1859
It is a mark of the influence of John Stuart Mill that many of his ideas are accepted, at least in theory, in most modern democracies. Today, the need to protect individual liberty against the dominance of society at large is part of the general consensus, as are equal rights for women and universal education. But when On Liberty was written in the mid-19th century, Mill’s proposals were deeply controversial, and the book itself was seen as a radical, even dangerous tract.
On Liberty is a short work of fewer than 50,000 words, divided into five chapters. The first chapter sets out the basic principle that lies behind the whole book, that there can be no justification for society to interfere with the freedom of action of any individual, except where that freedom causes harm to someone else. This is followed by three chapters that deal with liberty of thought and discussion, individuality as one of the elements of well-being, and the limits that should be set to the authority of society over the individual. A final section looks at practical ways in which Mill’s ideas can be applied in society. On Liberty became the most widely read defence of individual freedom in the English-speaking world, and it remains a template for the maintenance of human and civil rights in a free society.
In his Introduction, Mill takes a historical perspective on the concept of liberty, starting with the Ancient Greeks and Romans, and concluding with the English parliamentary system of his own day. His theory is that as society tends to progress over time, ultimately attaining a level of representative democracy, so liberty in the past generally meant the protection of society from over-powerful individuals.
Modern society, he suggests, reverses the problem: it is the individual that is threatened by the possibility that a democratic majority might force its will on a minority. Mill declares that this is likely to be ‘the vital question of the future’. Three distinct forms of liberty need to be jealously guarded – freedom of thought, freedom of action and freedom to join together with other like-minded individuals. Unless these three freedoms are preserved, Mill says, society itself can become the tyrant – ‘a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression’.
The simple principle on which the book is based is described overleaf:
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
ON LIBERTY, INTRODUCTION, 1859
In the second chapter, Mill defends the idea of freedom of speech: the censorship of any opinion, however repugnant, he says, is morally wrong – much the same point of view as Voltaire expressed nearly a century earlier, when he reputedly said: ‘I disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.’ Mill suggests that dissent and argument are the only way to prevent truth from being confused with prejudice and dogma. ‘Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it,’ he says. It is in the interests of society, in short, to defend the right of unpopular people to hold unpopular views.
In the third chapter, Mill concedes that there have to be more limits on actions than on thought and opinions: you may hold unpopular views, but still not be permitted to put them into effect. One route towards progress in society, he suggests, is through experimentation with different and possibly unpopular ways of living, but actions that damage the interests of other people may be forbidden by law, and those that may be hurtful to other people, without actually violating their rights, may be punished by society at large.
The fourth chapter considers the exceptions – the areas in which society can legitimately limit the freedom of the individual. If people expect to be protected by society, they have to accept the responsibility to protect each other from harm. Society, in fact, must be able to put a stop to behaviour that harms other people. This, the so-called principle of harm, marks the limit of legitimate state power.
In the fifth and final chapter, Mill sums up his argument: individuals can do what they like as long as their actions affect no one but themselves, and society has the right and duty to prevent or punish action that causes harm. He also looks at the implications of these general principles – that women, for instance, should enjoy the same rights as men, and that children should enjoy a universal right to education. In an age of what Mill called ‘the almost despotic power of husbands over wives’ and the ‘absolute and exclusive control’ allowed to a father over his children, these were bold and controversial suggestions.
As a Member of Parliament from 1865 to 1868, Mill was able in more practical terms to espouse many liberal causes, including opposition to English repression in Ireland. He was the first MP to demand votes for women, and in 1869 he published The Subjection of Women, specifically aimed at setting out the case for giving women equal political rights.
Elements in the political establishment were already moving towards some of the policies that Mill encouraged, but it was a slow process. Compulsory education, for instance, was introduced in Britain in 1888, but it was 1928 before women in Britain were granted the vote on the same terms as men. (In the United States, national women’s suffrage was granted in 1920.) The real influence of On Liberty was not so much on particular political issues as on the general tenor of political debate.
Some more recent critics have questioned Mill’s commitment to liberalism, suggesting that he was interested only in defending liberty for intellectuals or ‘persons of decided mental superiority’ by protecting them against the mass of the people. But at the time On Liberty appeared there was general acceptance that Mill was propounding and codifying political ideas that would extend individual rights across society. Many of these had already been expressed in the American Declaration of Independence, although the French historian and philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–59), a friend of Mill, had warned that the power of the state in the new American nation was threatening to swamp that of the individual.
Mill’s achievement was to bring these ideas on individual liberty into mainstream political discussion, and to establish as a benchmark of political maturity the idea that ‘If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.’ It remains a defining principle of a properly functioning democracy that it defends the rights of minorities rather than simply exerting the will of a majority.