APPENDIX 4

Battle Report (Extract) 12th York and Lancaster
Regiment July 15/1916

The extract below is from a battle report made by the Adjutant of the 12th York and Lancaster Regiment after the events of July 1st, 1916. The description of the German trenches and the suggestions/criticisms apply equally to those encountered by the 11th East Lancs. Regiment.

NOTES ON THE GERMAN TRENCHES, ETC. 1.7.16

1) The German front line trench was 12 ft. deep and 3 ft. wide at the bottom sloping upward. There was no parapet at all, but a very high parados 3 or 4 ft. in height, immediately behind the fire trench. There were no fire steps at all. The wire in front of the German trench is very thick, from 2 to 5 ft. high, thinner at the bottom than at the top, and comes to within three feet of the edge of the trench.

Trenches revetted with basket work and floor boarded. The traverses very wide. No information is available regarding the second line, reserve and communication trenches.

2) DUG-OUTS. One Dug-out was noted. This was deep and of a type similar to the one in MONK trench. It had about 18 steps and would accommodate eight men. The dug-out was run out under the parapet and was just at the corner and close to the traverse. The man who saw this states that there was a notice up with the following in English characters:

M.G.No.1 POST

He was quite positive about this. The Dug-Out was not damaged by our fire.

3) MACHINE GUNS. Machine guns were fired both from emplacements and from behind parados. One emplacement in particular was noted to be situated in a parados. The parados was hollowed out and a mound raised behind it, so as to conceal the emplacement. This gun caused a great number of casualties and was situated in the German front line just to the south of MARK COPSE.

4) UNDERGROUND TRENCHES. Although no underground trenches were found by men reaching to the front line, it is suggested that these exist, owing to large numbers of the enemy apparently appearing from nowhere, in the front line.

SUGGESTIONS AND CRITICISMS

a) The wait in the Assembly trenches was too long.

b) The first wave should not have occupied the front line. Owing to the Trench Mortars being in position in the front line, it became a death trap when the enemy retaliated against them.

c) More bombardment slits should have been dug. It was found that men occupying these suffered very slightly compared with those in Assembly trenches, those that were dug should have been deeper.

d) More men should have been trained in the use of the Bangalore torpedo. It was found that all trained men had become casualties by the time the torpedoes were actually required.

e) Smoke bombs would have been useful to conceal our efforts to cut the enemy’s wire. As it was, anyone attempting to cut the wire was immediately sniped.

TACTICS

i) The assault should have been made at dawn or soon after. As it was the enemy had 4½ hours to prepare for an attack, as our intention was undoubtedly given away by the gaps cut in our wire and the tapes laid out in front. Men who reached the German wire state that on looking towards our own lines, they could see almost every movement. This being so any attack by day was scarcely likely to succeed.

ii) The attack should have been in double time.

iii) The waves were too far apart, the distance between them allowing the enemy to pay attention to each wave before the next came up.

MISCELLANEOUS

Assaulting bombers state that they think they could have carried their bombs better in jackets than in the buckets. The general opinion was that Officers, N.C.O.’s and machine gunners were marked men.