Penkovsky was put on the GRU reserve list after returning from Ankara. He was given a series of temporary assignments during 1957 and most of 1958. His close friend Marshal Varentsov had promised to intercede on his behalf to get him out of the GRU and into a regular regimental command in the artillery, but this came to nothing.

It was a peculiar and frustrating interlude in Penkovsky’s life. He still felt committed to helping the West understand and deal with Khrushchev’s exaggerated claims of Soviet superiority in nuclear military capacity, but some of his earlier passion and urgency had drained away. Perhaps the result of the Savchenko and Ionchenko affair had taken the wind out of his sails. Or perhaps his remoteness from involvement with day-to-day work that could have an impact on world events simply led to a temporary loss of interest.

In any case, he did not make any serious attempt to contact British, American or any other Western officials during this time. What could he say to them? ‘I really want to help you but at the moment I’m twiddling my thumbs in backwater offices.’ That only devalued him, in Western eyes, as a source of intelligence. Penkovsky bided his time.

‡

Khrushchev’s Secret Speech and the Hungarian Revolution had weakened his hold on power. There was open criticism of the soft line he had taken with Poland, Hungary and other satellite countries. The proposals he made in February 1957 to abolish national economic ministries and replace them with regional economic councils also attracted strong opposition in certain quarters. Throughout the spring and early summer his behaviour became erratic and some senior politicians began to question his ability to rule.

The canny Serov, recognising what might be afoot, had started to spy on Politburo members from early spring and warned Khrushchev of the burgeoning dissatisfaction with him.

In June, a group of Khrushchev’s critics (Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin, Shepilov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Saburov and Pervukhin) attempted a coup, with Malenkov taking the lead. These eight represented a majority of the Politburo’s full membership of fifteen, and it was normal practice for politicians outvoted in the Politburo to resign even though, constitutionally, Politburo decisions were subject to endorsement by the Central Committee. Khrushchev enjoyed support from Minister of Defence Marshal Zhukov and Serov, and also from Suslov, Mikoyan, Kirichenko, Brezhnev and Furtseva.

On 19 April, a majority of the Politburo voted for Khrushchev to leave office but he stubbornly refused to resign, calling for a special meeting of the Central Committee the next day.

Overnight, the military and the KGB marshalled their resources to fly and drive Central Committee members who supported Khrushchev – most of them, as he had appointed them to their positions in the first place – from all parts of the Soviet Union to Moscow for the crucial vote. Khrushchev had a comfortable majority and was able to continue to govern as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

In the final event, the logistical efforts of the military and the KGB saved Khrushchev.

In 1953, Serov had played a leading part in organising support for Khrushchev in his battle to succeed Stalin. Now he had galvanised support to keep him in power. In both cases one could claim that, at the outset, the odds were against Khrushchev winning. Why did Serov join and stay in Khrushchev’s camp? True, they had known each other for a long time, but they were not particularly close friends and they certainly had their differences. Serov had been badly shaken by Khrushchev’s Secret Speech. Khrushchev had been unhappy with Serov over the killing of diver Commander Crabb during the visit to the United Kingdom, and the overzealous way in which he had put down the Hungarian uprising. Perhaps the shrewd Serov simply knew how to pick a winner.

Serov was working as hard as ever. His main priority was to improve the capability of the KGB ‘Illegals’ throughout the world, and particularly in America.

Unlike Western intelligence agencies that relied on ‘turning’ regular residents in foreign countries, the Soviet Union groomed its own citizens sometimes for several years, before sending them on long-term assignments to foreign countries where they lived illegally on false documents and spied for their masters.