Nixon, Latin America, and the Politics of Anger
Jeffry M. Cox
By late morning of May 13, 1958, Vice President Richard Nixon and his retinue knew they were in trouble as their cars were forced to a stop in the streets of Caracas, Venezuela. On cue, an angry mob poured out of the side streets and a wave of sticks, pipes, fists, and spit slammed into the motorcade. For 12 minutes, the mob did its best to vent years of frustration with U.S. policies in a spirited but ultimately ineffective attack. As Venezuela’s police and security forces stood by, a handful of Secret Service agents did their best to protect the passengers. A path was finally cleared; the motorcade sped past the mob and, abandoning the rest of the planned activities, took refuge at the U.S. ambassador’s residence.
Vice President Nixon’s May 1958 tour of Latin America exposed significant problems with President Eisenhower’s Latin America policy. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Caracas, where the trouble began as soon as Nixon got off the plane. Ceremonies were cut short, drowned by angry shouts from the waiting crowd, while the Nixon group was showered in spit from the angry Venezuelans there to greet this representative of the United States and U.S. foreign policies. Demonstrations became increasingly violent, leading Nixon to cancel many of the planned activities and leave a day early.
In this chapter, I will do five things. First, I will demonstrate the historical context of this anger toward the United States: a history of paternalism and intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American nations. Second, I will address the specific frustration that aroused their anger: U.S. Cold War foreign policies that privileged anticommunism over democracy or economic development, leading to U.S. support of dictators. Third, I will describe Venezuelan history under the U.S.-supported dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez to further explain the individuals involved and the sources of their anger. Fourth, I will describe the violence committed against Nixon in an attempt by Latin Americans to draw attention to their grievances and effect change. Finally, I will describe the effects these expressions of anger had on the issue: the serious discussions and reappraisals of U.S. policies that resulted.
The violence Nixon encountered in Caracas shocked the Eisenhower administration, though there was ample warning. Nixon experienced less violent demonstrations earlier in his tour of South America, and received threats of serious violence in Caracas. Yet, even without such warnings, the demonstrations should have come as no surprise. Latin American expressions of discontent with U.S. policies far predated the Nixon tour or even the Eisenhower administration. Throughout the history of U.S.–Latin American relations, the United States has sought political, economic, and cultural hegemony at the expense of Latin Americans.
I
Beginning with their struggles for independence from Spain, Latin Americans have looked up to the United States as an inspiration and an example of what capitalist democracy could achieve. Shortly after Latin American independence movements succeeded, President James Monroe issued the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declaring the entire Western Hemisphere off limits to Europeans. This was to protect the new republics from attempts to reassert European imperialism.
Though it waxed and waned, this pro-United States sentiment remained a strong, even dominant theme in Latin American perception of the United States throughout the history of U.S.–Latin American relations. Yet not all felt this way. The first significant problems began in 1847 with the United States–Mexican war, a clear land grab by a superior power. This war, and the land seizure that resulted, reflected U.S. perceptions of Latin Americans that would endure well into the 20th century. The United States viewed Latin Americans as inferior, demonstrating an attitude of race-based paternalism. This attitude justified the war with Mexico, as well as many subsequent interventions in Latin American affairs.
After the war with Mexico, the United States was consumed with sectional differences that resulted in the Civil War, and afterward focused on reconstruction and subduing the West. By the end of the century, the United States had recovered and emerged as a power, demonstrated by their unsolicited intervention in the Cuban war for independence, leading to the Spanish–American-Cuban–Filipino war of 1898, commonly called the Spanish–American War. This marked a significant change in U.S. policy regarding Latin America, inaugurating an era of intervention.
President Theodore Roosevelt’s infamous “Big Stick” diplomacy embodied this new approach. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was designed to compel “uncivilized” nations, by any means, to live up to their agreements with “civilized” nations, thus justifying U.S. intervention in Latin America in any form, at any time, for any reason. President Taft followed with Dollar Diplomacy. This policy shifted from strategic to commercial considerations. Taft hoped to promote political stability in Latin America through financial stability by encouraging the export of capital through loans to Latin American countries. This increase in financial interventions was paired with continued military interventions. Interventions continued under President Wilson, including the Pershing Punitive Expedition to hunt Pancho Villa.
Throughout this era of interventions, U.S. policy makers believed they had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations, to redirect the course of other societies. Conversely, they believed that, as part of inferior cultures, Latin Americans did not have the right to conduct their own affairs in their own ways. U.S. policy makers convinced themselves that Latin Americans actually welcomed U.S. influence.
Throughout the 1920s, U.S. presidents sought to limit interventions and end occupations. They were largely successful, though the Marines were still sent in on occasion. Finally, in 1929 President Herbert Hoover announced a new approach to U.S.–Latin American relations: the Good Neighbor Policy. Hoover continued to improve the relationship with Latin America, but it was under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt that the Good Neighbor Policy fully fledged. Roosevelt announced “an end to U.S. interference in the internal affairs of other nations and a cooperative approach to the Monroe Doctrine” (Coerver & Hall, 1999, p. 87). Finally, a U.S. administration pursued a Latin America policy that was pleasing to Latin Americans. The commitment to treat them as equals lasted through FDR’s lengthy presidency, and President Harry S. Truman took it up after him.
The Cold War proved to be the death of the Good Neighbor Policy, though the roots of its demise can be found in the end of World War II. In spite of their support of the war effort, with two countries actually contributing troops, Latin America was left out of the peace process. The Truman administration began to hear rumbles of discontent, claims that the Good Neighbor Policy was not being followed with the same vigor as before. Latin Americans felt that the Good Neighbor Policy was pursued during the war because it was expedient, but since the end of the war the Truman administration did not fully appreciate the value of continental solidarity (Confidential Memorandum on Latin America, n.d.). With the advent of the Cold War, global policies superseded regional policies such as the Good Neighbor Policy. With the advent of the Eisenhower administration in 1953, the Good Neighbor Policy was abandoned.
Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, the U.S. view of Latin America was racial and gendered. This can be seen in political cartoons: Latin America is consistently shown as either a White woman in need of rescue, or as Black children in need of guidance. This view began to change in the 1930s. Under the Good Neighbor Policy, the United States began to see and treat Latin Americans more as equals. However, under Eisenhower’s Cold War–oriented policies, the overt racism was gone, but the paternalistic attitude toward Latin America remained, reasserting itself in Cold War policies.
II
Although these policies provide the historical context for the Latin American view of the United States at the time of the Nixon trip, the frustrations that led to the violence were based on more recent Cold War policies that favored anticommunism, in any form, over all other considerations. The United States was looking for Cold War allies. To this end, the Eisenhower administration’s three main foreign policy objectives in Latin America were increasing private investment, building hemispheric solidarity, and promoting anticommunism.
Latin America had been suffering from economic problems since the end of World War II, and Eisenhower’s emphasis on loans and private investment was not helping. “Latin Americans felt that the United States owed them economic aid, either because they blamed the United States and U.S. investors for the state of their economy, or because they felt that the United States had the resources, and that both sides would benefit from a stronger Latin American economy” (Cox, 2012). “Where’s our Marshall Plan?” became a common refrain in Latin America, referring to the massive economic aid program to assist Europe after World War II. “Latin Americans blamed the US not only for not assisting, but for implementing policies that actually harmed Latin American economies” (Cox, 2012).
These policies included tariffs on some Latin American exports that had deep, adverse effects on Latin American economies. While in Argentina, Nixon repeated the party line, reminding Argentines that “it was incumbent upon the Argentine government to create an atmosphere and incentives to attract that capital” (Zahniser & Weis, 1989, p. 172). The Eisenhower administration recommended that Latin Americans weather the present economic crisis by spending less and delaying economic development programs (Rabe, 1988, p. 101). New York Times correspondent Tad Szulc reported that Latin Americans “take exception” to the policy of focusing on private investment, rather than grants or more favorable loans. Szulc argued that the “problem is that where money is most needed is for such unprofitable yet fundamental projects as railroads, ports, highways and dams, for which private investments are not forthcoming” (Szulc, 1956, May 30, p. 25). Thus, Eisenhower’s rigid policy of consistently favoring private investment was unable to meet the needs of the majority of Latin Americans. Administration officials warned of “the desire of Latin Americans to have the U.S. assume a larger share of the financial burden involved in solving their economic problems than the U.S. is willing to bear” (“Progress Report on NSC 5432/1,” Feb 3, 1955, p. 2).
The Eisenhower administration also insisted on hemispheric solidarity, by which they meant Latin Americans always had to agree with the United States. A primary goal of the Eisenhower administration in its Latin America policy was “hemispheric solidarity in support of our world policies, particularly in the UN and other international organizations” (“Progress Report,” 144, p. 2). Latin American governments were judged by the Eisenhower administration in part based on how closely and how willingly they supported U.S. agendas in both the Organization of American States and the United Nations. Essentially, the United States evaluated its neighbors by its own standards on their willingness to be “Cold Warriors,” constraining their ability to construct their own foreign policies.
The issue that led to the strongest anger among Latin Americans was the U.S. policy of privileging anticommunism over any other feature of a Latin American government, leading to U.S. support of repressive dictatorships, as well as a return to direct intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American nations. The greatest example is the intervention in Guatemala, in which the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) aided a handful of rebels in overthrowing a popularly elected president and inserting a repressive military dictator, because of fears of Communist influence. Though it was a covert operation, it was no secret that the United States chose a leader, trained some rebels, and then embarked on a campaign of psychological warfare that ultimately led to the removal of the Guatemalan president. The U.S. role was known throughout the region, and the backlash was strong. Though it did not adversely affect official relations, it accelerated the growing anti-U.S. sentiment in the region.
While the Eisenhower administration was creating problems in the Latin American relationship with the United States, they also demonstrated remarkable ignorance as to the nature and source of these problems. Many U.S. policy makers believed that the root of the problem was in public relations, with the solution being a greater effort by the United States to tell its side (Zahniser & Weis, 1989, p. 165). The Nixon trip was designed in part to address this perception. In fact, the Eisenhower administration made numerous and varied efforts to influence Latin American public opinion, all directed at the masses. These included films, pamphlets, posters, cartoons, exhibits, books, radio programs, and so on (“Progress Report,” 1955, p. 20). However, these efforts ultimately met with limited success, and problems in the relationship with Latin America continued to grow.
Eisenhower administration officials continued to blame Latin Americans for the problems. Hard-liners in Washington “found a large measure of self-pity in the hemispheric cries for help and a growing determination to place on U.S. shoulders the burden for economic problems that stemmed from natural and historical causes or that persisted through a lack of national economic and political discipline” (Zahniser & Weis, 1989, p. 168). This diagnosis of “self-pity” demonstrates that paternalistic feelings toward Latin Americans remained prevalent in the Eisenhower administration. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was even more condescending, telling President Eisenhower, “you have to pat them a little bit and make them think that you are fond of them” (John Dulles to Dwight Eisenhower, quoted in Rabe, 1988, p. 33).
Policy makers in Washington rarely took Latin American critiques of U.S. policies seriously, preferring instead to attribute them to ignorance or foreign influence, usually Soviet. Historian Alan McPherson demonstrated that “anti-Americanism seeped down from literary and other elites into the political consciousness of ordinary people as it also percolated up from the poor to shape mainstream politics” (McPherson, 2003, p. 11). U.S. citizens badly wanted to know, “Do they like us?” But they had no wish to know the real answer to the question, preferring to simply believe they were well liked while simultaneously denying that such opinions even mattered (McPherson, 2003, p. 21). U.S. policy makers believed that Latin American leaders who criticized U.S. policies were “out of touch with popular opinion” (McPherson, 2003, p. 25). United States–Latin American relations got progressively worse after World War II, reaching a new low by the beginning of 1958 (Zahiser & Weis, 1989, p. 168).
III
The Pérez Jiménez administration, both for the Venezuelans who experienced it and for foreign observers such as the Eisenhower administration, represented a dilemma: the ends, or the means? Under Pérez Jiménez, Venezuela experienced the greatest concentrated economic growth in its history. It saw massive public works projects designed to increase the standard of living for all. In many ways, it was the high point of Venezuelan history. But all of this came at a price.
The military government, of which Marcos Pérez Jiménez became the leader, came to power in 1948 following three years of democracy in Venezuela. The Pérez Jiménez regime embraced the notion of a technocracy, a governmental philosophy that de-emphasized political and social progress in favor of economic and material growth. The plan the Pérez Jiménez administration put forward was called the “New National Ideal,” which consisted of using Venezuela’s mineral wealth to benefit all Venezuelans. Pérez Jiménez himself declared that the goal for his nation was the “moral, intellectual, and material improvement of the inhabitants of the country and the rational transformation of the physical environment, in order that Venezuela occupy the rank that corresponds to its geographic situation, its extraordinary riches, and glorious traditions” (Servicio Informative Venezolano, 1954; quoted in Mayhall, 2005, p. 126).
Unfortunately for most Venezuelans, the benefits of this period remained concentrated among a few sectors of society, especially the military and foreign investors. Journalist Tad Szulc reported, “civil liberties and the United States conception of democracy have fallen by the wayside in this attempt by the Venezuelan Government to give the country generations’ worth of material progress in less than a decade” (Szulc, 1956, March 17, p. 6). The Pérez Jiménez government made no effort to improve the lives of the rural poor, whose standard of living had been in decline since World War I. The Pérez Jiménez regime returned to a policy of catering to U.S. oil companies, in an attempt to boost production and revenues. Under Pérez Jiménez, U.S. direct investments in Venezuela more than doubled (Rabe, 1982, p. 128). “The oil industry provided the government with over half of its revenues, about 75 percent of its income taxes, and almost 95 percent of its export earnings” (Rabe, 1982, p. 131). Yet, it employed less than 2% of the workforce.
The profits went into massive public works projects, centered in Caracas, which became an impressive, modern-looking city. The repressive Pérez Jiménez government, with U.S. encouragement, squandered the nation’s oil revenues and the great opportunity they represented. Meanwhile, U.S. businesses applauded the Pérez Jiménez government, praising “progressive” and “forthright” policies (Rabe, 1982, p. 130).
In 1948, shortly after they took power, the military government banned the political party Accion Democrática (AD). AD was by far the most popular party in Venezuela and had just won a massive victory in the 1947 national election. Still feeling threatened, the military government began hunting down adecos (members or supporters of Accion Democrática). In 1950, when Pérez Jiménez took control, the oppression of opposition expanded and accelerated.
Illegal imprisonment, concentration camps, torture, and murder became the favorite tools of the Pérez Jiménez regime. The tortures inflicted were as imaginative as they were terrible: “prisoners were slashed with razors, burned with cigarettes, forced to sit for hours on blocks of ice. Some prisoners were force-fed harsh laxatives and then, in a chamber of horrors awash with blood, excrement and vomit, they were forced to walk naked around a razor-sharp wheel rim” (Time magazine, August 23, 1963, quoted in McMaughan, 2011, p. 22). These activities were the domain of the new Seguridad Nacional, and its head Pedro Estrada quickly became the most hated man in Venezuela.
In 1952, the Pérez Jiménez regime felt the time was right to confer at least some legitimacy to their government by calling for an election. One hundred and four members were to be elected to a constituent assembly, which would then elect a president. AD was not allowed to run, leaving Venezuelans to choose between the government party or the two remaining opposition parties. Copei was a conservative, religious party associated with the Catholic Church. The Democratic Republican Union (URD) was the other opposition party, “generally considered a left-of-center nationalistic party,” associated with anti-U.S. tendencies, which it denied (“Venezuela vote lead,” 1952). The government party was the Independent Electoral Front (FEI). The military regime strictly controlled the activities of Copei and URD, forcing them to turn over all of their materials and even jailing their leaders. Government interference became so great that URD seriously considered simply boycotting the election.
Nevertheless, the opposition parties, especially URD, continued to campaign hard. In spite of their progress, it came as complete shock to all when early returns showed URD with a full 50% of the vote, with FEI at 35% and Copei at 15%. Just as these returns were being reported, the government suddenly imposed a complete media blackout. In one case, a telephone call was taking place, in which a reporter in Caracas was relaying totals. He gave the URD totals at the time, and the Copei numbers, then as he “started to give the next figure—probably for the Government coalition—he was interrupted. When he resumed, he said ‘I cannot talk about the election’ ” (Bracker, 1958). This is an extraordinary example of censorship in action.
While it was initially hoped the blackout was just to avoid further embarrassment, it soon proved to be far more sinister. The blackout remained in place for two full days. When it was finally lifted, the regime announced they had tallied the results. The URD candidate claimed his party had received enough votes to grant it 70 of the 104 seats, but the government later announced that FEI had won 56 seats, URD only 27 seats, and Copei 14 seats. The day after the election the URD candidate and six other party leaders were arrested and deported to Panama. Though both Venezuelans and members of the international community were outraged, the fraudulent election was an insufficient catalyst for revolution, and after a brief period of unrest, it was back to business as usual for the Pérez Jiménez regime.
For the next five years, the military government continued to torture and murder its opposition, while the highest ranking members of the government and the military amassed gigantic personal fortunes through rampant graft and corruption. Venezuela continued to enjoy an oil boom, but the profits continued to flow into showy but ultimately ineffective public works projects, into the pockets of the rulers, or out of the country and into the hands of foreign investors.
By and large, Venezuelans chose to bide their time, waiting for the next opportunity to remove Pérez Jiménez from power. A handful of poorly organized revolts were easily put down, and everyone began turning increased attention to the scheduled 1957 election. Pérez Jiménez was of course also aware that his term was coming to an end, and that he was even less popular in 1957 than he had been in 1952. The regime could not risk the likely embarrassment of another free election. Something needed to be done.
The Pérez Jiménez regime announced a plebiscite, a simple yes or no answer to the question of whether or not Pérez Jiménez should remain in office. Still, even this sham of an election was deemed too risky to proceed freely. A “YES” card and a “NO” card were mailed to all voters. They were to mail their vote back. The day after the election, government workers and employees of businesses friendly to the regime were required to come to work with their “NO” card to prove they had not voted against the regime, or risk losing their jobs.
Unsurprisingly, Pérez Jiménez won the December 15, 1957, plebiscite, though many Venezuelans simply refused to vote. The U.S. ambassador to Venezuela reported, “In the absence of democratic traditions, the majority of Venezuelans have developed what appears to be an apathetic or acquiescent attitude toward their authoritarian governments.” He went on to say, “In the present political situation, the typical mood of the man in the street appears to be one of passive, though cynical, acceptance of the Regime’s decision and plans to remain in power” (Despatch from the Ambassador, 1955–1957).
In spite of the prevailing feeling of resignation, the plebiscite angered Venezuelans. In addition, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the vast majority of the country was not benefiting from the massive economic boom, and they were not likely to see any benefits so long as things stayed the same. Anger among Venezuelans began to grow and, fortunately for the Venezuelan people, elements of the armed forces were beginning to lose patience as well.
A generation of young officers was growing in the Venezuelan armed forces. These junior officers were frustrated, because although the Pérez Jiménez regime was a boom time for the military, the benefits were concentrated at the highest ranks. Even more important was the legacy of those three years of democracy, 1945–1948, Venezuela’s first experience with democratic civilian government. This combination of material and ideological motivations finally stirred some to action.
On January 2, 1958, elements of the Air Force revolted. Though the revolt was quickly put down, it represented the strongest challenge to Pérez Jiménez’s rule yet. After this, things began to happen very quickly. Pérez Jiménez received increasing pressure from the Armed Forces, while civilian opposition grew bolder and bolder. Pérez Jiménez frantically scrambled to maintain power, proposing and granting numerous concessions to both civilian and military opponents. When that failed, he resorted to force, and by mid-January over 250 officers were under arrest. Students were in massed protest, and intellectuals circulated an anti-government manifesto that received hundreds of signatures (Szulc, January 17, 1958). “It was noted … that this was the first time since the inception of dictatorial rule here that such leaders, including influential business men, had been willing to identify themselves with the opposition movement” (Szulc, January 19, 1958).
Things came to a head on January 21, 1958. “It was a true popular revolution of Venezuelan citizens of all ages and social classes” (Kolb, 1974, p. 175). Venezuelans organized a general strike for January 21st. “Precisely at 12 o’clock noon on that day all editorial offices closed without having printed a single newspaper, church bells rang, factory sirens screamed, thousands of automobiles sounded their horns and, by common consent, shop owners locked their doors and walked into the streets, to be joined by great masses of caraceños [residents of Caracas] who converged toward the center of the city to protest the rule of Pérez Jiménez” (Kolb, 1974, p. 175). The Seguridad Nacional responded with force, opening fire on the protesters, who returned the violence: “Students and workers threw Molotov cocktails into police jeeps, incinerating the occupants, while women and children poured boiling water upon the uniformed men from windows and balconies” (Kolb, 1974, p. 176). The few shops that did open, mostly owned by foreigners, were vandalized. As the strife continued into a second day, several more shops and few factories dared open for business; the mobs broke the shops’ windows, and set the factories ablaze.
The protests mobilized nearly the entire population, with all ages and occupations represented, but even such widespread and committed opposition could not oust the dictator. Regardless of the ferocity of this storm, Pérez Jiménez thought he could weather this one too. Thus, it came as a surprise to him when word came that all branches of the armed forces had risen up against him as well. In the end, a truly united Venezuela overthrew their dictator and finally began the process of a return to democratic civilian rule.
In February, 1958, the Eisenhower administration offered a cautious statement of approval of the popular overthrow of Pérez Jiménez: “while we are not in a position to intervene in the internal developments of the countries of Latin America, we are in a position to feel, and we do feel, satisfaction and pleasure when the people of any country determinedly choose the road to democracy and freedom” (U.S. Department of State Bulletin, March 31, 1958, p. 520; quoted in Rabe, 1982, p. 134). This is a remarkably reluctant response to such a landmark event in another nation. This is understandable, considering the close relationship between the Eisenhower administrator and the Venezuelan dictator. This close relationship would soon lead to some serious consequences.
IV
Vice President Nixon went on a tour of Central America in 1955, which went very well. Thus, when President Eisenhower began to believe that a high-level delegation to South America was needed, he unsurprisingly turned to his Vice President. “Nixon undertook the trip to strengthen United States relations with the region, and to congratulate the Latin Americans on their social and political achievements” (Cox, 2012).
The first stop on the trip was in Montevideo, Uruguay, where Nixon was able to overcome a disorganized attempt by Communists to mar his visit. The tour continued without incident until he reached Peru. While the Vice President was assured that he would find a warm reception, “Peru in fact echoed with angry complaints against the United States” (Zahniser & Weis, 1989, p. 175). Peruvians were upset over U.S. policies that adversely affected Peru’s economy, as well as the Legion of Merit that United States awarded former dictator Manuel Odria. Nixon took advantage of the situation to seek another confrontation with Communists at San Marcos University, though the demonstrations he encountered were not Communist-inspired. This time, demonstrators began throwing stones, forcing Nixon to retreat. One of his companions was struck in the mouth, though Nixon himself was unharmed. As he retreated, one of the individuals confronting Nixon spit directly in his face. The vice president responded in a fashion appropriate for a high-ranking diplomat abroad: he kicked the man in the shin. After his escape, and a better visit at Catholic University, Nixon returned to his hotel, only to discover the San Marcos crowd waiting for him, forcing him and his retinue to enter the hotel through a shower of spit (Cox, 2012).
After relatively uneventful visits in Ecuador and Colombia, the final scheduled stop was Venezuela. This was just three months after the Venezuelans overthrew their brutally repressive, U.S.-supported dictator. Pérez Jiménez eagerly embraced all three of the Eisenhower administration’s foreign policy goals for Latin America: he was fiercely anticommunist, though in practice much of this was simply labeling his opposition as Communists, then hunting them down in the name of anticommunism; he, with few exceptions, followed the U.S. line in all hemispheric affairs; and he made Venezuela, especially its oil industry, a haven for U.S. investors. In light of these traits, in March 1955, U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela Fletcher Warren declared that Venezuela under Pérez Jiménez was the best example in the world of the U.S. method of “doing business” and was a “showroom” for the success of the U.S. system (Telegram, 1955–1957). Warren made this claim in spite of the brutal political and social repression, the systematic theft of Venezuela’s revenues through graft and corruption, and the electoral frauds that maintained the regime. The Eisenhower administration even awarded Pérez Jiménez a Legion of Merit, the highest award given to foreign persons, “for his exceptionally meritorious conduct in the discharge of high duties.” It was to recognize “his spirit of collaboration and friendship toward the United States,” going on to cite his “constant concern for the problem of Communist infiltration” (El Universal, October 22, 1954, quoted in Kolb, 1974, p. 142). The Eisenhower administration, in spite of their knowledge of the repression and abuses that took place under Pérez Jiménez, nevertheless worked hard to achieve and maintain not just a working relationship, but a friendly one. To this end, he and his military were pampered; Pérez Jiménez was also named an “honorary submariner” by the Navy Department in 1957 (Rabe, 1982, p. 127).
In March 1958, the Communist weekly Tribuna Popular of Caracas published a letter from U.S. Ambassador Warren, dated January 10, in the midst of the rising tide against Pérez Jiménez, in which Warren congratulated the Pérez Jiménez government on weathering the New Year’s Day rebellion and offered well wishes for 1958. The Eisenhower administration chose to offer no response to the publication of this letter. In fact, they chose the very next week to announce that they had offered Pérez Jiménez, and the even more hated Pedro Estrada, asylum in the United States (Kolb, 1974, p. 181).
The governments of both Venezuela and the United States had received threats of violence. In spite of this warning, Venezuelan security forces were totally unprepared for what Vice President Nixon encountered. Nixon, his wife and the rest of the U.S. delegation, and several Venezuelan officials endured long minutes of shouting and a deluge of spit as the two countries’ national anthems were played. As they stood at attention, spit and garbage rained down on them from crowds in an overhanging airport terminal observation deck. Nixon’s wife’s “new red suit quickly turned a dirty brown with tobacco juice stains” (Zahniser & Weis, 1989, p. 181). Ceremonies were cut short as they moved straight to the cars to escape the continued rain of saliva and vitriol (Cox, 2012).
Unfortunately, though the cars offered some shelter, the ordeal was far from over. The route the motorcade was to take was public knowledge, and cars containing demonstrators wove in and out of the motorcade as it made the 12 mile journey from the airport to Caracas. Even worse, demonstrators made use of this knowledge to organize a blockade. The cars were stopped and attackers came pouring out of side streets. The crowds were primarily youthful, almost certainly made up of some of the same individuals who took to the streets to oust Pérez Jiménez just three months before. According to U.S. officials, “the mob was made up of ruffians and riffraff and it was in an ugly mood” (Memorandum, 1958/1991). One historian described “a howling mob of Venezuelans who gave every indication of wishing to tear him to bits, wreaking vengeance on the person of the Vice-President for all of the indignities and deprivations endured in a decade of tyranny” (Kolb, 1974, p. 182).
For 12 minutes, the crowd assailed the cars with rocks, pipes, sticks, and still more spit. Nixon later reported that the attackers were rocking his vehicle, in an attempt to overturn it. “Rocks, dirt and dung flew everywhere” (Zahniser & Weis, 1989, p. 181). A few Secret Service men jumped out to try to protect the occupants, fortunately maintaining the presence of mind to avoid resorting to deadly force, which would only have made the situation even more dangerous. Meanwhile, Venezuelan security forces stood by while the mob attacked. Just three months earlier, a mob very like this one hunted down Seguridad Nacional officers in the streets. Their successors were not eager to resist another such popular uprising. In a display of hemispheric solidarity, though not the type sought by the Eisenhower administration, Venezuelans were heard to shout “We won’t forget Guatemala” as they attacked the vice president (Brands, 2010, p. 17). The rioters also screamed the names of Pérez Jiménez and Pedro Estrada, demanding to know why they were being sheltered in the United States.
The cars took a beating; windows were shattered, and a Venezuelan official received a face full of broken glass. Fortunately, no one in the U.S. delegation was seriously injured. They were able to negotiate the roadblock and drive the battered, spit-covered cars to the U.S. ambassador’s residence. Following the attacks on the road, riots erupted throughout the city.
The protesters represented a new social mixture. “They were mostly young and literate, often led by adult university students or Communist Party cadres” (McPherson, 2003, p. 10). The violence Nixon encountered demonstrated “the readiness of mass-based groups to express hostility directly at the U.S. government” (McPherson, 2003, p. 9). A State Department officer declared of the demonstrations in Caracas, “This is something new in Latin America” (quoted in McPherson, 2003, p. 26).
After completing an abbreviated and modified schedule of appointments, the Nixon retinue was ready to travel the same road back to the airport to return to the United States. No chances were taken this time: “they were accompanied by the junta in automobiles well-stocked with small arms, tear gas canisters, and submachine guns, and were escorted by a riot-ready army filling nine buses and three trucks” (Zahniser & Weis, 1989, p. 183). Once the vice president returned to the United States, the Eisenhower administration began the process of understanding what had just happened, and responding.
V
Much of the Eisenhower administration’s rhetoric about the Nixon trip initially focused on Communism, suggesting they had completely misunderstood the nature of the protests and the sources of the anger displayed. However, the administration’s firm commitment to anticommunism necessitated a discussion of the role of Communism in the violence. Beginning immediately after the violence in Caracas, and continuing throughout the discussion of the Nixon mission, Nixon and other officials in the Eisenhower administration began discussing the actual sources of grievances. Ultimately, the violence led to serious discussions, effectively raising awareness and leading to substantial changes in policy.
The first official reaction to the Nixon tour came in a May 16, 1958, cabinet meeting. While much of the meeting was consumed with Nixon’s discussion of the role of Communists, they quickly realized that even if the crowds were organized by Communists, the vast majority of protestors were not themselves Communist. The discussion quickly turned to an effort to identify who they were, and why they were protesting so violently (Cabinet meeting, 1958).
Costa Rican president José Figueres said, “People cannot spit on a foreign policy which is what they meant to do” (quoted in McPherson, 2003, p. 9). The Nixon trip led to a period of “creative tension,” leading the United States “to reshape long-standing policies toward Latin America and recast them in major ways” (Zahniser & Weis, 1989, p. 163). Nixon believed “his mission had alerted his own nation that its relations with Latin America needed attention on a wide variety of fronts,” forcing “a reassessment of the administration’s policy toward Latin America” (Zahniser & Weis, 1989, pp. 184–185). He suggested the Eisenhower administration make Latin America a higher priority, and also suggested that they more clearly embrace and support democracies while distancing the United States from repressive dictatorships (Cox, 2012).
Seven months after the trip, a national intelligence estimate entitled “Latin American Attitudes toward the US” described what the Eisenhower administration had learned from the experience. “It pointed out the growing power of the middle and lower classes,” including “the differences in culture and living standards” between them and the United States (National intelligence estimate, 1991). “It also stressed this group’s feelings about the US interventions which contradicted stated policy and signed agreements, the role of US companies in the Latin American economies, and the relations between the United States and Latin American dictators” (Cox, 2012).
Congress also responded to the violence in Caracas. Senator Wayne Morse almost immediately began conducting hearings, featuring “the grilling of several State Department officers” (Zahniser & Weis, 1989, p. 185). About a year after Nixon’s trip, a report was submitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. “The report was dedicated to understanding the problems that led to the demonstrations of the year before, and how to fix them” (Cox, 2012).
It was not only the U.S. government whose opinions began to change. Immediately after the Nixon trip, and sporadically over the next few months, newspaper articles began detailing the problems in the U.S. relationship with Latin America. Tad Szulc wrote, “Nixon Tour Highlights a Continent’s Crisis: South Americans Voice their Loud Complaints against the U.S.,” in which he concisely outlined for the U.S. public the various political and economic sources of friction in the relationship (Szulc, May 11, 1958). Armed with a changed perception gained from articles such as this, the U.S. public added its voice to calls for change in United States–Latin America policies.
Ultimately, the violence Nixon experienced in Caracas led not just to a reassessment of policy, but to a complete reevaluation of Latin American society and the relationship between Latin Americans and the United States. “While Latin American governments continued a longstanding tradition of peaceful cooperation with the United States, US policy-makers began to understand that the real power in Latin America was shifting to the people, and it was the masses, not the ruling elite, that they had to court” (Cox, 2012). Caracas “revitalized the public relations approach to Latin America” (McPherson, 2003, p. 26). After the incident, United States Information Agency director began conducting presentations titled “The Image of America” (McPherson, 2003, p. 35).
Eisenhower finally began to publicly express his preference for democracy and respect for human rights. Upon receiving the Venezuelan ambassador three months after Caracas, Eisenhower became the first U.S. president to ever publicly, unequivocally announce his preference for representative governments in Latin America (Rabe, 1988, p. 105).
The mob violence Vice President Nixon encountered in Caracas represents a remarkable example of an angry political group, and the capacity of such expressions of anger to raise awareness and create policy changes. Though the violence itself shocked the Eisenhower administration, the sentiments behind it should not have. The history of United States–Latin American relations is full of examples of policies that have created hard feelings. In the wake of World War II, after participating in the global struggle of democracy against authoritarianism, Latin Americans became less willing to accept authoritarianism in their own lives. A surge of popular democracies followed the war, with dictators and military governments falling across the region. Shortly thereafter, though, authoritarian forces made a comeback, with U.S. backing. This betrayal of democratic forces in Latin America, paired with U.S. policies that exacerbated economic troubles, created the intense anti-United States feelings that Nixon encountered on his tour.
Although the anger had a long legacy, much of the way it was expressed was new. Mass-based politics in Latin America was quickly replacing traditional rule by elites. The social make-up of the crowds, and their willingness to commit violence against the vice president of the United States, were new developments. This novelty shocked many in the United States, ultimately leading to a broad reassessment of U.S. policy, and of the entire relationship with the region. Though this rethinking did not fix all of the problems, it forced the United States to confront the new situation in Latin America.
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