Raffles sailed from Calcutta with his entourage on 7 December on board HCS Nearchus (under the command of William Maxfield), accompanied by another Bengal vessel, HCS Minto (J.S. Criddle). Three days later, he wrote to the Duchess of Somerset off the Sandheads, informing her of his “unfortunate illness” in Calcutta and of his having embarked on his return to the Eastern Islands, “which I doubt not I shall find as fresh and blooming as ever except where they may be blasted by the corrupt and tainted hand of the Dutch”. He again reported his success in having “at last succeeded in making the Authorities in Bengal sensible of their supineness in allowing the Dutch to exclude us from the Eastern Seas”, but he feared that it was now “too late to retrieve what we have lost”:
I have full powers to do all we can and if any thing is to be done, I think I need not assure your Grace that it shall be done – and quickly done – But the main questions must depend upon the Authorities in Europe and unless we can regain Banca and keep the Dutch out of Borneo & Sumatra no good can be expected – They are now almost the most powerful Nation in India – Their naval force is immense and they have 15000 European Troops besides Natives –.82
On his arrival at Pinang on 29 December 1818, Raffles received confirmation that the Dutch had indeed re-established themselves in the Riau Archipelago “with a large naval and military force” under the terms of a new treaty concluded with the Bugis and Malay rulers on 27 November, the intelligence having been communicated to Prince of Wales Island by Farquhar in a letter dated 14 December.83
Fig. 18
Fort Cornwallis, Prince of Wales Island (Pinang).
Aquatint by Baily, London, 1813, after a watercolour drawing by William Westall, 1804.
Realising the urgent need to adapt his plans to the changed circumstances, he discussed the matter with Governor Bannerman, who had been informed independently by the Supreme Government of Raffles’s orders, and who at this time was not openly hostile to his mission.84 Bannerman sent him on 31 December a copy of the correspondence between Farquhar and the Dutch Commissioners at Melaka, Jan Samuel Timmerman Thijssen and Vice-Admiral J.C. Wolterbeek, in which the latter claimed in “very strong and decided language” that the Riau Archipelago, Johor, and Pahang were dependencies of the Netherlands. But Bannerman assured Raffles that if he decided to pursue his mission, despite the Dutch return to Riau, and his own advice not to do so, he would nevertheless have “the most cordial & efficient assistance and co-operation” from the Prince of Wales Island government.85
However, in a private letter to Hastings dated 1 January 1819, Bannerman forcibly expressed his opposition to Raffles’s mission and informed the Governor-General of the “unqualified sentiments” of the Prince of Wales Island government “against the possibility of the British Govt in India now executing any advantageous political relations with the Malay states to the Eastward” as “the period for such a measure had passed, & that any attempt now made … to gain a footing among these States, would infalably [sic] produce a collision the most serious, between ourselves & the Netherlandish authorities of Java, who seem determined to overpower all opposition by a preponderating Naval as well as Military force”.86
Fig. 19
Colonel John Alexander Bannerman (1759–1819), Governor of Prince of Wales Island 1817–19.
Contemporary miniature portrait.
In a letter to Bannerman strongly opposing this opinion, Raffles stated that it would be inconsistent with the British national character or interests to yield in face of presumed Dutch rights, and when “the eyes of the whole Malayan race are turned upon us at this moment”, there was no alternative, “in order to uphold character with the Native Chiefs”, than “to make a stand in some Port to the Eastward of Malacca where the Dutch may not have preoccupied”. He admitted that it might be difficult to find “an Islet throughout the whole range of the Archipelago, to which they will not lay claim”, but so long as “we refrain from all collision in any spot where they have Troops or a Station, we surely may consider ourselves in common with every Malay & Bugguese adventurer entitled to a footing on any unoccupied Territory”. In this respect, “The Island of Singapura or the Districts of old Johor appear to me to possess peculiar & great advantages … The Carimon Islands have also advantages”.87
In refusing to give priority to his mission to Aceh, rather than to the Eastward, Raffles soon fell out with the Prince of Wales Island government,88 which expressed its opposition to detaching 500 men from its military establishment to support him.89 In a heated exchange of letters, Bannerman denied that he was unwilling to cooperate with Raffles’s plans, but he maintained that Raffles’s instructions made Aceh the first object of his mission and he appealed to the Supreme Government on the point. He also categorised Raffles’s idea of securing the island of Bangka as “chimerical” and inspired by “views of personal ambition”, and claimed that Raffles’s plan to establish a port in Johor or in the Straits of Singapore would frustrate the object of the Anglo-Dutch negotiations in Europe when the opportunity for direct negotiation with the Malay States had already passed. Nevertheless, if Raffles continued with his plan (“and I fear my remonstrance will have little effect on his restless, enterprising and ambitious spirit”), any settlement formed to the Eastward should be placed under the authority of the Prince of Wales Island government.90
Raffles, in the meantime, had informed Hastings of the return of the Dutch to Riau, and of rumours of Russian support being given to Dutch colonial activities in the region, which added urgency to the acquisition of a station commanding the southern entrance of the Straits of Melaka, despite the “hazard” of any counter-claim:91
Letter 4
Raffles to Hastings
8 January 1819
Penang 8th. January 1819
My Lord,
I have the honor to inform your Lordship of my arrival at this Port on 30th. Ultimo –
I am sorry to report that the Dutch have preoccupied the Station of Rhio and that there is some reason to believe they will set up a claim to extend their influence over the whole of the ancient territories of Johor. These include the Southern extremity of the Peninsula and the whole of the Islands lying off that entrance to the Straits – We are not however as yet informed of the precise nature of their engagements with Rhio – We only know that the Chief refused for a considerable time to admit them without express permission from the English, and that they at length succeeded by force – and that whatever may be the political obligations under which the Chief has been placed, he has succeeded in keeping the Dutch out of his Capital and in preserving his person free from their immediate control – The Dutch force left at Rhio consists of 30 Europeans and as many Natives and we have no reason to believe there are at present any Ships of War to the Northward of the Line –
In the present state of my information and that I may avoid all collision with the Dutch Authorities, I have thought it most prudent not to proceed further East for the present – but as it is an object to know the precise nature of the engagements which the Chief of Rhio may have entered into with the Dutch and how far we may obtain a just title to some Station in the vicinity where we may establish ourselves without collision with the Dutch, I have resolved to depute Major Farquhar on a Mission in the first instance to Rhio – where he will merely ask for information – he will afterwards according to the information he may receive proceed to obtain more detailed particulars regarding Johor – the Carimon Islands &c and act according to circumstances –
The intelligence which I have recently received from Batavia & from Malacca confirms the Reports of the Dutch having the support of Russia in their present plans92 – Russia if not already in possession of the Sandwich Islands is openly stated to have taken measures to that effect – and a connected Chain of Ports between the Dutch Capital and the North Eastern Possessions of Russia is the declared object of policy – In two or three months the Dutch Authorities say, the Plans of Russia and the extended policy of the two Nations will be fully developed – Japan is said to be an eventual object of attack, but the conveyance of Tea from China to Malacca whence they may be smuggled into Great Britain by Free Traders and others seems to be a more immediate object with the Dutch – Speculations of this nature are already talked of and a visit to Malacca by the Governor General of Batavia on the change of the Monsoon in May or June, is the period assigned for a public declaration of the plans and prospects of the Dutch –
In short, My Lord, from every information I have been able to obtain, and my means are rather extensive, it would seem that what the Dutch have already done is only to be considered as a preliminary to some more extensive policy not yet divulged, and when we consider the poverty of Holland, the limited extent of the Resources of Java & advert to the immense force maintained in the Eastern Seas, naval & military & to the extensive disbursements which must be occasioned by the occupation of so many Dependencies, it seems reasonable to conclude that Holland must secretly be aided by some other power –
Should this be the case we may expect much demur on their part in acceding to any of the proposed arrangements which have been recommended to Europe, and unless in this Country we manage to command the Straits of Malacca before their ripen’d plans & policy are avowed and acted upon, we may find it too late –
My Instructions and the wishes of your Lordship are so decided with regard to my avoiding all interference where the Dutch may even set up a claim, that under existing circumstances it is very doubtful whether I can do any thing effectual – but while we carefully abstain from an interference in any Island where the Dutch may be actually established or where the Dutch flag may fly, it may be questionable whether our own safety may not dictate the propriety of establishing ourselves in an advantageous position – even at the hazard of a subsequent claim being set up by the Dutch – They can set up no claim that cannot well be contested, and notwithstanding all we have heard of their Naval and Military Force there is no chance that they would attempt to dislodge any respectable Establishment.
From every inquiry I have made I am fully satisfied of the value & importance of the Island of Sincapore which commands Johor – There is a most excellent Harbour which is even more defensible and more conveniently situated for the protection of our China Trade and for commanding the Straits than Rhio – it has been deserted for Centuries and long before the Dutch power existed in these Seas – There are about 2000 Inhabitants upon it (new settlers) under a respectable Chief – but it is probable the Dutch may say we have no right to go there as it forms part of the ancient Territory of Johor –
I have mentioned to Mr Adam93 some particulars regarding this State & one object of Major Farquhar’s Mission will be to obtain full information on the subject –
I have taken measures for surveying the Carimons – and your Lordship may confidently rely that while I omit no measure for permanently establishing our influence I shall cautiously avoid all collision with the Dutch – It would however be of much importance to me to receive your Lordship’s sentiments through Mr. Adam or otherwise whether under the alter’d state of affairs we should not act with more decision than at first contemplated – I am the more anxious to receive these sentiments as the local Government are divided in their opinions and the Majority are adverse to any Settlement to the Eastward of Penang –
I purpose proceeding in the course of a few days to Acheen accompanied by Captain Coombs,94 whence if any essential change has taken place we shall lose no time in communicating to Bengal –
I have the honor to remain with the highest respect
Yr Lordship’s most obedient & devoted servant
T S Raffles
The Most Noble
The Marquess of Hastings KG
&c. &c. &c.
The preference for a British settlement at Singapore, expressed in this private letter to Hastings written a week after arriving at Pinang, establishes beyond all doubt that this was Raffles’s principal objective when he set out from Calcutta, having already suggested as much in a letter to William Marsden.95 That it continued to be so, even after the return of the Dutch to Riau, is also clearly indicated in a despatch he addressed to the Governor-General’s Political Secretary, John Adam, on 16 January 1819.96 In this long document, he reported the information he had obtained from Asian traders and others with regard “to the capabilities of Sincapore, & other stations” in the vicinity of the ancient Malay capital of Johor Lama, and he affirmed that Singapore,
independently of the straits & harbour of Johor which it both forms & commands[,] has on its southern shores, & by means of the several smaller Islands which lie off it, excellent anchorage and smaller harbours, and seems in every respect most peculiarly adapted for our object. Its position in the Straits of Sincapore, is far more convenient & commanding than even Rhio, for our China Trade passing down the Straits of Malacca, & every native vessel that sails thro’ the Straits of Rhio must pass in sight of it.
Moreover, on grounds of salubrity,
there does not seem to be any objection to a Station at Sincapore, or on the opposite shore towards Point Romania or on any of the smaller Islands which lie off this part of the Coast. The larger Harbour of Johore is declared by professional men whom I have consulted, and by every Eastern trader of experience to whom I have been able to refer, to be capacious & easily defensible, & the British Flag once hoisted, there would be no want of supplies to meet the immediate necessities of an Establishment. The Population here as well as throughout the Archipelago of Islands at the entrance of the Straits of Malacca, for the most part resides on the water, moving from one Island to another as their necessities and interests dictate, and might be expected to flock in considerable numbers under our protection.
Raffles was unable to clarify the present political state of the Johor empire, but it had been in decline since the Dutch established themselves at Melaka. The latter had supported the nominal authority of Johor in order to prevent the ruler from ceding the Karimun Islands or other parts of his territories to the British, but “it would be absurd to suppose that 60 men stationed at Rhio, are to exclude us from communication, & even from forming engagements in any of the other Islands where it may be for our interest to settle”. To argue the contrary “would be to sacrifice a great national interest in deference to a principle & policy as unjustifiable as they are manifestly illiberal and injurious: it would be to give up the right of protecting our Eastern Commerce, a right for which we have been solicitous since our first Establishment in India, for no other reason but because it has pleased a subordinate Dutch authority to declare himself adverse to the exercise of it”.
Raffles then gave an account of the succession dispute in the Johor empire following the death of Sultan Mahmud Shah in 1812, details of which he had obtained from Farquhar following his mission to the Riau-Lingga Archipelago in 1818, and also from his own conversations with Asian traders from Johor. He argued that if the details of the account were correct, “we may possibly find at Johor or in its vicinity, a competent authority with whom to treat, and in this case, should that position be attainable in other respects, we shall have lost nothing essential by the preoccupation of Rhio by the Dutch”. Already, it would seem, Raffles had decided on a strategy of finding a Malay ruler independent of Dutch authority with whom he could make contractual arrangements for the surrender of territory, a strategy which may have been suggested to him by Farquhar, who knew of the disputed claims to the sultanate of Johor through his correspondence with Tengku Hussain Muhammad while he was Resident at Melaka.
A British port in the Lingga Archipelago, where the Malay rulers had established themselves at Daik, free from the immediate control of the Bugis regime at Pulau Penyengat, was considered by Raffles to be too far south to command the Straits of Melaka and was also inconvenient for large ships. It was therefore unsuitable as a principal British station, though it might “deserve more consideration, on account of the rank of the Chief, & its affording a secure resting place for our flag, with a view to ulterior arrangements at Sincapore or elsewhere”. Therefore if there was still an opening for a British establishment in the vicinity of Johor, and should difficulties arise in procuring the required title, such a title “may be fairly expected from the Sultan of Lingin, the nominal Chief of Johor”. Moreover, the vicinity of Lingga to the Karimun Islands “will at all times give us the command of such Stations, as they may afford for our shipping”, and a position at Lingga, maintained with an inconsiderable force, will enable the port of Riau to be “more effectually commanded”.
In conclusion, Raffles informed the Supreme Government that as the Karimun Islands had been suggested by Farquhar “as affording advantages for our proposed Port”, he had requested Captains Daniel Ross and J.G.F. Crawford, commanding the Bombay Marine survey ships, Discovery and Investigator, recently arrived from Macau, to make a general survey of the islands as part of their hydrographical survey of the Straits of Melaka,97 and report the result to Farquhar as he proceeded down the Straits. “[S]hould we fail at Sincapore”, Raffles wrote, clearly indicating his preference, “these Islands may deserve immediate consideration, but for the present as they are not likely to be occupied by the Dutch, I should consider a decision upon them premature”.
