Memorandum by the Sub-Committee on the Allocation of Active Air Defence
Part I
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
1. Three main factors necessitate the review of A.D.G.B.:
(1) The defeat of France, which opens up the West and North-west of the United Kingdom to a higher scale of attack than has hitherto been possible. Furthermore, hostile bombers escorted by fighter aircraft can now attack a large proportion of the country.
(2) The possibility of Eire being used as a base for air attack on this country.
(3) The anticipated increase in German air strength (see paragraph 3), with the likelihood that this may be reinforced by Italian air forces.
2. The broad conclusions to be derived from the above considerations are as follows:
(1) A higher scale of defence is necessary over large areas of country and to cover the Irish Sea and the approaches thereto, which had previously been regarded as relatively immune from air attack.
(2) Considerable extensions of the searchlight zones will have to be made.
(3) The existing gun and searchlight zones are not susceptible to any decreases. In fact, the paramount necessity for maintaining our industrial effort and the rapid growth of industry itself calls for certain increases in defences, quite apart from the new areas open to increased scale of attack.
Part II
INCREASES IN FIGHTER SQUADRONS AND BALLOON BARRAGES
Fighter Aircraft
3. The present first line strength of the German Air Force is assessed at approximately 5,400 aircraft. This includes 1,550 fighters of which 500 are long range fighters. The German long range bomber and bomber reconnaissance force comprises some 3,107 aircraft. It is anticipated that the first line strength will rise to approximately 6,500 aircraft by the 1st August, 1941. Of these, 1,870 would be fighters while the bomber strength would be 3,670. In addition, the possibility of the employment of Italian air forces against this country must be taken into account.
4. In order to provide an adequate scale of defence in terms of first line fighter aircraft to enable us to match the enemy bomber and fighter strength in the new strategic situation, a large increase in the number of fighter squadrons is necessary.
5. Immediate increases are clearly necessary and it has been found practicable to increase the fighter force by the equivalent of 10 additional fighter squadrons. In addition, a further three foreign squadrons have been formed. The latter should be operationally fit in the course of a few weeks. This brings the strength of the fighter defence to 76 squadrons or 1,216 first line fighters, and includes the equivalent of 5 long range fighter squadrons under Coastal Command. Further it is intended to form an additional 4 squadrons as soon as circumstances permit. It should be appreciated however that this increase has been obtained by adding an extra section of aircraft to certain fighter squadrons. It is the intention to withdraw these and amalgamate them into squadrons as soon as circumstances permit and until this is done the increase in first line strength will not be fully effective.
6. The full number of squadrons required to meet the potential scale of attack cannot be reached for some considerable time, nor indeed is it possible to estimate with any accuracy the optimum scale of fighter defence necessary until we have had more experience of the effect of intensive attack on the air defence system as a whole and of our counter air offensive.
7. In order to deploy these new resources to the best advantage, having regard to the new areas open to the increased scale of attack, new sectors will be required in the following areas:
North-East coast of Scotland
Ayrshire
Cumberland
Westmorland
Lancashire
Shropshire
Warwickshire
South Wales
Devon
Cornwall
Work on the provision of those sector stations and communications has already begun on a high priority.
8. As regards the provision of R.D.F. observation in the new areas and the Observer Corps, the R.D.F. screen is now being extended to cover the Western coast of Great Britain and appropriate extensions to the Observer Corps are being made.
9. If Ireland is invaded and we go to her aid, it is proposed to establish sector stations in the vicinity of Dublin and Wexford (to enable interception to be made from both sides of the Irish Sea) together with the necessary R.D.F. stations. Preparatory arrangements on these lines have already been undertaken. It will be realised, however, that such facilities take time to organise and until sector stations and intelligence resources have been developed the air defence based on the East Coast of Eire will not be fully effective.
Balloons
10. As regards balloon defence, not only are new barrages necessary in certain vulnerable areas, formerly reasonably secure from heavy scale attack, but extensions to existing barrages require consideration. An examination of these suggests that 6 new barrages will be required, i.e. at Falmouth, Pembroke, Ardeer, Yeovil, Newport and Belfast, while extensions to existing barrages will be necessary at Liverpool, Runcorn, Manchester, Bristol, Hull, Swansea, Port Talbot, Cardiff, Barry Docks and Clyde.
11. Moreover, on account of the greatly increased scale of minelaying now being undertaken by Germany the necessity of providing anti-mine laying barrages at our major ports on the South and West coasts can no longer be ignored. The proposed provision of new barrages and the extension of existing barrages are shown at Appendix B. From this it will be noted that a total of 436 first line balloons will be required. In addition it is recommended that a further 164 balloons should be provided to meet unforeseen requirements. The authorised establishment of Balloon Command has therefore been raised from 2,000 to 2,600 first line balloons with 100% reserve, and production has been increased accordingly.
Part III
A.A. SEARCHLIGHTS
Searchlight Zones and Requirements
12. The existing searchlight zones and the proposed new extensions are shown on the sketch map attached at [missing from file – handwritten comment states to be brought to meeting]. The requirements of searchlights are defined at Appendix D. The calculations for these requirements have been made on the basis of wide spacing (6,000 yards) for general area defences, and close spacing (3,500 yards) for the more important gun zones, both existing and new. It will be noted from Appendix D that the total new searchlight requirements are estimated to be as follows – (exact requirements can be arrived at only by reconnaissance).
| Role | No. of Batteries | No. of Lights |
| (i) To cover new areas of wide spacing | 87 | 2,088 |
| (ii) To thicken up gun zones | 60 | 1,440 |
| (iii) Mobile reserves (see para. 14) | 12 | 288 |
| Total | 159 | 3,816 |
It is considered that these lights should be provided on a scale of one A.R.C. light to two hand controlled equipments.
New Areas and Gun Zone Lights
13. First priority should be given to the completion of the A.F.Z. (87 batteries); the thickening up of the gun zones (60 batteries) can be relegated to a later phase. In fact the employment of G.L.II as a means of engaging the unseen target by gunfire may render unnecessary the close spacing of searchlights in gun zones. Furthermore, there are the requirements of the Field Force. These initially amount to 60 batteries, to be followed by an additional 36 to correspond to possible future expansion of the Field Force. The requirements of the Field Force are not an immediate commitment. It will be convenient, therefore, at this stage to merge the Field Force’s initial requirement (60 batteries) into that of the batteries wanted for thickening up gun zones in A.D.G.B. (60 batteries).
Mobile Reserves
14. No allowance has yet been made for extra searchlights to be placed round specially selected vital points in order to ensure that attacking aircraft are dazzled on approach, and therefore unable to pick out the exact location of the target. For this purpose it is considered that 12 batteries should be provided which would allow of 24 specially selected places being covered by these lights. It is not possible at this stage to allocate these lights to definite objectives. They are therefore included under the heading of the Mobile Reserves.
15. Production forecasts suggest the possibility of supplementing the searchlight programme as follows. By January 1st, 1941, 36 batteries and thereafter 16 batteries per month.
The requirements of the expansion of the A.F.Z. (87 batteries) could thus be met by April, 1941, and thereafter provision could be made at a rapid rate to meet any future expansions of A.D.G.B., to thicken up gun zones, and to meet Field Force requirements.
The production problem is thus satisfactory and the position as regards further orders can be reviewed later on.
16. Detailed priorities within the first phase, i.e. the completion of the expanded A.F.Z. must depend on a number of factors which require further examination, but from an operational standpoint it is suggested that a start should be made as follows:
(i) Completion of present authorised zones (6 batteries).
(ii) The Devon – Cornwall extension (19 batteries).
(iii) South Wales coast (5 batteries).
(iv) Edinburgh – Tyne corridor (8 batteries).
(v) Northern Ireland (7 batteries).
In addition the organization for the other zones should be started forthwith and developed so that units can be fitted in smoothly as desired. It follows that latitude must be given to the completion of (i) to (v) above if smooth development elsewhere should demand it.
Part IV
INCREASES IN HEAVY A.A. GUNS AND LONG-RANGE U.P. WEAPONS
Heavy A.A. Guns
17. Increases in Heavy A.A. gun defences over the scales of defence authorised in C.I.D. paper No.319 i.e. 2,232 guns are required for the following reasons:
(i) Certain localities, already allotted gun defences, are now open to a heavier scale of attack.
(ii) Certain localities, for which no gun defences have hitherto been allotted, have now assumed a higher degree of importance by virtue of the expansion of industry.
(iii) The experience of this campaign indicates that there is a marked difference between the efficacy of enemy attacks when heavy A.A. gun defences exist and when there is nothing of this nature to deter him. Furthermore, fire against the unseen target, the technique of which is a relatively new development, is an essential element of air defence as a whole. When flying in clouds, etc. the enemy should be subjected to this form of fire as often as possible.
(iv) The possibilities of sea or airborne invasion of this country render it necessary to be able to allocate heavy A.A. defences to cover the operations of our land forces in this country.
(v) Morale of the civil population.
It is essential that any enemy, who has penetrated the main defences, should be fired on. The mere presence of a few A.A. guns will suffice to avoid considerable loss of industrial output and dislocation of normal life.
Broadly speaking, apart from the obvious necessity of reinforcing certain existing defences, the problem is to provide a measure of defence for all communities of any size engaged on industrial work of national importance and to hold a reserve to meet unforeseen requirements and to cover the operations of land forces at home.
The details of the proposed increases in Heavy A.A. guns are shown in Appendix E from which it will be seen that they amount to 1,512 guns.
It is desirable that 50% of the guns should also be mobile, but a higher proportion of static guns would be acceptable if a marked increase in rate of production would thereby be obtained. Should, however, it be necessary to accept a higher proportion of statics every effort should be made to make these transportable by the provision of extra transporters and holdfasts.
Ammunition
18. The Ministry of Supply have been recently asked to increase the rate of production of Heavy A.A. gun ammunition to 500,000 rounds per month, a rate which can be dropped to 400,000 per month on completion of the gun programmes.
The ammunition programme is based on the conception of building up a ‘capital’ allocation to each equipment of 1,200 rounds with an overall monthly wastage requirement, which up till now has been assessed at 350,000 rounds per month. In order to smooth out the production problem the average figure stated above of 500,000 rounds per month has been accepted.
It is considered that this large ammunition figure for the equipment programme already authorized will suffice to absorb the increased ammunition requirements arising out of the proposed increases in guns (1,512 equipments).
The 3” U.P. Weapon as a Supplement to Long-Range Heavy A.A. Defence
19. With a view to increasing the density of fire against massed aircraft targets the provision of a 24 barrel projector is under examination. The production of suitable multi-barrel projectors is not likely to present insuperable difficulties. The limiting factor is the large supplies of special cordite involved. This aspect of the problem is being examined and it seems that we should be justified in introducing about 160 multiple barrel projectors into A.D.G.B. These would be distributed in the more important gun zones to provide an additional 24-48 barrel density. Defence against low flying attack
Light A.A. Guns.
20. The authorized scale of Light A.A. defence in A.D.G.B. is 1,860 barrels, corresponding to the defence of about 300 vital points. The number of Vital Points which now require Light A.A. protection has greatly increased. These may conveniently be divided into two headings – industrial and service requirements. A comprehensive survey of industry is now available in the lists of Category 1 Vital Points summarized in Secret Document KP/DI. A study of this document suggests the need for protection of a further 200 points. Service requirements, for the most part new operational aerodromes, amounts to a further 150 points.
21. Furthermore war experience indicates the necessity for light A.A. weapons for the following additional purposes:
(i) Anti-mine laying aircraft.
(ii) To cover balloon barrages – there is evidence to show that the enemy regards the destruction of balloon barrages as an essential preliminary to major scale air attack.
These may be said to be the equivalent of a further 75 Vital Points, making a total of 425 additional points to be provided with Light A.A. defences.
22. The average number of equipments to cover a vital point on the present scale of defence is six. It is arguable that a higher scale of defence is desirable, but it is considered that such reinforcements as are necessary can largely be obtained in terms of the U.P. weapon (see para.
23 below). Accepting, therefore, the average requirement of 40 mm. equipments to be six per vital point, the extra 425 vital points indicated above will call for 2,550 equipments. The total figure required for A.D.G.B. thus becomes 4,410.
U.P. Weapon
23. 8,000 3-inch U.P. projectors have been ordered with the specific object of defence against low-flying attack. 5,000 of these will be single and the reminder it is hoped will be twin barrel projectors. These are being organized in troops each of 16 projectors i.e. 500 troops in all. Summary
24. The increases recommended in this paper may be summarised as follows:
Royal Air Force
(i) Fighter Squadrons 17 of which 13 have already been formed (para. 5).
(ii) Balloons. From an operational strength of 2,000 to 2,600 with 100% reserve (para. 11).
Army
A.A. Searchlights
(i) Phase I: To extend A.F.2. 87 Batteries (para. 12).
(ii) Phase II (problematical): To thicken up gun zones. 60 batteries (paras. 12 and 13).
(iii) Mobile Reserve 12 batteries (para. 14).
A.A. Guns
(iv) Heavy A.A. Guns, 189 batteries (para. 17 and. Appx. E). (v) Light A.A. equipments, 212 batteries (para. 22).
U.P. Weapons
(vi) Single or Twin U.P., 125 batteries (para. 23).
(vii) Multi barrel U.P. weapon, 160 equipments (para. 19).
It should be noted that the acceptance of the above recommendations will involve appropriate increases in ancillary services and in the holding of reserve equipments on the authorized scales.
25. Higher Organisation.
The above increases, which amount to between 170 and 180 regiments will call for a corresponding increase in brigades, divisions, and also in the creation of some intermediate formations such as A.A. corps, between the A.A. higher command and the divisions. The exact requirements in the above respects calls for more detailed examination. At this stage, therefore, it will suffice to indicate that there are two cardinal principles which must govern the new organisation.
(i) A.O.C.-in-C., Fighter Command must have a single A.A. Commander to deal with.
(ii) The location and boundaries of A.A. corps and divisions must be largely dictated by the necessity for close co-operation with Royal Air Force Groups.
Although the production of A.A. heavy and light artillery equipments has still considerable leeway to make in order to complete authorised programmes, nevertheless much preliminary work, reconnaissance, etc., for the new defences has to be done and should accordingly be initiated as soon as possible. With regard to A.A. searchlights, the expansion will begin almost at once.
The Committee are, therefore, of opinion that the details of the new organisation should be a matter for early examination and the necessary new formations and their staffs set up without delay.
26. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff are therefore asked –
(i) To take note of the increases in Fighter Squadrons and Balloon barrages indicated in paragraphs 5, 10 and 11 i.e. 17 more squadrons, 6 new balloon barrages and increases to existing balloon barrages. Further to note that increases beyond the above figures may prove necessary but that the assessment of these requirements must be deferred until more experience is obtained both of the effects of enemy attacks and of our counter offensive.
(ii) To approve the suggested increases in A.A. defences as follows:
(a) Searchlights:
(i) Stage I., 87 batteries to complete the extensions of the A.F.Z.
(ii) Stage II., 60 batteries to thicken up gun zones. This stage to be undertaken only if necessary should the developments of G.L.II as an adequate means of directing gun fire prove unsuccessful.
(iii) The provision of a mobile reserve of 12 batteries.
(b) Heavy A.A. guns: 1,512 guns making a total of 3,744 H.A.A. guns for A.D.G.B.
(c) Light A.A. guns: 2,550 equipments making a total for A.D.G.B. of 4,410
(d) Single or twin barrel U.P.: 500 troops i.e. 8,000 projectors.
(e) Multi barrel U.P. weapon: 160 equipments.
(iii) They are further asked to endorse the view expressed in paragraph
25 that the higher organisation necessitated by the above increases, should be examined by the War Office as a matter of urgent priority and that the new organisation arising from this examination should be implemented forthwith.
(Signed) D.F. Stevenson,
Chairman, on behalf of the Sub-Committee.
Richmond Terrace, S.W.1.
16th August, 1940.
Annex B
PROPOSED INCREASES IN BALLOON BARRAGE DEFENCES
New Land Borne Barrages
| Pembroke | 48 (to cover Convoy Assembly Anchorage, mine-filling depot and oil tanks). |
| Falmouth | 24 |
| Ardeer | 48 (to cover I.C.I. and R.O.F.) |
| Yeovil | 24 |
| Newport | 40 (to cover Docks; industrial plants of town, G.W.R. Bridge and Lysaghts Steel Works). |
| Belfast | 40 (exact number dependent on reconnaissance). |
| Total | 224 |
Extensions to Existing Barrages
| Location | Additional | New Total Establishment |
| Cardiff | 16 | 32 |
| Barry | 8 | |
| 16 | ||
| Swansea | 24 (to cover Llandarcy) | 32 |
| Port Talbot | 8 | 16 |
| Totals | 56 | 96 |
Anti-Mine Laying Barrages
| Clyde (Greenock) | 6 land borne (excluding water-borne V.L.A.) |
| Mersey | 8 in outer barrage + 4 in inner all waterborne |
| Bristol Channel | 10 water-borne (above Barry to Avonmouth) |
| Plymouth | 2 land-borne + 6 water-borne |
| Portsmouth | } |
| (Spithead to Nab.) | } |
| Milford Haven | } |
| Poole | } |
| Portland | } |
| Barrow | } |
| Humber | } 10 each (subject to reconnaissance) |
| Hartlepool | } |
| Tyne | } |
| Blythe | } |
| Falmouth | } |
| Swansea | } |
| Belfast | } |
Annex D
DETAILED A.A. SEARCHLIGHT REQUIREMENTS For (a) Extensions of the A.F.Z. and (b) Thickening up Gun Zones
Annex E
PROPOSED INCREASES IN HEAVY A.A. DEFENCE
1. Increase to defences authorised under C.I.D. 319.
2. Defences authorised since C.I.D. 319 and suggested increases.
Under C.I.D. 319-168, guns were authorised to meet new requirements. The above can, therefore, be satisfied by provision of a further 232 guns i.e. (400-168).
3. New Defences Recommended
4. Aerodromes
Under C.I.D. 319-128 A.A. guns were authorised for the defence of 32 aerodromes. There are now 100 operational aerodromes (including aerodromes of the Fleet Air Arm co-operational Training Units and Aircraft-storage units) located within 20 miles of the coast. It is considered that H.A.A. defences should be allocated for these aerodromes on a scale of 4 per aerodrome. The total commitment will thus be 400 of which 128 are already provided for. An extra 272 guns will thus be required. Total 272
5. Reserve
C.I.D. Paper 319 authorised a mobile reserve of 168 guns. In view of the need for covering land forces operating in this country and for meeting a new tactical situation it is recommended that this reserve should be retained. (No extra provision over that of C.I.D. 319 is therefore required for the mobile reserve). In addition a new requirements reserve should be provided to take the place of the reserve provided under the Ideal Scheme and which has now been absorbed. It is recommended that in view of the increased defences provided under this paper that this new requirement should be limited to 72 guns.
6. The total increases thus recommended are:
(i) To increase defences authorised under C.I.D. 319 (para. 1) – 264 (ii) To provide for defences authorised together with their increases since C.I.D. 319 (para. 2) – 232
(iii) To create new defences (para. 3) – 672
(iv) For aerodrome defence (para. 4) – 272
(v) To create a fresh new Reserve (para. 5) – 72
Total: 1,512
MINUTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE
Bearing in mind the immense cost in war-energy and disadvantage of attempting to defend the whole west coast of Great Britain, and the dangers of being unduly committed to systems of passive defence, I should be glad if the following notes could be borne in mind:
1. Our first line of defence against invasion must be as ever the enemy’s ports. Air reconnaissance, submarine watching, and other means of obtaining information should be followed by resolute attacks with all our forces available and suitable upon any concentrations of enemy shipping.
2. Our second line of defence is the vigilant patrolling of the sea to intercept any invading expedition, and to destroy it in transit.
3. Our third line is the counter-attack upon the enemy when he makes any land fall, and particularly while he is engaged in the act of landing. This attack which has long been ready from the sea, must be reinforced by Air action; and both sea and air attacks must be continued so that it becomes impossible for the invader to nourish his lodgments.
4. The land defences and the home Army are maintained primarily for the purpose of making the enemy come in such large numbers as to afford a proper target to the sea and air forces above mentioned, and to make hostile preparations and movements noticeable to Air and other forms of reconnaissance.
5. However, should the enemy succeed in landing at various points, he should be made to suffer as much as possible by local resistance on the beaches, combined with the aforesaid attack from the sea and the air. This forces him to use up his ammunition, and confines him to a limited area. The defence of any part of the coast must be measured not by the forces on the coast, but by the number of hours within which strong counter attacks by mobile troops can be brought to bear upon the landing places. Such attacks should be hurled with the utmost speed and fury upon the enemy at his weakest moment, which is not, as is sometimes suggested, when actually getting out of his boats, but when sprawled upon the shore with his communications cut and his supplies running short. It ought to be possible to concentrate 10,000 men fully equipped within six hours and 20,000 men within twelve hours, upon any point where a serious lodgment has been effected. The withholding of the reserves until the full gravity of the attack is known, is a nice problem for the Home Command.
6. It must be admitted that the task of the Navy and Air Force to prevent invasion becomes more difficult in the narrow seas, namely: from the Wash to Dover. This sector of the coast front is also nearest to the supreme enemy objective, London. The sector from Dover to Lands End is far less menaced because the Navy and Air Force must make sure that no mass of shipping, still less protecting warships, can be passed into the French Channel ports. At present the scale of attack on this wide front is estimated by the Admiralty at no more than 5,000 men. Doubling this for greater security, it should be possible to make good arrangements for speedy counter-attack in superior numbers, and at the same time to achieve large economies of force on this southern sector in which the beach troops should be at their minimum and the mobile reserves at their maximum. These mobile reserves must be available to move to the south-eastern sectors at short notice. Evidently this situation can only be judged from week to week.
7. When we come to the west coast of Britain, a new set of conditions rules. The enemy must commit himself to the broad seas, and there will be plenty of time, if his approach is detected, to attack him with cruisers and flotillas. The Admiralty dispositions still conform to this need. The enemy has at present no warships to escort him. Should we, for instance, care to send 12,000 men unescorted in merchant ships to land on the Norwegian coast, or in the Skagerrak and Kattegat, in face of superior sea power and air power? It would be thought madness.
8. However, to make assurance triply sure, the Admiralty should pursue their plan of laying a strong minefield from Cornwall to Ireland, covering the Bristol Channel and the Irish Sea from southward attack. This minefield is all the more necessary now that by the adoption of the North-about route for commerce we have transferred a large part of our patrolling craft from the Western Approaches which have become permanently more empty and unwatched.
9. The establishment of this minefield will simplify and mitigate all questions of local defence north of its point of contact with Cornwall. We must consider this sector from Cornwall to the Mull of Kintyre as the least vulnerable to seaborne invasion. Here the works of defence should be confined to guarding by a few guns or land torpedo tubes the principal harbours, and giving a moderate scale of protection to their gorges. It is not admissible to lavish our limited resources upon this sector.
10. North of the Mull of Kintyre to Scapa Flow, the Shetlands and the Faroes lie in the orbit of the main Fleet. The voyage of an expedition from the Norwegian coast would be very hazardous, and its arrival anywhere right round to the Firth of Forth would not raise immediately decisive issues. The enemy, who is now crouched, would then be sprawled. His advance would lie in difficult and sparsely-inhabited country. He could be contained until sufficient forces were brought to bear, and his communications immediately cut from the sea. This would make his position all the more difficult, as the distances to any important objective are much longer and he would require considerable wheeled transport. Scapa is the main naval base. Cromarty Firth and Invergordon are fortified. The Firth of Forth is a very strong fortress. Flotillas are available in all these bases. It would be impossible to fortify all landing points in this sector, and it would be a waste of energy to attempt to do so. A much longer period may be allowed for counterattack than in the south-east opposite London.
11. From the Forth to the Wash is the second-most important sector, ranking next after the Wash to Dover. Here, however, all the harbours and inlets are defended, both from the sea and from the rear, and it should be possible to counter-attack in superior force within twentyfour hours. The Tyne must be regarded as the second major objective after London, for here (and to a lesser extent at the Tees) grievous damage could be done by an invader or large scale raider in a short time. On the other hand, the sea and air conditions are more favourable to us than to the southward.
12. The combined Staffs should endeavour to assign to all these sectors their relative scales of vulnerability and defence, both in the number of men employed in the local defence of beaches and of harbours, and also in the number of days or hours within which heavy counter-attacks should be possible. As an indication of these relative scales of attack and defence, I set down for consideration the following:
| Forth to Wash inclusive | 3 |
| Wash to Dover promontory | 5 |
| Dover promontory to Lands End, and round to start of minefield | 1½ |
| Start of the minefield to the Mull of Kintyre | ¼ |
| Mull of Kintyre Northabout to the Firth of Forth | ½ |
(Initialled) W.S.C., 5th August, 1940
Richmond Terrace, S.W.1.