Chapter 1
“Four hundred thousand ground troops.” Robert McNamara, In Retrospect (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 221.
“targeting North Vietnamese supply lines.” George C. Herring, ed., The Pentagon Papers (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 132.
Chapter 2
“ground targets within distance of her planes.” The navy has a strict policy of neither confirming nor denying that nuclear weapons are on board certain vessels, but retired officers confirm that nuclear bombs were on board when the Forrestal went to Vietnam in 1967. The navy’s subsequent investigation makes reference to the handling of “conventional (and nuclear) weapons aboard Forrestal.”
“calculated to be 2.5 million pounds.” The design of the chain proved sound, and after the Forrestal was decommissioned in 1993, the chain was transferred to the Harry S. Truman, currently the newest and most sophisticated nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in the world.
“$188.9 million.” The price of a modern Nimitz-class nuclear aircraft carrier is about four billion dollars.
“five-hundred-ton air-conditioning units.” R.F. Dempewolff, “Our Navy’s Mightiest Carrier: USS Forrestal,” Popular Mechanics, November 1954, p. 84.
“make the Forrestal a ‘happy ship.’” Ibid., p. 264.
“to hold that record.” In her thirty-eight-year career, the Forrestal continued to undergo design changes to keep her at the head of the pack in terms of usefulness and efficiency. In 1961, she entered the Norfolk Naval Shipyard to have the forward five-inch gun mounts removed when the navy decided that changing trends in warfare made them unnecessary on a carrier. The accompanying ships and the Forrestal’s own aircraft would provide much more defense than the five-inch guns, and besides, the heavy concussions from the guns caused too much disruption to flight operations. The five-inch guns to the rear remained on the ship as an extra measure of safety, but no one really expected to use them. The arresting gear, including the huge wires that are used to snag planes as they land, also was modified at that time. Originally designed with six wires, the configuration was changed to just four wires. An updated signal-light system to guide pilots was also installed at that point, replacing the earlier version.
“follow in their footsteps.” John McCain and Mark Salter, Faith of My Fathers (New York: Random House, 1999), pp. 118–152.
Chapter 4
“beaten his flashlight.” Dempewolff, p. 270.
“falling overboard into the sea.” On a modern carrier, everyone on the flight deck must wear a “float coat,” a color-coded garment that looks like a long vest but actually is an important piece of survival equipment. The float coat is comfortable to wear even while working. It normally is flat and thin like a typical vest, but it can be inflated to act as a life preserver in the water, and it also carries some important gear to help in your retrieval if you go overboard: a dye pack to mark your location in the water, a whistle to signal for help, a flashlight that can be stuck to your helmet with Velcro, and reflective tape on the shoulders and back to make you more visible.
“lose consciousness in thirty minutes.” Think Safe (Washington, DC: United States Coast Guard, 1999), p. 14.
“he was never recovered.” William Jordan, “USS Washington BB56: Man Overboard!” http://home.flash.net/~hfwright/moverbrd.htm.
Chapter 5
“hundreds of smaller incidents.” Kit Bonner and Carolyn Bonner, Great Naval Disasters: U.S. Naval Accidents in the 20th Century (Osceola, WI: MBI Publishing, 1998), p. 5.
“fire was at the top of the list.” Largely as a result of what happened in 1967, the navy now takes fire safety aboard ships very seriously. Visitors to a carrier, whether civilian or military, are greeted by a safety officer who provides an immediate lesson on fire safety. Before their feet have been on the carrier for sixty seconds, they receive detailed instructions on how to use an emergency breathing apparatus during a fire, where to find one, and how to call for help in an emergency from anywhere on the ship.
“Skyhawks on an attack just after midnight.” Ibid., pp. 85–91.
“They say it’s the only way to get all the planes launched fast enough.” Ironically, the navy had just produced a training film on board the Forrestal earlier in 1967 that specifically addressed flight-deck hazards, including the arming of planes. The film shows Forrestal sailors arming planes with rockets and bombs, noting that “most of these weapons have considerable firepower packed into a small space, and need only a tiny electric current to fire them.” The film warns that “careful handling alone will not protect you from two prime hazards of arming: the presence of stray voltage and the unintended actuation of the weapons-system firing circuits. Avoid these dangers by professional adherence to ship and squadron safety rules when arming aircraft.”
Chapter 6
“2,475 railroad cars, and 11,425 water craft.” Ibid., p. 212.
“assessed the war effort.” United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), vol. IV, p. 11.
“send the execute order.” Ibid.
“sorties have been canceled.” McNamara, p. 242.
“knew the truth was different.” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/military/guys/smith.html.
“provided ammunition.” The description of the Diamond Head and its mission to deliver bombs to the Forrestal is based on an interview with Greg Strain, a sailor aboard the Diamond Head in 1967.
“been manufactured in 1935.” The navy’s official report on the incident says those bombs were made in 1953, not 1935 as Rocky Pratt recalls. Pratt allows that he may be mistaken about the exact date he saw on the bomb shipment, but he says it was prior to his birth in 1940. He also suggests that a bomb made in 1953 and stored in the Philippine jungle still would have been dangerous by 1967.
Chapter 7
“back to work that day.” Official records from the Forrestal indicate that the man run over by the plane most likely survived the incident, although he suffered extensive injuries, including the loss of a foot. However, Gary Shaver was certain for the next thirty-four years that the man had died, and his guilt over the incident figured prominently in his post-traumatic stress disorder. Research for this book revealed the discrepancy between Shaver’s memory and the records.
“put this plane ACOP.” Situation Critical: The USS Forrestal [videotape] (Arlington, VA: Henninger Media Development, 1997).
Chapter 8
“One minute and thirty-four seconds.” There is some discrepancy among sources as to the exact length of time before the first bomb exploded, usually one minute and twenty-eight seconds versus one minute and thirty-four seconds. The official navy investigation determined that the bomb exploded after one minute and thirty-four seconds.
“high pressure and temperature.” http://wseweb.ew.usna.edu/wse/academic/ courses/es300/book/chapte13.htm.
“a headless body.” Robert Timberg, The Nightingale’s Song (New York: Touchstone, 1996), p. 98.
“felt particularly helpless.” Associated Press, “Forrestal Crewmen Become Fireballs.” New York Times, August 12, 1967, p. 1.
“as the first bomb blast hit.” Manual of the Judge Advocate General: Basic Final Investigative Report Concerning the Fire on Board the USS Forrestal (CVA-59) (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1967). The navy’s report concludes that the Zuni rocket fired at 10:51:21, then the first bomb exploded one minute and thirty-four seconds later, at 10:52:55, then general quarters was sounded five seconds later, at 10:53. It is likely that the time for general quarters was not recorded precisely because of the emergency. Most of the veterans remember that general quarters was sounded immediately before the first explosion, but some recall it sounding just after. All agree that the general-quarters alarm was sounded at almost the same time as the first blast.
“fireballs hopping and tumbling.” Ibid.
Chapter 9
“One of the most sensitive spots.” USS Forrestal (Newport News, VA: Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, 1954). The oxygen-generating plant was another of the Forrestal’s technical innovations. Previously, it was typical for carriers to keep individual oxygen cylinders for use on board the planes. But enough cylinders to supply the planes for five days would weigh seventy thousand pounds, whereas the oxygen-generating plant itself weighed only twenty thousand pounds. In addition to the weight reduction, the plant made the Forrestal self-sufficient for liquid oxygen instead of relying on deliveries at sea.
Chapter 10
“doing a pretty good job.” Situation Critical: The USS Forrestal.
“explosion aboard the carrier Bennington.” Scott Vanier, “A Survivor’s Story,” The Flagship, July 29, 1999, p. A4.
“certainly would have survived.” “Tragedy’s Start: A Blast Is Heard,” New York Times July 31, 1967, p. 1.
“disappeared as quickly as it had arrived.” “Chicago Sailor sees ‘Great Lady’ Burn.” New York Times, July 31, 1967. There is no official report of a U.S. ship engaging one of the local boats, but Ed Roberts and others on the Forrestal witnessed the boat being destroyed. In addition, a newspaper account quotes twenty-five-year old Tony DeBella of Chicago, a tower-control leader aboard the carrier Oriskany, describing the same scene.
Chapter 12
“That list was dangerous.” Associated Press, “Forrestal Fire Took 29 Lives,” Norfolk (VA) Ledger-Star, July 31, 1967, p. 1. Though Beling and Rowland maintain that they never feared losing the ship, Beling was quoted soon after the fire as saying that it was “absolutely possible” the ship could be lost. He apparently meant the ship could be lost without a proper response from the crew, but he was confident the crew would perform well.
Chapter 13
“McCain quickly left the sick bay.” McCain and Salter, p. 179; Timberg, pp. 98–99.
“more than three hundred.” The official count is 161 injured from the Forrestal fire, but Kirchner says the sick bay saw far more than that. Not all were serious injuries, especially toward the end of the day, and many may not have been officially recorded if they needed only superficial care.
“a dark ammunition elevator.” Lenny Julius confirms that the Oriskany used the ammunition elevator to transport the wounded. Normally, crew were forbidden to ride on the ammunition elevator because it was designed only for cargo and not considered safe for people. When the volume of patients forced the use of the ammunition elevator, Julius feared the doors at the top of the elevator would not open in time and the patients would be crushed as they were raised to the flight deck.
Chapter 14
“photo of flames and smoke.” William Mason, a photographer’s mate on the Forrestal, rushed topside to take photos during the fire, many of which were used in Life.
“occurs about once a week.” R.W. Apple, Jr., “Heroism on Big Carrier,” New York Times, July 31, 1967, p. 1.
“yet another fire.” Associated Press, “12 Sailors Still Listed as Missing,” New York Times, August 12, 1967, p. 1.
Chapter 16
“you are hereby reprimanded.” The wording of the reprimand is taken from a draft of the letter provided to the author by the navy, which refused to release it until Beling personally intervened. The navy states that the final version of the reprimand letter is not in its files and may have been different from this draft version. Beling did not retain a copy of the letter and does not remember the exact wording, but he confirms that the gist of the letter is correct.
Epilogue
“worst disaster in the U.S. Navy.” Bonner and Bonner, p. 5. The loss of life on the Forrestal was superseded by an incident in 1952 when the carrier Wasp ran over the destroyer Hobson during nighttime flight operations. The accident killed 176 men, including the captain of the destroyer. Sixty-one men were recovered from the Hobson, some without serious injuries. There were no injuries on the carrier. Since 134 men died on the Forrestal and 161 were seriously injured, the combined death and injury toll was slightly higher for the Forrestal incident.
“It was thin-skinned.” Situation Critical: The USS Forrestal; Symposium 2000—Valor Under Fire: Forrestal, 29 July 1967 [videotape] (Pensacola, FL: Naval Aviation Museum Foundation, 2000). Vice Admiral Thomas Kilcline stated at a naval symposium in 2000, in reference to the bombs that exploded in the Forrestal fire, that the military was compromising by using old bombs. A pilot aboard the Forrestal in 1967, Kilcline stated that he overheard the conversation between Captain Beling and the skipper of the Diamond Head while the ammunition was transferred to the ship the night before the fire. He said Beling “was not very happy with what he was going to get in the thousand-pounders,” but the other skipper replied that the old bombs were all they had to provide. Kilcline said, “We were making a lot of compromises in those days and this was one of them. This was a World War Two bomb. It was not something new. We were buying a lot of new things, but much of our attention was being paid to nuclear weapons and modernization of that type.”