the Spirit to curse Jesus suggests the following argument: Those who have the secret wisdom of God have the Holy Spirit; Those who have the Holy Spirit cannot say, “Jesus is accursed”; Those who cannot say, “Jesus is accursed” cannot crucify Jesus; Therefore, those who have the secret wisdom of God cannot crucify Jesus [the Lord of glory].32 It follows from this that the probabilistic reading of the passage fails and instead, that which affirms the truth of the counterfactual,
If the rulers of this age understood God’s secret wisdom, they would (freely) refrain from crucifying the Lord of glory;
stands, and the passage supports belief in true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.
Jesus's farewell speech to his disciples may indicate that there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Consider Jesus's words to the disciples: “If the world hates you, you know that it has hated Me before [it hated] you. If you were of the world, the world would love its own; but because you are not of the world, but I chose you out of the world, therefore the world hates you” (John 15:18–19, NASB). Jesus seems to argue that the world hates the disciples because they are not of the world and that the reaction of those in the world to the disciples would be different if they were of the world, to wit, the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom,
If the disciples were of the world, those in the world would freely love them;
is true, and
If the disciples were of the world, those in the world would freely hate them;
is false. Likewise, the conditionals of creaturely freedom,
If the disciples were not of the world, those in the world would freely hate them;
is true, while
If the disciples were not of the world, those in the world would freely love them;
is false. Robertson denies the possibility of a probabilistic interpretation of the conditional statement in verse 19 because it is a second class conditional statement, and therefore, the argument that verses 18 and 19 support belief in counterfactuals of freedom seems unassailable.34
Included in the discourse is an interesting discussion of the impact of the incarnation and Jesus's ministry upon the guilt of those who hate God. Consider his words:
But all these things they will do to you for My name’s sake, because they do not know the One who sent Me. If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin, but now they have no excuse for their sin. He who hates Me hates My Father also. If I had not done among them the works which no one else did, they would not have sin; but now they have both seen and hated Me and My Father as well. But [they have done this] in order that the word may be fulfilled that is written in their Law, ‘THEY HATED ME WITHOUT A CAUSE’” (John 15:21–25, NASB).
He seems to imply that if he had not come and worked miracles, those of the world would have been ignorant of God and thereby, innocent of sin, and so the incarnation gave godless men an opportunity for sin they would otherwise not have been given.35 While this may seem to allow ignorance to stand as an excuse for sin, it doesn’t necessarily.36 It may be that Jesus was referring to the specific sin of rejecting him (and by extension, the Father) rather than to sin in general.37 If both love and hate are free responses with love the desired and hate the undesirable sinful response, then Jesus's argument looks something like the following: If Jesus had not come and worked miracles, those of the world would have been ignorant of God (Jesus and the Father), and they would not have had an opportunity to respond to Jesus and the Father with love or hate. If that were the case, then they would not be credited with freely loving God or guilty of freely hating God, and therefore, if Jesus had not come and worked miracles, those of the world would not be credited with freely loving God or be guilty of freely hating God. This argument appears to be based on a couple of principles:
One can only be held guilty for inaction or credited with action if he can act;
and
An individual cannot act if he does not have an opportunity to act.
On the second reading of Jesus's statements (in verses 21–25), no counterfactuals of freedom have been presented, and the opponents of Molinism may argue they do not prove that there can be true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Still, no alternate reading has been proposed for verses 18–19, which are also dependent upon counterfactuals, and none seems possible, and therefore, the overall thrust of Jesus's teaching here supports the claim that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom can be true.
We have considered five passages that appear to support the Molinist contention that there are true counterfactuals of freedom, and shown that a responsible interpretation confirms this claim. I first argued that the passage regarding the faith of the inhabitants of Chorazin and Bethsaida is inconclusive, and its support of the existence of true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom is doubtful at best. However, I also demonstrated that the reading of the text from 1 Samuel which supports the doctrine of divine knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom is more probable than the reading proposed by Kenny. Likewise, it has also been shown that middle knowledge can be maintained on either Molina’s or Kenny’s understanding of the passage in Wisdom of Solomon, and that the most likely reading of Proverbs 24 relies upon counterfactuals of freedom. Similarly, the passage in 1 Corinthians 2 requires a true counterfactual of freedom to have any force at all. Last, the passage in John 15 was shown to be based upon a counterfactual of freedom, though an alternate interpretation which does not appeal to any counterfactuals of freedom could be used, but is less likely. The burden of proof now belongs to the Arminian detractors of Molinism.
Thus far, I have argued that the biblical text supports the Molinist claim that there are true counterfactuals of freedom and therefore, the Open Theist critique cannot stand. I will now show that the Bible also supports the Molinist position against its Calvinist detractors by questioning some of the common tenets of Calvinist soteriology. Specifically, I wish to explore two: Calvinist conceptions of the order of salvation and unconditional election.
The concept of ordo salutis (literally, “order of salvation”) is similar to the idea of the pre-creative divine decrees. It has to do with the logical order of the various facets of God’s saving work. While it is acknowledged that many of the aspects of salvation occur simultaneously, there still may be dependency relationships among them, and a number of biblical passages seem to allude to such an order (Rom. 8:29–30; 1 Cor. 1:26–30; Eph. 1:11–14; 2 Thess. 2:13–15; 2 Tim. 1:8–10; 1 Peter 1:1–2; 2 Peter 1:9–11).38 For example, John Murray, following the wording of Rom. 8:30, suggests the following order: calling, regeneration, faith/repentance, justification, adoption, sanctification, perseverance, and glorification.39 Louis Berkhof offers a similar construction: calling, regeneration, conversion, justification, sanctification, perseverance, and glorification.40 Suppose, then, that talk of an ordo salutis is legitimate.41 What if Romans 8:30 does give insight into the order of salvation, as Murray thought? It would, of course, only mean that the following order can be confirmed: predestination, calling, justification, glorification. This order, though, is not problematic for anyone, Calvinist or Arminian. Yet many contemporary Calvinists have rejected the use of Paul’s words here as indicative of the ordo salutis. Most have attempted, along the lines of Hoekema, to claim that this was not Paul’s primary purpose here.
While it is true that this was not Paul’s primary purpose, there still seems to be an order communicated. The important point to note (and the motivation behind Calvinist rejection of using this passage for ordo salutis considerations), is that when verse 29 is also considered, the order of salvation includes a reference to divine foreknowledge: foreknowledge, predestination, calling, justification, glorification.42 This order is problematic because in the Calvinist system, God’s foreknowledge must be logically posterior to predestination; he foreknows who will be saved because he predestined them to salvation by an act of his will. Molinists typically claim that middle knowledge functions as a sort of proto-foreknowledge such that God’s predestining work is logically dependent upon his (logically prior) knowledge of how all possible persons would act in all possible situations. So the Molinist can argue that Paul provides an order of salvation in which predestination (and election) logically follows from a type of God’s foreknowledge (Rom. 8:29–30). This discussion should lead to the greater question of the nature of God’s election.
As noted in chapter 5, most Calvinists—even those who are not “five-pointers”—hold to the doctrine of unconditional election. Indeed, many Molinists hold to a form of it, understood as the truth that God’s election is not based on good works the individual will perform or upon foreseen merit. Nevertheless, Calvinists and Molinists often disagree over this doctrine concerning foreseen faith. Calvinists typically argue that there is nothing to explain God’s choice of particular individuals to salvation except his own gracious choice (his “good pleasure”), while Molinists often argue that election is based on God’s knowledge of how persons would respond in faith.
The use of yada in several Old Testament passages suggests a sort of deliberation in God’s will that is commensurate with the doctrine of middle knowledge and the idea of election based on foreseen faith. Four such passages will be examined: Genesis 18:19, 2 Samuel 7:19–20, Jeremiah 1:5;, and Exodus 33:14–23; further allusions to this process can also be found in Isaiah 40:14, 1 Chronicles 28:9, and elsewhere.
The Abrahamic covenant is first recorded in Genesis 12, but is referenced again several times throughout the book. It is normally considered a grant covenant in which God makes a covenant with Abraham independent of Abraham’s actions and faith. As sovereign king, God blesses his subject with no requirement as a condition for its reception. Yet, later in the story as Yahweh reflects on whether to tell Abraham of his decision to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah, he references the covenant and seems to indicate that his reasons for entering into that relationship with Abraham had to do with his intimate knowledge of Abraham. Consider the following passage:
The LORD said, “Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do, since Abraham will surely become a great and mighty nation, and in him all the nations of the earth will be blessed? “For I have chosen him, so that he may command his children and his household after him to keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice, so that the LORD may bring upon Abraham what He has spoken about him” (Gen. 18:17–19, NASB).
The word translated as “chosen” in this verse is from the Hebrew root yd. The translation of yada as “chosen” makes Abraham’s covenant faithfulness appear to be dependent upon God’s choice, or predestination. That is, it gives a sense of divine causation behind Abraham’s covenant faithfulness. Abraham is going to command his children and household to keep the way of the LORD because God chose him (and, implicitly, because God caused him to respond positively). Yet there are good lexical reasons for rejecting this translation of yada in favor of the more common, “known.”
First, the translation of yada as “choose” or “chosen” is uncommon by all counts. The word occurs almost 950 times in the Old Testament and it is given this reading only one or two times by most translators. For example, the New American Standard translates yada in this way only twice (including this passage), and in both cases, “know; known” fits the context. The other passage is Amos 3:2: “Hear this word which the LORD has spoken against you, sons of Israel, against the entire family which He brought up from the land of Egypt, ‘You only have I chosen among all the families of the earth; Therefore, I will punish you for all your iniquities.’ Do two men walk together unless they have made an appointment?” (Amos 3:1–3, NASB). The immediate context suggests that yada should be understood in a relational sense (i.e., “know; known”). The reference to two walking together in verse 3 points to the familial relationship apparent in verse 2. “Known,” or an intimate knowledge, seems to fit the passage better than the less intimate “chosen,” and under this interpretation, the punishment comes as a result of a broken relationship, not a broken promise or rejection of God’s choice.
Many commentators have acknowledged that yada is best translated as “known,” even though they still opt for the less common, “chosen” in Genesis 18 anyway, with little or no explanation. For example, Gordon Wenham notes that yada is literally, “known,” but then points the reader to a variety of other passages which also presumably have a sense of choosing or electing (Exod. 33:12, 17; Deut. 34:10; 2 Sam. 7:20; Amos 3:2). No further explanation is given and the reader is expected to simply agree that the verses listed do, indeed, have such a sense.43 Speiser has attempted to walk a line between knowledge and choice by translating it as “singled out” (i.e., “I have singled him out”). Speiser writes, “Another aspect of the flexible stem yd’ ; cv. Comment on iv.1. Here the stress is on ‘to acknowledge.’ The verse as a whole gives an excellent summary of the way of life (‘way of Yahweh’) that is expected of Abraham and his descendants.”44 Speiser’s interpretation seems closer to that being proposed here; namely, that God’s knowledge of Abraham has led to a covenant relationship. Skinner argues that yada here is a reference to intimate knowledge and translates it as “entered into personal relations with.”45
Ironically, many OT scholars defend the use of “chosen” here because “known” may not include the requisite intimacy. They criticize translating yada as “known” here and in Amos 3:2 because it could be misinterpreted as mere intellectual awareness instead of personal knowledge of Abraham (by God). Commenting on the Amos passage, McComiskey writes, “The word yada bears a special sense of intimacy. . . . Thus the word connotes more than simple awareness or acknowledgment. It includes the idea of God’s sovereign activity whereby the object of that knowledge is set apart or chosen for a divine purpose.”46 However, it is unclear exactly how “chosen” remedies this possible deficiency of the English term. It seems that, while “known” could possibly be misinterpreted in this way because of its semantic range, “chosen” is even more misleading because it connotes a dispassionate action on God’s part and introduces decision into the passage; God is picking. In fact, some Calvinist explanations of unconditional election require a lack of directed passion in the choice (i.e., that God loves this particular individual over against an individual not chosen), lest one infer that the choice is based on something in the individual elected. Thus, if the concern is for the reader to catch the personal aspect of God’s relationship to Abraham, “known” is better than “chosen.” In addition, it is clear enough that “known” has a range of meaning to include intimate relations (as epitomized in sexual union). Thus, it is hard to see how “chosen” serves as a less misleading term for translating yada.
The second reason for favoring “known” over “chosen” is the fact that both the Septuagint and the Vulgate translate yada as “known” here. The Septuagint translates yada with ēdein (first person singular pluperfect active indicative of oida), while the Vulgate uses the common scio, from scientia. Of course, this does not prove error by modern translators, but it gives some indication of the beliefs prevalent at the time these two translations were prepared. Neither opts for a sense of choosing, and it may call into question the preference for the more unusual translation over the more common (“chosen” over “known”).
Third, a word exists in Hebrew that would have been better to use if the writer of Genesis wished to convey the sense of choice presented by that translation of yada and the Calvinist interpretation of God’s election of Abraham for covenant relationship. The Hebrew word most commonly translated as “choice, choose, chosen, etc.” is bachar, from the bchr root. Of the eighty-five occurrences of “chosen” in the New American Standard version, eighty are from this root; and of the twenty-one occurrences of “chose” and the twenty-two occurrences of “chooses” in the New American Standard, one hundred percent are from this root; and of the forty-two occurrences of “choose” in the NASB, forty are from this root. Clearly, bachar is the dominant Hebrew word for “choice.” So the question that must be answered by translators who wish to render yada as “chosen” in Genesis 18:19 is, “Why did the writer of Genesis not use bachar if he wanted to say, ‘chosen’?”
It may be thought that bachar was not available to the writer of Genesis, that the word had not yet developed to have the connotations of choice needed for use in the Genesis 18 passage and that therefore, yada was used, but this is not the case because bachar is used seven times to connote choice in Job, widely thought to be the oldest book in the canon, and it is found in Genesis on two occasions with both references prior to the narrative between Abraham and the men.47
It may be argued that the writer of Genesis uses yada for “chosen” here for some of the very reasons already cited regarding the nature of yada and the relationship of God—because the choosing of Abraham was personal in nature; because God chose Abraham for an intimate, personal relationship. Under this interpretation, yada is seen as the preferred Hebrew word for covenant choosing, while bachar is seen as a somewhat disinterested or impersonal choice. This seems to be the line of thought Ken Matthews follows. He writes, “Exceptional to the Deuteronomic language of covenant is the term for ‘chosen,’ which translates yada (‘to know’), rather than the common Deuteronomic word bachar (‘to choose’). Yada conveys the idea of election with the nuance of familiarity, intimacy (e.g., Jer 1:5; Hos. 13:5; Amos 3:2).”48 Related to this argument is the claim that bachar indicates unacceptable choosing; a choice with negative consequences, or that bachar refers to human choice, while yada refers to divine choice. Proponents of this line of reasoning can point to the Israelites’ choice [bachar] of Saul as king, which was a disaster. For example, in warning the people against getting a human king, Samuel told them everything the king would do and that, when those events occur, they would cry out for relief from the king they had chosen (1 Sam. 8:18). Similarly, in a speech before Israel, Samuel recounted the history of God’s deliverance, from the time of the exodus through the judges, and he confronted them because of their desire to have a king. In that condemnation, he charged them with choosing the king (1 Sam. 12:13). In both cases, the choice [bachar] was a human endeavor and had negative outcomes.
While this argument has an initial plausibility, it cannot be sustained, for bachar is used in many places to refer to God’s choice of both individuals and groups for covenant relationship. It refers to God’s choice of Palestine for his people twenty-one times in the Pentateuch alone.49 It is used in reference to God’s choice of Israel as his covenant people and of his choice of the Levites.50 It is used to refer to God’s choice of Moses (Ps. 105:26) and Jacob (Ps. 135:4; Isa. 41:8; 44:1–2) as well, and it is used to refer to God’s choice of Saul (1 Sam. 10:24) and of Solomon (1 Chron. 28:4–5, 10; 29:1), and even of God’s choice of David (1 Kings 8:16; 2 Chron. 6:6; Ps. 78:70), thus eliminating the suggestion that it cannot refer to covenant choice of nations or persons. However, some may wish to argue that Abraham’s covenant relationship with God was unique because it was the first covenant or was more intimate and needed yada rather than bachar. After all, Abraham is described as the “friend of God,” and so it may be that God’s covenant choice of Abraham was of a different nature from his covenant choice of David or Moses.51 Even this argument fails because Nehemiah uses bachar to refer to God’s choice of Abraham (Neh. 9:7), and the very next verse seems to indicate that the covenant choice of Abraham was based on his faith: “You are the LORD God, who chose Abram and brought him up from Ur of the Chaldees. You found his heart faithful before You, and made a covenant with him to give him the land of the Canaanite, of the Hittite and the Amorite, of the Perizzite, the Jebusite and the Girgashite—to give it to his descendants” (Neh. 9:7–8, NASB; emphasis mine). Note that the covenant is entered subsequent to God’s finding Abraham faithful. Thus, there seems to be no good explanation for why the writer of Genesis used yada instead of bachar for “choice” in 18:19, apart from plain literary license.52
Now consider the implications of reading the passage with yada translated as known: “The LORD said, ‘Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do, since Abraham will surely become a great and mighty nation, and in him all the nations of the earth will be blessed? For I have known him, so that he may command his children and his household after him to keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice, so that the LORD may bring upon Abraham what he has spoken about him’” (Gen. 18:17–19, NASB, with change of yada). The change seems to add a different nuance, one that is not insignificant. The blessings of God’s covenant promise to Abraham appear directly related to Abraham’s faithfulness in teaching his family the way of the LORD. The second half of the passage makes it clear that the granting of the covenant blessings is tied to Abraham’s future faithfulness. That is, God will bring upon Abraham what he has spoken about him (i.e., that he will become a great and mighty nation and that he will be the means of blessing for all the nations of the earth) when (because) Abraham is obedient to the covenant requirements by faith. This understanding is consistent with the passage in Nehemiah noted earlier. Wenham agrees, noting that the pattern of promise-obedience-fulfillment of promise is found throughout Old Testament covenant theology and indicates that the covenant is conditional (at least in some sense).53 Yet, this is not to say that the covenant is based on works; the Bible is abundantly clear that Abraham was justified by believing God.54 It is to say that the covenant was effected because God had a kind of knowledge of Abraham whereby he knew Abraham would respond in faith if he were to call for such a response. That is, God knew several counterfactuals. For example, he knew that if he were to tell Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, he would respond in faith. Similarly, he knew that if he were to call upon Abraham to enter into a covenantal relationship, Abraham would respond positively, and that if they were to enter into such a relationship, Abraham would teach his descendants to honor and worship the LORD. So God’s knowledge of these truths, among others, informed his decision to enter into a covenant with Abraham. (Molinists would typically make the further claim that it impacted God’s decision about what sort of world to actualize.) This is not a particularly controversial claim insofar as some moderate Calvinists could agree that something like this does indeed take place, though they view the nature of faith and the freedom involved in the responses differently. It does, however, call into question the view of those [Calvinists] who see God’s decision to enter into covenant with Abraham as an expression of God’s good pleasure with no reference to Abraham’s future response. Instead, then, God’s decision to enter into covenant with Abraham is based on his knowledge of how Abraham would respond to his call.
There is also a hint (and perhaps only a hint) that the Davidic covenant is also based on God’s knowledge of the recipient [David]. The covenant was made after David expressed his wishes to build a Temple for the LORD. After initially telling David to proceed with his plans, Nathan received a word from God to the contrary. Instead of David building a house of cedar for the LORD, God would build a house for David (2 Sam. 7:5–7, 11). This promise includes a descendant who “will build a house” and it includes an everlasting relationship between David’s house and the LORD, manifested in an everlasting kingship.
In response to this covenant, David offers a humble prayer of thanksgiving. There is a sense of awe in David’s words. He wonders at God’s grace to him and his household as set over against God’s reaction to Saul and his household: David’s posterity will enjoy the blessings of God’s love, even when he sins: “I will be to him a father, and he shall be to me a son. When he commits iniquity, I will discipline him with the rod of men, with the stripes of the sons of men, but my steadfast love will not depart from him, as I took it from Saul, whom I put away from before you” (2 Sam. 7:14–15, ESV). David asks why this is the case. From his own perspective, he is not worthy of such favor. In fact, David’s words belie a curiosity about the reason for the bestowal of covenant love upon him and his household such that it will endure: “Who am I, O LORD God, and what is my house, that you brought me thus far?” (2 Sam. 7:18b, ESV). So David cannot make sense of the reason. He can, however, make sense of God’s ability (for lack of a better term) to make such a promise. He offers up two explanations.
First, David attributes it to God’s immeasurable power and providence: “And yet this was a small thing in your eyes, O Lord GOD” (2 Sam. 7:19a, ESV). Second, he points to God’s immeasurable love and grace: “Because of your promise, and according to your own heart, you have brought about all this greatness” (2 Sam. 7:21, ESV). Interestingly, though, sandwiched between these two explanations, David refers to God’s knowledge of him. David has asked for a reason why God would make the covenant with him and admits that he, himself, is perplexed; so much so that he is rendered speechless (2 Sam. 7:20a)! He sees himself (and his household) as unworthy, but resigns himself to God’s providence. It is at this point that he apparently suggests that the answer to his question may be found in God’s knowledge of him: “And what more can David say to you? For you know your servant, O Lord GOD!” (2 Sam. 7:20, ESV). This phrase could mean several things. On the one hand, it could be a reference to David’s inability to articulate his feelings in response to God’s gracious offer and God’s ability to know without such articulation; that is, it could simply be David’s way of reveling in God’s grace to him. On the other hand, it could also be an expression of David’s resignation to God’s wisdom and providence. In essence, David may be saying, “I do not understand why you did what you did, but you know me better than I know myself, so I trust your decision to grant me this grace.” God’s knowledge in verse 20 appears to be directly related to his love [the reference to God’s “heart”] in verse 21. Read in this way, we may surmise that David is suggesting that God considered the outcomes of his making everlasting covenants with both Saul and David and elected David based on that knowledge. God knew that if he were to offer Saul an everlasting kingdom, Saul would freely reject it by acting in ways contrary to faith, and if he were to make the same offer to David, he would freely respond in faith. We already know that God would have granted Saul an everlasting kingdom if Saul had been faithful (1 Sam. 13:13). That is, the following counterfactual of divine freedom is true:
If Saul were faithful to the LORD, God would grant him an everlasting kingdom.
Yet this fact poses a problem for the Calvinist: It makes no sense for this counterfactual to be true if God is the cause of Saul’s unfaithfulness, even if only as a secondary cause by creating Saul so that he will freely (in the compatiblistic way) choose to reject God. Under a Molinist conception regarding Saul’s freedom to respond in faith, we can deal better with how such a counterfactual of divine freedom can be true while the corresponding counterfactual of creaturely freedom (i.e., If God were to offer an everlasting kingdom to Saul, he would respond with unfaithfulness) is as it is.
If God did consider how Saul and David would respond to the offer of an everlasting kingdom in deciding whether to offer it or not, then it seems that the following counterfactuals were also true and considered by God in his electing decision(s):
If I were to offer an everlasting kingdom to Saul, he would fail to raise his son to be faithful;
If I were to offer an everlasting kingdom to David, he would raise his son to be faithful.
On this reading, then, the Davidic covenant should be seen as, like the Abrahamic, conditioned on a faith response (by David, as well as on Saul’s lack of faith response) to God. It is not conditioned on David’s works, but on his being a person of faith. God’s knowledge of how Saul and David would respond to God’s calling on their lives informed his pre-creative decision regarding his election of David for covenant relationship. God’s election or predestination of David to covenantal love is directly tied to God’s intimate knowledge of him. Notice that it will not do to note the obvious nature of God’s love for David after David existed, for the covenant was part of the original decree of God. A similar argument may be developed regarding the predestination of Jeremiah and his call to prophetic ministry.
This, of course, is one of the most oft-quoted passages in support of the pro-life movement. It is a reference to Jeremiah’s call to the prophetic ministry. In verse 5, the consecration of Jeremiah and the appointment of Jeremiah as a prophet to the nations is linked to God’s knowledge (yada) of him. Prior to Jeremiah’s physical existence, God had knowledge of him which is tied to God’s decision to set Jeremiah apart as a prophet. The text does not elaborate on the details of the relationship between that prior knowledge and God’s decision, but that there is a relationship is abundantly clear. It seems that God’s call on Jeremiah’s life was based on his knowledge of how Jeremiah would act or respond in various circumstances. Molinism claims that something like the following propositions were true (and we know they were, given the events that happened) and served as a basis for God’s decision to actualize a world where Jeremiah exists and God calls and equips him for the prophetic ministry:
If God were to call Jeremiah to be a prophet, he would (freely) respond positively.
If God were to give Jeremiah his words (v. 9), Jeremiah would (freely) speak them to the nations, to pluck up and break down, destroy, overthrow, and to build up and plant (v. 10).
God’s knowledge of these propositions forms the basis of his predestining work with regard to Jeremiah’s prophetic ministry. While some Calvinists would not take issue with this claim (as long as the freedom noted were understood as compatibilism), most would because it undercuts unconditional election as it is traditionally conceived in reformed circles. It makes predestination to ministry dependent upon the individual’s ability, foreknown actions, or foreknown faith. I would argue the latter—that election is based on foreseen faith (if God were to actualize a world where the individual is born and the appropriate circumstances prevail)—and that godly actions follow from that faith.
In each of the cases considered thus far, we have seen that God’s election of individuals seems to be tied to his knowledge of them. I have argued that the presence of yada in the discussion of the Abrahamic and Davidic covenants, as well as Jeremiah’s call to prophetic ministry, indicates that this relationship exists. Interestingly, a similar point can be made with regard to Moses in the passage quoted by the apostle Paul in Romans 9.
In his most developed discussion of predestination (and a favorite passage of Calvinists for their view of unconditional election), Paul notes that God says to Moses, “I will have mercy on whom I have mercy and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion” (Rom. 9:15, ESV). This is often cited as evidence that Paul believes God’s predestining persons for salvation is based on nothing but his own good pleasure; that nothing regarding how the individual acts or responds (or more properly, will act or will respond if created) is considered in that decision. While most Calvinists claim ignorance regarding what God considers in his electing decisions, they tend to argue that it is at least not based on foreseen merit or foreseen faith. A quote from John Calvin himself may be representative: “And what pray, does this mean? It is just a clear declaration by the Lord that he finds nothing in men themselves to induce him to show kindness, that it is owing entirely to his own mercy, and, accordingly, that their salvation is his own work.”55 However, an examination of the context of the Old Testament passage Paul quotes seems to indicate otherwise. In fact, I want to suggest that God’s decision to show mercy is directly related to the faith of the individual and that Paul does not quote it in an effort to teach that God will show mercy to anyone he chooses without regard to the individual’s faith position. The quotation comes from Exodus 33:19, where God reveals himself to Moses as he hides in the cleft of the mountain. The passage reads as follows:
And He said, “My presence shall go [with you,] and I will give you rest.” Then he said to Him, “If Thy presence does not go [with us,] do not lead us up from here. “For how then can it be known that I have found favor in Thy sight, I and Thy people? Is it not by Thy going with us, so that we, I and Thy people, may be distinguished from all the [other] people who are upon the face of the earth?” And the LORD said to Moses, “I will also do this thing of which you have spoken; for you have found favor in My sight, and I have known you by name.” Then Moses said, “I pray Thee, show me Thy glory!” And He said, “I Myself will make all My goodness pass before you, and will proclaim the name of the LORD before you; and I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show compassion on whom I will show compassion.” But He said, “You cannot see My face, for no man can see Me and live!” Then the LORD said, “Behold, there is a place by Me, and you shall stand [there] on the rock; and it will come about, while My glory is passing by, that I will put you in the cleft of the rock and cover you with My hand until I have passed by. Then I will take My hand away and you shall see My back, but My face shall not be seen” (Exod. 33:14–23, NASB).
There are at least two points worth noting here: First, it should be noted that the phrase, “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy,” refers to a special blessing God wished to give to someone, not to an initial entry into covenant relationship. Specifically, he will allow Moses to see him and live.56 Second, and more importantly, the text notes that he did so because Moses had found favor in his sight (v. 17); that is, the showing of mercy to Moses was a response to Moses's request and to Moses's faithfulness to God. Ultimately, it was based on God’s personal and intimate knowledge of Moses. God knew (yada) Moses to be a person of faith. Of course, in this case, God’s knowledge of Moses is not middle knowledge; it does not refer to knowledge of how Moses would react or would be if he were created. Rather, it refers to God’s present knowledge of Moses's character as he truly is. Nevertheless, the point still stands that the granting of mercy here is responsive to Moses's character and faith.
Now we must ask how Paul is using the passage in Romans 9. If it is determined that Paul is using the passage to argue that God shows mercy for his own internal reasons, with no reference to the actions/faith of the people, then it is hard to see how Paul has not misapplied the passage or at least quoted it out of context.57 Fortunately, this is not the only option; it may be that what Paul has in mind is this—although salvation is by grace, not of works (Eph. 2), it is nevertheless God’s gift to persons as they respond to his call in faith.
This interpretation accords well with the other reference from Romans 9 used by Calvinists to argue their point: the comment regarding God’s love for Jacob and hatred for Esau. There are actually two quotes/allusions to Jacob and Esau in the chapter. First, Paul notes that, prior to either child doing anything good or bad, and prior to their birth, their mother, Rebekah, was told that the older would serve the younger. This is a reference to Genesis 25:23 and is essentially just as Paul notes. Yet to make his point about election, Paul goes on to quote Malachi 1:2–3: “I loved Jacob, but I hated Esau.” In context, this is a prophecy to Israel, to call the nation to properly worship the LORD. It includes the possibility of cursing if the people do not offer proper sacrifices, and ultimately includes a warning about the coming Day of the LORD. The people are exhorted to “Remember the law of my servant Moses, the decrees and laws I gave him at Horeb for all Israel” (Mal. 4:4, NIV), and recalls Moses's warnings given in his farewell discourse (Deut. 28:15ff.; 30:15ff.). It is also a prophecy against the people of Edom, as a nation, similar to that offered in Obadiah. The love and hatred, then, seem to apply to the nations represented by Jacob and Esau.
Throughout the latter part of his letter to the Romans, Paul is addressing the Jew/Gentile question; how is it that those for whom Jesus came (i.e., Israel; Matt. 15:24; John 1:11) are not saved, while those to whom he did not come are saved? Paul is arguing that Israel is not lost, but that there is a hardening for a time, and that the hardening figures into God’s plan for the ages so that the Gentiles may enter into the fellowship of faith (Rom. 10–11). That is, it is not clear that Paul is using the passage to argue for election of particular persons, but rather for people groups—here he is speaking of the Gentiles entering into the kingdom of God and how that fits into the overall plan of God for the ages. God shows mercy to the Gentiles because he knew they would respond in faith to his call when the time was right. God has allowed the Jews to be hardened so that the Gentiles could enter into covenant relationship with him through Christ (Rom. 11:25). So the Molinist believes that God considered the following counterfactuals:
If I were to offer covenant relationship to the Gentiles in the first century, they would freely respond in faith;
If the Jews were to respond in faith to the Gospel in large numbers, the Gentiles would not freely respond in faith;
If the Jews were hardened to the Gospel, the Gentiles would freely respond in faith;
If the Jews were hardened so that Gentiles could respond, the Jews will still one day freely respond in faith;
and others like them in his plan for Jews and Gentiles, and that they served as a basis for his decisions regarding election of Jews and Gentiles.58 Only God could know truths of this sort and set forth a perfect plan for all peoples, and it is this truth that leads Paul to worship God for the depth of his knowledge and wisdom (Rom. 11:32–36). If a reading following this model is seen as correct, then Paul is not misapplying the Old Testament texts, or interpreting them in some colorful ways. Rather, he is being true to the sense of the passage quoted.
Does what I have presented here prove the superiority of Molinism to Calvinism? I think not. There are several places at which the Calvinist could object to the argument. For instance, he could dispute my initial claim that yada should be translated as “know” in these passages. After all, most translators have rendered it “chosen,” and it is unlikely that there is a vast Calvinist conspiracy among translators to subvert the true meaning of the text. Still, a more satisfying answer to the question of why it should be translated as “chosen” is required. Even if my initial argument on translation is accepted, unconditional election as traditionally conceived among Calvinists is not conclusively overturned. Rather, all that was shown is that the passages suggest that God considers future faith (for example, of Abraham) in his decisions to enter into covenant relationship, call to ministry, or grant mercy. The moderate Calvinist could grant this point and still discount Molinist claims regarding libertarian freedom and the independence (from God’s determining will) of the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. That is, the moderate Calvinist could agree that God’s decisions to enter into covenant relationships are based on foreseen faith, but still claim that God determines the truth of counterfactuals of freedom because he causes or grants faith. This, though, would be a major concession to Arminian theology. To grant that predestination is based on foreseen faith or that election is unconditional with respect to good works, but conditional with respect to future faith just is to agree with traditional Arminian soteriology. It would seem to be a strange position for a Reformed theologian to take. Nevertheless, I have argued that the presence of yada in passages referencing the Abrahamic and Davidic covenants, Jeremiah’s call to prophetic ministry, and even Paul’s use of God’s decision to grant special mercy to Moses, at least suggests that election (to salvation and service) is tied to God’s intimate knowledge of the individuals in question. Specifically, I argued that predestination is based on God’s middle knowledge regarding individual faith.
In this chapter, I have argued that there is good reason to believe that the Bible teaches that God knows counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (and therefore, they can be true). Those who object (primarily Open Theists) have either presupposed the grounding objection, or have unwittingly superimposed their philosophical commitments onto the biblical text. I have also demonstrated that biblical references to election of persons to covenant relationship and ministry suggest conditions of faithful response of those called. This best accords with the Molinist picture and avoids the difficulties of Calvinist soteriology.
1. See chapter 2.
2. As noted in chapter 3, it is my contention that the circularity or logical priority objections to middle knowledge are, at their most basic level, derived from the grounding objection because they assume a particular answer to the grounding objection, namely the grounding in the closest possible but not actual world. See also my “Molinism and Supercomprehension.”
3. Some may object to my use of “Arminian” here, since most libertarian opponents of middle knowledge are Open Theists. I readily acknowledge this as true, and have already argued that classic Arminian theology assumes the truth of middle knowledge. However, it would also be misleading to categorize Open Theism separately, since most Open Theists have come from Arminian roots. My use of the term here is in no way meant to suggest or endorse the idea that consistent Arminian theology leads to Open Theism. Quite the contrary, Molinism is a consistent (and more orthodox) Arminian theology.
4. Some Calvinists have characterized their own theological positions as Calvinist-Molinist and have referred to themselves as Middle Knowledge Calvinists. Time and space constraints will not permit a demonstration of why this position is both untenable and impossible, but the very fact that some have attempted to articulate such a position points to the careful distinctions that need to be made in the presentation of the evidence. See my “The Compatibility of Calvinism and Middle Knowledge,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 47, no. 3 (September 2004): 455–67. These Calvinists have not questioned the prevolitional nature of counterfactuals of freedom, but have placed all of God’s knowledge in his natural knowledge. I have argued elsewhere that this leads to Fatalism. See my “Middle Knowledge and the Assumption of Libertarian Freedom: A Response to Ware,” paper presented at the National Meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society, Baltimore, MD, 2013. See also John D. Laing, “Calvinism, Natural Knowledge and Fatalism,” paper presented at the Southwest Regional Meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society, Fort Worth, TX, 2014; also presented in a revised format at the Houston Baptist University Philosophy Conference, Houston, TX, 2014.
5. Molina, Concordia 4.49.9 (trans. Freddoso, 116–17). Molina writes, “God knows that there would have been repentance in sackcloth and ashes among the Tyronians and Sidonians on the hypothesis that the wonders that were worked in Chorozain and Bethsaida should have been worked in Tyre and Sidon. . . . But because the hypothesis on which it was going to occur was not in fact actualized, this repentance never did and never will exist in reality—and yet it was a future contingent dependent on the free choice of human beings.” Ibid.
6. Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, 64.
7. Some may wish to point out that my strict reading of the passage can only lead to the claim that God grants grace to some based on what they would have done. In this case, the Tyrians, Sidonians, and Sodomites will receive some measure of grace because they would have repented if Jesus had performed his miraculous works in their cities, but the judgment upon the inhabitants of Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum is for their unbelief in the face of Jesus's actual ministry. While this point is technically correct, for it to overturn the point I am making, it would have to support the idea that God has two standards: one for administering grace, and one for prosecuting judgment, but this does not seem to be the biblical model, where grace and judgment are almost always tied together. Thus, it should still be noted that it is doubtful that God rewards and punishes based on counterfactuals. Interestingly, if it were the case, then no one could have assurance of salvation, as personal faith in reality would be only one factor in God’s consideration of salvation/judgment. Perhaps counterfactuals regarding our unbelief in various nonfactual situations would override our faith in Christ in actuality.
8. Freddoso concedes that Kenny is correct to claim that Jesus's words are rhetorical. However, Freddoso argues that this is not to say that Molina’s interpretation is incorrect: “Often enough, the plain truth has far greater rhetorical force than an obvious exaggeration. So Molinists and Bañezians may justifiably insist that the burden of proof is on those who claim that the words in question are not to be taken in the most natural way.” Freddoso, “Introduction,” 63. Although I am sympathetic to Freddoso’s desire to defend Molina here, given my analysis of the context, I must side with Kenny here.
9. Molina, Concordia 4.49.9 (trans. Freddoso, 117). Molina makes a point of noting this because he is arguing against the position that God knows future free actions because he observes them in eternity. Here is an example where God knows how a free agent will act, but there is no event in eternity to observe.
10. Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, 64.
11. Ibid.
12. Actually, the argument does not really speak against middle knowledge proper, but rather against divine knowledge of how contingent counterfactual states of affairs would obtain if actual. Although this is the content of middle knowledge, one can believe that God has such knowledge, but it is not middle knowledge. Báñez believed that God has such knowledge, but denied that it is prevolitional or middle knowledge.
13. Freddoso offers an interesting critique of Kenny’s interpretation of this passage. On Kenny’s interpretation, God does not give good advice and, in fact, may be seen as deceitful. Freddoso writes, “We may safely say that even if God knows of the distinction between counterfactual and material implication, David did not. But in that case God’s affirmative answers were deceptive if His advice presupposed that David’s questions involved material implication. At the very least, David would have every right to feel betrayed upon learning that yes was likewise an ‘appropriate’ answer to the alternative question, ‘If I stay In Keilah, will Saul refrain from invading?’” Freddoso, “Introduction,” 63.
14. Babylonian Talmud, Mishnah Yoomah; see also Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed II.45.
15. The phrase quoted is a hif’il infinitive absolute followed by the imperfect form of nsg. This construction makes the phrase emphatic. The inifnitive absolute is one of the more difficult Hebrew constructions to translate. Burton Goddard has provided a helpful analysis of several of the less common uses, as well as a working hypothesis regarding the development of the function of the infinitive absolute in the Hebrew language of the Bible. See Burton L. Goddard, “The Origin of the Hebrew Infinitive Absolute in the Light of Infinitive Uses in Related Languages and its uses in the Old Testament,” ThD thesis, Harvard Divinity School, 1943. Despite the difficulty with some passages, in this passage, the infinitive absolute seems to function in one of the more traditional ways. Haiim Rosén notes that the infinitive absolute “precedes a verbal form (except the inf.) of identical radical probably in such cases where the most emphatically important concept of the sentence is expressed by the verbal stem, i.e. that if the sentence were continued with ‘but not’, another verb stem had to be used in exactly the same construction.” Haiim Rosén, A Textbook of Israeli Hebrew (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 215. An example of this form in the English is the question, “shall thou indeed reign over us?” The implication here is that the individual (Joseph) shall reign over his brothers rather than be their peer.
16. Molina believed that verses 11 and 14 of chapter 4 taught that “God, foreseeing the sins into which the just would fall if they remained in this life for a long time, in His mercy often takes them from this world.” Molina, Concordia 4.49.9 (trans. Freddoso, 117–18). The entire passage reads as follows:
There were some who pleased God and were loved by him, and while living among sinners were taken up. They were caught up so that evil might not change their understanding or guile deceive their souls. For the fascination of wickedness obscures what is good, and roving desire perverts the innocent mind. Being perfected in a short time, they fulfilled long years; for their souls were pleasing to the Lord, therefore he took them quickly from the midst of wickedness. Yet the peoples saw and did not understand, or take such a thing to heart, that God’s grace and mercy are with his elect, and that he watches over his holy ones (Wis. 4:10–15, NRSV).
Kenny criticizes Molina’s interpretation of this passage as well. Kenny believes that the knowledge attributed to God in this passage does not have to come via middle knowledge. Instead, it is knowledge God possesses because he knows the characters and dispositions of the persons spoken of in the passage. Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, 64. On such a reading, the untimely demise (or rapture) of certain saints must be seen as a sort of preventive measure on the part of God. Implicit in Kenny’s argument is the assertion that an individual may act out of character or in a way contrary to his/her disposition. This leads Kenny to the conclusion that God cannot know the future if humans are truly free. It must be noted that the basic idea behind Kenny’s interpretation does not necessarily conflict with the doctrine of middle knowledge. It may be the case that divine middle knowledge comes from God’s knowledge of the character of an individual, but this in no way requires the instantiation of the individual. Rather, it can come from God’s knowledge of the individual as he/she existed in his mind prior to the creative act of divine will. See my “Molinism and Supercomprehension.”
17. While it is possible to interpret the “death” and “slaughter” referred to as spiritual in nature (e.g., persons who are led to spiritual despondency when they are led away by their own sinful desires), the stark, graphic imagery indicates a more straightforward interpretation.
18. Crawford H. Toy, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Proverbs, International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1899), 445.
19. “The general application would include any who are in mortal danger, through disease, hunger, war—we cannot dodge responsibility, even by ignorance.” Alan Ross, “Proverbs,” in The Expositor’s Bible Commentary. Vol. 5, Psalms–Song of Songs, ed. Frank E. Gaebelein (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991), 1075.
20. R. B. Y. Scott, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, The Anchor Bible 18 (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 145. Unfortunately, Scott offers no textual justification for his alternate translation of yada.
21. It may be that Scott is attempting to take into account the fact that the indictment suggests that the guilty parties did, in fact, have knowledge of the plight of the prisoners. An appeal to ignorance makes little sense in that case. But given the fact that there is no warrant for the unusual rendering of yada, this line of reasoning must be rejected.
22. The Greek term used by Paul is teleioi, which can refer to persons who are older or more developed, but it can also simply mean complete. Robertson and Plummer note that although Paul does distinguish between the teleioi and nepioi en Christō, there is no restriction placed upon the possibility of progress for the nepioi. So teleioi does not refer to a “select body” of the initiated. Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians, International Critical Commentary (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1911), 39. W. Harold Mare, “1 Corinthians,” in Expositor’s Bible Commentary, ed. Frank E. Gaebelein (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1976), 10:200. Fee agrees, noting, “On the one hand, those who are still of this age, who have not received the Spirit, do not understand the wisdom of God in Christ crucified. But their wisdom is under divine judgment and already on its way out. Those who have the Spirit, on the other hand, have ‘the mind of Christ’ and thus understand God’s activity, revealed to them by the Spirit. This is why Paul comes down so hard on his Corinthian friends. They do have the Spirit; they are part of the new age that God is ushering in. But their present conduct and stance toward wisdom betray them. Paul includes them among the ‘spiritual’ (vv. 7–13), yet later addresses them as ‘fleshly’ and ‘merely human’ because their quarrels indicate that they are acting just like those who do not have the Spirit (3:1–4). The real contrast is therefore between Christian and non-Christian, between those who have and those who do not have the Spirit.” Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 100–101.
23. It is further buttressed by Paul’s assumption that those to whom he writes have this wisdom (note the first person plural pronouns in vv. 10, 12, 13, and 16). It strains credulity to think that Paul considered all of the Corinthians as mature Christians. On the contrary, Paul makes it clear that they are nowhere close to being mature in the faith. See, for example, Paul’s words in the very next chapter: “I gave you milk to drink, not solid food; for you were not yet able [to receive it.] Indeed, even now you are not yet able” (1 Cor. 3:2, NASB).
24. While the majority of recent commentators reject this view, Conzelmann prefers the spiritual powers interpretation. He writes, “The mythical context suggests the interpretation demons, and so also does the solemn prediction tōn katargoumenon, ‘which are being brought about to nothing.’ They are the minions of the ‘god of this aeon’ (2 Cor. 4:4).” Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, trans. James W. Leitch, ed. George W. MacRae, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 61. I have transliterated the Greek text. Of course, Conzelmann’s point could be buttressed with references to Romans 8:38; 1 Corinthians 15:24, Colossians 2:15; and John 16:11.
25. As Robertson and Plummer write, the wisdom of God spoken of here “comprises primarily Christ and Him crucified; the preparation for Christ as regards Jew and Gentile; the great mystery of the call of the Gentiles and the apparent rejection of the Jews; the justification of man and the principles of the Christian life; and (the thought dominant in the immediate context) the consummation of Christ’s work in the doxa emōn.” Robertson and Plummer, Critical and Exegetical Commentary on First Epistle to the Corinthians, 39. I have transliterated the Greek in the quote. Conzelmann’s interpretation of the rulers of the age as spiritual powers leads him to argue that Paul allows for a higher insight into the meaning of the cross; “an insight into the cosmic background of the crucifixion.” Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 63.
26. It is worth noting that even on the probabilistic interpretation, the counterfactual, If the rulers of this age understood God’s secret wisdom, they would (freely) crucify the Lord of glory, would still be false, as would a corresponding probabilistic counterfactual (i.e., If the rulers of this age understood God’s secret wisdom, they would probably (freely) crucify the Lord of glory).
27. A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research, ed. (Nashville: Broadman, 1934), 1015. Regarding determined conditionals, Robertson writes, “A positive statement is made in either case and the conclusion follows logically from this premise.” Ibid., 1004. He goes on to explain the second class conditional: “In this somewhat difficult condition only past tenses of the ind. occur. The premise is assumed to be contrary to fact. The thing in itself may be true, but it is treated as untrue. Here again the condition has only to do with the statement, not with the actual fact.” Ibid., 1012.
28. Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 248.
29. Even though Robertson speaks of the conclusion following logically from the premise, it is clear, even to the determinist, that properly speaking, this is not the case.
30. They write, “The blasphemous Anathema Iesous would be more likely to be uttered by a Jew than a Gentile; faciebant gentes, sed magis Judaei (Beng). It is possible that it was uttered against Jesus by his bitter enemies even during his life on earth. It is not improbable that Saul himself used it in his persecuting days, and strove to make others do so (Acts xxvi. 11). When the Gospel was preached in the synagogues the fanatical Jews would be likely to use these very words when Jesus was proclaimed as Messiah (Acts xiii. 45, xviii. 6).” Robertson and Plummer, Critical and Exegetical Commentary on First Epistle to the Corinthians, 261. I have transliterated the Greek in the quotation.
31. The situation which gave rise to this particular teaching of Paul has been widely discussed and disputed. Hypotheses regarding the origin of the “Jesus is accursed” saying range from the suggestion that there were Christians who said it while in a sort of spiritual ecstasy and were supposedly speaking by the power of the Holy Spirit, to a rebuttal of Gnostic attempts at separating Christ from Jesus, to the belief that it arose out of Christian controversies with Jewish antagonists. The third hypothesis seems most accurate. As Orr and Walther point out, the idea of cursing Jesus was “not hypothetical, even for this comparatively early date. In Paul’s defense before Agrippa he says that he ‘tried to make [the Christians] blaspheme’ (according to Acts 26:11); and this would presumably be an abjuration of Jesus. Later in the century there are hints of the same sort of challenge, coming both from within and from outside the church; cf. I John 4:1–6 and Rev 2:13, 3:8, 12:17, 17:14.” William F. Orr and James Arthur Walther, 1 Corinthians, Anchor Bible 32 (New York: Doubleday, 1976), 278. Robertson and Plummer agree. These considerations leave little doubt regarding the validity of relating cursing to murder.
32. Some may object to the claim that those who have the Holy Spirit cannot say, “Jesus is accursed” because Paul’s words only refer to one speaking by the Holy Spirit, or in the power of the Holy Spirit, as opposed to having the Holy Spirit (e.g., Paul’s words may have allowance for so-called carnal Christians to curse Christ). This is faulty reasoning, for as Orr and Walther point out, these affirmations [“Jesus is Lord” and “Jesus is accursed”] are not meant to be taken as purely verbal in nature. They write, “They are rather commitments of the whole life. The one statement is a rejection of the one who determines what Christian life is; the other means that one accepts the lordship of Jesus Christ and is willing to live by his commandment. The enablement for this latter commitment comes by God’s Holy Spirit.” Ibid.
33. I wish to give credit to my former research assistant, Steven Hays, for suggesting this passage for investigation.
34. He writes, “In verse 19 of John 15 we have ei ek tou kosmou ete, ho kosmos an to idion efilei. ‘The addition of an to an indicative hypothesis produced much the same effect as we can express in writing by italicizing ‘if’’ or by adding to the apodosis ‘in that case.’ This is the definite use of an.” Robertson, Grammar of the Greek New Testament, 1014. I have transliterated the Greek.
35. Most commentators neglect to discuss the implications of the conditionals included in this passage. Morris is an exception. Commenting on verse 22, he writes, “The seriousness of rejecting Christ is brought out. Jesus does not mean, of course, that the Jews would have been sinless had he not appeared. But he does mean that the sin of rejecting God as he really is would not have been imputed to them had they not had the revelation of God that was made through him.” Leon Morris, The Gospel according to John, rev. ed., The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 604. Robertson notes that the conditional statements found in verses 22 and 24 are both second class conditionals, and therefore refer to definite events that would occur if the requisite conditions were met: “But in Jo. 15:22 (and 24) ei me ēithon kai elalēsa autois, hamartian ouk eichosan, how is it? Is it a simple historical narrative about a past situation? Is it a hypothesis about the present time in terms of past time to suggest its unreality? Fortunately here the context shows. The very next words are nun de prophasin ouk echousin peri tēs hamartias autōn (Cf. also nun de in verse 24). The contrast with the present and actual is made in plain terms.” Robertson, Grammar of the Greek New Testament, 1013–14. As before, I have transliterated the Greek.
36. Several commentators see the charge (against the world) of ignorance of God referenced here as the same charge Jesus made earlier in John’s gospel against “the Jews” who did not know the Father (John 5:37; 7:28; see also 8:54–58). This issue is not, then, one of awareness of Jesus or the Father, but rather of intimate knowledge. So, Raymond Brown: “There are several instances in the NT where those responsible for the suffering of Jesus are said to have been ignorant (Luke xxiii 34; Acts iii 17); yet when in John xv 21 and again in xvi 3 Jesus says that those who persecute his disciples have not known the Father (nor himself), there is no suggestion that such ignorance lessens culpability. Rather the ignorance itself is culpable. Jesus has come to these men both with words (22) and with works (24); yet they have refused to know him, and this refusal to believe is the root of sin. Because the words and works of Jesus are the words and works of the Father (v 36, xiv 10), rejection and hatred of Jesus are rejection and hatred of the Father, as 23 makes clear.” Raymond E. Brown, The Gospel according to John XIII–XXI, Anchor Bible 29A (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970), 697.
37. Interestingly, this reading may ultimately reduce Jesus's claims to a tautology, which would leave them meaningless. Consider the following argument:
[1] If I had not come into the world to be known, those of the world would not have known me;
[2] If I could not be known, then those of the world could not have known me;
[3] If I could not be known, then I could not be known.
Of course, this is not a tightly constructed argument. Perhaps more thought on this issue is needed.
38. A word of caution is in order. As G. C. Berkouwer has noted, focusing on theoretical questions like ordo salutis could have the negative effect of detracting from a proper perspective on salvation; there should be greater concern for the riches of salvation than for the order. G. C. Berkouwer, Faith and Sanctification, trans. Lewis B. Smedes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), 25–26.
39. John Murray, Redemption—Accomplished and Applied (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955), 104–5.
40. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 416.
41. In a helpful discussion, Hoekema rejects talk of an order of salvation conceived of as a succession of separate steps (even if only logical succession) and instead suggests thinking of salvation as a unit with different aspects. Hoekema’s concern seems to be twofold: First, the traditional way of expressing an ordo salutis almost always devolves into a chronological conception (despite attempts to avoid this; see, for example, Berkhof’s qualifications regarding the reformed approach), as if a Christian can be justified without also being sanctified (or regenerate without being justified, or effectually called without being regenerate, etc.); and second, the step-by-step process conception leads to problematic views of the Christian life which we characterize by hierarchies of believers. By way of example, he points to both the way belief in Holy Spirit baptism functions in much Pentecostal theology and the way talk of carnal Christianity is employed among some evangelicals. In both cases, a sort of hierarchy of Christians emerges. Hoekema, Saved by Grace, 17–26. Still, Hoekema is unable to completely free himself from all speculation regarding a proper ordering of the different aspects of salvation, and following traditional reformed dogma, he argues that regeneration must precede repentance and justification. He writes, “Before we take up this question, we should consider the relationship between regeneration and the other aspects of soteriology. By regeneration we mean the work of the Holy Spirit whereby he initially brings us into a living union with Christ and changes our hearts so that we who were spiritually dead become spiritually alive. It will be obvious that regeneration as thus defined must precede conversion (including faith and repentance), justification, sanctification, and perseverance, since the last-named experiences presuppose the existence of spiritual life. In this sense we could speak of a kind of order in the process of salvation: regeneration must be first.” Ibid., 14.
42. It is worth noting that none of the passages place foreknowledge after election. The passage in First Peter (1 Peter 1:1–2) also suggests that election and calling follow divine foreknowledge.
43. Wenham goes on to discuss the implications of God’s covenant love/choice of Abraham. He writes, “If the ground of election was God’s promise (v. 18), its fuller purpose is now stated for the first time: to create a God-fearing community (v. 19).” Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 16–50, Word Biblical Commentary 2 (Dallas: Word, 1994), 50.
44. E. A. Speiser, Genesis, Anchor Bible 1 (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 133.
45. John Skinner, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis, vol. 1, 2nd ed., International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1930), 304.
46. Thomas E. McComiskey, The Expositor’s Bible Commentary. Vol. 7, Daniel–Minor Prophets, ed. Frank E. Gaebelein (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1985), 298.
47. Job 7:15; 9:14; 15:5; 29:25; 34:4, 33; 36:21. The two occurrences both refer to choice: “the sons of God saw that the daughters of men were beautiful and they married anyone of them they chose” (Gen. 6:2); “So Lot chose for himself the whole plain of the Jordan and set out toward the east” (Gen. 13:11).
48. Kenneth A. Matthews, Genesis 11:27–50:26, The New American Commentary 1B (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2005), 223.
49. Deut. 12:5, 11, 14, 18, 21, 26; 14:23, 24, 25; 15:20; 16:2, 6, 7, 11, 15, 16; 17:8, 10; 18:6; 26:2; 31:11.
50. Israel (note: I have only included reference found in the Pentateuch): Deut. 4:37; 7:6, 7; 10:15; 14:2; 17:15. Levites: Deut. 18:5; 21:5; 1 Sam. 2:28.
51. There is, however, one other argument advanced in favor of reading yada as “choice” here. In an oft-cited article, Herbert Huffmon argued that yada can serve as a technical term for treaty relationships between a suzerain and vassal; for recognition of the status of the vassal in covenant with the king (in this case, Yahweh). If this argument is correct, then it may help explain the translation of yada as “chose”; God knew Abraham in covenant relationship. However, to move from covenant recognition to choice goes beyond the point Huffmon makes. In fact, Huffmon concludes that yada in the passages cited (Genesis 18:19 among them) should be rendered as “acknowledge” or “recognize.” Herbert B. Huffmon, “The Treaty Background of Hebrew YADA,” Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research 181 (February 1966): 31–37. But this does not alter the point I am making here. It does not carry the connotation of choice without regard to intimate knowledge of the individual. Rather, it still suggests intimate or personal knowledge and does not denote choice.
52. Perhaps this is why Hamilton suggests that the writer of Genesis used yada in order to make a play on words, but this is hardly compelling (if the writer really wanted to communicate a sense of choice), especially given the overwhelming use of bachar and the lack of use of yada for “choice.” He writes, “The choice of the verb ‘know’ may be deliberate in the light of the context. Yahweh knows Abraham; yet he goes to Sodom in order to know (v. 21b) what is going on there. Certainty and uncertainty are placed alongside each other. Or again, perhaps the narrator wants to draw a contrast between Yahweh who knew Abraham and the Sodomites who wanted to ‘know’ Lot’s guests (19:5). Here benign knowledge and diabolical knowledge are juxtaposed.” Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, Chapters 18–50, The New International Commentary on the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 18.
53. Wenham, Genesis, 50.
54. As the text says, “Abraham believed God and it was credited to him as righteousness” (Gen. 15:6, 22; Rom. 4:3; Gal. 3:6; James 2:23). The very idea of belief being credited as righteousness suggests an ordo salutis in which faith/belief precede regeneration/justification. In biblical usage, the language of crediting is most often associated with justification, and it appears to be God’s gracious response to human faith.
55. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion 3.22.6, trans. Henry Bevridge (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2008), 619.
56. This may not be terribly important, as Paul appears to apply it to the salvation of Gentiles: their initial entry into the blessings of the Abrahamic covenant.
57. Of course, some may agree that Paul has done just this, and argue that this is fine since he does so under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.
58. Of course, many other counterfactuals could be presented in order to perverse God’s justice by his weakly actualizing the hardening of the Jews or by nothing that there may be no other way for the Gentiles to believe.