THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR
Clausewitz is often quoted as stating that war is the continuation of politics by other means. If this is so, then the Italian campaign to gain Tripoli cannot be said to have conformed to the maxim. Making war was not a means to an end but rather an end in itself, because all that Italy hoped and wanted to gain could have been achieved politically without fighting. Further, it may be argued, having decided to ignore Clausewitzean principle in that context and fight for the sake of military glory, the Italians went on to disregard other, much more important, principles; the Principles of War.
There are no universally accepted Principles of War as such because different states, military organizations, and cultures have codified them (if they have done so at all) according to circumstance; the needs of time and place. Having said that, those principles that have evolved, however they may be articulated, represent an attempt to grapple with fundamental truths, and serve as basic guidelines, in relation to the practice of the art or science of military affairs. Indeed, many writers have argued that, however expressed, the Principles of War are essentially timeless; that there is Nothing New under the Sun Tzu.1 There have been many attempts at writing them down. The first, and perhaps the most famous, being the treatise by Sun Tzu known as The Art of War which dates from around 500 years BCE. The somewhat more recent works by Clausewitz, Jomini, et al have also been well studied.
Current thinking, certainly in western militaries, has decocted all the various theories, wisdom, and experiences into a few general principles (doctrine). For example, the United States military has nine whilst the British have ten. Current US doctrine, and the ruling principles underlying it, has been tabulated as follows:2
PRINCIPLE |
DEFINITION |
Mass |
Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time |
Objective |
Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective |
Offensive |
Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative |
Surprise |
Strike the enemy at a time, at a place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared |
Economy of force |
Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts |
Maneuver |
Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power |
Unity of command |
For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander |
Security |
Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage |
Simplicity |
Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding |
There are no doubt many others, and it may be an interesting, if entirely academic, diversion to take whichever rendition most appeals and compare and contrast it with the conduct of the Italian campaign in Tripoli. So, to steal a line from the unknown author of The Beale Papers, ‘when your day’s work is done, and you are comfortably seated by your good fire, a short time devoted to the subject can injure no one, and may bring its reward.’
1 Commander Jacques P Olivier, Nothing New Under the Sun Tzu: Timeless Principles of the Operational Art of War. Available from www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol14/no1/PDF/CMJ141Ep55.pdf
2 The nine Principles of War, as defined in the Army Field Manual FM-3 Military Operations. Available from: www.wpi.edu/academics/military/prinwar.html