INTRODUCTION
Modern warfare requires the application of both the science and the art of war. The science of war is in a constant state of change, driven by new technological developments which can radically change the nature of the battlefield. The art of war, on the other hand, involves the critical historical analysis of warfare. The military professional derives from this analysis the fundamental principles—their combinations and applications—which have produced success on the battlefields of history. The principles of war, thus derived, are therefore a part of the art rather than the science of war. They are neither immutable nor causal, and they do not provide a precise mathematical formula for success in battle. Their value lies in their utility as a frame of reference for analysis of strategic and tactical issues. For the strategist, the principles of war provide a set of military planning interrogatives—a set of questions that should be considered if military strategy is to best serve the national interest. For the tactician, these principles provide an operational framework for the military actions he has been trained to carry out. They are neither intended nor designed to be prescriptive; the principles of war, if understood and applied properly, should stimulate thought and enhance flexibility of action.
THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR
The United States Army published its first set of principles of war in a 1921 Army training regulation. These principles were in large measure drawn from the work of British Major General J. F. C. Fuller, who developed a set of principles of war during World War I to serve as guides for his own Army. In the ensuing years, these original principles of war adopted by our Army have undergone minor revisions and changes, but have essentially stood the test of analysis, experimentation, and practice. For the United States Army today, the Principles of War are:
Objective
Offensive
Mass
Economy of Force
Maneuver
Unity of Command
Security
Surprise
Simplicity
1. Objective. Every military operation should be directed towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
As a derivative of the political aim, the strategic military objective of a nation at war must be to apply whatever degree of force is necessary to allow attainment of the political purpose or aim for which the war is being fought. When the political end desired is the total defeat of the adversary, then the strategic military objective will most likely be the defeat of the enemy’s armed forces and the destruction of his will to resist. It is essential, however, that the political purpose be clearly defined and attainable by the considered application of the various elements of the nation’s power. Not until the political purpose has been determined and defined by the President and the Congress can strategic and tactical objectives be clearly identified and developed. Once developed, the strategic objectives must constantly be subjected to rigorous analysis and review to insure that they continue to reflect accurately not only the ultimate political end desired, but also any political constraints imposed on the application of military force.
Just as the strategic military objective focuses on the political ends, so must tactical military operations be directed toward clearly defined, decisive, and attainable tactical objectives that ultimately assist in achieving the strategic aims. Similarly, intermediate tactical objectives must quickly and economically contribute, directly or indirectly, to the purpose of the ultimate objective. The selection of objectives is based on consideration of the overall mission of the command, the commander’s assigned mission, the means available, and the military characteristics of the operational area. Every commander must clearly understand the overall mission of the higher command, his own mission, and the tasks he must perform and the reasons therefore; he must consider each contemplated action in light of his mission, and he must communicate clearly to his subordinate commanders the intent of the operation upon which the command as a whole is about to embark.
2. Offensive. Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
While the principle of the objective requires that all efforts be directed toward a clearly defined “common goal,” the principle of offensive suggests that offensive action, or maintenance of the initiative, is the most effective and decisive way to pursue and attain that “common goal.” This is fundamentally true in both the strategic and tactical sense. While it may sometimes be necessary to adopt a defensive posture, this should be only a temporary condition until the necessary means are available to resume offensive operations. An offensive spirit must be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations—it must be an active defense, not a passive one. This is so because offensive action, whatever form it takes, is the means by which the nation or a military force captures and holds the initiative, achieves results, and maintains freedom of action. It permits the political leader or the military commander to capitalize on the initiative, impose his will on the enemy, set the terms and select the place of confrontation or battle, exploit weaknesses and react to rapidly changing situations and unexpected developments. No matter what the level, strategic or tactical, the side that retains the initiative through offensive action forces the foe to react rather than act.
3. Mass. Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.
In the strategic context, this principle suggests that the nation should commit, or be prepared to commit, a predominance of national power to those regions or areas of the world where the threat to vital security interests is greatest. For nations such as the United States, which have global security interests in terms of politico-military alliances and commitments and resource dependencies, the accurate and timely determination of where the threat to vital national interests is greatest is becoming increasingly more difficult. In today’s volatile world, the nature and source of threat often change in dramatic fashion. It is therefore incumbent upon military strategists to anticipate the most likely areas of concern and develop suitable contingency plans. Since every possible contingency or trouble spot cannot be anticipated, much less planned for, it is absolutely essential for Army planners and Army forces to retain flexibility of thought and action.
In the tactical dimension, this principle suggests that superior combat power must be concentrated at the decisive place and time in order to achieve decisive results. This superiority results from the proper combination of the elements of combat power at a place and time, and in a manner of the commander’s choosing, in order to retain the initiative. The massing of forces, together with the proper application of other principles of war, may enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive battle outcomes.
4. Economy of Force. Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
As a reciprocal of the principle of mass, economy of force in the strategic dimension suggests that, in the absence of unlimited resources, a nation may have to accept some risk in areas where vital national interests are not immediately at stake. This means that if the nation must focus predominant power toward a clearly defined primary threat, it cannot allow attainment of that objective to be compromised by unnecessary diversions to areas of lower priority. This involves risk, requires astute strategic planning and judgment by political and military leaders, and again places a premium on the need for flexibility of thought and action.
At the tactical level, the principle of economy of force requires that minimum means be employed in areas other than where the main effort is intended to be employed. It requires, as at the strategic level, the acceptance of prudent risks in selected areas in order to achieve superiority in the area where decision is sought. Economy of force missions may require the forces employed to attack, defend, delay, or conduct deception operations.
5. Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
In the strategic sense, this principle has three interrelated dimensions: flexibility, mobility, and maneuverability. The first of these involves the need for flexibility in thought, plans, and operations. Such flexibility enhances the ability to rapidly react to unforeseen circumstances. Given the global nature of U.S. interests and the dynamic character of the international scene, such flexibility is crucial. The second dimension involves strategic mobility, which is especially critical for an insular power such as the United States. In order to react promptly and concentrate and project power on the primary objective, strategic airlift and sealift are essential. The final strategy dimension involves maneuverability within the theater of operations so as to focus maximum strength against the enemy’s weakest point and thereby gain the strategic advantage.
In the tactical sense, maneuver is an essential element of combat power. It contributes significantly to sustaining the initiative, to exploiting success, to preserving freedom of action, and to reducing vulnerability. The object of maneuver is to concentrate or disperse forces in a manner designed to place the enemy at a disadvantage, thus achieving results that would otherwise be most costly in men and materiel. At all levels, successful application of this principle requires not only fire and movement, but also flexibility of thought, plans, and operations, and the considered application of the principles of mass and economy of force.
6. Unity of Command. For every objective, there should be unity of effort under one responsible commander.
This principle insures that all efforts are focused on a common goal. At the strategic level, this common goal equates to the political purpose of the United States, and the broad strategic objectives which flow therefrom. It is the common goal which, at the national level, determines the military forces necessary for its achievement. The coordination of these forces requires unity of effort. At the national level, the Constitution provides for unity of command by appointing the President as the Commander in Chief of the Armed forces. The President is assisted in this role by the national security organization, which includes the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the highest level, and the unified and specified commands and joint task forces at the operational levels.
In the tactical dimension, it is axiomatic that the employment of military forces in a manner that develops their full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command means directing and coordinating the action of all forces toward a common goal or objective. Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved by vesting a single tactical commander with the requisite authority to direct and coordinate all forces employed in pursuit of a common goal.
7. Security. Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.
Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. At the strategic level, security requires that active and passive measures be taken to protect the United States and its Armed Forces against espionage, subversion, and strategic intelligence collection. However, implementation of such security measures must be balanced against the need to prevent them from severing the link between the American public and its Army. In addition, they should not be allowed to interfere with flexibility of thought and action, since rigidity and dogmatism increase vulnerability to enemy surprise. In this regard, thorough knowledge and understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine, and detailed strategic staff planning can improve security and reduce vulnerability to surprise.
At the tactical level, security is essential to the protection and husbanding of combat power. Security results from the measures taken by a command to protect itself from surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, sabotage, or annoyance. Security may be achieved through the establishment and maintenance of protective measures against hostile acts or influence; or it may be assured by deception operations designed to confuse and dissipate enemy attempts to interfere with the force being secured. Risk is an inherent condition in war; application of the principle of security does not suggest overcautiousness or the avoidance of calculated risk.
8. Surprise. Strike the enemy at a time and/or place and in a manner for which he is unprepared.
To a large degree, the principle of surprise is the reciprocal of the principle of security. Concealing one’s own capabilities and intentions creates the opportunity to strike the enemy unaware or unprepared. However, strategic surprise is difficult to achieve. Rapid advances in strategic surveillance technology make it increasingly more difficult to mask or cloak the large scale marshaling or movement of manpower and equipment. This problem is compounded in an open society such as the United States, where freedom of press and information are highly valued. However, the United States can achieve a degree of psychological surprise due to its strategic deployment capability. The rapid deployment of U.S. combat forces into a crisis area can forestall, or upset, the plans and preparations of an enemy. This capability can give the United States the advantage in both a physical and psychological sense by denying the enemy the initiative.
Surprise is important in the tactical dimension for it can decisively affect the outcome of battle. With surprise, success out of proportion to the effort expended may be obtained. Surprise results from going against an enemy at a time and/or place, or in a manner, for which he is unprepared. It is not essential that the enemy be taken unaware, but only that he become aware too late to react effectively. Factors contributing to surprise include speed and alacrity, employment of unexpected forces, effective intelligence, deception operations of all kinds, variations of tactics and methods of operation, and operations security.
9. Simplicity. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to insure thorough understanding.
In both the strategic and tactical dimension, guidance, plans, and orders should be as simple and direct as the attainment of the objective will allow. The strategic importance of the principle of simplicity goes well beyond its more traditional tactical application: it is an important element in the development and enhancement of public support. If the American people are to commit their lives and resources to a military operation, they must understand the purpose which is to be achieved. Political and military objectives and operations must therefore be presented in clear, concise, understandable terms: simple and direct plans and orders cannot compensate for ambiguous and cloudy objectives. In its military application, this principle promotes strategic flexibility by encouraging broad strategic guidance rather than detailed and involved instruction.
At the tactical level, simplicity of plans and instructions contributes to successful operations. Direct, simple plans, and clear, concise orders are essential to reduce the chances for misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors being equal, the simplest plan executed promptly is to be preferred over the complex plan executed later.
APPLICATION
While any set of principles of war adopted by a nation has application across the entire spectrum of warfare, it must be understood that these principles are interdependent and interrelated. No single principle can be blindly adhered to, or observed, to the exclusion of the others; none can assure victory in battle without reinforcement from one or more of the others. Indeed, the military forces of each nation conduct operations on the basis of operational concepts which are derived from combinations of principles. For example, an operational concept deriving from a combination of offense, mass, surprise, and maneuver might suggest a large military force, using masses of swiftly moving armored forces, whose dominant mode of operation is to overwhelm, disrupt, and destroy, using surprise and maneuver to assist in the execution.
Although the most common application of the principles of war is in the form of operational concepts on the field of battle, the principles can also be useful integrated into the military estimate and decision process as an aid to judgment and analysis. The principles of objective and unity of command, for example, can assist in mission analysis both at the strategic and tactical level. They are also valuable aids in determining the purpose and direction of effort. In a like manner, the principle of simplicity can serve as a measure for the formulation of tasks. The principles of offense, mass, economy of force, maneuver, security, and surprise can assist in the analysis of the situation as well as in the formulation of courses of action. Again, simplicity can serve as the measure against which the courses of action can be compared.
Planning. Planning is essential to the operation of the Army both in preparing for war and in the conduct of war itself. Planning is both an art and a science. As a science it deals with the specifics of manpower, arms, equipment, and monies, both actual and projected. However, since the future cannot be accurately predicted nor the rate of change held constant, planning is also an art. As such, it deals in intangibles; as a distillation of military art, the principles of war are particularly valuable as an aid to planning.
Force Planning, as part of the planning, programing, and budgeting system, is an integral part of preparation for war. Such planning deals primarily with fixed values, physical quantities, and unilateral action; with the mechanics of force structuring and force manning; and with the research, development, and acquisition of arms and equipment. While thus primarily concerned with the science of war, force planning also involves an appreciation of the art of war. Using the principles of war as a frame of reference, the force planner can better appreciate the potential utility of the designed force on the field of battle.
Contingency planning is the closest approximation among all planning forms to the conduct of actual war. It deals primarily with variable quantities, intangible forces and effects, and a continual interaction of opposites. While also concerned with the science of war, primarily the characteristics of weapons and the means for maneuvering, supplying, and controlling military forces, contingency planning draws more closely on the art of war. Like the principles of war, contingency plans are not absolutes, but are designed to identify the right things to do and assist in doing things right. Application of the principles of war to the contingency planning process insures practicality and simplicity and provides a direct link to actual execution on the battlefield.
* Chapter 3, Field Manual 100-1, The Army, 14 August 1981 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1981).