Attributions to Prejudice: Collective Anger and Action
Stuart S. Miller, Amanda L. Martens, and Donald A. Saucier
Throughout human history, groups have been oppressed, marginalized, stigmatized, and forced to bear the chains of lower status. Societies have allowed, and continue to allow, status hierarchies to deem some groups less worthy than others, and to treat them accordingly. It is only when the members of society recognize the discrimination that faces lower-status groups that their collective anger and action may work to combat the status hierarchies that oppress those groups. In the United States, the recognition of the oppression that has faced racial minority groups has prompted members of both racial majority and minority groups to reform society over the last two hundred years, such as by abolishing slavery and establishing civil rights that had been previously withheld. Humanity has made great strides in terms of social justice when the recognition of prejudice has inspired collective anger and action. But the work is not over.
Through the years, several incidents involving the commission of violence by White police officers against Black men (e.g., Amadou Diallo, Michael Brown, Rodney King, and Walter Scott) have aroused controversy. For instance, in 2014, Michael Brown was unarmed when he was shot and killed by police officer Darren Wilson, leading many to blame the killing on racism. Many individuals attributed events such as these to factors having nothing to do with race, or even attributed the violence to the targets’ inappropriate behavior (e.g., Darren Wilson claimed that his life was threatened by Michael Brown’s behavior). Others have attributed these events to racism, and their consequent anger has produced a variety of collective actions (e.g., Black Lives Matter). The shooting of Philando Castile, in the St. Paul suburb of Falcon Heights, Minnesota, in 2016 more recently demonstrates the collective anger and action that such events inspire when police violence is attributed to racism. The different attributions people make in reaction to these events may be explained by a combination of factors associated with perceiving group-based injustices. These factors include individuals’ general beliefs about the prevalence of racial prejudice that relate to their propensities to make attributions to prejudice, their social identities, and their politically motivated views about the legitimacy of existing social hierarchies. We assert that these individual difference variables help explain both the perceptions of events involving interracial aggression as well as the collective anger and action these events inspire.
Because people derive a sense of identity from the social groups to which they belong (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), feelings of anger are likely to result when individuals believe that they have been mistreated because of their group membership, or when they believe that others in their social group have been mistreated. Discrimination and other acts that violate principles of justice and fairness based on prejudicial attitudes and stereotypical beliefs are a chronic source of mistreatment, especially for lower-power, lower-status social groups, such as women and racial minorities. In this chapter, we discuss the psychological factors that increase or decrease individuals’ tendencies to attribute prejudice as the cause of others’ transgressions against one’s social group, how perceptions of injustice attributed to racism and sexism create a sense of collective anger, and how collective anger may translate into collective action aimed at addressing these injustices. Because perceiving injustice toward one’s social group is considered to be the initial factor for eliciting the feelings of anger and indignation that lead to collective action, we begin this chapter with a discussion of the factors that influence individuals’ attributions to prejudice.
Factors Influencing Attributions to Prejudice
Whether or not a perceived transgression is indeed racist or sexist depends on the internal motivations of the transgressor. But because current social norms condemn expressions of prejudice against many different oppressed social groups (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002), the motivation behind the behavior is likely to be masked or otherwise justified in terms of non-prejudicial motivations (Dovidio, 2001). This masking of one’s true intentions creates attributional ambiguity, leaving room for subjective interpretation. Thus, individuals’ judgments about whether prejudice has been expressed are influenced by a variety of psychological factors related to the characteristics of the individual perceivers. Accordingly, individuals often differ in terms of whether or not they believe that racism is a factor in events such as the shooting of Michael Brown or believe that sexism is a legitimate explanation for why women typically earn less money than men do for equal work. Consequently, individuals are likely to experience varying levels of anger about the poor treatment and lower status of social groups at the bottom of the social hierarchy.
Theories of attribution, motivated cognition, and racial prejudice help explain why individuals arrive at different conclusions about the causes of these perceived injustices. In this section, we describe how individuals’ tendencies to make attributions to prejudice (i.e., tendencies to see prejudice as the cause of other’s behaviors), and contrary tendencies to discount prejudice as an explanation, are influenced by psychological factors such as collective identities (and their related motivations) and general beliefs about expressions of prejudice. Researchers have examined the attributional processes and eliciting circumstances from the point of view of individuals belonging to groups that are chronically targeted by prejudice and discrimination (e.g., Blacks), as well as the point of view of individuals belonging to groups that are the prototypical perpetrators of prejudice (e.g., Whites). Much of the focus of this work has been on how individual differences in beliefs and expectations related to expressions of prejudice, individuals’ social identities, and their ideological belief systems or worldviews function to inhibit or reinforce attributions to prejudice and discrimination.
Expectations
Perhaps the most proximal factor influencing targets’ judgments of prejudice is their expectations to be mistreated because of their membership in a stigmatized social group. This is a concept Pinel (1999) termed stigma consciousness. Much of the work on stigma consciousness has focused on women as a stigmatized, lower-power social group (e.g., Pinel, 2002; Pinel & Paulin, 2005; Pinel, Warner, & Chua, 2005; Wang, Stroebe, & Dovidio, 2012). Women’s expectations to be treated stereotypically have been shown to predict quicker reaction times in perceiving facial expressions of male contempt (Inzlicht, Kaiser, & Major, 2008) and attentional vigilance toward subliminal cues related to sexism (i.e., sexist words presented at preconscious speed) (Kaiser, Vick, & Major, 2006). These findings demonstrate that, for women, the expectation to be treated prejudicially is related to heightened sensitivity to indicators of prejudice.
Attributing one’s negative outcomes (e.g., social rejection, being passed over for a promotion) to the prejudice of others may be self-protective. In cases where the achievement of some desired goal (e.g., obtaining employment or a promotion) depends on the judgment of another individual (e.g., an employer), making an external attribution for the failure to reach that goal may reduce self-blame, reduce negative self-directed emotions, and protect self-esteem. Several studies have found that when individuals who identify with a group that is chronically targeted by prejudice and discrimination (e.g., women, Blacks) attribute a negative evaluation to the prejudice of the evaluator, their self-evaluations are more positive than those of individuals who do not attribute their outcomes to prejudice (e.g., Major, Kaiser, & McCoy, 2003; Major, Kaiser, O’Brien, & McCoy, 2007; Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003). Presumably, when one makes an attribution to prejudice in these situations, the negative emotions that might otherwise be directed inward are experienced as anger and resentment toward a perceived transgressor. Thus, a general tendency to make attributions to prejudice is thought to be an adaptive response that protects a positive self-image for individuals belonging to stigmatized groups (Wang et al., 2012).
The cognitive process by which tendencies to make attributions are thought to operate can be illuminated by applying foundational theories of perception. Signal detection theory (SDT) describes a process by which perceiving the presence or absence of a signal is a function of individuals’ thresholds for detecting the signal under conditions of uncertainty. These thresholds are theorized to represent decisional or judgmental criteria, such that the presence of a stimulus or attribute is perceived once the signal is stronger than the threshold and not perceived when the signal is weaker than the threshold. According to SDT, the extent to which individuals directly experience being targeted by prejudice and discrimination, and/or their beliefs about the extent to which their social group is targeted by prejudice, affects their thresholds for perceiving prejudice toward oneself or one’s group. Different thresholds for detecting prejudice may express themselves in individuals’ accuracy for detecting the presence or absence of prejudice, or in their response bias toward or away from tendencies to make attributions to prejudice (Barrett & Swim, 1998).
According to the SDT perspective, more frequent experiences of prejudice, or knowledge of the extent of historical expressions of prejudice (Nelson, Adams, & Salter, 2013), are hypothesized to affect individuals’ thresholds for detecting prejudice given the presence or absence of various cues for prejudice (e.g., the actors’ intent to racially discriminate, or perceived harm done to the target) (Swim, Scott, Sechrist, Campbell, & Stangor, 2003) that may or may not be present in a given situation. For example, individuals who expect others to act according to their prejudices, and individuals who are more vigilant in attending to potential signals of prejudice, may have lower thresholds for detecting prejudice. They may consequently be more likely to interpret others’ behaviors as expressions of prejudice. Alternatively, individuals who think that prejudice is uncommon and who rarely think about it or look for it may have a higher threshold for detecting prejudice, and thus be less likely to see prejudice when it is expressed. In other words, differences in individuals’ beliefs and expectations related to expressions of prejudice may work to set different thresholds for detecting prejudice.
To test the hypothesis that individuals’ prior beliefs and expectations related to expressions of prejudice would predict their actual attributions to prejudice, Miller and Saucier (in press) designed a measure of individual differences in observers’ tendencies to make attributions to prejudice: the Propensity to Make Attributions to Prejudice Scale (PMAPS). As an extension of the measure of stigma consciousness that measures targets’ expectations to be treated stereotypically (Pinel, 1999), the PMAPS items are worded to measure third-party observers’ attitudes. This allows researchers to measure the attitudes of members of social groups who are chronically targeted by prejudice (e.g., racial minorities, women), as well as the attitudes of members of social groups who are prototypically the perpetrators of discrimination (e.g., Whites, males). The PMAPS expands upon existing measures of expectations for prejudicial treatment by measuring additional, theoretically related constructs. Specifically, the PMAPS was designed to measure four related dimensions of general tendencies to make attributions to prejudice. These were conceptualized as: (a) expectation, or perceptions of the pervasiveness of prejudice (i.e., beliefs about the base-rates for prejudice); (b) vigilance in spotting instances of prejudice; (c) trivialization of targets’ claims and concerns about being treated prejudicially (which would be inversely related to greater tendencies to make attribution to prejudice); and (d) self-efficacy, or self-confidence in recognizing instances of prejudice. In combination, these constructs were hypothesized to underlie individuals’ tendencies to make attributions to prejudice.
Initial research on propensities to make attributions to prejudice (Miller & Saucier, in press) demonstrated that these tendencies predict perceptions of racism even when it is blatantly expressed. That is, even when instances of racism are obvious (e.g., voicing a racial slur), there is variability in recognizing it as such. These results suggest that tendencies to not make attributions to prejudice may be a factor in whether or not prejudice is perceived, even when the prejudice is blatant and presumably difficult to ignore. In one study, the authors manipulated the level of ambiguity such that participants read one of three sets of scenarios that differed in terms of the ambiguity in which prejudice was expressed. The low-ambiguity, non-prejudice scenarios all contained a race-neutral explanation for the actors’ behaviors (e.g., A White driver flips off a Black driver for driving dangerously in traffic). In other words, the scenarios in the non-prejudice condition described the actor’s behavior as being motivated by situational factors that had nothing to do with the target’s race (e.g., in the example above, the White driver may be responding to the Black driver’s behavior, not race). In the ambiguous prejudice condition, no explanations were given for the actor’s behavior (e.g., A White sales associate keeps a close eye on a Black customer). In the blatant prejudice condition, the scenarios described a more obvious expression of prejudice (e.g., A White individual shouts, “Go back to Mexico,” at a group of Hispanics at a civil rights protest). Observers’ tendencies to make attributions to prejudice predicted perceptions of prejudice across all three levels of ambiguity. These findings are consistent with theories of perception that emphasize how attributional ambiguity leaves room for top-down processing of information in ways that are consistent with existing beliefs and expectations. These findings suggest that tendencies to make attributions to prejudice may be related to the discounting of alternative, non-prejudice explanations when prejudice is ambiguously expressed. Furthermore, these data support the conclusion that tendencies to not make attributions to prejudice or to deny prejudice as an explanation may influence perceptions even when prejudice is more overtly and obviously expressed. Thus, even when prejudice and discrimination are clearly present, some individuals may be less willing to recognize or admit to this fact.
In summary, existing research supports the conclusion that general expectations and beliefs about expressions of prejudice are related to different thresholds for making attributions to prejudice. One social psychological factor that may help explain why individuals differ in their tendencies to make or not make attributions to prejudice, and the level of anger and indignation they experience from attributing prejudice to personal or group mistreatment, is the extent to which individuals derive a sense of identity from belonging to a particular social group.
Social Identities
According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), individuals may vary in terms of how much personal meaning they derive from their social group memberships, and to what degree their group-level identities shape their cognitive interpretations of the social world. One interesting prediction made by this theory is that the increased importance of individuals’ social groups to their self-concept increases the likelihood that social interactions with outgroup members will be interpreted through the lens of their group identities. Stronger group identification is thought to increase the tendencies for stigmatized individuals to attribute others’ ambiguously prejudiced behaviors to group-level causes (e.g., being a member of a stigmatized social group), rather than to individual-level causes (e.g., their own idiosyncratic behaviors). Consistent with this reasoning, research shows that members of oppressed groups report higher tendencies to make attributions to prejudice than do members of higher-status groups (Miller & Saucier, in press). Additionally, individuals who more strongly identify with a stigmatized group are more likely to perceive that they have been the target of group-based discrimination. Major and colleagues (2003) found that, after receiving negative feedback, women who more strongly identified with their gender group (i.e., for whom being a woman was a more important element of their social identity) were more likely to attribute the negative feedback to sexism. Similar studies have found that racial minorities who more highly identify with their racial group are more likely to interpret subtle, or ambiguous, prejudice cues (e.g., avoiding eye contact) as expressions of prejudice (Operario & Fiske, 2001), as well as being more likely to believe that they have been the target of prejudice and discrimination in the past (Eccleston & Major, 2006; Sellers & Shelton, 2003).
Despite the notion that members of lower-status groups who claim discrimination are motivated to protect favorable group identities and self-concepts, and that members of higher-status groups are similarly motivated to deny responsibility for discrimination, basic human needs for social acceptance and belongingness (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995) may heighten or minimize attributions to prejudice depending on the group membership of the perceiver and the social group from which one seeks social approval. Self-concerns may sometimes lead individuals of chronically oppressed groups to not perceive prejudice when it is expressed, and members of powerful groups may denounce expressions of prejudice for selfish reasons. For example, racial minorities who either explicitly or implicitly believe that acceptance by the higher-status racial majority is an important part of achieving upward social mobility may be less likely to experience and express anger and outrage over highly publicized sources of racial tension related to discrimination. Because confronting prejudice is typically an act of moral condemnation toward transgressors and their social groups, and as is likely to be perceived as antagonistic (Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006), members of lower-status groups may fear social reprisal from members of higher-status groups (Kaiser & Miller, 2001). Thus, this desire for acceptance along with the social fears of confronting prejudice may function to minimize perceptions that they have been the target of prejudice and discrimination (Carvallo & Pelham, 2006).
Conversely, whereas members of lower-status groups may discount prejudice as an explanation for potentially prejudicial behaviors in order to gain acceptance from, and entrance into, higher-status groups, members of higher-status groups may be motivated by impression management concerns to denounce prejudice and discrimination against oppressed groups. Research on interracial interactions demonstrates that members of groups who are perceived to be the primary perpetrators of group-based discrimination (e.g., Whites, men) may attempt to overcome the stereotypes of prejudice attributed to their group (e.g., as the “White racist” or the “male sexist”; Goff, Steele, & Davies, 2008). In voicing statements condemning prejudice toward oppressed groups, such as by denouncing sexist statements or historical representations of racism such as slavery, individuals who harbor prejudices may believe that they are distancing themselves from being perceived as sexist or racist (e.g., Monin & Miller, 2001). Furthermore, individuals who are more deeply and intrinsically concerned about ridding themselves of their own racist thoughts and behaviors because it is important to their self-concept (e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998) may be more likely to make attributions of prejudice to others in order to condemn such behavior. Prior research has found that general tendencies to make attributions to prejudice are related to such internal motivations to suppress prejudice (Miller & Saucier, in press).
Impression management concerns may also function to increase tendencies to label other social groups, or individuals belonging to these groups, as prejudiced. For example, people may use attributions to prejudice as a form of moral condemnation that serves to convey the impression that oneself or one’s social group is morally superior to other individuals or social groups (e.g., liberals who claim that conservatives are more likely to be racist). Although this hypothesis that claiming other groups are more prejudiced than one’s own has not been directly tested, such self-serving expressions of moral condemnation may be motivated by a desire to build coalitions with other social groups (see Webster, Saucier, & Parks, 2011). For example, Democrats who attempt to win over the “Black vote” or who paint Republicans as sexist may be motivated by desires to build the party base. In a political climate where social groups compete for legitimacy, support, and power, understanding the motivations behind labeling one’s adversaries as racist or sexist may be ripe for further empirical research.
Collectively, research and theory on how identity and self-presentational concerns are related to judgments about prejudice demonstrate that individuals may be motivated to make attributions to prejudice, or alternatively, to make attributions to non-prejudiced causes, depending on the social concerns of the perceiver to identify or affiliate with a particular social group or to portray a positive self-image to oneself or others. In addition to general expectations and beliefs associated with propensities to make attributions to prejudice discussed in the previous section and the motivations related to social identities discussed in this section, an understanding of perceptions of prejudice can be further illuminated by the examination of how a variety of different ideological beliefs work to increase or decrease tendencies to make attributions to prejudice.
Ideological Beliefs
People tend to hold strong beliefs that play an integral role in how they interpret and understand their social world. Individuals’ ideological and foundational beliefs about how individuals attain high social status and about reasons for why socially constructed groups are hierarchically organized in terms of their social statuses, resources, and power may be particularly strong sources of influence on beliefs about the extent to which prejudice is a prevalent social issue that needs to be addressed. Social psychologists have given particular attention to how individuals’ endorsements of meritocratic worldviews affect their general beliefs about prejudice and their attributions to prejudice in different contexts. Meritocratic worldviews involve beliefs that people are individually responsible for their own successes or failures and that people are rewarded or punished by others based on decisions that are just and fair. According to meritocratic worldviews, social status is primarily attributed to the merit of individuals’ self-determined choices and at the same time, external or environmental explanations are often underappreciated or unrecognized (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Lerner, 1980). Thus, when confronted with the existence of race- or gender-based social and economic inequalities, individuals who more strongly endorse meritocratic worldviews are thought to justify existing social hierarchies by attributing blame and negative stereotypes to lower-status groups, rather than by acknowledging the problems of prejudice and discrimination.
From the perspective of an individual belonging to a lower-status, stigmatized social group, more strongly endorsing meritocratic worldviews may function to make individuals less likely to believe that they have been targets of discrimination and prejudice. Believing that one has been treated unfairly is discordant with beliefs that the world is meritocratic, just, and fair, and may additionally make individuals pessimistic about their chances for upward social mobility. To avoid the discomfort associated with this dissonance, individuals who believe that the attainment of social status is meritocratically determined may minimize the extent to which they perceive discrimination and prejudice directed at themselves or their social group. Indeed, multiple studies have found that more strongly endorsing meritocratic worldviews may lead chronic targets of discrimination to fail to perceive instances of discrimination because it threatens their belief in meritocracy (Kaiser, 2006; Kaiser et al., 2006; Kaiser & Major, 2006; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002) and lowers their self-esteem (Major et al., 2007). At the group level, we speculate that aggregated levels of the extent to which different groups believe that social status is awarded meritocratically may at least partially explain group-level differences in perceptions of injustice related to prejudice and discrimination as well as in experienced levels of anger that they feel in response to these injustices.
From the perspective of higher-status groups, research by Miller and Saucier (in press) suggests that beliefs related to higher levels of racial prejudice, and ideologies that function to justify existing social hierarchies, are associated with higher-status group members’ tendencies to not make attributions to prejudice. For example, lower tendencies to make attributions to prejudice as measured by the Propensity to Make Attributions to Prejudice Scale (PMAPS, described previously) were related to higher levels of modern racism (i.e., harboring beliefs that racial prejudice and discrimination are no longer a problem, and expressing antipathy toward Blacks because of their social activism; McConahay, 1986). Additionally, lower tendencies to make attributions to prejudice were found to be associated with higher levels of social dominance orientation (i.e., preference for social hierarchy; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), and right-wing authoritarianism (i.e., preference for cultural homogeneity and fear of stereotypically threatening groups; Altemeyer, 1988)—two worldviews that function to justify prejudice toward lower-status groups and that function to justify existing power structures that favor Whites (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; McFarland, 2010). Consistent with findings that targets’ system-justifying ideologies are associated with whether or not they make attributions to prejudice and discrimination, observers’ lower tendencies to make attributions to prejudice appear to also be related to system-justifying beliefs and the denial that racial prejudice is a social justice problem. Thus, individuals who tend not to make attributions to prejudice are presumably much less likely to become angry about prejudice because they fail to recognize it; in fact, because of their motivations to protect the existing social hierarchy, they may be more likely to become angry when lower-status groups claim discrimination (see Saucier, Webster, O’Dea, & Miller, this volume).
In contrast to third-party observers who tend not to make attributions to prejudice, observers who have greater tendencies to make attributions to prejudice when considering the reasons behind the poor treatment of lower-status groups may be more likely to experience anger. Research by Miller and Saucier (in press) reports evidence that tendencies to make attributions to prejudice are associated with dispositional empathy and perspective taking, suggesting that greater tendencies to make attributions to prejudice may be related to higher levels of empathy for the targets of racial prejudice and discrimination. Higher levels of dispositional empathic concern, combined with greater tendencies to make attributions to prejudice, might additionally create feelings of anger in individuals as they witness the anger expressed by groups who claim to be the targets of prejudice and discrimination. Additionally, findings by Miller and Saucier (in press) suggests that observers’ greater tendencies to make attributions to prejudice are associated with stronger support for humanitarian and egalitarian beliefs, and personal commitments to be free of one’s racial biases. This is compelling evidence that tendencies to make attributions to prejudice are positively related to a constellation of dispositions related to beliefs that prejudice is wrong and that discrimination based on socially constructed categories is unjust. How and when these psychological patterns of beliefs and attributions in higher-status groups translate into the experience and expression of anger is ripe for further empirical investigation.
Discrimination and oppressive practices still permeate society, and often manifest in forms that are less blatantly obvious. Individual tendencies to perceive prejudice in society, having experiences as the target of that discrimination and oppression, and other individual difference factors influence whether or not people will recognize the plight of lower-status groups. This recognition is necessary for collective anger and action to follow with the goal of ending that discrimination and oppression. But while the discrimination and oppression may not always be recognized, it is important to consider what happens when individuals do recognize the events in the world around them as discriminatory, oppressive, and motivated by more global group-based injustice.
Collective Action against Prejudice and Discrimination
Is the future simply bleak for the members of chronically disadvantaged lower-status groups, or is there a way for groups to alter the discriminatory status quo? What researchers and scholars have found is that recognizing unfair disadvantage promotes “action emotions” such as anger (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993). Collective anger, defined as anger on behalf of the groups, in turn drives groups to collective action (e.g., Leonard, Moons, Mackie, & Smith, 2011; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Collective action occurs when an individual or a group works toward social change and justice to improve the entire group’s status (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Zomeren et al., 2008; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Collective action by an individual may seem counterintuitive; however, collective action is defined by the intention of the action to improve the group’s status, not the number of individuals engaging in the action to improve the group’s status (Brady, 1994; Klandermans, 1997). As long as an individual is participating in action for the betterment of a specific group (e.g., by voting, contributing money, signing an online petition, changing his or her Facebook profile picture to an equality sign), one is participating in collective action. Thus, at its core, collective action is the behavioral actualization of individuals’ motivations and abilities to create change for themselves and others.
Researchers and scholars have noted that collective action is a very effective way of establishing social justice (e.g., Klandermans, 1997; Wright et al., 1990) and promoting the values of the disadvantaged group (e.g., the marriage equality message that “love is love” that is promoted by efforts to support same-sex marriage rights). Indeed, this mechanism of social change has historically played a large role in challenging the status quo and furthering efforts toward equality. For example, voting rights for women were hard won by the collective action of activists in the Women’s Suffrage Movement (1848–1920). These activists engaged in collective action to further women’s rights by writing essays depicting women’s points of view, marching in the streets in solidarity, and participating in group protests (Baker, 2002). Thirty years later, collective action also played a major role in reducing racial segregation and discrimination in the United States. Individuals in the American Civil Rights Movement (1954–1968) used acts of nonviolent protests and civil disobedience to promote their message and drive social change.
Contemporary forms of collective action may also include nonviolent protests that take advantage of ever-evolving technological advances and online social networks. For example, many forms of the movements for Black Lives Matter (#blacklivesmatter) and Marriage Equality (#loveislove) mirror those of their predecessors (e.g., nonviolent protests). Individuals were able participate in these movements by signing online petitions, posting on blogs and writing articles online, sharing information on social media, or changing their Facebook profile pictures to show support for the movement. With the advances in online communications and social media, it appears that the sharing of collective anger and opportunities for collective action are on the rise.
Because collective action has the potential for major social change, scholars and researchers are particularly interested in the social and psychological factors that drive or inhibit individual participation in collective action. Within this framework, researchers have identified three key factors related to participation (or lack thereof) in collective action. First, members of the disadvantaged group must perceive their relatively lower social status as unlikely to be improved by attempts to gain entry into the higher-status group (Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenber, 1993). Second, the social structure that creates the low and high status groups must be perceived as unstable, such that there is at least some perceived probability that the status quo can be changed (e.g., Wright et al., 1990). Third, the disadvantaged group’s relatively lower social status must be perceived as unfair and illegitimate (e.g., Mummendey, Kessler, Klink & Mielke, 1999).
The recognition of unfair disadvantage and injustice, for example, by attributing the lower status of one’s social group to prejudice and discrimination, promotes collective action by arousing action-oriented emotions such as anger (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993). Feelings of anger and resentment are well-established antecedents of collective action (e.g. Leonard et al., 2011; Stürmer & Simon, 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Relative deprivation theory describes a social comparison process in which lower-status group members’ perceptions of deprivation relative to members of higher-status groups result in perceptions of injustice and feelings of anger (for a review, see Walker & Smith, 2002). According to relative deprivation theory, collective anger resulting from perceived injustices against the group drives individuals to take collective action in an attempt to rectify these perceived inequalities (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2004). It is important to note that these feelings of deprivation and anger must be on behalf of the group in order to inspire collective action. When individuals do not attribute their own disadvantage or deprivation to their group status, they may use other means that are less psychologically taxing (e.g., venting to a friend) to reduce their negative emotions (see Smith & Ortiz, 2002). Thus, only when anger is experienced as an intergroup emotion does it facilitate collective action (Smith & Ortiz, 2002; Stürmer & Simon, 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2004; Walker & Smith, 2002).
The initial psychological factor associated with collective action is perceived group-based injustice and, therefore, psychological accounts of collective action share similarities to psychological accounts of attributions to prejudice and discrimination already discussed in this chapter. For example, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), introduced earlier in this chapter as a factor that helps explain tendencies to make attributions to prejudice, has also been applied to the explanation of the psychological factors that lead to collective action (e.g., Stürmer & Simon, 2004). Researchers have repeatedly found that the more individuals identify with their disadvantaged group, the more likely they are to participate in collective action to elevate the status of their group (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Additionally, evidence also suggests that the perception that one’s social group has been targeted by discrimination reinforces a sense of collective identity and affiliation with other social groups who also experience discrimination (Craig & Richeson, 2012).
As previously mentioned, perceived injustices are associated with the experience of group-based anger (Mummendey et al., 1999; Wright et al., 1990). However, although anger and perceived injustice are related, when these factors are tested against each other, researchers have found that affective reactions (i.e., anger) are stronger predictors of collective action than are cognitive reactions (e.g., perceived injustice; for a review, see van Zomeren et al., 2008). Further, the importance of affective antecedents to collective action is demonstrated by evidence that suggests that for perceived injustice to motivate individuals to participate in collective action, members of the disadvantaged group often must harbor extremely negative feelings toward the higher-status group, frequently going as far as to vilify members of higher-status groups (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Saguy, & van Zomeren, 2014). In turn, these negative attitudes toward the higher-status group may help foster a sense of group identity that further increases participation in collective action (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).
Thus, the experience of anger plays an integral role in determining whether individuals engage in collective action. However, it may not be enough to simply experience collective anger about the prejudicial treatment or the status of one’s social group to motivate collective action. While individuals may want to challenge an oppressive status hierarchy that has aroused their collective anger through engaging in collective action, they may feel powerless to do so. Accordingly, perceived group efficacy also plays a major role in individuals’ willingness to participate in collective action (for a review, see van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). Group efficacy reflects the extent to which the members of the group feel that the goals of the group can be accomplished. A sense of group efficacy can be fostered by perceptions that the unfair social structure is unstable or malleable (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014). Further, beliefs that the out-group’s prejudices are malleable, as opposed to fixed, result in stronger collective action tendencies through increased group efficacy.
In summary, the main factors that influence collective action are perceptions and emotions of group-based injustice, social identity, and group efficacy. Meta-analytical findings have confirmed that these factors are theoretically and practically instrumental in inciting collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Of specific importance to the collective action process is the recognition of unfair or illegitimate group-based disadvantage; without this recognition, and the subsequent anger-related emotions, the motivations for collective action would not arise (van Zomeren et al., 2008). However, modern expressions of prejudice tend to be subtle, indirect, and ambiguous, or otherwise justified in terms of non-prejudiced principles that are often motivated by the desire to maintain existing social hierarchies (Dovidio, 2001; Jost et al., 2004). This masking of prejudicial intentions often makes it difficult for the perceiver to determine whether prejudice or discrimination has occurred. In other words, the very nature of modern prejudice undermines the “key catalyst” (i.e., the recognition of injustice) of participation in collective action (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009).
Furthermore, some forms of prejudice may actually be perceived positively by the disadvantaged group. For example, benevolent sexism, a form of sexism in which the gender status hierarchy is maintained by perceiving and treating women as individuals who must be protected and cherished (Glick & Fiske, 1996), has the potential to be perceived as flattering (Jackman, 1994). Therefore, instead of perceiving behaviors of benevolent sexism as patronizing, women may instead feel favorably toward those who engage in benevolent sexism. This not only undermines the key catalysts to collective action (i.e., perceptions of unfair treatment and the subsequent anger), but it also serves to undermine women’s identification with their disadvantaged group (Becker & Wright, 2011; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). This highlights the instability of the foundation of collective action. Status hierarchies must be recognized as discriminatory in order for collective anger and collective action to arise. But status hierarchies are self-maintaining, with higher-status groups wielding greater levels of political, social, and economic power. Thus, collective action is most effective when members of higher-status groups join in the efforts to demolish the inequalities within those hierarchies.
The Role of Higher-Status Groups in Collective Action
Research on collective action is extremely heterogeneous; many different approaches and methods (e.g., observation, survey, experimental) have been employed by researchers and scholars in their study of this phenomenon. One commonality is that researchers and scholars have primarily focused on collective action among the disadvantaged or lower-status groups, and on the psychological processes and emotions these group members experience (e.g., van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009; see also Crosby, 1976; Runciman, 1966; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Smith & Ortiz, 2002; Walker & Smith, 2002). However, researchers have recently widened their attention to groups in power (e.g., Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Leach, Snider, & Leach 2002; Simon & Klandermans, 2001).
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court in the United States ruled in favor of legalizing same-sex marriage nationwide. Millions of Americans’ fight for marriage equality was finally won. Notably, both members of the LGBT community and heterosexual individuals (i.e., allies) participated in behaviors that qualified as collective action (e.g., protests, demonstrations) in support of legalizing same-sex marriage. In this case, members of the higher-status group (i.e., those who could already legally marry) supported members of the lower-status group (i.e., those who could not legally marry) in their fight for marriage equality. Facebook and Twitter were flooded by individuals sharing equality signs and the #marriagequality hashtag as means of support. Accordingly, these higher-status members, in their support for marriage equality efforts, apparently worked against their own positions of privilege to extend to others the rights that they themselves enjoyed. However, not all heterosexual individuals supported this movement. In fact, some of these higher-status group members did engage in action, but did so instead to thwart the marriage equality efforts, attempting to protect the discriminatory status hierarchy by joining together to protest marriage rights for anyone other than heterosexuals. The cause of these disparate choices of higher-status individuals of whether to support or oppose marriage equality may be explained by the same initiating emotion that causes lower-status individuals to engage in collective action. Researchers have established that anger not only drives collective action by lower-status group members, but also drives collective action by members of higher-status groups; the anger, though, may inspire collective action that is intended either to raise up (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007) or keep down (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001) those in the lower-status group. Therefore, it is likely that perceived injustice and anger inspired the collective action of higher-status group members in both cases. Those who supported marriage equality likely experienced perceived injustice and anger in reaction to same-sex couples not having the right to marry (and were moved to collective action to challenge the existing status hierarchy), whereas those who opposed marriage equality likely experienced perceived injustice and anger in reaction to same-sex couples pursuing the right to marry (and were moved to collective action to preserve the existing status hierarchy).
The marriage equality struggle demonstrates that members of higher-status groups can help lower-status groups to challenge and defeat an oppressive status quo by joining in collective action behaviors. However, we would like to offer one caveat. Unfortunately, experiences that may reduce intergroup prejudice (e.g., positive contact with members of the higher-status group) may ironically work to undermine the psychological processes (e.g., group-based identities, anger, mistrust) that lead to collective anger and action to address inequalities and injustices (Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2007; Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). For example, having contact with the higher-status group may result in members of the lower-status group perceiving the higher-status group more favorably (e.g., perhaps from seeing members of the higher-status group supporting their group). Thus, this contact may weaken the perceived distinction between the lower-status and the higher-status group, and potentially undermine lower-status group members’ identification of their own group as one that is disadvantaged (Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Therefore, trying to help the lower-status group by showing support may actually hinder individuals’ motivation to participate in collective action. Interestingly, a counterpoint to this is that higher-status group members can help spread awareness, knowledge, and values through their collective actions to those it might have otherwise never reached. Subsequently, this may lead to more individuals joining the movement and acknowledging their support for the disadvantaged group. Thus, we in no way recommend that individuals refrain from participating in collective action because of the potential for hindering the movement. We instead recommend that they acknowledge their support for the disadvantaged group and help by spreading information and values of equality, but also continue to recognize the existence of inequality inherent in a social status hierarchy.
Higher-status members have great power to help or hinder the station of lower-status groups through their own collective action efforts, and with great power comes great responsibility. Higher-status members may choose to wield this power to help the lower-status group members in their pursuits of equality, or they can oppress and hinder these pursuits. Anger, a key component of collective action, not only drives members of the lower-status group to collective action, but it drives the members of the higher-status group to use their power to assist or thwart the goals of the lower-status group. And as we demonstrated earlier, the choice to help or hinder lower-status groups through collective action is likely dependent on their willingness and ability to recognize the existence of social injustice around them.
Collective anger and collective action are solutions to remedy the continued existence of social inequality, discrimination, and oppression in contemporary society. The foundations of collective anger and action lie in individuals’ willingness and ability to perceive the discrimination that serves to advance the political, social, and economic power of higher-status groups at the expense of lower-status groups. Thus, individual differences, including propensities to make attributions to prejudice, social identification with higher-status and lower-status groups, and politically motivated ideologies about status hierarchies, become important as necessary, but insufficient, factors in motivating collective anger and action. Even when social injustice is perceived, effective collective action to combat it requires that lower-status group members believe that they have the ability to win that battle. It may be that the surest path by which collective anger and action successfully bring about social change that increases fairness and justice within society is through collective efforts in which higher-status group members ally themselves with the cause. This will likely require higher-status group members to experience collective anger and engage in prosocial collective actions themselves. Until the collective anger and collective action by all members of society unite to correct the inequality of the existing social hierarchy, the work is not over.
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