Realising that he would require the agreement of the Supreme Government for the expansionist measures he had adopted in Sumatra, especially at Palembang, Raffles was pleased on his return to Bengkulu in August 1818 to receive Hastings’s invitation to visit Calcutta. He immediately engaged the small brig Udney to take him and Lady Raffles, and her brother William Hull, to Calcutta, where they arrived on 29 September after transferring to another vessel when their ship ran aground at the mouth of the Hugli River.
Raffles described his reception by the Governor-General in a letter to William Marsden dated 16 October 1818:
You will be happy to hear that I have made my peace with the Marquess of Hastings, and that his Lordship has at last acknowledged my exertions in Java in flattering terms. This was one object of my visit to Calcutta, and on it depended, in a great measure, the success of the others. I am now struggling hard to interest the Supreme Government in the Eastern Islands; and the measures taken by me at Palembang, &c. will, I doubt not, lead to the advantage of some defined line of policy being laid down for the future. With regard to the Dutch proceedings at Palembang, … Lord Hastings has unequivocally declared, that his mind is made up as to the moral turpitude of the transaction, and that he considers this but as one of a course of measures directed in hostility to the British interests and name in the Eastern Seas. My despatches are now under consideration, and it is uncertain what may be the immediate result. There is but one opinion in regard to the manner in which our interests have been sacrificed by the transfer of Java, &c. and it is clear that the government at home will be called upon from hence to interfere for the security of our trade; but in the mean time, and pending the reference to Europe, I fear that nothing decisive will be done. Lord Hastings is, I know, inclined to recommend our exchanging Bencoolen for Malacca, and to make the equator the limit.63
In a further letter to Marsden dated 14 November 1818, Raffles acknowledged that he had been unable to induce the Government “to enter warmly into my views with regard to Sumatra”, and that Padang was to be transferred to the Dutch without delay.64 He repeated this message in a letter to Charlotte, Duchess of Somerset, on the following day, stating that although he had received from Hastings “the strongest assurances of friendship and support”, he had been unable to persuade him “to cooperate in my plans for Sumatra” and that the Governor-General was also of opinion that Padang “should be given up to the Dutch and that it is to be regretted I interfered at Palembang – My station in Samanka Bay is considered likely to excite the jealousy of the Dutch and so out of delicacy to them we must nearly sacrifice every interest in Sumatra”.
Despite his evident resentment, he wrote a conciliatory letter to the Supreme Government on 16 November after receiving a formal statement of the views of the Governor-General on his political proceedings in Sumatra:
I … regret most deeply that I should have adopted any measures not in consonance with the wishes of His Lordship. His Lordship in Council may be assured that my proceedings will be entirely influenced by the orders which I have now received and that in all future communications with the agents of the Dutch Government the most conciliatory and amicable spirit shall be manifested.65
Official opposition to Raffles’s policies in Sumatra had been made known to him during the first week of November when he and Lady Raffles were guests of the Governor-General at his beautiful garden retreat at Barakpur, sixteen miles north of Calcutta, where he spent three days of every week escaping from the exacting duties of government business. During these discussions with Hastings and his officials, Raffles’s Sumatran policies were completely disavowed, and the fateful decision taken which led directly to the founding of Singapore.
Fig. 15
Barakpur, garden retreat of the Governor-General of India, where the decision was made to pursue a mission “to the Eastward”.
Drawing by Charles D’Oyly, published in Views of Calcutta and Its Environs.
Hastings, who by now had become convinced of the aggressive nature of Dutch activities in South-East Asia,66 decided that instead of extending British influence in Sumatra, a better and more direct way of countering Dutch threats to British interests, especially the China trade, was by establishing a station at the southern entrance of the Melaka Straits.67
Raffles reported the decision to the Duchess of Somerset on 15 November 1818:
I am now upon a new project and the object is to secure the command of the Straits of Malacca by establishing two commanding Ports at Acheen & Rhio – if the Dutch are not before hand with us, this plan offers great advantages and the civilization of Sumatra will commence from the Eastern instead of the Western side – … If I obtain the command at Rhio, which your Grace will recollect to have been one of my plans before I left England, I may eventually do a great deal –.68
Writing to Marsden on the previous day, he suggested that it had been owing to his own personal communications with members of the Supreme Government that they had become united “in opposing the grasping and excluding policy of the Dutch” and in keeping “the command of the Straits of Malacca, by forming establishments at Acheen and Rhio”.69 The most influential of these officials were John Adam, Private Political Secretary to the Governor-General, who became a member of the Supreme Council in January 1819,70 and Charles Milner Ricketts, a friend, confidant and “principal adviser” of Hastings who, according to Raffles, was “the most powerful advocate” in the country “for our Javan and Malayan cause”.71 Obviously, in discussions with Hastings and his officials, Raffles expressed his earlier ideas of establishing a British entrepôt in the Riau Archipelago, although by now these ideas were widely held in commercial and political circles in Calcutta.
Indeed, as early as October 1816, the threat posed to British interests in the region by the return of the Dutch to Melaka was clearly indicated by the Resident and Commandant of Melaka, Major William Farquhar, in a “Memorandum” addressed to the Prince of Wales Island government.72 In this, he stated that in the event of Melaka being restored to the Dutch, “it would be extremely desirable if a New British Settlement could be formed on some convenient spot near the S.E. entrance of these Straits, so as to lye as nearly as possible in the direct route of shipping passing to and from China and the Eastern Archipelago”. He thought that Riau, which had formerly been under Dutch control, would be “a very desirable place for us to occupy” because it was already an important commercial centre, although he admitted that it was “rather out of the way of ships passing to China thro’ the Straits of Sincapour – but not so far as to cause any material delay in touching there”. He considered that it would be less costly than establishing a new settlement and would have the advantage of preserving to Great Britain “a share at least of that influence over the Malay States, which by the restitution of Malacca will most undoubtedly fall entirely into the hands of the Dutch”. After discussing the matter with the Governor of Prince of Wales Island, Colonel John Alexander Bannerman, in April 1818, Farquhar received on his return to Melaka instructions from the Pinang government to conclude commercial treaties with the rulers of Riau, Lingga, Siak and Pontianak. He was forestalled at Pontianak by the return of the Dutch in the person of the Commissioner, Jacob d’Arnaud van Boekholtz, but at Pulau Penyengat in the Riau Archipelago he was able to conclude a treaty with the Bugis Yang Dipertuan Muda, Raja Jaafar, on behalf of Sultan Abdul Rahman of Johor, granting the British favoured-nation trading privileges in the ports of Johor, Pahang, Lingga and Riau, and binding the Sultan from renewing obsolete treaties with other nations. A similar treaty was concluded with the ruler of Siak in eastern Sumatra.73
Fig. 16
Government House, Calcutta, residence of the Governor-General, and seat of British power in the East.
Aquatint from J.B. Fraser’s Views of Calcutta (London, 1824–6).
Fig. 17
Major William Farquhar (1774–1839), Resident of Melaka 1808–1818, and subsequently first Resident and Commandant of Singapore, 1819–1823.
The fact that a commercial treaty had been concluded with the Bugis ruler of Riau, while still independent of Dutch control, had an important bearing on the instructions which Raffles received from the Governor-General on 28 November 1818.74 Three days before they were issued, Hastings had written to the Secret Committee expressing his regret at having to adopt a “tone of censure” on Raffles’s actions in Sumatra, but nevertheless expressing such “general confidence” in him that “we have actually entrusted to him the conduct of an important service to the Eastward”.75 The instructions, which according to the Calcutta merchant, John Palmer, were drafted by Raffles himself, refer initially to the Dutch exclusionist policies in the Eastern Seas, and the consequent need of the British “to secure the free passage of the Straits of Malacca” by “the establishment of a Station beyond Malacca, such as may command the southern entrance of the Straits”. Riau was stated to possess “the greatest advantages for this purpose”, as it effectually commanded “both the Straits of Malacca and of Sincapore”, and Farquhar’s recent engagement with the ruler offered “the most favourable opening for improving and confirming our connexion with the Government of the country”. However, the instructions were framed on the assumption that the Dutch had not re-established their base in the Riau Archipelago, and in the event of their having done so, Raffles was ordered to “abstain from all negotiation and collision” with them.76
Wishing to secure the continued benefit of Farquhar’s “Experience & talents”, the Supreme Government on 28 November addressed a letter to him at Pinang ordering him to accompany the mission “with a view to your remaining in the local charge of the British Interests in that quarter” under Raffles’s general superintendence.77 The fact that Raffles as a relative outsider was given the superior role in conducting British policy in the Straits of Melaka was viewed with hostility by many in both India and Pinang, including John Palmer, who considered that it was “the very height of injustice” to have him benefiting from the fruits of Farquhar’s earlier labours in the Riau Archipelago and at Siak. “I do hope, my Friend,” he wrote to Farquhar, that you will be employed to complete and perfect the only substantially important measures which have been attempted since the Peace with Holland in these Seas; and that even Sir Stamford may not be used to diminish the value of your previous services”. He urged him to “hang on another year and see the Issue of Events, big as they are likely to be, to the Eastward”.78
Farquhar kept Raffles informed of developments in the Straits, though he was not the source of the rumours which began circulating in Calcutta early in December that the Dutch had returned to Riau. It was still unknown that a naval force had sailed from Melaka on 3 November 1818 under the command of Vice-Admiral Johan Constantijn Wolterbeek and that a new treaty had been concluded with the Bugis and Malay rulers of Riau,79 but the rumours carried sufficient weight for Raffles to be issued with supplementary orders on 5 December advising him that “in the event of the previous occupation of Rhio by the Dutch, or other circumstances preventing the accomplishment of our views at that port and at Lingen, it might be expedient to endeavour to establish a connection with the Sultan of Johor on the same footing as is now contemplated with Rhio and Lingen”.
Clearly displaying an ignorance of the political structure of the Johor empire, the Supreme Government stated that the position of Johor rendered it “nearly, or perhaps entirely, as convenient a post for our purpose as Rhio; but the imperfect information possessed by the Government, both of the local circumstances of the town and harbour[,] and the condition and relations of the State of Johor, induce the Governor-General in Council to prefer a connection with the Chief of Rhio, and his immediate superior, the Rajah of Lingen, if it be practicable”. But it would be necessary to obtain correct information of the “local capabilities of Johor for a British port, such as we are desirous of establishing at the mouth of the Straits of Malacca”.80
Raffles had written a few days earlier to Charlotte, Duchess of Somerset, stating that he had now
accomplished the principal object of my visit to Bengal and purpose embarking once more for the Eastern Islands in the course of four or five days – I yet hope to be in time to do something for the public good, but the policy of the Dutch and the unreserved terms of the [1814] Convention preclude me from being very sanguine – … The Dutch have seized the principal parts of Borneo and declared themselves Sovereigns of the whole Island – they are also determined to have the best parts of Sumatra – my views are in consequence now turned towards Siam where I hope to have the field to myself – My next letter however will apprize your Grace whether any thing can be done against the Dutch – and until I know this myself, I can hardly speculate on my future views & plans with any certainty – if I obtain a Station at Rhio, you will hear from me very often and by every passing Ship –.81
