Along Emmitsburg Road, Maj. Gen. Andrew Humphreys faced a dire situation. His division was already short-handed. Colonel George Burling’s brigade had been detached, its regiments scattered to several sectors that needed reinforcements. That left Humphreys with but two brigades, about 3,500 men, to defend the area along Emmitsburg Road north of the Peach Orchard. In addition, his units faced northwest, and three Confederate brigades were closing on him from two directions.
Two regiments of Col. William Brewster’s brigade, the 72nd and 71st New York, aligned to the right of Brig. Gen. Charles Graham’s brigade along Emmitsburg Road. Next came Brig. Gen. Joseph Carr’s brigade, deployed from left to right as follows: 11th New Jersey (on the right of the 71st New York) – 12th New Hampshire (on the right of the Klingle house) – 16th Massachusetts – 11th Massachusetts (behind the Rogers house) – 26th Pennsylvania. A detachment of 100 men from the 16th Massachusetts moved south to occupy the area around the Klingle house, flanking the 12th New Hampshire on two sides. Three regiments were on the skirmish line covering Carr’s wide front. The 1st Massachusetts was on the right, and to its south (left) were the 1st U.S. Sharpshooters of Brig. Gen. J. H. Hobart Ward’s brigade, and the 5th New Jersey of Burling’s brigade. To protect Carr’s right, which dangled in the air, the 74th New York of Brewster’s brigade moved into position behind the 26th Pennsylvania. Three batteries sporting eighteen guns also defended the area. Lieutenant Francis Seeley’s battery deployed just south of the Klingle house and John Turnbull’s battery unlimbered about 250 yards to the north between the 16th Massachusetts and 11th Massachusetts north of the Spangler farm lane and south of the Rogers house. Farther north, Lt. Gulian Weir’s six guns prepared to open fire on the enemy.1
Advancing on Humphreys’ division from Spangler’s Woods were Brig. Gen. Cadmus Wilcox’s Alabama brigade and Brig. Gen. Edward Perry’s small Florida brigade. Because General Perry had fallen ill, Col. David Lang of the 8th Florida was in command of the brigade. Wilcox’s men had already fought with units of the III Corps when it approached Pitzer’s Woods earlier that day. Prior to the arrival of James Longstreet’s First Corps, Wilcox’s infantry formed the right wing of the army. At that time the 8th and 10th Alabama faced south and its sister regiments—the 9th, 14th, and 11th Alabama—fronted east. Prior to the main attack against the Emmitsburg Road defenders, Wilcox moved his brigade north and reassembled near Perry’s (Lang’s) Floridians. Wilcox’s pre-attack deployment was from left to right as follows: 9th Alabama – 14th Alabama – 11th Alabama – 10th Alabama – 8th Alabama. The 10th Alabama formed to the right of the 11th Alabama, but since the 8th did not follow this movement, a 200-yard gap formed between it and the rest of the brigade. As a result, when the 8th Alabama finally advanced against the Federal position, it moved out independently and with unfortunate consequences.2
Colonel Lang later reported that his orders were to “throw forward a strong line of skirmishers, and advance with General Wilcox, holding all the ground the enemy yielded.” The 740 men in the three Florida regiments to the left of Wilcox’s brigade deployed from left to right as follows: 2nd Florida – 8th Florida – 5th Florida. Unlike most of the brigadiers in Lee’s army, Lang was inexperienced at brigade command.3
When Wilcox’s and Lang’s 2,500 men stepped to assault Humphreys’ line, Barksdale’s Mississippians were devastating Graham’s brigade in the Peach Orchard. Brewster could see the disaster unfolding and sent the 73rd New York south in an attempt to shore up the line. The move proved too little too late, and the New Yorkers were forced to pull back. Flush with victory, Barksdale’s men advanced up Emmitsburg Road, closing in on Humphreys’ exposed left flank while Wilcox and Lang approached from Seminary Ridge to the west.4