Penkovsky arrived for his second visit to London on 18 July 1961, ahead of the other delegates who were to attend the Soviet Exhibition at Earls Court. Penkovsky was the leader of the delegation and his visit was to last three weeks.
It had been a traumatic fortnight prior to his departure from Moscow. The original authorisation by the Soviet Council of Ministers for a visit to the Soviet Exhibition in London by forty to fifty delegates was reversed a week later by Khrushchev. Penkovsky’s authorisation was reinstated because of the work he had to do for the GRU, and then seven others (a group of metallurgy specialists) also received approval. More delegates were in the pipeline at the time of Penkovsky’s departure.
Ivan Serov’s wife, Valya, and his daughter, Svetlana, were going to London as tourists on the same flight as Penkovsky. It was a flight specially chartered for the Kirov Ballet Company, going to London as part of the Soviet Exhibition programme.
Serov was at the airport to see his wife and daughter off. It was six o’clock in the morning and there was a chill in the July air. In an unprecedented show of friendship he put one arm round Penkovsky’s shoulder and asked him to look after Valya and Svetlana; to see that they had a car at their disposal; that someone helped them with their shopping; and that, in general, they had a good time. Serov always showed genuine love and affection for his family: it was one of the few ways in which he differed markedly from Stalin.
This was a perfect opportunity for Penkovsky to cultivate a close friendship with his boss, the head of the GRU.
The Soviet Embassy failed to meet the Serovs when they arrived at Heathrow Airport. Penkovsky arranged transport for them and said he would contact them again that evening.
Because of other appointments, it was 8.30 p.m. before Penkovsky called to invite them out. It had been a long day and they were already relaxing in their pyjamas and preparing to go to bed. Penkovsky told them boisterously that they were in London and could not afford to waste time in bed.
He took them to his hotel restaurant and paid for an excellent meal, for which he would be reimbursed by MI6. Over dinner, Penkovsky asked them about their shopping plans. Valya said her husband had given her the equivalent of about £20 in US dollars to buy a settee-swing for their dacha garden. Penkovsky told her that was not enough, but not to worry because he would get the swing for them. She thanked him profusely, promising to repay the difference and to invite him to their dacha.
Valya and Svetlana found Penkovsky charming. After the meal, they went on a nocturnal sight-seeing tour of the West End by taxi. The 22-year-old Svetlana – a little tipsy after the generous amounts of excellent wine consumed at dinner – squeezed up close to him. She looked into his eyes and told him she would like ‘to dance the rock-and-roll’ with him.
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Penkovsky reported the courtesies he had extended to the Serovs, and much more, during the debriefing meetings. There was more time than during the April/May visit, and the meetings were more structured now that Penkovsky was working as a proper agent for MI6 and CIA.
They discussed how to make the meetings with Janet Chisholm in Moscow more secure, and how to widen their contact base in Moscow, for example, by the British Embassy’s Commercial Minister Hilary King inviting Penkovsky and other Soviet trade officials to a reception at his house. They firmed up arrangements for using Greville Wynne as a contact and considered suggestions as to where Penkovsky could hide his growing volume of espionage materials and equipment. They discussed possible methods of escape to the West in the event that his clandestine activities were discovered.
Above all, they went into astonishing detail about Soviet military armaments, especially rockets and nuclear warheads; their military strategies and intentions; the careers and private lives of senior military, KGB and GRU personnel and their pay and pension levels. Again, Penkovsky emphasised his view of Khrushchev’s belligerent attitude.
Kisevalter: What new developments do you know about the Soviet position on the Berlin question? For example: what is the present Soviet position, what action have they taken, and what is their plan?
Penkovsky: The Soviet position is as follows: first of all, if it were possible, an advance by a huge army on a wide front using only conventional weapons and no rockets with atomic or hydrogen warheads. There would probably be mass defections to our (the West) side. I mention this as a preamble to the situation.
Kisevalter: Is this your view or do Varentsov and others share this view?
Penkovsky: This is a general view because our situation at home is rotten. They don’t trust Khrushchev, they don’t trust the Soviet government, and the people remain half-hungry as before. The people are very displeased with Khrushchev’s militant speeches; Kennedy, Macmillan and De Gaulle have been forced to increase their armament programmes by two or three times. If Stalin were alive he would do everything quietly, but this fool is blurting out his threats and intentions and is forcing our potential enemies to increase their military strength. They dislike him and say that he is hurting his own cause and that he talks too much about Soviet military accomplishments in his effort to frighten the Western leaders.
We (the West) should react with firmness if he blocks the access roads to Berlin. Those blocking forces should be smashed, without striking with atomic weapons, at industrial centres or rear areas. Should he attempt to do this then he should be repaid in kind and the whole world told that the West is protecting its vital interests which Khrushchev has trampled upon in violation of the Potsdam Agreement signed after World War II. If he expands the conflict to some degree then he should be answered with corresponding counterblows. Actually, Khrushchev and the Soviet Army at this time are unprepared for this.