The 11th New Jersey opened fire on the enemy, its men firing volleys by rank, rear rank first. Soldiers from both sides fell in droves, but Barksdale’s infantry continued advancing. As the Confederates closed in, Seeley’s battery limbered up and galloped to safety. The 11th New Jersey, 120th New York, and 74th New York could no longer hold their positions and also drifted rearward.10
As the situation deteriorated, General Birney ordered Humphreys’ men to fall back to Cemetery Ridge. The order irked Humphreys, who believed he could hold the Emmitsburg Road line. But there was no chance of that, for his left flank was no longer there. One soldier recalled the order was to “change fronts to the rear,” and that it was immediately carried out. The regiments making up the right of Carr’s line insisted that they never received orders to fall back, but did so when their positions became untenable. Turnbull’s battery lost so many horses that some of the infantry had to help drag the guns and caissons to the rear.11
Confederate success created a problem when the brigades of Wilcox and Barksdale began overlapping. The former spotted the difficulty when his right flank began crowding Barksdale’s advancing left. He remedied the situation with a quick adjustment, ordering his line “to incline slightly to the left.”12
Lang’s Floridians, facing the right of Carr’s line, contributed mightily to the Federal retreat. Seeing that the Florida brigade extended far beyond their right, the 1st Massachusetts and 26th Pennsylvania attempted to wheel their line to meet this new threat. Lang reported that his men “opened a galling fire upon them, thickly strewing the ground with their killed and wounded. This threw them into confusion, when we charged them, with a yell, and they broke and fled in confusion into the woods and breastworks beyond, leaving four or five cannon in my front.” These guns were from Turnbull’s battery. The right side of Carr’s line had no choice but to pull back to safety, which the men performed in a relatively orderly fashion.13
With Barksdale’s Brigade pushing them from the south, and Wilcox’s from the west, Carr’s regiments on the left of his line also relinquished their positions along Emmitsburg Road. Most of the Federal units still had enough fight in them to turn periodically and face the enemy. Much of that was because of Humphreys. The general was everywhere during the retreat, inspiring his soldiers with orders to halt periodically and fire into the enemy that followed relentlessly in their wake. After firing several volleys in this manner, the men continued their retreat.14
The victorious Confederates continued pressing the Federals, but their ranks were by now in much disarray. In particular, the 10th and 11th Alabama regiments were thoroughly mixed. One officer noted that the regiments were in “marked confusion, mixed up indiscriminately, officers apart from their men, men apart from their officers, but all pushing forward notwithstanding.” Separated from the rest of Wilcox’s Brigade, the 8th Alabama had informally attached itself to Barksdale’s Brigade. When the men spotted the flags of their comrades to the left, the regiment undertook a “half-wheel” maneuver and rapidly closed the distance.15
Humphreys’ division lost more than forty percent of its men during this fairly brief action. Although circumstances beyond his control dropped the division in an untenable position, many of the enlisted men blamed Humphreys for their defeat. Confederate losses are difficult to ascertain because Wilcox’s Brigade was engaged later that evening and, together with Lang’s Floridians, attacked Cemetery Ridge again on the afternoon of July 3.16
The tactical situation facing the Federals was now critical. Major General Dan Sickles’ entire III Corps and Brig. Gen. John Caldwell’s division of the II Corps had been shattered and driven from their positions. Three Confederate brigades had pierced the left center of the Union line and were vigorously moving to press their advantage. Cemetery Ridge rose invitingly before them.