The era of Napoleon saw some highly significant developments in battle tactics and strategies. Napoleon had two favourite strategies: the strategy of indirect approach and the strategy of the central position. The strategy of indirect approach focused on attempts to approach the enemy in an indirect manner, while the strategy of the central position involved taking a position at the centre of the location. The strategy of indirect approach often involved using a curtain of manoeuvre. This was a strategy that involved concealing the method and direction of a manoeuvre. He used this strategy in battles at Ulm in 1805, Jena in 1806 and Friedland in 1807.
By contrast, the strategy of the central position can be described as a strategy of inferiority, which is a strategy you use in a position of relative inferiority. Napoleon sometimes used the strategy of indirect approach and the strategy of the central position interchangeably. This interchangeability was a feature of battles in 1813 at Bautzen and Lützen, though the resulting strategy was not entirely successful in these cases. The aim in such battles was to have not just a victory but a decisive victory. In responding to Napoleon’s tactics of the strategy of indirect approach and the strategy of the central position the Allies tended to rely on the concentric advance. This was an advance that had a concentric aspect to its methodology. In general we can divide specific battle plans into two main categories: the battle of manoeuvre and the battle of attrition. The battle of manoeuvre is a tactic in which one attempts to use manoeuvres to gain an advantage, while the battle of attrition is a more attritional approach. Napoleon often relied on the battle of manoeuvre but sometimes used the battle of attrition instead.
The Jena campaign of 1806 provides us with some relevant examples of Napoleon’s strategies. It lasted one month, from 6 October to 6 November. One of Napoleon’s specific tactics in this campaign was the bataillon carré (the battalion square), which involved arraying a specific battalion in a square shape. This square could advance behind a cavalry screen in order to perform a manoeuvre sur les derries. Starting from the Rhine River and the Upper Danube, Napoleon’s troops unexpectedly advanced to the north, with considerable success. This took the troops past the Thuringian Forest Mountains, which might have seem strategically unwise. However, given the location of the Prussian and Russian troops and supply lines, it was a well-executed strategy. There was heavy fighting at Jena and also at Auerstädt, in which the French troops mostly prevailed.
When enemy contact was encountered in these battles, the advanced guard would take up an advanced position. The light infantry would carry out infantry manoeuvres in support of the advance guard. Once the enemy army was engaged, fighting would ensue, either of the battle of manoeuvre variety or, less frequently, of the battle of attrition model. Napoleon generally chose an offensive battle formation, in which one’s troops attempt to aggressively attack the opposing forces, over a defensive formation, in which one attempts to defend one’s flank, centre and supply lines. However, he did sometimes choose to use defensive strategies in situations where he felt a defensive approach was more likely to be successful than an offensive approach.
Napoleon once said that, ‘Strategy is the art of making use of time and space.’ He was less concerned about the latter than the former, although he did sometimes prioritise the latter over the former. He preferred strategies that didn’t require any elements of encampment or entrenchment, preferring active strategies to inactive ones, although on a few occasions he did choose to use an inactive strategy in which his troop encamped or entrenched themselves into specific positions.