Anger and Politics in Iran
Mohammad Amjad
Anger is a natural human emotion that plays an important role in human interactions, including social conflicts. Anger as a motivating force for human action, has been reflected in holy texts such as the Koran and Bible, as well as in mythology texts and literature. The scientific study of this phenomenon, however, took place shortly before the breakout of World War II. The seminal work of John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Doob, Oliver Mowrer, and Robert Sears (famously known as the Yale Group) on the frustration-aggression hypothesis in 1939, paved the way for understanding the causes of anger as a component of social conflict. Despite the sweeping generalization of the group that “Aggression is always a consequence of frustration” (Dollard et al., 1939, p. 1), the study of psychological factors in human interactions left a great impact on social scientists. Leonard Berkowitz modified the hypothesis to read that frustration results in a multitude of responses, including aggression and violence (Berkowitz, 1989, pp. 60–62). Political scientist Ted Robert Gurr, also argued that deprivation is the major cause of political violence. In Why Men Rebel, Gurr (1970) contends: “the greater the frustration, the greater the quantity of aggression and the magnitude of violence against the source of frustration” (p. 9). Gurr (1972) equates relative deprivation and frustration, and defines them as a perceived discrepancy between a person’s value expectations and their value capability. He simplifies the process as follows: Relative deprivation results in discontent, and discontented people become angry and resort to violence against the source of deprivation.
James Davies (1962) looks at the frustration of the rising expectations and the role of popular anger in the political process. Borrowing from de Tocqueville, he argues: “Revolutions ordinarily do not occur when a society is generally impoverished, … [E]vils that seem inevitable are patiently endured, because the physical and mental energies of the people are totally employed in the process of staying alive” (p. 7). He also adds that political violence is more likely to occur if a long period of economic development is followed by a sharp reversal. He calls this process the J-curve of rising expectations and their eventual frustration (pp. 8–12).
The aim of this chapter is not to prove or disprove the validity of the deprivation/aggression hypothesis. Yet, something is clear. There is a direct relation between frustration, deprivation, and anger in the political process. Frustration and deprivation have various psychological ramifications, of which anger is one. Anger, however, is not necessarily destructive, and might play quite a constructive role in society. I define anger as the motivating force, reflecting the reaction of political actors to a situation in which they feel they have been deprived of what was rightly theirs. Severity of the situation has a great impact on the actor. The reaction might be rational or irrational, depending on the actor and the situation. We can observe manifestations of anger in political processes in different political systems, whether they are democratic, semi-democratic, or authoritarian. The presidential election of 2008 in the United States reflects the anger of a majority of Americans at the domestic and foreign policies of President George W. Bush, which led them to vote for candidate Barack Obama, since he was totally against those policies. The rise of the Tea Party as a populist political phenomenon also reflected the political anger of a large segment of the American population at policies they felt were elitist and harmful to the United States. In this chapter, I shall discuss three forms of political anger: democratic, radical, and theological.
Democratic Anger
By democratic anger, I mean using peaceful means for addressing social as well as economic and political issues. The philosophy of Satyagraha (passive resistance) which was put in practice by Mahatma Gandhi in India, the civil rights movement in the United States, and the May 1968 Movement in France, are clear examples of democratic anger. Going on strikes and staging peaceful demonstrations anywhere in the world are also examples of democratic anger, where demonstrators use non-violent means to achieve their goals. Whereas the aim of the Satyagraha movement was to achieve India’s independence from Britain, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States targeted mainly racial discrimination. In the case of France, demonstrators were seeking social reforms, protesting consumerism, and demanding change of traditional values in their country.
Democratic anger rarely has the sympathy and cooperation of the government in power right from the beginning. It is usually after the protest movement, as the manifestation of democratic anger reaches a critical mass, that the government realizes the need for a new paradigm, and either reluctantly or willingly starts cooperating with the public. (In the case of the United States, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson came to the conclusion that they had no other choice but to work with the Civil Rights Movement.) In other situations, democratic anger might result in the fall of the government and the establishment of a new government that can address the issues that had resulted in the democratic anger in the first place. Rigidity of the political system and its failure to realize the need for a new paradigm might result in the overthrow of the regime (e.g., the Solidarity Movement in Poland).
Democratic Anger and the Military Coup of 1953
Democratic anger in Iran was ignited by a multitude of issues. In 1950, Iran was an underdeveloped country with a corrupt, yet semi-democratic, political system. The power bloc of Iran, composed of landlords, religious hierarchy, and the Shah, had control of the Iranian Parliament. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which was run by British managers exclusively, dominated the Iranian political system and society. To understand how badly Iranians were exploited by Britain, it is worth noting that the revenue the Iranian government received in royalties and taxes for the years 1945 to 1947 was £19.89 million (British sterling pounds). The British government, however, received £48.04 million from the AIOC during the same period in taxes alone (Mina, 2004). The revenues generated by the AIOC allowed Britain to establish a pro-Britain network among politicians, landlords, and journalists. Domination of Iran by Britain resulted in indignation of millions of Iranians who had come to believe that Britain was behind all the evils of the country. This condition gave the National Front, which was created by veteran politician Mohammad Mossadegh in 1949, an opportunity to champion grievances of people against the corrupt political system, poverty, dictatorship, and foreign domination. Major aims of the National Front were democratization of the political system, non-interference of foreign powers in Iran, and nationalization of the oil industry, which was the domain of Britain.
Angry demonstrations against the AIOC, and in support of Nationalization of the oil industry, in 1950 and early 1951, forced the Iranian lower House of the Parliament (Majlis) to reluctantly pass the Oil Nationalization Bill on March 20, 1951. The Oil Nationalization Bill became the law of the land when the Iranian Senate ratified it, and the Shah found no choice but to sign it. Immediately after this process, Mossadegh was elected Prime Minister by the Majlis, with the mission to carry out the nationalization of the oil industry. The AIOC was renamed the National Iranian Oil Company, and its management was transferred to Iranian managers, engineers, and technicians. Britain did not recognize nationalization of the Iranian oil industry and announced it would take punitive measures against Iran. British managers and technical staff also refused to serve under the Iranian managers and left the country.
Mossadegh’s plan for the democratization of Iran had three major parts: containing the Shah to his constitutional power, freedom of press, and reinvigoration of the electoral process by allowing all political parties to participate in elections freely. For this reason, he lifted the restrictions that had been imposed on the Tudeh Party (Iran’s communist Party) following an unsuccessful attempt on the Shah’s life in 1948. This Mossadegh policy agitated the power bloc, which was afraid this initiative might gradually pave the way for the victory of Tudeh Party in future elections.
Despite some skirmishes between the supporters of the Tudeh Party and the National Front, these two political organizations started working together in the streets of Tehran for mass rallies aimed at ending political corruption, eliminating foreign domination, and fighting poverty. The Shah and his conservative pro-British allies, who were opposed to Mossadegh’s domestic and foreign policies, enlisted two groups to force Mossadegh out: Fadayan-e Eslam or Self-Sacrificers of Islam (a small terrorist group whose aim was to establish an Islamic government in Iran), as well as gang leaders and villains (Laatha) to render the Mossadegh government powerless and erode its social base. Later on, a faction of theologians, such as Ayatollah Abolghasem Kashani, who had initially cooperated with Mossadegh on nationalization of the oil industry, was enlisted by the court. This latter development resulted in a split within the national movement for democracy and social reform, with devastating consequences for the country.
The boycott of the Iranian oil industry by Britain and its Western allies angered millions of Iranians, who felt they were forced to either surrender to British domination or face starvation. The Majlis deputies, who had wrongly stipulated that Mossadegh would not accept the Premiership, were now hoping he would fail to manage the oil industry and were elated to see the impact of the boycott on the Iranian economy. They were conspiring with the Shah and Britain against the Mossadegh government, in the hope that he would resign and would be replaced by a politician who would be acceptable to Britain. Because the efforts of this group to force Mossadegh out failed, they decided to overthrow him through a military coup, and while keeping the façade of oil nationalization, entered into negotiations with Britain for a new contract that would be acceptable to that country.
The CIA/MI6 engineered coup of August 19, 1953, was the last stage of this drama. After the coup, the Shah, who had fled the country after his failed first coup three days earlier, returned and established a bloody dictatorship. All of the opposition political parties were suppressed and their leaders and many of their members and supporters were imprisoned and tortured, and hundreds of them were executed. Immediately after the coup, the Shah decided to destroy all independent political organizations and impose a tight censorship on media, in order to protect his throne. The Tudeh Party, as a Marxist organization, was specifically targeted and its members and supporters who were imprisoned would have to condemn the party in order to be released. The Syndicate of Iranian Workers (Sandicay-e Kargary-e Iran), which had close ties with the Tudeh Party, was also dissolved and the workers were prevented from unionization. Mossadegh was tried for “treason” and sentenced to three years in jail; he was later put under house arrest, where he remained until his death in 1965.
The coup and its aftermath left a huge impact on the psyche of the masses and intellectuals. Political apathy replaced the enthusiasm for political participation, which manifested itself in low turnout throughout the Shah’s regime. The poetry of this time, reflected in works of major poets such as Ahmad Shamloo, Mehdy Akhavan Sales, and Hooshang Ebtehadj, demonstrates the bitterness, pessimism, and agony of the society.
Within a year after the coup, Iran signed a contract with a consortium of Western oil companies (U.S., British, French, and Dutch) for the exploration, production, and sale of its oil in a 50–50% profit sharing. The consortium, however, was in charge of decision making, which was contrary to the principles of the oil nationalization movement (Engler, 1961, pp. 207–210). The United States, which before the coup had a marginal role in Iran, became very influential in the country, and its financial and military advisers played a crucial role in Iran’s economic and security policies. The Eisenhower administration granted Iran a $40 million emergency loan shortly after the coup and continued providing loans and grants for at least a decade. Between 1954 and 1962, Iran received $861 million in economic aid and another $500 in military aid.
Economic Development and Democratic Anger
Rapid economic growth of Iran following the coup of 1953 made the pre-capitalist social formation of Iran untenable. In 1962, the Shah promulgated a series of reforms including a land reform, which paved the way for capitalist development in Iran. The rapid industrialization, which was funded by increasing oil revenues since 1968, convinced the Shah that he did not need the support of the middle class as the support base of his regime. This development further alienated the middle class and resulted in its unofficial boycott of the electoral process. Low voter turnout (usually under 35 percent) became a major challenge to the legitimacy of the regime and eventually worried the Shah about the future of his throne. The solution the Shah found for mobilizing people around his plans for the future of Iran, was to create a one party system, based on royal ideology. Interestingly enough, the Shah had previously boasted that as a constitutional monarch, he was against a one party system (Pahlavi, 1961, pp. 172–173).
It seems that some of the Shah’s advisors, who were fascinated by modernization theorists such as David Apter and Samuel Huntington, had convinced him that in developing countries, a disciplined single party system was the best mechanism for mobilizing people as the support base of the regime (Apter, 1965, pp. 12–16; Huntington, 1970, pp. 395–404; Stemple, 1981, pp. 30–35). On March 2, 1975, the Shah announced the establishment of the Rastakhiz (Resurgent) Party and the dissolution of the multi-party system in Iran. To make the situation worse, he threatened that those who were opposed to the new development would have to leave the country (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 440). This development angered millions of previously apolitical Iranians, who found no choice but to join the anti-Shah opposition later on.
Worse yet, the economic boom of 1973–1976 was followed by the bust of 1977. The ambitious industrialization plans to turn Iran into the world’s fifth economic power, without taking into consideration the many shortcomings of the country, including insufficient infrastructure and a shortage of skilled labor and experienced managers, turned out to be catastrophic. Moreover, the importation of capital-intensive factories and wasting billions of dollars on sophisticated weapons and an ambitious nuclear program, had depleted the Iranian treasury. To remedy the serious economic problem Iran was facing, the Shah forced Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda to resign, and replaced him with the veteran technocrat, Jamshid Amouzgar on August 7, 1977.
Amouzgar’s main goal was to resolve the financial problems of the country and to energize the economy by cutting wasteful spending. His first step was to slash the budget of religious institutions, which infuriated the religious hierarchy. He also put several major construction projects on hold to prevent financial collapse. As a result, tens of thousands of construction workers, most of whom were rural migrants, lost their jobs. To make the situation worse, he decided to level the shantytowns which had sprung up outside of Tehran as the result of rural exodus to major cities including Tehran. The shantytown inhabitants, who were mostly rural migrants (many of whom had lost their jobs as the result of new economic policies of the regime), found no alternative but to resist the government representatives who had arrived with bulldozers to level their houses. A fight broke out between them and the military personnel who had been sent to carry out the mission. Fear of the spread of violence to the rest of the shantytowns around Tehran forced the government to shelve the plan. Amouzgar’s miscalculation had politicized this otherwise apolitical sector of the Iranian population. Rural migrants became the most active participants in the anti-Shah movement from early 1978, when religious symbolism played a crucial role in the movement.
Before the beginning of 1977, with the exception of university students, a handful of pro-Khomeini theologians, and underground political organizations, no other group dared to openly challenge the regime. Despite this, a volcano of anger was simmering beneath and was waiting for the right condition to erupt. This opportunity was provided when Jimmy Carter became President in 1976. The announcement of Human Rights Policy as a foreign policy objective by President Jimmy Carter had a great impact on Iran. Both the Shah and the opposition took the Human Rights policy of Jimmy Carter seriously. The Shah felt obliged to somehow relax repression in order to buy the support of the new president and to appease the people who were enraged by the economic downturn. Although the Shah was looking at this new development as a breathing space to overcome economic setbacks, the opposition found a window of opportunity to demand an end to political repression and revival of the Constitution of 1906, according to which the monarch was solely head of the state and was prevented from meddling in policy-making.
Iranian students, who have historically played an important role in political process, were the first group to challenge the Shah’s dictatorship and put his liberalization policy to the test in early 1977 by going on strike and staging demonstrations. The reaction of security forces was, amazingly enough, not harsh, and usually ended with no casualties. This development inspired other social groups to join the struggle for democratization of the political system. Modern middle class, social democratic opposition such as the National Front, and various civil society institutions also resumed the political activities that had been previously suppressed. Between the months of May and June 1977, 53 lawyers and 45 members of the Iranian Writers Association separately wrote open letters to the Shah, expressing their grievances against the interference of the executive branch in the judicial process and violation of human rights in Iran. The latter group’s activities had been suspended upon its inception in 1965, and it was not recognized as a legitimate entity by the regime. Shortly afterwards, three prominent leaders of the National Front, Karim Sanjabi, Dariush Foruhar, and Shapur Bakhtiar, wrote an open letter to the Shah and demanded dissolution of the Rastakhiz Party, freedom of speech, assembly, and press, and the freedom of all political prisoners. To the astonishment of many, none of these people were arrested, which energized other civil society actors to express their anger toward the regime for political repression, and demand return to the rule of law and revival of the 1905 Constitution, which had been gravely violated by the Shah.
In early summer of 1977, several political organizations such as the Freedom Movement of Iran (founded by Mehdi Bazargan and Ayatollah Taleghani in 1961) and the Radical Movement of Iran, created by Rahmatollah Moghaddam Mareghehi (a Majlis Deputy from Miandoab, Azerbaijan), started their activities. Several human rights organizations were also created in early 1977, demanding an end to repression and recognition of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the regime. The democratic anger expressed by civil society and the modern middle class put the Shah (who at the same time was trying to find a way to resolve the economic woes of the country and keep President Carter happy) in a very difficult situation.
From Protest Movement to Revolution
The mass mobilization against the Shah, which gradually started in 1977 and ended in the overthrow of monarchy in 1979, suggests the validity of James Davies’s J-curve theory. The economic boom of the 1960s through mid-1970s, which was followed by the bust of 1976, accompanied by political liberalization of 1977, after a long period of dictatorship, provided the condition for a huge eruption in Iran. The real or perceived support by President Carter for human rights was also a contributing factor in this process. It seems very likely that the Shah and his associates, who had studied David Apter and Samuel Huntingon’s work so avidly, either did not have a chance to follow the works of Davies and his predecessors such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Crane Brinton, or did not take them seriously. The Shah, who had painted himself against the wall by establishing a one party system, was now on collision course with history, by his liberalization policies following a quarter of a century of repression, while trying to deal with an economic bust following a long period of economic growth. Worse yet, as the protest movement was developing into a full-fledged revolution, the Shah was constantly vacillating between refraining from the use of violence and using brute force against the opposition. The latter was probably due to the fact that he had not designed a clear-cut plan to deal with the complicated events that were occurring almost daily, and hoping everything would go back to normal miraculously.
By late 1977, various social groups had something to protest about: The salaried middle class was angry because of political repression, workers were enraged because their salary had not kept pace with inflation, peasants were disenchanted with the regime for failing to pursue a coherent policy in rural areas following the land reform, and rural migrants either could not find suitable jobs or had lost their jobs, all as the result of austerity measures pursued by the Amouzgar government. University students and human rights organizations were furious over the treatment of political prisoners, the intellectuals were resentful because of the severe restrictions imposed on freedom of the press and expression, and finally, the religious hierarchy was against secularization of the country.
During the months of August and September of 1978, two incidents occurred that radicalized the movement and made any compromise with the Shah impossible. First, while anti-Shah demonstrations and strikes had become daily events in Iran, on August 19, 1978, the Rex movie theater was set on fire in the oil city of Abadan, resulting in the deaths of over 400 people. Despite the mishandling of the incident by the government, especially the fire department, there is some evidence that a small group of agitators close to top religious authority in Iran had instigated it, in order to discredit the Shah further and intensify popular anger against him. The opposition, however, unanimously blamed the Shah for the incident.
The next event is the so-called Black Friday. On Friday, September 8, 1978, several thousand people who were participating in a quiet sit-in in Jaleh Square in Tehran were surrounded by military units, who opened fire at them after they refused to disperse. According to government sources, 88 died as the result, although clerics claimed several thousand had been killed. Regardless of the real number of the victims of this dreadful incident, it was the beginning of the end for the Shah (Abrahamian, 1982, pp. 516–517). Prime Minister Sharif Emami, who had replaced Jamshid Amouzgar, resigned and General Gholam Reza Azhari, a moderate and incompetent general, replaced him. In protest against the Jaleh Square massacre, the oil workers went on strike, depriving the government of revenues, which made the fall of the Shah inevitable.
Democratic Anger since the Revolution
With the overthrow of the monarchy, political parties, various interest groups, and newspapers sprang up. Underground political organizations as well as social democratic and liberal political parties and organizations started their activities openly and freely. Marxist organizations such as the Fadayan Khalq Guerrilla Organization, the Tudeh Party, Ranjbaran, Peykar, and Komeleh as well as the Mojahedin Khalq Organization, which had surfaced, became very popular with the new generation, especially among university students. The National Front and the Freedom Movement were popular with the older generation and were put in charge of the provisional government, with Mehdi Bazargan as its prime minister. The expectation of the democratic opposition was that dictatorship, censorship, and restriction on civil society would never return. But within a few weeks after the overthrow of the monarchy, things turned sour. Ayatollah Khomeini, who in Paris had promised a democratic political system with no restrictions for any political party, turned his back against all of those promises and expressed his decision for the creation of an Islamic order (Ashkevari, 2015). Gradually, the secular politicians were either purged, became discouraged and left, or were forced to resign, and were eventually replaced either by theologians or staunch pro-Khomeini non-clerics.
The dictatorship returned, but this time in the guise of “revolutionary Islamic” principles. Khomeini started criticizing intellectuals, independent newspapers, feminists, secular political parties, and universities for the problems of the country. Middle-class women, who were enraged by the regime’s pressure to force women to wear veils, organized a huge demonstration on March 8, 1979 (International Women’s Day), to show their opposition to this policy and demand equal rights with men. This event was, however, broken violently by Khomeini’s supporters, who threw rocks at them and beat a large number of demonstrators. Sadly enough, the leftist forces did not support the women’s show of force and dismissed it as a bourgeois attempt to divert the attention of people from the class struggle. This short-sidedness of leftist forces eventually cost the left and the entire civil society dearly.
The only chance that remained for the civil society activists to prevent the total control of the state by the proponent of a theocracy was the upcoming election for president and the parliament (Majlis). Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, who despite his liberal views was allowed to run for president, was able to win the presidential election with 75% of the popular vote. Happiness over this victory did not last long, because pro-Khomeini theologians, who had created the Islamic Republic Party (IRP), won the majority of seats in the parliament. By controlling the Majlis, the IRP leaders were in a position to oust Bani-Sadr, who had become the major obstacle to the total control of the state by pro-Khomeini theologians. Disagreements between Bani-Sadr and leaders of the IRP-dominated Majlis created a crisis in the country. With the blessing of Khomeini, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Majlis speaker, mobilized the parliament members to impeach Bani-Sadr on June 21, 1981, and put an end to the possibility of democratic process in Iran. This development allowed the IRP, which already had the control of judiciary and the Majlis, to gain the control of the executive branch as well. Within a few months, the regime was in a position to ban all non-conformist political parties, shut down independent newspapers, and purge the universities (which were already closed down) of dissident professors and students in order to “Islamize” them. With the total domination of the state by the staunch proponents of theocracy, the civil society became dormant and listless. The result was bitterness, bewilderment, and passive anger of millions of Iranians who found no other choice but to wait for the disintegration of unity in the power bloc.
Despite the totalitarian understanding of Khomeini about the nature of the state, it soon became clear that various groups within the power bloc had different, divergent, and even contradictory interests. Despite the façade of unity within the Islamic Republic Party as the party of Khomeini and his instrument of Islamization of the country, three different factions within the party emerged: right wing, left wing, and centrist. Ali Khamenei, with strong roots in the bazaar, was the leader of the right wing, while his prime minister Moosavi, who was also deputy leader of the party, represented the left wing of the party. Hashemi Rafsanjani, as a centrist, was more of a pragmatist. He mostly sided with the right wing, but kept his close contacts with the leftists in the party. While the right wing of the party supported a free market and was in favor of less government intervention in economic activities, Moosavi was a staunch supporter of state control of the economy and a welfare state. Although Khomeini was trying to stay above these differences, he mostly sided with the left wing of the party. Ideological differences between Khamenei as the president and Moosavi as prime minister created a division in the Islamic Republic Party. Khamenei’s aim was to dismiss Moosavi and execute his own policies, but Khomeini’s support for Moosavi prevented the Iranian president from achieving his goal. Clashes between Moosavi and Khamenei over domestic and foreign policy issues eventually resulted in the dissolution of the Islamic Republic Party in May 1987. This new development was instrumental in restructuring of civil society in the 1990s.
Khomeini’s death in June 3, 1989, left the Iranian theocracy without a suitable successor. According to Article 109 of the original Iranian constitution, Valy-e Faghih (the Supreme Leader) should have the qualification of Marja’ Taghlid (highest Shi’a religious authority). In the emergency meeting of the Assembly of Experts, held immediately after Khomeini’s death, Hojjatol Islam Ali Khamenei, a junior theologian, who was serving as the president, was selected as the new Valy-e Faghih. As Khamenei did not have the qualification to succeed Khomeini as the Valy-e Faghih, the Assembly of Experts elevated him to the rank of Ayatollah to make his appointment look less conspicuous (Kadivar, 2015, pp. 95–120).
Post-Revolutionary Democratic Anger
It took the democratic anger more than a decade to come to the surface as the result of the restructuring of civil society in Iran. The civil society, which was besieged by the state, was able to break its encirclement when the contradiction within the power bloc surfaced in the mid-1990s. The democratic anger eventually erupted in the 1997 presidential election, when Hojjatol Islam Mohammad Khatami, the reformist candidate, announced that his main objective upon winning the election would be to strengthen the civil society in Iran. Khamenei had strongly supported the Majlis Speaker, Hojjatol Islam Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, a conservative cleric who had promised to Islamize the country further. Contrary to the conservative circle’s expectation that Khamenei’s support would guarantee Nuri’s victory, Khatami won the 1997 presidential election by landslide. Victory of Khatami was the result of the mobilization of millions of young people who, as the infantry of civil society, enthusiastically worked in his headquarters and prevented further Islamization of the country. Khatami received 70% of the vote, which gave him the mandate for change.
Khatami, who owed his presidency to pro-democracy groups and individuals, did good on his promise and lifted most of the restrictions that had been imposed on civil society. Despite the opposition of conservatives, reformist newspapers sprang up, the dress code (especially for women) became less restrictive, the tight control on employment of non-conformists was lifted, and political openness (relatively speaking) became the norm. Newspapers started writing freely about people’s grievances and shortcomings of the theocratic system of the country, and publicized the abuse of power by conservatives. The conservative theologians who were concerned that the freedom of expression, assembly, and speech might weaken their position, started an all-out war against the reformists and did all they could to derail Khatami’s government. Despite the fact that Khamenei and his conservative camp were able to weaken the reformers, the civil society remained vibrant and did not surrender to the conservative camp’s attempts for the creation of a monolithic political system.
The democratic anger erupted one more time during the presidential campaign of 2009, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the super conservative and populist president of Iran, started campaigning for re-election. The Reformist camp had two candidates who reinforced one another: Mir Hossien Moosavi (former prime minister), and Mehdi Karrubi (former Majlis speaker). Moosavi’s presidential campaign was colorful and attracted millions of young people, especially university students and women. Moosavi, who had selected the “color green” as the symbol of his campaign, was genuinely in favor of democratization of the political system, reviving democratic values which had been severely restricted during four years of the Ahamdinejad presidency, and putting an end to discriminations against women, ethnic and religious minorities, and ending confrontational policies of Ahmadinejad toward the West. What separated Moosavi from all other candidates in 2009, was his wife and his unofficial running mate, Zahra Rahnavard. Rahnavard, a painter, sculptor, writer, university professor, and the first female university president, had great appeal among millions of women. As an Islamic feminist, she had played an important role in publicizing discriminations that existed against women. She campaigned tirelessly by Moosavi’s side, which endeared both of them to millions of young people who, for the first time since 1979, saw a candidate holding hands with his wife in public. This simple and meaningful gesture electrified Moosavi’s campaign and encouraged millions of young women to join his campaign enthusiastically.
The results of the election angered pro-reform supporters when Ahmadinejad was announced winner of the presidential election held on June 12, 2009. Millions of people throughout the country poured to the streets to protest the outcome of the election and demanded its annulment. These protesters believed the election had been rigged, and the loser had been announced the winner. The main slogan of the protesters was “Where is my vote?”, indicating their votes had been stolen by the candidate who had lost the election. The widespread protests, known as the Green Movement due to protesters wearing green bracelets, head scarfs, scarfs, or shirts, shook the regime. The security forces and plainclothesmen (an unofficial pressure group that has been set up by the regime since 1979 to attack anti-government rallies) physically attacked the demonstrators, after Ali Khamenei, the Iranian Supreme Leader, openly expressed his support for Ahmadinejad, and threatened that if demonstrations and rallies continued, the demonstrators would be responsible for the outcome of their actions.
To the surprise of many, Khamenei’s threat did not scare demonstrators, and they continued expressing their disappointment and anger toward what had happened by continuing their protest. Dozens of demonstrators were killed by security forces and pro-Khamenei supporters. Several hundred people were arrested and were imprisoned following mass trials, reformist political parties were disbanded, and many political activists, university professors, and journalists were forced to leave the country to escape persecution. The leaders of the Green Movement: Mir Hossien Moosavi, Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi Karrubi, were also put under house arrest without due process of law.
Radical Anger
The frustration-aggression hypothesis, which indicates that frustration or relative deprivation will result in some form of violence against the source of deprivation, is manifested in the use of violence by underground political organizations against the state. This kind of political activism, which mostly (but not exclusively), takes place in non-democratic countries, views violence as the only possible means to impact the political process. Proponents of the use of violence as a political action usually justify their use of violence as the counter-violence or revolutionary violence, and deny the fact that what they are engaged in, is terrorism. These groups usually rob banks to finance their activities, and assassinate government officials to terrify and weaken the regime. The same trend was followed in Iran in the 1960s, when a new generation of political activists who were greatly influenced by the Cuban, Algerian, Palestinian, and Vietnamese experience, came to the conclusion that the use of violence was a legitimate means for the achievement of political ends. The underground political organizations of Iran that used violence as the manifestation of political activism fall into three categories: Islamic, Left-wing Islamic, and Marxist.
The main aim of Islamic groups that emerged between the 1940s and 1970s was the creation of an Islamic state by assassinating those who were considered to be the enemy of Islam. Fadayan Islam (Islam’s self-sacrificers) was the first group in this category. Fadayan Islam was founded by a young Tollab (singular; Talabeh, students of religious seminaries) in Qom by the name of Navvab Safavi in the early 1940s. Navvab Safavi was greatly influenced by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. This group assassinated the prominent Iranian historian Ahmad Kasravi and Prime Minister General Haji Ali Razm Ara in the 1940s. They were later enlisted by the court to harass Mossadegh and his associates. They also had an unsuccessful attempt on Mossadegh’s right-hand man and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hossein Fatemi. The group was rounded up after the coup of 1953. Hayathay-e Mo’talefeh Eslami (the Association of Islamic Coalitions) is yet another pure Islamic group whose main base of support was in the bazaars (Iranian traditional market place). This organization managed to assassinate the Iranian Prime Minister, Hasan Ali Mansur, in 1964. The group was discovered and destroyed in 1965, and it remained dormant until 1977.
Contrary to the pure Islamic group, the Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO), which was founded in 1965, was a modern Islamic group that had both Islamic and Marxist tendencies. Founders of the group and most cadres were college graduates, and they recruited their members from university students as well. This organization split into a Marxist faction and the original Islamic group in 1974. The Marxist group was later renamed Sazman-e Peykar dar Rah-e Azadi Tabagheh Kargar or simply Peykar (The Organization for the Liberation of the Working Class), but the Islamic Mojahedin retained the original name. Lastly, several Marxist activists created the Fadayan-e Khalq Organization (FKO) to violently overthrow the Shah’s regime and establish a socialist state in its place. In contrast to the strictly Islamic group, which had a limited following, both MKO and FKO were very popular among the youth and university students.
The violent campaign these organizations either carried out or planned, resulted in swift and harsh reaction by the regime. Members and supporters of the underground political organization were imprisoned, tortured, and some of them were executed. Despite this, in contrast to the apathy and fear of 1950s, the repressive measures of 1960s and 1970s convinced the new generation that the only way to overthrow the Shah’s regime was direct and violent confrontation. In contrast to the lamentation of 1950s, the poetry of the 1960s and 1970s is full of praise for counter-violence, revenge, underground mobilization, and armed struggle. The most prominent poets of this period who used revolutionary terminologies and supported confronting the regime violently are Ahmad Shamloo, Khosrow Golsorkhi, and Saeed Soltanpoor. The execution of Khsorow Golesorkhi, who was falsely accused of trying to organize a group to kidnap royal family members in 1973, made the young generation angrier with the regime and resulted in its further isolation from the people. The Iranian secret police, SAVAK, forbade the use of terminologies such as revolution, red, forest, and rose (the latter because its Persian translation is Golesorkh and therefore reminded people of the executed poet Golesorkhi).
Although the regime was able to weaken both MKO and FKO, these two organizations played a crucial role in mobilizing people for disarming military garrisons and forcing the military to surrender on February 11, 1979. Shortly after the overthrow of the Shah, both FKO and MKO, along with other leftist political organizations, found themselves at odds with the new regime and gradually went underground again. The new regime’s determination to eliminate all non-conformist political organizations convinced FKO and MKO and several underground Marxist political organizations, such as Sarbedaran, Komeleh, and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, that they had no choice but to resort to violence as a means to survive. The result was, however, disastrous; all of leftist political organizations were uprooted and forced to migrate abroad, and since then have not been able to play an important role in political life of Iran.
Theological Anger
By theological anger, I refer to the reaction of the hierarchy of Shi’a theologians (Foghaha) to the secularization of Iran since 1963, their activism for the creation of a theocracy, and their determination to eliminate anyone who dares to challenge the Islamic regime. Theological anger in Iran was triggered by the promulgation of land reform and other reform measures popularly known as the Shah’s “six point reform measures,” the “White Revolution,” and “the Revolution of the Shah and the People.” While the Shah allayed the fear of landlords by selling them shares of state-owned factories in exchange for their lands to be owned by landless peasants, he did not have anything to offer to the hierarchy of theologians. Theologians were angry at the Shah for granting equal rights to women as part of his reform measures. The religious hierarchy of Shi’a Ulama in Qom considered these measures anti-Islamic and the sign of surrendering to pressure from the United States. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who in the early 1960s was not well known, played a crucial role in the fear and concern of Shi’a theologians in Iran. He vehemently attacked these new policies as anti-Islamic and contrary to the 1906 Constitution (Khomeini, 1981, pp. 168–178). He was arrested and later exiled to Iraq, where he remained until his triumphant return to Iran in 1979.
While in exile, Khomeini kept close contacts with both senior and junior theologians, as well as Tollab (singular; Talabeh, students of religious seminaries). Khomeini and his associates later changed their tactics and started voicing their opposition to corruption, poverty, political repression, shortages, social inequality, and finally to the foreign policy of the Shah. Although opposition political parties were banned, the religious hierarchy was able to use the network of 80,000 mosques to masterfully reach out to the people and voice their grievances against the injustices in society in religious terms, without directly criticizing the Shah’s regime.
Khomeini, who was initially only critical of the Shah’s regime for not abiding by Koranic principles, gradually became the major proponent of theocracy. While in exile in Iraq (1964–1979), Khomeini came to the conclusion that in order to roll back secularization of society in Iran, it is absolutely necessary to establish an Islamic state and revive Islamic laws (Shari’a). Khomeini’s views in regard to an Islamic state are reflected in his Velayat-e Faghih (Governance of Jurisprudence) book, in which he argues that theologians inherit the mantle of the prophet and as a result are his trustees. He further concludes, because of their position in Muslim countries, theologians have the duty to establish an Islamic order, revive and apply Shari’a, rescind all secular laws, and create a society based on Koranic principles. “The Just Foghaha must be leaders and rulers, implementing divine ordinance and establishing the institutions of Islam” (Khomeini, 1981, p. 75).
The secular opposition did not take Khomeini seriously, but felt he could contribute to the mobilization of people against the regime. From the mid-1960s through 1977, it was the leftist forces with Marxist ideology and socialist tendencies that had the backing of the people in Iran. Even activist theologians such as Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani, Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, Hojjatol Islam Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Hojjatol Islam Ali Khamenei, believed that the only political force capable of overthrowing the Shah was underground leftist organizations, especially FKO and MKO. When the mobilization against the Shah started in early 1977, supporters of Khomeini were few, absent, and insignificant. From early to late 1977, the modern middle class, composed of students, lawyers, and writers, was in the forefront of the movement. The major aim of the democratic anger was revival of the 1905 Constitution, respect for human rights, an end to dictatorship, and freedom of the press. During this time, the National Front and the Freedom Movement led the movement. Despite clashes between the security forces and demonstrators, there was no call for the violent overthrow of the regime. The main slogan of demonstrators was revival of the constitution and an end to dictatorship.
An incident on October 23, 1977, changed the fate of the movement and its direction drastically. On that day, Khomeini’s elder son, Mostafa, died suddenly. Khomeini’s associates accused the regime of murdering him, although Khomeini personally did not make a comment about the cause of the death. Yet he became more vociferous in his anti-regime messages. Commemoration of Mostafa Khomeini’s death in Iran, which was accompanied by clashes between the mourners and police, brought the name of Khomeini to the fore. Terrified by the popularity of Khomeini, the Shah made the deadliest mistake of his life, which cost him his throne. To discredit Khomeini, the Shah ordered the publication of a degrading and inflammatory article against Khomeini. This article, which was published in the semi-official Ettela’at Newspaper under a pseudonym, changed the fate of the Iranian revolution. American journalist Joseph Kraft, who was covering Iran during the tumultuous last few months of the Shah’s regime, as well as Iran’s former minister of information, Dariush Homayoun, suspect that this letter was written either by the Shah or by somebody in the court (Homayoun, 1984; Kraft, 1978). Publication of this article deeply angered Khomeini’s staunch supporters. Several thousand Talabeh (seminary students), marched in the holy city of Qom to protest this event on January 9, 1978. Police opened fire at the protestors and killed 12 of them. Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari, a top Grand Ayatollah in Qom, issued a Fatwa (religious declaration), in which he announced that participation in the commemoration of the dead Talabeh was an Islamic duty. The Islamic public mournings, which are held on the third, seventh, and fortieth day of the passing of a person, gave a great opportunity to the religious hierarchy to put an Islamic stamp on the anti-Shah movement. On February 9, the fortieth-day commemoration of Qom incident was held in several major cities. The commemoration in Tabriz took the form of a popular uprising when police shot and killed a young worker. Angry demonstrators attacked banks, movie theaters, and government headquarters, and clashed with police who killed dozens of them. The people, however, managed to take the control of the city and pushed the security forces back. The Shah, who was frightened by this incident, tried to mend fences with the opposition and publically criticized security chiefs for mishandling the situation. In another gesture to make peace with the opposition, he removed the powerful head of SAVAK, General Nematollah Nasiri, and replaced him with moderate General Naser Moghaddam.
In mid-October 1978, Khomeini went to France to mobilize people against the Shah. While in France, he presented himself as the voice of democratic opposition and refrained from calling for the creation of a theocracy in Iran. Witnessing the ever-increasing popular unity, the Shah decide to compromise with the moderate opposition in order to keep his throne. The middle class was ready to strike a deal with him, but Khomeini refused to do so and called instead for the overthrow of monarchy and the establishment of a democratic order in its place. The Shah, who had totally lost self-confidence and was worried about his life, made the fateful decision to leave the country, hoping that this move might sooth the popular anger. Before leaving the country, he appointed Shapour Bakhtiar, one of the National Front leaders, as prime minister. Both men erroneously believed that the Shah’s departure would end the crisis and that everything would go back to normal within couple of months. Bakhtirar’s premiership, however, only lasted five weeks (January 4 to February 11, 1979), and ended when the military surrendered to angry demonstrators and armed opposition.
The Establishment of Theocracy in Iran
The overthrow of the monarchy on February 11, 1979, gave Khomeini absolute control over the machinery of the state and enabled him to push for the establishment of theocracy based on his Velayat-e Faghih (the Guardianship of Theologian). The concept of Velayat-e Faghih is included in the Iranian constitution of 1979 (Articles 5, 57, and 107–111) and constitutes the backbone of the Iranian political system. The Iranian Constitution of 1979 subordinates three branches of government (judiciary, executive, and legislative) to Velayat-e Faghih, who has the final word on all important issues.
Khomeini’s insistence on the establishment of an Islamic state ended the coalition that had been established in the months leading to the overthrow of the Shah. This new development antagonized not only secular forces, but some of the top theologians who found Velayat-e Faghih harmful to Islam. While the former were disappointed and angry with the breach of Khomeini’s promises in France about the establishment of a democratic order in Iran, the latter were concerned about the ramification of the establishment of an Islamic state. The latter group argued that theologians should only advise the government to act according to Islamic principles, since the enforcement of Islamic laws by theologians would turn those negatively affected by Shari’a, against Islam. Ayatollah Khomeini, however, was determined to go ahead with the establishment of a theocracy based on Velayat-e Faghih theory without any compromise.
On the occasion of the anniversary of anti-reform riots of 1963 that Khomeini had incited, he criticized all of the groups, personalities, and political organizations that did not share his views about the establishment of a theocracy in Iran. Khomeini had this to say to theologians who were warning him about the danger of the creation of a theocracy: “If you do not implement the laws of Islam now, in full detail, you must give up all hope of ever being able to do so. Those who believe in Islam and whose hearts beat for the Qur’an must act decisively today” (Khomeini, 1981, p. 271).
He also threatened secular forces with severe punishment if they did not stop criticizing his attempt to create a theocracy. “As for those who oppose us because of their opposition to Islam, we must cure them by means of guidance, if it is at all possible; otherwise, we will destroy these agents of foreign powers with the same fist that destroyed the Shah’s regime” (Khomeini, 1981, p. 269). And for the final word, he said: “We do not want anything other than Islam; Islam can be implemented at all times, and particularly at the present time” (Khomeini, 1981, p. 271).
In order to create a theocracy based on the Velayat-e Faghih, the following steps were taken by Khomeini and his close associates:
First, by establishing Islamic Revolutionary courts, top generals and politicians of the Shah’s regime were summarily executed to prevent the possibility of a military coup against the new regime.
Second, instead of total destruction of the military and police force of the ancient regime, Khomeini opted for gradual replacement of these institutions with the new yet highly ideological ones. The Islamic Revolutionary Committee (Komiteh Enghelab-e Eslami) and Islamic Revolutionary Guards (Sepah-e Pasaran-e Enghelab-e Elami) were parallel police and military institutions whose original cadre came from the most dedicated followers of Khomeini. The Islamic Revolutionary Committee, which served as the police force, was in charge of arresting the suspected pro-shah officials and “counterrevolutionaries,” as well as providing internal security. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard (Sepah-e Pasadran-e Enghelab-e Eslami, or Sepah) was to protect the “Islamic Revolution” and defend the country against violent opposition to the regime. The backbone of the Sepah came from several small underground Islamic guerrilla organizations such as Hizbollah and Mansouroun, which were created in the 1970s. In November 1979, Sazman-e Basij-e Mostasz’afin (the Organization for the Mobilization of Poor) was created as the paramilitary unit of Pasdaran. This highly ideological paramilitary organization had branches throughout the country, and its members were mainly recruited from rural migrants, the urban poor, and peasant families in rural areas. There was no age limit for joining Basij, and most of its members were volunteers between the ages of 15 and 17. (Some had even joined at a much younger age.) Basij played a very important role during the Iran–Iraq war. By the end of the war in 1988, both Basij and Pasdaran had developed into formidable military-political institutions and paved the way for militarization of the country. These two groups play a significant role in the Iranian economy now.
Third, in regard to writing a new constitution, instead of the Constituent Assembly that Khomeini had promised in France, the Assembly of Experts (Majlis Khobregan), composed of top theologians and some Islamic intellectuals, was put in charge of this task. Despite the dismay of Islamic intellectuals such as Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and Abolhasan Bani-Sadr (the man who had a crucial role in Khomeini’s public relation success in France, and Iran’s first president), the Assembly of Experts wrote a theocratic constitution, with central role for Valy-e Faghih.
Fourth, Khomeini’s most dedicated junior Mojtaheds, composed of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Hossein Beheshti, Ali Khamenei, Abdel Karim Ardebili, and Mohammad Javad Bahonar, created the Islamic Republic Party (IRP). The major aim of this political organization was to mobilize followers of Ayatollah Khomeini for the establishment of a theocracy and crush secular opposition as well as Khomeini’s competitors in the religious hierarchy. Leaders and associates of the IRP monopolized political power and marginalized other groups and factions, both secular and religious. Domination of the first Majlis by the IRP allowed it to oust the first Iranian president, Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, who was against the Islamization of the country.
Fifth, all of the secular laws were replaced by Islamic laws, and the judiciary became the domain of Shi’a Foghaha. According to the Article 157 of Iranian Constitution, the Head of Judiciary, who is appointed by Valy-e Faghih, must be a Mojtahed who is dedicated to the implementation of Islamic laws. To ensure the application of Islamic laws in society, the Prosecutor General and the Supreme Court Chief must also be theologians.
Sixth, Khomeini’s preoccupation with eliminating those who might pose a threat to the regime was not limited to secular politicians. Even top theologians and long-time associates of Khomeini who did not share his views about the future of the country were sidelined, harassed, or killed. The most prominent theologians who were punished for their disagreement with Khomeini included Grand Ayatollah Shariatmdari, Grand Ayatollah Hasan Qomi, and Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. In order to oust Sahriatmadari, he was falsely accused of plotting against Khomeini’s life (Menasheri, 2001, p. 22). For this accusation against which he was not allowed to defend himself, his title as Marja’ Taghlid was taken away (something which was unheard of in Shi’a history until then), and he was denied access to medical treatment for his prostate cancer. Ayatollah Hasan Qomi was put under house arrest in 1984, where he remained until his death in 2004. Lastly, Ayatollah Montazeri was forced by Khomeini to resign his position as the acting Valy-e Faghih in 1989. The harsh treatment of these prominent theologians demonstrated to all top religious leaders that Khomeini’s anger could destroy them, and therefore they kept quiet, despite their disagreement with him.
Khomeini’s Anger
Khomeini’s anger was directed toward individuals, ideologies, political organizations, and governments he suspected might pose a threat to theocracy in Iran. The long list included symbols of the ancient regime (including universities), secular political organizations and institutions, his competitors, non-conformists, freedom of press, democracy, nationalism, Western countries (especially the United States), Israel, conservative and pro-Western governments in the Middle East, as well as theologians who did not share his view about the Velayat-e Faghih.
The immediate problem after the revolution was how to resolve the dichotomy between Khomeini’s promises in France for a democratic political order and his theory of Velayat-e Faghih. While a democratic order would require free and fair elections, strengthening the civil society through promoting political parties and enhancing independent media, guaranteeing gender equality, and empowering religious and ethnic minorities in Iran, the theory of Velayat-e Faghih was totally opposed to all of these principles. Despite this, as a shrewd strategist, he moved against all of these groups, cautiously, and with each step carefully calculated. The brilliant tactic of Khomeini to marginalize all non-conformists and pave the way for the Islamization of country was the adoption of “Neither East, Nor West” slogan. This simple slogan provided a great opportunity to Islamize the country within the constraints of Velayat-e Faghih. Invoking Neither East, nor West, all political parties, institutions, and entities that contradicted Velayat-e Faghih were considered allies of either the Soviet Union (East) or the United States (West) and were destroyed with absolute cruelty. Within just a year, freedom of the press was non-existent, political parties (with the exception of those supporting the regime) were either closed down or severely restricted, universities were shut down for three years (1980–1983) and were reopened only after they were “Islamized,” women were forced to wear veils, and the stage was set for the establishment of a theocracy.
Khomeini’s anger toward the United States played a crucial role in the American hostage crisis in Iran, ending diplomatic relations between the two countries, and eventually contributed to the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988. Although there is no evidence that Khomeini had previous knowledge about this incident, his support for the American Embassy takeover, after it took place, was instrumental in its continuation, with catastrophic consequences. The crisis provided the best opportunity to Saudi Arabia, which was terrified by the Iranian Revolution to encourage Saddam Hussein to invade Iran. American investigative journalist Robert Parry reports that Saudi Arabia had convinced Saddam Hussein that the United States would support the invasion (Parry, 2015). Whether the United States had given Saddam Hussein the green light to invade Iran or not, Khomeini’s preoccupation with war efforts played a crucial role in the release of American hostages who had been held in Iran for 444 days.
The war enabled Khomeini to stabilize the regime, Islamize the country, and destroy all non-conformist political parties and organizations. During the war with Iraq, the military, which was reorganized by the first Iranian president, Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, played a crucial role in preventing Saddam Hussein from achieving a quick victory. The IRP leaders, especially Beheshti, Rafsanjani, and Khamenei, were afraid that the victory in war would boost Bani-Sadr’s popularity and he could pose a serious threat to the stability of regime. They convinced Khomeini to oust Bani-Sadr and put the newly established Pasdaran in charge of handling the war. They had correctly calculated that continuation of the war with massive casualties, accompanied by injecting the Shi’a ideology among the Basij volunteers, would stabilize the regime further and pave the way for institutionalization of an Islamic regime.
The war continued for eight years and ended when Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was the acting commander-in-chief, in July of 1988 came to the realization that the war could not be won, and that it was in the best interest of the regime to accept the United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 to end the war. Khomeini bitterly accepted this advice, that he referred to as “drinking the cup of poison” (Jam-e Zahr), and ordered all of his supporters to abide by it. Many die-hard followers of Khomeini felt betrayed and were angry at those who had played a role in convincing him to end the war. While unhappy about accepting the Security Council Resolution, Khomeini was convinced that the regime could not afford to continue the war. Therefore, he felt it was necessary to find scapegoats to calm the anger of his supporters. Two incidents took place around the same time that allowed Khomeini to show his supporters that he had not given up shedding blood for the preservation of the Islamic regime.
Embarrassed by accepting to end the war that he had promised not to end before toppling Saddam Hussein, Khomeini targeted political prisoners and British-Indian novelist Salman Rushdie, whose Satanic Verses novel was considered blasphemy in the Muslim World. Immediately after both Iraq and Iran accepted the United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, MKO forces that were stationed in Iraq invaded Iran in the hope of toppling the regime. The invasion failed to achieve its objective, but made Khomeini angry enough to put an end to the existence of leftist forces who had been imprisoned since 1979. In July of 1988, he ordered the summary execution of political prisoners affiliated with the MKO and various Marxist organizations who were not willing to “repent” or condemn their respective political organizations (without warning them that failing to do so would result in their execution). This order was put immediately into effect during the summer of 1988. The exact number of victims of this crime is still unknown, but it seems to be between 5,000 and 6,000. Ayatollah Montazeri, who had protested this mindless killing, was forced to resign in early March 1989. Khomeini also issued a fatwa (a religious declaration) for the assassination of the British-Indian novelist Salman Rushdie, as well as all those who had participated in the publication of his Satanic Verses book.
Khamenei’s Anger
Khamenei inherited both Khomeini’s title as the Valy-e Faghih and his anger. As a result, like Khomeini he considers civil society, democracy, freedom of press, as well as the West, Israel, and conservative Middle Eastern leaders as a threat to the security of the regime. Khamenei’s anger is directed against his opponents among theologians, former associates, and reformers. During his reign as the Valy-e Faghih, he has masterfully bought the support of top theologians such as Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi, Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, and Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. He also tightly controls junior theologians who as Friday Prayer leaders have great influence on more traditional and conservative groups in Iran. The common theme of these theologians is that reform movement in Iran will result in secularization of society, and that political power will slip into the hands of liberals and seculars.
But unlike Khomeini, who had earned the religious and political leadership, he was granted the title of Valy-e Faghih as a matter of convenience. In order to make up for his shortcomings, he mobilized Basij, Ministry of Intelligence, and plainclothesmen against top ranking Shi’a theologians, who had reminded him that despite his appointment as the Valy-e Faghih, he did not have the qualification to issue a fatwa. Two top Marja’ Taghlid, Ayatollah Ahmad Azari Qomi and Ayatollah Hossein Ali Motazeri, were put under house arrest because they had criticized him openly for overstepping religious boundaries. The former died in 1999 while under house arrest, but the restrictions were lifted on the latter, when news about his depression broke out. Ayatollah Montazeri remained critical of Khamenei, and he supported the Green Movement and was considered its spiritual leader. He died in 2009. Several other former associates at the rank of Grand Ayatollah have either been marginalized (Grand Ayatollah Abdolkarim Ardebili), or have been harassed and their houses ransacked by Basij and plainclothesmen (Grand Aytaollah Ali Mohammad Dastghaeyb and Grand Ayatollah Yusef Sane’i).
After the humiliating defeat of his favorite candidate, Nateq Noori, Khamenei became more determined to isolate and eventually defeat reformers. He personally led the opposition to the reform movement by mobilizing Friday prayer leaders, the judiciary, the Guardian Council, the Ministry of Intelligence, Pasdaran Corps, Basij, religious institutions, populist and semi-fascist pressure groups such as Ansar-e Hizbollah (Supporters of the Party of God), and anti-reform clerics to start a war of attrition on Khatami’s government. In Khatami’s words, during his first four years as Iran’s president (1997–2001), the conservatives on the average created one crisis every nine days (Taghibeigi, 2001). Khatami’s reelection in 2001, with 80% of the votes, made the matter even worse for him, and the conservatives were creating more crises in order to force him to resign.
In line with this tactic, the Ministry of Intelligence mobilized its special unit to assassinate a large group of intellectuals and secular politicians to render Khatami powerless and force him to resign. The victims of this campaign, known as the Murder Chain (Ghatlhay-e Zangirehi), included members of Iran’s Writer’s Association, including Mohammad Ja’far Pooyandeh and Mohamad Mokhtari, as well as the Leader of the National Front, Daroiush Forouhar and his wife Parvaneh Eskandari.
Khatami’s courage in publicizing murder chains and his promise to bring perpetrators to justice, made the conservatives angrier. All the fingers in civil society were pointed at Khamenei and his close associates. Khamenei eventually felt it was necessary to discuss the matter, but instead of accepting responsibility for what had happened in the Ministry of Intelligence (as it is directly responsible to Khamenei, and its minister is appointed with his blessing), he blamed the incidents on the “enemy,” Israel, and the United States, which he claimed had infiltrated this intelligence organization. Two prominent reformist journalists Saeed Hajjarian and Akbar Ganji, who had tirelessly worked on the subject, suffered the consequence. Saeed Hajjarian, the renowned journalist and the strategist of reform, became the victim of an assassination attempt that kept him paralyzed for life. His assailant, Saeed Askar, was a Basij member. Akbar Ganji, as an investigative journalist, played a crucial role in revealing the murder chains and the hands behind them. His articles about the people behind the scene of these political murders and his human rights activities resulted in his arrest several times (Ganji, 2000). He was sentenced to six years imprisonment in 2000.
To tame the reform movement, the judiciary chief, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Sharoodi appointed a young, ambitious and ruthless judge by the name of Saeed Mortazavi, as the Prosecutor of Islamic Revolutionary Courts, with a clear mission to close down reformist newspapers and imprison reformist journalists. Mortazavi, nicknamed “butcher of the press” in Iran, managed to closed down 120 pro-reform newspapers and websites and imprison several journalists including Abbas Abdi, Omid Me’marian, and Reza Alijani. His harsh treatment of political prisoners and journalists got the attention of the international media for his role in the death of Iranian-Canadian photographer, Zahra Kazemi on July 11, 2003, and the death of at least four political prisoners during the Green Movement of 2009. He was relieved from his duties as the Prosecutor of Islamic Revolutionary Court, but later was promoted to the position of Deputy Prosecutor General and even later as the Head of Iran’s Social Security Administration.
Khamenei’s anger against reformers and secular opposition has not intimidated them. After the 2009 election, pressure against reformist and secular opposition of Iran has intensified. Some reform leaders are under house arrest, some are imprisoned (Mostafa Tajzadeh and Mohsen Mirdamadi), some are excommunicated (Khatami), and many have found no choice but to leave the country, yet the reform movement is alive and strong. The presidential election of 2013 in which Khamenei’s candidate Saeed Jalili, who was a younger version of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was badly defeated by Hasan Rouhani, shows one more time that Khamenei cannot dictate the result of a relatively fair election. Jalili, who was Iran’s nuclear negotiator (2007–2013) with 5+1 (five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany), received only 11.31% of the vote despite the official and unofficial support of Khamenei, Sepah, Basij, and conservative clerics. Rouhani, a former nuclear negotiator and proponent of moderation in both domestic and foreign policy, received 50.88% of the vote; 34.39% of the vote was divided among other candidates, and 3.42% of the votes were announced to be invalid or blank. Although Rouhani, like Khatami, has to deal with the crises the conservative circles create for his government, his survival is evidence that Khamenei’s anger is not the determining factor in Iranian political process any more.
Conclusion
Anger, or more precisely political anger, plays a very important role in the political process. Success or failure of political movements to a great extent depends on how this anger is directed, the nature and reaction of the political system to which this anger is directed, as well as the social milieu in which this process takes place. The success of Satiagraha in India, the PNC in South Africa, and the Civil Rights Movement, in bringing long lasting change, is the result of their leaders’ commitment to the stated goals. Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Martin Luther King, Jr., who led the democratic anger in their country, did not have a plan to eliminate their opponents. Their aim was to institutionalize tolerance, understanding, and mutual respect in their respective societies. The problem in Iran was that Khomeini, like many revolutionary leaders of the 20th century, wanted to create a society based on authoritarian or totalitarian models of government. Worse than that, Khomeini was not honest about his plans for the future. Although he had the plan for the creation of theocracy in Iran, while in France he presented himself as representing all groups and as a disinterested individual whose only aim was to liberate his people and play the spiritual leader of the movement. The grand design that Khomeini had for Iran (the creation of a pure Islamic state) has prevented Iran from achieving political and economic development. Khamenei as the successor of Khomeini is following the same policies with devastating consequences for Iran.
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