To the southwest, Brig. Gen. Charles Graham’s men could see Brig. Gen. Joseph Kershaw’s South Carolina brigade stepping off on its attack from Seminary Ridge. While Kershaw’s right-most regiments (the 7th, 3rd, and 15th) approached the Wheatfield and Stony Hill, the 2nd, 8th, and 3rd South Carolina Battalion advanced farther north, more directly toward the Peach Orchard salient.
As the South Carolinians approached, the 3rd Maine and 3rd Michigan on the skirmish line pulled back beyond the Peach Orchard. Some thirty-two artillery pieces opened fire on the South Carolinians. Kershaw recalled that his men marched “majestically across the field … with the steadiness of troops on parade.” As they advanced, however, the tremendous weight of Federal artillery fire “rendered it difficult to retain the line in good order.” A soldier in the 2nd South Carolina called it “the most terrible fire to which they ever were exposed.”4
Captain Nelson Ames’ battery expended its ammunition quickly and withdrew from the Peach Orchard, replaced by Lt. Malbone Watson’s battery. It would not remain long.5
As the South Carolinians charged the enemy, a miscommunication caused the 2nd South Carolina to veer right, where its flank lay exposed to massed artillery fire. According to its commander, Col. John Doby Kennedy, the carnage was almost unspeakable. “We were in ten minutes or less, terribly butchered,” he wrote. “I saw half a dozen at a time knocked up and flung to the ground like trifles … there were familiar forms and faces with parts of their heads shot away, legs shattered, arms torn off, etc.” The battered unit’s survivors took refuge in a depression, shaken by the intensity of the flying metal that had cut its ranks into ribbons.6
Meanwhile, the troops next to the 2nd South Carolina (8th South Carolina and 3rd South Carolina Battalion), holding the left of Kershaw’s line, drove forward, pushing back the 3rd Maine and 3rd Michigan on the skirmish line. With the 2nd South Carolina turning off to the right, these two units had become isolated, which may have contributed to what happened next.
Seeing the enemy approach, Colonel Bailey of the 2nd New Hampshire sought out Graham and asked permission to charge. Graham purportedly replied, “Yes, for God’s sake, go forward!” The last thing the South Carolinians expected to see was a line of screaming Federals running at them. The tactic halted the Palmetto soldiers in their tracks. According to a man in the 2nd New Hampshire, Kershaw’s men “did what any other body of troops would have done under like circumstances—about-faced and went back as fast as they could run, for a new start.”7
With the quick (albeit temporary) repulse of Kershaw’s left wing, the Peach Orchard sector grew relatively quiet. During the brief lull, the 68th Pennsylvania crossed Wheatfield Road and took up position in the Peach Orchard facing Emmitsburg Road, its right touching Wheatfield Road. It now formed the left flank of Graham’s line along Emmitsburg Road; the 114th Pennsylvania was on the 68th’s right flank.8
The quiet did not last for long. In Pitzer’s Woods, Barksdale’s Brigade waited, aligned from left to right as follows: 18th Mississippi - 13th Mississippi - 17th Mississippi - 21st Mississippi. Their general was anxious to attack, and had been very vocal about doing so, pleading for permission to launch his brigade. His request was made first to division leader McLaws, and then to James Longstreet, the commander of the First Corps. Longstreet counseled patience. “Wait a little,” he replied, “we are all going in presently.” Barksdale brightened considerably when he finally received permission to assault the Federal positions opposite him along Emmitsburg Road. When he gave the signal, his men responded with alacrity. As one veteran put it, the Mississippians were “yelling at the top of their voices, without firing a shot, the brigade sped swiftly across the field and literally rushed the goal.”9
A soldier in the 17th Mississippi recalled the men stepped off “in perfect line” only to meet a storm of fire crossing the open fields. “They would knock great gaps in our line. Then we would fill up the gaps and move on.” Another soldier agreed. “When a solid shot tore a gap in your ranks it was instantly closed up, and the Brigade came on in almost perfect line.”10