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WHEN CERTAIN persons, after I had secured rest from my labors, which for twenty years I had devoted to the instruction of youth, requested of me in a friendly manner to write something on the art of speaking, I certainly resisted their solicitations for a long time: I was not ignorant that authors of the greatest celebrity in both languages had bequeathed to posterity many treatises having reference to this subject, written
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with the greatest care.1 But by the very plea on which I thought that excuse for my refusal would be more readily admitted, my friends became still more urgent, “since” they said, “amid the various opinions of former writers, some of them contradicting each other, choice was difficult” They appeared, not unjustifiably, to press upon me the task, if not of inventing new precepts, at least of pronouncing judgment
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concerning the old. Although, however, it was not so much the confidence of accomplishing what was required of me, as the shame of refusing, that prevailed with me; yet, as the subject opened itself more widely, I voluntarily undertook a heavier duty than was laid upon me, not only that I might oblige my best friends by fuller compliance, but also that, while pursuing a common road, I might not tread merely in other men’s footsteps.
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Other authors who have committed to writing the art of oratory have in general commenced in such a manner, as if they were to put the finishing touches to those who were accomplished in every other kind of learning—whether from despising the branches of knowledge which we previously learn, as insignificant, or from supposing that they did not fall under
their province, the duties of the professions being distinct; or, what is more probable, from expecting no credit to their ability in treating of subjects, which, however necessary, are yet far removed from display: as the pinnacles of buildings
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are seen, while the foundations are hid. For myself, I consider that nothing is unnecessary to the art of oratory, without which it must be confessed that an orator cannot be formed, and that there is no possibility of arriving at the summit in any subject without previous initiatory efforts: therefore, I shall not shrink from stooping to those lesser matters, the neglect of which leaves no place for greater, and shall proceed to regulate the studies of the orator from his infancy, just as if he were entrusted to me to be brought up.
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This work, Marcellus Victorius, I dedicate to you, whom, as being most friendly to me, and animated with an extraordinary love of letters, I deemed most worthy of such a pledge of our mutual affection. Not, indeed, on these considerations alone, though these are of great weight, but also because my treatise seemed likely to be of use for the instruction of your son,2 whose early age shows his way clear to the full splendor of genius: a treatise which I have resolved to conduct, from the very cradle, as it were, of oratory, through all the studies which can at all assist the future
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speaker, to the summit of that art. This I designed because two books on the art of rhetoric were already in circulation under my name, though neither published by me nor composed for that object. After holding two days’ discourse with me, some youths, to whom that time was devoted, had caught up the first by heart; the other, which was learned indeed in a greater number of days (as far as they could learn by taking notes), some of my young pupils, of excellent disposition, but of too great fondness for me, had made known through the indiscreet
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honor of publication. In these present books, accordingly, there will be some things the same, many altered, very many added, but all better arranged, and rendered complete, as far as I shall be able.
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We are to form, then, the perfect orator, who cannot exist unless he is above all a good man. We require in him, therefore, not only consumate ability in speaking, but also every
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excellence of mind. For I cannot admit that the principles of moral and honorable conduct are, as some have thought, to be left to the philosophers. This is true because the man who can duly sustain his character as a citizen, who is qualified for the management of public and private affairs, and who can govern communities by his counsels, settle them by means of laws, and improve them by judicial enactments, can
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certainly be nothing else but an orator. Although I acknowledge, therefore, that I shall adopt some precepts which are contained in the writings of the philosophers, yet I shall maintain with justice and truth that they belong to my subject
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and have a peculiar relation to the art of oratory. If we constantly have occasion to speak of justice, fortitude, temperance, and other similar topics, so that a cause can scarcely be found in which some such discussion does not occur, and if all such subjects are to be illustrated by invention and elocution, can it be doubted that, wherever power of intellect and copiousness of language are required, the art of the orator is to be there pre-eminently exerted?
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These two accomplishments, as Cicero very plainly proves, were, as they are joined by nature, so also united in practice, so that the same persons were thought at once wise and eloquent. Subsequently, the study divided itself, and, through want of art, it came to pass that the arts were considered to be diverse 3; for, as soon as the tongue became an instrument
of gain, and it was made a practice to abuse the gifts of eloquence, those who were esteemed as eloquent abandoned the care of morals, which, when thus neglected, became, as it
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were, the prize of the less robust intellects. Some, disliking the toil of cultivating eloquence, afterward returned to the discipline of the mind and the establishment of rules of life, retaining themselves the better part, if it could be divided into two—but assuming, at the same time, the most presumptuous of titles, so as to be called the only cultivators of wisdom, a distinction which neither the most eminent commanders nor men who were engaged with the utmost distinction in the direction of the greatest affairs and in the management of whole commonwealths ever ventured to claim for themselves; for they preferred rather to practice excellence of conduct
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than to profess it. That many of the ancient professors of wisdom, indeed, both delivered virtuous precepts, and even lived as they directed others to live, I will readily admit; but, in our own times, the greatest vices have been hidden under this name in many of the professors. They did not strive by virtue and study to be esteemed philosophers, but adopted a peculiarity of look, austerity or demeanor, and a dress different from that of other men, as cloaks for the vilest immoralities.
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But those topics, which are claimed as peculiar to philosophy, we all discuss everywhere. For what person (if he be not an utterly corrupt character) does not sometimes speak of justice, equity, and goodness? Who, even among rustics, does not make some inquiries about the causes of the operations of nature? As to the proper use and distinction of words, it ought to be common to all who make their language an object
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of care. But it will be the orator who will understand and express those matters best, and if he should ever arrive at perfection, the precepts of virtue would not have to be sought from the schools of the philosophers. At present it is necessary to have recourse, at times, to those authors who have, as I said, adopted the deserted, but pre-eminently better, part of philosophy, and to reclaim, as it were, what is our own,
not that we may appropriate their discoveries, but that we may show them that they have usurped what belonged to others.
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Let the orator, therefore, be such a man as may be called truly wise, not blameless in morals only (for that, in my opinion, though some disagree with me, is not enough), but accomplished also in science, and in every qualification for
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speaking—a character such as, perhaps, no man ever was. But we are not the less, for that reason, to aim at perfection, for which most of the ancients strove; though they thought that no wise man had yet been found, they nevertheless laid down
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directions for gaining wisdom. For the perfection of eloquence is assuredly something, nor does the nature of the human mind forbid us to reach it; but if to reach it be not granted us, yet those who shall strive to gain the summit will make higher advances than those who, prematurely conceiving a despair of attaining the point at which they aim, shall at once sink down at the foot of the ascent.
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Indulgence will so much the more then be granted me, if I shall not pass over those lesser matters which are necessary to the work which I have undertaken. The first book, therefore, will contain those particulars which are antecedent to the duties of the teacher of rhetoric. In the second book we shall consider the first elements of instruction under the hands of the professor of rhetoric and the questions which are asked
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concerning the subject of rhetoric itself. The next five will be devoted to invention (for under this head will also be included arrangement); and the four following, to elocution, within the scope of which fall memory and pronunciation.4
One will be added, in which the orator himself will be completely formed by us, since we shall consider, as far as our weakness shall be able, what his morals ought to be, what should be his practice in undertaking, studying, and pleading causes, what should be his style of eloquence, what termination there should be to his pleading, and what may be his employments after its termination.
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Among all these discussions shall be introduced, as occasion shall require, the art of speaking, which will not only instruct students in the knowledge of those things to which alone some have given the name of art, and interpret (so to express myself) the law of rhetoric, but may serve to nourish the faculty of speech, and strengthen the power of eloquence;
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for, in general, those bare treatises on art,5 through too much affectation of subtlety, break and cut down whatever is noble in eloquence, drink up, as it were, all the blood of thought, and lay bare the bones, which, while they ought to exist and be united by their ligaments, ought still to be covered with
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flesh. We, therefore, have not, like most authors, included in our books that small part merely, but whatever we thought useful for the education of the orator, explaining every point with brevity; for if we should say on every particular as much as might be said, no end would be found to our work.
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It is to be stated, however, in the first place, that precepts and treatises on art are of no avail without the assistance of nature; and these instructions, therefore, are not written for him to whom talent is wanting, any more than treatises on agriculture, for barren ground.
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There are also certain other natural aids, such as power of voice, a constitution capable of labor, health, courage, and gracefulness—qualities which, if they fall to our lot in a moderate degree, may be improved by practice, but which are often so far wanting that their deficiency renders abortive the benefits of understanding and study. These very qualities, likewise, are of no profit in themselves without a skillful teacher, persevering study, and great and continued exercise in writing, reading, and speaking.
1 Quintilian refers here to the numerous Greek and Latin textbooks dealing with the technical aspects of rhetoric. Aristotle wrote a book on rhetoric; Cicero composed seven.
2 Geta.
3 The basic premise of the whole Institutio oratoria is laid out in this key passage, which discusses the difference between the merely eloquent man and the merely wise man. Neither, for Quintilian, is complete. As Quintilian notes here, Cicero (De oratore III. 19, 72) had blamed Socrates for divorcing eloquence from philosophy. The passage might be compared with a famous one by Cicero: “Wisdom without eloquence does too little for the good of states, but that eloquence without wisdom is generally highly disadvantageous and is never helpful” (De inventione I. 1. 1).
4 These are the five ancient elements or “parts” of rhetoric. Invention deals with the discovery of materials for the speech; arrangement treats the sequence or order of their appearance in the speech; elocution, or style, deals with matters of wording, including such factors as vocal rhythm and rhetorical figures and tropes; memory deals with both natural and artificial means of recall; pronunciation, or delivery, with such external aspects as gesture, facial expression, and control of the voice. Taken together they form a complete textbook on the subject as it was taught in Roman times.
5 Here Quintilian refers to the arid, highly schematized handbooks of rhetoric which were common in his day. Elsewhere (II. 13. 1–7) he derides writers who try to encompass the whole subject into “one short body of rules.” This is one of the many times that Quintilian urges the cultivation of artistic discretion, rather than the mere learning of rules.