5
Introduction
This chapter will focus on high-lighting some important conclusions and implications of this book as well as offering suggestions for further, needed studies. First, it will briefly revisit and comment upon the argument that this book has laid out and the new narrative that it has brought to the fore. This chapter will then discuss the implications for the history of philosophy, namely in the specific area of the rise of natural religion in England. A new, corresponding categorization scheme for organizing thinkers during this rise and for orienting students of this period will be suggested. This will be followed by a few comments on Locke’s and Toland’s treatments of categorizations of propositions and doctrines in relation to reason and then a brief discussion on the implications of Locke’s and Toland’s teaching that revealed propositions are not made more credible by support from natural philosophy or what is commonly referred to today as science. This chapter then will comment on scholarship that has argued that CNM is not indicative of Toland’s true thoughts. This chapter will end with a section describing a very important study that this book begins. A comparative study of Locke’s and Toland’s prolegomena, namely regarding the attributes of Scripture and hermeneutics, could nicely build upon the epistemological foundations laid in this book.
Part I: Re-visioning Reason, Revelation, and Rejection in John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and John Toland’s Christianity Not Mysterious
As was said throughout this book, scholarship mostly denies that Stillingfleet correctly read Locke but they affirm or, at least, assume that he correctly read Toland. The strange truth of the matter is that Stillingfleet connects two thinkers for particular shared notions and terminology, which they did indeed share, but ends up misinterpreting what both were saying. And partly due to Locke’s loud and articulate protestations in his own defense, it has been accepted by scholarship that there was insufficient warrant for Stillingfleet, or anybody for that matter, to frame the Essay and CNM as being very similar. Besides, says scholarship, how close could they be when Locke clearly accepts doctrines above reason and Toland’s utmost concern was to attack them? But few took the time to even glance at what Locke said of Stillingfleet’s reading of CNM, let alone the entire debate and the implicated works and related defenses.
Another major stumbling block directly for Locke scholars and indirectly for Toland scholars is Locke’s concessionary definitions of faith and reason that he introduces in IV.xviii. Throughout most of IV, Locke is developing his understanding of what this book calls proper reason and proper faith, the very same that Toland appropriates, which negates the category of above reason propositions. So, when Locke starts to use his concessionary or vulgar set of faith and reason definitions, Locke scholars have historically been confused by the switch and those comparing Locke and Toland in a more superficial manner think that this in some way is proof of their significant differences.
But in the end, as indicated in the last chapter, Toland deviates very little from Locke. In fact, when he does it is due to his working out the implications of Locke’s epistemological principles in conjunction with his own interpretations of certain biblical passages and certain theological preferences and presuppositions, some of which, one might argue, are still in some sense Lockean. And while CNM might not thus be considered a very original work, it is significant, at least, by how well Toland demonstrates his grasp on the epistemological principles of the Essay.
Part II: Historical Implications for the Narrative of the Rise of Natural Religion in England, Corresponding Thinkers, and the Biddle Hypothesis
Historians of philosophy have labored hard to categorize the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English philosophical theologians into various groups in order to economically convey to their readers the movement of thought that gave rise to natural religion in England. These categories often cannot be pressed too far and have limited utility. At times the criteria used to define groups are too loose or vague and the groups overlap leaving a thinker or thinkers in two groups or the criteria are too rigid, leaving some notable thinkers outside of all of the groups. The former situation is far more common than the latter. In what follows, this part will briefly discuss the figures typically incorporated in the narrative of the rise of natural religion in England, a couple of examples of the attempted groupings of these thinkers by more recent literature, and these specific groupings’ respective shortcomings. This part will then note the implications of the findings of this book on the rise of natural religion, namely a suggestion of new criteria by which to group some of these thinkers, a related need for the further study of particular figures, and a rebuttal to John Higgins-Biddle’s hypothesis regarding one of Locke’s reasons for writing ROC related to CNM.
A few names commonly appear in the narrative of the rise of natural religion in England. They are all considered to be outside of the pale of Protestant scholasticism. Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583–1648) is often the first or one of the first named. In his De Veritate (1624) he puts forth the common axioms or precepts of universal natural religion and for this reason is sometimes fashioned as the father of deism. Chronologically he is followed by John Locke and sometimes by Archbishop John Tillotson. Locke’s and Tillotson’s epistemologies and defenses of religion have numerous affinities and are thus discussed together. The subsequent group treated is the next generation of thinkers, some of which were writing at the same time as Locke. It includes such thinkers as John Toland, Anthony Collins, and Matthew Tindal, to name a few. Most, if not all, placed in this next generation are considered Lockean in one sense or another. And each thinker’s major defining work, except for Toland’s CNM, appears after Locke’s death.318 All of these thinkers are often portrayed as de-emphasizing the role of the supernatural in our lives and religion compared to the previous generation. But the shorter a particular treatment of the rise of natural religion in England is, the fewer there are who will be named from this post-Locke generation. Toland is almost always mentioned because of the much-touted deviation from Locke made popular by Stillingfleet. Tindal is also almost always mentioned because his Christianity as Old as the Creation, published in 1730, is the clearest articulation of Christianity as merely natural religion.319 It marks the height of the natural religion narrative before its decline in prominence, helped along by such minds as David Hume.
James Livingston attempts the difficult task of dividing the thinkers above into separate groups in one of his recent works. After mentioning Herbert of Cherbury and De Veritate, he groups John Locke and John Tillotson as “rational supernaturalists” and John Toland and Matthew Tindal as “deists.” He writes the following:
By the end of the seventeenth century most of the ablest thinkers were divided into two camps. The orthodox or rational supernaturalists insisted on the unique role of revelation and on the distinction between what could and what could not be known by the exercise of reason alone. The more radical thinkers, who came to be known as the Deists, rejected the necessity of revelation and insisted on the sufficiency of unaided natural reason in religion.320
One of the first problems is that the two groups are based on different criteria or the answers to different questions. That is, the rational supernaturalists are said to affirm “the unique role of revelation,” a vague claim, and a distinction between what reason can and cannot conclude for itself, while the deists, in the passage above, are said to reject the necessity of revelation and apparently thought natural reason was capable of determining the way of salvation for itself. If they were intended to be the same criteria, it seems the best interpretation of these two groups would be that the rational supernaturalists believed that revelation was necessary for salvation and the deists did not. The problem stemming from that is that the paradigm of the rational supernaturalists, John Locke, did believe that humans had the potential to be saved by responding to the natural light they had. While it was not likely, it was possible.321
Another commendable categorization scheme comes from Claude Welch in Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, vol. 1. After naming Lord Herbert of Cherbury as being a significant first articulator of the precepts of natural religion, he goes on to categorize key figures into three chronologically overlapping but progressing stages of natural religion. The first stage, where John Locke is the paradigm, includes those who assert, “Essential Christianity, though its content transcends what alone reason is able to discover, is harmonious with natural religion.”322 “The second stage was characterized by the assertion that Christianity (insofar as it is acceptable) does not transcend natural religion but is an instance of it. At no point may Christianity go beyond it.”323 Toland and Tindal are placed in this stage. The third and final stage is marked by those who think revelation is “wholly unnecessary, or even opposed to the true religion of reason.”324
The problems with Welch’s scheme are few but important. First, stage one encompasses, in reality, those like Locke who do not, in principle, accept anything inconceivable into religion but also those who do. That is a rather significant difference to allow in the same stage. Secondly, moving from the first to the second stage, an important common point, Christianity, is necessarily defined differently in those different stages; and it is not even present in the description of the third stage. Thirdly, the appropriateness of putting those who see revelation as wholly unnecessary and those who think it opposed to true religion is doubtful. On a related point, it would seem that those who think revelation is wholly unnecessary (but not opposed to true religion) might fit better into the second stage.
While both of these models of thinking through the rise of natural religion could possibly be improved, this chapter suggests another and simpler categorization scheme that is inherent within this book. There are a series of sifting questions regarding revelation that one asks of and answers for a certain thinker. By virtue of these questions a thinker’s approach to revelation in principle is used to group him or her with similarly principled individuals. The first question is: Does this thinker claim that assent to revelation as being such can be legitimate? If no, the thinker denies revelation. If yes, the next question is asked: Does this thinker claim assent to revealed doctrines or propositions not comporting with natural probability can be legitimate?325 If no, then the thinker teaches that divine revelation must comport with natural probability to be legitimate; in other words, legitimate revelation and its associated doctrines are according to or subordinate to the dictates of natural or vulgar reason.326 But if the answer is yes, another question is asked: Does this thinker claim assent to one or more revelations (namely revealed doctrines or groups of related propositions) that are ultimately inconceivable or irreconcilable can be legitimate? If the answer is no, the thinker denies revealed inconceivable doctrines but not conceivable ones that transcend natural probability; in other words, legitimate revelation and its associated doctrines are according to or subordinate to Locke’s proper reason and its rules and thus can be above vulgar reason. If the answer is yes, another question could be asked: Does this thinker think that revealed doctrines or groups of propositions that offer so-called “human-logical contradictions” are acceptable? If no, the thinker accepts revelation as such that results in summarily incomprehensible doctrines but not those that are “human-logically contradictory” (In fact, most in the era would deny that it is theologically appropriate to separate human logic from divine logic.) If yes, then the thinker posits that we might be required to believe human-logical contradictions (that are not so according to God’s logic). This final distinction, however, is found more at home within the discussions and debates among the orthodox thinkers and will not take up notable space here.327 On a similar note, one who accepts things above vulgar reason might consider things above proper reason to be considered logical contradictions or effectively so. Thus, based upon the questions being asked in the order they are, concrete groups are formed: 1) those that categorically reject revelation and divine doctrines as such; 2) those that categorically reject revelation and divine doctrines as such that do not comport with natural probability; 3) those that categorically reject revelation and divine doctrines as such that go beyond natural conceivability or reconcilability; 4) those that can accept inconceivable, albeit logically non-contradictory, revelation or doctrines; 5) those that can accept revelation or doctrines with so-called human-logical contradictions (but would not accept that the divine logic could be transgressed).328
The advantages of this scheme are a few. For one, this concentrates on the nature of reason, faith, and traditional revelation. While other types of revelation are discussed during this period in history, most of these English thinkers are predominantly concerned with the Bible, the accepted traditional revelation of Christianity. While modern-day original revelation was also an important topic, allowances for it or categorical rejections of it could be based upon Scriptural considerations. Presumably, most would agree that these thinkers’ stances on the question of modern-day revelation are less important than their stances on traditional revelation from past original revelation. These questions give a better sense of the thinkers’ positions on the latter (One would be hard pressed to find a notable thinker in the era who explicitly denies ancient revelation while accepting only contemporary revelation. Besides, the questions could easily be reconfigured to specify Scripture as the revelation of concern.) Also, concentrating on the nature of revelation from the standpoints of thinkers is more orderly than grouping thinkers based upon what they think is necessary for salvation, or some other complicated issue. Furthermore, this scheme is based upon Lockean categories. This is important because the epistemologies of thinkers typically found in the narrative are variations of the epistemology laid out in the Essay. Locke looms large into the eighteenth-century and his Essay undoubtedly helped guide conversations about revelation. Asking the above questions for thinkers such as Anthony Collins or John Tillotson, who himself was likely formative to the Essay, are areas for further study, while a cursory read of Tindal, at least toward the end of his life, would seem to place him in the second group, those who subordinate revelation to natural probability.329 What is more, from this book it is apparent that Locke and Toland fit into the third group together.
Moreover, the fact that Toland is placed in the same group as Locke and not the group that subordinates revelation to natural or vulgar reason or the group that denies revelation would tend to overturn John Higgins-Biddle’s hypothesis regarding the writing of ROC, now taken as a matter of fact by some. He thinks it is possible that Locke had a copy of CNM prior to its publication. If so, he wonders if Locke’s noting of its epistemological connections to his Essay and its deistic conclusions might have caused him to write ROC, in part, to show his Essay does not end up in deism, but on the contrary is against it.330 What is more, Higgins-Biddle’s account appears to be a tacit affirmation of Stillingfleet’s reading of CNM. Nonetheless, the conjectured motivations for Locke’s writing of ROC lose their force when it is seen that the gulf between the Essay and CNM is not as wide as once thought.
Finally, there is some warrant for the frequent grouping of Toland together with Tindal as opposed to Locke, but scholarship has not properly identified these connections. Again, first and foremost the grouping occurs in scholarship because Toland is thought to have subordinated revelation to natural reason as does Tindal. While this is incorrect, there are still important affinities between the two thinkers. In the end, Toland seems to strip Christianity of God’s original revelation of the unconveyable sort, modern-day miracles, and modern-day revelation. Tindal also seems to attack unconveyable original revelation, modern-day original revelation, and miracles, albeit from different angles.331 Thus, Toland and Tindal both limit God’s interaction. So, when only considering their conclusions as stated, Tindal and Toland appear to be more alike than Locke and Toland. A further study juxtaposing Toland and Tindal more thoroughly than done here, however, is needed and would likely prove a helpful and fruitful project.
Part III: Categorization of Propositions and Doctrines
It is worthwhile mentioning a few observations regarding categorizations of propositions or doctrines in the Essay and CNM. This book has shown that Locke’s stated acceptance of above reason propositions or doctrines and Toland’s rejection of doctrines with the same label amounts to no epistemological differences between the two thinkers. Had they organized propositions and doctrines according to their preferred conception of reason, proper reason, they would have the same categorization of propositions. Interestingly, neither thinker explicitly produces such a categorization. The explicit categorization Locke does give, as mentioned in chapter 3, is concessionary, having been based upon his concessionary vulgar reason notion. Toland defines contrary to reason things and above reason things to discuss those categories but never presents a full taxonomy including an according to reason category. In short, while this book asserts that they have apparently limited themselves to have according to reason and contrary to reason proposition categories ready to hand, they never expressly employ them. While it could be the case that both thinkers never offer a full and preferred categorization of propositions because they believe that the reader should infer it, it also might be that both decided not to offer an express and preferred categorization of propositions due to the confusion that could arise.
In their era, such categorizations of propositions in relation to “reason” abounded. Reading CNM alone gives you the sense of the confusion that could arise and the effort one might expend in trying to explain what is or should be meant by the different categories. Perhaps additional evidence that Toland and Locke were far more interested in undoing the harm done by what they considered haphazard employment of labels (Locke with far more subtlety) and that they were not very interested in positively advocating a particular way of categorizing are comparisons of their works with those of Robert Boyle (1627–91). While acknowledging that employment of such labels are liable to misunderstanding, Boyle, undeterred, carefully explains, for instance, how we can understand and organize all of the different things that often come to be spoken of as being “above reason.”332 In short, Locke’s, Toland’s, and Boyle’s pertinent works all share a careful criticism of the then-current categorizations of propositions, but it is only Boyle’s that are also clearly constructive in that respect.
Part IV: Locke’s and Toland’s Hermeneutics amidst the Influences of the Natural Sciences and Biblical Criticism
Locke and Toland operate with a certain epistemological and hermeneutical principle that guards against the Bible’s authority being usurped by extra-biblical sources. Locke is adamant in his debate with Stillingfleet that a particular doctrine derived from Scripture is not to be thought more or less credible depending on the probability for or against it supplied by vulgar or natural reason.333 What can be inferred from this is that while vulgar reason may provide us with a possible interpretation, one should not be compelled in any sense to use or favor such an interpretation. So, an interpretation of a passage that is supported by a prevailing theory of natural science, for instance, is not, because of that support, to be given more weight than an interpretation that does not seem as probable under only natural considerations. When it comes to multiple, possible interpretations, the only advice Locke has is that one proposition of Scripture cannot contradict another. If that cannot be done with two propositions, for instance, after “fair endeavours,” one must suspend one’s judgment.334
Now this rule clearly affects passages that might be or are commenting on metaphysics, miracles, or divine agency. But that is not all. This rule even applies to passages where one might claim that archaeological findings “support” Scripture’s historical claims. Again, Locke and Toland would counter that Scripture is not made more credible by finding support in archaeological findings but rather the Bible confirms the probable interpretations of the unearthed data that conform to it. For Locke and Toland there is comparatively little knowledge for us in this world. We are immersed in probability.
How well they employed this principle is another question. Both men have works in other areas beyond theology where Scripture is employed. How much biblical support did they find, for instance, for their political views? Does it appear they are guilty of eisegesis? If so, might this offer some insight to the next generations of political writers who eschew the Bible?
Part V: The Question of Stylistic Camouflage and Hidden Pantheism versus Deism Forthrightly Stated
In the 1980s a rift in Toland scholarship was created. Toland’s CNM had been fashioned as a “deistic” work and the progenitor of Tindal’s so-called “Deist’s Bible,” Christianity as Old as the Creation. In the 1982 publication of John Toland and the Deist Controversy, Robert E. Sullivan advanced his notion that Toland is truly a pantheistic materialist at the time of writing CNM.335 Sullivan thinks that Toland argues for revelation because the Bible supports civil order and morals, but concurrently argues that Christianity is simply an instance of natural religion.336 In truth, according to Sullivan, Toland, however, does not believe in the possibility of divine revelation.337 This was received into scholarship by some with slight alteration and by others with significant alterations. That latter scholarship hypothesizes that CNM has a three-tiered intention as follows: first, Toland wants CNM at face value to read like a Christian work—for instance, defending revelation; second, Toland wants to lead unwary readers to make for themselves the irreligious conclusions against which Toland pretends to be writing; and third, Toland wants to convey to the intelligent, irreligious readers his true beliefs.338 So while the older line of Toland scholarship and much of the recent Toland scholarship label Toland as a deist, some since Sullivan understand CNM to be masking Toland’s pantheism.
There are problems with all of these views. First, as already discussed, epistemologically Toland is closer to Locke than he is to Tindal. Regarding Sullivan’s claims and the assertions of many others, CNM does not subordinate revelation to natural reason and Christianity requires faith in Christ for those who have heard the gospel. So it cannot simply be promulgating natural religion or deism. Also, Sullivan’s argument that Toland was a pantheist all of his life is based on circular reasoning as discussed in chapter 4.339 And, those with the complicated three-tiered notion of CNM have just as many problems. What are these irreligious conclusions that Toland intended his reader to make and that his irreligious counterparts understood? Again, these authors simply make assertions amidst scant exegetical work and depend on the claims of Toland’s adversaries that he has underhanded intentions. Toland is shown in this book to echo Locke in so many respects to the degree that they are left with one of two conclusions if they want to persist with their hypothesis: 1) Locke is oblivious to his mistakes that Toland mischievously replicates and there are plenty of people on a higher mental level than Locke that recognize them; or 2) Locke is doing the same thing that they claim Toland to be doing. Assuming they would choose the latter option, they still must be pressed to deliver precisely how Toland and Locke intend to undercut Christianity with hidden snares. This will also require that they enter the lists with some very formidable Locke scholars, few of whom doubt that Locke earnestly thought himself a believing Christian under the authority of Scripture.340
If there is any charge of knowing misconduct, it is unlikely in either thinker’s epistemology. Some have charged Locke with the abuse of Scripture intentionally or unintentionally, but that question could be investigated regarding Locke and Toland in the suggested study below.
Part VI: A Comparison of Locke and Toland Regarding the Nature of Scripture and Hermeneutics
A final area of study involving Locke and Toland that could build on this book is a comparative look at Locke’s and Toland’s bibliologies in this time period. This would involve exploring both thinkers regarding their views of the nature of Scripture, namely the attributes of Scripture. The thinkers’ respective views on hermeneutics in principle and in practice could also be explicitly incorporated. Such a study would go beyond the subsections involving reason and revelation in this book. While CNM is a combination of a theological work and an exploration of experimental philosophy, the Essay is predominantly an exploration of experimental philosophy. Thus, to get a better grasp on Locke’s hermeneutics and his positions on several aspects of Scripture, ROC and its vindications, which are primarily theological, would be necessary to study.
This proposed study of Locke’s and Toland’s views of the nature of Scripture and hermeneutics is, in fact, one logical next step to this book. While in recent decades scholarship has become increasingly focused on Locke’s theology, little has been done specifically with Locke’s bibliology. It is possible that Locke’s views on the nature of Scripture have received so little attention because treatments of biblical authority are impossible to separate from Locke’s epistemology regarding faith, revelation, and reason, all challenging interrelated topics. In other words, what has made an exploration of Locke’s bibliology formidable is that Locke’s epistemology has been interpreted very differently by the many scholars involved in the on-going conversation. Thus, there is no consensus view of Locke’s epistemology from which to build. Moreover, there has been some scholarly treatment of Toland regarding Scripture, and those are typically on his hermeneutics. But these have approached Toland as one who thinks the Bible does not or cannot give humans anything that transcends natural probability.341
I hope this present work opens new vistas for the prolegomena and hermeneutics of John Locke and John Toland and spurs on further studies into the theology and epistemology of John Tillotson, Anthony Collins, and Matthew Tindal, just to name a few.
318. Most would agree that the works for which Toland and Tindal are best known today are CNM and Christianity as Old as the Creation, respectively. Toland’s career began with CNM and Tindal’s ended with Christianity as Old as the Creation. Anthony Collins has several works for which he is noted that span throughout his writing career. Thus, there does not seem to be significant agreement in scholarship regarding what Collins’s most influential work is.
319. Tindal has appropriated the epistemological thought of Locke regarding ideas and knowledge. Cf. Tindal, Christianity as Old, 159–60. It is beyond doubt as well that he deviates from him. Anthony Collins was a student and close personal friend of Locke. His works have many similarities to Locke. Collins, Essay; Collins, Philosophical Inquiry.
320. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought,1:16. Livingston’s rational supernaturalist and deist categories are likely based to some degree on John Herman Randall, Jr.’s categories: supernatural rationalists and deists. It is unclear to me into which group Randall intends to place John Toland. Randall, Jr., Making of the Modern Mind, 285–89.
321. Locke, ROC, 254–93.
322. Welch, Protestant Thought, 1:35.
323. Ibid., 36.
324. Ibid., 38.
325 A proposition that does not comport with natural probability is one that runs counter to natural probability based upon purely natural considerations or a proposition asserted that could not rightly be affirmed upon purely natural considerations.
The following are some helpful reminders regarding natural probability. Natural probability includes the testimony of humans that does not originate in divine sources. The King of Siam hearing about particulars regarding Holland from a Dutch Ambassador may believe him about many things but stop short of assenting to the claim that an elephant could walk on a lake made hard by the bitter cold. The proposition, while not touching on the experience of the king, can be verified or could rationally be believed upon the veracity of the ambassador. All that is to say, natural probability is not necessarily the simple results of mental calculations based on the collections of the experiences and observations of an isolated individual (cf. Locke, Essay IV.xv.5). Also, one might through analogy and observation assent to propositions regarding the supernatural realm through divinely unassisted reasoning. For instance, it is possible some have reasoned that it is likely that there are ranks of intelligent beings, some of who are immaterial, that reach up to the infinite perfection of God (Essay IV.xvi.12). While this is a proposition focused on supernatural things it could come about from reasoning from natural sources. Locke’s above (vulgar) reason category transcends divinely unassisted or natural probability. Locke’s above (vulgar) reason propositions must be divinely revealed and they always pertain to supernatural things that we could not otherwise rationally assent to even in the unlikely scenario that we happened to imagine them (Essay IV.xvii.23; IV.xviii.7–8).
These things are important to understand in considering the second group—those that admit of traditional revelation but deny that it can go beyond natural or vulgar probability or run counter to it. For instance, if a divine revelation seems to suggest that the universe contains powerful, immaterial beings subordinate to God, a thinker in the second group could affirm that, while he or she might not affirm that one-third of them rebelled against God; the person might not be able, even with others, to come up with good reasons from purely natural considerations why this might be so. In addition, if one is convinced that the Bible teaches that God made humans in one day but is convinced that science says otherwise, science is to be followed. Thus the second group operates with the presupposition that God does not communicate propositions that we are unable to derive ourselves and assent to in principle or to observe ourselves and verify without divine assistance. In other words, they believe that God does not communicate to us that which is above (vulgar) reason or counter to or beyond natural probability. Traditional revelation for the second group can still be helpful in reminding us of or teaching us our moral duties or showing us the conclusions that reasoning should arrive at (and does), filling in the gaps in our reasoning, etc. It is possible that there are some who subordinate revelation to natural probability in only salvific matters—so as to give no geographical people group more of an advantage in being saved—and thus would claim assent to the proposition that one-third of the angels fell as being legitimate. But these would fall into the third group that this section will treat shortly.
326. I say that they subordinate revelation to natural or vulgar reason because according to these thinkers revelation cannot run counter to natural probability or be above vulgar or natural reason to be considered as such. Nonetheless, these thinkers claim traditional revelation exists so they are technically operating with proper reason. The difference, however, is in the nature of revelation. According to them, it will never assert something or present an argument, if it is truly divine, that natural or vulgar reason would dismiss if the claim were merely based on human testimony or other natural sources without any admixture of divine assistance. This counters Locke’s stance that revelation can trump natural probability and even convey propositions beyond our natural or vulgar reasoning abilities.
327. Francis Turretin answers the following question with a yes for the Reformed tradition: May the judgment of contradiction be allowed to human reason in matters of faith? He charges the Lutherans (namely the ubiquitarians) with ruling out the judgment of contradiction in so-called matters of the faith. Turretin, Institutes of Elecntic Theology, 1:32. Anthony Collins, one of the foremost thinkers frequently labeled a deist, chides those who dismiss the use of human logic in theology. For him, while God is far more perfect and intelligent, our human logic is a subset of the divine logic. Collins, Essay.
328. The first question asked in the series of questions groups thinkers into one of two groups, the first being group one, the second containing groups two, three, four, and five. The second question divides this second group into two groups, the first being group two, and the second being comprised of groups three, four, and five. The third question then further divides the combined grouping of groups three, four, and five into group three and a grouping consisting of groups four and five. The fourth question then divides group four and five.
329. Tindal, Christianity as Old. He is quite explicit that his desire is to “advance the Honour of External Revelation; by shewing the perfect Agreement between That and Internal Revelation” (8). He also remarks that external revelation and natural religion may not differ in one aspect (51). He also gets rid of Locke’s rule that revelation can trump natural probability (158). While Tindal is operating with a version of Locke’s proper reason (he is claiming traditional revelation is such), his expunging of the rule effectively subordinates revelation to natural probability or, in this book’s terms, vulgar reason. It is possible, however, that Tindal means that the way of salvation as explained in revelation cannot differ from natural religion (cf. 59). So, Tindal might claim beliefs in above natural or vulgar reason propositions not regarding the message of salvation, such as one-third of the angels rebelled, could be reasonably accepted. While this latter explanation is doubtful, more investigation and closer readings of Tindal would be needed.
330. Higgins-Biddle, introduction to The Reasonableness of Christianity, xxvii–xxxvii; Biddle, “Locke’s Critique of Innate.”
331. Tindal, Christianity as Old, 162, 170, 199.
332. Marko, “Above Reason Propositions.”
333. Locke, Mr. Locke’s Reply . . . Answer to his Second Letter, 136–39, 418–29, 443–44.
334. Locke, ROC, 304.
335. Sullivan, John Toland, 43–47, 114–19.
336. Ibid., 119, 138, 173–74, 207–8.
337. Ibid., 125, 127, 216, 275.
338. Berman, “Deism, Immortality, and the Art”; Berman, “Disclaimers as Offence Mechanisms”; Berman, “Toland, John”; Fouke, Philosophy and Theology; cf. Berman, History of Atheism.
339. Cf. Rappaport, “Questions of Evidence.”
340. There is another way that one might attempt to argue that Toland’s, and even Locke’s, 1695–96 works are undergirded by pantheism: that anything mentally irreconcilable should be dismissed. Many theists claim that we should not expect to be able to reconcile all ideas as there are supernatural things for which we have no direct experience. A Trinitarian might say, for instance, that God is one with respect to substance and three with respect to persons (and thus not a logical contradiction), even though in our experience one human substance results only in one human person; our experience of a material world and faculties do not provide us with ideas by which to reconcile the doctrine of the holy Trinity. So, one might argue that Locke and Toland do not accept irreconcilable things because there is actually nothing that is supernatural: all is nature. But that would directly contradict them in their works either regarding pantheism or their trust that God has equipped us for what is helpful (and that apparently excludes some supernatural things). What is more, they both admit supernatural miracles as an external mark of divine revelation.
341. Works for beginning the exploration of the scholarship on Locke’s understandings of Scripture and hermeneutics are: Champion, “’Directions for the Profitable Reading”; Champion, “‘Law of Continuity”; Foster, “The Bible and Natural Freedom”; Kuehne, “Reinventing Paul”; Sell, John Locke, 92–104; Conrad, “Locke’s Use of the Bible”; Weinsheimer, Eighteenth-Century Hermeneutics; Lucci, Scripture and Deism. These last two works treat Locke and Toland.