Understanding Angry Groups

Burning for Independence: Anger, Violence, and the Evolution of the Tibetan Independence Movement

Jeannine Chandler

Getting what I do not want

And that which hinders my desire—

There my mind finds fuel for misery,

Anger springs from it and beats me down.

—Shantideva, A Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life 1

In Tibetan Buddhist doctrine, anger is a manifestation of suffering and weakness, born of ignorance regarding the state of reality. Rage poisons perceptions, creates unhappiness, and enables the abandonment of reason. The Fourteenth (and current) Dalai Lama notes that “as a destructive force there is nothing as strong as anger” (Gyatso, 1994, p. 52). Yet he also acknowledges that some anger can be positive, if one is motivated by compassion or the desire to enact positive change. Anger may thus serve as an impetus for unity or collective action, or may even be used as a demonstration of solidarity or an expression of identity, as on the political stage (Gyatso & Cutler, 1998, pp. 248–249; Tolchin & Tolchin, 2006, pp. xv, 94). Contagion, as a property of anger, has facilitated the spread of conflict and sparked change; this is particularly accurate in today’s world, in which emotion and opinion are consistently shaped and driven by the internet and social media (Tolchin & Tolchin, 2006, p. 94). Without a doubt, in the modern era, anger (positive and negative) has altered national boundaries and global politics (Tolchin & Tolchin, 2006, p. xv).

Anger propels the debate regarding the status of Tibet and the genesis of the Tibetan independence movement. Since 1950, Tibet has been occupied by the People’s Republic of China; in 1959, the Dalai Lama fled to India (where he has since lived in exile in the hill town of Dharamsala), and was eventually followed by more than 100,000 of his fellow countrymen. Led by the Dalai Lama, Tibetans in exile have sought international recognition of their plight and pushed for global intervention (especially by the West) on their behalf, guided by the Dalai Lama’s calls for non-violence. However, although Western citizens have demonstrated their support for the Tibetan cause, Western governments have yet to take up the mantle of Tibetan independence, unwilling to risk the ire of the Chinese government. More than 55 years later, many Tibetans (both in Tibet and in exile) are exasperated, frustrated by the Dalai Lama’s seemingly failed approach with regard to the issue of Tibet’s status and the increasing repression of Tibetans inside China. Over the past few decades, Tibetan youth (both in Tibet and in exile) have become radicalized, and although they express a deep respect and reverence for the Dalai Lama, they believe that time is running out for Tibet, and they must act. Tibetan anger can thus be viewed as a consequence of fear and humiliation, a sign of despair, and, to some, an acknowledgment of defeat. Martin and Susan Tolchin maintain that a sense of defeat is a fundamental element of political anger; defeat becomes anger, anger begets violence (Gyatso, 1994, p. 54). The most recent explosion of this anger is the rash of self-immolations that have plagued Tibetans since 2009. The act of self-immolation for Tibetans is simultaneously an expression of anger and a gesture of defeat, with the primary goal being the continued radicalization and unification of Tibetans in a quest to win back their homeland. A Tibetan writer named Gudup posted the following message on his page on a Chinese social networking site prior to his self-immolation on October 4, 2012. He noted that “in order to let the world know about the real situation in Tibet, we have to radicalize our peaceful action, voice out Tibetan independence by lighting up our bodies” (Lam, 2012). In this plea, the imagery of bodies on fire demonstrates the dramatic evolution of Tibetan anger regarding the occupation of their native land.

The historical relationship between Tibet and China is complex, spanning several hundred years.2 In the 600s, as China experienced its Golden Age of Buddhism and cosmopolitanism during the Tang Dynasty (618–907), Tibet became unified and emerged as a strong kingdom along China’s western boundary. The two powers formalized their relationship through the signing of treaties and engaging in diplomatic marriages, and in this way interacted as equals. The introduction of Buddhism into Tibet from India during this period was perceived as a threat to the indigenous Tibetan folk religion of Bön, and subsequent political intrigues and assassinations resulted in the repression of Buddhism and the disintegration of the Tibetan kingdom, lasting for two centuries. The 11th century witnessed a revival of Buddhism in Tibet and the creation of strong, politically influential religious sects that would ultimately solidify into the four principal schools of Tibetan Buddhism (Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakya, and Gelug) (Goldstein, 1997, pp. 1–2).

After the fall of the Tang Dynasty, Sino-Tibetan relations would be nearly nonexistent until the 13th century, when the rise of the Mongols drastically changed the landscape of much of Asia and Europe. The Mongols did not invade Tibet, as the Tibetans submitted to the conquerors and began to pay tribute to the Mongol leader, Genghis Khan. The Chinese resisted the Mongols’ attempts at subjugation until the late 1200s, when they were ultimately forced to capitulate, and Khubilai Khan (Genghis Khan’s grandson) founded the Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368), coopting the structure and components of previous Chinese dynasties and ruling as Great Khan over the immense Mongol empire from his seat in China. Melvyn Goldstein notes that “contemporary Chinese scholars and officials consider this the period when Tibet first became part of China,” although pro-independence Tibetans argue in contrast that Tibet and China were both conquered by the Mongols, and “incorporated into a Mongol empire centered in China” (Goldstein, 1997, p. 4). The Tibetans and Mongols ultimately entered into a “priest-patron” relationship in which the Tibetan lama, or teacher, would provide religious instruction, and the khan, or ruler, would afford political support to the lama and his religious sect. In this way, the Mongols would play a crucial role in Tibetan history, as the Mongols bestowed the title of Dalai Lama³ on the leader of the Gelug school in the late 1600s; successive Dalai Lamas would be recognized in their youth as reincarnations of Chenrezig, a bodhisattva (a deity who delays his/her own enlightenment in order to help all beings end the suffering of the cycle of life, death, and rebirth) who embodies compassion. With Mongol backing, the Gelug sect would reach political prominence in Tibet, and the institution of the Dalai Lama would provide spiritual and temporal leadership for millions of Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhists. Most importantly, Buddhism would comprise the core of the Tibetan identity (Goldstein, 1997, pp. 2–10).

In the early 1600s, Chinese sovereignty, which had been restored after the fall of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty with the success of the ethnically Chinese Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), was threatened once again by the ascendancy of an emerging semi-nomadic, non-Chinese group known as the Manchus. The Manchus, who conquered the Ming and founded the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), initially entered into a cordial relationship with the Dalai Lama; however, in the Qing quest to subdue the remaining Mongol tribes, the Manchus began to perceive the Tibetans, whose religious sects were aligned with different Mongol tribes, as potentially dangerous. A combination of Buddhist sectarianism, weak Dalai Lamas, competing Mongol tribes, and Manchu political calculations resulted in the subjugation of Tibet to the Qing Empire in the early 1700s. The Qing would not rule Tibet directly, however; instead, they stationed two Manchu imperial officials (known as ambans) in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa. For the most part, the ambans exerted little direct control over Tibet, which was ruled by powerful regents in the absence of strong Dalai Lamas, in a period stretching from the mid-1700s through the late 1800s (Goldstein, 1997, pp. 10–21).

The mid-1800s witnessed the beginnings of China’s declining power during its “century of humiliation,” as the modern age of imperialism brought the Qing Dynasty into conflict with the West. As a result, the Qing’s grasp on its border lands faded. In Tibet in the late 1800s, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama was enthroned. Strong and progressive, he increasingly made decisions regarding Tibet’s affairs without consulting the ambans, and thus Qing control continued to wane. This status quo was disrupted in the early 20th century as Tibet’s strategic value as a buffer area in Central Asia made it a pawn in the Great Game among imperialist Western nations. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama’s independence, in combination with the Qing Dynasty’s incapacity to save itself from inevitable collapse, resulted in Tibet’s ability to negotiate its own treaties with outside powers (actions that pro-independence Tibetans and scholars interpret as indications of Tibetan sovereignty). As the last dynasty of China ended in 1911, nationalistic Chinese emphasized the need to reunify the motherland and counter foreign threats (tasks at which the Qing Manchus had failed) (Goldstein, 1997, pp. 21–29).

As both China and Tibet entered the 20th century, each country was wary of the other, and looking to protect itself from outside threats through modernization.4 The Thirteenth Dalai Lama attempted to institute social reforms and create a strong military; however, he faced resistance from the feudal aristocracy and monastic elites, and ultimately was forced to rescind his policies. In China, the Nationalist Party (under Chiang Kaishek) and the Communist Party (under Mao Zedong) emerged as China’s strongest candidates for leadership of the country. As China was entrenched in civil war (1928–1949), as well as the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), Tibet fostered its de facto independence without Chinese interference. However, as China reached a peak of nationalism, Tibet continued to adhere to feudal policies, and was further weakened by the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1933. The Fourteenth Dalai Lama was not officially recognized and enthroned until 1939, at the age of four. Tibet was thus shocked and unprepared when Mao’s army invaded Tibet in 1950, with the intent of “liberating” Tibetans from their feudal oppression under the Dalai Lama’s theocracy. Tibetans were unable to counter the large modern Chinese army and, in 1951, Tibetan government delegates were forced to sign the Seventeen Point Agreement, which (to the Chinese) solidified Tibet’s status as part of China. During the 1950s, as the Dalai Lama reached the age of majority, China pushed for socialist reforms in Tibet, which exacerbated conflict between the Chinese and Tibetans. In 1959, rebellion erupted, and the young Dalai Lama fled to India and founded his government-in-exile. China cracked down on Tibetan resistance to its policies, continued to reform Tibetan society and politics, and tightened its control over all Tibetan regions (Goldstein, 1997, pp. 30–60). In 1965, the Chinese government created the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), a designation similar to a Chinese province.

The Chinese government’s insistence that Tibet has always been a part of China, in comparison with the exile government’s argument that Tibet has historically been independent, demonstrates that the two groups have fundamentally divergent understandings of history, and have been unable to reach an agreement on the most basic elements of this issue. For example, since the late 1980s, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile have urged the Chinese government to consider granting Tibetans political “autonomy,” potentially similar in status to the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau. However, the two sides have been unable to reach a decision on a definition of “autonomy.” The two governments cannot even reach an agreement on the definition of “Tibet.” For the Chinese, it is solely the TAR; for the Tibetan exile community, it is the region commonly referred to as Greater Tibet, a designation that includes not only the TAR, but also the traditional Tibetan regions of Kham and Amdo (parts of which are currently located in the Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan) (Johnson, 2011, p. 89).

Contemporary Tibetan anger is primarily fueled by the continued occupation of Tibet and the treatment of ethnic Tibetans within China’s borders. Tibetans in exile argue that Tibetans in China lack rights and freedoms and, like other minorities in China’s frontier areas, they are condemned by Han (ethnic) Chinese (who comprise more than 90% of China’s population) and repressed by Chinese authorities. Human rights organizations report that Tibetans are frequently abused, arrested, and imprisoned for alleged political crimes. According to Amalendu Misra, “… with less than 1 per cent of the total population, Tibet contributes more political prisoners than the rest of China’s provinces combined” (Misra, 2000, p. 82). Many of those abused and imprisoned are monks and nuns, leaders of the Tibetan Buddhist monastic establishment. Tibetans (in exile and in Tibet) have frequently noted that the communist government has placed restrictions on Tibetan religious practices, as well as drastically reduced the admissible number of ordained monastics. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when the “Four Olds” campaign targeted for destruction “old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas,” minority ethnic groups and religions endured the brunt of the Red Guard attacks. Monasteries were torn down, religious relics were damaged, and monks and nuns were beaten, tortured, and killed (Ardley, 2002, p. 9). Furthermore, the Dalai Lama, who, for most Tibetans, is revered and adored as an enlightened being, has long been demonized and attacked in official Chinese propaganda. These denunciation drives spiked in the early 1990s, as the Chinese government attempted to counter his rising popularity and visibility in the Western media (Barnett, 2014, p. xxxii). This new campaign attacked him personally (casting doubt on his religious credentials) and accused him, in Chinese communist parlance, of leading the “Dalai clique,” being a “splittist” (attempting to split Tibet from the Chinese motherland), and inciting unrest among Tibetans. Tibetan monks, nuns, and laypeople, especially those subject to political reeducation, are told they must denounce the Dalai Lama, they are forbidden from displaying his image, and they must endure his continued absence from their homeland (Human Rights Watch: China, 1997, pp. xx–xxi). Liu Xiaobo, Chinese political prisoner and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, wrote that “denying a devout citizen the right to meet his spiritual leader for more than 40 years is like depriving Tibet of its core values. To accuse and defame the Dalai Lama is like taking a knife and cutting out the Tibetan people’s heart” (Woeser, 2010).

In addition to religious persecution, Tibetans (in exile and in Tibet) maintain that Tibetan culture (closely intertwined with Tibetan Buddhism) has been targeted for elimination. Chinese language is the primary language of instruction in Tibetan schools; Tibetan children are forced to celebrate traditional Chinese holidays and are restricted in their celebrations of Tibetan culture (many of which are religious in context). According to some Tibetans, these shackles on their cultural expression have negatively impacted the lives of the families, and they see the Chinese government as responsible for their disappearing way of life. A 53-year-old nomadic herder fumed, “After I die, my sons and grandsons will remember. They will hate the government” (Johnson, 2011, p. 29). Aiding in this cultural destruction, Tibetan exiles argue, is the government’s “Developing West” campaign that encourages Han Chinese migration to Tibet via economic incentives. Tibetan architecture, art, and culture are being eclipsed by the Chinese cultural influences that have been brought in by an overwhelming influx of Han workers. The Dalai Lama has referred to the government’s actions as “cultural genocide” (“Dalai Lama accuses China,” 2008). Scholars have also noted that Chinese racism toward minority groups (referred to more specifically as “Han Chauvinism”) has resulted in the stereotyping, mythmaking, and denigration of Tibetans and their culture. Tibetans are perceived by ethnic Chinese as lazy, incompetent, and superstitious, as well as dangerous (Tuttle, 2015). One report notes that the 2008 protests (during which Tibetans attacked Han businesses) “intensified the views among many Han Chinese that minority groups in the nation’s west, including the Tibetans, are ‘remote and backward barbarians’ ” (Johnson, 2011, p. 96).

An additional impact of the Chinese government’s policies in Tibet (along with the more recent unchecked Han migration) has been the uneven economic development between the TAR and the rest of China, as well as within Tibet between the Han Chinese and Tibetans. Tsering Woeser sardonically refers to this phenomenon as “economic imperialism with Chinese characteristics.” State money has done little to benefit the Tibetans in the TAR. Han Chinese, accustomed to a capitalist system, are able to outperform Tibetans in the marketplace; even many of the traditional “Tibetan handicrafts” are now made by ethnic Chinese (Woeser & Wang, 2014, pp. 19–20). Relatedly, this unrestrained economic development has had a detrimental impact on the delicate environment of the Tibetan plateau, sometimes referred to as “the world’s most fragile ecosystem.” In 2006, the Qinghai-Tibet railway was completed, facilitating the Chinese government’s ability to exploit Tibet’s natural resources, including wildlife, forests, minerals, lakes, and rivers. Tibetans lament also the unrestrained tourism (from Han and foreigners) that has not only damaged the environment, but has also polluted sacred spaces. In 2012, the local government and media announced that Yamdrok Lake, where high lamas traditionally retreat to pray, chant, and receive signs regarding the locations of potential holy reincarnations, would be the site of boat tours and pleasure cruises, which sparked outrage and protests from pious locals and environmental activists (Liu, 2012).

It is important to distinguish among the many entities that impact this discussion of Tibet’s status and have therefore played a role in scaffolding, challenging, directing, and mollifying Tibetan anger. Since the 1950s, the Chinese government has not wavered in its rhetoric to unite the races of China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and in this way, views Tibetan actions against the state as treasonous. The state further resents the interference of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan exile community, and the sympathetic West in what they see as a domestic affair, pertinent to the integrity of the Chinese polity. The state has focused on blaming the Dalai Lama and the exile community for the unrest, and counters any protests with severe punishments and repression. Using official pronouncements and propaganda, the Party casts aspersions on the Dalai Lama, accusing him and outside elements of provoking the turmoil in order to re-establish his Buddhist theocracy. By painting the Dalai Lama as a splittist, the government is able to stoke the fires of Han nationalism, in support of the state’s actions, while at the same time avoiding any discussion of the root of Tibetan anger (Johnson, 2011, p. 18). The Chinese state is thus perceived by Tibetans (and the sympathetic international community) as the epitome of the traditionally oppressive Communist power and as such, is ultimately the source of and target for Tibetan rage over the occupation of Tibet. As for Chinese citizens, in country and overseas, regardless of their perceptions of the Chinese government, most will find common ground on the issues of Tibet and Taiwan, especially in this era of heightened Chinese nationalism. After the unrest in minority areas in 2008–2009, many Chinese “otherwise critical of the government, underwent unprecedented mobilization around Chinese national identity” (Anand, 2009, p. 30).

It is difficult to overstate the significance of the Dalai Lama to contemporary Tibetans, as the perception of him as sacred, symbolic, and divine is embedded and internalized in the Tibetan mindset. In the West, the Dalai Lama is often incorrectly referred to as a “god,” “priest,” or “Pope” of Tibetan Buddhism. However, whereas the Pope is a representative of the deity (God), the Dalai Lama is rather regarded as a manifestation of the deity (Chenrezig) (Goldstein, 1968, p. 161). Tibetans have traditionally perceived him as being not only a bodhisattva, but also a protector of (Tibetan) Buddhism, Tibetan people, and Tibet itself. In discourse, the Tibetan cause, Tibetan Buddhism, the Dalai Lama, and Tibet are often explicitly or implicitly equated with one another. The idea of the Dalai Lama as Tibet has been a prevalent idea since he entered exile in 1959. Scholar Robert Barnett argues that within the exile government, the Tibetan community, and the international media, “the representation of Tibet” has been the Dalai Lama (Barnett, 2001, p. 299). As this involves seeing the exile community in India and abroad as “Tibet,” this theory implies that where the Dalai Lama is, so is Tibet. The Dalai Lama himself has said that “Tibet is not just about being an independent country. It is about a valuable belief system that is being destroyed by China. So when you support what I have to say you also support the belief system and therefore Tibet” (the Dalai Lama, quoted in Chhaya, 2007, p. 243).

Winner of the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize and the 2007 Congressional Gold Medal, the Dalai Lama has become an international spokesperson for Buddhism, ethics, and human rights. He has consistently adhered to a “peace philosophy,” informed by his Buddhist belief, Gandhian non-violence, a sense of realpolitik, and an abiding concern for the welfare of Tibetans (Puri, 2002, p. 3501). He cautions fellow Tibetans to cultivate patience in order to counteract any anger they feel toward the Chinese:

To be patient means not to get angry with those who harm us and instead to have compassion for them. That is not to say we should let them do what they like. We Tibetans, for example, have undergone great difficulties at the hands of others. But if we get angry with them, we can only be the losers. This is why we are practicing patience. But we are not going to let injustice and oppression go unnoticed. (Gyatso, 1994, p. 74)

In facing injustice and oppression, the Dalai Lama contends that one should not allow anger to grow into violence, as violence only begets more violence. Regarding the plight of Tibetans vis-à-vis China, he claims that “in our case, violence is more or less suicidal. It is not at all practical” (Shiromany, 1998, p. 251). In light of that realization, the Dalai Lama’s recommendation is to engage in nonviolent forms of protest in order to continually publicize the Tibet issue to the world. “Therefore, I feel that the Tibetan people should show their resentment to the Chinese because the Chinese never seem to accept the problem that exists in Tibet. Expressions such as prayers, hunger-strikes, demonstrations without violence are all meaningful” (Shiromany, 1998, p. 252). Despite his advice to Tibetans, many of them view his nonviolent approach as having failed, and their anger has prompted some to conclude that “his message of peace has divided the exiled Tibetan community” (Puri, 2002, p. 3500).

In contrast to the successful non-violent strategies of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., the Dalai Lama’s policies have not resulted in a victory for Tibetans. Perhaps his lack of success is due to the nature of his opponent; whereas Gandhi and King were up against democratic regimes with a certain regard for international opinion, the Dalai Lama has been forced to engage an aloof, often despotic, Chinese communist regime. On the other hand, the Dalai Lama’s critics, such as Jamyang Norbu, have contended that the success of Gandhi’s non-violence was found in its aggressive and confrontational approach. Norbu has provocatively argued that the Dalai Lama’s non-violent strategy has failed because he does not “comprehend the nature of modern politics” and he lacks “an understanding of totalitarian regimes.” He criticizes the Dalai Lama’s non-violent policy as inaction, claiming that non-violence “cannot be an excuse for not doing anything” (Norbu, 2008).

However, despite the criticisms, what the Dalai Lama has accomplished with his “message of peace” is the acquisition of enough “soft power” in the global forum to challenge China’s overwhelming military might. John Whalen-Bridge claims that the Dalai Lama is able to simultaneously play both victor and victim on the world stage, a dual role that “multiplies the dramatic effect” of his propagation of the Tibetan cause and, in so doing, he has been able to wield “power-in-defeat” (Whalen-Bridge, 2013, p. 181). His inability to achieve autonomy or independence for Tibetans can be perceived as a “performance of failure,” an act in which “a successful performance” is determined not by his ability to gain concessions from the Chinese at the negotiating table, but rather by his effectiveness in retaining international sympathy (Whalen-Bridge, 2013, p. 181).

The Western world thus comprises the audience for the theater of political protest showcasing Tibetan anger. In theory, the West functions as “hypothetical fair arbitrator,” passing judgment on the Tibet issue (Schwartz, 1994, p. 21). Ronald Schwartz, a visitor to Tibet during the 1989 protests, observed that “Tibetans were grateful for the presence of Western witnesses. Their presence brought international attention to the situation in Tibet” (Schwartz, 1994, p. 38). It is noteworthy, however, that the West seems far from unbiased on this issue, given its rocky relationship with China, and the tendency for Westerners (particularly Americans) to see themselves as global arbiters of democracy and justice. Furthermore, since the late 1980s, Tibetans have been able to appeal to the West on these principled grounds, highlighting transgressions of human rights (thereby attracting Western liberals) (“Studying Tibet Today,” 2014). Western political ideals, such as democracy and freedom, are portrayed in Tibetan exile discourse as compatible with Tibetan nationalism and the independence movement, and Westerners are regarded as allies in a quest for independence (Schwartz, 1994, p. 92). The Chinese, in contrast, base their argument on Chinese nationalism and historical absolutes, a position supported by the Chinese public yet seen as provocative by Tibetans and their allies in the West (“Studying Tibet Today,” 2014). In recent years, as the West’s relationship with China becomes closer and more economically complex, the Tibet issue has become an increasingly awkward situation: the proverbial elephant in the room. The Chinese government harangues the West (in particular the United States) for feting the Dalai Lama and seemingly condoning what the Chinese perceive to be seditious activities. The Tibetan cause continues to compete for the support of Western governments and media, and meanwhile faces threats from heightened Chinese nationalism and economic dominance, which has been shown to be the West’s primary concern (Anand, 2009, p. 30). As one journalist noted, “it is clear that there is no appetite in the West to risk relations with China because of Tibet” (Abraham, 2008, p. 9).

Various communities in Tibet, in exile, and in the West, have made concerted efforts to bring attention to the Tibetan independence issue, gain international support for the cause, and apply pressure to the Chinese government in order to effect change. At the beginning of the occupation, during the 1950s, many Tibetans, particularly those in the regions of Kham and Amdo, engaged in active resistance against the Chinese. In this early Cold War era, as part of the American attempts to thwart the spread of Communism around the world, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began to nurture and train Tibetan freedom fighters in order to counter the Chinese occupation. In 1958, the volunteer military force known as Chushi Gangdruk (“Four Rivers, Six Ranges,” the traditional name for the eastern Tibetan regions of Amdo and Kham) was formed, comprising Amdowa and Khampa resistance leaders. Over the next few years, the CIA trained nearly 300 Tibetan guerrillas at Camp Hale in Colorado, later reintroducing them into Tibet to fight against the Chinese; the freedom fighters, however, had little success in halting the occupation (Knaus, 1999, pp. 142–146). Lhasa-area Tibetans rose up against Chinese troops in Lhasa in March 1959, sparked by the rumor that the Chinese planned to kidnap the Dalai Lama. In the chaos, the 24-year-old Dalai Lama fled through the snow and mountains, protected by Khampa guerrilla fighters, ultimately arriving in India. The CIA program in Tibet was ultimately phased out in the 1960s, and discontinued all together by the time of President Nixon’s rapprochement with China in the early 1970s. It was during this time that Tibet’s status ceased to be of concern to the American government (Goldstein, 1997, pp. 49–58).

In the late 1960s, throughout China, people endured the chaos and violence of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Mao began this movement in order to eliminate his opposition in the Communist Party and to galvanize the populace through revolutionary fervor. As a result, authority, tradition, religion, and history were attacked in regions across China, especially in Tibet, where these aspects seemingly coalesced in the age-old feudal theocracy of Tibetan Buddhism. As noted above, monasteries were destroyed, monks and nuns were beaten and humiliated, and religious relics were damaged or disappeared completely. China attempted to heal itself in the late 1970s and early 1980s through the policies of Deng Xiaoping, who initiated the Reform Era responsible for China’s spectacular economic growth. Initially, these reforms also included a more relaxed atmosphere for cultural and intellectual expression. In Tibet, this involved fewer restrictions on cultural and religious behaviors, as well as the spontaneous rebuilding of monasteries destroyed by the Cultural Revolution (Schwartz, 1994, p. 59). An unintended consequence of this period of tolerance was the growth of Tibetan nationalism as Tibetans participated in the revival of their culture and religion. While the Chinese government seemingly had planned to co-opt the performance and symbols of this revitalization of Tibetan religion in order to exert more control over the region, for the Tibetans, the mere assertion and practice of their religion and culture (as different from the Han) became their means of protesting China’s actions in Tibet (Schwartz, 1994, p. 1). This has led to the blurring of the line between religious actions and political actions; as Ronald Schwartz states, “political protest has come to be framed in religious idioms” (Schwartz, 1994, p. 22). The ethnic repression and political repression combined has resulted in a dramatic level of resistance to the Chinese state’s attempts to stabilize and extend their authority over the Tibetan regions (Whalen-Bridge, 2013, pp. 169–170). Tibetan identity is dictated and reaffirmed by the performance of cultural and religious behaviors, such as the celebratory throwing of tsampa flour, engaging in monastic debates, displaying the picture of the Dalai Lama, and flying the Tibetan national flag. These activities have been variously politicized and criminalized by the Chinese government, which sees these actions as conspicuous and threatening attempts to assert an identity separate from the Chinese state (Schwartz, 1994, pp. 111–112). “Tibetanness” is thus defined by the performance of these cultural and religious rituals, which thereby unify (to borrow from Benedict Anderson) an “imagined community” of Tibetans, including those in the diaspora and in China (Anderson, 1991). Tibetan activist Tsering Woeser wryly notes the connection between identity creation and political protest: “Perhaps we should thank our authoritarian government for its devious ways to publicize Tibetan tradition and history. Thanks to Beijing’s efforts to snuff out our cultural practices, even more Tibetans, especially the younger generation, are taking them to heart” (Woeser & Wang, 2014, p. 66).

The pro-independence demonstrations and riots of the late 1980s in Tibetan areas were in reaction to the continued repression from the Chinese government. At this time, the Chinese state was dealing with political unrest in its Han areas as well, as pro-democracy activists in Beijing and other major cities engaged in widespread protests, demanding intellectual freedoms and an end to government corruption (the demonstrations were ultimately ended when the Chinese military crushed the movement, culminating in the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 1989). In Tibetan areas, the protests grew in intensity and violence between 1987 and 1989, leading up to the 30th anniversary of the Tibetan Uprising of March 1959. From 1987 to 1993, there were nearly 200 protests by Tibetans against Chinese rule (Barnett, 2014, p. xxxii). Schwartz (1994) claims that, between 1987 and 1992, there were 140 demonstrations by Tibetans against the Chinese government. Almost all of the demonstrations occurred in Lhasa and were carried out by young monks and nuns. Interestingly, these young Tibetans had grown up in Tibet under a more liberal Chinese regime; however, as Schwartz states, they “still found reasons to challenge Chinese rule in Tibet” (Schwartz, 1994, p. 3). Many were frustrated with government interference in monasteries; others demanded the release of political prisoners or called for independence. Hundreds were arrested and unknown numbers were killed (Schwartz, 1994, pp. 1, 87). In January 1989, a letter from independence activist Lobsang Tenzin to fellow university students was smuggled out of prison. In the letter, he explained why he took part in the protests in March 1988: “I have tried to contain the fire of anger burning freely inside my body. But this time, though I knew the Chinese would arrest me, I needed to express the strong feelings I have had for many years” (Schwartz, 1994, p. 147). Indeed, the frustration that prompted the Tibetan protests of the late 1980s can be perceived as the merger of despair and anger.

The role of Buddhist monastics in these demonstrations piques the curiosity of Westerners, who have been saddled with the Orientalist trope of the Asian religious man as reasonable, calm, and profound. The Dalai Lama is certainly the personification of this trope; since he also represents Tibet and Tibetans, the land and its people have been stereotyped as peace-loving and content, thus the myth of Shangri-la. Contrary to Western perceptions, the Tibetan monastic community has long been associated with activism and unrest, even violence. Tibetan monasteries are traditionally known as hubs of dissent and conflict, particularly in consideration of the history of sectarianism and even warfare between (and within) the schools of Tibetan Buddhism (Chandler, 2009, pp. 40–57). In pre-occupation Tibet, the dob-dobs, or “fighting monks,” were known for their aggressive behavior; they wielded weapons, engaged in combat, and served as bodyguards for the monasteries (Goldstein, 1989, pp. 25–26). Tsering Woeser claims that Tibetan monks, free of the worldly constraints of modern society, are commonly characterized as fearless resistors, and have historically provided leadership for uprisings (Woeser & Wang, 2014, p. 34). Schwartz (1994) contends that “it has been the best scholars among the young monks who have been the most active in politics” (p. 71). As Tibetans continue to fear the loss of their religious and cultural heritage, “the monasteries have come to signify Tibetan nationhood and survival, and thus have become the principal background for Tibetan resistance to the Chinese state” (Schwartz, 1994, p. 17).

In a recent analysis, John Whalen-Bridge refers to the phenomenon of monastic resistance as “Angry Monk Syndrome” (AMS). He argues that the monks’ effectiveness is derived from their performance of anger in a context of political protest. Since (Buddhist) monastics are perceived as being beyond worldly emotions such as attachment and anger, an image of a monk seemingly unable to control his emotions is a paradox for the audience (in this case, the international media). Whalen-Bridge (2013) contends that the imagined weakness of the monks is the source of their “soft power” (pp. 164–165). Just as the Dalai Lama finds success in defeat with his “performance of failure” (see above), the monks’ “honorable powerlessness” manifests in their angry protests, which are effective as long as they continue to appear as victims (Whalen-Bridge, 2013, pp. 169–170).

In the run-up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008, Tibetan monastics again seized the opportunity to draw attention to the Tibetan cause. For the Han Chinese, hosting the Olympics was a badge of honor, celebrating their arrival on the world stage. Increasing Han nationalism brought with it more unrest and anti-Chinese sentiments in ethnic areas like Tibet (Barnett, 2014, p. xxxiii). As a consequence, and in order to create stability, the Chinese government increased their repressive actions across the Tibetan areas, amplifying patriotic education in monasteries and forcing monastics to denounce the Dalai Lama in writing (Demick, 2011). Coinciding with the observation of Tibetan Uprising Day (commemorating the anniversary of the uprising of March 10, 1959), several monks (in particular, those from the three main Gelug monasteries of Drepung, Sera, and Ganden), staged protests against the government in early March. Their grievances included socio-economic inequalities, the Dalai Lama’s continued exile, increased political repression, and the detainment of political prisoners (Johnson, 2011, p. 92). The protests became violent as demonstrators destroyed Han Chinese businesses and attacked Han residents. The riots spread outside of the TAR into Tibetan areas of Chinese provinces, and, along with the police response, resulted in dozens of deaths, hundreds of wounded, and potentially thousands of arrests. The Chinese blamed the “Dalai clique” for the unrest, yet still suffered a black eye from the negative publicity just months before the Olympics. Tim Johnson maintains that the 2008 unrest in Tibet “marked the biggest and most widespread ethnic upheaval to challenge the ruling party since it came to power, surpassed only by the Uighur riots more than a year later.” Between mid-March and early June, there were 125 documented protest incidents (Johnson, 2011, p. 93). From his seat in exile, the Dalai Lama cautioned against the escalating violence. However, as discussed below, the increasing repression by the Chinese government in combination with the radicalization of young Tibetans demonstrates that the Dalai Lama’s exhortations to adhere to a path of nonviolence are falling on deaf ears.

Since arriving in India in 1959, the Dalai Lama, along with the Tibetan government-in-exile, has worked tirelessly to keep the Tibetan issue in the international press. He has received a great deal of sympathy and assistance from individuals and organizations in the West. The spread of the Tibetan diaspora, including the exodus of high lamas, resulted in Tibetan Buddhism’s diffusion around the world. The combination of an exotic religion with the appeal of a human rights issue attracted many Americans to both Buddhism and the Tibetan cause, which were often conflated. Many individuals in Hollywood (including Richard Gere, Sharon Stone, Goldie Hawn, and the late Adam Yauch of the Beastie Boys) have used their fame to publicize the Tibet issue and garner support for their cause. In the late 1980s, Gere, along with composer Philip Glass and Robert Thurman (former ordained Buddhist monk, personal friend of the Dalai Lama, professor of Indo-Tibetan Studies at Columbia University, and perhaps most famously, father of actress Uma Thurman) founded the Tibet House at the request of the Dalai Lama to help protect Tibet’s endangered cultural and religious heritage (“Tibet House,” n.d.). The late 1990s witnessed a flurry of books and films that furthered the discussion in the West about the Dalai Lama, Tibetan Buddhism, and the occupation of Tibet. Organizations such as Students for a Free Tibet (based in New York City) attracted Western youth with Tibetan Freedom Concerts and held protests in front of U.S. governmental agencies and Chinese embassies; their efforts to agitate for Tibetan independence have included disrupting the 2008 Olympic torch relay (Students for a Free Tibet, n.d.). Despite condemnation from Beijing, the Dalai Lama has been able to meet with the most recent four American presidents (George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama); over the course of several years, his visits with the U.S. presidents have become less covert (“U.S. Presidential Statements on meetings with the Dalai Lama, 1991–2014,” n.d.). However, in spite of this outpouring of support from individuals and organizations in the West for the Dalai Lama and his cause, Western governments have for the most part been unwilling to firmly and publicly stand with the Dalai Lama out of fear of provoking China (Wong, 2008).

The lack of strong public endorsement from Western nations and prospects of continued violence in Tibet have prompted the Dalai Lama to change tactics over the course of his tenure in exile. Although the Dalai Lama and his administration initially advocated for Tibetan independence, he changed his approach in the late 1970s. Beginning in 1979, in response to seemingly encouraging words regarding Tibet’s status from China’s new reform leader Deng Xiaoping, the exile leader began to endorse what he described as the Middle Way approach (Ume Lam, or MWA). This policy was so named in reference to the historical Buddha’s epiphany concerning the path to enlightenment (sometimes referred to as the Middle Way). The Buddha’s view was that in order to achieve Nirvana, one must lead a life of moderation, avoiding the two extremes of indulgence and self-denial. With regard to the Tibet situation, the new strategy of the Dalai Lama involved promoting a solution of autonomy as the “middle way” between complete independence (favored by most Tibetans) and incorporation into the People’s Republic of China. In the 1980s, China hosted several Tibetan delegations and engaged in negotiations with the Chinese government, although little was accomplished and relations between the two entities continued to deteriorate. In 1987, in a speech to the U.S. Congress, the Dalai Lama elucidated a Five Point Peace Plan, which included the “transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace” and recognition of Tibetan human rights within China (Gyatso, 1987). He reiterated these remarks in 1988 during an address to the European Parliament, which became known as the Strasbourg Proposal. In this speech, which occurred in the midst of the late 1980s unrest in Tibet, the Dalai Lama elaborated on the Five Points and urged acceptance of the Middle Way approach in order to obtain authentic autonomy for Tibetans in China. He admitted that, for those Tibetans who still backed the goal of independence (Rangzen), many would be disappointed by his conciliatory and moderate position (Gyatso, 1988). Indeed, the absence of a resolution for the Tibet question has fueled Tibetan anger regarding what some perceive as the “utter failure” of the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way approach (Chhaya, 2007).

Supporters of Rangzen are most often young Tibetans. The Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) has been vocal in criticizing the Middle Way approach and the political policies of the Dalai Lama. Founded in 1970 with the blessings of the Dalai Lama, the group currently claims 30,000 members around the world. Called the “largest pro-independence group in exile,” the TYC contends that its members are “united in our common struggle for the restoration of complete independence for the whole of Tibet” (“Largest Tibetan pro-independence group,” 2012). Jamyang Norbu (1990) (TYC co-founder, former guerrilla fighter, and prolific activist/ blogger) refers to the organization as the “loyal opposition to the government.” And while they do not support the Middle Way, they still respect the Dalai Lama as a leader (Chhaya, 2007, p. 277). TYC followers pledge to “to struggle for the total independence of Tibet even at the cost of one’s life” (“Tibetan Youth Congress,” n.d.). According to Schwartz, the TYC “sometimes advocates violence and sabotage directed at the Chinese.…” (Schwartz, 1994, p. 7). Kalsang Godrupka Phuntsok, former TYC president, has promoted “targeted victimless violence,” which includes blowing up bridges and railroads in order to wound China economically (Pocha, 2003). Needless to say, the TYC is hated and feared by the Chinese government. Beijing has accused the TYC of openly advocating terrorism against Chinese inside Tibet and has claimed that the TYC “does not have much difference with Al Qaeda and Chechen terrorists” (Puri, 2008). Although the radicalism and violent tendencies of Tibetan youth are generally condemned by the government-in-exile and proponents of the Middle Way, the Dalai Lama states that he empathizes with them and can appreciate their frustration. “The younger Tibetans in and outside Tibet are less patient and some of the younger Tibetans outside Tibet criticize me for being too mild. Of course that is understandable. They are very patriotic and have little patience. They want things immediately” (Shiromany, 1998, p. 251).

This quotation highlights the sentiments behind the recent self-immolations by Tibetans protesting China’s actions in Tibet. Some of the victims were seemingly driven to set themselves on fire by feelings of disappointment with the ineffectiveness of the Middle Way approach. One young man related prior to his suicide that “he saw no option but to inflict violence on himself to make a point about how frustrated young Tibetans were becoming that the Tibet question was not getting resolved fast enough” (Chhaya, 2007, pp. 276–277). It is therefore important to note that these events were not necessarily carried out to effect change. Rather, they should be perceived as performances of anger and defeat.

Videos of their immolations and letters they left behind have illuminated the reasons why some people resorted to such extreme measures. Some victims renewed the call for independence; others expressed fears for the future of Tibetan culture, religion, and language (Barnett, 2014, p. xxxv). Some expressed a desire for the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. Still others wanted to demonstrate ethnic and political solidarity, and some sought solely to translate into action the regret and sadness they felt on behalf of Tibetan people (Butler, 2014, p. 10). Thus, the impact of the series of immolations has been amplified with the use of modern technology. Several of the immolations have been filmed, photographed, and posted on the Internet; Tibetans have showed their support by sharing pictures and sentiments on blogs, Facebook, and Twitter. Again, contagion plays a role as new links, re-tweets, and re-posts provide tangible evidence of the spread of frustration, indignation, and empathy (Butler, 2014). As Jamyang Norbu (2015) imparts: “… we’ve all seen the blurry cellphone videos of the self-immolations in Tibet, that have filled us with concern, sadness, but most of all, admiration for the courage and resolve of those giving up their lives for our freedom.”

Between 1998 and 2010, self-immolations were rare among Tibetans (Demick, 2011). Self-immolation as a Tibetan protest movement emerged in 2011 when, according to John Whalen-Bridge, Tibetans lost their temporary soft power they had collected in the run-up to the Olympics (Whalen-Bridge, 2013, pp. 186–187). As of June 1, 2015, 147 Tibetans have lit themselves on fire in protest, and most have died (Tibetan National Congress, 2015). Most of these immolations have occurred not in the TAR, but in Greater Tibet, primarily in Sichuan. At first confined to monks and nuns (indeed, many of those who self-immolated had been kicked out of monasteries for protesting), the epidemic gradually spread to young laypeople (Barnett, 2014, pp. xxxiv–xxxv; Demick, 2011). Epidemic appears to be the right word; contagion is not only a property of anger but also of suicide, both of which form the basis for the recent immolations. Woeser claims that “after every immolation, emotions stir and arguments rage to no avail” (Woeser & Wang, 2014, p. 17). People are then galvanized to act, and to show solidarity. Dibyesh Anand also contends that there is a “copycat dimension” to these suicides, in the form of competition. “If I immolate myself, my friends are under pressure to do the same to show they are just as patriotic” (Demick, 2011).

The Chinese response has been to accelerate the crackdown by placing further restrictions on Tibetan monastics, with more arrests and increased violence. Predictably, the government has blamed the Dalai Lama for the recent immolations, referring to the Dalai Lama’s alleged “support” for immolators as “terrorism in disguise” (Branigan, 2011). The Chinese government’s fear may be appropriate; some analysts have compared the Tibetan suicides with that of Tunisian fruit-seller Mohamed Bouazizi, whose immolation sparked the Arab Spring (Demick, 2011). A “Beijing Spring” could potentially bring down the Chinese communist regime.

In the press, the Dalai Lama has acknowledged that he is in a difficult position in relation to the self-immolations, as he has neither definitely condoned them nor condemned them. Calling the immolations a “very, very delicate political issue,” he admitted that “now, the reality is that if I say something positive, then the Chinese immediately blame me. If I say something negative, then the family members of those people feel very sad. They sacrificed their own life. It is not easy. So I do not want to create some kind of impression that this is wrong” (Branigan, 2012). Ultimately, the dramatic deaths confirm increasing Tibetan desperation and discontent. In December of 2012, Dr. Lobsang Sangay, leader of the Tibetan government-in-exile, declared that the spate of self-immolations constituted “a new threshold of Tibetan despair and resentment” (“Statement of Sikyong Dr. Lobsang Sangay,” 2012). Ultimately, contemporary Tibetan anger has assimilated earlier waves of frustration and has catalyzed the radicalization of the independence movement, taking it from its roots in hope to its current state of disillusionment. In the diaspora, anger has manifested in more vocal support for political leaders whose opinions on Tibetan-Chinese relations are in opposition to those of the Dalai Lama and his exile government, a trend that was not visible decades ago. Tracing this historical evolution of Tibetan anger illustrates the increasing desperation and extremism among Tibetan activists and offers a means of predicting the course of the Tibetan issue.

As the immolations continue, however, it is difficult to calculate the future for Tibetans. Two major factors will ultimately change the trajectory of the issue. The first is that of increasing youth radicalization, in exile and in Tibet. Young Tibetans are exasperated; many claim they don’t want to engage in violence but they feel they are out of options (Chhaya, 2007, p. 281). Exile youth are in a particularly frustrating situation. They lack citizenship and stability; they are rootless and stateless. Facing restrictions on work and travel, they are enflamed by events happening in Tibet, “a land that most of them have never known” (Johnson, 2011, pp. 104–105). As noted above, and as evidenced by the spike in violence since the late 1980s, the youth in Tibet, especially the monastics, have been galvanized to oppose China’s continued attempts to tighten its control over the Tibetan regions. Of the 147 immolations, 24 of the victims were under the age of 18. Kirti Monastery in Sichuan has been a center for the monastic unrest; 41 of the 147 immolations have occurred in the Ngaba region, home to Kirti Monastery. Of the Ngaba deaths, 24 were monks or former monks from the monastery (International Campaign for Tibet, 2015). Regarding the discontent among young Tibetans, one young Tibetan explained that “they are very angry at the Chinese government and the Chinese people. But they have no idea what to do” (Johnson, 2011, p. 29). Although they may not know what to do, most feel that the time to act is now. According to Lhasa Tsering, the former head of the TYC, “we are going to be wiped out in another thirty years. It is now or never, do or die” (Johnson, 2011, pp. 112–113). In their anger, some have not ruled out guerrilla warfare or terrorist activities (Burke, 2008, p. 83). A young doctor named Tashi Dorje clearly stated: “If you can blow up a railroad track, it means more than a protest” (Johnson, 2011, p. 105). A controversial independent film titled “We’re No Monks” tells the story of four disaffected young Tibetan exiles who are engaged in a violent crusade for Tibet’s freedom. Fulbright scholar Pema Dhondup, who directed the film, claims his work plays a role in dissolving the myth of Shangri-la. He maintains that “there are very ordinary Tibetans who get angry, have ordinary vices. If tomorrow they take to violence as a means to express themselves, please do not be surprised” (Biswas, 2004).

The second factor that will change the course of the Tibet issue is the inevitable death of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama (on July 6, 2015, he celebrated his 80th birthday). His death will not only impact the future of Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet, but will also dramatically alter the Chinese government’s Tibet policy. The current strategy of the Chinese leadership appears to be to bide their time in consideration of the Dalai Lama’s advancing age (Wong, 2008). Upon his death, the Chinese government will control the search for the highest incarnation in Tibetan Buddhism. Once they have found a suitable candidate, he will be raised under strict government tutelage. From the government’s perspective, their control over the Fifteenth Dalai Lama will, by extension, afford them greater control over the Tibetan populace, both in the TAR and in outlying Chinese provinces.

However, the likely scenario is that China’s involvement in the search and recognition of the next Dalai Lama will be viewed as intrusive and manipulative by most Tibetans around the world. The Tibetan government-in-exile, along with the Tibetan Buddhist religious leadership, will conduct their own quest to find the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. Once dueling lamas have been enthroned, the Chinese government’s candidate will be perceived as illegitimate, this perception fueled by the current Dalai Lama’s insistence that his successor will not reincarnate in occupied Tibet. Following custom, the Fifteenth Dalai Lama will be guided by a regent in his minority until he is able to assume his spiritual responsibilities. During this time, Tibetans will lack a strong Dalai Lama to serve as a rallying point and unifying force. Divisions and tensions among Tibetans will be exacerbated in the absence of the current Dalai Lama’s abilities to mollify and pacify the Tibetan diaspora and devoted Tibetans in the TAR.

While the Chinese government has worked tirelessly over several decades to undermine and delegitimize the efforts of the Dalai Lama to bring attention to the issue of Tibet’s status and to the plight of the Tibetans, the Dalai Lama’s exhortations to adhere to a path of non-violence have mitigated the anger of Tibetans in Tibet and in exile. Ironically, the Dalai Lama may be China’s best chance of maintaining order in the Tibetan region. Tenzin Choden, Tibetan activist and member of the Tibetan parliament-in-exile, contends that “if the Dalai Lama is not there, that moral authority is not there to guide Tibetan people; then you can certainly predict that people will do desperate things” (Johnson, 2011, p. 147). Tempa Tsering, the Dalai Lama’s brother-in-law and former official in the exile government, asserts that the Dalai Lama is the solution, not the problem, in China’s Tibet crisis. “It is His Holiness’s uncompromising insistence on nonviolence and pacifism and his stature to ensure that it remains so that has stopped Tibet from going out of control. I don’t think the Chinese recognize that fact at all and they should” (Chhaya, 2007, p. 299).

As a symbol of hope and unity, he is perhaps uniquely qualified to quell the tide of frustration and discontent among Tibetans around the world, as numerous scholars have pointed out. Orville Schell (as quoted in Strober & Strober, 2005, p. 271) states:

Nobody will ever be able to replace him because he represents continuity with that past—the last time when Tibet was separated, isolated, and culturally and religiously whole.… I don’t really know what the alternative to him is; I don’t think there is one. It could be very bad for Tibet because if something happens there, there would be no one to calm it down.

Tsering Woeser similarly notes that the Dalai Lama’s death may also serve as a spark to the flames of violent protest. She maintains that Tibetan grief over his passing will manifest in an outpouring of anger and sorrow, a volatile situation in which “hope becomes despair, hatred overcomes fear, and bereavement fans fanaticism.” According to Woeser, at that time, “Tibetans will not need to coordinate or be organized; they will all rise up spontaneously” (Woeser & Wang, 2014, p. 10). His death “will send out the call to arms for Tibetans,” presenting the Chinese government with a situation for which they will be ill-prepared (Johnson, 2011, p. 97). Radicalized Tibetans will not be afraid to die for the Tibetan cause. After all, she reflects, “If you are not afraid of setting yourself on fire, what else can scare you?” (Woeser & Wang, 2014, p. 18).

Notes

1. As quoted in Gyatso (1994, p. 54).

2. The best introduction to the complex historical background of this dispute over Tibet’s status is Goldstein (1997).

3. Dalai means “ocean” in Mongolian. Combined with the Tibetan term, lama, the title can be variously translated as “ocean of wisdom” or “oceanic teacher,” a spiritual teacher whose wisdom and compassion is as vast as the ocean.

4. An excellent resource for early 20th century Tibetan history, including the vagaries of Sino-Tibetan relations, is Goldstein (1989).

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