ROLE OF 12 CORPS
1. Acting under command South-Eastern Command, 12 Corps is responsible for defeating invasion in Kent.
SCALE AND NATURE OF ATTACK
2. From the German point of view, Kent provides the most attractive area in which to stage the main effort of an invasion for the following reasons:
(a) He can concentrate a larger sustained fighter effort over East Kent than over any other part of England.
(b) Communications from the Continent to East Kent are much the shortest and therefore most easily kept secure.
(c) East Kent coast has two reasonably good ports in DOVER and FOLKESTONE, and two indifferent but useful harbours in RAMSGATE and MARGATE.
3. East Kent will therefore probably be the scene of the enemy’s main effort, which would be both seaborne (including armoured formations) and airborne.
12 CORPS PLAN IN OUTLINE
4. In order to defeat invasion 12 Corps plan will be based on the following:
(a) The holding of the beaches by strong, well wired platoon or company localities, capable of all-round defence and of holding out until our reserves get into action.
(b) Offensive action by reserves of forward Bns., Bdes. and Divs. for the purpose of taking immediate and energetic action against any enemy penetration of beach defences or against enemy airborne landings in rear of the beach defences.
(c) Offensive action by Corps and Army reserves in an area in which certain vital “fortresses” will hold firm indefinitely.
FORTRESSES
5. (a) The most serious menace in Kent would be the presence of an enemy force, armoured or otherwise, which had penetrated or overcome the forward defences. In order that such a force may be destroyed by our reserves, it is necessary to have certain strong “FORTRESSES” to act as “hinges”, or pivots of manoeuvre, in the area where these reserves will operate.
(b) The vital “fortresses” will be as follows. On the coast: the defended areas of FOLKESTONE and DOVER, each held by one Independent Inf. Bde. Inland: the towns of CANTERBURY, ASHFORD, MAIDSTONE and TONBRIDGE, each held by a special garrison.
(c) The importance of these six places is immense; as long as they hold out, and remain intact, East Kent cannot be lost. They must, therefore, hold out, and will do so.
12 CORPS’ PLAN – IN DETAIL
6. The “invasion battle” in the coastal belt will be fought by the two forward Divs. of 12 Corps.
Each Division has one Ind. Inf. Bde. under command holding the “fortresses” of FOLKESTONE and DOVER respectively. Each Division has one Inf. Bde. in reserve. Right forward Div. has one Army Tank Bn. under command: Left forward Div. has an Army Tank Bde. (less one Bn.) under command. MAIDSTONE Sub-area is responsible for that part of 12 Corps area in rear of forward Div. areas.
7. Forward Inf. Bdes. will fight the battle in their present allotted areas. The garrisons of localities will hold out to the last, fighting the enemy on their own ground without thought of withdrawal or surrender, and inflicting the maximum toll on his forces; so that, even if his seaborne forces manage to fight their way inland, they will be disorganised, exhausted and seriously weakened before they meet our reserve formations.
Local reserves will be kept ready to take immediate and energetic offensive action against enemy penetrations from the coast, or against airborne landings in rear of beach defences.
8. Right Forward Division
(a) Reserve Inf. Bde. One Inf. Bde., with one Army Tank Bn. and one Coy. Reece. Bn. under command, will be located in the area LYMINGE 6059 – ARPINGE 6257 – POSTLING 5857 to deal with enemy airborne landings North of FOLKESTONE or the formation of an enemy beach-head on the DYMCHURCH – HYTHE – SANDGATE beach. (NOTE: reserve battalion of the centre forward Inf. Bde. is located to the North of the ROYAL MILITARY CANAL).
(b) Recce. Bn. (less one coy. with Res. Inf. Bde. as in sub-para. (a) above) will be positioned in area ROLVENDEN 2849 to deal with enemy airborne landings in that area or make initial contact with enemy seaborne penetration in the RYE area.
9. Left Forward Division.
(a) The left forward Inf. Bde. area of the left forward Div. (the area HERNE BAY – CANTERBURY – WHITSTABLE) is garrisoned by one Inf. Bde. Gp. of the reserve Division, under operational command of the left forward Division.
This Bde. will be kept assembled in the area and NOT dispersed on the coast to the North, which will be watched by Home Guard or military O.Ps as necessary.
The Bde. will be prepared to operate offensively in an Easterly direction to restore the situation in the ISLE OF THANET, or in a S.E. or Southerly direction against a threat to CANTERBURY. It will also be prepared to man the coast in the Sector HERNE BAY – WHITSTABLE should this be necessary.
One Bn. of the Bde. will be earmarked to reinforce the garrison of CANTERBURY should such action become necessary.
As long as communications exist, the Bde. will not be used by the left forward Div. without reference to Corps H.Q.
(b) Reserve Inf. Bde. with one Army Tank Bde. (less one Bn.) under command, will be located in the area TILMANSTONE 7369 – WALDERSHARE PARK 7266, so as to be able to manoeuvre to deal with the formation of an enemy beach-head on the beaches astride DEAL.
(c) Recce. Bn. will move out of 12 Corps and come under command NORTH KENT AND SURREY AREA.
10. Reserves of Forward Divs. Reserve Inf. Bdes. (including the Inf. Bde. mentioned in para. 9(a) which can also be regarded as in reserve initially) and Army Tank and Recce. units will be kept so assembled that offensive action can be developed rapidly; on no account will they be dispersed over a wide area.
The reserve Inf. Bdes. whose role is the dealing with enemy beachheads on the beaches astride HYTHE and DEAL respectively will be prepared to commence reducing these beach-heads within two hours of receiving the order to do so, or within one hour of first light should the landing take place at night. They must not be dispersed for the purpose merely of taking action against enemy airborne troops landed behind the bench defences in order to attack the latter from the rear.
11. Reserve Division of 12 Corps. One Inf. Bde. Gp. will be located North of CANTERBURY under operational command of left forward Div., vide para. 9(a). Remainder of Division (less Bns. providing immediate assistance for WEST MALLING and DETLING aerodromes, vide para. 14 below) will be concentrated in areas West and South of CANTERBURY.
One Inf. Bde. Gp. will be concentrated in area BARHAM 6468.
One Inf. Bde. Gp. will be concentrated in the area South of CANTERBURY and East of CHARTHAM 5573 with dets. holding the crossings over R. GREAT STOUR between excl. CANTERBURY and incl. GODMERSHAM 5068.
The Div. in conjunction with 31 Army Tank Bde. (less one Bn.) if allotted will be prepared to:
(a) act offensively against enemy penetrations N.E. of CANTERBURY, westwards from the beaches astride DEAL, or northwards or N.W. from the beaches West of FOLKESTONE.
(b) stabilise the situation South of CANTERBURY so as to create a favourable opportunity for the action of reserves placed at Corps disposal by Army H.Q. In this connection the importance of maintaining a secure bridgehead across R. GREAT STOUR between CANTERBURY and GODMERSHAM becomes obvious.
(c) act offensively against enemy forces in and South of the ASHFORD area.
12. Troop carrying transport for Reserve Div. The Reserve Div. will have two Motor Coach Coys. under command.
13. Employment of Army Tanks,
(a) Any Tanks under command 12 Corps will be employed for Cooperation with the reserve Inf. Bdes. of forward Divs. and the Inf. Bde. in the ISLE OF THANET in immediate action to reduce enemy “beach-heads” or deal with large-scale airborne landings. As a Corps reserve to act either in co-operation with the reserve Div. or independently in counter-attacking enemy penetration.
(b) The two Army Tank Bdes. will be positioned as follows:
First Bde. Bde. (less one Bn.) in area HASTINGLEIGH 5363 under command of Corps. One Bn. Under reserve Inf. Bde., right forward Div.
Second Bde. Bde. under Comd. left Fwd. Div. having: Bde. (less one Bn.) under reserve Inf. Bde., left forward Div. One Bn. under Inf. Bde. in ISLE OF THANET.
14. Artillery. See below.
15. Protection of Aerodromes
(a) Each of the five aerodromes in 12 Corps area has a special garrison (provided by Coys. of independent battalions) under command of the R.A.F. Station Commander.
(b) Field force units, in addition, as follows, will be earmarked to provide immediate assistance to aerodromes by offensive action in the event of enemy airborne attack:
| Right Forward Div. area | |
| LYMPNE | Reserve Bn. of centre forward Inf. Bde. |
| HAWKINGE | One Bn. of left forward Inf. Bde. |
| Left Forward Div. area | |
| MANSTON | Mob cols provided by Inf. Bde. on Isle of Thanet |
| MAIDSTONE Sub-Area | |
| DETLING | One Bn. of Reserve Div. |
| EASTCHURCH | None at present. |
| NORTH KENT AND | SURREY Area (outside 12 Corps) |
| WEST MALLING | One Bn. of Reserve Div. |
(c) Units earmarked for immediate counter-attack of aerodromes will not be moved away from the aerodrome without reference to Corps H.Q.
16. Moves to Assembly and Concentration Positions. Where formations and units are not already in the assembly and concentration positions shown above, the necessary moves will be made on issue by Corps H.Q. of the code message “FORM CONCENTRATIONS”.
17. R.E. Engineer personnel and resources will not be dissipated on the widespread manning of minor demolitions and similar tasks. The maximum number of R.E. units must be held suitably concentrated in reserve, so disposed that they will be available as required for the many R.E. tasks which are likely to develop as the battle progresses. The most important of these will be the maintenance of road communications. Responsibility for repair of these is laid down as follows. In order to conserve R.E. resources for such tasks not more than one Fd. Coy. in each forward Div. will be deployed as firing parties on demolitions, petrol immobilisation and kindred tasks. Not more than one Section R.E. will be allocated as part of the garrison of any “Fortress”.
18. Demolition Policy. See below.
19. Air Co-operation.
(a) Reconnaissance. One A.C. Sqn. is under comd. 12 Corps. Demands for Tac. R and Arty. R will be submitted by Divs. to Corps H.Q.
(b) Army Air Support. Initially, the Army Comd. will himself retain control of such fighter and bomber sqns. as may be allotted to S.E. Army.
HOME GUARD
20. The Home Guard in the Corps area will play a vital part in the plan for defeating enemy invasion by:
(a) Holding defensively their own towns and villages throughout KENT, so as to restrict enemy movement.
(b) Providing O.Ps and small scouting parties to observe, and report on, enemy air landings or other enemy movement.
(c) Providing the Regular Army with guides and information.
A pool of expert local guides will be maintained at every village post office in KENT.
INTERCOMMUNICATION
21. H.Q. 12 Corps.
| TUNBRIDGE WELLS. | A mobile Adv. Corps H.Q. will move forward to HARRIETSHAM on or after “FORM CONCENTRATIONS” as Corps Comd. may direct at the time. |
| H.Q. Right forward Div. | SCHOOLS, SOUTH ASHFORD 441601 (moving there on “FORM CONCENTRATIONS”). |
| H.Q. Left forward Div. | CHAUCER BARRACKS, CANTERBURY 600765. |
| H.Q. Reserve Div. | Area MYSTOLE HO 5371. |
| H.Q. MAIDSTONE Sub-Area | AYLESFORD 1777 (moving shortly to MAIDSTONE). |
PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE
22. Commanders concerned will prepare their plans in accordance with the orders outlined above. These plans will not be called Defence Schemes, since this is liable to induce a defensive mentality. They will be called “Plans to Defeat Invasion”.
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE
23. The longer the war goes on the clearer it becomes that success in battle can only be achieved by vigorous offensive action. If the enemy is allowed to obtain the initiative and to develop his plans, no defences, however strong, will prevent him from achieving his object. All ranks must, therefore, be thoroughly imbued with the offensive spirit. They must be trained to regard their defences:
Firstly, as a means of inflicting heavy losses upon the enemy in his first rush.
Secondly, as a means of denying to the enemy avenues of approach through which he must not pass.
Thirdly, as pivots round which reserves can manoeuvre to exploit enemy failures and temporary disorganisation.
Every opportunity to counter-attack the enemy effectively will be seized, and at once. For this purpose Comds. of all grades will keep their reserves concentrated, and will employ them unhesitatingly and unflinchingly when opportunity offers, without waiting for doubtful contingencies which may never arise. It is only by such methods that the initiative can be regained in the defensive battle, and without the initiative we cannot win.
Lieutenant-General, Commander, 12 Corps.
(signed 11.00 hours) 26 Mar. ’42
Home Forces.
GENERAL
1. The area of England which is nearest to the enemy is EAST KENT and it is in this area that he is most likely to attempt the establishment of a bridgehead and lines of communication. Operations by reserve formations to destroy any enemy forces which have penetrated our defences in EAST KENT will depend to a large extent on the free use by the reserve formations of the roads between the Southern outskirts of LONDON and the SOUTH DOWNS. The destruction of any enemy forces which may have penetrated into SUSSEX is therefore complementary and vital to the defence of EAST KENT. Whilst it is not possible to make a detailed plan for every contingency this Instruction lays down the general principles upon which the moves of reserve formations will be based. Separate Instructions have been or will be issued regarding the probable roles of each reserve formation.
DEGREE OF READINESS
2. All reserve formations will be at 12 hours’ notice prior to STAND TO and at 4 hours’ notice after STAND TO. This implies that the heads of columns must be capable of passing Start Points in reasonable proximity at that notice.
CONCENTRATION AREAS
3. A list of selected divisional headquarters within these concentration areas is attached below.
4. Formations whether normally located in or outside the Command may be required to move to one of these areas either as a strategical move or immediately prior to deployment. The more likely concentration areas for each formation will be specified in the separate Instructions referred to in paragraph 1. Formations will carry out detailed reconnaissance of the areas so specified but will only be required to carry out general reconnaissances of the remaining areas as opportunity affords.
ROADS
5. The main reinforcement routes to the EAST, SOUTH-EAST, SOUTH and SOUTH-WEST will be known by letters. No other lettering of roads in the Command which may cause confusion with these will be permitted.
ORDERING OF MOVES
6. When a reserve formation is required to carry out a move to a concentration area which involves passing through the Army Traffic Control area (see paragraph 10 below) or from one Corps district to another, Army Headquarters, when ordering the move, will lay down the routes to be used, start points, dispersal points if necessary, and block timings. Corps will be consulted as regards routes passing through Corps districts. Whenever such a move can be anticipated and has not been already covered by a specific Operation Instruction, the formation concerned will be given warning in advance of the probable concentration areas, routes, start points etc. so that the executive order for the move can be given by message consisting merely of the code name of the concentration area and the time for heads of columns to pass start points.
COMMAND
7. After ACTION STATIONS commanders of reserve formations will be prepared to report to Army Headquarters at short notice if required. On being placed under command of a Corps, reserve formation commanders will report to Corps Headquarters as soon as possible after issuing any necessary preliminary orders. Command will pass at a time to be laid down by Army Headquarters when ordering the move.
LIAISON
8. Liaison officers from reserve formations located in the Command will report to Army Headquarters on STAND TO. Liaison officers from reserve formations located outside the Command will report as soon as possible after the formation has been ordered to move into the Command. As soon as a reserve formation is placed under command of a Corps, the Liaison officer at Army Headquarters will be released and will return to his formation to give his Commander the latest available information about the situation.
SPEED AND DENSITY
9. An appendix below shows the speeds and densities which will be observed and the approximate road times required by armoured and infantry formations. It is NOT normally desirable for one formation to cross another while in movement but maintenance vehicles and other traffic will be allowed to pass through gaps in convoys at pre-arranged points.
TRAFFIC CONTROL
10. The Army Traffic Control area is shown on the map attached at Appendix ‘A’ and is defined in greater detail at Annexure 29 to Section XIII of SOUTH-EASTERN ARMY Standing Administrative Instructions. Within this area the Army Traffic Control organization will be established on a static basis, functioning primarily on the main reinforcement routes. Certain points will be permanently manned after ACTION STATIONS, while others will be manned as required. A list of these points is contained in Annexure 28 to the above Administrative Instructions.
11. Within the Army Traffic Control area, Army Headquarters will control all movement, selecting and establishing the necessary Regulating Headquarters, Sector Controls and Traffic Posts in consultation with the formation moving. The latter may be required to provide personnel to supplement the Army personnel either as pointsmen or for sector controls operating under command of Army Traffic Control. Any additional traffic control arrangements made by the formation from its own resources will be co-ordinated with and subject to Army Traffic Control. The formation moving will in all cases send representatives with suitable means of communication to Army Regulating Headquarters and if required also to Army Sector Controls.
12. For moves outside the Army Traffic Control area, traffic control will be the responsibility of the formation moving and Army Traffic Control personnel will not normally be available. In the case of moves which are partially outside the Army Traffic Control area the formation moving will if necessary set up its own Regulating Headquarters in conjunction with the Army Regulating Headquarters.
METHOD OF ARRANGING DETAILS OF TRAFFIC CONTROL
15. Representatives of Army Headquarters will visit the Headquarters of the moving formation as soon as possible after the issue of the warning order to move, taking with them information relating to operational restrictions or requirements and to other movement which may affect the move in question. They will be ready with a proposed traffic control layout, which will be modified to meet the wishes of the Commander of the moving formation so far as conditions allow. If time does not permit the issue of written orders, these representatives will be authorized to complete all arrangements on the spot.
14. Traffic Control before Start Points and after Dispersal Points within as well as outside the Army Traffic Control area will be the responsibility of the formation moving.
INTERRUPTION OF ROAD MOVEMENT BY ENEMY ACTION ETC.
15. Commanders of formations and units moving within the Army Traffic Control area will retain the right under active conditions to take temporary control of the move if in their opinion the local tactical situation so demands, always bearing in mind that any action taken by them may affect other moves taking place at the same time. Any such action will be notified immediately to Army Traffic Control through the representatives of the moving formation at Army Regulating Headquarters, or Army Sector Controls.
OPERATION INSTRUCTION
16. SOUTH EASTERN COMMAND Operation Instruction No. 20 dated 22 Jul. ’41 is cancelled and will be destroyed.
17. ACKNOWLEDGE.
J.B. SINCLAIR, B.G.S.
Time of Signature 17.00 hrs.
S/J3
Annex ‘B’
TO SOUTH -EASTERN ARMY STANDING OPERATION INSTRUCTION No.3
Dated 19 January 1942
Annex ‘E’
TO SOUTH -EASTERN ARMY STANDING OPERATION INSTRUCTION No.3
Dated 19 January 1942
DAY
ARMOURED DIVISION
ARMOURED BRIGADE GROUP
INFANTRY DIVISION
| Speed | 12.5 m.i.h |
| Density v.t.m. | 15 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: One Road | |
| F | - |
| A | - |
| B | - |
| Total | 18 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: Two Roads | |
| F | - |
| A | - |
| B | - |
| Total | 9 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: Three Roads | |
| F | - |
| A | - |
| B | - |
| Total | 7.25 |
INFANTRY BRIGADE GROUP
| Speed | 12.5 m.i.h |
| Density v.t.m. | 15 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: One Road | |
| Total | 4.75 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: Two Roads | |
| Total | - |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: Three Roads | |
| Total | - |
NIGHT
ARMOURED DIVISION
| I Tanks | Wheels | |
| Speed | 12 m.i.2h | 12 m.i.2h |
| Density v.t.m. | 30 | 30 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: One Road | ||
| F | 5.5 | 5.5 |
| A | 2.75 | 2.75 |
| B | 9.5 | 9.5 |
| Total | 17.75 | 17.75 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: Two Roads | ||
| F | 3 | 3 |
| A | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| B | 6 | 6 |
| Total | 10.5 | 10.5 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: Three Roads | ||
| F | 2 | 2 |
| A | 1.25 | 1.25 |
| B | 3 | 3 |
| Total | 6.25 | 6.25 |
ARMOURED BRIGADE GROUP
| I Tanks | Wheels | |
| Speed | 12 m.i.2h | 12 m.i.2h |
| Density v.t.m. | 30 | 30 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: One Road | ||
| F | 2.25 | 2.25 |
| A | .75 | .75 |
| B | 1.25 | 1.25 |
| Total | 4.25 | 4.25 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: Two Roads | ||
| F | 1.25 | 1.25 |
| A | .5 | .5 |
| B | .75 | .75 |
| Total | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: Three Roads | ||
| F | .75 | .75 |
| A | .25 | .25 |
| B | .5 | .5 |
| Total | 1.5 | 1.5 |
INFANTRY DIVISION
| Speed | 7.5 m.i.h |
| Density v.t.m. | 15 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: One Road | |
| Total | 28 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: Two Roads | |
| Total | 14 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: Three Roads | |
| Total | 11 |
INFANTRY BRIGADE GROUP
| Speed | 7.5 m.i.h |
| Density v.t.m. | 15 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: One Road | |
| Total | 6 |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: Two Roads | |
| Total | - |
| Times Past a Point in Hours: Three Roads | |
| Total | - |
NOTES:
(a) At night speeds may be slightly faster or slower according to the obscurity of the night and the lighting allowed.
(b) In an operational move of Armd. Div. only the Fighting Echelon will go forward. ‘A’ echelon or a proportion of it will come up at the end of the day to replenish the Fighting Echelon. ‘B’ echelon is unlikely to move from Rear Div. area.
(c) Calculations are based on Fighting Echelon at 15 m.i.2h and ‘A’ and ‘B’ echelons at 25 m.i.2h by day, and all at 12 m.i.2h by night.
(d) Armd. Bde. Gp. includes one Bty. R.H.A. – one Bty. A.Tk. – one Bty. Lt. A.A. – one Fd. Tp. R.E. – one Sec. Lt. Fd. Amb.
(e ) At night timing for cruisers and I tanks will be the same.