In the eye of the storm from the mid-1970s onwards, and victim of the great changes shaking modern societies, social democracy currently seems to be in the ascendant again, and is the principal governmental force in the EU countries today. A social democracy that was in crisis – and, according to some, in decline, decay, or a kind of coma – has been transformed, as if by a modern Circe, into a triumphant force at the beginning of the new century. Does this betoken what René Cuperus and Johannes Kandel have called the ‘magical return’1 of a political current which, only a little while ago, seemed to be in the grip of a ‘historical decline’? Or is it an ultimately insignificant conjunctural oscillation in a cycle of electoral decline or stagnation?
Table 6.1 measures the electoral strength and governmental ‘capacity’ – what Wolfgang Merkel calls the power ‘quotient’ – of the main socialist/social-democratic parties, grouped in three categories, over various periods. The first, 1960–73, corresponds to the phase of social democracy’s blossoming; the others – 1974–89, 1980–90, 1990–99 – to phases of uncertainty and retreat, but also of the new social democracy’s accession to power (in particular, 1990–99).
Table 6.1 Electoral performance (legislative elections) and governmental quotient of socialist parties in western Europe (average)
| 1960–73 | 1974–89 | 1980–90 | 1990–99 | |||||
| EP | GQ | EP | GQ | EP | GQ | EP | GQ | |
| Austria | 46.3 | 2.3 | 48.1 | 3.94 | 44.6 | 2.5 | 37.3 | 2.0 |
| Denmark | 38.7 | 3.0 | 32.7 | 1.94 | 32.2 | 1.0 | 36.0 | 2.1 |
| Norway | 42.9 | 1.8 | 38.6 | 2.75 | 37.4 | 1.8 | 36.0 | 2.8 |
| Sweden | 46.8 | 4.1 | 43.3 | 2.5 | 44.5 | 3.0 | 39.8 | 2.8 |
| Germany | 41.0 | 1.3 | 40.2 | 1.69 | 37.9 | 0.7 | 36.9 | 0.3 |
| Great Britain | 45.1 | 2.0 | 33.6 | 1.88 | 29.2 | 0.0 | 38.8 | 1.5 |
| Averages | 43.5 | 2.4 | 39.5 | 2.45 | 37.6 | 1.5 | 37.5 | 1.91 |
| 1960–73 | 1974–89 | 1980–90 | 1990–99 | |||||
| EP | GQ | EP | GQ | EP | GQ | EP | GQ | |
| Belgium | 30.0 | 1.2 | 27.2 | 0.75 | 28.2 | 0.7 | 23.2 | 2.0 |
| Netherlands | 25.9 | 0.3 | 31.5 | 0.88 | 31.0 | 0.3 | 26.5 | 2.5 |
| Finland | 24.0 | 1.1 | 24.9 | 2.0 | 25.4 | 2.7 | 24.4 | 1.2 |
| Averages | 26.6 | 0.9 | 27.86 | 1.21 | 28.2 | 1.23 | 24.7 | 1.9 |
| 1960–73 | 1974–89 | 1980–90 | 1990–99 | |||||
| EP | GQ | EP | GQ | EP | GQ | EP | GQ | |
| Spain | – | – | 39.3 | 2.69 | 44.0 | 3.6 | 38.0 | 2.4 |
| France | 16.8 | 0 | 32.1 | 1.69 | 34.7 | 2.7 | 20.7 | 2.1 |
| Greece | – | – | 34.4 | 2.88 | 42.2 | 3.5 | 42.3 | 3.0 |
| Portugal | – | – | 28.9 | 1.38 | 27.2 | 0.7 | 39.1 | 1.6 |
| Averages | – | – | 33.67 | 2.16 | 37.0 | 2.6 | 35.02 | 2.27 |
Sources: 1960–73, 1980–90: Wolfgang Merkel, ‘After the Golden Age: Is Social Democracy Doomed to Decline?’, in José Maravall et al., Socialist Parties in Europe, ICPS, Barcelona 1991, pp. 215–18. Averages per party (with the exception of the SPD) established by Merkel; 1974–89, 1990–99: Wolfgang Merkel, ‘The Third Ways of Social Democracy’, in René Cuperus, Karl Duffek and Johannes Kandal, Multiple Third Ways, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Amsterdam, 2001, pp. 34–5. Group classification of parties and averages for each group calculated by the author.
Note: The governmental quotient is calculated as follows:
5points: socialist governments with a parliamentary majority
4points: socialist governments without a parliamentary majority (minority government)
3points: socialists as dominant partner in a coalition government
2points: socialists as equal partner in a grand coalition
1point: socialists as junior partner in a government coalition
0point: socialists in opposition
The parties in the first group possess more of the distinctive characteristics of the social-democratic model than the others; despite striking national specificities, they more or less represent the historically most accomplished and (in the sense defined in this study) ‘modelled’ form of social democracy. Formations with a very high competitive status, fluctuating within an electoral zone of influence usually exceeding 35 per cent of the electorate, these parties represent governmental social democracy par excellence.
The second group contains social-democratic parties which, while not very distant from the first in their identity traits, are distinguished by their intermediate competitive status.
Finally, the third group, commonly referred to by the dubious term ‘southern European socialism’, comprises parties presumed to be different from typical social democracy on account of their overall constitution and history.
Several conclusions emerge from these data.
1.Straightforward observation of the electoral performance and governmental quotient of the three groups offers a timely reminder of the reductive character of the diagnosis of a general electoral regression in the 1980s – or a general advance in the 1990s – by the socialist and social-democratic left. The data in Table 6.1 display the diversity of national situations, and the interpretative difficulties generated by the electoral pattern. The period 1974–89 emerges overall as a phase of significant electoral weakening for the group of great social-democratic parties, culminating in the 1980s. At the same time, as indicated by the negative evolution of their governmental quotient, their transition to opposition (or shared governmental power) becomes more frequent, more protracted, and – not surprisingly – makes itself felt more in the same period. By contrast, the ‘southern European socialism’ group plays its hand well, and experiences an unprecedented electoral upturn. Situated between these two groups with contrasting electoral records, we have the social-democratic parties of intermediate competitive status. The Belgian PS is in clear retreat, whereas the PvdA marks an appreciable advance in its level of electoral influence (only to lose ground again in the 1990s), and the Finnish SDP progresses weakly.
2.This first impression (which takes no account of post-1990 developments) is partially modified, without being fundamentally altered, in the period 1990–99. The first group of parties sees its losses confirmed and, in general, proves incapable of recovering the electoral ground lost in the 1980s. Obviously, this impression of overall electoral stability conceals highly distinct – even opposed – trends at the national level. For the three traditionally most powerful parties within this group – the SAP, DNA and SPÖ – the trend is a marked increase in their regression, particularly in the case of the Austrian social democrats, for whom all signals are at danger. By contrast, a long dose of opposition in the case of the Danish social democrats, and British Labour translates into a sharp recovery of influence and reversion to a more customary balance of forces in the relevant countries. In sum, the period 1990–99 witnesses a very interesting contraction effect, with the gap between the strongest and weakest parties in the group closing significantly. This contraction against a background of overall electoral stability (but with strong fluctuations from country to country) is in marked contrast to the impression of disorderly upheaval for the period 1974–90. On the other hand, it is remarkably close to that of the years 1960–73. It is as if, from 1990 to 1999, social democrats – who were initially surprised, hesitant, lacking in inspiration and, in some cases (Denmark or Great Britain), enormously ‘affected’ by changes in economic rhetoric or the advent of ‘new politics’ (or ‘semi-new politics’) – are in the process of absorbing the shock, and getting a better grip on the new political and ideological order. At the same time, the ‘social-democratic image of society’ having ceased to be dominant, the great robustness of the Swedish and Austrian social democrats and, to a lesser degree, Norwegian Labour, is impaired. Henceforth, ‘banalization’ of their electoral performances, formerly exceptional, is the rule. The example of the SAP is striking in this context. Having been in government since 1982, and won three consecutive elections, in 1991 the Swedish social democrats achieve their lowest electoral score since 1928 (39.5 per cent), picking up again in 1994 (46.1 per cent), only to plummet in 1998 (36.4 per cent). In its electoral performances, ‘the west’s most successful electoral party of any political stripe’2 has become a ‘commonplace’ party: henceforth it is a party ‘like the others’.
3.The parties of southern Europe, classed among the great victors of the 1980s, consolidate their strong electoral positions in the 1990s, despite an appreciable but ultimately limited retreat. Once their electoral ‘maturation’ is complete, around the mid-1980s, we observe a type of electoral pattern that tends to be analogous to that of the most classically social-democratic parties. Analysis by country reveals the very great instability – and fragility – of the French PS, traditionally capable of the best and the worst, as well as the resurgence of the Portuguese PS. In contrast, PASOK appears relatively robust – like the PSOE, which, although noticeably weakened, remains powerful despite its long period in government and the electoral setback of 1996.
4.The group of parties of intermediate electoral status, having enjoyed increased support in the period 1980–90, registers some important losses in the 1990s, especially in the case of the Belgian socialists and the PvdA. Here, too, a narrowing is visible, the margin of the average influence of the three parties concerned tending strongly to converge.
5.In sum, the parties of the first group, with a disappointing electoral ‘harvest’ in the period 1980–90, stabilize at the same level in the 1990s overall. But compared with the 1980s, they strengthen their governmental presence. The parties of the intermediate group fall back appreciably relative to the 1980s, but they, too, improve – and strongly – their governmental quotient! Only the southern parties, following their extraordinary electoral performances in the 1980s, regress at both electoral and governmental levels, albeit slightly. If one compares the average performance by decade of the thirteen parties represented in Table 6.1, nine register electoral losses compared with the 1980s, and only four (the Danish SD, the British Labour Party, PASOK, the Portuguese PS) progress. Obviously, the unit of comparison employed here – the electoral average by decade – does not measure short-term fluctuations (from one election to the next), which alone determine a party’s transition to opposition or its accession to government. Nevertheless, taken overall, as a political family, socialist parties recede electorally (albeit moderately) not only compared with some distant electoral ‘golden age’, but also relative to their worst electoral decade: the 1980s. Significantly however, the great majority of them find themselves in power. Socialism dominates governments in Europe, even if the electoral base of this domination, compared with that of the period 1960–73, is less broad and less solid.
6.Let us try to refine the analysis above. Comparing the electoral results of socialist parties in three parliamentary elections before June 1999, Table 6.2 demonstrates that the fact of being in government or opposition in the parliament preceding the election is a ‘key’ to explaining socialist electoral performance.3 Participation in government constitutes an important factor in electoral weakening; opposition a factor in electoral strengthening. This broadly explains the variations and contrasts by country. Without making such participation the exclusive foundation of the differential competitive trend of the socialist and social-democratic parties, the data in Table 6.2 tally in indicating its importance. Obviously, this phenomenon – the corrosive effect of office – is standard in the political history of democratic societies, and nothing new. It forms part of the basic democratic game and conventional wisdom. But it currently seems to involve a high electoral price – in all probability, higher than in the past. Like their non-socialist opponents, socialists in government are dependent on the very difficult general conjuncture, which is inauspicious for parties in power. They are thus subject to the hazards and reversals typical of electoral cycles.4
7.Yet the corrosive effect of being in power, linked to the specific logic – and exacting character – of the act of governing, operates more as symptom than cause: it makes it possible to take stock of the shortcomings and inadequacies of the social-democratic political project. Accordingly, while there is no point in ignoring its particular contribution to increased socialist weakness, it would be unwise to overestimate its significance. In reality, participation in government generated, triggered or accelerated a weakening which, in ‘creeping’ or ‘blatant’ fashion, began to rack the social-democratic parties successively, to different degrees and at different rhythms and moments, from the beginning of the 1970s. From this point of view, it is indicative that the parties closest to the classical social-democratic model, which historically represented governmental social democracy par excellence (the first group in Table 6.1), started to waver. They were suffering. Over the last twenty-five years they have, on average, lost 14 per cent of their electoral strength. Electoral performance is always ‘a feeling thermometer evaluation of political parties’.5 In this sense, statistics are not simply statistics: they are the tangible sign and echo of the political weakening of social-democratic-type parties. They disclose, confirm and reflect their political ‘destabilization’.
Table 6.2 Election results of socialist parties in the three most recent legislative elections (as ofJune 1999), according to whether or not in government
| Ante-penultimate elections | Elections before last | Last elections | General evolution | |
| In government throughout | ||||
| Austria | 42.8 | 34.9 | 38.1 | -4.7 |
| Belgium | 25.5 | 24.5 | 19.7 | -5.8 |
| Denmark | 37.4 | 34.6 | 36 | -1.4 |
| Spain | 39.6 | 38.8 | 37.5 | -2.1 |
| Norway (except 89–90) | 34.3 | 36.9 | 35 | +0.7 |
| Netherlands | 31.9 | 24 | 29 | -2.9 |
| In opposition and then government since the elections before last |
||||
| Greece | 38.6 | 46.9 | 41.5 | +2.9 |
| Sweden | 37.7 | 45.2 | 36.6 | -1.1 |
| In government and then opposition since the elections before last |
||||
| France | 37.5 | 19.2 | 23.5 | -14 |
| Finland | 24.1 | 22.1 | 28.3 | +4.2 |
| In opposition throughout | ||||
| Germany | 33.5 | 36.4 | 40.9 | +7.4 |
| United Kingdom | 30.8 | 34.9 | 43.2 | +12.4 |
| Ireland | 9.5 | 19.3 | 10.4 | +0.9 |
| Italy (PDS) | 16.1 | 20.4 | 21.1 | +5 |
| Portugal | 22.3 | 29.3 | 43.8 | +21.5 |
Source: Stavros Skrinis, ‘Electoral Performance and Governmental Power of the European Socialist Parties (1990–1999)’, in Skrinis et al., Elections in the European Union 1977–1998, Pantheion University, Athens, 1999 (in Greek).
On the basis of these findings, the analysis above might be summarized as follows:
(a)The mixed and contrasting character of the socialist electoral record does not support the hypothesis of a general decline in the period 1974–90 (compared with 1960–73); still less does it corroborate the thesis of the ‘historical decline’ of social democracy.6 The hypothesis of an overall electoral advance for the 1990s, compared with the already very testing 1980s, is not verified either. ‘The report of my death was an exaggeration,’ said Mark Twain. But recent reports of a social-democratic resurrection are equally exaggerated.
(b)Over the long term, if we compare 1974–99 with 1960–73, the socialist parties are less strong electorally, without this preventing them from exercising power, particularly during the second half of the 1990s.
(c)Given their losses, a destabilization and weakening peculiar to the most classically social-democratic parties, or those close to them, appears to influence their electoral performance and governmental power significantly.
(d)The weakening of these parties seems bound up as much with a crisis of social-democratic political logic as with a crisis of governability of European political systems, the one compounding the other.
(e)The most recent electoral results (post-1990) do not allow us to establish a dichotomy between electoral destinies according to the north/south divide, or according to a division between socialist parties of a social-democratic type and non-social-democratic socialist parties. The impression conveyed by the 1980s (an electorally prosperous south, a mediocre or disappointing ‘harvest’ in the north) was the effect more of a two-speed electoral development than of the greater ‘strategic flexibility’ of the southern parties.7 In this sense, the ‘southern socialists’ and ‘northern social democrats’ resemble one another electorally more than ever – not only because they structure political systems in analogous fashion, as key forces with a governmental vocation in their respective countries;8 but also because their electoral dynamics, the sequence of highs and lows, seem to conform to the same political logic, and would not appear to differ significantly.
Placed in historical perspective, the electoral weakening and rapid exhaustion of left-wing governments reveal a profounder malaise affecting socialist forces: they manifestly lack robustness, and their intervention is faltering. Can we, therefore, talk about an electoral crisis of European socialism? If the present is judged in the light of past performance, indeed we can. But if the present is judged relative to itself, certainly not. For from the viewpoint of the electoral balance of forces – let me stress: the electoral balance of forces, not electoral history – a party’s strength is a direct function of its opponents’ strength, and its stability is a function of their stability. All political actors fashion their identity (of which electoral influence is a constitutive element) in and through the adversaries facing them. It is in confronting them that a party becomes itself. And faced with their strength, its strength assumes political significance. From this angle – the position of relative strength – the weakening and reduced stability of socialist parties, while they are significant in themselves, do not betoken an electoral crisis, in so far – and only in so far – as their conservative opponents are, today, even weaker and more unstable than they are. This explains why, in a political landscape that is more fragmented than previously, socialists could simultaneously lose votes and increase their governmental quotient in the 1990s.9 Today’s socialists are not as powerful as they were in the 1960s; overall, they are even less powerful than they were in the 1980s. Nevertheless, everything suggests that they are less weak than their opponents. As a result, in relative terms, socialists are strong – strong, but weakened!
Notes
1.René Cuperus and Johannes Kandel, ‘The Magical Return of Social Democracy’, in Cuperus and Kandel, eds, European Social Democracy: Transformation in Progress, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Amsterdam 1998, p. 11.
2.Winton Higgins, ‘Social Democracy and the Labour Movement’, South African Labour Bulletin, vol. 17, no. 6, 1993, p. 74.
3.The construction of Table 6.2 by Stavros Skrinis is inspired by the work of Alain Bergounioux and Gérard Grunberg, and in fact updates their data (L’utopie à l’épreuve. Le socialisme européen au Xxe siècle, Éditions de Fallois, Paris 1996, pp. 271, 277).
4.Some notable exceptions require us to restrict the scope, and stress the limits, of this assertion. Having held power alone for eleven years, despite its weakening the PSOE succeeded in securing a fourth consecutive electoral victory in 1993, only to be removed from power in 1996 after obtaining a very respectable electoral score (37.4%). Again, the Finnish SDP, a governmental party par excellence, was able to improve its electoral performance while being in government virtually without interruption in the 1970s and 1980s, despite an important falling-off (22.1%) in the March 1991 elections, which brought a ‘bourgeois’ coalition to power. Profiting from the economic crisis, attributed by the social democrats to the bourgeois coalition, the SDP received 28.3% of the vote in the 1995 legislative elections, thus attaining a peak it had exceeded only in 1939. By contrast, in 1992 the British Labour Party confirmed – for the fourth consecutive time, and despite a considerable electoral advance – its status as a party of opposition (before returning to power in 1997). In the same way the SPD, out of power since 1982, became a party of government again only in 1998. At all events, on this very fluid terrain, where a whole host of parameters is in play, and where the share of hypothesis and deduction is large, prudence is required.
5.John Coleman, ‘Party Organizational Strength and Public Support for Parties’, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 40, no. 3, 1996, p. 811.
6.According to Bergounioux and Grunberg’s calculations, comparing the averages of electoral percentages for all the socialist parties (excluding Spain, Portugal and Greece) for the years 1945–74 and 1975–95, it seems that the decline is slight: 31.7% in the former period as against 30.4% in the latter, or a difference of 1.3%. If we add the three parties of southern Europe, the drop is no more than 0.7% (L’utopie à l’épreuve, p. 271). Wolfgang Merkel reached about the same conclusions; see his ‘The Third Way of Social Democracy’, pp. 34–35.
7.See Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994, pp. 324–6.
8.With the notable exception of the French PS, characterized by a congenital fragility and an extraordinary capacity for bouncing back.
9.For a fuller analysis of the socialists’ return to power, see Chapter 9.