Peter Van Der Veer claims that religion had been crucial in the formation of national identities both in India and in supposedly
secular Britain. During the first half of the nineteenth century, while the Utilitarians tried to define modernity in terms
of utility and rationality, the evangelicals attempted to define it in terms of Christian morality. Veer contends that even
during the Industrial Revolution, religious expansion occurred
simultaneously with secularization. Moreover, the impact of scientific discoveries, especially the evolutionary theories of
Darwin, on the decline of religion as a belief system must not be exaggerated. The separation of church and state did not
lead, claims Veer, to a decline in the social and political importance of religion. In Veer’s view, the Indians did not look
upon the colonial state as a secular entity but as a fundamentally Christian one.
1During the seventeenth century, the East India Company (hereinafter EIC) was a minor power in South Asia. The EIC’s small
forces were repeatedly defeated by the indigenous powers. However, the scenario started changing rapidly beginning in the
1750s. From coastal enclaves, the EIC started projecting power into the interior of the subcontinent. One after other, the
indigenous powers were defeated and destroyed. By 1849, the EIC had gained political dominance on the subcontinent. The EIC’s
military success was not merely the result of importing the military institutions that had emerged in Western Europe. One
of the principal factors behind British military success on the subcontinent was the use of Indian military manpower for imperial
purposes. The EIC had to utilize indigenous military manpower because the demographic resources of Britain were inadequate
for conquering India. Further, Indian manpower was not only cheaper but also more effective in the terrain and climate of
South Asia.
2During the late seventeenth century, the land forces maintained by the EIC were in a sorry state. In 1664, the EIC’s garrison
at Bombay numbered 400 men.
3 In 1699, the EIC’s military force in Bengal numbered 130 men plus some artillerymen.
4 Gradually, the size of the colonial military establishment rose. This was made possible by effective utilization of South
Asian manpower. In 1773, the EIC possessed 9,000 European and 45,000 Indian soldiers.
5 In 1813, there were 21,940 British troops and
179,632 Indian troops in South Asia organized into three armies: those of Bengal, Madras and Bombay.
6The EIC’s Indian military personnel were long-term volunteers who served willingly for about twenty-five years. Because of
South Asia’s huge demographic resources, military service had always been voluntary. Between 1600 and 1800, the population
of the subcontinent rose from 150 million to about 200 million.
7 Younger sons of small farmers joined the army in order to supplement their family income, especially after the harvest was
over. Moreover – unlike the situation in eighteenth-century Britain, where military service was unpopular
8 – in India there were several communities who regarded military service, under any power broker, as honourable. National
consciousness did not exist among the Indians at that time.
9 The attractions of regular pay and a pension pulled Indians into the EIC’s forces. The British officers won the trust of
the sepoys by showing deference to their religious and cultural sensibilities. Language training for communication with the
sepoys and sowars was part of British officers’ professional expertise.
10 On 22 August 1806, the commander-in-chief of India ordered the British officers to become thoroughly acquainted with the
‘native’ languages
11 in order to effectively command the
Purbiyas of the Bengal army.
The Mughal government recruited musketeers from the high castes (Brahmins and Rajputs) of Awadh and Buxar. They were known
as
Purbiyas (men from Purab, i.e., east India).
12 The
Purbiyas joined the
Maratha
campoos (brigades comprised of infantry armed and trained in Western style by European mercenaries). The
Dal Khalsa of Ranjit Singh also recruited the
Purbiyas and the Gurkhas into the infantry. These communities were also tapped by the EIC. In the 1820s, most of the sepoys of the
Bengal army were
Purbiyas. This was partly because the British officers believed that tall yeomen peasantry made the best infantry recruits and that
the higher the caste, the more respectable and well-behaved were the men.
13 The
Purbiyas were five feet eight inches tall, hence the British officers liked to recruit them.
14 In 1823, the commander-in-chief of India extended the recruiting base of the Bengal army’s infantry to Allahabad, Meerut,
Bundelkhand and Rohilkhand.
15 In 1825, the Brahmins and the Rajputs constituted 80 percent of the Bengal army, and Muslims constituted another 10 percent.
These three communities came from Awadh, Bihar and Rohilkhand.
16 Most of the Hindu sowars were Rajputs and Marathas. The low castes were not recruited due to the hostility of the high castes
who had joined the EIC’s units.
17The EIC was cautious in introducing Western dress for the sepoys. The introduction of leather cockades along with declining
service conditions sparked the Vellore Mutiny among the sepoys in the Madras Army in 1806. According to high-caste Hindu soldiers’
cultural mores, the use of leather resulted in a loss of caste.
18 Feeding a multi-ethnic army made the logistical task complex. The EIC had to take care of the dietary preferences of their
indigenous soldiers, which in turn were shaped by culture. Among the South Asian military personnel, the Gurkhas and the Muslims
consumed beef. Most of the high-caste Hindu soldiers were vegetarians. The Madras army’s sepoys consumed rice.
19 In the Bengal army’s infantry regiments, dominated by Brahmins, messing was impossible. The caste rule was that a Brahmin
could not touch food that had not been prepared by himself or his relatives or by members of his own
gotra (sub-division
within a caste). So messing was not possible for the Brahmins, and each Brahmin soldier prepared his own food (rice,
ghee [clarified butter] and vegetables) and ate alone. However, during campaigns, they depended on
puris (fried bread made of wheat) and
laddus (sweetmeats), which they prepared and carried in haversacks.
20The British-officered Indian army was used before the 1857 uprising to annex the various independent kingdoms of the subcontinent.
After 1859, the British-led Indian army was used for internal policing, that is, for guarding India against the Indians on
behalf of the white masters. To an extent, the Indian army was also used to protect the
Raj from a Russian invasion of India through Afghanistan. Before World War I, the Indian army was comprised of 128,854 sepoys
and about 25,036 sowars. The Imperial Service Troops (British-commanded armies of the Indian princes) numbered about 22,479
men.
21 The British garrison in India numbered 75,000 personnel.
22 During the two world wars, the Indian army was used as an imperial reserve. Between 1914 and 1918, 877,068 combatants were
recruited from India.
23 Between 1919 and 1930, the percentage of recruits supplied by Punjab and North-West Frontier Province rose from 46 percent
to 58.5 percent. The percentage of Nepal, Garhwal and Kumaun rose from 14.8 percent to 22 percent for the same period.
24 Through voluntary enlistment, the Indian army between September 1939 and August 1945 expanded from 189,000 to 2,500,000 men.
25One of the reasons behind the revolt of the Brahmins and Rajputs of the Bengal army in 1857 was the fact that they did not
like the British policy of overseas deployment. The British frequently used the Bengal army as an imperial reserve, but the
high-caste soldiers believed that crossing the
kalapani (sea) resulted in loss of caste. During the pre-1857 era, the British relied on caste categories to recruit selected communities
into the army. However, the 1857 mutiny of the Bengal army resulted in the replacement of a policy of categorizing Indian
communities by caste with a policy based on race.
26 For the British, there was much similarity between caste and race. Religious, occupational and hereditary factors determined
the nature of a caste/race in British eyes.
27 Important scholar-officials of the
Raj like W. W. Hunter and Herbert Risley conceived of castes as ethnologically based races.
28 From the late nineteenth century, the Martial Race theory shaped recruitment policy.
According to the Martial Race theory, only selected communities on the subcontinent, for biological and cultural reasons,
were capable of bearing arms. The father figure of the Martial Race theory was Lord Roberts (the commander-in-chief of India
from 1885 to 1893). In 1882, Roberts, then commander-in-chief of the Madras army, argued that the people inhabiting west and
south India lacked courage and possessed inferior physiques.
29 He believed that the fighting races of the subcontinent were the Sikhs, Gurkhas, Dogras, Rajputs and Pathans.
30 The Dogras recruited from eastern Punjab and the hills of Jammu and Kashmir were actually Rajputs who inhabited the mountainous
regions of the above-mentioned provinces.
31 The imperial belief was that the
vedas designated the Rajputs as warriors.
32 Table 6.1 shows that the ‘martial races’ dominated the British-led Indian army just prior to World War I. Roberts’s concept influenced
the British officers even during the Second World War. For instance, in July 1943, Lieutenant-General G. N. Molesworth noted
that the virile races were the Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, Rajputs, Dogras, Pathans and Jats.
33
The Indian National Congress (henceforth INC) was set up as a ‘safety valve’ in 1887 by a liberal British named A. O. Hume.
44 In 1907, the INC was divided into moderate and extremist wings.
45 In January 1915, M. K. Gandhi returned to India from South Africa.
46 By 1919, Gandhi was controlling the INC.
47 Demonstrations and a massive procession organized by the Home Rule League were held in connection with the Rowlatt
Satyagraha in 1919 at Aligarh. The charisma of Gandhi encouraged people from both the Hindu and Muslim communities to join the movement
and boycott government institutions.
48 However, Gandhi’s alliance with the Muslims through cooperation with the
Khilafat movement leaders (i.e., the Ali brothers) soon collapsed. The
Khilafat leaders were actually demonstrating grievances against the British following the abolition of the
caliphate in Turkey in the aftermath of World War I. In response to India’s contribution of men and materials to the British Empire
during World War I, and also to appease the rising nationalist forces, the British Government decided to offer some political
concessions to the Indians. In 1917, the Montagu Declaration promised Indians ‘responsible’ government. The 1919 Government
of India Act (based on the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms) introduced
dyarchy (joint rule) in provincial and central government. In 1928, the INC demanded dominion status. In response, to ward off agitation,
on 31 October 1929, Viceroy Lord Irwin issued his dominion status declaration. In 1930, Gandhi launched the salt march at
Dandi. The stated grievance was that the Indians refused to pay salt tax to an alien government; it was the inviolable right
of every Indian to make salt from sea water.
49 Following Gandhi’s civil disobedience campaign, the British government passed the Government of India Act, which allowed
the Indian political parties to form ministries at the provinces. In 1942, Gandhi launched his last and greatest mass movement,
called ‘Quit India’. Ultimately, in 1947, British India was divided into two independent states, India and Pakistan. In 1948,
Gandhi was assassinated by a Hindu fundamentalist named Nathuram Godse.
50 The British government accused the INC of being a Hindu body and not representative of the ‘Indian nation’. There were some
elements of truth in the British accusation.
There were about eighty million Muslims in South Asia, and Muslims constituted about 25 percent of British India’s population
in the early twentieth century.
51 Political and social developments within India widened the rift between the Hindu and Muslim communities. In 1867, Hindu
leaders
demanded the replacement of Urdu with Hindi in the United Provinces. The
Arya Samaj was established in Bombay in 1875 and in Lahore in 1877. Similarly, an Islamic seminary was established at Deoband. The net
result was consolidation of the religious identities of both Hindus and Muslims on the subcontinent. Millions of people who
had lived under tribal and folk traditions and outside the influence of the scriptures of the great religious traditions (rigid
scriptural Islam, Brahmanism, etc.) were persuaded to make their identities and their commitments clear. As a result, these
‘outsiders’ now began to move towards the different great religious traditions. This, in turn, resulted in a hardening of
religious boundaries and identities. Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar (born 1820), an ardent Bengali nationalist and social reformer,
proclaimed himself at one level a humanist and an atheist but at another level, for the purpose of reforming the ‘decadent’
Hindu society, he justified rationalism on the basis of classical Hindu texts. The
shuddhi (purification) movement of the
Arya Samaj also aggravated Hindu-Muslim tensions. To give an example, during 1923–4, in the Agra-Mathura region, the
Arya Samaj persuaded 150,000 Muslims to convert to Hinduism.
52 Towards the end of the nineteenth century,
ganapati festivals and a cow protection movement by Marathi Hindu leaders like B. G. Tilak further inflamed the situation. At the
local level in north India, the idiom of discourse was vernacular and religious, and the rhetoric of local politics among
the lower classes was Hindu in content.
53 Nationalist leaders like Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai, Bipin Chandra Pal and Aurobindo Ghosh, who belonged to the
extremist wing of the INC, equated the nation with the Hindu community, and Hindu religion became the natural paradigm for
describing the national ethos.
54 As a reaction, in 1906, the Muslims demanded separate electorates from the viceroy.
55 The Morley-Minto reforms of 1908–9 gave Indians some representation in provincial and central government. The British, in
order to prevent the emergence of a joint Hindu-Muslim opposition, went ahead with the introduction of separate electorates
in the Indian Councils Act of 1909.
56 From then onwards, Hindu and
Muslim leaders could look only to their co-religionists for winning elections. William Gould asserts that the widening of
communalism in public life was encouraged by the INC leaders’ representation of the national polity using Hindu symbols.
57 The INC’s dependence on Hindu religious symbols and on Hindu organizations like the
Mahasabha and the
Arya Samaj for mobilizing Hindus further alienated the Muslims, who perceived that the INC’s goal was Hindu
raj.
58 Throughout the early 1930s, the INC leaders in the United Provinces organized meetings during religious festivals and bathing
fairs. The vernacular newspapers associated with the ‘leftist’ and ‘secular’ Congress position also used Hindu religious imagery.
59 In the 1937 election, the INC was able to secure only 5.4 percent of the total Muslim seats. In the elections of 1945–6,
the Muslim League won 427 of the 507 Muslim seats and formed ministries in the two Muslim-majority provinces, Bengal and Sind.
In the provincial elections held in February 1946, the Muslim League won 88.8 percent of the Muslim seats.
60 The failure of the INC to carry the Muslims was due in part to Gandhi’s techniques of mass mobilization, which involved concepts
like
satyagraha,
swaraj,
sarvodaya,
ahimsa,
harijan,
Ramrajya, and so on. All these idioms were derived from Hinduism, as the following discussion shows.
Much of Gandhi’s philosophy could be culled from
Hind Swaraj, which was written in November 1909. Gandhi’s objective was to transmit the ‘mighty message of
ahimsa’ to the rest of the world through the English language. Anthony J. Parel writes that
Hind Swaraj was addressed to the British living in India and Britain and also to expatriate Indians who were attracted to terrorism,
and also to the extremist wing of the INC.
61 The underground Bengal revolutionaries were supported by the Ramakrishna Mission. The Ramakrishna Mission was organized by
Swami Vivekananda during 1897–1902. Its central message was rejection of Western material superiority and assertion of the
spiritual superiority of Hinduism.
62 Interestingly, Gandhi’s philosophy
also reflected these trends. In 1921, Gandhi recalled that during his 1909 visit to London, he came in contact with several
Indian ‘anarchists’ and felt the need to write a book in response to their ‘immoral’ demand for political violence.
63In
Hind Swaraj, Gandhi linked the moral regeneration of India with its political emancipation from British rule. Gandhi made a distinction
between
swaraj as self-rule/self-government or the quest for home rule and establishment of a ‘good’ (i.e., righteous) state and
swaraj as the quest for self-improvement. Gandhi’s concept is similar to the concepts of inner/greater
jihad (self-purification of the Muslims) and inferior/lesser external
jihad (expanding
Dar al Islam into
Dar al Harb). Gandhi pushed the argument that modern civilization posed a greater threat than colonialism and that the latter was the
product of modern civilization. Basically,
Hind Swaraj pushed twin interlinked ideas: that worldly pursuits should give way to ethical living, and that there is no room for violence
against any human being. Later, in his collected works, Gandhi noted that one cannot build non-violence on factory civilization;
ahimsa could be built only on the basis of self-contained villages. Gandhi’s aim was also rapprochement between the Indians and
the British.
64 Gandhi critiqued the idea of the extremists and the revolutionaries that expulsion of the British and retention of their
political, military and economic institutions would result in
swaraj. Gandhi noted that they want the structure of British rule without the British personnel. Then it will not be Hindustan but
Englistan, and he is against this sort of
swaraj.
65 On 1 November 1921, Gandhi wrote that for him, attaining
swaraj is a part of the striving for
moksha.
66In Gandhi’s philosophy there is no religious act without political implications and no political act without religious overtones.
67 Gandhi believed that politics is part of
dharma and that political power is a means and not end.
68 On 12 May 1920, Gandhi claimed:
I have been experimenting with myself and my friends by introducing religion into politics. Let me explain what I mean by
religion. It is not the Hindu religion, which I certainly prize above all other religions, but the religion which transcends
Hinduism, which changes one’s very nature, which binds one indissolubly to the truth within and which even purifies… It was
in that religious spirit that I came upon
hartal. I wanted to show that it is not a knowledge of letters that would give India consciousness of herself, or that would bind
the educated together.
69
On 3 April 1924, Gandhi expounded that his patriotism is a stage in his journey to the land of eternal freedom and peace.
In his paradigm, there are no politics devoid of religion. Politics bereft of religion, warned Gandhi, are a death-trap because
they kill the soul.
70Gandhi once stated that there was adequate space in Hinduism for both Islam and Christianity.
71 On 11 August 1920, Gandhi wrote that his life was dedicated to the service of India through the religion of non-violence,
which according to him is the root of Hinduism.
72 Gandhi believed that the ancient epics and the vedic literature preached
ahimsa. Gandhi explained:
Even in 1888–9, when I first became acquainted with the
Gita, I felt that it was not an historical work, but that under the guise of physical warfare, it described the duel that perpetually
went on in the hearts of mankind, and that physical warfare was brought in merely to make the description of the internal
duel more alluring…. I do not regard the
Mahabharata as an historical work in the accepted sense…. The author of the
Mahabharata has not established the necessity of physical warfare; on the contrary he has proved its futility.
73
In an article in
Harijan (the newspaper published by Gandhi) dated 3 October 1936, Gandhi wrote that the epic describes the eternal duel between the
forces of darkness and of light.
74On 3 October 1936, in an article published in
Harijan, Gandhi clarified his modification of Hinduism as regards
ahimsa. Gandhi acknowledged that no Hindu ‘prophet’ before him had ever condemned violence in such strong language. Further, Hinduism,
in his eyes, is always evolving. The fact that, unlike the Koran and the Bible, there is no single book in Hinduism gives
it the scope and flexibility, wrote Gandhi, to adapt to the demands of the time.
75Gandhi claimed that he derived his concept of
dharma from the
Bhagavad Gita and the
Ramayana. In Gandhi’s view, the
Gita and the
Tulsidas
Ramayana preaches
dharma, which means concern for the welfare of others, and this leads to
ramrajya.
76 Gandhi’s concept of the force of love is derived from Tulsidas
Ramayana. Gandhi notes in
Hind Swaraj that the poet Tulsidas said that pity or love is the root of religion.
77Gandhi’s concept of
anasakti yoga (selfless, disinterested action) was influenced by disinterested action for the greater good as preached by Lord Krishna
in the
Bhagavad Gita.
78 Gandhi noted that the solution for most, if not all, problems is renunciation of the fruits of action. This is the core around
which the
Bhagavad Gita is woven.
79 On 21 December 1925, Gandhi had written:
When, thousands of years ago, the battle of Kurukshetra was fought, the doubts which occurred to Arjuna were answered by Shri
Krishna in the
Gita; but that battle of Kurukshetra is going on, will go on, for ever within us, the Prince of Yogis, Lord Krishna, the universal
atman dwelling in the hearts of us all, will always be there to guide Arjuna, the human soul, and our Godward impulses represented
by the Pandavas will always triumph over the demoniac impulses represented by the Kauravas.
80
On 16 March 1945, Gandhi wrote that fate is the fruition of
karma. Fate may be good or bad. Human effort consists in overcoming adverse fate or reducing its impact. There is a continuous
struggle between fate and human effort. Who can say which of them really wins? So we human beings must continue with our work
and leave the result to God.
81 Gandhi linked his concept of
anasakti yoga to
ahimsa in the following manner. He declared that when there is no desire for fruit, there is no temptation for untruth or
himsa.
82To an extent, Buddhism and Christianity also influenced Gandhi. On 12 May 1920, Gandhi wrote that Buddha would have died resisting
the priesthood if the majesty of his love had not proved equal to the task of bending the priesthood. And Christ died on the
Cross with a crown of thorns on his head defying the might of the Roman Empire. Gandhi admitted that he had learnt the message
of non-violence, in part, from these great masters.
83Gandhi made a distinction between Eastern and Western civilization, and he claimed that the latter was predominantly based
on force. Gandhi made a distinction between the humanistic Christian civilization and the modern Western civilization based
on barbarism.
84 In
Hind Swaraj, Gandhi describes the modern barbaric Western civilization as one that, according to the teachings of Prophet Muhammad, could
be considered a satanic civilization. And Hinduism calls it the Black Age.
85Gandhi believed in the use of force in some context. The
Hind Swaraj tells us that a petition, without the backing of force, is useless. However, Gandhi made a distinction between soul force
and brute force.
86 Gandhi says in the
Hind Swaraj:
Two kinds of force can back petitions. ‘We will hurt you if you do not give this’ is one kind of force; it is the force of
arms, whose evil results we have already examined. The second kind of force can thus be stated: ‘If you do not concede our
demand, we will be no longer your petitioners. You can govern us only so long as we remain the governed; we shall no longer
have any dealings with you.’ The force implied in this may be described as love-force, soul-force or, more popularly but less
accurately, passive resistance. This force is indestructible.
87
The Gujarati word for passive resistance is
satyagraha, a word derived from
sadagraha (firmness in a good cause).
88 Satyagraha could be defined as non-violent resistance. So
satyagraha is a sort of ‘just’ technique for waging just war.
Satyagraha means truth-force, that is, the power of truth directed towards the promotion of social welfare. Injustice and the attendant
hostility could be confronted through an appeal to conscience. However,
satyagraha is also a policy of action and non-violent resistance.
89 Gandhi’s non-violence requires active resistance to evil.
90 Gandhi advanced an alternate view of heroism for the purpose of conducting non-violent struggle. He believed that heroism
is a quality of heart, free from every trace of fear and anger, and geared to exact instant atonement for every breach of
honour. Heroism can enable a person to stand alone in times of trial and isolation.
91Gandhi can conceive of getting
swaraj only by applying soul force because he believed in an inviolable connection between ends and means. Gandhi elaborates in
the
Hind Swaraj that only fair means can produce fair results. There is harm in the exercise of brute force, never in that of pity.
92 Gandhi in
Hind Swaraj quotes the Gospel of St. Matthew: ‘Those that wield the sword shall perish by the sword.’
93 On 11 August 1920, Gandhi further explained his position. He claimed that he is not a visionary but a practical idealist.
The religion of non-violence is not meant merely for the
rishis and saints. It is meant for the common people as well. Non-violence is the law of our species as violence is the law of the
brute. The spirit lies dormant in the brute, who knows no law but that of physical might. The dignity of man requires obedience
to a higher law – to the strength of the spirit. On 8 November 1926, in the newspaper titled
The Hindu, Gandhi wrote that the trait that distinguishes man from all other animals is his capacity to be non-violent.
94Gandhi believed that soul force is much superior to brute force. In the
Hind Swaraj, Gandhi writes that the force of arms is powerless when matched against the force of love or the soul.
95 On 11 August 1920, in
Young India, Gandhi wrote:
I do believe that where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence I would advise violence…. I would rather have
India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than she should in a cowardly manner become or remain a helpless witness
to her dishonour. But I believe that non-violence is infinitely superior to violence, forgiveness is more manly than punishment.
Kshama virasya bhushanam. ‘Forgiveness adorns a soldier.’ But abstinence is forgiveness only when there is the power to punish; it is meaningless
when it pretends to proceed from a helpless creature…. But I do not believe India to be helpless. I do not believe myself
to be a helpless creature. Only I want to use India’s and my strength for a better purpose. Let me not be misunderstood. Strength
does not come from physical capacity. It comes from an indomitable will.
96
Gandhi claimed that he would tolerate neither organized violence by the government nor unorganized violence by the people.
97 After the first civil disobedience movement (1919–22), Gandhi asserted his inability to
conduct a successful campaign of civil disobedience unless a completely non-violent spirit were generated among the people.
98 On 1 November 1928, Gandhi declared that he could not lead India again until the people were ready to pursue a policy of
non-violence.
99 Gandhi aimed at moral regeneration. He pointed out that the application of violence does not improve the behaviour of the
target group or the applicant. However, the exercise of
daya (benevolence) results in the moral uplift even of the culprit. For acquiring
swaraj, the people should follow
satya (truth) and
dharma (duties).
100 For Gandhi,
sat (truth) is equivalent to God.
101 On 1 October 1931, Gandhi, in
Young India, wrote that his daily experience is that every problem would lend itself to a solution if we were determined to make the
law of truth and non-violence the law of life. For truth and non-violence are two sides of the same coin.
102 In 1932, Gandhi noted that the pursuit of truth is true
bhakti (devotion). It is the path that leads to God, and therefore there is no place in it for cowardice, no place for defeat. It
is the talisman by which death itself becomes the portal to life eternal.
103 In February 1946, when the Indian ratings of the Royal Indian Navy rebelled against British authority at Bombay, Madras and
Karachi, Gandhi did not approve because the rebellion was wedded to violence.
104Linked to the concept of
satyagraha is the idea of
sarvodaya. Gandhi pushed the idea of civil humanism and broadened the concept of
dharma to include notions of citizenship, cooperation, equality, liberty and fraternity.
105 Gandhi believed that human beings could incarnate their latent divinity by deliberately and joyously putting their abilities
and assets to practical use for the sake of all (known as
sarvodaya).
Sarvodaya means universal welfare. Gandhi, unlike the socialists, did not favour ‘revolution from above’, which involved state violence.
Gandhi’s
sarvodaya and his attendant concept of
ahimsa made class war distasteful and unnecessary. Raghavan Iyer claims that the fundamental presupposition behind
sarvodaya is non-violent socialism, which is as old as the communal sharing preached by Buddha and Christ.
106 Gandhi was opposed to the use of
violence for achieving social revolution. In 1934, when the left wing of the INC, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru,
was arguing for radical social change, Gandhi defended the zamindari system and talked of trusteeship.
107One of the crucial components of
satyagraha is self-sacrifice. Gandhi indulged in daily acts of
tapas (spiritual exercise and meditation/voluntary sacrifice) while engaged in social and political activities. Gandhi felt that
leaders must always share the trials and travails of the human condition; he felt that ubiquitous suffering is the common
predicament of humanity, while earthly pleasures and intellectual joys are ephemeral and deceptive.
108 On 11 August 1920, Gandhi noted: ‘For
satyagraha and its off-shoots, non-cooperation and civil resistance, are … new names for the law of suffering. The
rishis, who discovered the law of non-violence in the midst of violence … were themselves greater warriors than Wellington. Having
themselves known the use of arms, they realized their uselessness and taught a weary world that its salvation lay … through
non-violence.’
109In 1942, Gandhi wrote that non-violence in its dynamic condition means conscious suffering.
110 As D. G. Dalton notes, fasting was the ultimate weapon of
satyagraha, employed when the other means failed.
111 However, Gandhi at the same time was aware of the limitations of fasting as a political weapon. He once said that you cannot
fast against a tyrant.
112 D. A. Low rightly says that the British Empire during the interwar period was not looking forward to giving independence
to India, though the British ruling elites assumed that sometime in the distant future, a grant of independence might become
necessary. And the British, while devolving power to the Indians at the local and regional levels, simultaneously strengthened
their control at the national level. The British were prepared to suppress mass movements but did not aim to eliminate the
nationalist leaders. In other words, the British Empire in India was not as oppressive as the Dutch and French colonial empires.
If the Conservatives under Winston Churchill had been in power in the 1930s, the British Empire in
India might have become like the French and Dutch colonial empires.
113 In such a scenario, Gandhi would have been replaced by the hard-liners who spoke of armed revolutions, terrorism and direct
violent action against the
Raj.
In fact, in Gandhi’s framework,
ahimsa is an integral part of
yajna (sacrifice), a practice rooted in the ancient Indian belief in a benevolent cosmic order maintained by human self-purification
and self-examination.
Ahimsa, for Gandhi, is based on
anasakti (selfless action).
Ahimsa in a passive manner means refusal to do harm, and in a positive/active form means the largest amount of love leading to large-scale
charity.
114 On 2 May 1935, Gandhi claimed that love has no boundary. My nationalism, noted Gandhi, includes the love of all the nations
of the earth, irrespective of creed.
115 However, not every nationalist leader accepted Gandhi’s message of love, peace and non-violence. The greatest challenge emerged
from the Bengali politician Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945).
While Gandhi believed that the struggle for independence was a
dharmayuddha and that in
dharmayuddha, physical force can never be applied, Subhas Bose believed that the end justifies the means. Since the object of independence
is a
dharmik (noble) aim, unfair means (i.e., the use of physical force, alliance with the enemy’s enemy, etc.) were well justified in
order to achieve the righteous end. In an article printed in the
Azad Hind (the official bi-monthly journal of the Netaji’s Free India Centre in Europe) dated June 1942, Bose bluntly wrote: ‘[N]on-violent
civil disobedience cannot secure the expulsion of the British from India…. Tell the Indian people that if passive resistance
fails to secure the liberation of the country, they should be ready to take up arms in the final struggle.’
116 In another article dated October 1942, which appeared in the
Azad Hind, Bose posed a more trenchant criticism of Gandhian philosophy in the following words:
But now that the British are engaged in a war with other powers and have been considerably weakened thereby, it has become
possible for the Indian people to work up a revolution which will end British rule once for all. But, it is necessary for
the Indian people to take up arms in their struggle and to cooperate with those powers that are fighting Britain today. This
task, Gandhi will not accomplish – hence India now needs a new leadership.
117
Since Bose demanded violent rather than non-violent struggle, he warned his countrymen about the necessary bloodletting. In
a broadcast from Berlin on 7 December 1942, he asserted: ‘Two years and one hundred thousand lives! We must be prepared to
voluntarily sacrifice one hundred thousand lives in the course of the struggle. If we do so freedom will be ours once and
for all.’
118 In January 1943, Tokyo decided to bring Bose from Germany to Japan to lead the anti-British struggle in India from Southeast
Asia.
119 Before Bose departed for Japan in a German U-boat on 8 February 1943, he prepared a speech that was broadcast over
Azad Hind Radio in Berlin on 13 April 1943. In this speech, Bose reminded his listeners of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre and argued,
‘The blood of the martyr is the price that must be paid for liberty.’
120 On 6 July 1944, in a broadcast to Gandhi on Rangoon Radio, Bose emphasized: ‘These men and women honestly feel that the British
Government will never surrender to persuasion or moral pressure or non-violent resistance.’
121Bose’s concept of history was coloured by Western secular freedom fighters and socialism, as well as by Hinduism. Bose was
influenced by Aurobindo Ghosh (1872–1950), who advocated combating British violence with indigenous violence. Like Balgangadhar
Tilak, Aurobindo realized the necessity of setting up secret societies for carrying out violent revolutionary struggle.
122 Aurobindo used Kali (the fearsome Tantric goddess) worship as an instrument to promote revolutionary terrorism in Bengal.
Tantra is an esoteric system that heroically subverts social norms in order to confront death and suffering and achieve
liberation and worldy empowerment simultaneously.
123 Some background information about Bose is necessary to contextualize his political philosophy.
In 1938, Bose was appointed president of the INC. Bose demanded direct action against the
Raj.
124 Due to pressure from Gandhi, Bose resigned from the post of president of All India Congress Committee and in May 1939 formed
the Forward Bloc in order to consolidate the left forces under its banner. In March 1941, Bose escaped from Calcutta to Kabul.
In March 1941, at Kabul, Bose met Alberto Quaroni, the Italian minister, at the Italian legation in Kabul.
125 On 9 April 1941, in a secret memorandum send to Berlin, Bose noted:
The overthrow of British power in India can, in its last stages, be materially assisted by Japanese foreign policy in the
Far East. If Japan decides on expansion southwards it will lead to an open clash with Great Britain…. A defeat of the British
Navy in the Far East including smashing up of the Singapore base, will automatically weaken British military strength and
prestige in India.
126
After arriving in Berlin, Bose organized the Free India Centre and started broadcasting on
Azad Hind Radio to India and East Asia in order to undermine British war efforts.
127 From the Indian soldiers captured by the Afrika Korps while fighting the British forces in North Africa, Bose created the
3,000-strong Indian Legion. However, Germany’s failure to reach India through Egypt or south Russia meant that this body of
troops could not be utilized directly for invasion of India.
128 In fact, Nazi Germany’s plan was that, after the successful conclusion of the Russian campaign, German forces would advance
into Afghanistan and then into north-west India.
129 On 1 May 1942, Bose, in a broadcast from Berlin, exhorted: ‘On the 10th day of that month in the year 1857, began India’s
first war of independence. In May 1942, 85 years later, has begun India’s
last war of independence.’
130 On 15 November 1943, the Provisional Free Indian Government was announced at Berlin in the presence of Nazi Foreign Minister
Joachim Von Ribentrop, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin Oshima and the Italian Ambassador Anfuso. A. C. N. Nambiar was deputized
in the absence of Bose, who at that time was in Southeast Asia organizing the Indian National Army/
Azad Hind Fauj (henceforth INA) for liberating India from the yoke of the British.
131In July 1943, the INA was resurrected by Bose. Even before the advent of Bose, the Japanese government from 1939 onwards had
been collaborating with another Bengali revolutionary named Rash Behari Bose to organize an anti-British front using Indian
prisoners of war (hereafter POWs) and the Indian diaspora in Southeast Asia. After the surrender of the Allied forces at Singapore
on 15 February 1942, the Indian POWs were handed over to an Indian military officer named Captain Mohan Singh. With the aid
of the Japanese and Rash Behari (head of the Indian Independence League), Mohan Singh formed the INA.
132 Due to differences with the Japanese, Mohan Singh was soon removed from command of the INA. On 25 August 1943, Bose became
the supreme commander of the INA.
133 On 5 July 1943, Bose, in his first address to the INA at Singapore, emphasized: ‘Throughout my public career I have always
felt that though India is otherwise ripe for independence in every way, she has lacked one thing; namely, an army of liberation.
George Washington of America could fight and win freedom, because he had his army. Garibaldi could liberate Italy because
he had his armed volunteers behind him.’
134 Bose’s objective was to raise an army of about 300,000 volunteers from the Indian POWs in Japanese hands as well as from
the three million Indian civilians settled in Southeast Asia.
135When addressing an assembly of Indians at Singapore on 9 July 1943, Bose used the phrase ‘Total Mobilization’.
136 Despite the opposition
of the Japanese and some conservative Indians, Bose decided to set up an all-female military regiment called the Rani of Jhansi
Regiment and appointed Lakshmi Sahgal as commander of this unit.
137 She was later given the rank of colonel. The philosophy behind setting up this regiment was elaborated in the inaugural address
that Bose delivered at the Rani of Jhansi Training Camp at Singapore on 22 October 1943:
India could not have produced a heroine like the Rani of Jhansi if she did not have a glorious tradition. The history of the
great women in India is as ancient as the Vedic period. The greatness of Indian womanhood had at its roots in those early
days when India had its Sanskrit culture. The same India which produced great women in the past also produced the Rani of
Jhansi at a grave hour in India’s history. And today while we are facing the gravest hour in our history, I have confidence
that Indian womanhood will not fail to rise to the occasion. If for the war of independence of Jhansi, India had to produce
and it did produce a Lakshmi Bai, today for the war of independence of the whole of India, to liberate 38 crores of Indians,
India had to produce and shall produce thousands of Rani of Jhansi…. We have the inspiring examples of Ahalyabai of Maharashtra,
Rani Bhawani of Bengal, Raziya Begum and Nur Jahan, who were shining administrators in recent historic times prior to British
rule in India.
138
Bose’s concept of women actively participating in armed struggle was shaped by the Hindu Mother Goddess (Durga, Kali, etc.)
paradigm. The Mother is the most powerful Hindu feminine prototype. The Mother Goddess is backed up by the cosmic power of
the universe,
shakti, which is also female. According to Joyce C. Lebra, Bose was also influenced by Vivekananda, who argued that women should
be trained in physical exercise and also with weapons. By contrast, in Gandhi’s framework, Indian women would be like submissive
Sita, the epitome of loyalty, chastity and courage. Both Gandhi and Bose demanded sacrifice from women. Sacrificial ritual
was, after all, a central part of vedic religious observance. In fact, the women who joined revolutionary terrorist groups
in Bengal during the 1920s and 1930s as well as the personnel of the Rani Jhansi Regiment were imbued with the motivation
of sacrificing themselves for
Bharat Mata (Mother India).
139 Carol Hills and Daniel C. Silverman write that Bose’s philosophy – as evident from his setting up of the Rani of Jhansi Regiment,
which demanded that women, instead of accepting
a Sita-like role, take Goddess Durga as their role model – represented a fusion of aggressive Hindu nationalism and feminism.
140During August 1943, at Singapore, Bose met some Japanese military officers and discussed a possible joint invasion of north-east
India by the Imperial Japanese Army and the INA. In February 1944, in a meeting with the Japanese military officers of the
Fifteenth Army at Maymyo in Burma, Bose urged that if the Japanese were to break through into Manipur, a large-scale uprising
of Indians would start in Assam. Further, seeing the INA in action, Bose hoped that the Indian soldiers in the British-Indian
army would desert and join the INA in large numbers.
141 On 8 March 1944, the Japanese invasion of Manipur started.
142 In July 1944, Bose elaborated his strategic concept in a speech:
So far as I am concerned after twenty years’ experience of public service in India, I came to the conclusion that it was impossible
to organize an armed resistance in the country without some help from outside, help from our countrymen abroad, as well as
from some foreign power or powers.… In 1940 I read my history once again, and once again, I came to the conclusion that history
did not furnish a single instance where freedom had been won without help of some sort from abroad.
143
During November 1944, when Bose visited Tokyo, he tried to meet the Soviet ambassador. Bose’s strategy was to turn to the
USSR to conduct the anti-British struggle in case Japan failed in the war. However, the Soviet ambassador refused to meet
Bose.
144 On 17 August 1945, Bose left Saigon Airport to go to the USSR via Manchuria. However, he died in an aircraft accident.
145