Despite the comparative diversity that characterizes formations of a social-democratic type, between 1945 and 1973 they tended to share numerous traits in common. Let us recall some of them:
(a)a mass organization with great power in terms of activists and finances;
(b)a privileged link, whether institutionalized or not, with a working-class trade-unionism that was representative and often unified, well-articulated and centralized;
(c)a specific electoral make-up. Social-democratic parties were coalition parties, combining a very strong class base with a significant influence among sections of the middle classes. They were parties of the working class without thereby being working-class parties;
(d)these parties largely dominated the left of the political/ideological continuum;
(e)they were natural parties of government, capable of (i) identifying themselves with the opposition; and (ii) neutralizing – or not provoking – a ‘regime vote’;
(f)political liberalism, the welfare state, and the pursuit of social justice, as well as a culture of moderation, conferred on them an ideological raison d’être and a programmatic unity;
(g)the upshot of these characteristics of social-democratic identity was the social-democratic compromise, an important aspect of which was often – but not always – the establishment of a bi- or tripartite system of negotiation (neo-corporatist structures).
Thus defined, social democracy was not really established outside central and northern Europe. Strictly applied, this definition encompasses Sweden, Austria, Norway, Denmark, Germany, and, in a very ‘atypical’ – but well-modelled and distinct – version, Great Britain. The Belgian PS shared some of these characteristics, as did the Dutch PvdA in a less developed form.
The Party/Union Link and Social-Democratic Structuration
Social democracy in the first phase of the postwar period thus represented a particular model of constitution of the left, a specific and distinctive mode of existence.
At its heart, obviously, was the party/union link. This political/trade-union dual structure supported the whole edifice, and was partially responsible for its specificity. In the first place, the unions assumed the role of partner in the social-democratic political enterprise – something that allowed the party’s leaders to pride themselves on a privileged position in party competition as the repository of ‘social peace’. The implementation of bi- or tripartite negotiation under the auspices of social-democratic governments represented ‘tangible’ proof of this privileged, electorally beneficial position. Next, the unions took on the role of effective organizer of the working class, tending to re-establish – often in confrontation with the party – the importance of the class divide, fundamentally challenged by interclassist social-democratic strategies. Finally, they constituted a large ‘reservoir’ of voters and members for the party, since they facilitated social-democratic penetration of society. The party’s electoral anchorage in the working class, its activist strength, and a significant proportion of its financial means – in other words, its sociological, organizational and, to a considerable extent, competitive status – were directly (though certainly not exclusively) attributable to the synergy of these two organizations. In the 1960s, the relation between the two basic historical component parts of the working-class movement was doubtless no longer that of ‘one body, two wings’. In reality, each actor consolidated its power in the face of the other, in a subtle and sometimes conflictual game of mutual influence and permanent pressure – a game that often led where it did not wish to go. But as long as the link endured, this was something of an advantage. In a society that was not socially bipolar, it allowed the social-democratic party greater freedom of action and greater ambiguity as well.
Nevertheless, the reality of the social-democratic experience, now more than a century old, is not reducible to the party/union link. The thesis that correctly regards social democracy as a ‘constellation’ or ‘configuration’ often contains a significant drawback in practice. Social-democratic parties are not always considered in their electoral and strategic dimension; they are not always conceived in and for themselves, but essentially through their relationship with a more or less ‘external’ institution. Now, other parties – notably some of the major communist, Christian democratic, or ‘non-social-democratic’ socialist parties – have preserved, or still preserve, a link with large trade unions, which are often dominant, without thereby being (or becoming) social-democratic. Social-democratic reality unquestionably contains and ‘condenses’ in transposed form – that is to say, a properly political (electoral, ideological, organizational) form – the trade-union connection. The ideological or organizational reality of some major communist parties likewise – if not in identical fashion – involved this connection. In fact, social democracy, with its own organizational, ideological and political tradition, its own social and cultural reference points, its own memory and legacy – in short, its own identity – was constructed both with this link and at the same time, to a considerable extent, outside it. There exists a social-democratic type of electoral constitution and a social-democratic type of political operator which, along with the party/union link, are at the base of social democracy’s specificity. For social democracy is above all a partisan form.
Obviously, in suggesting here the importance of the social-democratic type of electoral coalition and political entrepreneur, I have not discovered America. In their general outlines these two dimensions are ‘known’ and spontaneously or diffusely present in every representation of the social-democratic phenomenon, whether intuitive or elaborated. They form part of the ‘obvious facts’.
But as with Cyrano’s nose, there are numerous ways of referring to the same obvious facts. What must be underlined is that if social democracy is composed of the elements and structures I have just enumerated, these are not reducible to the unity of some primary, preponderant element. Social democracy is a whole. The singular ‘links’ composing it should not be considered social-democratic as such but, rather, as parts of a whole which alone, in the combination of its elements, is social-democratic. Thus, on bases that were not wholly alien either to certain major communist parties or to some Christian democratic parties, there progressively emerged an institutional-political configuration whose components, unoriginal when taken separately, formed an original, unprecedented totality as a result of their combination and precise weighting. And it is precisely this totality – and not simply the party/union relationship – which is today in the process of changing.
Social Democracy, Social Democracies
I do not intend to repeat the analyses above. However, let me give some examples to illustrate the fact that what I have called social-democratic attributes are bound up with one another, and account – or accounted – for the cohesion and strength of social democracy.
(a)The link with the unions commands social-democratic domination of the world of labour, permits the implementation of the social-democratic compromise, and partially facilitates social-democratic domination of the left of the electoral and political spectrum.
(b)This domination, index of the absence of any important competitor on the left, facilitates social-democratic penetration of the working-class electorate and the trade-union world, and makes it possible to adopt a moderate ideological and political profile without excessive electoral cost.
(c)Moderation allows the social-democratic party to address the ‘centrist’ segment of the electorate, to extend its audience well beyond the working class, and to operate as a ‘legitimate’ political force with a governmental vocation, in a position to identify itself as the opposition and neutralize in advance the possibility of a ‘regime vote’. It allows it to conceive and implement ‘natural party of government’ strategies. In addition, it favours the establishment of neo-corporatist structures, one of whose essential foundations is precisely a culture of conciliation and respect for the opponent-partner – in short, a culture based on pragmatism.
(d)The institutionalization of social conflict through these structures enhances and strengthens the role of unions. This, in return, allows the latter to perform their role as ‘mass relays’ to the social-democratic party more effectively, to exercise greater influence within the party and thus, in these two ways, to strengthen the party’s role as the party of the class.
So, if we want to understand social democracy in the initial postwar period, we must first of all ask what structure and coherence it rested on, rather than how and to what end that structure was employed. It permitted various ideological and political trajectories, depending on the national context and the environment in which the social-democratic parties were operating. Everything suggests that social democracy’s continuity, its resilience over time, was not exclusively (or even primarily) based on ideological parti pris. Instead, it was founded on the continuity of a party, trade-union and electoral structure. Social democracy was the product of a mechanics of forces and a set of structures. Then, but only then, was it an ideology.1 The preeminence of this ‘mechanics’ reached a peak, and in part found its embodiment, in the practice of the social-democratic compromise – particularly in its most complete version, the neo-corporatist system. This system derived as much from a mechanics of structures, a logic of ‘power and counter-power’, as from a culture of moderation – a ‘psychology of intentions’, as Regis Debré would say. Postwar social democracy was postwar social democracy only because it integrated all these particular dimensions and planks, all these ‘links’ I have just mentioned, into a political totality possessed of coherence – a coherence that was practical, not necessarily logical.
Like any interpretation that refers to social democracy in the singular, this one conceives it as an abstract and coherent political entity, and hence somewhat unreal. The traits of this actor form a system – ideally, but not always actually – and are all more or less present in the national social-democratic parties, which are the only things with a ‘real’ historical existence. Now, this ‘more or less’ is of the utmost importance: it determines the ‘individuality’ of each national party, as well as its effectiveness (in politics, effectiveness is indirectly part of the identity of a political actor, since it influences the roles a party does or does not assume). If these elements are necessary for the maximum effectiveness of social democracy, it does not follow that some intrinsic requirement preserves their links with one another. Depending on the country, the socioeconomic context, the circumstances of competition, one or more of them comes under challenge. Thus, many are the parties that deviate, or have recently deviated, from this abstract description. To put it differently: the characteristic properties of social democracy thus defined are to be found in the national parties, but we cannot expect to find them all, in identical form, in every national party. Each ‘individual’ party draws on this collection of properties, which is not identical for any of them, yet not peculiar to each either. A party is a living part of its environment – a ‘party-part’2 whose specificity is largely related to this environment. In reality, there is no social democracy. Social democracy is a construction. There have been – there are – only social democracies.
Now, the presence of the maximum number of these distinctive features aids a better balance and greater effectiveness of the national social democracies on electoral and governmental levels, and in terms of legitimacy. Their absence leads to a destabilization of the social-democratic poles – and roles – in the political and party system.
Social-democratic parties must therefore do battle on several fronts to preserve their virtual monopoly on the left, their working-class influence, trade-union support; to remain a force with a governmental vocation; to implement the social-democratic tripartite compromise; to attract the middle classes. Like any self-respecting party, they must do battle to preserve or reinforce their political achievements, which are simply the result – the payout, as it were – of past battles. Now, the object and stake of this battle are not only political-electoral domination, but also the identity of social democracy. Like any partisan identity, social-democratic identity is in reality simply the product of battles won and battles lost. For, far from corresponding to a permanent state, it is changeable. Political identities are events, not ‘essences’.
Notes
1.Michel Winock, Le Socialisme en France et en Europe, Seuil, Paris 1992, pp. 111–12.
2.Pierre Avril, Essai sur les partis, Payot, Paris 1990, p. 20.