Appleman, Roy H. U.S. Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1960. Official U.S. Army history of the Korean war from the beginning to the Chinese intervention in November 1950. (Note that the volume covering this intervention [Ebb and Flow] still has not been published 30 years later.)
Arnold, Hugh M. “Official Justifications for America’s Role in Indochina, 1949-67.” Asian Affairs, September/October 1975. A useful compendium of official U.S. justifications of the Vietnam war.
Baldwin, Hanson W. Strategy for Tomorrow. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. Somewhat dated but the first chapters provide insights into the relations between the President and his military advisors during the critical early days of the Vietnam war.
BDM Corporation. A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: 1979. Volume I: The Enemy, Volume II: South Vietnam, Volume III: US Foreign Policy and Vietnam 1945-1975, Volume IV: US Domestic Factors Influencing Vietnam War Policy Making, Volume V: Planning the War, Volume VI: Conduct of the War, Volume VII: The Soldier, Volume VIII: Results of the War, and an Omnibus Executive Summary. This multi-volume work of more than 3500 pages gathers together under topical headings not only the literature on the Vietnam war but also discussions with many of the senior civilian and military decision-makers of the Vietnam era. Copies have been provided to the Army, Navy, and Air War Colleges, the National Defense University, the Army and Marine Command and Staff Colleges, and the U.S. Military Academy as an aid to Vietnam war researchers.
Bell, Coral. “The Asian Balance of Power: A Comparison with European Precedents.” Adelphi Papers No. 44. London, England: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 1968. Somewhat dated because of the change in Sino-U.S. relations, this analysis still provides insights into the critical differences between European and Asian security issues.
Bell, J. Bowyer. The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971. One of the first challenges to the counterinsurgency fad, it exposes how guerrilla war was transformed into “revolutionary war.”
Betts, Richard K. Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Scholars. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977. Best analysis of role of JCS in Vietnam decisionmaking.
Bidwell, Shelford. Modern Warfare: A Study of Men, Weapons, and Theories. London, England: Allen Lane, 1973. A study of modern warfare by the editor of RUSI.
Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War. New York: The Free Press, 1973. A source book on the causes of war that debunks current simplistic notions and illuminates the interrelationship between war and peace.
Blaufarb, Douglas S. The Counter Insurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present. New York: The Free Press, 1977. The best single source analysis of the birth, life, and death of the counter-insurgency dogma.
Braestrup, Peter. The Big Story: How the American Press and TV Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 68 in Vietnam and Washington. (Two volumes) Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1973. The landmark work on American media reporting on the Tet Offensive of 1968.
Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics. New York: MacMillan, 1973. A seminal work on U.S. civil-military relations by one of America’s foremost strategists.
Bundy, McGeorge. “Vietnam, Watergate and Presidential Powers.” Foreign Affairs. Winter 1979-1980. Analysis of why the U.S. failed to intervene in 1975 when North Vietnam flagrantly violated the 1973 “peace” accords by a former presidential national security advisor.
Byely, B., Colonel, Soviet Army, et al. Marxism-Leninism on War and Army (A Soviet View). Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1972. Although turgid almost to the point of obscurity because of Marxist-Leninist jargon, the final chapter contains insights into the Soviet use of “the laws of military science and the principles of military art.”
Clausewitz. See Von Clausewitz.
Cohen, Eliot. “Systems Paralysis.” The American Spectator, November 1980, pp. 23-27. A critical examination of the effects of systems analysis on strategic planning.
Collins, John M., Colonel, USA. Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1973. A source book on grand strategy by a former member of the National War College faculty.
——, “Vietnam Postmortem: A Senseless Strategy,” Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College, Vol. VIII No. 1. An analysis of our Vietnam strategy in terms of failure to properly apply counterinsurgency doctrine.
Cooke, James E., ed. The Federalist. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1961. The Founding Fathers’ own commentary on the reasoning behind our Constitution.
De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy In America. New York: New American Library, 1956. An analysis of the American character made in the 1830s that still provides insights into the way we think and the way we act.
Don, Tran Van. Our Endless War. San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1978. A look at coalition warfare from the Vietnamese perspective by the former RVN Minister of Defense.
Dung, Van Tien, Senior General NVA. “Great Spring Victory.” Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Volume I, FBIS-APA-76-110 7 June 1976; Volume II, FBIS-APA-76-131 7 July 1976). Remarkably readable and straightforward account of the 1975 North Vietnamese offensive that conquered South Vietnam by the NVA’s field army commander.
Dunn, Joe P. “In Search of Lessons: The Development of a Vietnam Historiography.” Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College. December 1979.
Eagleton, Thomas F., Senator. War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of Congressional Surrender. New York: Liveright, 1974. An attack on the War Powers Resolution as a weakening of Constitutional principles.
Enthoven, Alain C., and Smith, K. Wayne. How Much Is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. The definitive work on the impact of systems analysis on the Department of Defense during the McNamara era.
Erfurth, Waldemar, Gen., German Army. Surprise [Die Ueberraschung im Krieg (Berlin, 1938)] (translated by Dr. Stefan T. Possony and Daniel Vilfroy), Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Co., 1943. Primary work on the principle of surprise.
Etzold, Thomas H., and Gaddis, John Lewis. Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.
Fehrenbach, T. R. This Kind of War. New York: MacMillan, 1963. The best book written on the Korean war, it discusses the conduct of the war at every level from Washington to the front-line soldier and provides insights and perspective on leadership, training, morale, and combat operations.
FitzGerald, Frances. Fire In The Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown & Co., 1972. By her own admission “not a scholarly work,” this shallow analysis pandered to the prejudices of the anti-war movement in the early 1970s. Useful now primarily as a litmus test for discussions of the Vietnam war, it cries out for a sequel on those who have fled the society that this book extols. For a scholarly analysis of Vietnamese society see John T. McAlister, Jr. and Paul Mus’s The Vietnamese and Their Revolution. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
Foch, Ferdinand, Marshal of France. The Principles of War (translated by Hilaire Belloc). London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1918. A French analysis of the principles of war, including Foch’s four principles–Economy of Force, Freedom of Action, Free Disposal of Forces, and Security.
Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command. New York: Scribners, 1942. The classic study of Southern leadership during the American Civil War.
Fuller, J. F. C., Colonel, D.S.O. The Foundations of the Science of War. London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1925. A British analysis of the principles of war by one of the world’s foremost military theorists.
Gabriel, Richard and Savage, Paul. Crisis in Command. New York: Hill and Wang, 1978. A somewhat overdrawn but widely quoted critique of the Vietnam war emphasizing our overreliance on management at the expense of leadership.
Gelb, Leslie H., and Betts, Richard K. The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979. An examination of the Washington bureaucracy emphasizing that the “system” accomplished all that it was asked to do and by inference highlighting the need for leadership to set bureaucratic goals.
Gittings, John. The Role of the Chinese Army. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Although now dated, a useful work on the PLA.
Haass, Richard. “Congressional Power: Implications for American Security Policy.” Adelphi Papers No. 153. London, England: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979. An excellent analysis on the role of Congress in American national security matters by a former Congressional staffer.
Hannah, Norman B. “Vietnam Now We Know.” All Quiet On The Eastern Front (edited by Anthony T. Bouscaren). New York: Devin-Adair, 1977. A succinct critical strategic analysis of the Vietnam war by a former State Department foreign service officer with long experience in Southeast Asia.
Harrison, Selig S. The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy. New York: The Free Press, 1978.
Hart, Liddell. Thoughts on War. London, England: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1943. An analysis of the principles of war by a renowned British strategist.
Heiser, Joseph M., Lt. Gen., USA. Vietnam Studies: Logistic Support. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1974. An analysis of Vietnam logistics problems by the former commander of the 1st Logistical Command, Vietnam.
Herr, Michael. Dispatches. New York: Avon Books, 1978. A scatological and irreverent account of the Vietnam war that contains some of the best and most insightful writing on the war. His description of the 1st Cavalry Division moving to the relief of Khe Sanh, for example, captures in less than a page the Army at its best–as a kind of inexorable force that sweeps all before it.
Herrington, Stuart A., LTC, USA. Peace with Honor? An American Reports on Vietnam, 1973-1975. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983. A firsthand account of the evacuation of Saigon by the last American soldier to leave Vietnam.
Honey, P. J. Communism in North Vietnam: Its Role in the Sino-Soviet Dispute. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1963. An early account of North Vietnam’s objectives in Indo-China.
Hoopes, Townsend. The Limits of Intervention. New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1969. An account of Washington decision-making in late 1967 and early 1968 by a former Under Secretary of the Air Force in the Johnson Administration.
Hosmer, Stephen T., et al. The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders. Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, December 1978. A summary of oral and written statements by 27 former high-ranking South Vietnamese military officers and civilians on their perceptions of the causes of the collapse of South Vietnam.
Howard, Michael. “The Relevance of Traditional Strategy.” Foreign Affairs, January 1973. An important article by a distinguished British strategist emphasizing the importance of conventional forces both in their own right and as legitimizers of the nuclear deterrent. Coinciding as it did with the Army’s reevaluation of its role in national security it had a major impact on strategic thinking.
——. “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy.” Foreign Affairs. August 1979. An emphasis on the logistical, social, and technological dimensions of strategy as essential complements to the operational dimension.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belkap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967. The landmark work on U.S. civil-military relationships.
Javits, Jacob K., Senator. Who Makes War: The President vs. Congress. New York: Morrow, 1973. A detailed analysis of the conflict between the Legislative and Executive branches on the question of war powers by one of the framers of the War Powers Resolution.
Jessup, John E., Jr. and Coakley, Robert W. A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History. Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1979. A collection of articles on the nature and use of military history as well as a series of bibliographic guides.
Johnson, Chalmers. Autopsy on People’s War. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1973. An important critical analysis of “People’s War” by a distinguished Asian scholar.
Johnson, Lyndon Baines. The Vantage Point: Perspective of the Presidency 1963-1969. New York: Popular Library Edition, 1971. An autobiographical account of the Johnson Administration.
Just, Ward. Military Men. New York: Knopf, 1970. An examination of the U.S. Army circa 1970.
Kalb, Marvin and Abel, Elie. The Roots of Involvement: The US and Asia 1784-1971. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1971. An account of our Vietnam involvement by two distinguished Washington journalists that is most useful in its analysis of decision-making at the national level.
Kautsky, John H. “Myth, Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, and Symbolic Reassurance in the East-West Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume IX, No. 1, March 1965. An important article that illuminates some of the causes of confusion in dealing with the Communist bloc.
Kearns, Doris. Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream. New York: Harper & Row, 1976. A biography drawn in part from personal interviews with President Johnson.
Kestor, John J. and Holloway, James L., III. “The Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Better System?” AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, Volume II, No. 1. An examination of the JCS system by a former Chief of Naval Operations and a former Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.
Kinnard, Douglas. The War Managers. Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1977. Results of a survey of more than 100 Army generals who had commanded in Vietnam.
Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston, Massachusetts: Brown & Co., 1979. The memoirs of the former National Security Advisor to President Nixon and Secretary of State in the Nixon and Ford Administrations covering the period 1969-1973. The introductory chapters on the workings of the Washington bureaucracy are alone worth the price of the book.
Komer, R. W. Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on US-GVN Performance in Vietnam. Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, August 1972. A landmark analysis of how bureaucratic form tends to shape and inhibit operational substance.
Kriete, Charles F., Chaplain (Colonel), USA. “The Moral Dimension of Strategy.” Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College, Volume VII, No. 2, 1977.
Lung, Hoang Ngoc, Colonel, ARVN. Strategy and Tactics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980. An analysis of Vietnam war strategy by the former J-2, Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
Luttwak, Edward N. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. Analysis of Roman strategy with disturbing parallels with NATO strategy today.
——. “The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance.” Survival, March/April 1979. A warning about the dangers of an attrition strategy against a numerically superior adversary.
——. “On the Meaning of Strategy … For the United States in the 1980s.” National Security In The 1980s: From Weakness to Strength [W. Scott Thompson (ed.)]. San Francisco, California: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980. A critical look at military strategy today.
MacArthur, Douglas A., Gen., USA. Annual Report of the Chief of Staff for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1935. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1935. MacArthur told B. H. Liddell Hart that this report was prepared “as a doctrinal statement for study by officers of the American Army and as an educational document.”
MacDonald, Charles B. An Outline History of U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, April 1978.
Meyer, Edward C., Gen., USA. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. White Paper 1980, A Framework for Molding the Army of the 1980s into a Disciplined, Well-Trained Fighting Force. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 25 February 1980.
Momyer, William W., Gen., USAF, Retired. Air Power in Three Wars. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1978. An account of the air war in Vietnam by the former commander of the 7th Air Force and later commander of the Tactical Air Command.
O’Meara, Andrew P., Jr., Major, USA. Infrastructure and the Marxist Power Seizure: An Analysis of the Communist Models of Revolution. New York: Vantage Press, Inc., 1973. An analysis of the “explosive” and “implosive” models of revolution together with a critical examination of the Viet Cong organization and structure.
O’Neill, Robert J. General Giap: Politician and Strategist. New York: Praeger, 1969. An even-handed biography of the commander in chief of the North Vietnamese Army.
Osgood, Robert Endicott. Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1957. A seminal work on limited war theory.
——. Limited War Revisited. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979. A post-Vietnam reexamination of limited war theory.
Palit, D. K., Lt. Col., 9th Gurkha Rifles. The Essentials of Military Knowledge. Aldershot, England: Gale and Polden Limited, 1953. An excellent handbook on military strategy.
Palmer, Dave Richard, Brig. Gen., USA. Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective. San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1978. The best single volume source on the conduct of the Vietnam war.
——. The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War for America 1775-1783. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975. An account of General George Washington as strategist.
Palmer, Gregory. The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon, 1960-1968. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978. The most lucid account to date of the impact of PPBS on military strategy.
Phillips, Thomas R., Major U.S. Army. Roots of Strategy. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1940. A collection of the works of Sun Tzu, Vegetius, De Saxe, Frederick the Great, and the military maxims of Napoleon.
Podhoretz, Norman. “The Present Danger.” Commentary, March 1980. Although primarily concerned with America’s present and future, the analysis of the evolution of containment theory is particularly valuable.
Ridgway, Matthew B., Gen., USA. The Korean War. New York: Double-day & Co., Inc., 1967. An autobiography of the former Eighth Army commander and former Army Chief of Staff with emphasis on the Korean war but also some observations on limited war.
——. Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956. General Ridgway’s observations on the responsibility of the Chief of Staff to the President and analysis of why the U.S. did not intervene in Indochina in 1954.
Sawyer, Robert K., Major, USA. Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1962.
Schandler, Herbert Y., Colonel, USA. The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977. A critical analysis of Washington decision-making after Tet 1968 based on both the official record and private interviews with the late General Earle Wheeler, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
——. “America and Vietnam: The Failure of Strategy” in Regular Armies and Insurgency (ed. by Ronald Haycock). London, England: Croom Helm, Ltc., 1979. An excellent analysis of our failure to set political objectives for the Vietnam war.
Sharpe, U. S. G., Admiral, USN and Westmoreland, William C., Gen., USA. Report on the War in Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1968. A report on the Vietnam war for the period June 1964-July 1968 by CINCPAC and COMUSMACV.
Skirdo, M. P., Colonel, Soviet Army. The People, The Army, The Commander. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1970. A Soviet view of the political, economic, and moral factors of national power.
Summers, Harry G., Jr., Colonel, USA. “Army Strategy Today: Control War, Keep Peace.” Army. October 1978. An analysis of Army strategy in the post-Vietnam period.
——. “Politics and Culture of Southeast Asia.” Military Review. June 1970.
——. “What Did You Do In Vietnam, Grandpa?” Army. November 1978. A survey of changing American attitudes toward the Vietnam war.
Taylor, Maxwell D., Gen., USA. Swords & Plowshares. New York: Norton, 1972. The autobiography of the former Army Chief of Staff, Special Advisor to the President, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Ambassador to South Vietnam.
——. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. An attack on the strategy of massive retaliation and the source of the strategy of flexible response.
Thomas, James A. Holy War. New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1973. An analysis of ideological factors in American public perceptions of war.
Thompson, Sir Robert. Revolutionary War in World Strategy 1945-1969. New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1970. One of the primary source books on counterinsurgency by the former British commander in Malaya.
Thompson, W. Scott and Frizzell, Donaldson D., eds. The Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1977. Excerpts from a 1973-1974 colloquium on the Vietnam war at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy which included 31 distinguished military and civilian panelists.
Upton, Emory, Brevet Maj. Gen., USA. The Military Policy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1917. A source book on the U.S. Army.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. The War Powers Resolution. 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1975.
——. Senate. Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations. Military Situation in the Far East. 82nd Cong. 1st Sess. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1951. The so-called “Great Debate” on the Korean war which included testimony by Sec. of State Acheson, Sec. of Def. Marshall and Generals of the Army Bradley and MacArthur.
——. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Termination of Middle East and Southeast Asia Resolution. 91st Cong. 2nd Sess. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1970.
U.S. Dept. of the Army. Field Manual 100-1: The Army. Washington, D.C.: August 1981.
——. Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations: Operations. Washington, D.C.: August 1949.
——. Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations: Operations. Washington, D.C.: September 1954.
——. Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations: Operations. Washington, D.C.: February 1962.
——. Field Manual 100-5: Operations of Army Forces in the Field. Washington, D.C.: September 1968.
——. Field Manual 100-5: Operations. Washington, D.C.: July 1976.
U.S. Government Manual, 1979-1980. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1979.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub. I: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, D.C.: 1979.
U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations: Operations. Washington, D.C.: June 1944.
——. Field Manual 100-5: Tentative Field Service Regulations: Operations. Washington, D.C.: October 1939.
Vien, Cao Van, General, ARVN. “The Strategy of Isolation.” Military Review. April 1972. A recommendation for isolating the Vietnam battlefield by a senior Vietnamese commander.
—— and Khuyen, Dong Van, Lt. Gen., ARVN. Reflections on the Vietnam War. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980.
Von Caemmerer, Lt. Gen., German Army. The Development of Strategical Science (authorized translation by Karl Von Donat). London, England: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1905. An analysis of 19th century military thinkers including Jomini, Clausewitz, Moltke, Willisen and Archduke Charles of Austria.
von Clausewitz, Carl. On War (edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret with introductory essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard and Bernard Brodie and a commentary by Bernard Brodie). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976. The basic theoretical work on war in a masterful new translation. Not only is the language more readable, the essays by Paret, Howard and Brodie, as well as Brodie’s reader’s guide, turn this classic into an understandable and usable guide to modern strategy.
von der Goltz, Colmar, Baron. (Lt. Gen., German Army) The Conduct of War: A Brief Study of its Most Important Principles and Forms (translated by 1st Lt. Joseph T. Dickman, 3rd Cavalry, Asst. Instructor in the Art of War, U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School). Kansas City, Missouri: The Franklin Hudson Publishing Co., 1896. A treatise on war particularly useful for its examination of offense and defense in both their strategic and tactical dimensions.
——. The Nation In Arms: A Treatise on Modern Military Systems and the Conduct of War (translated by Philip A. Ashworth). London, England: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1906.
Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy. New York: MacMillan, 1973. The source book on the evolution of U.S. military strategy.
Westmoreland, William C., Gen., USA. A Soldier Reports. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1976. General Westmoreland’s autobiographical account of his service as COMUSMACV and Chief of Staff U.S. Army.
Weyand, Fred C., Gen., USA. “Serving the People: The Basic Case for the United States Army.” CDRS CALL. May/June 1976. An analysis of the relationship between the Army and the American people.
—— and Summers, Harry G., Jr., Colonel, USA. “Serving the People: The Need for Military Power.” Military Review. December 1976. An analysis of how military power serves U.S. national interests.
——. “Vietnam Myths and American Realities.” CDRS CALL. July/August 1976.
Whiting, Allen S. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence-India and Indo-China. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1975.
Willoughby, Charles Andrew, Lt. Col., USA. Maneuver In War. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Co., 1939. An outstanding work on maneuver that derives a maneuver theory through analysis of the principles of war. This book also contains the text of War Department Training Regulations 10-5, 23 December 1921, the first official codification of the principles of war.
Wolfe, Tom. Mauve Gloves and Madmen, Clutter and Vine. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1976. Although it might not seem so from the title, this is an important book on American social attitudes by one of America’s more observant commentators.